VIRGINIA J. HUNTER

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To Rodger

On Rigor in Science

. . . In that Empire, the Art of Cartography reached such Perfection that the map of one Province alone took up the whole of a City, and the map of the empire, the whole of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps did not satisfy and the Colleges of Cartographers set up a Map of the Empire which had the size of the Empire itself and coincided with it point by point. Less Addicted to the Study of Cartography, Succeeding Generations understood that this Widespread Map was Useless and not without Impiety they abandoned it to the Inclemencies of the Sun and of the Winters. In the deserts of the West some mangled Ruins of the Map lasted on, inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in the whole Country there are no other relics of the Disciplines of Geography.

J. L. Borges

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PREFACE

MORE THAN one critic, in commenting on the manuscript of the present work, noted some special quality to the concluding chapter. For there, suddenly, was an array of ideas, welcome to be sure, but unsuspected, ideas to which, nonetheless, the preceding chapters had been leading. Tone, style, whatever it includes, I myself attribute the perceived quality chiefly to intellectual development undergone in the years of writing this work. For in truth, when I began my researches into Herodotus and Thucydides in the spring of 1976, I had no idea that Braudel or Foucault would afford me the formulations required to set the two historians in a new perspective, and thereby to make those researches fully fruitful.

The writing of *Past and Process* was not continuous, but fell into three distinct periods. I completed my preliminary researches and wrote three of its six chapters during 1976-1977, when I was on sabbatical leave from York University. At that time I was the holder of a Canada Council Leave Fellowship, for which I am most grateful. Thanks to the Canada Council, I acquired the excellent assistance of Mark Golden, hitherto a personal friend and at that time a graduate student at the University of Toronto. Work with Mark was always a joy, for he has the kind of effervescence and good humor which are contagious. Together we read and summarized a whole mountain of articles and books, the number of which is in no wise represented by the select bibliography that accompanies this study. Here I should like to thank Mark for reading my early chapters and for encouraging me to continue at a point in 1977 when the bibliography seemed overwhelming.

Anyone who has returned to teaching with half a manuscript must experience feelings, in turn, of relief and distress. In actual fact, the time with students, when the manuscript

lies concealed in a file cabinet—if that time be suitably attenuated—allows foundations to settle, structure to solidify, and plans for a larger, more imposing edifice to emerge. In my case, I had the good fortune to be invited to Vassar College for a semester in the winter of 1978 and given the unforgettable title, The Blegen Distinguished Visiting Research Professor of Classics. In surroundings that were warm, friendly, and always encouraging, it was not difficult to pick up the strands of my work and attain a new assurance. With affection I remember Walter Moskalew, Bob Pounder, and Lily Beck for their hospitality, their solicitous efforts to make everything perfect for me, and their friendship; James Day for his high spirits, his great love of the two historians, and his grand eloquence; and finally, Christine and Eric Havelock, Christine for becoming a friend, and Eric for being irascible and provocative. I was sorry to leave these people and all my other kind friends at Vassar College. I hope this book will meet their expectations of me. Had it not been for the leisure and the freedom from mundane pursuits the Blegen professorship afforded me, the book would never have been completed.

Finally, I should say a few words about York University and my colleagues. The York history department is unusual, perhaps unique, in Canada at any rate, in requiring its honor students to take a course entitled "History as an Intellectual Discipline" (History 200). Rather reluctantly in the spring of 1979, my manuscript completed and sent away for scrutiny, I became course director of History 200. My task was to collaborate with other instructors in the course to make it a solid introduction to historical methodology. In the end, three of us, Juan Maiguashca, Gerald Ginsburg, and myself, thrashed out a sequence of lectures centering mainly on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Work with Juan and Gerry, whether planning lectures and syllabus or actually lecturing in that course, was extremely helpful. For me, frankly an autodidact in contemporary methodology, it meant replacing a certain excess of zeal by greater confi-

dence. I discovered that I had indeed been on the right track, but now there was a milieu in which to express ideas and concerns. I am thus most grateful to all my colleagues in History 200 in 1979-1980 and to those who participated in the historical methodology group, which, during that same year, became a center of discussion for members of the department of history interested in contemporary historical practice. Here has been the very best intellectual collaboration I have experienced as an academic. It has aided me immensely to restructure, to revise, and to reformulate parts of my manuscript for Princeton University Press this past summer.

During this same summer I was again fortunate to acquire the help of another excellent assistant, John Healy, one of my students at York University. John's care in searching out new bibliography, his meticulous summaries, and his boundless curiosity bespeak a fine intellect, which, it is to be hoped, will, even in these mean times, ultimately find some outlet in the scholarly world. His assistance has been invaluable.

Here perhaps some comments are in order about the format of this volume. As I underwent an intellectual evolution, it began to seem essential to revise the work in such a way as to make it accessible to a readership wider than those whose speciality is classics or ancient history, and who can read Greek. In particular, I wished to ensure that any historian who has an interest in methodology be able to read this work without difficulty. Consequently, with the nonspecialist in mind, whether historian, philosopher perhaps, or even educated layman, I have adopted the following expedients. All Greek in the text itself has been translated into English. Unless otherwise indicated, the translations are my own. (I have also translated into English passages of French cited in the text. In footnotes and appendixes I have left citations—whether Greek, French, or German—in the original.) However, certain key words used by both Herodotus and Thucydides very often do not have an exact English equivalent,

or, in some cases, an equivalent that does not distort the original by a host of modern associations. Examples are *polis* and *arche*. The word city can never capture all that is implied in the Greek *polis*, a unique social and political structure. *Arche* is similarly badly served by the single word, empire, which suggests a kind of solidity and control unknown in the fifth century B.C. Such key terms I have therefore merely transliterated. Their number is not excessive, and they do recur. Again to aid the nonspecialist, I have appended a glossary of key words, giving their approximate English equivalents, the word or words I might choose, were I to attempt an English translation of the historians.

Here too let the nonspecialist and specialist alike be warned of a certain capriciousness, always present in the spelling of Greek proper names. My preference is for transliteration, hence Attika, Boiotia, Hippokrates, and Nikias. On the other hand, I do not like Thoukydides, and have become accustomed to Thucydides, as well as Herodotus and even Pericles. Let me excuse myself in this inconsistency in Latinizing certain proper names, by pleading that the ones I have chosen do represent usages widely familiar outside classical studies. I trust readers will also excuse my choices.

Again with the nonspecialist in mind, I have contrived to remove from the text many distracting discussions and debates, and much rarefied bibliography, which might hinder the flow of the argument. This material I have comprised in a series of appendixes, which are, for the most part, bibliographic essays. I refer specialists to these appendixes to read of matters with which they will no doubt be familiar. Others too may find them interesting for the scholarly background, not to speak of arcana, they contain. Chapter One illustrates the kinds of changes I have made to the text. In its original version it appeared as "Thucydides and the Uses of the Past" in *Klio* 52 (1980), 191-218. In revising that chapter, I believe I have made it more taut, more readable, and somewhat more sophisticated in its formulations. (Here let me take the opportunity to thank the editors of *Klio* for permitting me

to reprint "Thucydides and the Uses of the Past" in its present altered version.)

In a word, the book in its present form should interest specialist and nonspecialist alike, and be readable to the latter with the aid only of an English translation of Herodotus and Thucydides. For the former, I prefer George Rawlinson, and for the latter, Richard Crawley, a predilection which goes back to my undergraduate days.

Finally, I wish to record a particular debt of gratitude to the following individuals: Gerald Ginsburg and Brayton Polka (York University), James Day and Robert Pounder (Vassar College), Eric Havelock (Yale University), and Margaret Visser (University of Toronto), who each read some part of the manuscript and offered advice, criticism, or, just as important, encouragement; Joanna Hitchcock, Executive Editor of Princeton University Press, who has more than upheld the press's reputation for concerned and kindly dealings with its prospective authors and who was acute enough to perceive at once where revisions were needed, and innovative enough to encourage a rather hesitant author to make the radical changes in format required to produce the present volume; Daniel Tompkins of Temple University, at the outset one of Princeton's anonymous referees, but ultimately a valued counsellor, whose close scrutiny of argument, explications of texts of the two historians, bibliography, and even style represent an act of unprecedented generosity and whose meticulous criticisms have saved me from many an error or an awkward formulation, helping to render the final version more cogent and more readable (as he will be the first to perceive, in at least two areas where we disagree I have remained stubborn in my views, though I hope not perversely so); Juan Maiguashca of York University, something of a rarity today, a polymath, certainly in the area of historical methodology, but perhaps too in philosophy, who was kind enough to read the entire revised manuscript, giving me confidence where I required it, and assisting with the more philosophic aspects of the work, and some of whose perceptions

have been profound enough to require a period of reflection and will thus emerge mainly in further studies of the two historians that I am contemplating.

Toronto, Canada
October, 1980

Abbreviations

AHR	*The American Historical Review*
AJP	*American Journal of Philology*
Annales	*Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations*
BICS	*Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*
CJ	*The Classical Journal*
C&M	*Classica et Mediaevalia*
CP	*Classical Philology*
CQ	*The Classical Quarterly*
CW	*The Classical World*
DK	Diels, H. and Kranz, W. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (sixth edition), Vol. 2, Berlin, 1952.
FGrH	Jacoby, F. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, Berlin and Leiden, 1923-1958.
G&R	*Greece and Rome*
HSCP	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
LSJ	Liddell, Scott, Jones, McKenzie, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (ninth edition), Oxford, 1940.
NLR	*New Left Review*
QS	*Quaderni di Storia*
RE	*Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, edited by G. Wissowa *et al.*, Stuttgart, 1884-
REG	*Revue des études grecques*
RM	*Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*
SCI	*Scripta Classica Israelica*
TAPA	*Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*
UCPCP	*University of California Publications in Classical Philology*

WS	*Wiener Studien*
YCS	*Yale Classical Studies*
ZDMG	*Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*

Past and Process in Herodotus and Thucydides

INTRODUCTION

EVERY WORK must have a context, and the present study is no exception. It was begun and completed in a period when interest in the discipline of history and concern about its methodological foundations have never been more intense. Consider, for example, the following titles: *The Territory of the Historian; Faire de l'histoire: nouvelles approches*; and *Main Trends in History*. The authors are, respectively, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Jacques Le Goff, and Geoffrey Barraclough, all eminent practicing historians.[1] The significance of their works is that they reveal historians, on the basis of their own practice, submitting the discipline to critical examination.

It is reasonable, then, that as contemporary historians become more conscious of their methodology, one might, in the same spirit, begin to consider the analogous intellectual and critical tools of the first historians. *Past and Process in Herodotus and Thucydides* is a contribution to such a project. This is not to deny that others have submitted the procedures of the two historians to examination. Quite the contrary. One need only consult Arnaldo Momigliano's recent article, "Greek Historiography," to be made aware of the extent of that examination.[2] Studies of what the nineteenth century termed "method" are manifold. Moreover, in the past score of years structural studies of the two historians have been extremely popular, and just as fruitful.[3] In other words, in-

[1] Le Roy Ladurie, trans. B. and S. Reynolds (Hassocks, 1979); ed. Le Goff and P. Nora (Paris, 1974); Barraclough (New York, 1978). See too G. G. Iggers, *New Directions in European Historiography* (Middletown, Conn., 1975). The list could be extended to include many other titles, some of them in Spanish, the works of Latin-American historians.

[2] *History and Theory* 17 (1978), 1-28. See especially his bibliographic appendixes, pp. 23-28.

[3] *Inter alia*, see H. R. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (Cleveland, 1966).

terest in the concepts and methodology of Herodotus and Thucydides is not new, a fact to which a truly awesome list of titles attests. Such a list notwithstanding, interest has perhaps never been greater than at the present moment. New studies abound, many of them *au courant*, and all, surely, reflective of the more general interest in historiography.[4]

Within this context the present study makes two claims to uniqueness. To begin, it is the first systematic attempt to compare Herodotus and Thucydides as contemporaries, that is, as pre-Socratic thinkers who employed rather similar concepts and intellectual tools.[5] Curious as it may seem to those outside the field, there is in fact no work that considers the two together, as historians working within the same theoretical framework or space: none, that is, that seeks, on that basis, to abstract their methodological principles. *Past and Process* is also unique in a second way: it brings to the study of the ancient historians widely accepted and recognizable concepts derived from contemporary historiography and the methodology of the social sciences.

Another aspect of the present study also deserves comment. It began as a reading, in the original Greek and in their

[4] In Italy one thinks especially of L. Canfora and the many articles he has published in recent years, following his book, *Totalità e selezione nella storiografia classica* (Bari, 1972). Especially interesting are the contributions of Canfora and others to the journal *Quaderni di Storia*. Belgium too has more than its share of new studies, the work of scholars like H. Verdin, "L'importance des recherches sur la méthode critique des historiens grecs et latins," *Studia Hellenistica* 16 (1968), 289-308; and G. Schepens, "Some Aspects of Source Theory in Greek Historiography," *Ancient Society* 6 (1975), 257-274 and "L'Idéal de l'information complète chez les historiens grecs," *REG* 88 (1975), 81-93.

[5] Pre-Socratic is not meant to imply a chronological but an intellectual distinction. For clearly Herodotus (c. 484-425) and Thucydides (c. 460-396) were contemporaries of Socrates (470-399). But so were Anaxagoras and Protagoras, whose mode of thought was also pre-Socratic. (Pre-Platonic, if the term were widely used, would probably better describe all the above. But that opens up the "Socratic Question," a problem better avoided here.)

entirety, of the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides.[6] Such a reading inspired in turn a dialogue between past and present, as the author was led to consider writings in diverse fields beyond traditional classical scholarship. In the early stages of the work François Châtelet's essay on historical time and the evolution of the historian's function had real heuristic value, suggesting possible lines of approach. Particularly fruitful was his proposition: "A concrete history of historiography should unite the history of the various types of 'historical narrative' with the history of theories of time and with that of critical techniques."[7] Critical techniques, or more broadly, methodological procedures, the peculiarities of ancient narrative, and the classical Greek concept of time, all are the concern of this study, for it attempts to demonstrate that historical narrative, time, and methodology are indeed closely connected. In so doing, it considers and compares the following: in Part I, The Past: Enquiry and Interpretation, logic, reasoning, and use of evidence; reconstruction and interpretation, as used by the two historians in their approach to the past, as well as the generalizations, even theories, on which the interpretations are based; and finally their attitude to myth and level of rationalism: in Part II, The

[6] Though a reading, this is not a structural study of the kind advocated by Roland Barthes in "Historical Discourse," English translation in *Structuralism: a Reader*, ed. M. Lane, trans. P. Wexler (London, 1970), pp. 145-155. For the latter approach, see M. Rosellini and S. Saïd, "Usages de femmes et autres *nomoi* chez les 'sauvages' d'Hérodote. Essai de lecture structurale," *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa* 8 (1978), 949-1005. See too J. Vansina, "Once Upon a Time: Oral Traditions as History in Africa" in *Historical Studies Today*, ed. F. Gilbert and S. R. Graubard (New York, 1971), pp. 413-439. In respect of oral tradition, Vansina discusses three structures of discourse and three levels of meaning: literal, intended, and symbolic. The present study is concerned with Vansina's first two levels of meaning. For the most part, it seeks out the conscious, reflective, or at least deliberate procedures of the historian. What is meant here by a reading will become clear in Chapter Six, in the section entitled Problematic.

[7] "Le temps de l'histoire et l'évolution de la fonction historienne," *Journal de psychologie* 53 (1956), 356-357.

Process of History, historical explanation, process, and the dynamic of process; event, cause, chronology, and time in relation to process; and the use of analogy and extent of conceptual and cognitive development.

Part I concerns, for the most part, what the nineteenth century called "the critical method." A prominent handbook, written during that era to explain this method and entitled *Introduction to the Study of History*, distinguished the search for documents, or heuristic, from analytical operations, or external and internal criticism, and these in turn from the most difficult undertaking, synthetic operations. The three procedures were seen as separate from one another.[8] In the present study the terms heuristic, source criticism, and synthesis, and the procedures implied by them, have been rejected in the light of twentieth-century practice and writings on that practice. The terms have been replaced by the logic of enquiry, meaning the techniques of authentication and verification employed by Herodotus and Thucydides. From beginning to end, however, it has been emphasized that these purely investigative procedures cannot be separated from the historians' interpretative procedures. The present study has thus avoided the rather mechanistic distinction made in the nineteenth century between analytical and synthetic operations.[9] Part I then is concerned with both

[8] C. V. Langlois and C. Seignobos, *Introduction to the Study of History*, trans. G. G. Berry (London, 1898).

[9] For an early criticism, made in 1911, see H. Berr, *La synthèse en histoire. Son rapport avec la synthèse générale*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1953). In discussing the notion of hypothesis, Berr points out, p. 40: "En définitive, le problème capital, dans la synthèse historique, c'est de trouver le biais grâce auquel les généralisations hypothétiques pourront être triées, confirmées, coordonnées, les lois secondaires consolidées, groupées, rattachées aux principes d'explication plus généraux." See, too, T. C. Cochran, "The Social Sciences and the Problem of Historical Synthesis" in *The Varieties of History: From Voltaire to the Present*, ed. F. Stern, rev. ed. (New York, 1972), pp. 348-359, and Iggers, *New Directions*, p. 11, who states:

> The historians of the twentieth century have remained committed to the critical use of evidence upon which the nineteenth-century "scien-

interpretation and synthesis in relation to investigation or the logic of enquiry. Hence, here one might very fruitfully employ the philosophical term "moment," and speak of the investigative moment and the interpretative moment. This at least has the virtue of suggesting integrated intellectual activity.

Part II moves directly into the twentieth century and its concerns, for its subject is historical explanation. What it seeks to discover is the nature of the generalizations or, in some instances, the concepts used by Herodotus and Thucydides to explain events. This study has disclosed in both histories a series of generalizations and concepts that have a logic and a coherence, and that thus form a configuration. This configuration I have designated a process. Process represents the motion of those societies that not only aspire to, but actually do, control others. In other words, process involves *arche*, empire, or better, hegemony, its achievement, consolidation, or unity and growth, maintenance, and finally crisis, or breakdown and decline. Furthermore, because process has a temporal dimension, it affects the attitude of the two historians to the event, to chronology, and to cause.

Cause, event, and chronology—such categories are fundamental to the historian's craft. But so is time itself.[10] In

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tific" school insisted; yet at the same time they have recognized that the documents do not tell their own story and that the historians of the nineteenth century in letting the past speak for itself were generally insufficiently aware of the presuppositions which enabled them to establish threads of historical development. The result has been a strengthened recognition of the role which theories, hypotheses, and conceptualizations occupy in historical analysis and narration.

As to even earlier procedures, see, for the eighteenth century, E. Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, trans. F. Koelln and J. Pettegrove (Princeton, 1951), Chapter 5, "The Conquest of the Historical World." Especially interesting are Cassirer's remarks about the differing emphases of Voltaire and Bayle. Compare A. D. Momigliano, "Ancient History and the Antiquarian" in *Studies in Historiography* (New York, 1966), pp. 1-39. Momigliano also discusses the nineteenth century.

[10] See F. Braudel, "History and the Social Sciences," English translation in *Economy and Society in Early Modern Europe. Essays from Annales*, ed.

turn, time involves change, for history is diachronic as well as synchronic, and the historian must take account of the dynamic as well as the static. In the words of Marc Bloch, "it is change which the historian is seeking to grasp."[11] Bloch also believed that continuity and discontinuity are at the very center of the historian's concerns. In identifying process in the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, this work has attempted to isolate their particular way of perceiving change or the dynamic, and with it their mode of explanation. They are, it will be seen, very much concerned with continuity and discontinuity.

Explanation, time, and change are abiding concerns of the historian, whether ancient or modern. But what about the particular set of problems or questions that historians must address in the fifth century B.C., and the intellectual tools available to them to solve such problems or answer such questions? These tools include views of human nature and human behavior, ideas about chance and inevitability, and theories about civilization's past.[12] Like the concept of time, the notion of the event, and concern for chronology, ideas and theories of this kind were specific to the fifth century, part of a theoretical framework. What constituted that framework, paradigm, or, as I ultimately term it, problematic? Given a distinct intellectual terrain, what kinds of problems was it possible to pose? What concepts did the historians have ready to hand? Upon what bodies of knowledge could they draw? Conversely, what problems or ideas could not emerge? If one works with the notion of paradigm or theoretical framework, can one discern any fundamental difference in the procedures or concepts used by Herodotus and

P. Burke (New York, 1972), p. 35: "In fact the historian can never get away from historical time: time adheres to his thought like earth to the gardener's spade."

[11] M. Bloch, *The Historian's Craft*, trans. P. Putnam (New York, 1953), p. 46.

[12] See Berr, *La synthèse*, pt. 2: he discusses causality, contingency, and necessity.

Thucydides, a break or rupture between them, and so a reorganization of basic principles? Or do the two historians work on the same intellectual terrain? These are the questions to which this study ultimately led and that Part II attempts to answer.

In the end, however, it proved impossible to understand the nature of paradigm, to discuss cognitive development, or even to define notions like rationalism and rationality, without turning to the works of scholars in fields such as anthropology or philosophy of science. In particular, the question of literacy and its effect on conceptual and cognitive development has taken on significance. In many ways writing, or better the communicative mode, holds a key to the differences others have perceived between the two historians. Under close examination many of these differences turn out to be superficial. Here the work of Eric Havelock has been most helpful.[13]

In studying works in other fields, one is struck by the paucity of references to the ancient historians and their methodology. Consider, for example, Marx Wartofsky's *Conceptual Foundations of Scientific Thought*, an introduction to the philosophy of science.[14] In a chapter on the Greeks entitled "From Common Sense to Science," Wartofsky discusses rationalism, rational criticism, and theoretical frameworks. In the end he argues that there is a continuity between Greek and contemporary science in the role of "dominating concepts": "Contemporary science still operates within the conceptual frameworks of matter and form, of structure and function, of laws of change and development. Like the

[13] In particular, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963). See too J. R. Goody, *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* (Cambridge, 1977), p. 150: "Writing puts a distance between a man and his verbal acts. He can now examine what he says in a more objective manner. He can stand aside, comment upon, even correct his own creation—his style as well as his syntax. Hence the attitude to writing differs from that towards oral performance."

[14] Subtitled *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (New York, 1968).

Greeks, we postulate theoretical entities to explain the phenomena, and like theirs, our science has a deep sense of the underlying mathematical structures of the physical world."[15] Wartofsky's conclusions are based on a study of Greek philosophers from the pre-Socratics to Aristotle. He makes no reference to Herodotus or Thucydides. And yet the strength of his argument would be enhanced by a knowledge of the procedures of the two historians, whose works allow one unprecedented insights into early rationality, criticism, conceptual formulations, and theoretical constructs. Rich as they are, they remain a source untapped. The absence of a work or works explicating their methodological principles and procedures, in effect, leaves their histories inaccessible to writers like Wartofsky. Thus is the sharp distinction between disciplines, characteristic of the modern era, imposed on the ancients: history remains a body of knowledge apart.[16] It is in no sense apparent that such distinctions were made in the ancient world. In fact, the historians are perhaps the single greatest source of applied pre-Socratic philosophy and of early rational thought. The present study, in viewing the historians together and seeking to abstract their methodological procedures, has the explicit aim of making those procedures accessible to scholars in other disciplines. Just as in recent years anthropologists have brought new life to the study of the Greeks,[17] so it is fitting that the Greek historians in turn open up new areas of reflection to anthropologists, as well as to other social scientists and to philosophers.

To return, in Herodotean fashion, to the beginning, to Part I, the following are some terms that have permitted a

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

[16] Even within the discipline of classics itself the historians remain apart. In *Preface to Plato*, for example, Havelock makes but scant reference to Herodotus and Thucydides. Similarly, G.E.R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy. Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought* (Cambridge, 1966), is quite cursory in his treatment of the historians.

[17] See especially S. C. Humphreys, *Anthropology and the Greeks* (London, 1978).

systematic approach to the two ancient historians. Synthesis, as used here, has much in common with the idea as it was employed by Berr and his followers. And while the concept of hypothesis would be anachronistic as applied to the method of Herodotus and Thucydides, the notion of generalization is not. Synthesis, then, represents the generalizations that each brought with him to his research and that, at times, in the course of his research and writing, underwent modification on the basis of the sources he discovered and his evaluation of them. Synthesis thus involves both investigative and interpretative procedures. By the former, the logic of enquiry, are meant not just techniques of authentication and verification but also the kind of argumentation, "critical reflection," and "internal criteria of truth"[18] employed by Herodotus and Thucydides in structuring their narrative. As for their interpretative procedures, this study has linked them to the historians' principles of selection. In fact, it analyzes very closely the details the historians selected for narration, convinced that the criteria implied in their choice hold one key to these procedures, a key, that is, to the generalizations, at times even theories—preconceptions of all kinds, informing their narrative and so producing a synthesis. Again these procedures represent different moments of integrated intellectual activity.

To return, in yet another sense, to the beginning, the subject of Part I is ancient history as the two historians reconstructed it. In Thucydides' case, the choice of a passage to analyze was not difficult. For he begins his work with an excursus, traditionally named the Archaeology (1.1-19), wherein he sets forth a history of civilization from its beginnings. Included in this brief excursus are a number of chapters dealing with Mycenaean civilization and the Greek expedition to Troy, based mainly on Homer's *Iliad*. As for

[18] The words are those of H. R. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 5. His very interesting note 11, pp. 5-6, concerning the terminology used by Herodotus in comparing variant accounts and in forming judgments suggests that the "whole complex of methods needs further investigation."

Herodotus, major portions of his *Histories* deal with the distant past. But the passages chosen for comparison with the Archaeology, all from Book 2, the Egyptian *Logos*, form a kind of unit. Here Herodotus not only reconstructs certain events at Troy, but, in addition, he uses Egyptian records to extend the time that preceded the Trojan War back more than ten thousand years to the beginnings of man's history.

In Part II, The Process of History, the parallel passages chosen for analysis are Brasidas' expedition against Thrace, Book 4.78-135 of Thucydides' *History*, and Dareios' expedition against Scythia, Book 4.83-142 of Herodotus' work. Both are examples of classic historical narrative, reconstructing as they do military exploits and problems. By "classic" I mean further that these passages are, at least on the surface, concerned with the event and with chronologically narrated historical action. The present study analyzes them with a view to discovering the historians' modes of explanation.

Finally, why does the work begin with Thucydides and proceed to Herodotus? While it is true that the two were contemporaries, Herodotus was the earlier historian and, according to one ancient tradition, read in the presence of his successor.[19] In the first instance, Thucydides represented a natural starting-point, being the subject of considerable previous research and writing on the part of the author. Ultimately, however, it came to seem not just natural, but correct, to begin with the later historian, whom posterity has judged the more "advanced," "sophisticated," or even "modern." In moving back to his predecessor, one became aware of what Thucydides chose to retain, what he discarded, and what he altered in subject matter, narrative techniques, and especially methodology. It remains to be seen if the general judgment of posterity as to his superiority to Herodotus is a correct one.

In sum, the procedures consciously adopted in this work are different from those of the linear approach, common in

[19] The *Suda* s.v. Thucydides, 413.

intellectual history. For the most part, studies of Greek historical thought proceed either from Homer or from scant fragments of early prose-writers like the geographer Hekataios. Such studies begin with the kind of implicit assumption about origins which Marc Bloch described, and criticized, thus: "In popular usage, an origin is a beginning which explains. Worse still, a beginning which is a complete explanation."[20] The present study will proceed in the opposite manner, moving from the later to the earlier historian, and making as few prejudgments as possible about origins and evolution. In considering the two historians together, it will attempt to set forth the features of historical methodology as they existed in the late fifth century.

[20] Bloch, *The Historian's Craft*, p. 30.

ONE Mankind's Progress to Civilization in Greece: Thucydides' Archaeology and the Problems of Power

THE ARCHAEOLOGY, (Book 1.1-19), with which Thucydides begins his *History*, is in some ways an unexpected excursus. In his statement of methodology (1.20.1) Thucydides stresses his difficulty in finding trustworthy evidence for "ancient history" (τὰ παλαιά), since mankind is universally uncritical in the transmission of traditions (τὰς ἀκοάς), even as it is careless about the pursuit of truth in matters not obscured by the passage of time. His specific remarks about ancient history are, of course, an echo of his opening statement (1.1.3), where he poses for the first time the difficulties one encounters in recording the history of events preceding the Peloponnesian War, and *a fortiori* those events that lie in the even more distant past: the passage of time has obscured them. Having acknowledged his difficulties, Thucydides then embarks on a history of civilization from its veritable beginnings, fully aware of the paucity and unreliability of his sources. Surely he had something extremely important to communicate in attempting such a daring reconstruction.

Significant for the present study, the Archaeology allows one to see what is all too rare elsewhere in the *History*—the historian selecting data, submitting them to logical analysis, and ultimately reconstructing the events of a period far in the past to which he was not witness and about which he could have no firsthand evidence. The passage begs to be compared in its methodology with major portions of Herodotus' *Histories*, where the latter too delves into the distant and far distant past without the support of firsthand evidence. While no definitive comparison of the two historians has been undertaken, this aspect of the Archaeology has not

gone unnoticed. T. S. Brown's comments might be considered typical: "Herodotus was a pioneer in Homeric 'higher criticism,' the purpose of which was to rationalize the epic in order to make it acceptable workaday history. Each historian can then use the legendary materials to suit his own needs. Herodotus sacrificed the good name of Menelaus in order to combat the prevailing Greek view that the old Egyptians were brutal in their treatment of foreigners; Thucydides manipulates the epics to show that the Trojan War was not a really first class war—like the war Thucydides was describing."[1] "Manipulation" may be strong, but certainly "rationalization" is a word widely employed to describe both historians' use of epic poetry.[2] Curiously enough, if a full comparison were made, one might be forced to admit that Herodotus was more critical than his successor, since he not merely rationalized but actually challenged Homer's account of Helen's presence at Troy.[3]

In other ways too Thucydides appears to adopt a slightly different perspective from which to view tradition. Herodotus, for example, goes out of his way to stress that Poly-

[1] "The Greek Sense of Time in History as Suggested by their Accounts of Egypt," *Historia* 11 (1962), 262-263. See too H. Erbse, "Zur Geschichtsbetrachtung des Thukydides," *Antike und Abendland* 10 (1961), 19-34, for a comparison of some aspects of Thucydides' methodology in the Archaeology with that of Herodotus in Book 2.112-120. K. von Fritz, *Die Griechische Geschichtsschreibung* (Berlin, 1967), vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 575, notes that "hier ein unmittelbarer Vergleich mit den Vorgängern, vor allem mit Herodot, möglich ist."

[2] See, for example, F. Jacoby, *Atthis. The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 358-359, n. 26; A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 1, corr. rpt. ed. (Oxford, 1950), p. 114; and L. Pearson, *The Local Historians of Attica*, rpt. ed. (Westport, 1972), p. 30.

[3] Her. 2.118-20. W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, 2 vols., corr. rpt. ed. (Oxford, 1928), 1:224, consider the skepticism of 120.3 "unlike Herodotus," but then term the whole chapter "an instance of Greek rationalizing criticism." Gomme, *Commentary*, p. 110, expressly notes Herodotus' "great scepticism about events of the 'mythical' period," though he believes his "scepticism is less of the epic tradition than of the reconstructions of it by his immediate predecessors."

krates of Samos was "the first of the Greeks of whom we have knowledge [τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν] to form the design of mastering the sea" (3.122.2). And while he acknowledges Minos' claim to priority, he draws a firm line between myth and history, by insisting that Polykrates was the first in human history.[4] Thucydides, on the other hand, gives Minos priority, thus rejecting the line drawn by Herodotus between human history and myth, for unlike Herodotus he is willing to accept the tradition about Minos' priority (1.4, ὧν ἀκοῇ ἴσμεν). And yet Thucydides certainly had no new factual evidence about Minos, but worked with the same traditions as his predecessor.

Interpretation is perhaps the key to an understanding of the different use to which Herodotus and Thucydides put the same evidence. Thucydides' interpretation of tradition differs from that of Herodotus in that it is based on a "preconceived theory," derived from the world around him and applied to

[4] In actual fact, the Greek states that Polykrates was the "first of the generation of men." (Rawlinson construes it "the first of mere human birth.") Compare Ph.-E. Legrand, *Hérodote: Introduction* (Paris, 1932), p. 39: "Les générations 'que l'on appelle humaines' s'opposent aux générations mythiques; les événements 'humaines' (ἐξ ἀνθρώπων), aux événements fabuleux." What in fact I am trying to capture is the spirit of the expression *le temps des hommes*, which, though it does not mention history, has come to mean human history, as opposed to myth, in a number of important French works. See, for example, J. de Romilly, *Histoire et raison* (Paris, 1956), p. 275, and P. Vidal-Naquet, "Temps des dieux et temps des hommes," *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 157 (1960), 55-80. Vidal-Naquet's theme is the separation of human from mythic time. History and the historians are naturally important in this division and he expressly selects the above passage of Herodotus as a reference to "le temps des hommes," where human history "s'oppose ainsi à la mythologie" (p. 67). One of the seminal works on the subject is F. Châtelet's "Le temps de l'histoire et l'évolution de la fonction historienne," *Journal de psychologie* 53 (1956), 355-378. See too M. I. Finley, "Myth, Memory and History" in *The Use and Abuse of History* (New York, 1975), pp. 11-33 (also in *History and Theory* 4 [1965], 281-302). Finley interprets Her. 3.122.2 as expressing "historical, as distinct from mythical, times" (p. 18). We shall return in Chapter Two to this question of the beginnings of human history, as opposed to myth, in Herodotus' *Histories*.

the past for purposes of his own.[5] In a sense, John Finley alludes to this, when he states that "the formative ideas of the *History*" are first expressed here.[6] Even more explicit is the view that the purpose of Thucydides' Archaeology is "to state and develop his theory of history and thereby to justify his exclusive concern with the Peloponnesian War."[7] If, then, the Archaeology is not merely an example but a statement of Thucydides' theory of history, and this is its purpose, it is certainly germane to the question of synthesis, and more particularly to the broader generalizations that produce a synthesis, whether in the Archaeology or in the *History* as a whole. Before we turn to those generalizations, however, we shall first consider selection, the details Thucydides chose for narration, in order to establish precisely what he was attempting to communicate in this reconstruction of the past.[8]

It is scarcely novel to note that in chapter 2 Thucydides reaches back to the beginning of civilization, to man, if not "in a state of nature,"[9] at least in a nomadic stage of existence. He lists the indices of a civilized state to show all that is lacking in that early era. First and foremost is a settled way of life (βεβαίως οἰκουμένη), which inhibits migration and resists invasion. This kind of security rests in turn on commerce (ἐμπορίας), free communications, a surplus of resources (περιουσίαν χρημάτων), and the systematic cultivation of land. On the one hand, Thucydides implies, such a combination of indices results in the building of walls capable of resisting invaders, while at the same time, by inducing permanence, it inhibits individuals from migrating in search of basic necessities. Without a settled way of life, and

[5] De Romilly, *Histoire et raison*, pp. 261-262.

[6] *Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), p. 87.

[7] A. Parry, "Thucydides' Historical Perspective," *YCS* 22 (1972), 51.

[8] As others have perceived, the Archaeology holds a key to the understanding of the rest of the *History*. Therefore, I have made an effort to present a full, though not exhaustive, analysis of it in the pages that follow on selection.

[9] Parry, "Thucydides' Historical Perspective," p. 53.

all it implies, however, man cannot advance beyond the nomadic to a higher stage of civilization, characterized by the strength (ἴσχυον) that comes from large cities and other forms of material resources (παρασκευῇ). Thucydides devotes a major portion of this chapter to a seeming paradox, explaining how the very poverty of Attika's soil led to her achieving a security of existence (βέβαιον ὄν) that invited not invaders but refugees, the basis of a populous city. At this point we shall not follow Thucydides as he leaps ahead to the Ionian migrations, but note for the first time the word αὐξηθῆναι (2.6), which admits of no single translation but implies prosperity, development of every kind, flourishing resources, and power. Such a peak of civilization is difficult to achieve.[10]

Having established his indices of civilization, Thucydides then proceeds to rearrange his concepts positively, so as to develop one of the high points of civilization, the Creto-Mycenaean era. He first notes that one result of the weakness described in chapter 2 was the lack of collective achievement before the Trojan War (3.1, οὐδὲν φαίνεται πρότερον κοινῇ ἐργασαμένη ἡ Ἑλλάς). For this statement he offers his own kind of proof, defining collective achievement (repeated at 3.4, ἀθρόοι ἔπραξαν) as an expedition, *strateia*, and stating that it was only made possible by the increased adherence to the sea that preceded it. Moving backward in time, he then develops his statement about seafaring by the

[10] The second chapter of the Archaeology has provoked considerable controversy. Gomme, *Commentary*, p. 94, points out the difficulties in 2.6 (as well as suggested emendations). See too G. V. Sumner, "A Note on Thucydides 1.2.6," *CP* 54 (1959), 116-119, H. W. Stubbs, "Thucydides 1.2.6," *CQ* 22 (1972), 74-77, and M.H.B. Marshall, "Urban Settlement in the Second Chapter of Thucydides," *CQ* 25 (1975), 26-40. I accept Stubbs' interpretation of this passage, *ibid.*, p. 76: "Τὰ ἄλλα are the precise respects in which, as he says, Mycenaean Attica did not 'increase,' though the μετοικίαι might have been expected to make her do so." Thus "instead of becoming a panhellenic power like Oedipus' Thebes or Agamemnon's Mycenae, Attica could not support its surplus population, and had to export it to the colonies" (p. 77).

example of Minos. He was the first person known to possess a navy and to achieve mastery of most of the Hellenic Sea. Moreover, he established the first *arche*, for he ruled over the Kyklades and, again a first achievement, colonized most of them, by driving out their inhabitants, the Karians, and establishing his own sons there. He also ensured the flow of revenues (τὰς προσόδους), by clearing the sea of pirates. We shall not follow Thucydides in his account of ancient piracy, his proofs of it and the customs that resulted therefrom. Rather we shall pick up the thread of the narrative at chapter 8.2, where Thucydides returns to Minos and stresses that his establishment of a navy made circumstances more favorable for navigation, because it enabled him to drive the pirates out of their island havens, the pirates now being synonymous with the aforementioned Karians (as well as the Phoenicians). Comparatives abound, as he returns to some of the concepts of chapter 2. The possibility of securing greater wealth allows a more settled way of life (βεβαιότερον) and in some instances increased wealth leads to the building of walls. Here, however, a negative note is sounded, as the concept of *arche* is developed: the weaker yield to the stronger and accept slavery (δουλείαν),[11] seeing in it some gain to themselves, while those who have achieved greater power (οἵ τε δυνατώτεροι) through a surplus of resources (περιουσίας) make the smaller cities subject to themselves. Returning to the concept of collective achievement, the expedition against Troy, Thucydides subsumes all the advances made by Minos, based on his naval power, under the advances attributed to Agamemnon, beginning with the phrase ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ (8.4), "with this as their way of life."

To pass for the moment over Agamemnon's background, and his ascension to leadership both internally and externally, in chapter 9.3 many of the aspects of Minos' rule reemerge. Agamemnon had a strong navy, stronger than any

[11] It is not clear whether this slavery is external or internal, though it may well be the latter, since Thucydides next addresses himself to the acquisition of subject cities.

other, and, in fact, appears to have provided the most ships for the expedition against Troy. Like Minos too, he controlled many islands, that is, he had an *arche*. The key here, however, is not mere repetition but advance along the line selected for discussion in chapter 3, collective achievement. The reference in the last sentence of chapter 3.4 to the expedition is picked up in 9.1 as *stolos* and in 9.3 as *strateia*, and again in 9.4, where Thucydides infers the size of earlier expeditions from this one. By a rather interesting piece of reasoning, he puts forward his evidence for the belief that this was the greatest *strateia* up to that time, though inferior to those of the present (10.1-3). Having specified its limitations, he returns to the theme he has been developing since 3.1, the collective effort (κοινῇ) of all Greece (10.5). To such has the development of civilization led.

But even this apparent continuity of development has its moments of regress. In the first instance, Greece's most fertile regions did not lead, as one might expect, to the surplus of resources and cultivation of land that is the basis of a settled way of life, but instead had the most frequent changes of population (2.3-4). For this paradox individuals are responsible, since, in reaping the advantage of rich soil and the powers it allowed to devolve on them, some few fell into political turmoil, or *stasis*, that weakened them to the point of ruin at a very time when such areas naturally attracted outside invaders. Indeed, it is the absence of this problem that characterized Attika. Poverty kept her free from *stasis* (and implicitly, free from the powerful individuals that cause *stasis*) and so she retained a stable population and in time established a settled way of life (2.5-6).

At a later stage, when seafaring had developed, once again individuals, seeking gain for themselves, as well as sustenance for the weak among them, disrupted civilization by piracy, making their livelihood by preying on cities that were as yet unwalled, and, in fact, scarcely more than scattered villages (5.1). This new threat from individuals to the security and ultimately the unity of civilization was ended,

when the powerful navy of Minos brought the pirates under control. And thus, while his *arche* had a negative side, in that it led to certain cities becoming subjects, it put an end to this threat to the security of all, and thus resulted in the positive advances of chapter 8.3.

Serious as these hindrances are to the development of civilization, which at this point culminates in the united effort of all Greece in the Trojan War, they do not attain the proportions of the genuine regression following that war. The *arche* of Agamemnon, and the security and unity it established, like Minos' before it, crumbled in the face of renewed movements of population, both internal and external. Again the word (12.1) αὐξηθῆναι, "a high stage of development, based on growth," reappears, and again in the negative, since peaceful conditions (ἡσυχάσασαν) were not at hand for its achievement. The problems are twofold, though neither of them new. *Staseis* recurred in the cities, basically as a result of the length of time that elapsed in the returns from Troy and the numerous political innovations that this produced. Thucydides is synoptic, yet clear, about the internal struggles that ended in the ejection of some, who founded cities elsewhere. In addition, there were, in the wake of the war, fresh migrations into Greece of Boiotians and Dorians. Thucydides is equally clear that only with difficulty and many years later with the cessation of these renewed migrations were peace and security sufficiently reestablished in Greece (ἡσυχάσασα ἡ Ἑλλὰς βεβαίως) to permit colonization in Ionia and elsewhere.

To accept regression in chapter 12 implies, of course, that there is a kind of renaissance with the reestablishment of peace and security in Greece. Such a view has, however, not found much favor.[12] In order first to put the matter in its

[12] De Romilly, *Histoire et raison*, pp. 289-291, strenuously rejects this view, emphasizing continuity. In so doing, she opposes the thesis of E. Täubler, *Die Archäologie des Thukydides* (Leipzig, 1927), pp. 58-61, that μετὰ τὰ Τρωικά begins a second half of the Archaeology and that chapters 12 and 2 parallel each other. Täubler states, for example, that "die allgemeinen Er-

proper perspective one must go beyond chapter 12 and study the text that follows. From chapter 12 to 13 there is no straight line of development. The same Greece that took years to reestablish peace and security sufficiently to send out colonies also became more powerful (δυνατωτέρας) by that time—the era of the tyrants—and devoted herself more to the acquisition of wealth. The comparatives must be read in relation to the almost chaotic circumstances of chapter 12. Thucydides does not dwell on the complex of causes that gave rise to the tyrants but seems to connect them with "economic" improvement.[13] Nor does he repeat all his indices of civilization but, in the words of the first two lines, which are precisely those of 8.3,[14] implies the concomitants

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scheinungsformen der ganzen Entwicklung sind μετὰ τὰ Τρωικά dieselben wie πρὸ τῶν Τρωικῶν" (p. 59). F. Bizer, "Untersuchungen zur Archäologie des Thukydides," dissertation (Tübingen, 1937), p. 35, agrees with Täubler: "Der Aufstieg Griechenlands von bescheidensten Anfängen bis zur Akme Athens und Spartas verläuft nicht ungebrochen in einer aufsteigenden Linie, sondern nach dem trojanischen Krieg liegt tatsächlich ein Einschnitt." Von Fritz, *Griechische Geschichtsschreibung*, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 597, sees here "ein langsamer Prozess des Hin und Her" but "keineswegs ein stetiger Prozess." He refers to periods of "Machtverfalls und des wirtschaftlichen Niedergangs" that can follow those of prosperity. On the other hand, he believes that "das Auf und Ab der Bildung und des Zerfalls von Machtkonstellationen ist in seiner Unregelmässigkeit kein Kreislauf im Sinne späterer Theorien" (vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 273-274, n.55). To support this view, he cites A. Momigliano, "Time in Ancient Historiography," *History and Theory*, suppl. 6 (1966), 1-23. Compare L. Canfora, "La préface de Thucydide et la critique de la raison historique," *REG* 90 (1977), 455-461.

[13] I use the word "economic," because in its simplicity it seems to express best the complex of cause and effect implied in chapter 13.1. I use it with caution, however, since I do not believe Thucydides thought in terms of economic cause or even had an understanding of the economy in general. In this I agree entirely with M. I. Finley, *The Ancient Economy* (London, 1973), p. 21, where he stresses that the ancients "in fact lacked the concept of an 'economy,' and, *a fortiori*, that they lacked the conceptual elements which together constitute what we call 'the economy.' " See too M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet, *Économies et sociétés en Grèce ancienne* (Paris, 1972), who take a similar view in their first chapter, which summarizes the history of the controversy about the ancient economy.

[14] Compare chapters 13.1 and 8.3: οἱ παρὰ θάλασσαν ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ἤδη τὴν κτῆσιν τῶν χρημάτων ποιούμενοι.

of the greater acquisition of wealth, with the exception of revenues (τῶν προσόδων), which he indicates specifically were increasing. The point of the chapter, however, is the reemergence of navies in the age of the tyrants. Greece, he states, began to equip herself with navies and to adhere more to the sea. Since there is again a repetition of the circumstances of chapter 3.4,[15] it is not unreasonable to expect a repetition of the pattern of accomplishments detailed in the account of Minos' empire and, to a lesser degree, Agamemnon's. One is not disappointed, only now it is not an individual, but the Corinthians, who, given the general increase in the practice of navigation (13.5, μᾶλλον ἔπλῳζον), repeat Minos' achievements. From time immemorial, noted for the wealth that their favorable position on the Isthmus had brought them when communications were by land, the Corinthians now employed this wealth to acquire ships and clear the sea of pirates (compare 13.5 and Minos' achievements in 4). The revenues (προσόδῳ) that resulted from an *emporion* both by land and by sea enhanced the power of their city.

Chapter 13 ends with a list of other, later navies that are characterized as "the most powerful" (14.1, δυνατώτατα). Though it is only a list, even here some of the vocabulary used to describe Minos' empire reappears. In the time of Cyrus the Ionians were for some time master of the sea in their region (13.6, ἐκράτησαν echoes ἐκράτησε of 4). Polykrates of Samos not only possessed a powerful navy (ἰσχύων), but by that means made certain of the islands subject to himself (compare 4 and 8.3). Chapter 15.1 summarizes in a few lines the advantages and power that navies bring—and here Thucydides is referring to all navies, whether ancient or more recent, for the pattern is the same. Navies are a great source of strength (ἰσχύν) because they produce revenues (προσόδῳ) and lead to control over others, empire or *arche*: they enable

[15] Compare chapter 13.1, τῆς θαλάσσης μᾶλλον ἀντείχοντο and 3.4, θαλάσσῃ ἤδη πλείω χρώμενοι.

their possessors, and in particular those whose land is inadequate, to subdue the islands (see again 4).

Regression and repetition rather than continuity are what emerge from the text of chapters 12 to 15.1. There are two new developments (13.2-4), however—one a distinct advance in *techne*, the other more dubious, though doubtless significant in the eyes of a military historian. The first is the invention of the trireme, said to have been first built and used by the Corinthians. An inventor is specifically named, Ameinokles, who appears to have built four triremes for the Samians.[16] Secondly, employing a common Herodotean expression (ὧν ἴσμεν), Thucydides asserts that the oldest known sea battle took place between the Corinthians and the Kerkyraians. These two developments are important for the *History* as a whole and are brought together in chapter 14. There Thucydides recounts the history of the trireme, which it appears existed in only scant numbers even in the most powerful navies of the day. It was not until the period just before the Persian Wars that triremes were employed in any large numbers by the tyrants of Sicily and the Kerkyraians, the last noteworthy navies before Xerxes' *strateia*. At this point Thucydides recognizes two other important cities, Athens and Aigina, whose navies were but mediocre. However, during a war between these two powers, at a time when Xerxes' invasion was also imminent, Themistokles persuaded the Athenians to build the ships with which they later fought at sea. Though even these ships were technically deficient, nevertheless a connection is being established between the navy and its ultimate component, the trireme, and the sea battle (14.3, ἐναυμάχησαν; compare 13.3 and the victory of the Phokaians at 13.6). This theme will reemerge.

[16] The name of an inventor is not a novelty here, but as de Romilly comments about the fifth century in "Thucydide et l'idée de progrès," *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa* 34 (1966), 144: "Il y a, éparses chez les auteurs, de nombreuses notations relatives aux inventions et aux inventeurs de tout ce qui constitue la civilisation." Compare Vidal-Naquet, "Temps des dieux," p. 66.

Having discussed navies, their development and the advantages that accrue from them, we must return to the thesis advanced above: in framing his account of naval power, whether of Minos or of Agamemnon, by the word κοινῇ, "collectively" (3.1 and 10.5), Thucydides indicated that it was in fact collective achievement, defined at that point as the *strateia*, that truly interested him. Again, now that navies have reemerged, it is not unreasonable to expect a return to their concomitant, collective achievement. And again one is not disappointed. This strand of the narrative is picked up at chapter 15.2, where Thucydides contrasts the possibilities of war by land with the varied achievements of naval powers. Land battles were only local, between neighbors, and there were no distant *strateiai*, aimed at the subjection of other (καταστροφῇ echoes κατεστρέφοντο of 15.1). The reason for this was that no coalescence of subjects around the most powerful cities occurred nor did the peoples of Greece unite as equals for collective expeditions (κοινὰς στρατείας). Even though Thucydides does recognize that the Lelantine War was the most significant of early times in that it forced the rest of Greece to ally itself with one side or the other, it was still a local affair and so not truly akin to the collective achievement of all Greece under Agamemnon in the *strateia* against Troy.

The next two chapters continue this strand of the narrative negatively, as it were, as Thucydides recounts the hindrances to a truly flourishing stage of development (16.1, αὐξηθῆναι). Where the Ionians are concerned, their brief control of the sea was ended by the encroachments of Persia, a true *arche* with the capacity not only to make expeditions but to enslave the cities on the mainland and later, with the Phoenician navy, the islands as well. In addition, wherever there were tyrants, they hindered advancement. Because of their concern for themselves and the aggrandizement of their own families they stressed security and so accomplished nothing

of note, except locally.[17] The limitations imposed by the tyrants are akin to the problems created by powerful individuals, similarly motivated by self-interest, in the earlier period, that is, those who engaged in *stasis* in chapter 2.4 and later the pirates. At this point, Thucydides culminates his analysis by returning specifically to collective achievement. The purpose of the narrative from chapters 15.2 through 17 is to show why Greece was so long prevented from achieving anything κοινῇ, "in common."[18] Again, the concept of collective achievement is at the heart of his thesis.

Leaving aside Thucydides' remarks about the Lakedaimonians, let us see how he brings together the several strands of the narrative in chapters 18 and 19. Like their Ionian kinsmen the Athenians face an extension of the Persian *arche*, which they successfully resist at Marathon. The real test, however, comes ten years later with the vast *strateia* of Xerxes (τῷ μεγάλῳ στόλῳ), whose purpose is to enslave Greece, a danger which unites the Greeks under the leadership of Sparta, the preeminent power,[19] and collectively (18.2, κοινῇ) they repel the barbarian. Thucydides then goes on to adumbrate the schism, fully described in the *Pentekontaetia*, that will rend this temporary alliance, and in particular differentiates the nature and bases of the individual strength

[17] Commentators have been loath to accept Thucydides' statement about the tyrants of Sicily. While Gomme, *Commentary*, pp. 127-128, is not prepared to bracket the sentence, he does find it "unnecessarily obscure." I am not sure one gets around the problem by his further suggestion that "Thucydides is thinking of the period before 480." Thucydides, it seems to me, wants to keep Sicily in the background, a distant, rather unknown place with a history, or more precisely, an Archaeology of its own, saved for its proper place at the beginning of Book 6.

[18] One should not ignore the word ἀτολμοτέρα. As yet the cities individually were lacking in enterprise or a spirit of adventure. *Tolma* will soon emerge as one of the characteristics, a major strength, of the Athenians.

[19] As Gomme, *Commentary*, p. 132, notes, with others, the terminology is the same as that used to describe Agamemnon's relationship to the other Greeks of his day in chapter 9.1, δυνάμει προύχων.

of the Lakedaimonians and Athenians, who ultimately attract the rest of Greece into their respective camps. In other words, the power of the former is by land, the latter by sea. Brief as he is in chapter 19, Thucydides makes it clear that it is not the Lakedaimonians but the Athenians (who in time take over the ships of their allies[20] and impose tribute on them) who will attain a true *arche* and thus be the successor to Minos, Agamemnon, Polykrates, and the Persians. At this point it would be premature to speak of collective achievement. The rest of the *History* will record the growth and problems of the Athenian *arche* and its culmination in an extraordinary *strateia*.

It is now possible to turn to Thucydides' investigative procedures, which I have termed the logic of enquiry. We do so, aware of the kind of details Thucydides chose for narration, as well as certain of the selective principles implied in that choice, theses, concepts, and even purpose. We shall consider Thucydides' attitude to his sources, where he specifies them, and the kind of logic or reasoning he employs in reconstructing the past on the basis of those sources. His internal criteria of truth should thus become apparent. Chapters 9 and 10 will serve to illustrate this aspect of Thucydides' methodology.

In chapter 9 Thucydides relies on oral tradition and Homer as sources and accepts both without criticism. To be sure, he insists that his Peloponnesian informants transmit the most reliable traditions (τὰ σαφέστατα),[21] and he is certainly conscious that, though Homer's poems record accepted tradition and contain much truth about "ancient history," they must

[20] Thucydides excepts the Chians and Lesbians, the two island powers still providing ships at the beginning of the war in 431.

[21] See Gomme's note *ad locum, Commentary*, p. 109. Relying on the work of Felix Jacoby, he speculates that Thucydides might have used Hellanikos' work and thus "may be thinking especially of him" in chapter 9.2. Jacoby himself states in *Atthis*, pp. 358-359, n. 26: "Actually, what Thukydides gives in ch. 9 is epic poetry interpreted rationalistically and (as seems to be universally agreed since the paper of U. Koehler) what could be found in Hellanikos about these matters."

be used with caution. Whether the import at 9.4 of the conditional clause, "if his testimony is deemed sufficient,"[22] be trust or irony, he does go on to cite Homer and accept his description of Agamemnon's kingdom. Given this factual base, it is interesting to see how he interprets it. He employs both sources to prove that those who united in the first collective effort of all Greece, in the *strateia* or *stolos* led by Agamemnon against Troy, did so out of fear and not because of any sense of responsibility or favor due to Agamemnon based on the oaths sworn to Tyndareus. Thucydides stresses twice that this is his own personal view (μοι δοκεῖ in both 9.1 and 9.3). In assessing the oral tradition about Pelops and his descendants, one finds it very difficult indeed to challenge Thucydides' account, for it may be a perfectly accurate reproduction of a version of the tradition that is no longer extant. If one assumes that he is as faithful to the general truth and even the details of this tradition as he is to Homer's poems, the account is probably an accurate reproduction of what he heard or read. In any case, what it serves to do is to establish one of the sources of Agamemnon's power, the wealth that Pelops brought with him from Asia, and that moved a hitherto poor and nameless peninsula toward a higher level of civilization. In return, Pelops not only won power for himself (and incidentally gave his name to the area, a significant index of unity) but his descendants flour-

[22] Crawley's translation of εἴ τῳ ἱκανὸς τεκμηριῶσαι. See Gomme's note *ad locum, Commentary*, p. 109. He interprets this statement positively, believing that "Thucydides is in fact relying on Homer's authority both here and in 10.3." My agreement with Gomme that Thucydides did rely on Homer for his "facts," and may well be stressing the soundness of such an authority, with the appropriate provisos noted by Gomme, will be clear in what follows. Still, the word φαίνεται in 10.3 may indicate that Thucydides is not prepared to convert Homer's evidence on this point into a sheer assertion. Compare H. Verdin, "Les remarques critiques d'Hérodote et de Thucydide sur la poésie en tant que source historique" in *Historiographia Antiqua* (Louvain, 1977), pp. 53-76. Verdin discusses chapters 1.9-10 at pp. 72ff.

ished.[23] Without following the details of the problem of succession, I shall only note that one of Atreus' credentials for retaining the kingship was his reputation for being a powerful man, a power which must be related to the wealth and influence of his ancestors. All this then devolved upon Agamemnon, whose rule over Mycenae and its *arche*[24] was firmly established. This is one basis of the fear that produced unity. In addition, there is the concrete strength (ἰσχύσας) of a navy that wealth and security bring. And here Homer's statement is important. According to Homer, Agamemnon led the most ships to Troy. The statement would in itself seem to be sufficient, but Thucydides wants to be sure that no one doubts the extent of his naval power. Only a navy, he continues, could have permitted him to rule the many islands that Homer made part of his kingdom. Thus all the evidence cited is used to prove the concrete strength of Agamemnon and the fear it produced, which motivated the rest of Greece to join in the *strateia* against Troy.

To summarize then, what Thucydides does in chapter 9 is accept both Peloponnesian oral tradition and the Homeric poems as factually accurate, and then go on to interpret the data in such a way as to prove his own personal thesis that fear motivated the other Greeks to accompany Agamemnon to Troy. The whole passage is an exercise in reasoning from probability, in which Thucydides uses the present to draw inferences about the past.[25] It is possible to expand this point.

[23] In chapter 3 Thucydides connects lack of a common name with disunity and weakness and makes a special point of recording the origin and spread of the name Hellenic, which postdated even the unity of the Trojan War. In Book 6.2 he shows a similar interest in the name(s) of Sicily.

[24] I am tempted to translate τὴν ἀρχήν in chapter 9.2 as the kind of *arche* established by Minos in chapter 4, and described in greater detail in chapter 8.2-3. This is the stage of development that the Greeks had reached when they made the expedition against Troy somewhat later (8.4). Certainly, this kind of *arche* emerges from 9.4. Both Crawley and Warner translate the word as "government."

[25] Compare *Histoire et raison*, p. 242, for a list of key words indicating that the thesis is personal and that it is based on probability. The view that the

Inferences based on probability imply similarities, and based on those similarities, whether they are perceived through direct experience or otherwise, a body of generalizations. Such generalizations then become the premise or premises underlying the interpretation of new situations, or in this case, of events far in the past. There is no single emotion in the *History* that is so pervasive as fear.[26] Fear in some combination with power usually lies at the heart of collective achievement. The following are a few brief examples. In the face of Xerxes' invasion it is fear that unites Greece under the leadership of the Lakedaimonians, at that time the preeminent power (18.2, δυνάμει προύχοντες). Later Thucydides records the increasing discrepancy in power between Athens and her allies (1.99.3). The former rules her subjects in an *arche* by her vast *dynamis* and the fear it inspires, as the Mytilenaian envoys complain in 427, emphasizing their own fears (3.9-14 and especially chapter 12). Finally, in the Sicilian War it is fear of both Syracuse's power and Athens' aspirations in Sicily that makes Kamarina hesitant to join either side (6.88.1). One fear outweighs another, however, and by Book 7.33.1-2 Kamarina sends reinforcements to Syracuse; in fact, by this time almost all Sicily is united under the leadership of that powerful city in a vast collective effort not unlike that described in Book 1.18.2, which was aimed at repelling the invaders. Thus, when one speaks of using the present to draw inferences about the past, one can go further and locate in the *History* itself the parallel situations that might have formed the basis of Thucydides' personal thesis that power and fear united the Greeks against Troy. That thesis is central to his reconstruction in chapter 9.

Having established the motives for the expedition, in

Archaeology is based on reasoning from probability is widely accepted by, among others, Finley, *Thucydides*, p. 82, and J. Gommel, *Rhetorisches Argumentieren bei Thukydides*, Spudasmata 10 (Hildesheim, 1966), pp. 48-49 and 66.

[26] De Romilly has devoted a paper to the subject, "La crainte dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide," *C & M* 17 (1956), 119-127.

chapter 10 Thucydides goes on to describe its magnitude. Again he cites two sources, the poets and tradition (or so I interpret *logos*), although in fact he depends entirely on Homer for his figures. While admitting the probability of poetic exaggeration, he accepts Homer's figures, for even if they are inflated, nonetheless it seems (φαίνεται) that Agamemnon's *strateia* was still inferior to expeditions in his own time.[27] Clearly, we are once again dealing with a personal thesis, signalled by the use of words like "it appears" (employed twice) and "it is probable" (employed three times). It is again a series of arguments from probability, employing some very curious reasoning indeed. For example, to bolster his contention that Mycenae's size is not an accurate gauge of the magnitude of the expedition, he uses a contemporary analogy in which he argues that if Athens and Sparta were both deserted, with the passage of time the difference in the archaeological remains of the two cities would give a completely distorted impression of their former power. The modern historian, who, incidentally, knows more than Thucydides about the extent of Mycenae's material remains, may well question Thucydides' reasoning. For the buildings and temples and other archaeological remains of Athens are in fact an accurate index of her achievements in building an empire, amassing a treasury, and maintaining her position throughout the latter half of the fifth century as the trading and cultural center of the Aegean. Conversely, in all these respects—wealth, trade, monuments, culture—Sparta was a backwater, whatever the size of her army and the number of her allies. This is not of course to criticize Thucydides or to expect him to have a concept of power akin to the modern one, which must include economic considerations. But it does raise the interesting question of what exactly is meant by power, *dynamis*, in the *History*, if archaeological remains or the lack of them can distort one's judgment of it. And

[27] In chapter 10.3 Thucydides' reference to Homer is similar to his remark in 9.4, τῇ Ὁμήρου αὖ ποιήσει εἴ τι χρὴ κἀνταῦθα πιστεύειν, though here he qualifies it by mentioning the likelihood of poetic exaggeration.

while Thucydides does give some indices of the power of Sparta in chapter 10.2, in rejecting the mere appearance of cities and advising the reader to consider instead their "powers" (τὰς δυνάμεις), he evinces, in this instance, a narrow notion of power and an odd means whereby to judge it. Power, it appears here, is military forces, including allies.[28] And the evidence for power that is more trustworthy than archaeological remains is Homer and only Homer.

Leaving aside some of the minor assumptions of chapter 10.4, let us consider the major curiosity of the chapter, 10.5. On the basis of Homer's figures Thucydides comes to the conclusion that the numbers who went to Troy do not appear to be considerable (οὐ πολλοὶ φαίνονται), a conclusion that is patently absurd and generally recognized to be so.[29] In the absence of a systematic criticism of Homer's figures, which he cannot make, because he has no basis on which to challenge them, certainly no new data, Thucydides numbers the fleet at 1,200 ships and the men at 102,000 (the latter calculation not made by himself). This is scarcely inconsiderable, or as Gomme points out, even allowing for some poetic exaggeration, it is "a very large number for an

[28] Gomme, *Commentary*, p. 113, interprets τὰς δυνάμεις as military forces. Surely such "powers" also imply the unity and control needed to amass and lead large numbers, whether one's own military forces or allies. For a larger view of *dynamis* see H. R. Immerwahr, "Pathology of Power and the Speeches in Thucydides" in *The Speeches in Thucydides*, ed. P. A. Stadter (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1973), pp. 16-31. Immerwahr believes that the growth of *dynamis* in Greece is not just the main theme of the Archaeology but "the main unifying theme in the work: all other elements in the *History* are somehow related to it" (p. 20). Further, Thucydides "sees power as a force which nourishes, perpetuates, and increases itself in constant progression" (p. 18). Compare A. G. Woodhead, *Thucydides on the Nature of Power* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 37ff. and E. Bar-Hen, "Les sens divers du mot Δύναμις chez Thucydide," *SCI* 2 (1975), 73-82. Bar-Hen also takes a broad view of *dynamis*: "outre la force matérielle-financière et militaire, le mot désigne force morale—capacité, influence, authorité—pouvoir, domination, et sphère d'influence ou de domination politique" (p. 82).

[29] Gomme, *Commentary*, p. 114. Compare de Romilly, *Histoire et raison*, p. 248.

overseas expedition (στρατεία, 10.3), and much larger than any that sailed in the Peloponnesian War."[30]

To summarize, chapter 10 follows the pattern of chapter 9. It has a central point, the magnitude of Agamemnon's expedition, the sole evidence for which is Homer's poems. No matter how critical he is about poetic exaggeration, it is in the end Homer's figures that Thucydides uses to calculate the numbers of the forces at Troy. Again it is an exercise in arguing from probability, except that in this case, if one were to look for the similarities on which he based his premises one would not find them, since his conclusion about the inferiority of this expedition is incorrect. In other words, if we are dealing with a personal thesis, it must stem from some larger view so deeply held that it led him to insist that the Greek forces at Troy were inconsiderable and the expedition inferior to those of his own day in spite of "evidence" to the contrary.

I do not propose to dissect every chapter of the Archaeology. The same sources, used in precisely the same way, and the same kind of reasoning are found throughout it. "Terms of intellectual discernment"[31] or, more precisely, expressions of personal judgment abound. Chapter 3, for instance, relies mainly on Homer as its source: the absence in his poems of a common name for all the Greeks at Troy Thucydides uses as proof of his own assumption (φαίνεται) that Greece achieved nothing collectively before the Trojan War. Here too Homer's evidence is framed by the expression, "it seems to me," δοκεῖ δέ μοι (3.2, and picked up as ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, "as I think," in 3.3). Similarly, chapter 4 about Minos' naval power is based on tradition (ἀκοῇ): Thucydides' statement that Minos cleared the sea of pirates to secure revenues is his own interpretation of that tradition, an inference, as the phrase ὡς εἰκός, "probably," indicates. Even when he has left the "mythical" period behind, per-

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] Parry, "Thucydides' Historical Perspective," p. 52.

sonal expressions do not disappear. In chapter 13 the Corinthians are said (λέγονται) to be the first to have had triremes built, and it appears (φαίνεται) that Ameinokles, the Corinthian, built four ships for the Samians. Clearly, Thucydides is still working with data that we would term "oral tradition." On the whole, in other words, the sources he cites and the reasoning he employs throughout the Archaeology are uniform.[32] He thus reconstructs the past. What is lacking in his reconstructions, however, is the contribution of the nineteenth century to the discipline of history, source criticism. No matter how painstaking he considered his pursuit of truth, how reliable his evidence, or how reasonable the conclusions he drew from it; no matter how much he understood that caution was necessary in the face of poetic exaggeration, he must nonetheless accept both the poets and oral tradition as his factual basis. He just did not have at his disposal the tools of source criticism or the means of evaluating documents used by the contemporary professional historian.[33] Uncertainty and doubt he might express, but with-

[32] We must not, of course, overlook Herodotus as a source, once Thucydides reaches the era that his *Histories* describe. Without commenting on Thucydides' use of Herodotus, I shall only note that he draws on the latter at 13.6 and certainly from chapter 16 through 18.

[33] The conversion of history from a branch of literature to an academic discipline, a craft or even a science, with its own critical method in the nineteenth century is documented in *The Varieties of History: From Voltaire to the Present*, ed. F. Stern, rev. ed. (New York, 1972). (A useful earlier work that explains the critical method and its three distinct procedures of heuristic, analysis, and synthesis is Langlois and Seignobos, *Introduction to the Study of History*.) Part 2 of Stern's work documents some of the reactions of the twentieth century to the new science and its own varied contributions to history as a discipline. Compare Iggers, *New Directions in European Historiography*. Iggers begins by discussing the crisis of the conventional conception of "scientific" history. See too Marc Bloch, *The Historian's Craft* (New York, 1953), chap. 3, "Historical Criticism," and, for a philosophic history of history, R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford, 1961), *passim*. Collingwood carefully distinguishes "Greco-Roman Historiography" in Part 1 from "Scientific History" in Part 4. Similarly, F. Châtelet in "Le temps de l'histoire," p. 356, differentiates clearly the function of the modern historian, the result of a long evolution, from that of the ancient

out ancillary disciplines like archaeology, comparative literature, or linguistics his efforts to criticize his sources, or even his opportunities to verify them, remain minimal.[34]

Thucydides' investigative procedures, we discovered, cannot be separated from generalizations derived from the world around him and applied to the past for purposes of his own. Thucydides used the present, in particular the model of Athens and her *arche*, to make inferences about the past. One example, noted above, is the emotion of fear. Similarly, Atreus' courting of the populace in order to retain the kingship of Mycenae is modelled on the political style of the demagogue of the latter half of the fifth century.[35] But inferences are drawn about more than motivation. Some of Thucydides' facts are also anachronistic. For example, what evidence would he have had to prove that Minos colonized the Kyklades? None. Minos' colonization of the islands is, like his policy of clearing the sea of pirates, an inference, based on the accepted tradition about his sea power, which Thucydides interpreted as a full-blown *arche* in the modern sense, complete with island colonies.[36] In the same way, his re-

historian, a more limited one: "Il n'est pas juste de croire que les historiens anciens—qui négligent plus ou moins la chronologie, qui ne pratiquent pas la critique des témoignages—ont simplement manqué de l'esprit scientifique. Ce manque résulte d'un montage psychique différent." He goes on to evaluate the work of Thucydides, concluding with a number of criticisms a contemporary might make, among them (p. 361): "Il s'étonnerait qu'une plus grande précision chronologique ne soit pas donnée et qu'il y ait souvent de l'obscurité dans les renseignements matériels. Il reprocherait au narrateur d'affirmer qu'il critique ses sources sans jamais signaler celles qu'il choisit et pourquoi il les choisit." See, by contrast, A. Momigliano, "Tradition and the Classical Historian," *History and Theory* 11 (1972), 279-293.

[34] This is not to deny that Thucydides was a precursor of the nineteenth century. His use, for example, of archaeological evidence in Book 1.8.1 is brilliant.

[35] This point is made by de Romilly in *Histoire et raison*, p. 277: "L'ensemble des légendes que retient Thucydide s'organise selon des schèmes d'allure récente: Atrée, comme un démocrate, sait flatter le peuple (τεθεραπευκότα)." I use the term *demagogue* as it is defined by M. I. Finley in "Athenian Demagogues," *Past and Present* 21 (1962), 3-24.

[36] Compare de Romilly, *ibid.*, p. 276 and her remarks in *Thucydides and*

marks at chapter 8.3 about subject cities shed more light on his own belief in the advantages that accrue to those who come to possess a surplus of resources (περιουσίας) than they do on "ancient history." Again he has no evidence with which to demonstate that such a process antedated the Trojan War; again it is an interpretation based on his theory of *arche*. Finally, his various references to *stasis*, which are both anachronistic and undemonstrable,[37] are more at home in the troubled world of the late fifth century than in the periods of migration. The very fact that he read this destructive process into the past, however, provides an early clue to Thucydides' theory of human nature, wherein the cupidity and ambition motivating individuals often become disruptive of the common good.

Chapter 11 is one chapter in particular that provides a fascinating insight into Thucydides' personal views and is as well a lesson in military science. Essentially, Thucydides attributes the length and difficulty of the war at Troy to lack of resources (ἀχρηματία). He argues that the Greeks, in going to Troy with insufficient supplies (τῆς τροφῆς ἀπορίᾳ) with the hope of living off the land there, encountered a host of problems. For though they were successful at the outset in winning a fortified camp as a beachhead, shortage of supplies prevented them from making use of all their forces. Instead, they turned to cultivation of the land and to piracy. By dispersing in this way, that is, by splitting their forces, they allowed the Trojans to hold out for ten years. What is interesting about this is not so much Thucydides' reconstruction of the Greeks' activities and problems at Troy,[38] but the

Athenian Imperialism, trans. P. Thody (Oxford, 1963), pp. 67-68: "And it looks as if the form assumed by Athenian imperialism had brought the character of Minos to life, simply because he could be seen as a forerunner."

[37] Chapters 2.4 and 12.2.

[38] Erbse, "*Zur Geschichtsbetrachtung*," p. 23, *points out how Thucydides'* account contradicts Homer's in many important details, citing, for instance, *Iliad* B 123-130 and H 467ff. He concludes, "Um die für seine

advice he offers for success in conducting an overseas expedition and siege. It is absolutely essential to remain united after an initial success on enemy territory, an initial success being a prerequisite of all else. In turn, the ability to remain united for the siege that follows depends on the supply of foodstuffs. Thus it is essential to arrive with a surplus (περιουσίαν) so as to devote full and continuous effort to the siege. It is his belief—and such judgments are rare in Thucydides—that had the Greeks adopted this policy, they would have captured Troy in less time and with less effort.

Again it is my view that one can locate in the *History* itself similar situations that might have formed the basis of Thucydides' personal views about overseas expeditions. There is one in particular that parallels the siege at Troy, as Thucydides reconstructed it: it is the great expedition against Syracuse. In spite of Nikias' warnings in the year 415 the Athenians departed for Sicily without a surplus of resources but confident that they would obtain supplies, food, money, and cavalry from their allies there.[39] This miscalculation then produced grave difficulties, when they failed to achieve the prerequisite of all other success, the kind of victory at the

klugen Folgerungen brauchbaren Voraussetzungen zu erhalten, ändert er augenscheinlich die Angaben des Dichters leichter oder stärker ab, ohne auf den Homerleser sonderlich Rücksicht zu nehmen."

[39] See Virginia Hunter, *Thucydides, the Artful Reporter* (Toronto, 1973), chap. 8, "Nikias' Warnings," especially p. 137, which shows that the narrative of events in Sicily confirms the truth of Nikias' *logoi* at the beginning of Book 6. By the outset of winter (6.71.2) the Athenians lacked food, money, and cavalry, and the allies necessary to provide them. This was the case despite the fact that in his reply to Alkibiades (6.20-23) Nikias had attempted to deter the Athenians by a realistic estimate of the forces and supplies required for the expedition. As a result, where food was concerned, the Athenians did take more than a few days' supplies. Given the distance of Sicily, however, it is understandable that they should adopt what Gomme, in *Commentary*, p. 114, terms "a general principle of all Greek warfare"—"to live on the country." In other words, "the great bulk of their supplies were to be purchased or seized in the island."

outset[40] that establishes a secure beachhead, and that in turn permits a united and unrelenting application of all one's forces to the siege and ultimately its speedy resolution in conquest. Though the above is a simplification of the problems faced by the great expedition against Syracuse, to which Thucydides devoted two full books, yet in its outlines it allows us to see where Thucydides might have derived his similar simplification in chapter 11.2, the generalizations from experience on which he based his musings about Agamemnon's *strateia*. The problems he read into the past, and their solution, are the problems of warfare in his own time.[41]

In this study of the Archaeology references have consistently been made to the preconceptions of Thucydides, his personal theses and even theories, and behind them, generalizations, derived, in many instances, from his own experiences. Such generalizations are in no sense random but have a logic. They result in a synthesis that is closely argued to uphold a purpose. In what follows we shall consider that synthesis and its purpose, as well as Thucydides' chronology and its relationship to his purpose in writing the Archaeol-

[40] Hunter, *ibid.*, chap. 6, "Demosthenes at Epipolai," which relates Lamachos' predictions at 6.49.2 to the events which followed, specifically 6.63.2, and Demosthenes' reflections at 7.42.3. By not adopting Lamachos' original strategy, the Athenians had allowed the terror of their enemy to turn to contempt, especially when they sailed away to other parts of the island. Demosthenes is critical of Nikias for wintering at Katana and not attacking at once, thus allowing Gylippos to arrive with troops from the Peloponnese. Lowell Edmunds, *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), p. 132, comments on Nikias: "he shows himself as Spartan as ever and as un-Athenian in failing to follow up his initial success. Nicias was formidable when he first arrived at Syracuse, but he was scorned when he did not press on but sailed away (in late 415) to winter in Catana (7.42.3). Nicias is not one of those paradigmatic Athenians who follow up victories (1.70.5)." While Edmunds and I agree on this point, I cannot accept his Athenian/Spartan dichotomy, though a full criticism is not germane here.

[41] See Gomme, *Commentary*, p. 115.

ogy. But first, what was he attempting to demonstrate in that synthesis, if such a term is not too strong?

The Archaeology is a history of progress that, negatively at first and then positively, establishes the indices of civilization required to advance from a nomadic way of life to a secure and collective one, based on control of the sea and power over others, including colonies and revenues, all of which result in *dynamis*. At the same time, the highest achievement of any civilization is the use of this *dynamis* in some form of collective effort, the kind of "noteworthy achievement" (17, ἔργον ἀξιόλογον) that the tyrants inhibited. This progress is in no sense a linear one of continuous development in a straight line from past to present. It is constantly disrupted by individuals motivated by various combinations of cupidity and ambition, who, either by winning or seeking to take society's wealth, hinder its advancement. Such are the *stasiotai*, the pirates, and the tyrants. Firm control is necessary, the control of a Minos or an Agamemnon, with a navy to clear the sea and establish an *arche*.[42] On the other hand, much as the common good is furthered by firm control and its attendant security, it also engenders a loss of independence. The weak become enslaved to the strong and the smaller cities lose their autonomy to the more powerful. Even the unity that produced the most outstanding collective achievement of ancient times was based on fear, perhaps the same kind of fear of power that kept the smaller cities subject. Finally, after this unity had been achieved, there was still the possibility of disintegration, due not merely to foreign invaders (or migrants) but to internal disunity. Chapter 12.2 is a repetition of 2.3-4. Perhaps if the *strateia* of Agamemnon had sailed with a surplus of supplies and if the siege had been shorter and less troublesome, the return to Greece

[42] Clearly, certain tyrants were as capable of firm control as Minos or Agamemnon. Polykrates, for example, had a navy and an *arche*, as did many tyrants whose names and achievements Thucydides surely knew but chose not to record. Whatever stability and security they brought, however, was balanced by their lack of noteworthy achievement.

would have been much more speedy and subsequent problems (*staseis*) avoided. Be that as it may, Thucydides links the disintegration in chapter 12 to the *strateia* and its problems. In other words, the high and low points of civilization, which de Romilly believes Thucydides omitted in an "évolution théorique,"[43] are there, and are essential to his theory of "ancient history." Disunity, hindrances, and regression are as much a part of the historical process as advancement.

At this point it seems proper to address briefly the difficult and controversial question of Thucydides' chronology. Many believe that, in matters of chronological detail, it is wrong to expect of an author like Thucydides the same precision one would of a modern scholar.[44] For the fall of Troy, for instance, Thucydides must have had in mind merely a conventional date, knowledge of which he assumed in his readers. It should be noted, however, that since he does not date that event, he no more establishes it as a fixed point than he does the foundation of Syracuse in Book 6. Still, let us grant him a knowledge of the date of the fall of Troy. It does not follow that, based on that date, he had a chronological scheme in mind, which embraced the Archaeology as a whole. Consider his chronological references up to chapter 12, words like "long ago," "later," "not many years ago," and "most recently."[45] Quite bizarre from a modern point of view, it is not dating at all except in the most relative sense. Then

[43] *Histoire et raison*, p. 286.

[44] See Bizer, "Untersuchungen," p. 16, Jacoby, *Atthis*, n. 74, p. 310, and F. Mitchel, "Herodotos' Use of Genealogical Chronology," *Phoenix* 10 (1956), 52-53. See also Appendix to Chapter One, section B: "Chronology in Thucydides' Early History."

[45] Chapter 2.1, πάλαι; chapter 2.6, ὕστερον; chapter 3.1, τῶν παλαιῶν and πρὸ τῶν Τρωικῶν; chapter 3.4, ὕστερον and πρὸ τῶν Τρωικῶν; chapter 4, παλαίτατος, chapter 5.1, τὸ πάλαι; chapter 6.3, οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐπειδή; chapter 6.5, οὐ πολλὰ ἔτη ἐπειδή; chapter 7.1, νεώτατα; chapter 8.4, ὕστερον χρόνῳ; chapter 9.2, ὕστερον. This is by no means an exhaustive list. "Long ago" and "before the Trojan War" could mean almost anything.

comes chapter 12 with its first real datable event, though not dated, but assumed, and with it an almost equally bizarre precision. The Boiotian and Dorian migrations are dated respectively sixty and eighty years after the fall of Troy.[46] An epochal date has been established, to be sure, but it still does not result in a chronological scheme, since many of the events after it are still not truly dated; they are relative to one another as much as the events before chapter 12. Again there are references like "after a long time," "after the events at Troy," and "many generations after the Trojan War." Toward the end Thucydides again assumes in his readers a knowledge of fixed points in time like the reign of Cyrus and Cambyses or the battle of Marathon, based on Herodotus. He still does not supply dates.[47]

It is now possible, on the basis of this study, to view the Archaeology from a somewhat new perspective. Its purpose, achieved by a careful selection and interpretation of data, is threefold. First, it offers a glimpse at a variety of high points of civilization, the indices of which generally cluster together in a similar pattern of security, surplus, fleet, rule over others, walls, and revenues—in short, development of every kind, a flourishing condition, or power, expressed concretely as *dynamis*—and at the very peak, some form of collective effort.

[46] Why these dates in particular? Let us speculate. Earlier I suggested that chapter 12.2 is a repetition of chapter 2.3-4. With 12.3 the migrants arrive and by the end of eighty years the Creto-Mycenaean civilization is gone and Greece once more is in a state of insecurity and shifting population. Only with difficulty and over a length of time (12.4, μόλις τε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ)—much longer than sixty or eighty years—will she once again reach a high point of civilization.

[47] Again why the precision in chapter 13.3 and 4? Again let us speculate. These dates seem to indicate the beginning of the "modern" world, the genuine "temps des hommes," in which Thucydides himself lived, as opposed to the "mythical" period of Minos and Agamemnon, the achievements of which in seafaring, as in all else, disappeared. The trireme and the sea battle, innovations in seafaring, are part of the achievement and "progress" that will characterize Periclean Athens and finally Syracuse. They are indices of civilization unknown in "ancient history."

But the Archaeology does more than illustrate the highest points of civilization. Its second purpose is to offer a glimpse at the problems and difficulties endemic in *arche*, and the potential for loss and regression. First, there is *stasis* that, whatever its particular cause, disrupts peace and security, bringing in its wake disunity, often total destruction. Secondly, even the unity that leads to collective achievement is at best problematic, since it is bound up with enslavement, subjection of islands and smaller cities, and the fear that the unifying power can produce in such subjects or in her allies. All these are dangerous forces and emotions, which the power at the center must surely know how to balance in order to sustain her *arche*. Finally, collective effort in the form of the *strateia* is, even apart from the fear that motivates it, in itself fraught with problems. These problems rendered the siege of Troy long and arduous, producing in the end a kind of Pyrrhic victory. In other words, the Archaeology also illustrates that the highest points of civilization have their own particular problems, and further that civilization can and may regress. This negative side should not be underestimated; for, if, on the one hand, the Archaeology points to the *arche* of Athens, the Athens of the Funeral Oration, the very culmination of civilization, it also anticipates the problems and difficulties that will lead to the disintegration of her *periousia,* her *dynamis,* and her *arche.*

The third purpose is connected with repetition, that cluster of indices forming a pattern, which reemerges several times in the Archaeology. If the pattern is destroyed in one power, will it reemerge in another? It will indeed, for even as Athens had predecessors, so she has a successor, Syracuse. If the *History* proper begins with Athens at the height of her power, with only a synoptic backward glance at how she reached that height,[48] it is not so with Syracuse. The *History*

[48] I am referring, of course, to the *Pentekontaetia*, which Thucydides himself describes as a digression, τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου, at Book 1.97.2, his "second preface," as Gomme calls it, where he justifies his narrative of the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars. Significantly, it will

records in detail the progress of Syracuse to a new peak of civilization as the cluster of indices reemerges, the pattern which culminates in collective achievement, not a *strateia* yet, but the same kind of unity in the face of danger as the Greeks themselves achieved in chapter 18.2.[49] The example of Syracuse is as much at the heart of the Archaeology as the example of Athens.

Here too the use of the word progress may be qualified. In fact, the Archaeology is not concerned with the modern, or perhaps "classic," notion of progress, which looks to an open-ended future. For there is in Thucydides' history of the past a sting in the tail of progress, of man's achievements through civilization. Having indicated the kind of problems and difficulties that, in the Archaeology itself, lead to loss and regression and potentially can do so again, I shall be content at this point with likening Thucydides to Sophocles. Sophocles' great paean to man and man's wondrous achievements ends on a cautious note: "Clever beyond all dreams/ the inventive craft that he has/ which may drive him one time or another to well or ill."[50] Man's ingenuity, his *techne*,

be an *apodeixis* of the establishment of the Athenian *arche*, and thus closely connected with Thucydides' own explanation of the cause of the war, Spartan fear of Athenian power (1.23.6; 88; and 118.2).

[49] The word κοινῇ will reappear many times in Thucydides' account of events in Sicily, but it will refer strictly to a defensive unity, as opposed to a collective effort aimed at conquest (that is, the "expeditions far from home" for the subjection of others, καταστροφῇ, described in 1.15.2). See too note 52, below, and Hunter, *Thucydides*, chaps. 7 and 9. Significantly, by Book 7 Syracuse has walls, a fleet, allies, and revenues, and has developed skill in seafaring.

[50] *Antigone*, 11.365-367, translated by Elizabeth Wyckoff. For the modern view of progress, I have consulted G. G. Iggers, "The Idea of Progress in Historiography and Social Thought Since the Enlightenment" (unpublished manuscript). Iggers, p. 5, describes the classic belief in the idea of progress, that is, the belief expressed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, thus: It represents "an optimistic expectation of the society which human reason can and will construct. . . . There is, to start with, a firm faith in the emancipatory role of science and technology. . . . Indeed an optimistic conception of man is fundamental to the theories of progress in their classical form." I could go on, but I think the point has been made. As Iggers points

can turn against him. Whatever the subtleties of Thucydides' notion of *techne*, one also has the impression in studying the cluster of indices, the pattern of *arche* and *dynamis*, which reemerges several times in the Archaeology, that progress is for him quantitative. What differentiates the *strateia* against Troy from its predecessors is its size: it was the greatest up to that time (10.3, μεγίστην), the biggest, though inferior to those that came after. To be sure, the Persian War was great, and great too was the *stolos* of Xerxes, described by Herodotus, and in turn the *dynamis* required of the Greeks to repel it. Yet at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War the material resources amassed individually by the two former allies, the Lakedaimonians and the Athenians, were even greater than they had been together in 480-479.[51] The latter is, of course, a repetition of the superlatives of chapter 1.1-2. Not only were the two protagonists at "their height in all matters of material resources," but the disturbance was the greatest (μεγίστη) in history, greater than any that preceded it, involving almost the whole of mankind.[52] Here is differ-

out, p. 3, the idea of progress cannot be separated from its "concrete social, political and intellectual setting." Thus it has a specific meaning in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries "which differentiates it essentially" from the view expressed in Greek thought.

[51] Chapter 19. Here I agree with Gomme, *Commentary*, p. 134, that it is "the comparison with conditions in 480-479 which is chiefly intended," however one might evaluate Athens' παρασκευή in 431 vis-à-vis her resources in 465 or 445. And like him I interpret αὐτοῖς in the last sentence as both powers, Athens and Sparta, described in the preceding sentence. Crawley, I believe, construes it correctly: "Both found their resources for this war separately to exceed the sum of their strength when the alliance flourished intact."

[52] It is the very proliferation of superlatives in Books 6 and 7, employed mainly to describe the magnitude and significance of the struggle at Syracuse, that, along with three other leading ideas, led John Finley to argue for composition after 404 in "The Unity of Thucydides' History" in *Three Essays on Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp. 118-169 (also in *Athenian Studies Presented to William Scott Ferguson, HSCP* suppl. 1 [1940], 255-298). (See especially p. 126 and pp. 129-140.) The ἔργον μέγιστον of 7.87.5 echoes not just the μεγίστη of 1.1.2, but must be connected with the process of growth, achievement, and regress found in the Archaeology. The

ence amidst similarities, but clearly not a modern notion of progress.[53]

As for chronology, we noted above that Thucydides' chronological precision leaves much to be desired. Perhaps we should not expect him to evince a modern concern for precise dates. Perhaps too the fact that, even when he knew

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Syracusans have reached a new peak, quantitatively the most significant in all history, including tradition (ὧν ἀκοῇ Ἑλληνικῶν ἴσμεν).

[53] My own view of the ancient concept of progress would be closer to M. I. Finley's in "Utopianism Ancient and Modern" in *The Use and Abuse of History*, pp. 178-192 (also in *The Critical Spirit. Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse*, ed. K. H. Wolff and B. Moore, Jr. [Boston, 1967], pp. 3-20). In grounding Utopian ideas and fantasies in "the society to which they are a response" (p. 180), he posits an "unbridgeable gap that exists between us and antiquity" (p. 190). One of the reasons for this is the fact "that it was not possible by any means to bring about an equitable society in antiquity, given the poor resources, the low level of technology, the absence of growth possibilities (other than conquest) in the economy, and the absence of the very idea of progress" (*ibid.*). This statement must be related to his analysis of the ancient economy as a preindustrial one, in which "neither efficiency and productivity nor economies of scale were operative factors" in *The Ancient Economy*, p. 85. The following statement from the same work also serves to explain why the modern concept of progress had no material basis in the ancient world: "We must remind ourselves time and again that the European experience since the late Middle Ages in technology, in the economy, and in the value systems that accompanied them, was unique in human history until the recent export trend commenced. Technical progress, economic growth, productivity, even efficiency have not been significant goals since the beginning of time" (p. 147). See also his "Technical Innovation and Economic Progress in the Ancient World," *The Economic History Review* 18 (1965), 29-45, as well as H. W. Pleket, "Technology and Society in the Graeco-Roman World," *Acta Historiae Neerlandica* 2 (1967), 1-25. Another valuable work is J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs: Études de psychologie historique*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1974): the first four essays of the second volume deal with "Le travail et la pensée technique." By contrast, see L. Edelstein, *The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity* (Baltimore, 1967). Edelstein challenges the view that the ancients were ignorant of the idea of progress. He states, for example, on the basis of the Corinthian remarks at Thuc. 1.71.2, that "belief in progress is represented not as a thesis to be defended but as a commonplace" (p. 31, n. 22). While the book has a lengthy and valuable bibliography, it cannot compare either in use of sources or in depth of insight to de Romilly's work on progress.

precise dates, he did not supply them in his narrative would suggest that chronology *per se* did not truly interest him. If we accept his purpose in the Archaeology, to illustrate the process of history—growth, achievement, regress, decline, and repetition—then it is similarity of process, permanence amidst change that interested him as meaningful and not the precise dates when the process reemerges. If he had an interest in time as it applied to this process, I suggest it was in the following sense. He took great pains to show that only amidst difficulties, in the face of hindrances, and after great length of time did and does mankind reach one of the high points of civilization. And then it is lost, and rather quickly too, if Agamemnon's *arche* or Xerxes' *stolos* are examples. In establishing the indices of civilization that will reemerge in Athens' *arche*, was he also preparing his reader for the shock of how quickly the *periousia* and *dynamis*, amassed over generations, will disintegrate? His method of dating thus represents not a chronological scheme in the modern sense, with its concern for dates *per se*, but an interest in relative time in an otherwise meaningful process.

To conclude then, the Archaeology has, I believe, justified itself as an excellent starting-point for a study of ancient historiographic methodology. It has revealed not only generalizations brought by the historian with him to his work, but a logic to those generalizations that gives the Archaeology its threefold purpose. Thus, we have not merely uncovered the "formative ideas of the *History*," which John Finley thought were first expressed here, but put those ideas into perspective by formulating a coherent "theory of history,"[54] which must be reflected in the rest of the *History*.

[54] Parry, "Thucydides' Historical Perspective," p. 51. Obviously, my analysis of the Archaeology has implications for the Composition Question: 1.1-19 (or 1-22) was written late. Whether it can be dated with assurance after 404, as both Bizer and Finley believe, I am not prepared to say. The present analysis does, however, confirm the conclusions of my paper, "The Composition of Thucydides' *History*: A New Answer to the Problem," *Historia* 26 (1977), 269-294, where I propose 407 as the date by which the *History* as it is now extant was begun, with writing continuing as late as 396. The year 404 or after is thus not excluded as a date for the Archaeology.

Two The Discovery of "Historical Space": Herodotus and the Beginnings of Human History in Egypt

IN THE MIDDLE of Book 2 (99.1), before embarking on a history of Egypt, Herodotus gives his listeners some indication of the procedures he employed in conducting his researches in that land. He emphasizes his dependence on *akoe*, accounts he heard, as distinct from the personal observations, *opsis*, for which he had the opportunity earlier, and which he incorporated in the first half of the Egyptian *Logos*.[1] In addition, he promises to add to these accounts some material acquired as an eyewitness.[2] This brief statement represents a good starting-point for an evaluation of Herodotus' investigative procedures, in that it reveals something of his sources: for the most part, his work is an amalgam of what he heard from others and what he saw himself.

Here then it is germane to note a work that has assembled a whole series of passages in the *Histories* relevant to an understanding of Herodotus' investigative procedures, and that has, in addition, drawn certain conclusions relevant to the present study. In *De historisch-kritische Methode van Herodotus* H. Verdin devotes a lengthy chapter to direct testimony, in which he indicates the importance Herodotus attached to his

[1] In this study *Logos* indicates the Egyptian material in its entirety and is analogous to the Lydian *Logos* in Book 1 or the Scythian *Logos* in Book 4. By contrast, *logos* refers to an individual account or tradition, a series of which, *logoi*, constitute the *Logos*. In later chapters *logos* also means a speech reported verbatim, whether in direct or indirect discourse (e.g. Book 4.118).

[2] In referring to the earlier material on Egypt, Herodotus mentions, in addition to what he saw himself (*opsis*), the judgments he formed (*gnome*), and the enquiries he made (*historie*).

own observations and to information gathered from eyewitnesses.[3] Where oral tradition is concerned, he points out, Herodotus often emphasized his direct contact with his informants. As for indigenous tradition, Herodotus seemed to regard it as a kind of living entity. Hence his rather special attitude to this form of tradition and to native informants, which Verdin describes thus:

> With historical testimony, on the other hand, the basis of its authority lies in the local tradition which is a fixed whole. But this tradition too may ultimately trace back to the personal observation, not of the informants themselves, but of earlier witnesses of the events reported, so that the tradition can in such cases be regarded more or less as an extension of αὐτοψία. The testimony of the *epichorioi* thus displays a combination, even a unity, of those two important foundations of Herodotus' critical policy: αὐτοψία and tradition.[4]

Though Verdin believes that Herodotus showed a skepticism even to these sources, he makes it clear that one should not underestimate the place of autopsy, or direct testimony, whatever its form, in any evaluation of the historian's methodology.

Verdin raises another question relevant to the present study in his chapter on Herodotus' sense of historical criticism. He points out that Herodotus was not always presented with just one account, which he accepted as true, but was often called upon to make judgments both in situations where he could trust his own eyes and, more often, in cases where he was faced with conflicting testimony. What were his criteria for making such judgments? Again Verdin comments: "Numerous examples can be cited where he takes an explicit stand on the basis of very diverse criteria, among which the probability of the facts occupies a place apart (e.g.

[3] (Brussels, 1971).
[4] P. 232.

I, 214; III, 9). Moreover, in Herodotus' personal verdict on the value of his evidence several nuances can be distinguished. In addition to emphasizing of the degree of probability, there are cases in which he voices certainty, which is sometimes apparent from the use of such terms as οἶδα or ἀτρεκέως."[5]

The last statement in particular begins to suggest clues to Herodotus' "internal criteria of truth." It is on these criteria I propose to focus this study of Book 2, by asking the following questions: What induced Herodotus to resort to probability and what, by contrast, evoked certainty in him? What did he believe he knew? What was true? Or, how, in human terms, could be justify his assertions?[6] The chapters chosen for analysis are 43-45, 49-53, 116-120, and 142-146.

In chapters 116-120 Herodotus relies on two sources, Homer and Egyptian tradition, the latter referred to as a *logos*. Expressions of personal judgment recur sufficiently throughout the chapters to indicate by the end of chapter 120 which of the two sources Herodotus considers the more reliable.

[5] P. 233. The citations are from the summary in English at the end of the work. They are based on discussions in Chapters 4 and 5. Compare H. Verdin, "Notes sur l'attitude des historiens grecs à l'égard de la tradition locale," *Ancient Society* 1 (1970), 183-191. See too F. J. Groten, Jr., "Herodotus' Use of Variant Versions," *Phoenix* 17 (1963), 79-87, and A. E. Wardman, "Herodotus on the Cause of the Greco-Persian Wars," *AJP* 82 (1961), 133-150, both of whom stress the importance Herodotus attached to autopsy. For a discussion of Herodotus' written sources see F. Lasserre, "L'historiographie grecque à l'époque archaïque," *QS* 4 (1976), 113-142.

[6] See Chester G. Starr, *The Awakening of the Greek Historical Spirit* (New York, 1968), p. 109: "In practice the Greek thinkers who lived amidst the expanding, if unstable society of the sixth and fifth centuries could not endure an attitude of complete intellectual doubt; whether philosopher, poet, or historian, they often proclaimed that they were telling the truth. How, in human terms, could they justify their assertions?" The question is based upon a perceived development in Greek thought beyond the belief of an earlier period "that men could not know the truth unless the gods vouchsafed them knowledge" (Starr's formulation, *ibid.*). For another very different approach to this development in Greek thought see M. Detienne, *Les maîtres de vérité dans la Grèce archaïque* (Paris, 1967).

From this passage, and the several chapters preceding it, it is also clear that one of the tasks Herodotus undertook during his stay in Egypt was to enquire about the "facts" of early Greek history transmitted by the epic poems; here, specifically, the story of Helen as recorded by Homer. He begins his account of Helen in chapter 112. There, in offering certain conjectures about a temple in Memphis dedicated to Aphrodite *xeine*, he mentions the *logos* he had heard that Helen spent some time at the court of Proteus. The *logos* itself he proceeds to relate in the next three chapters, first indicating that it was in response to his own enquiries (113.1, μοι . . . ἱστορέοντι) that the priests told him the particulars about Helen. These particulars will not interest us *per se*, but rather their central feature, a real discrepancy between Homer's account and that of the priests. For, according to the latter, Helen and Paris not only visited Egypt, but Paris aroused such indignation and ire in Proteus that he ordered him out of Egypt, pledging to keep Helen at his court until Menelaos should reclaim her. Having related the details of the *logos*, Herodotus states again at the beginning of chapter 116 that it was the priests who told him the story. Realizing that the *logos* is quite in opposition to Homer's account, he offers an explanation of the discrepancy that is tantamount to a judgment on the poet.

Let us consider Herodotus' attitude to Homer in chapter 116. He expresses it first as an opinion: "I believe (δοκέει δέ μοι) that Homer was also aware of this story." He was aware of it, but considered it unsuited to his needs as an epic poet and so chose another version, the one extant in his poems. Herodotus is sufficiently interested in the fact of Homer's knowledge of the Egyptian *logos* that he attempts to prove it by an appeal to the internal evidence of the *Iliad* itself. He reasons thus: Homer inserted in the *Iliad* an account of the wanderings of Paris and Helen that brought them on their return to Troy to Sidon in Phoenicia. His evidence is *Iliad* 6.289-292, a passage referring specifically to Sidon as the source of the many-colored robes acquired on the jour-

ney to Troy. Syria, Herodotus points out, borders on Egypt, and the Phoenicians, to whom Sidon belongs, dwell in Syria. It follows then that in the lines cited Homer makes it evident (116.6, δηλοῖ ὅτι ἠπίστατο) that he knew of Paris' wanderings to Egypt.[7] Two additional points are significant here. Herodotus emphasizes that Homer is consistent about Paris' travels on his return to Troy. So insistent is he about this fact—or so important is it to his overall thesis—that he rejects Homer's authorship of the *Kypria*. Why? Because in that poem Paris reached Troy three days after leaving Sparta. Since this contradicts the *Iliad* and its author, Homer, whom Herodotus has already judged consistent, the *Kypria* must be the work of someone else. Secondly, Herodotus pictures Homer as working rather like himself, gaining knowledge through enquiry (116.1, πυθέσθαι), and at times choosing among variant versions. As a poet, however, Homer used a selective principle rather different from that of Herodotus, the suitability of a particular version for epic poetry. Thus, by the end of chapter 117 Herodotus has succeeded in proving to his own satisfaction the following: Whatever Homer chose to relate in his poems about Helen, he did know of another version of the story. That version gains in stature

[7] Compare chapter 116.1, δηλώσας and ἐπίσταιτο and 116.2, δῆλον. W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, 2 vols., corr. rpt. ed. (Oxford, 1928), 1:224, point out about 116.4-5: "The passages from Odyssey iv (227 seq., 351-2) are probably interpolations; there is no reference to them below. And the presence later of Menelaus and Helen in Egypt is (to say the least) a very indirect proof of the wanderings of Paris." Ph.-E. Legrand, *Hérodote: Histoires II* (Paris, 1936), p. 142, n.2, believes the citations from the *Odyssey* are out of place and would be better at chapter 119. Clearly, the citations add nothing to the argument, nor is my argument dependent on them. Thus, for our purposes, it is immaterial whether they are interpolations (a reasonable supposition) or misplaced quotations. Indeed, even the passage from the *Iliad* is no proof that Paris and Helen visited Egypt. However, it should be noted that this is not what Herodotus is trying to prove. His argument stems from his prior acceptance of the Egyptian *logos*. The fact that Homer knew of the wanderings of Paris to Sidon means that he too knew of this *logos*, and thus can offer a kind of confirmation of it, though he never actually mentions Egypt.

when its rejection by Homer is stated to be due to the requirements of epic poetry and not some more reliable principle.

If one looks at chapters 116-120 as a whole, it is possible to make a number of additional observations about Herodotus' attitude to Homer. First, like Thucydides he never doubts the factual basis of Homer's poems; the occurrence, for example, of the Trojan War, or the existence of Paris, Helen, Priam—any of the characters depicted in the poems. In fact, he has enough respect for the poet of the *Iliad* to note his consistency in the matter of Paris' travels. Secondly, again like Thucydides he indicates that the poems must be used with caution, at least in so far as some of the minute details of the story are concerned. This would seem to be the import of the qualification at 120.3, εἰ χρή τι τοῖσι ἐποποιοῖσι χρεώμενον λέγειν ("if it is possible to say anything on the basis of the epic poets"),[8] where he uses the

[8] This line is usually cited as evidence of Herodotus' skepticism about the trustworthinesss of the epic poets and compared to Thucydides' similar statements at Book 1.9.4 and 1.10.3. Legrand, *Hérodote II*, p. 145, n.1, states: "Hérodote n' a pas plus de confiance dans les dires des poètes en général que Thucydide (I, 9-10) dans les dires d'Homère." Compare A. Wiedemann, *Herodots zweites Buch mit sachlichen Erläuterungen* (Leipzig, 1890), pp. 443-444. In the case of Thucydides we discovered that, whatever the import of his remarks at 1.9.4 and 1.10.3, like Herodotus he relied on Homer for his "facts." (See Chapter One, pp. 30ff.) Note too that here Herodotus is in rather an awkward position, citing the poet only to refute him on a more basic point. Thus, while he does introduce a note of caution, it is difficult to view it as "an instance of Greek rationalizing criticism," as do How and Wells, *Commentary*, p. 224. I would also reject the emphasis of T. S. Brown, "The Greek Sense of Time in History as Suggested by their Accounts of Egypt," *Historia* 11 (1962), 262, that Herodotus "was a pioneer in Homeric 'higher criticism,' the purpose of which was to rationalize the epic in order to make it acceptable workaday history." It should be noted, for instance, that Herodotus' treatment of the *Kypria* is not an early form of Homeric criticism. Homer, he has attempted to establish, knew of the other *logos* and consistently used one aspect of it, the wanderings of Paris and Helen, in his poetry. To retain that knowledge unblemished he must then reject Homer's authorship of the *Kypria*, or his argument falters. As far as modern scholarship is concerned he happens to be right. Why he chose to

many losses of Priam recorded by Homer as part of his own argument in support of Egyptian tradition. Thirdly, he locates the unreliability of Homer in poetic license: in the face of variant versions his principle of selection led him, as a poet, to a bad (or at least an incorrect) choice. Herodotus himself then challenges Homer's version of Helen's presence at Troy with another version, which Homer himself knew but rejected, but which Herodotus affirms is the correct one: the *logos* he derived from the Egyptian priests.[9]

It is now possible to consider the Egyptian *logos* itself, which extends beyond the story of Helen to details of the Trojan War, elicited by Herodotus' additional enquiry of the priests as to the validity of the Greek account of events at Troy (118.1), though presumably he still has Helen in mind. The priests reply with their own version of how the Greeks came to Troy and ultimately discovered the truth of what the Trojans had continued to assert, that Helen was not there. In addition to these facts, presented in chapter 118, in the next chapter the priests describe Menelaos' visit to Egypt, his stay at the court of Proteus, and some of the indignities he perpetrated in their country. Again the particulars of the *logos* will not concern us, but rather the way in which Herodotus indicates the reliability of the priests' testimony and, implicitly, his reasons for accepting their *logos*

introduce the matter has not, however, been sufficiently appreciated; it is closely connected with his own acceptance of the Egyptian *logos*, which a self-consistent Homer serves to confirm.

[9] Compare J. W. Neville, "Herodotus on the Trojan War," *G&R* 24 (1977), 3-12. Neville stresses Herodotus' "critical acumen in making allowances for the epic poets since they were not writing history" (p. 4). The question, in other words, is one of historicity, not literary criticism, and this too Neville understands, for he points out: "This distinction, between historicity and other treatments—e.g. the epic—is elsewhere implicit in Herodotus with regard to what the poets say (e.g. at 4.16 and 6.52), and marks him as clearly the first critic of Homer as a *historian*, as far as we can tell" (*ibid.*). See too H. Verdin, "Les remarques critiques d'Hérodote et de Thucydide sur la poésie en tant que source historique" in *Historiographia Antiqua* (Louvain, 1977), pp. 53-65, who emphasizes the specificity of the genre poetry. Of this the historian must take account (p. 61).

as the true version in preference to Homer's account. The priests have two means of justifying their assertions, on which basis they are able to say they have genuine knowledge (118.1, εἰδέναι; 119.3, ἐπίστασθαι and ἀτρεκέως ἐπιστάμενοι). About events at Troy they have Menelaos' own testimony, the account of an eyewitness, for enquiries were directed to him while he was in Egypt. Their opening statement of certainty they repeat at the end of the *logos*, where they assure their listener that part of their account they know from enquiry (119.3, ἱστορίῃσι; compare 118.1). The rest they know because it happened in their own country. It is, in other words, part of their indigenous tradition, the certainty of which they strongly emphasize. Chapter 120 makes it clear that Herodotus found the priests' account, and in turn their sources, unassailable, for in 120 he proceeds to offer an argument of his own in support of it. In fact, at one point he specifically declares Helen's absence from Troy to be the truth (120.5, τὴν ἀληθείην).

To sum up, then, according to the priests, genuine knowledge derives from two sources, the testimony of an eyewitness and indigenous tradition. Furthermore, since Herodotus makes it clear in this passage that he accepts the priests' account, he thereby indicates his own trust in the reliability of such sources. Naturally, many questions arise in the mind of the modern reader. Even if Menelaos was an eyewitness, why should one believe in his veracity? Can an eyewitness not lie, distort, or display partiality or prejudice? Why in fact should one believe the account of the Egyptian priests, when hundreds of years had elapsed since the Trojan War and the visits of Helen and Menelaos? Herodotus does not at this point acknowledge such problems, nor does he feel called upon to justify his trust in Egyptian tradition. It is possible, however, to turn to a statement made earlier in the same book, which provides at least a partial explanation of this trust. At chapter 77.1 Herodotus describes the Egyptians who live in the arable part of the country (that is, Upper Egypt, which includes places like Memphis and Heliopolis)

as by far the "most learned" men he has met anywhere. In what sense they are learned he makes clear by specifying that they, more than any other people in the world, devote themselves to "memory" (μνήμην) or here "records."[10] In other words, Herodotus was impressed by the Egyptians' concern for records and their preeminence in preserving them. Thus, he could rest assured on one count, that Egyptian memory easily stretched back to Menelaos' time and that, given their skills, the priests retained an accurate record, written or otherwise, both of his visit and of Helen's stay. If, then, Herodotus adopted a rather special attitude to indigenous tradition in general, he must have felt even more regard for Egyptian tradition, which, as a kind of living entity, was not just a floating substance but the concern of a skilled caste, conscious of its responsibility.

In the passage under scrutiny, 116-120, the last chapter represents a new departure for Herodotus. Up to this point, in relating the Egyptian *logos*, he has *ostensibly* not veered from the account of his informants but has been repeating a story, albeit a variant version.[11] Now, in defense of that ver-

[10] For the geography see How and Wells, *Commentary*, p. 205, and W. A. Heidel, *Hecataeus and the Egyptian Priests in Herodotus, Book II* in Memoirs of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 18.2 (Boston, 1935), p. 68. Heidel distinguishes among the priests whom Herodotus cites. In chapter 2.3, for example, having mentioned the three centers of Memphis, Thebes, and Heliopolis, Herodotus states that the Heliopolitans are said to be the most learned of the Egyptians (λογιώτατοι). How and Wells, *ibid.*, following Rawlinson, translate λογιώτατοι as "most skilled in history." "History" is surely too modern. Earlier How and Wells construed the word more correctly, in commenting on chapter 3 (p. 157), as "most skilled in tradition." The priests know and preserve *logoi*. A. B. Lloyd, *Herodotus, Book II*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1975-1976), 2:16: points out," Λόγιος in Pre-Socratic philosophy may be used of the outstanding intellects who have furthered man's progress along the road to civilization." He believes that it may well be, in view of the civilizing role Herodotus accepts of the Egyptians, "that the word λογιώτατοι is here coloured by this concept."

[11] I say ostensibly in recognition of the problem of Herodotus' sources. As Heidel, *Hecataeus*, p. 76, states in reference to chapters 112-120: "Of all the tales which Herodotus attributes to the priests of Egypt this is undoubtedly the most difficult to accept as in any measure coming from them; and

sion, which he accepts, he appends some reasoning of his own, in which he reconstructs the situation at Troy, using the data supplied by both Homer and the Egyptians. It is his own interpretation of the evidence and, like Thucydides' interpretation of similar data in the Archaeology, is a lengthy argument from probability. Underlying his argumentation are some vague generalizations about human behavior. Briefly, he argues as follows: If Helen had been at Troy, the Trojans would have given her up. And even if Priam and his kin had not acted initially to preserve themselves and their city from danger, surely they would have done so after experiencing many serious losses at the hands of the Greeks. Nor could their failure to do so have been due to Paris' influence, since not he, but Hektor, was heir, and Hektor no more than his father Priam would have allowed such calamities to befall the Trojans. This appeal to probability on a number of levels proves that the Egyptians' *logos* is the truth: the Trojans could not give Helen back because she was not there.[12]

There is finally an additional argument presented as Herodotus' own judgment (*gnome*). It is worth noting at this point, because it is a form of explanation that recurs throughout the *Histories*. Having presented a fairly cogent argument from probability, Herodotus is not satisfied to leave the matter in the realm of mere human behavior. To allay any skepticism in the listener's mind as to the Greeks' inability to discover over a period of ten years, and come to believe, that Helen was not present at Troy, he resorts to a religious explanation. The great calamities visited on Troy—its utter destruction—were in fact part of a divine plan to make it evident to mankind that massive wrongdoings bring

no one, I believe, does accept it." See, however, von Fritz, *Die Griechische Geschichtsschreibung* (Berlin, 1967), vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 166 and vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 102-103, n.32, who argues in opposition to Heidel and others that Herodotus' history is "eine genuin ägyptische, wenn auch aus griechischen Elementen zusammengestellte," and see Appendix to Chapter Two, section B: Herodotus' Sources in Book 2.

[12] See Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 1:162-163, on argument by εἰκός, which he states is not uncommon in the *Histories*. He refers to the example of Book 2.120.

massive punishments from the gods. Like his arguments from probability and his "Homeric criticism" this final judgment serves to reinforce the Egyptian *logos*. Indeed, the whole of chapters 116-120 would seem to have as its purpose the verification of that *logos*.

On the basis of the above discussion it is now possible to offer a tentative answer to the questions posed at the outset. In specifically human terms Herodotus justifies his assertions in two ways: first, by inference or arguments from probability and, secondly, by an appeal to a reliable source. The latter alone he designates as knowledge or truth. Seen from the perspective of truth, chapters 116-120 are a coherent entity and not an example of variant versions. A conflict of versions is clearly implicit in the passage, and it may well have been distrust of the epic poets' "early history of Greece" that led Herodotus to make enquiries of the priests in Memphis. At one point, in other words, he faced variants. But the way in which he narrates and justifies the Egyptian *logos* reveals that there is no conflict in his mind about its truth. Thus, he does not introduce Homer as a variant but as a poet who made certain choices *qua* poet, but who left traces in his poetry of another version, the true version, the Egyptian *logos*, which he knew and rejected. The entire passage then, including the historian's so-called Homeric criticism with its inferences, and his reconstruction of events, argued on the basis of probability, serves to verify the Egyptian *logos*. In human terms Herodotus has established the truth about a commonly accepted fact of Greek history derived from the epic poets. He is able to do so because he trusts the reliability of a source that in its antiquity and care takes precedence over Homer. In turn, the reliability of that source is due to the levels of personal observation or autopsy on which the priests base their knowledge. What produces knowledge is a combination of antiquity, care in the preservation and transmission of records or tradition, and finally that tradition itself, an indigenous one, which is rooted in personal observation or autopsy and which, in this instance, stretches back to information gleaned by enquiry from an

eyewitness. All these elements together produce a true *logos*. It is the purpose of this passage to convey that truth.[13]

Chapters 116-120 are not just an isolated example of Herodotus' investigative procedures: the methodology employed there—the sources preferred and the arguments used—also characterize the several other passages chosen for consideration. In chapters 142-146, for instance, Herodotus relies on only indigenous Egyptian tradition, which he accepts without question and on the basis of which he attempts to correct certain Greek beliefs standing in conflict with that source. The point at issue is a genealogical one with serious implications for the comparative chronology of Greek and Egyptian gods, a question already discussed earlier in Book 2. In beginning his argument, Herodotus establishes his authority, rather loosely, as the Egyptians and their priests (142.1). The latter, he reveals, provided him with sufficient information to calculate a period of 11,340 years during which no god had appeared on earth in human form. Whether his "calculation is worthless" will not concern us, nor will his mistake in arithmetic.[14] More important is the way he uses and justifies that figure, for it leads him first to "challenge" his predecessor, Hekataios, and then to correct his own countrymen in their belief about the genealogy of their youngest gods.

Herodotus' "challenge" to Hekataios is curious indeed.

[13] An additional dimension is added to that truth in the last few lines of chapter 120, a dimension which, from a modern perspective, may well seem *de trop*, but which was surely as important to Herodotus as all his preceding arguments. The gods willed it. The emphasis on massive wrongdoings, which bring massive punishment or corrections from the gods, is tied closely to the first few chapters of the *Histories* (1.1-5) and Herodotus' general theme of wrongs and retaliation (*adika erga*). This theme will be addressed in a later chapter. In the present context, the explanation goes beyond human terms.

[14] How and Wells, *Commentary*, p. 236, explain why the calculation is worthless. They also note Herodotus' error in arithmetic (p. 237), assuming, of course, that he had in mind a generation of 33⅓ years. See Lloyd, *Herodotus* 1:175-178 and 1:185-189, for a discussion of Herodotus' Egyptian chronology and the Egyptian king list.

For he deliberately differentiates his own approach to the priests of Zeus from that of his predecessor. While Hekataios traced his descent to a god fifteen generations before himself, Herodotus made no such profession about his lineage. In both instances the priests responded by showing their visitor statues that extended back thousands of years. That Herodotus evinces "malicious joy" in this passage is surely too strong.[15] Even to describe his tone as "somewhat depreciatory" is perhaps a misreading.[16] To view the matter in an opposite light, whatever conclusions his predecessor drew from the information he obtained at Thebes about his own and Greek genealogy—and this we do not know—his example lends weight to the display Herodotus is about to describe and thus underscores the unchanging quality of the Egyptians' devotion to "memory" and their preservation of it. Even as the tradition is rooted in autopsy, so Herodotus like Hekataios is privileged to share in that autopsy. For the priests at Thebes showed him (143.2 and 3, δεικνύντες) colossal statues of their predecessors and, though they counted back from father to son, 345 priests in all, they reached neither a god nor a hero.[17] Chapter 143 thus provides evidence for the statement made in 142 about the longevity of *le temps des hommes* among the Egyptians. Brief as it is, the reference to Hekataios serves to corroborate this evidence, for he too saw the statues and described the procedures of the priests. In turn, this constitutes proof that there was indeed an opportunity for personal observation, rare in matters of ancient history.[18] That Herodotus both seized that opportunity and

[15] Lloyd, *ibid.*, 1:127.

[16] How and Wells, *Commentary*, p. 237. Legrand, *Hérodote II*, p. 21, states, "Il ne nomme Hécatée qu'une fois, au chapitre 143, pour se moquer de lui."

[17] Forms of ἀποδεικνῦναι also appear three times in chapter 143 and once in 144. Herodotus is more than insistent about the ability and readiness of the priests to display their "archaeological" evidence.

[18] In keeping with my interpretation of Herodotus' reference to Hekataios, I would also suggest a reason other than mockery for his mention of the manner in which his predecessor disclosed his lineage at Thebes, while he kept silent about himself. He thus underscores the availability of the

related the experience in detail shows once again the significance he attributed to autopsy, while at the same time it accords with the methodology he set forth in chapter 99.1.

Next follows *le temps des dieux* in Egypt, when gods dwelt as rulers among men, which is the major point of chapter 144. Since Herodotus proffers the names of the last two ruling deities and identifies them with their Greek counterparts, he is compelled to explain the resulting chronological contradiction. In actual fact, he has already discussed the problem earlier (chapters 43-53) and he refers the listener to that discussion. Here he proceeds to record the number of years, according to the Egyptians, from the time of the Greeks' three youngest gods—Herakles, Pan, and Dionysos—to the reign of Amasis. In citing periods of thousands rather than hundreds of years that must tax the Greek historical imagination, Herodotus evinces not the slightest diffidence but confidently justifies his assertion in the same manner as he did in the case of the *logos* about Helen and Menelaos. The Egyptians themselves gave him the figures and they declared that their knowledge was accurate, "because they always reckoned up and recorded the years" (145.3). Earlier (100.1), Herodotus made explicit reference to a papyrus from which the priests read him the names of the 330 successors of their first king, Min. In other words, the Egyptians not only took great care in the preservation and transmission of records or tradition, but in some instances they had also preserved written records. Such writing made an indelible impression on Herodotus and set him pondering, for it forced him to see the chronological contradiction that resulted from setting Greek and Egyptian accounts side by side.[19] This is made

evidence and the readiness of the priests to display it, even when they were not challenged by a different tradition. For the use of the expression *le temps des hommes*, see Vidal-Naquet, "Temps des dieux et temps des hommes," *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 157 (1960), 55-80; and Chapter One, note 4.

[19] καὶ ταῦτα Αἰγύπτιοι ἀτρεκέως φασὶ ἐπίστασθαι, αἰεί τε λογιζόμενοι καὶ αἰεὶ ἀπογραφόμενοι τὰ ἔτεα. In reading Chapter Two James Day of Vassar College noted: "And *this writing* perhaps was the most compelling, convincing, fascinating thing of all—his audience were not

clear in the next chapter, where he attempts to explain the conflicting genealogy, and in particular the chronology attributed by the Greeks to their three youngest gods. While ostensibly he allows his listener to choose between the two traditions, as if they were true variants, he indicates curtly that his own mind is made up and his "judgment" already expressed. Once again it is necessary to refer to earlier passages where he discusses whence the Greeks derived the names of their gods, and some of the gods themselves (43-53). Following the argument of chapters 43-44, he first distinguishes Herakles from Dionysos and Pan and then employs certain *lacunae* in the stories told about them to argue against a Euhemerist explanation: they were not originally famous men. The reasoning of chapter 146 is based on probability, but it allows Herodotus to revert to and make use of a thesis put forward in the passage referred to above, that almost all the names of the gods came to Greece from Egypt (50.1).[20] Here he concludes (146.2): "It is evident to me (δῆλα) that the Greeks learned the names of these gods after those of the other deities." To this time they also mistakenly attributed their birth. Thus is the contradiction resolved, the Greek account corrected, and once more Egyptian tradition allowed to emerge as the truth.

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readers, they were preliterate listeners . . . and bound to be impressed by 'book-learning' of such antiquity." Compare Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), *passim*. Goody, *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 14-15, believes that "the distinction between *mythos* and *historia* comes into being at the time when alphabetic writing encouraged mankind to set one account of the universe or the pantheon beside another and hence perceive the contradictions that lie between them."

[20] For what Herodotus means by τὰ οὐνόματα see Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 2: 203-205, who rather cautiously accepts the view that "οὔνομα may mean 'name + personality' " (p. 204). How and Wells, *Commentary*, p. 191, are much more assertive in their conviction that "the name of the deity involved his personality, and so H.'s position is that the Greek deities were defined, and their attributes and cult settled, by Egypt." Compare Legrand, *Hérodote II*, p. 96, n.3, and a series of other commentators cited by Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 1:204, among them I. M. Linforth, "Greek Gods and Foreign Gods in Herodotus," *UCPCP* 9 (1926), 1-25, who believe τὸ οὔνομα means personality.

To conclude the discussion of Herodotus' investigative procedures, it is merely necessary to reaffirm that the methodology employed in chapters 142-146 is the same as that found in 116-120. There is no doubt in the historian's mind about where truth resides, for he accepts as genuine the account of the priests purveying indigenous Egyptian tradition. Once again he makes but the palest concession to the Greek variant. Instead, having allowed that the Egyptians possess genuine knowledge, duly recorded and preserved, he employs his powers of reasoning to explain and argue away the resultant contradiction. Herodotus does not cite Hekataios, the only other source mentioned, as a variant, but draws from him just enough to suit his purpose. He uses his predecessor to corroborate his own experience at Thebes and the information he acquired there. As the reliability of Egyptian "memory" once again emerges, that source affords him the knowledge and certainty to justify certain of his own assertions. For having established what is in his own eyes the truth, he employs his reasoning much as he did in 116-120. Just as there he challenged a commonly accepted fact of early Greek history derived from Homer, so here he corrects certain Greek traditions about the gods, presumably also derived from the poets.

As a preface to our discussion of selection, it may be fruitful to consider a statement of How and Wells that raises the question of Herodotus' principle of selection and his purpose in writing Book 2. Chapters 142-146, they believe, "are a digression, before the history of the twenty-sixth (Saite) dynasty."[21] Without prejudging the question of selection, I would argue that chapters 142-146 are in no sense digressive. Analysis of the text has revealed that this passage is as taut and coherent as chapters 116-120, with a sustained viewpoint and a rather similar purpose. Indeed, in the case of 142-146 Herodotus' control was such that he twice cross-referred that passage to earlier portions of Book 2. The subject was evi-

[21] *Commentary*, 1:236.

dently one that engrossed him deeply. How and Wells are, however, correct in suggesting a break or transition at chapter 147. As they point out, "H. rightly emphasizes the change in the character of his sources."[22] Heidel explains the difference thus: "when the narrative is resumed, at II, 147, Herodotus recognizes that what we may call 'modern history' begins."[23] Whether one attributes this change in the text to sources or to historical period, if accepted, it lends weight to the view that chapters 142-146 are not a digression but a fitting conclusion to 99-141. As a statement or demonstration of methodology they complement 99.1, while their subject matter returns the reader to the papyrus mentioned at 100.1, whereon were listed the names of 330 kings. This circularity is accentuated by the first words of 147: "The above account is based on what the Egyptians themselves say." Seen as a complement and return to chapters 99 and 100, chapters 142-146 confirm the list of names there by "archaeological" evidence in the form of the statues of 345 priests and their successors, thus enhancing the reliability of the number of kings recorded at chapter 100.1 and the length of time their reigns spanned. Here, in addition, Herodotus makes it clear that though he began his "historical account" with Min, Egyptian longevity and the records that preserve its "memory" extend back far beyond that first king. That "memory" tells of a time when gods mingled with men and

[22] *Commentary*, 1:240. Compare J. Cobet, *Herodots Exkurse und die Frage der Einheit seines Werkes*, Historia, Einzelschriften 17 (Wiesbaden, 1971), p. 128, and Lloyd, *Herodotus* 1:185: "The importance of Greeks is especially emphasized by Herodotus who regards their intervention in Egyptian History and the first-hand information derived therefrom as the beginning of accurate Greek knowledge of Egypt's past." Herodotus specifically refers to Greek settlers in Egypt at 154.4 as the source of genuine knowledge (ἐπιστάμεθα ἀτρεκέως) about the period beginning with Psammetichos' reign. For the general view that these other informants were Greek, see von Fritz, *Griechishe Geschichtsschreibung*, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 410 and pt. 2, pp. 120-121, and Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (Cleveland, 1966), p. 65.

[23] *Hecataeus*, p. 96.

contains calculations that take one back thousands of years to dynasties of gods. If the Egyptians know this "with certainty"—and Herodotus does not demur—*a fortiori* they must be reliable in matters of human history. Chapters 142-146 are thus an appropriate conclusion to his account of the early part of that history.

It is now possible to consider Herodotus' principle of selection directly, and we shall do so by analyzing chapters 43-45 and 49-53. To begin, it is worth noting that the reasoning Herodotus employs in 43 follows the pattern outlined above. Faced with a conflict between Greek beliefs and his own discoveries about the god Herakles in Egypt, he speedily subverts the former by a number of inferences aimed at proving that the Greeks derived the names of their god from the Egyptians and not vice versa. Only after he has offered his own proofs (43.2, τεκμήρια) about probable derivation, designated at one point as his judgment,[24] does he introduce his Egyptian source to clinch the argument. The Egyptians, he points out, have an ancient god, Herakles, who came into being seventeen thousand years before the reign of Amasis. Clearly, Herodotus began the chapter accepting Egyptian tradition, which he attempted to support by his own reasoning. The latter, in other words, is again used for the purpose of verification, even if the order of the chapter is somewhat backward, with the Egyptian evidence kept to the end. As a whole then it resembles 116-120 and 142-146. Where the reasoning differs is in the addition of chapter 44, a departure in methodology, in that the historian's concern for the truth[25] led him to seek external evidence to verify the Egyptian account. Unlike other aspects of early Egyptian history and religion there fortunately existed sources of information about the god, which he could and did consult.

[24] Chapter 43.3, ὡς ἔλπομαί τε καὶ ἐμὴ γνώμη αἱρέει used in respect of early Greek and Egyptian contact as seamen and its implication for the probable derivation of deities. Compare Verdin, *De historisch-kritische Methode van Herodotus* (Brussels, 1971), pp. 184-186.

[25] Chapter 44.1, θέλων δὲ τούτων πέρι σαφές τι εἰδέναι.

Chapter 44 documents Herodotus' travels to Tyre and Thasos and his enquiries at the temples of Herakles there. It is a model of curiosity and discovery, full of words that indicate his investigative techniques, among them references to the familiar autopsy, proof that he actually saw the temples. On the other hand, the worth of his evidence depends entirely on what the priests at the respective temples told him.[26] In both places he discovered that the foundation of the temples predated the birth of Amphitryon's son by many generations. Two points are noteworthy here. First, he accepts the account of his local informants without question, confirming our own and others' findings about his rather special attitude to indigenous tradition. Secondly, what he has in mind in his search for the truth and what he brings into question at once are Greek beliefs. For even before he records the results of his enquiries at Tyre, he indicates that the account of the priests there conflicted with Greek tradition about Herakles.[27] Similarly, on discovering the age of the temple at Thasos, he shows how the date contradicts that accepted for the birth of Herakles in Greece. In other words, his concern in conducting his researches is the Greeks themselves. So seriously did Egyptian tradition undermine their beliefs that he thought it necessary to provide additional evidence in support of the former. At the same time, it is clear from the way he presents that evidence in chapter 44 that his main dispute is with the Greeks and that he consistently preferred his local informants to his own countrymen. Having thoroughly undermined the latter, he ends the chapter with the confident assertion that his researches prove (44.5, δηλοῖ σαφέως) the existence of an ancient god, Herakles. He has verified the Egyptian account. In fact, he feels sure enough

[26] The verb εἶδον, for example, occurs twice. We can only assume he enquired of the priests at Thasos, for he does not mention them, only the temple he discovered there (44.4, εὗρον) and some information about its founders and their date.

[27] The Greek of chapter 44.3 is εὗρον δὲ οὐδὲ τούτους τοῖσι Ἕλλησι συμφερομένους, again a discovery. Οὐδὲ refers back to the Egyptians.

of the truth to proffer an opinion of his own, indicating the correctness of those who offer separate worship to Herakles, the immortal, and Herakles, the hero. He thus resolves the contradiction, by positing a duality, and presumably a confusion in Greek tradition between god and hero. Once again those who composed the theogony and established the attributes of gods and heroes stand indicted.

Herodotus becomes even more explicit about his concerns in chapter 45, which one is tempted to read very closely with the two preceding chapters. It is true that the first sentence looks ahead to the "silly story" he will hold up to ridicule, that is, that Herakles killed thousands of Egyptians, when they attempted to offer him as a sacrifice to Zeus. Yet the statement that the Greeks accepted a great deal "without serious investigation" (ἀνεπισκέπτως) seems to emanate logically from the conclusion he drew in chapters 43-44. The *mythos* about Herakles is then a concrete instance of the general unreliability of much of Greek tradition. In any case, this chapter reveals clearly that, whatever his original purpose in visiting Egypt, his discoveries there ultimately produced a deep distrust in him about the reliability of that tradition, whether "historical" or religious. Thus one purpose of Book 2 is to correct the tradition in the light of the genuine knowledge and experience he himself gained in Egypt. In this instance he charges his countrymen with ignorance of the nature and customs of the Egyptians. He has himself laid the ground for much of the argument in earlier chapters (chapter 38 and following), and, while that argument amounts to an inference from probability, it is a clever one, based on his own documentation of the Egyptians' concern for purity and their discrimination among sacrificial animals. How would such a people, he asks sarcastically, sacrifice a human being?[28]

While it has become clear that in Book 2 Herodotus cor-

[28] His second argument rests on his belief that the Greek Herakles of the story was a mortal. See Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 2:214, How and Wells, *Commentary*, p. 187, and Wiedemann, *Herodots zweites Buch*, p. 205.

rected Greek tradition about the gods in the light of knowledge he had acquired in Egypt, to state in addition that that was one of his purposes in composing the Egyptian *Logos* is new and requires further illustration. Chapters 49-53 will serve to illustrate that purpose. Because of the difficulty Herodotus experienced in correlating Greek tradition and Egyptian knowledge, chapters 49-53 are full of his own conjectures and opinions. On the other hand, the passage is a fascinating, though unsubstantiated, disquisition on Greek religion, in which the subject of Egypt proper fades somewhat into the background. Egypt does, however, remain important to the degree that he could not have written the passage at all if he had not accepted the antiquity, and so the priority, of the Egyptian gods, the point which he proved conclusively in chapters 43-44 and to which he will return in 144-146. For instance, he verifies the antiquity of Dionysos, who existed under an Egyptian name long before he was "born" in Greece, and corrects the stories of those who deliberately and mistakenly composed a genealogy making Kadmos his grandfather. Having clarified the origin of Dionysos to his own satisfaction, he then turns to the derivation of the rest of the Greek pantheon. Alluding to researches that have taken him into areas remote from Egypt (50.1), he is nonetheless prepared to discuss his findings in the interest of general clarification. The entire passage, with its concern for truth, or at least for a reasonable hypothesis about the Greek gods, offers the reader a key to Book 2. It indicates that the subject of the Egyptian *Logos* is as much the Greeks as Egypt itself.

After stating the results of his researches, which indicate that the names of almost all the gods are of barbarian origin, Herodotus expresses the belief that Egypt was their source.[29]

[29] The original version of this chapter was much longer with a detailed discussion of the varied problems of chronology, origins, etc., found in chapters 49-53. The subsequent appearance of Lloyd's *Herodotus* permits me to refer the reader to the second volume of that work, pp. 224-251, for historical notes on, *inter alia*, Dionysos, Kadmos, Melampous, and the Pelasgians.

He distinguishes three stages in the history of Greek religion. In the first stage divine powers existed without names, gods who were worshipped by the Pelasgians before they had come to identify them with their counterparts in Egypt. These divine powers are identical with the latter, though only the Egyptians have genuine knowledge about their antiquity and have "always" had a pantheon in which the individual gods have a position and distinctive characteristics as well as a cult. The transition to the second stage occurred when the Pelasgians adopted Egyptian names (or whatever characteristics and attributes Herodotus implies by names)[30] for their nameless divinities, a kind of formal recognition of what had in essence preexisted the names. Thus, no gods were born in Greece at the traditionally accepted dates. Chapter 53 goes on to explain the source of the latter notion, along with a great deal more about the Greek gods, their physical and other attributes, lineage, and epithets, in a word, much of Greek mythology. The sources of all the above are the poets Hesiod and Homer. Herodotus has no authority for his assertions, as he readily admits in the last line (53.3, ἐγὼ λέγω), unlike his information about the Pelasgians, which he ascribes to the priestesses at Dodona.[31] As to the dates of Homer and Hesiod, he offers only an opinion (53.2, δοκέω). What emerges, however, is his calculation of a span of four hundred years back to those poets. In its brevity this span of time contrasts at once with the "memory" and written records of the Egyptian priests, which go back thousands of years and which Herodotus has already cited and will cite again as authoritative in such matters.[32] Sec-

[30] See above, note 20.

[31] Compare Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 2:243-247, for a discussion of Herodotus' three phases of Greek religious consciousness. Lloyd believes, "H.'s theological scheme, i.e. his attempt to systematize and explain his data on Gk. religion, appears to be original, though well within the spirit of the age" (p. 243).

[32] He stresses the brevity of the time-span by the words πρώην τε καὶ χθὲς ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ in chapter 53.1. The interest in this chapter has usually centered on the light it may or may not shed on the Homeric question, in

ondly, Homer and Hesiod and those who came after them are poets, and though poets may be aware of a true *logos*, they have their own criteria for relating and altering that *logos*; their artistic canons permit both exaggeration and fiction. The last stage of Greek religion, then, with its creation of the mythology which embodies descriptions and stories about the gods, traditions in general, as well as an early history of heroes and men, is the work of poets.

Based on the analysis of Book 2 to this point, one important conclusion has already been reached: the subject of the Egyptian *Logos* is as much the Greeks as Egypt itself. Clearly, this has serious implications for Herodotus' principle of selection, necessitating a further elaboration of that principle in order to see how much the subject of the Greeks influenced his choice of detail throughout the book as a whole. But first, a caveat. There are in Book 2 a number of internal proems, noted by Immerwahr and generally defined by him "as statements within the work which introduce not merely a single *logos*, but more generally a larger section of material, or as statements calling attention to the importance of a *logos* in more general terms than do simple anticipatory statements."[33] One of the most striking examples is found at the beginning of the section on customs (35.1), where Herodotus indicates that he is going to lengthen the *Logos* on Egypt "because the country has the most wonders (θωμάσια) and *vis-à-vis* other countries contains works which defy description (ἔργα λόγου μέζω)." This statement is reminiscent of a remark he made earlier with respect to the Nile (10.3): "There are other rivers as well, which are in size inferior to the Nile, but which have produced great works of their own [ἔργα ἀποδεξάμενοι μεγάλα]." Herodotus will devote

particular, the date of Homer. See, e.g., Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 2:247-249, and Verdin, "Les remarques critiques," pp. 58-59, who notes: "Pour autant qu'on sache, il fut en effet le premier à fournir une datation absolue d'Homère, sans qu'il nous renseigne toutefois sur les arguments qui ont amené cette conclusion."

[33] *Form and Thought*, p. 63.

many chapters to the *erga* of the Nile itself, a river equalled only by the Danube. What is striking about both these statements is the way in which they echo the words of the proem at the beginning of the *Histories*. For there Herodotus vowed that one of the purposes of his disquisition was "to ensure that the great and wondrous works [ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά] accomplished both among Greeks and among barbarians not go unrecognized."[34] Given so broad a purpose, then, one must not expect to find in Herodotus' work the kind of strict selective principles employed by Thucydides. The genre *historie* allowed for a certain amount of description of "works and wonders" for their own sake, be they individual customs or significant geographic details. In fact, to suggest that *historie* "allowed for" this kind of description is an understatement: the genre surely required such details. Or as Immerwahr states about 35.1, "This introduction cannot

[34] I have construed the passage making τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι a dative of interest (*dativus commodi*), thus incorporating the kind of *erga* referred to in chapter 10.3, which are not the works of man. Usually it is translated as a dative of agent. See H. W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, revised by G. M. Messing (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), pp. 342-344. The proem, which extends from this introductory sentence to the end of 1.5, has given rise to an extensive literature, cited by Immerwahr in "Aspects of Historical Causation in Herodotus," *TAPA* 87 (1956), 247-248, n.11, and in "*Ergon*: History as a Monument in Herodotus and Thucydides," *AJP* 81 (1960), 264, n.6. Immerwahr, "*Ergon*," discusses this passage and the controversy about the meaning of the word *ergon* in it, rejecting the narrow interpretation, "actual monuments such as temples or the Egyptian pyramids," accepted by, among others, Jacoby (Immerwahr, p. 263 and n.5 *ad locum*). Immerwahr himself prefers an older interpretation, p. 264: "A study of the whole work shows clearly that the broader interpretation is correct for both passages, and in particular, that we must take the *erga* at the beginning of the proem, with Regenbogen, in the widest possible sense as 'achievements' or 'works,' including both monuments and deeds." I agree entirely, and thus reject a different kind of narrow interpretation, Rawlinson's translation "the great and wonderful actions of the Greeks and the Barbarians." Compare Hannelore Barth, "Zur Bewertung und Auswahl des Stoffes durch Herodot (Die Begriffe θῶμα, θωμάζω, θωμάσιος und θωμαστός)," *Klio* 50 (1968), 93-110, and Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 1:141-147.

be taken at face value, because a *nomoi*-section is mandatory in ethnography."[35]

This much conceded, it would be quite mistaken to view Book 2 as a random selection of curiosities and anecdotes. The question is, how are we to explain the massive *Logos* about Egypt, if we do not take at face value Herodotus' proemial statement at 35.1, but believe that something more than extraordinary works and wonders interested him in Egypt. Why, for example, did he not devote a *Logos* of similar length and complexity to the works and wonders of Lydia or Persia? One of the reasons is that the peoples of Lydia and Persia did not impress him by their antiquity or by their past influence on the Greeks and their contribution to Greek self-knowledge. Egypt was extraordinary in these ways. No matter what might have been the original purpose of his journey to that country, Herodotus was deeply impressed there by the antiquity of the Egyptians, whom he believed to be coeval with the human race (15.3); by the long list of their inventions and discoveries, especially important because of their civilizing effect on other peoples; and finally by their self-sufficiency, their adherence to indigenous *nomoi* and refusal to admit foreign ways (79.1). Herodotus found himself in the unique position of being able to extend backward by thousands of years *le temps des hommes* to a period when gods mingled with men, a time so remote from the present as to be unimaginable, and one that challenged *le temps des dieux* accepted by the Greeks. Furthermore, he found that the Egyptians retained a "memory" of their past not merely in indigenous oral tradition but in written records as well, which extended back as far as the time of the gods. In many cases, it was possible to verify that memory by observable vestiges. All this, of course, had implications for the Greeks. It meant, first, that their obviously younger civilization was in many significant respects derivative and that their knowledge about their own past, their early traditions

[35] *Form and Thought*, p. 64.

and mythology, was quite unreliable and open to correction by this more authoritative source. Herodotus' enquiries thus represented a challenge to the poets in particular, but in addition, as we shall see, to many Ionian logographers, who had formulated reasoned opinions (*gnomai*) about Egypt.

This was a serious business, and one that required all Herodotus' capacity for research and powers of reasoning in order to produce an account authoritative enough to command respect and trust—in other words, to produce the truth, as opposed to *mythoi*, the fabrications of poets, or even certain *gnomai*, the theories of logographers. Basic to his account is the primacy of the Egyptians themselves, of their customs, and of their gods. One component of his argument is his insistence that they always adhered to their own ancestral *nomoi* and adopted no others (79.1; compare 49.3). Having asserted this in chapter 79, for example, he proceeds to discuss a song called by the Greeks "the Linos" and sung among a variety of peoples. He was, he tells us, amazed by this song as much as by anything in Egypt. (In this case Herodotus' wonder is obviously due to the coincidence of an Egyptian custom with one deeply rooted in Greek religious practice.) Thus he naturally enquired as to its origin and discovered that it had "always" existed. As usual "always" can be located in time and in this case refers to the reign of the first king, Min, when, the Egyptians said, the song, the first and only one of its kind, was sung in honor of his son, who had died prematurely. It was, in other words, an indigenous discovery.[36] Here Herodotus leaves it to his readers to form their own judgment about the possible derivation of the Greek Linos. This is not his usual procedure. For the obvious

[36] Compare chapter 91 for another kind of explanation of a custom that was admittedly Greek, gymnastic games at Chemis. The Chemmites were merely following the instructions of their own kinsman, Perseus, when they instituted and celebrated games in his honor. This is the only exception to the broad statement with which Herodotus begins chapter 91. Though derived from the Greeks, the custom takes on a rather special character, being enjoined by a hero. See Lloyd, *Herodotus* 2:367-370.

corollary of the Egyptians' self-sufficiency is that all their customs and beliefs must be, like the Linos, indigenous "discoveries." A second corollary, not so obvious perhaps, but reasonable, if their longevity as a people has been accepted, is that the Greeks derived many of their customs and beliefs from the Egyptians, who first discovered them. The list of Egyptian discoveries is impressive: oracles (55-57), divination (57.3), processions (58), the horoscope (82.1), geometry (109.3), metempsychosis (123.2-3), and the Mysteries of Demeter (171.2-3). Just as he did with the names of the gods, Herodotus carefully links all these discoveries to their Greek counterparts, indicating in each instance that the Greek practice derived from Egypt. Clearly, Greek civilization owed a great deal to Egypt.

All the above coheres rather neatly, but the cogency of Herodotus' arguments for Egyptian priority in discoveries, and hence their influence on Greek civilization, derives ultimately from the evidence he can adduce to prove their primacy as a people. Here the passages of Book 2 analyzed above, which were shown to be interrelated or at least interconnected as to purpose, are important. For they provide a picture of Herodotus at work, justifying his assertions by belief or certainty (based either on probability or on genuine knowledge, or a combination of the two), all the while challenging the traditions of the Greeks. From those passages it became clear that Herodotus himself accepted the priests' "memory" or records as valid evidence, and as a "true" *logos*, as contrasted to mere *mythos*. To his own satisfaction he established the longevity of the Egyptians and both the longevity and primacy of their gods. But Herodotus had more than *mythoi* with which to contend. For there were extant in his day certain theories that would deny the Egyptians their longevity and make them coeval with the delta. Basic to his arguments in the chapters discussed above is his prior refutation of those theories. It is noteworthy that he chose to begin the Egyptian *Logos* with just such a refutation in chapters 2-16. The passage is certainly important enough to con-

sider in some detail as an exemplar of the historian's methodology. For it provides additional insight into the kind of evidence and reasoning he employed to establish the truth, and his purpose in so doing.

Paradoxically, Herodotus begins chapters 2-16 with a story refuting the primacy of the Egyptians as a people. As a result of Psammetichos' experiment (which is described in such a way as to emphasize the thoroughness of the king's enquiries), the Egyptians concluded that the Phrygians were an older people and yielded first place to them.[37] That Herodotus is challenging a Greek variant he soon makes clear, by indicating that his source for the manner in which Psammetichos carried out the experiment was the priests of Hephaistos at Memphis (2.5). As for what the Greeks say, it is silly, like much else they say.[38] Thus the historian begins with indigenous tradition, gleaned from the priests, and sets it in opposition to a Greek variant. By default, the former emerges as more credible, though Herodotus passes no judgment. Instead, he moves to a description of his investigative techniques, which included travel to and further enquiries at Thebes and Heliopolis. There he sought to corroborate the *logoi* he had heard at Memphis. What he stresses about his

[37] Even if the story is taken seriously, there is no explanation of why the Egyptians deserved second place, unless their great antiquity was assumed. This is the view of How and Wells, *Commentary*, pp. 155-156, where they also discuss various difficulties surrounding the story, including the possibility it was a "Greek invention." Compare Legrand, *Hérodote II*, p. 66, nn.1-3, and p. 67, n.1, and Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 2:8-12. Note Psammetichos' rather Herodotean enquiries. He wanted to know (2.1, εἰδέναι) who really was first, but could not discover by mere enquiry (2.2, πυνθανόμενος). Hence the experiment. In time, when the children spoke, he had them brought into his presence (ἐς ὄψιν) and only on hearing them for himself (2.4, ἀκούσας δὲ καὶ αὐτός) made further enquiries, which brought an answer.

[38] Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 2:9, believes the Greek here sounds like an echo of the introduction to Hekataios' *Genealogies*. "Such irony is typical of H.'s attitude to Hec. . . . and the appearance at the beginning of the rejected version suggests strongly that it has something to do with Hec." See Appendix to Chapter Two, section C: Herodotus and Hekataios.

journeys is the reputation of the Heliopolitans, who are said to be "the most learned" of all the Egyptians (3.1).[39] His professed methodology, to seek agreement among his informants, becomes important in the next chapter, where he proceeds to recount a number of Egyptian discoveries about which there was common agreement (4.1). These include the discovery of the solar year, the adoption of the names of the twelve gods, and the dedication to the gods of altars, statues, and temples, for most of which the Egyptians had some kind of proof (4.2, ἔργῳ ἐδήλουν).[40] Up to this point the Greeks have not left his mind but are declared to be less wise where the calendar is concerned, and derivative in matters of religion.

Chapter 4 leads Herodotus very quickly to the question that most concerns him, the origin and nature of Lower Egypt. In the time of their first king Min, the priests told him, all Egypt except the Thebaic nome was a marsh and the land below Lake Moiris was actually inundated. Again the information is based on indigenous tradition, and to Herodotus it seems not just reasonable, but self-evident. It is, he states, obvious to any sensible person on the basis of his own observations (5.1, ἰδόντι) that the part of Egypt known to the Greeks and much that lies above it is an acquired land, the gift of the river.[41] Herodotus then proceeds to give a detailed account of the *physis* of Egypt, based for the most part on his own observations. Though he records mainly distances and dimensions, his aim is to prove that

[39] See above, p. 58 and note 10 *ad locum*.

[40] One can only trust that when Herodotus speaks of agreement it is among the priests at the three temples, the corroboration he referred to at 3.1. Ἔργῳ ἐδήλουν probably indicates that Herodotus saw the visible remains of the objects and buildings he lists at 4.2. Compare Verdin, *De historisch-kritische Methode*, p. 124.

[41] Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 2:37, believes Hekataios' influence is detectable here (*FGrH* 1, F.301), but he also notes that "despite the influence, the wording of F.301 and the discussion of sedimentation II, 5ff., taken together, prove that H. has gone far beyond Hec. in his analysis of the subject as far as Egypt is concerned."

this part of Egypt, some of which is swampy, is the result of alluvial deposits and had once been a gulf of the sea. Herodotus has, of course, no truly scientific means of confirming this theory but formulates his views as a series of opinions and conjectures. His mistakes and inaccuracies have naturally provoked comment and correction.[42] The important point, however, is not his accuracy in particulars but the genuine attempt he made to verify the priests' account by his own observations. By chapter 10 he offers a tentative opinion: "The greater part of this country described above I myself thought to be land acquired by the Egyptians, just as the priests said." Thus far then indigenous tradition has been verified by autopsy.

Herodotus' next argument is rather less sound but no less interesting. He starts from the observation that the region beyond Memphis appeared to have been at one time a gulf of the sea, and then tries to explain how it might have been filled in by the Nile, using the analogy of other rivers, which are admittedly smaller than the Nile but which are nonetheless comparable, in having formed land by alluvial deposits (one of the ἔργα μεγάλα of rivers). Reasonable enough, but Herodotus carries the argument a step further by suggesting a comparison with the present Arabian gulf. Egypt, he believes (11.3), was once very like that gulf. A principle of symmetry seems to enter here, in which the Nile chose almost whimsically to divert its waters into the Egyptian gulf. What if the Nile chose to flow into the Arabian gulf? What could prevent its silting up the gulf in less than twenty thousand years (or even ten thousand, his own guess)? The question is rhetorical, aimed at showing the capacity of this active river and its accomplishments in the fulness of time. Neither the comparison nor the question constitutes a proof, but if

[42] For example, note his terms at 10.1: ἐδόκεε καὶ αὐτῷ μοι and ἐφαίνετό μοι. He consistently employs forms of δοκέειν throughout the succeeding chapters. For his mistakes and inaccuracies see How and Wells, *Commentary*, pp. 160-165 and now Lloyd's detailed discussion in *Herodotus*, 2:36-64.

the reasoning behind the reference to the Arabian gulf is accepted, there can be no doubt that the *erga* of the Nile, working in the larger gulf, would have been great indeed and have spanned thousands of years before his own time.[43]

By chapter 12 Herodotus is prepared to assert his belief in what his informants say about Egypt. Indeed, it is a belief that he himself endorses, again on the basis of his own observations, this time of a geological nature, which follow. As Lloyd notes, "The scientific nature of this chapter has often been remarked upon."[44] Herodotus' final argument, designated as an important proof (13.1, μέγα τεκμήριον), has not been so well received by his critics. It is based on the difference in height that has come about in the land from King Moiris' time to his own day and the extent to which it is now necessary for the Nile to rise in order to flood the land. Whether valid or not as a proof of the origin of the delta, chapter 13 illustrates Herodotus' ready acceptance of the word of the priests as to their own past. He can neither confirm nor refute their figure of eight cubits for the extent the Nile rose in Moiris' day: he can and does establish and contrast the present figure of fifteen or sixteen cubits and speculates as to the problems the Egyptians may well face in future, if their land continues to rise at the same rate as it has in the past nine hundred years.

At chapter 15 Herodotus finally refutes outright those whom he surely had in mind as he adduced his evidence and stated his own opinions in the previous chapters. These are the Ionian logographers. According to their theories the delta alone constitutes Egypt; all the rest of the country is part of Libya and Arabia. This means that the Egyptians had no country before the delta came into being and are thus coeval

[43] Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 2:66, also notes the "sense of symmetry" and states, "Doubtless, this *Drang nach Symmetrie* was an important factor in suggesting to H. this argument κατ' ἀναλογίαν." How and Wells, *Commentary*, p. 165, point out, "Probably he allows '20,000' years, because this was roughly his conception of the duration of Egyptian history." Compare Wiedemann, *Herodots zweites Buch*, p. 73.

[44] *Ibid.* Compare How and Wells, *ibid.*

with the delta. Herodotus rejects this view, expressing an opinion in agreement with his Egyptian informants that the delta is formed of alluvial deposits and is relatively recent in origin. All the evidence and arguments from chapter 5 through 14, verifying the priests, back him up. This is, of course, no proof that Egypt existed before the delta. As evidence of that country's antiquity he reverts to the story of Psammetichos' experiment, with which he began the Egyptian *Logos*. It was not the story's capacity to astonish or charm that dictated his selection of it there; he clearly believed it and thought it essential to his argument. Here it is the crux of the argument. The essential point is that, if the Egyptians had really had no country of their own, they would never have had the temerity to believe themselves to be the first of mankind or found it necessary to make an experiment seeking linguistic proof of their primacy. But they did. Thus once again indigenous tradition, which Herodotus confirmed and corrected through the priests at Memphis, is used to verify the priests' account of their own past. He ends emphatically with the belief (15.3, δοκέω) that the Egyptians were coeval not with the delta but with the human race and had migrated from their original home in Thebes, anciently called Egypt, to the newer portions of the country.[45] Strictly speaking, by now Herodotus has proven his case about the antiquity of the Egyptians. But the argument is not quite over, for he will define the land of Egypt. He does so first by propounding the concomitants of the Ionians' *gnome*. If the latter is correct, then the Greeks do not know how to count, for there should be four not three con-

[45] Note that the Phrygians are now, and have been consistently, ignored. Just because Herodotus accepted the fact of Psammetichos' experiment does not mean he attached great significance to its results or thought they constituted a challenge to Egyptian antiquity, for the results of the experiment are not so important to him as the fact that the experiment took place at all. A tradition, and a widely held one, about Egyptian antiquity had prevailed down to Psammetichos' day, to the "historical period": it must contain a truth. That it does Herodotus himself will later show in his calculations of Egyptian longevity. It is closely connected with chapters 99-100 and 142-146.

tinents. Of course, everyone knows there are only three continents, thus *communis opinio* reduces the argument to absurdity. Having thus routed the Ionians, Herodotus is free to define the boundaries in his own way.[46]

Chapters 2-16 are impressive for their coherence. Though the historian represents himself as on a quest for knowledge, a journey of enquiry and discovery, in which the evidence that presents itself to his eyes and ears, as well as his own capacity to reason, gradually leads him to assurance, in fact such a picture of dawning awareness is an illusion. Beneath its apparent simplicity is a tautness, the result of a strict sense of purpose, as Herodotus lays the grounds for the refutation of Ionian *gnomai* about the delta. This is not to suggest that Herodotus did not travel to Thebes and Heliopolis or plumb the depths of the sea off the coast of Egypt or make any of the other observations he records. The credibility of his conclusions demanded that at some point he indicate the means he employed to arrive at them. Hence the order of the narrative, which moves easily and naturally from the tradition of the priests, about which there was general agreement, to his own attempts to verify parts of that tradition. But the order of the narrative need not replicate the order in which

[46] The passage continues through to the end of chapter 18. In opposition to the Ionians, Herodotus presents his own *gnome* making Egypt the entire country occupied by the Egyptians, a *gnome* which, he later discovered, had divine confirmation. When the oracle at Ammon was consulted as to the extent of Egypt, the god there declared that Egypt was all the land irrigated by the Nile and the Egyptians all who dwell below the city of Elephantine and drink its waters. The word of the oracle thus represents a justification of Herodotus' assertion that goes beyond mere human terms. (Compare 120.5 and note 13, above.) More interesting from our perspective is Herodotus' use of οἶδα at 17.1: "As for the boundary between Asia and Libya, we know of none [ὀρθῷ λόγῳ] except the borders of Egypt." This is the first instance of knowledge based on or justified by a "correct *logos*." I believe the latter is meant to stand in opposition to the Ionian *gnomai*, which are mere theories, as is his own *gnome*, except that the latter does ultimately have divine confirmation. Chapters 16-17 are full of problems that involve Herodotus' view of the accepted theory of three continents. For a full exposition of the problems involved, see Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 2:82-91, and von Fritz, *Griechische Geschichtsschreibung*, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 56-58 and 139-140.

he derived his information or made his observations. What I suggest is that Herodotus began with an hypothesis about the age of Egypt and the longevity of the Egyptians. Accepting that hypothesis himself, he used every means at his disposal to confirm it. Once he had assured himself of its confirmation, he could order his narrative in such a way as to produce an effective synthesis, written with a purpose and argued to prove a point.[47] That purpose is to refute the Ionian theory that Egypt is the delta and that the Egyptians themselves were coeval with the delta, by proving that the delta is alluvial and a recent addition to a country that preexisted it, a country named Egypt with Egyptian inhabitants.

Underlying the passage is an important prejudgment on the part of the historian, his acceptance of the priests' word as reliable. From the discussion of a number of other passages above, it became evident how and where Herodotus expressed himself with certainty and, conversely, where he expressed merely opinion or belief. Over and over he employed his powers of reasoning to verify the priests' knowledge and prove his own countrymen mistaken. In the end, there could be no doubt he accepted the longevity of the Egyptians, the primacy of their gods, and the span of time they had "recorded" back to *le temps des dieux*. All this must be assumed here as underlying his argument. Assured that he has genuine knowledge about the longevity of Egyptian civilization (the details of which he will ultimately introduce at an appropriate point), he turns all his attention to the refutation of Ionian theories that contradict that longevity and must be discarded as incorrect in order to clear the way for many of his later assertions. Hence the argument at this point centers on the origin and nature of the delta. Though he seems to be making discoveries and arriving at tentative conclusions, in fact every observation and every piece of evidence, together with the reasoning welding them together as part of a thesis, serves to verify the indigenous tradition of

[47] Chapters 2-16 could be considered an early approximation of hypothesis testing and confirmation.

the priests.[48] His strong point is his capacity as an observer, which at times leads him to cite evidence that is curiously modern. At other times, since, of course, he did not have the benefit of modern scientific techniques, his proof is virtually worthless. Autopsy remains, nonetheless, his major tool of verification, even if his view of what constitutes valid "traces" allows him at times to cite evidence that is quite inadequate. Throughout the passage he never asserts that he is certain or knows: he merely believes or thinks on the basis of his own observations. These professions of opinion, which are often made in conjunction with what the priests told him, become increasingly strenuous until he is finally assured enough to refute the Ionian theories. Using the evidence of the priests, verified by his own observations and arguments, he proves to his own satisfaction that the delta is alluvial and recent.

As a synthesis, chapters 2-16 are an exemplar of Herodotus' methodology. This exemplar in turn sheds light on the methodology used throughout Book 2, or at least throughout those chapters that have been the concern of this study (2-146). The methodology is a uniform one, revealing the same prejudgment noted above: Herodotus had accepted Egyptian tradition as genuine knowledge by the time he wrote Book 2. Just as in chapters 2-16 his techniques stemmed from a thesis he was attempting to prove, a thesis there based on an initial hypothesis he had himself confirmed, so in chapters 2-146 as a whole Herodotus is arguing to prove a thesis, one of his purposes in writing Book 2. In fact, it is within the context of this broader thesis that one

[48] By contrast, see S. Benardete, *Herodotean Inquiries* (The Hague, 1969), p. 36, who states: "Herodotus shows himself to be uninfluenced by what they say, and he is careful to indicate that his judgments were independent whenever an Egyptian story agrees with them." At some point his judgments may well have been independent, but that he is uninfluenced in writing the narrative is an illusion. I should be prepared to suggest that Herodotus' researches in Tyre and Thasos (chapter 44), which proved to him the antiquity of the god Herakles, may hold the key to his trust in the reliability of Egyptian tradition. Here he actually tested their "memory" in two independent temples and found it correct.

must view his vigorous refutation of Ionian theories about Egypt, in particular those that made the country and its inhabitants coeval with the delta. These theories rejected, their authors dismissed, and Egyptian longevity assured, he can begin to establish the truth in opposition to a more formidable group of thinkers, a venerable and traditional source of wisdom, the poets. His belief is that early Greek tradition and history as transmitted by the poets is not the truth at all but for the most part a fabrication. His purpose is to correct that tradition and history in the light of the genuine knowledge he had gained in Egypt. Thus wherever the opportunity presented itself he challenged the *mythoi* of the poets and attempted to establish in their place a "true" *logos*, which constituted a revised history of men, heroes, and gods. Those who accepted his judgment about the longevity of the Egyptians and the reliability of their traditions must also accept his revised history. This purpose then is the thread that unites chapters 2-146 and synthesizes the narrative by dictating many of the details the historian selects and much of the reasoning he employs.

How exactly did Herodotus view the poets and their craft, and the material with which they worked? In the first place, he thought that a mere four hundred years separated Hesiod and Homer from himself, leaving a considerable span of time between them and the events of the epic cycle. The latter was in turn reduced to insignificance when compared with the vast expanse back to *le temps des dieux* in Egypt. Secondly, by contrast with the memory of the priests, preserved in written records, the poets' material was oral tradition, memory in the purest sense. Not that Herodotus thought unrecorded oral tradition incapable of transmitting a true *logos*. On the contrary, he had great faith in the reliability of indigenous memory (*akoe*), and in one instance suggested that Homer knew and rejected a story that was in fact a true *logos*, preserved by the Egyptians. The concerns of the poets, however, were other than the truth to which they had access through memory. Far from recording and preserving that truth, they actually interfered in its transmission, by altering

it at will to suit their artistic purposes and by fabricating substantial portions of what in Herodotus' day had become accepted history and tradition, in particular, the *mythoi* concerning *le temps des dieux* in Greece. Herodotus' purpose then was to distinguish the true *logos* from the false, by scrutinizing Greek tradition in the light of an authority whose longevity and reliability he had proven to himself and demonstrated to his readers. At times he sought out the hidden truth amidst the fabrications and corrected the Greek version by substituting a true *logos* derived from Egypt. Elsewhere, having discarded the poets' *mythoi*, he used his Egyptian authority to reconstruct a new and more probable version of the past. In a word, he engaged in an early, though very simple form of source criticism.[49]

That there did exist in Herodotus' eyes some kind of objective truth about the past, capable of at least partial discovery, and that that truth conveyed a history of mankind spanning more than ten thousand years has significant implications for the *Histories*. The dichotomy between the *spatium historicum* and the *spatium mythicum*, as it is usually formulated, is a false one. Even the terms *le temps des dieux* and *le temps des hommes* are misapplied, when used of the *Histories*.[50] For He-

[49] Von Fritz, *Griechische Geschichtsschreibung*, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 183, believes that 142.4 is a critique of the Hesiodic myth of a Golden Age and that "indem die reale Kenntnis der Vergangenheit weiter in diese hereinzuleuchten scheint, weicht das Mythische einfach in die fernere Vergangenheit zurück." Compare How and Wells, *Commentary*, p. 237. For a somewhat different approach to Herodotus' procedures and their implications for mythology, see J. Vogt, "Herodot in Ägypten," in *Herodot. Eine Auswahl Aus der neueren Forschung* (Wege der Forschung 26), ed. W. Marg (Darmstadt, 1962), pp. 412-433 (also in *Orbis. Ausgewählte Schriften zur Geschichte des Altertums* [Freiburg, 1960], 11-46). Benardete, *Herodotean Inquiries*, p. 50, points out significantly: "Why Greek beliefs are unintelligible by themselves, the influence of the poets explains. They have taken historic events and reworked them so as to remove almost every trace of fact they once possessed."

[50] For the *spatium historicum* see W. von Leyden, *Durham University Journal* 11 (1949-1950), 89-104, who attributes its discovery to Hekataios (pp. 89-92). Von Leyden's use of the term to describe "unbroken continuity from the present back to earliest times" (p. 103) is exactly what is intended in this

rodotus discovered that the *spatium historicum*, human history, extended back to the time of the first king of Egypt, and that only prior to his reign had gods dwelt on earth and mingled with men. Even this earlier period is not, strictly speaking, a *spatium mythicum*, because it was duly recorded and remembered by the Egyptians. Rather it represented a true *temps des dieux* unlike its counterpart in Greece, which was a fabrication of the poets. The *spatium mythicum* in Greece then is actually a time of human history and can only be called mythological in the sense that it became enmeshed in the *mythoi* of the poets, and so its truth was blurred or lost. In the absence of any written records preceding the poets, or an unadulterated oral tradition, the only way to demythologize and humanize that period, that is, convert it to history, was to replace or reconstruct parts of it using the Egyptian authority. Herodotus' single most significant contribution in this regard was his rejection of the entire *temps des dieux* in Greece as a fabrication of the poets.

What then distinguishes this *spatium historicum* of more than ten thousand years from that brief part of it termed the "historical period?" The meaning of the latter at chapter 147 was quite clear; there in addition to his Egyptian informants and his own observations, Herodotus was able to seek agreement with or verification by external sources, the Greeks who had resided as colonists in Egypt since the reign of Psammetichos and who were in possession of "genuine knowledge" (154.4) about Egypt. This "historical period"

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study. It differs from the dichotomy between *spatium mythicum* and *spatium historicum* originally proposed by M. Pohlenz, *Herodot, der erste Geschichtschreiber des Abendlandes* (Leipzig, 1937), p. 7. The latter is followed by Shimron, "Πρῶτος τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν," *Eranos* 71 (1973), 48, who believes that Herodotus "divides the historical time, the *spatium historicum*, into two eras," the period of the two or three generations from Kroisos' time to his own and the one lasting between one hundred to one hundred and fifty years before that. "This earlier period differs again, as far as reliability is concerned, from the earliest, mythical period." Vidal-Naquet's "Temps des dieux," deals specifically with the "temporal experience" of the Greeks. He notes that "l'Égypte apparaît comme le paradigme de l'histoire humaine" (p. 67).

can be dated approximately to the mid-seventh century and is signalled by the existence of a reliable Greek tradition. I would suggest that it is this historical period to which Herodotus also refers in using the expression πρῶτος τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν, "the first of whom we have genuine knowledge," be it Kroisos of Lydia or Polykrates of Samos. It indicates the existence of a reliable Greek tradition, though not necessarily a written one. For while the historical period is roughly synchronous with the introduction and widespread use of writing, and while Herodotus has revealed his awareness of the importance of written records, I believe, with Jacoby, that his sources were predominantly oral.[51] Thus the period of which he had genuine knowledge was the time when indigenous oral tradition could be trusted, the time among the Greeks when memory was reliable because it had not been interfered with by the poets. In Greek terms the historical period, indicated by the phrase, "the first of whom we have genuine knowledge," was but a brief few hundred years of a vast human history, the memory of which could only partially be recovered by an appeal to the older, more reliable authority of Egyptian tradition.[52]

[51] F. Jacoby, *Griechische Historiker* (Stuttgart, 1956), 392-396. Compare von Fritz, *Griechissche Geschichtsschreibung*, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 407-417, and see Appendix to Chapter Two, section B: Herodotus' Sources in Book 2.

[52] Compare von Leyden, "Spatium Historicum," p. 95, who distinguishes between the notion of historical time and of historical knowledge "in virtue of which the c. 200 years before his life-time are singled out from all past ages as the only period which can be truthfully described." This differs somewhat from Shimron's belief, "Πρῶτος," pp. 47-48, that not only is the mythical period "distinctly separated from later times as one on which there is no certain information" but that the one hundred to one hundred and fifty years before Kroisos' time is a period "of which he has some information, but cannot claim certain knowledge." Book 2.154.4, where Herodotus uses the expression ἐπιστάμεθα ἀτρεκέως, would seem to refute this division of the historical period. Nor does the line drawn at chapter 154.4 mean that certainty is impossible about the "mythical period." On the contrary, analysis of portions of the Egyptian *Logos* indicates that Herodotus did believe that the Egyptians had genuine knowledge about their civilization's lengthy *spatium historicum*, just as oracles could convey genuine

To formulate Herodotus' purpose in this manner and abstract it from the complex of materials in Book 2 is not to divest his work of either preconceptions or contradictions. He does not, for example, reject a theogony or a *temps des dieux*, only the evidence for its time and place in Greece. According to his history of Greek religion, the priests at Thebes were perfectly correct to challenge Hekataios when he traced his descent to a god fifteen generations before himself. Herodotus traced the Greek gods back to divine, but nameless, powers worshipped by the Pelasgians, never suggesting that at that period the gods dwelt on earth. Whether he thought gods might have lived in Greece itself during *le temps des dieux* in Egypt, he does not make clear, probably because he could cite no evidence for their presence. Underlying Herodotus' history of religion is the additional belief that the gods mankind worships are uniform.[53] The various peoples learn of them—take their "names"—from one another, presumably younger nations from older, though ultimately most of the gods derived from the Egyptians, who knew of them first, being coeval with the human race and having recorded details of certain of their births and their rule on earth. These are but two of Herodotus' preconceptions. The contradictions in his account are manifold. For instance, without the ancillary disciplines of archaeology, linguistics, or comparative literature his efforts at source criticism remain primitive in the extreme. Though he is resounding in his rejection of the poets' *mythoi* about the gods, their theogony, he knows there was a Trojan War and with only a slight demur at chapter 120.3 accepts its protagonists. The truth of Egyptian tradition would be meaningless, if one

knowledge (e.g., σαφές τι εἰδέναι at 44.1 and in Book 1 οἶδα . . . ἀκούσας at 20.1). If this is the case, it is incorrect to distinguish, as von Leyden does, between the notion of historical time and historical knowledge.

[53] See Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 1, chap. 4, "Herodotus' Attitudes and Intellectual Affinities," *passim*, and in particular, pp. 169-170, Vogt, "Herodot," pp. 422-426, and pp. 70-72 above, including notes 30 and 31 *ad locum*.

did not accept the existence of Helen, Priam, Hektor, and, elsewhere, the heroes Herakles and Perseus. On this level his judgments about the epic poets and the "factual" core of their work remain entirely subjective. It should be observed, however, that he never once used the epic poets to verify or correct Egyptian history but vice versa, and further that he purposely delimited an historical period, for which evidence was more reliable than in the period preceding it. This would seem to indicate he trusted epic poetry very little except where he had an authority that allowed him to distinguish fact from fiction. Finally it need not follow from the above that Herodotus put his full trust in every detail of ancient Egyptian history any more than he did in all Greek tradition after about the year 700. Many of the stories he recorded in chapters 99-146 he could not corroborate by autopsy, nor was he especially concerned to ensure their verification and acceptance, because they bore no relation to Greek tradition. As he states at 123.1, his task was to record tradition; it was up to his readers to judge the credibility of it. This is quite different from his procedures in those chapters where he was concerned to establish the truth of Egyptian tradition *vis-à-vis* that of his countrymen. Perhaps he believed the stories contained in chapters 99-146 would not call that truth into question, because where it was important to him, he had taken the care to indicate his own verification of that tradition and consistently stressed its reliability. It remains nonetheless a contradiction, unacceptable in a philosopher, understandable in an enquirer into such distant and multifarious matters.

The Herodotus who emerges from this study of Book 2 is to be viewed as a conscious craftsman, certainly one who exercised a strong control over his work, to judge by its coherence and purposiveness. These are in fact the very qualities that make the Egyptian *Logos* much more than an illustration of "the method of Ionian 'logographers.' "[54] How-

[54] Myres, *Herodotus. Father of History* (Oxford, 1953) p. 96.

ever conventional its marshalling of material may seem, or however similar its principal topics to those found in other *logoi*—"geography, natural history, ethnology, religion, and miscellaneous curiosities"[55]—a mere list of these topics and their order fails to convey the purpose that lies behind them, the argument in aid of which they were marshalled. Nor can Book 2 be characterized as an excursus on problems of general geography.[56] For, whatever interests originally inspired Herodotus to extend his researches to Egypt and to develop his own theories about the delta, the number of continents, or the age of Egypt in opposition to Ionian *gnomai*, by the time he wrote that book these interests and problems were already subservient to a broader thesis. He did not, for instance, choose to introduce Book 2 with a refutation of theories that made the Egyptians coeval with the delta because he considered the geographical problems of the delta important *per se*. Rather he began with their refutation because it was ultimately integral to his demonstration of Egyptian longevity, which, together with the reliability of Egyptian tradition, formed the basis of his challenge to the poets and his own revision of early Greek history and tradition. It is also an underestimation of Herodotus to suggest that his history of ancient Egypt evinces no qualities we could identify with "critical writing of history."[57] To leave aside the significance the word critical has acquired since the nineteenth century, when the discipline of history was born, we have seen that Herodotus was as critical as any thinker could be about the past and in particular about his Greek sources for the past, given the absence of a whole series of ancillary disciplines and a critical method, which are the contributions of the nineteenth century to that discipline.[58] At the same time,

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 73, where Myres also states that "he marshalled his material on a system already conventional."

[56] Von Fritz, *Griechische Geschichtsschriebung*, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 106-107 and 141.

[57] Von Fritz, *ibid.*, p. 178.

[58] See Chapter One, n. 33.

Herodotus' acceptance and use of an "objective" Egyptian authority is of immense significance for our understanding of the way he wrote history and one of his purposes in doing so. Book 2 then takes on a new significance, if it is viewed as an illustration of early historical methodology. It reveals the historian at work, choosing his material in the light of a thesis and reasoning to defend that thesis by appealing to a source that he believed to be reliable. In justifying his assertions, he made clear what he considered truth and certainty, what opinion and belief. Using all these levels of knowledge, he attempted to establish a true *logos* and to reconstruct a new and more probable version of human history in opposition to the *mythoi* of the poets.

On the basis of Book 2 alone, it is thus possible to conclude that Herodotus is justifiably deemed the "father of history." For in accepting the validity of *le temps des dieux* in Egypt, he opened up a vast *temps des hommes* or *spatium historicum*, for which, he believed, the Egyptians had reliable evidence. His attempt to recover and reconstruct parts of that past, to convert Greek tradition to history by demythologizing and humanizing it, was already the act of an historian.[59]

[59] Compare Lasserre, "L'historiographie grecque," pp. 134–135. While this study has perhaps been no more successful than earlier ones in demonstrating the relevance of Book 2 to the *Histories* as a whole, both its subject matter and purpose take one far afield from the campaign of Cambyses and surely have an inherent meaning that transcends the narrow question of the Persian conquest and conquerors (H. Wood, *The Histories of Herodotus. An Analysis of the Formal Structure* [The Hague/Paris, 1972], p. 59). It seems that the *Logos* has an import for the Greeks that few have recognized. At this point, then, in speculating as to its significance for the work as a whole, one can only agree with Cobet, *Herodots Exkurse*, p. 130, that "der weite Raum der Vergangenheit wird Quelle jeglicher menschlicher σοφίη, die in der Gegenwart wirksam sein kann." In addition, "im grossen Raum der Zeit aber erfüllt sich erst das Ganze des Menschlichen, dessen Erkenntnis nur der Überblick über alle Zeiten vermitteln kann (5, 9, 3)."

THREE Herodotus and Thucydides and *le temps des hommes*

INTERPRETATION AND ITS USES: MYTH AND HISTORY

IT IS NOW POSSIBLE to compare the methodology employed by Herodotus and Thucydides in reconstructing a period far in the past. One is struck by the remarkable similarity. In the absence of firsthand evidence, the intellectual tools of the historian open to them, whether sources and the evidence or data such sources afford, or logic and argumentation, are virtually identical. The three most common sources of data at their disposal are tradition, usually indigenous oral tradition or *akoe*; poetry, in particular, epic poetry; and observable vestiges, the kind of material remains today often designated as archaeological evidence. Such data they view as tokens, signs, or even "positive proofs" (usually *tekmeria*, but also *semeia*), on the basis of which they form a judgment or draw a conclusion, a probable conclusion. A form of argumentation that also allows them to reach probable conclusions is an appeal to *eikos* or *eikota*, which, for the most part, represent the probabilities of human behavior. In other words, both historians employ inductive arguments characteristic of the late fifth century to produce a reconstruction of the past.[1]

[1] For the distinction in rhetoric between *eikota* and *tekmeria*, see G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton, 1963), pp. 99-100. Kennedy also comments briefly on the difference between *semeia* and *tekmeria*, noting that the orators "generally make use of both to mean a sign pointing to a probable conclusion" (p. 100). A. B. Lloyd, *Herodotus, Book II*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1975-1976), 2:201, who translates *tekmeria* as "positive proofs" and *semeia* as "indications," lists five *tekmeria* adduced in chapters 43-44 as proofs of the proposition that the name Herakles came from Egypt. Like *eikota*, *tekmeria* are used in argument throughout Book 2, though Herodotus does not always give them their technical name. They are quite diverse in kind, as Lloyd's list of five indicates. (In the instance of Herakles' name, for example, they include *inter alia* additional evidence within the Greek tradition

What makes their reconstructions differ then is not the varieties of sources or arguments they employ but the theses they are arguing and the generalizations that lie behind them. Both theses and generalizations determine the use to which they put their data and so their interpretation of it.

In what follows we shall consider the ways in which the two historians differ not only in their basic methodology, as

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and Egyptian tradition.) Compare the nine geological proofs listed by Lloyd, *ibid.*, p. 38, and his general comments about Herodotus' use of inductive arguments in *Herodotus* 1:160-163. The latter include argument from *eikos*, the importance of which Lloyd underscores by pointing out: "Clearly Herodotus, like Hecataeus before him and Thucydides after, found it a particularly useful instrument for extracting the truth from legendary traditions" (p. 163). As for Thucydides, J. H. Finley, "Euripides and Thucydides" in *Three Essays on Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp. 1-54 (also in *HSCP* 49 [1938], 23-68), states of the historian's method of using *tekmeria* in the Archaeology to establish uncertain events: "It is hardly necessary to point out how greatly Thucydides relies on these principles of τεκμήρια and εἰκός when he deduces a course of history from Homer's description of men's habits in former times" (p. 9). He believes that "both authors reflect a common rhetorical tradition" (pp. 6-7). H. Erbse, "Zur Geschichtsbetrachtung des Thukydides," *Antike und Abendland* 10 (1961), 19-34, goes farther in his discussion of Thucydides' use of *eikota, tekmeria*, and *semeia* and compares the methodology employed in parts of the Archaeology with Herodotus' use of similar arguments in Book 2.112-120. He makes it clear that those who claim that the argument from *eikos* is typically Thucydidean, the distinctive feature of his methodology, are quite mistaken, concluding, "Man kann also in der formalen Konstruktion des Denkens wesentliche Unterschiede zwischen beiden Geschichtsschreibern nicht entdecken" (p. 26). Indeed, Erbse is most positive in his remarks about Herodotus, whose conclusions he describes as "wenigstens ebenso wissenschaftlich und gescheit." For example: "Sie waren in den angeführten Fällen sogar korrekter und vorsichtiger; denn Thukydides scheut sich nicht, die gewünschten Prämissen aus dem Homertext herauszuholen, selbst wenn sie dort nicht stehen" (p. 25). See by contrast, von Fritz, *Die Griechische Geschichtsschreibung* (Berlin, 1967), vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 580-583, for Thucydides' use of "signs" in combination with tradition and pt. 2, p. 267, n. 22, where he cites Erbse's work and calls his comparison of Herodotus and Thucydides entirely false. Von Fritz's view that Herodotus' methodology has more in common with the rationalizing criticism of Hekataios, "der die Entstehung der Legenden psychologisch zu erklären versuchte," is questionable, given the conclusions of the present study.

set forth above, but in their purpose, and in the use and interpretation of their data that stem therefrom.

To begin with the author of the *Histories*, Herodotus is remarkably explicit about how he proceeds, where he travelled and what he saw, what he accepted as evidence, what he rejected and why, and how he reasoned and came to his conclusions. It would appear that he thought his thesis fairly controversial and possibly open to challenge, for he expends considerable effort verifying the Egyptian *Logos*, which he designates as genuine knowledge or truth. A major principle to which Herodotus adhered in accepting his informants' word as valid was "agreement," or as he expresses it at Book 2.3.1: "I wanted to know if the priests at Thebes and Heliopolis would agree with the accounts of the priests at Memphis." In other words, Herodotus first sought a consistent tradition, ensured by agreement among his Egyptian sources.[2] In addition, wherever possible, he attempted to establish some kind of agreement between himself and those sources, that is, to verify them by autopsy, by what he saw as a traveller in their country and an eyewitness to its geography, geology, and customs. Where "ancient" history was concerned (chapters 99-146), this included observed records, buildings, and statues, vestiges of the past. A third level of agreement was between the Egyptians and an external source or sources. While it is true that he did seek external evidence for the antiquity of the god Herakles, this kind of agreement was rarely available to him in recording the ancient history of Egypt. Generally speaking, external corroboration is what distinguishes the history of Egypt beginning with the reign of Psammetichos (chapter 147), for here Herodotus could cite evidence derived from informants and based on traditions generally acknowledged to be Greek. By contrast, in recording the history of Egypt that preceded Psammetichos'

[2] The Greek of 2.3.1 is ἐθέλων εἰδέναι εἰ συμβήσονται τοῖσι λόγοισι τοῖσι ἐν Μέμφι. Agreement (ὁμολογία) as an aspect of Herodotus' methodology has been studied in great detail by Verdin, *De historisch-kritische Methode van Herodotus* (Brussels, 1971), *passim*.

reign and that stretched back into and beyond the Greek "mythical period" to *le temps des dieux* in Egypt, he did not have these external sources from which he could seek the third level of agreement but was dependent on the Egyptians and on his own observations.

A second aspect of Herodotus' methodology brought to light in this study is the corroborative nature of his use of evidence and reasoning. He was evidently satisfied that he had found in Egypt itself a consistent tradition and that his own observations agreed with that tradition. By the time he wrote Book 2 he had not only accepted the reliability of Egyptian tradition, but he made every effort, as he wrote Book 2, to demonstrate that reliability to his listeners. In every passage analyzed in Chapter Two, Herodotus consistently used his own observations and researches to corroborate or verify the word of the Egyptians. In addition, much of what he expressed as his own opinion or belief was in agreement with his Egyptian sources, while the few reconstructions of the past he attempted, using arguments from probability, took the truth of those sources for granted. Thus his reasoning based on those sources becomes in turn an argument for those sources. Having himself accepted the longevity of the Egyptians and the reliability of their memory, Herodotus would have his listeners also accept this judgment. What led Herodotus in the first place to put his trust in Egyptian memory, a trust so deep that he sought in turn to corroborate that memory, using all the means at his disposal (autopsy, oracles, etc.)? Written records are one answer. The very existence of such records, preserved by the priests, made a deep impression on him. To him writing was (and was proven to be) a guarantee of accuracy, and so of knowledge that extended back as far as the gods.[3] In other words, written records not only impressed him but ultimately produced in him the confidence to proffer his listeners a true history of the past.

[3] See 2.100.1 and 145.3.

The antiquity of Egyptian civilization and the reliability of the Egyptians' tradition about their own past are two of the theses that Herodotus accepted and attempted to demonstrate by the above procedures. These two theses are in turn closely connected with one of his purposes in writing Book 2, which can be summarized as follows. First, he sought to extend historical time far into the past, and, secondly, he attempted to prove that genuine knowledge did exist about that time. This knowledge had meaning for the Greek historical past and for Greek self-knowledge. Moreover, on the basis of the Egyptian *Logos*, he was able to criticize accepted Greek tradition about gods, heroes, and men, reconstruct parts of the Greek past, and so regain some elements of the truth enmeshed in what he considered to be the fabrications of poets. For once he accepted Egyptian tradition, Herodotus never criticized it, but used it as an authority by means of which he at some times replaced Greek tradition entirely, and at others reconstructed it. To observe him at work, thinking and reasoning on the basis of that knowledge, is to gain a priceless insight into the conversion of myth and tradition to history. Such a conversion proves to be neither magical nor mysterious. In fact, it is possible to view Herodotus' attempt to distinguish the true *logos* from the false, or from *mythos*, as a rudimentary form of source criticism. In a sense, Egyptian records served as a kind of archival material. For it was these records and the startling information they contained that led Herodotus to an early use of many of the techniques that have come to characterize the discipline of history. First, he saw and attempted to solve the chronological contradictions that resulted from setting Greek and Egyptian accounts side by side. Furthermore, he pondered the question of historical time itself and the possibility of genuine knowledge about that vast expanse he had opened up to view. But chronology was not the only problem. Perceiving many other contradictions as well between the Egyptian and Greek accounts of their own past, he scrutinized the two versions carefully, criticized the latter, distinguished

truth from falsehood, and finally reconstructed a new version of the past based on that truth. The new version both demythologized and humanized the past.[4] It was the seriousness of this task, a challenge to Greek myth, tradition, and history, that inspired Herodotus to verification. He could thus demonstrate the reliability of his source and so the correctness of his criticisms and the validity of his own reconstruction of the Greek past.

I have called Herodotus a conscious craftsman, and his

[4] Compare J. R. Goody, *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 14-15:

> There is, of course, a simple-minded sense in which history is tied to the use of documentary material and hence is inseparable from literate cultures; before that, all is prehistory, the prehistory of societies dominated by myth. Without going into the many ambiguities involved in the definition of myth, there is a sense in which this concept often involves a backward look at that which is either untrue or unverifiable. And in the most literal sense the distinction between *mythos* and *historia* comes into being at the time when alphabetic writing encouraged mankind to set one account of the universe or the pantheon beside another and hence perceive the contradictions that lie between them.

In Chapter 1, "Evolution and Communication," Goody discusses a variety of speculations about the way in which modes of thought have changed over time and space. He points out, "The trouble with the categories is that they are rooted in a we/they division which is both binary and ethnocentric, each of these features being limiting in their own way" (p. 1). He rejects the notion of "this process as the emergence of rationality from irrationality," "of logico-empirical from mythopoeic thinking," or "of logical from pre-logical procedures" (p. 2). (For some of these dichotomies see, in particular, E. Cassirer, *An Essay on Man. An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture* [New Haven, 1944], and L. Lévy-Bruhl, *How Natives Think* [London, 1926].) Goody is also critical of "more positively phrased dichotomies, the wild and domesticated (or cold and hot) thinking of Lévi-Strauss," for example. (See C. Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* [Chicago, 1966].) He concludes, p. 16: "The traditional characterisation is essentially a static one in that it gives no reason for change, no idea of how or why domestication occurred; it assumes the primitive mind has this particular character, the advanced has that, and it is due to the genius of the Greeks or the Western Europeans that modern man emerged." See too Goody's earlier study, written together with I. Watt, "The Consequences of Literacy," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5 (1963), 304-345 (reprinted in *Literacy in Traditional Societies*, ed. J. Goody [Cambridge, 1968], pp. 27-68).

work coherent and purposive. These qualities derive in large part from the possibilities that writing, alphabetic literacy, afforded him. Though Herodotus composed for oral recitation, writing pushed him beyond the limits of oral communication. By reducing his material to permanent or semipermanent form, he was able to scrutinize it carefully. The result is a heightened level of cognitive development, that is, those qualities demonstrated above, skepticism, criticism, the perception of contradictions, logical reasoning, and finally skillful argumentation supported by evidence. As Goody observes: "When an utterance is put in writing it can be inspected in much greater detail, in its parts as well as in its whole, backwards as well as forwards, out of context as well as in its setting; in other words, it can be subjected to a quite different type of scrutiny and critique than is possible with purely verbal communication."[5] The significant word here is "scrutiny," both on the part of Herodotus, and, just as important, on the part of his reading public. In the city-state, a social structure quite different from the Egypt of Herodotus' travels, neither tradition nor history was the preserve of a priestly caste, of wise men, or of any other group whose authority could not be questioned. Tradition and history were the concern of researchers like Herodotus. Furthermore, since Herodotus' researches must ultimately stand up, in written form, to the scrutiny and critique of a small but significant reading public, he was himself forced to inspect his work carefully in advance. It is this scrutiny which "favoured the increase in scope of critical activity, and hence of rationality, scepticism, and logic."[6]

[5] *The Domestication*, p. 44. For oral recitation see Appendix to Chapter Five, section B: Herodotus, Literacy, and Oral Presentation.

[6] Goody, *ibid.*, p. 37. I do not believe that this kind of developmental perspective in any way detracts from Norman Austin's concern for the poetic, the paradigmatic, and the symbolic in Homer's *Odyssey* (*Archery at the Dark of the Moon. Poetic Problems in Homer's Odyssey* [Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975]). Austin quite rightly reacts against "the condescension prevalent in Homeric scholarship" (p. 6). His perception of "interrelated structures underlying linguistic usage" (p. 7) is extremely important, as is his view

Thucydides, unlike his predecessor, is singularly reticent about how he proceeded, where he travelled and what he saw, what he rejected and why, and how he came to his conclusions. On the other hand, he is certainly more explicit in the Archaeology than in other parts of the *History* about what he accepted as evidence and how he reasoned. For example, he must have seen Mycenae and Lakedaimon, he at least knew of the contents of the graves uncovered in the purification of Delos, and he could describe the manner of bearing arms in various parts of Greece in his own day. Furthermore, he is conscious enough of the methodology he employed in the Archaeology to comment on the evidence

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that "it may be more correct to reverse the order and say that the tales are inventions for carrying the formulas" (p. 6). Despite sarcastic references to "verbomotor skills" and "mnemotechnical glue," his thesis does not contradict current studies of oral tradition. Vansina, for example, "Once Upon a Time: Oral Traditions as History in Africa" in *Historical Studies Today*, ed. F. Gilbert and S. R. Graubard (New York, 1971), p. 424, stresses the importance of analyzing traditions at three levels in order to understand "three levels of meaning: the literal, the intended, and the symbolic, the latter being largely unconscious." "Literary devices," he points out, p. 425, "including playing with words, are usually responsible for the difference between literal and intended meaning. These devices are those proper to each literary genre—allegory, poetic allusion, explicit symbol—all found in written documents as well." Vansina also notes the significance of artistic value, wherever there is a performance. "The climate in which traditions are told influences their content" (p. 417). My colleague, Juan Maiguashca, who has studied Amerindian oral history, confirms Vansina's findings. In the Amerindian system there were three groups of specialists, including the conservators or caretakers of tradition and the narrators. The latter performed at festivals, amid song and dance, using their artistic skills to entertain their listeners with attractive metaphors and symbols. No one, in other words, would quarrel with Austin's discovery of levels of structure and meaning, or his analysis of the use of literary devices in the *Odyssey*. These are well-recognized characteristics of oral tradition and oral history: they did not need to await the advent of literacy. Austin has, however, underestimated the kind of arguments put forth by Goody and Havelock as to the effects of literacy on cognitive development. In fact, he ignores Havelock altogether. For Havelock's views on Homer as an oral poet, see now *The Greek Concept of Justice. From its Shadow in Homer to its Substance in Plato* (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1978).

adduced (21.1, both *tekmeria* and *semeia*) and the conclusions drawn from it. In chapter 21 he does not trouble to state his opinion of the relative merits of the varied sources of data he employed but merely expresses his own satisfaction: in his search for the truth, a difficult undertaking, he discovered the clearest "signs" and made the soundest judgments. It should be noted as well that he did not follow Herodotus in many aspects of his methodology (or at least made no explicit reference to them). For example, he did not attempt to establish agreement among his sources or between himself and those sources as a deliberate procedure. Nor did he use his evidence and his reasoning to corroborate or verify a source he considered reliable. Also, unlike his predecessor, Thucydides was not concerned about the existence and extent of the historical past. He accepted the past as a *temps des hommes*, without acknowledging any division in Greek tradition between it and *le temps des dieux*. Rather he believed that events occurred and individuals acted in the past much as they did in his own day. Furthermore, he had no interest in extending historical time by reference to a more ancient civilization and its history but sought only to reconstruct the development of civilization in Greece itself. It is unclear what he thought was the relationship of Greece to other parts of the world, their relative beginnings, and the influence on Greece of discoveries and customs elsewhere.[7] In centering on Greece and Greece alone, he offered no indication of the date when human history might have begun, nor did he tax the historical imagination as Herodotus did by suggesting even an approximate number of years between his own time and the period when mankind lived in a nomadic state. It was merely long ago or once upon a time.

Since Thucydides was not engaged in the controversial task of extending the historical past and thus challenging Greek tradition, there was no one source he felt obligated to

[7] See below, however. This aspect of Thucydides' outlook we shall discuss further in Chapter Six.

verify as genuine knowledge. Thus, in his own terms, he did not have a source he believed was the truth, that is, an objective means of distinguishing truth from fabrication in the *mythoi* of the poets or in other forms of oral tradition like the details about Pelops in chapter 9, which ultimately derived from the epic cycle, and so from "myth." Perhaps, like Herodotus, he believed that the poets distorted Greek history and fabricated many of the stories of gods, heroes, and men, but he felt no compulsion to demonstrate how and why they did so. Instead, he took for granted a length of historical time that preceded the events of the epic cycle and differed from them because it was a *temps des hommes* rather than a *temps des dieux*. In addition, he accepted the possibility of human knowledge of that time, even though he possessed no superior source to assist him in discovering the truth. In other words, in the absence of Egyptian tradition his reconstruction of the past is far more speculative than that of Herodotus in that he depended purely on his own judgment to decide what in Greek tradition was fact and what was fiction, and what constituted a proof from which he could draw probable conclusions.

What makes Thucydides' reconstruction of the past differ from Herodotus' then is the thesis he is arguing and, based on that thesis, his use and interpretation of data. Both historians subscribe to a theory of civilization; in modern terms Herodotus might be described as a diffusionist and Thucydides an evolutionist. The term evolutionist, as applied to Thucydides, must, however, be qualified. For Thucydides did not describe the past as a static continuum like Herodotus' *spatium historicum*, but formulated a theory of indigenous development from a nomadic to a civilized state, a dynamic process. This process is not a linear one, but rather is discontinuous, and has points of regress. The major generalization lying behind this theory is Thucydides' belief that the past is similar to the present, not just because it is a *temps des hommes*, but because the stages of civilization's progress and its high points (*arche, dynamis*, collective achievement),

as well as the manner in which it may regress and decline, follow a similar pattern. So convinced was Thucydides of his own theory of civilization that he went beyond merely selecting from his data that which seemed most rational to him or attributing reasonable motives to individuals in the past, as Herodotus had done in reconstructing the account of Helen and Menelaos, based on his Egyptian source. In addition, Thucydides generated facts for which he had no evidence and which were anachronistic assumptions derived from the contemporary world, such as the nature and achievement of Minos' *arche* and the disruptive effects of *stasis*. In other words, Thucydides interpreted his data in such a way as to make it useful to the present and the future by isolating similarity of process in the past, permanence amidst change.[8]

It is now clear that one cannot discover in the works of Herodotus and Thucydides a distinction between historical and mythical time, and hence an opposition of human history and mythology, for both consider the mythological period a *temps des hommes*, a time of real, historical personages.

[8] It should be observed of Herodotus, that he did not write a comprehensive account of all that occurred in Egypt's vast *spatium historicum*. Rather he carefully selected the achievements or works of note of but a few monarchs. Thus, though he saw the past as a continuum, he made no effort to establish the ups and downs of that past, a rhythm or process of history, which Egypt might illustrate. He presented the past as somewhat static and discontinuous, useful on occasion, e.g., the reign of Proteus, to correct Greek tradition, but otherwise a series of wonders and stories that he did not seek to verify and for which he disclaimed responsibility (123.1). In other words, the mere fact that he extended the historical past in Egypt and put it to present purposes in criticizing the traditions of his own countrymen did not tempt him to go further and use the events of that past to illustrate a theory of history. Compare Cobet, *Herodots Exkurse und die Frage der Einheit seines Werkes*, Historia, Einzelschriften 17 (Weisbaden, 1971), pp. 132-137, who also stresses the static as opposed to the processual in Book 2. He believes, however, that a number of stories told about the Egyptian kings reveal an aspect of the *kyklos* and are thus examples "für den im Proömium programmatisch angekündigten Zusammenhang," the instability of human happiness, referred to at 1.5.4 (p. 135).

Though Homer's characters may live in an atemporal world, to which the poet gains access only by an appeal to the muse, that world is not an atemporal one to the historians, who have a clear sense of when the Trojan War occurred. According to Herodotus, it was in the reign of Proteus. While Thucydides is not so precise, yet he must have had some conventional date in mind, which he assumed his readers knew, when he recorded migrations sixty and eighty years after the fall of Troy. Perhaps then one might best capture the distinction between the mythological and historical periods by describing the former as fabulous. About long stretches of the human past the poets told fables, thus making it difficult to recover the truth and so genuine historical knowledge about that past.[9]

[9] For the opposition of human history and mythology, see P. Vidal-Naquet, "Temps des dieux et temps des hommes. Essai sur quelques aspects de l'expérience temporelle chez les Grecs," *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 157 (1960), 67, who bases the distinction on Herodotus' remarks about Polykrates at 3.122.2. Finley, "Myth, Memory, and History," in *The Use and Abuse of History*, p. 18, follows Vidal-Naquet, characterizing Polykrates as "the first in historical, as distinct from mythical, times." He adds: "What Herodotus was able to do was to establish some kind of time-sequence for perhaps two centuries of the past, roughly from the middle of the seventh century B.C. on. All that came before remained as it had been when he began his work, epic tales and myths believed to be true, at least in essence, but incorrigibly timeless." Vidal-Naquet, *ibid.*, p. 60, believes, "L'histoire divine a donc un 'sens,' il existe un temps divin dont l'accès est réservé comme chez Homère aux disciples des Muses." Again he is followed by Finley, *ibid.*, p. 16, who describes the characters in the epic as "as timeless as the story itself." For an elaboration of this idea see M. Detienne, *Les maîtres de vérité dans la Grèce archaïque* (Paris, 1967), *passim*, whose concern is *le procès de laïcisation* (chap. 5) and who believes, p. 123, n. 78, that Châtelet "l'a bien montré pour la fonction historienne." Compare A. E. Wardman, "Myth in Greek Historiography," *Historia* 9 (1960), 404, who distinguishes myth in Herodotus' work, "a story which cannot be corroborated by personal observations or enquiry" (e.g., the story of Okeanos at 2.23), from myth in Thucydides' *History: "The functions of myth and history are sharply distinguished.* Myth produces entertainment, while history, though aiming at truth, will ultimately be a service; if not to the public, at any rate for the minority who want to know what happened." He believes that the effect of Herodotus' work and of Thucydides' preface "was to push myth to the edge of historical writing" (p. 406). See too T. S. Brown, "Herodotus

As to the actual possibility of recovering a knowledge of the past and reconstructing human history, the different attitudes of the two historians are reflected in their respective methodologies, described above. Herodotus, for example, refers several times to the river Okeanos, which he calls fabulous, and of which he says he has no knowledge. In fact, he suggests that the name is an invention of some poet (2.23). Though the Greeks, he continues elsewhere, go so far as to describe the river's course and have even pictured it on a map running around the earth, he states that they offer no proof of its existence (4.8.2, ἔργῳ δὲ οὐκ ἀποδεικνῦσι, and compare his ridicule at 4.36.2). The use of ἔργῳ here is surely the same as that at 2.4.2 (ἔργῳ ἐδήλουν), where it meant visible remains of objects and buildings, something one could see. Even some credible eyewitness, he indicates in another context (4.16.1), would allow him to speak of knowledge. Without such an authority he rejects Okeanos and reconstructs but a small portion of the fabulous past. Thucydides is by contrast more daring in dealing with that past, no matter how many professions of difficulty he makes. While he too regards the past as fabulous, he speaks more of poetic exaggeration than outright fabrication (10.3 and 21.1). Given the use to which he wishes to put the songs of the poets and Greek tradition, he is more willing to accept them as factual, without seeking some external, verifiable authority. His is very much a theoretical construct. From a few traditional details about Minos' sea power and the story of the expedition against Troy it is not difficult for him to reconstruct the process of development that preceded these achievements, including motives and activities not transmitted by the poets or tradition. A close study of the Archaeology reveals that major portions of it are the result of the application of his own theories to facts taken from Homer's

and His Profession," *AHR* 59 (1954), 829-843, and also his "The Greek Sense of Time in History as Suggested by their Accounts of Egypt," *Historia* 11 (1962), 257-270; as well as Momigliano, "Time in Ancient Historiography," *History and Theory*, suppl. 6 (1966), 1-23.

poems and other mythical traditions, the very evidence scorned by Herodotus.

Again the two historians' treatment of Minos is a good illustration of their different attitudes to mythical traditions. Herodotus names Polykrates of Samos as the first of the Greeks "of whom we have knowledge," that is, knowledge unadulterated by the poets, of forming the design of mastering the sea. In insisting, moreover, that he is the first of the generation of men, he is not necessarily rejecting Minos' historicity, just as he did not doubt that Hektor or Priam were real people. However, he has no evidence other than mythical tradition that Minos did in fact rule the sea. It was a fabulous rule at best. Thucydides, on the other hand, embraces the tradition wholeheartedly and builds it into his process, or developmental schema, which ends in the collective achievement of the expedition against Troy.

It is thus at the level of generalization or even theory that Thucydides' approach to the distant past represents a significant departure from that of Herodotus. Here Jacoby's comments on the methodology of the Atthidographers are pertinent: "The Atthidographers depend in this respect upon the general development of that science which we call history of civilization. It is certainly correct to look for the origin of this science in the circles of sophistry and philosophy; but their point of view is not properly historical and is not directed towards the conditions and development of one people or tribe, but towards those of humanity as a whole."[10] Thucydides' Archaeology is also dependent on a history of civilization. As a "speculative reconstruction" it is the product of anthropological theories about early civilization and man's evolution from a nomadic life to life in a higher level of society.[11] Indeed, at one point he makes it clear that he

[10] *Atthis. The Local Chroniclers of Ancient Athens* (Oxford, 1949), p. 142.

[11] The term "speculative reconstruction" is that of T. Cole, *Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology* (Cleveland, 1967), p. 145, who believes that as a method it "enjoyed a rather limited vogue in antiquity." In suggesting that the appeal to *eikos* was less popular in the fourth century, he

believed all mankind, both Greeks and barbarians, go through the same stages of development (1.6, especially 6.2 and 6.6). Such a theory of evolution, together with generalizations drawn from the world around him, enabled him to recreate stages of culture and to supply details and come to conclusions not found in his sources. They allowed him to see and describe a process in the scattered material of poetry and tradition. In the end this is precisely what distinguishes Thucydides' use of the distant past from that of Herodotus. Both employ generalizations and argue in such a way as to produce a synthesis. Thucydides alone begins with a theoretical and highly speculative construct and consciously applies it to the early history of Greece.[12]

Rationalism, Rationalization, and Rationality

It remains merely to discuss the rationalism of the two historians.[13] To begin, it is necessary to make some basic

points out that "the Archaeology of Thucydides did not, so far as we know, find a successor" (p. 146). Compare Jacoby, *ibid.*, who remarks about Atthidography, "The information furnished by ethnography . . . served as raw material either for abstracting some general conclusions, or for proving an assumed stage of culture." Again this is pertinent to Thucydides' methodology.

[12] The best book on early Greek anthropological speculations and theories of evolution is Eric Havelock's *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics* (New Haven, 1957), chaps. 3-5. I believe that Thucydides was influenced by this body of ideas, which appear in a variety of writings of the sixth and fifth centuries. Havelock concludes his discussion of the fragments of Greek anthropologists thus, p. 123: "A backward glance over the territory now traversed can reveal as in an aerial photograph the contours of a science of anthropology in the pre-Socratic period. While it follows a perceptible development from Anaximander to Democritus, the surviving scraps are too tenuous to encourage the scholar to draw elaborate lines of classification between different schools of thought in this common area." His Chapter 6, "The Political Theory of Democritus," is also interesting, in particular his comments on *stasis* (based on *DK* B245b and 249), "He wants a term as general as possible in order to view faction historically as a process endemic in the social order at all stages of its evolution" (p. 136). This comes very close to Thucydides' view of the disruptive effects of *stasis*.

[13] For references to rationalization and rationalizing criticism, see Chapter

distinctions that may lead to an understanding of the precise nature and extent of rationalism as a development in thought found in both Herodotus and Thucydides. In the first place, ancient rationalism must be distinguished from its modern counterpart, which is associated with certain philosophers of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This kind of rationalism stresses the power of *a priori* reason to grasp truths about the world: it is thus usually contrasted with empiricism. Such a development in philosophy, represented, for example, in the works of Descartes, must in turn be distinguished from a looser application of the term rationalism, held to be characteristic of some eighteenth-century thinkers of the Enlightenment. The latter praised reason in contrast to faith, traditional authority, and superstition. Hence rationalism came to represent opposition to religion.[14]

Innate ideas versus experience, is this what is meant by ancient rationalism? To be sure, pre-Socratic philosophers did develop rational criticism and even extolled rational thought, reason, and the arguments derived from reason as superior to the evidence of the senses. Xenophanes and Heraclitus are early examples. Parmenides goes further in his statement of the principle of noncontradiction: for him thought and being are one. Rationality has become a criterion for reality. This kind of rationalism reaches its fullest development in Socrates and Plato. First, there is the technique of the dialectic, with its relentless criticism of common-sense knowledge and belief, and its articulation of definitions and, ultimately, concepts. More important, there is the opposition of "ideas" or forms, an ideal world, to the world of the senses, mere appearances. The term *rationalism*

One, p. 18 and notes *ad locum*. R. Drews, *The Greek Accounts of Eastern History* (Washington, D.C., 1973), pp. 16-18, discusses Hekataios' rationalism (and rationalization) with full bibliography in notes 59-67 *ad locum*.

[14] For definitions of modern rationalism, works consulted include *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. P. Edwards (London and New York, 1967), 7:69-75 (written by B. Williams) and W. Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1931), pp. 389-393 and 437-440.

is widely applied to this development in philosophy. But its usage is quite specific. Parmenides is the first "rationalistic metaphysician" because he sets forth a logical principle whereby to determine the nature of the "real" world, of Being.[15] He does not, however, offer any meaning or explanation of the world of the senses, mere appearances. In the same way Plato is a "rationalist," for he believes he has discovered a "real" world, which admits of rational study.[16] This is the unchanging world of ideas or forms, of which the world of the senses, of perception, and change is a mere reflection. Precisely defined, ancient rationalism implies not only rational criticism, rational principles, and rational analysis, but a rational/real world opposed to the world of appearances, empirical reality.

A rationalism that seeks to explain the external world and that poses a duality between the real and the apparent, the rational and the empirical, need not imply its opposite, empiricism. Traditional empiricism (that of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) maintains that all knowledge is derived from experience.[17] In fact, for an empiricist like Hume there is no reason to believe that any explanation of the existence of things independent of our senses is possible. Here is the very opposite of Plato's dichotomy, in which the empirical is explained by the rational as being a reflection of it. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries experience, the empirical world, has primacy in knowledge. Ideas, derived as they are from sense impressions, are but a reflection of experience. Empiricism of this kind did not develop in the ancient world, nor did ancient rationalism stand in opposition to a philosophy of empiricism. Even the brilliant theories of the atomic physicists have more in common with rationalism

[15] C. Perelman, *An Historical Introduction to Philosophical Thinking*, trans. K. A. Brown (New York, 1965), p. 11.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[17] See R. Blanché, *Contemporary Science and Rationalism*, trans. I.A.G. Le Bek (Edinburgh, 1968), p. 85, and Perelman, *ibid.*, chap. 8, "Empiricism," pp. 158-172, a useful summary of the empirical tradition.

than empiricism, based as they are on the hypothetical existence of invisible entities. The latter were a construct of the mind and did not derive from experience: their existence could not be verified. In his *Conceptual Foundations of Scientific Thought* Marx Wartofsky makes a significant observation about the relationship of rationalism and empirical reality in the ancient world: "If one reconstructs the Greek context sympathetically, or even if one relies on one's own common-sense level of experience, then the most speculative of the Greek theories may be seen as an attempt to order and explain the world of common sense."[18] This comment applies equally to Democritus or Socrates, to Thucydides or Herodotus. Though there were no true empiricists, no philosophy of empiricism, the aforementioned did try to explain empirical reality. In so doing they employed rational criticism and rational principles to one degree or another. This does not, however, constitute the rationalism of Descartes. Nor do the historians attain the level of rationalism of Parmenides or Plato, if we accept the definition of ancient rationalism as the perception of a real/rational world opposed to the world of appearances. Much as Herodotus and Thucydides employ rational principles and rational criticism to explain empirical

[18] Pp. 85-86. Wartofsky (New York, 1968) does stress the empirical aspects of the Hippokratic corpus, with its emphasis on observation and practice. He is critical of those who believe that the Greeks relied too much on *a priori* speculation, for he believes that the whole intent of such speculation "is to give an account of the appearances, of the empirical data, of observation. The failures of *a priorism* arise when theoretical or speculative arguments are not submitted to the test of their empirical adequacy" (p. 85). In my opinion, most Greek thinkers had a minimal interest in, and capacity or opportunity for, observation and verification. Their methods (and this includes Hippokrates and the atomic physicists) were perhaps on a par with Herodotus' "scientific" procedures in 2.2-16. (See above, Chapter Two.) None had the intellectual, let alone the practical, tools to submit their arguments to the test of empirical adequacy. That this was the case and that we now regard their conceptual formulations as "false" (Wartofsky, *ibid.*, p. 95) does not negate the continuity in the use of theoretical constructs Wartofsky postulates between Greek speculative thought and contemporary science.

reality, they do not reject that reality or construct a higher form of Being.[19]

To digress briefly from the term rationalism, it is possible to locate in the works of both historians a more specific and rather more narrow application of rational principles, what is usually termed *rationalization*. Rationalization involves the use of reason to make tradition or poetry rational, by removing those elements that are contrary to nature, incredible, or even improbable, and at times substituting their opposites. A great deal of what is usually termed "rationalizing criticism" in Book 2 of the *Histories* is in fact not that at all. For instance, in criticizing accepted Greek traditions about gods, heroes, and men, Herodotus actually believed he had genuine knowledge based on an authority he could trust. Thus he either replaced those traditions entirely or reconstructed them on the basis of the truth derived from Egypt. Although his procedures did involve distinguishing truth from fabrication in the *mythoi* of the poets, it was always in the light of his Egyptian source, and thus it represents an early form of source criticism. In the case of Herodotus too it is not even possible to speak unequivocally of rationalization in the sense of criticism of religion in the light of reason (that kind of opposition to religion characterizing eighteenth-century rationalism). For it should be noted that Herodotus' appeal to reason in this regard was extremely limited. In reconstructing events at Troy, for example, he offered a divine explanation, based on his own religious belief, in support of his argument (120.5). He never doubted that the gods existed, only that they were born and lived among men at the time when and in the manner in which the poets sang of them. In other respects as well Book 2 is full of indications of Herodotus' own religious outlook, even piety (45.3), in-

[19] The historians did, of course, believe in the existence of gods and other superhuman forces. But that is another matter. Compare Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), chap. 14, "The Origin of the Theory of Forms," pp. 254-275, for a different interpretation of the transformation in thought brought about by Plato.

cluding his belief in oracles, which he cited both as a source of truth (52) and as a means of justifying his assertions (18). Herodotus' "rationalizing criticism" cannot be considered criticism of religion in the light of reason. This does not mean, of course, that Herodotus did not rationalize. In reconstructing events at Troy he did rationalize, in the sense that he attributed reasonable human motives to the protagonists there, based on arguments from probability. Thucydides did the same, when he attempted to prove that those who united in the first collective effort of all Greece did so out of fear and not because of any sense of responsibility or favor due to Agamemnon based on the oaths sworn to Tyndareus. In his *Atthis* Jacoby has, it seems to me, correctly described the kind of rationalizations found in both historians, when he speaks of attempts "to see the distant past under the same aspect" as the time of the historian.[20] Moreover, he points out: "To write the history of a time for which there is no historical tradition, only the narratives of the poets and popular legends, is impossible unless one conceives and describes persons and events even of a very remote past as if they belonged to the present time."[21] This describes precisely the rationalizations of both historians in respect of the distant past.

Jacoby's formulation suggests another intellectual tool used by the two historians: analogy.[22] Analogical reasoning is closely related to argumentation based on probabilities. For analogy like probability is based on the perception of similarities, the belief that individuals acted in the past, or will act in the future, much as they do in the present, and so that behavior in the past can be reconstructed by using the analogy of the present. Both probability and analogy are used by the historians in their rationalizations. In the case of Thucydides, one can go even further. Analogical reasoning

[20] P. 87. This he refers to as "rationalism."

[21] P. 133. Again he calls this "rationalism."

[22] See Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy. Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought* (Cambridge, 1966), Part 2, *passim*.

is at the heart of his evolutionist theory of civilization. For uniform development and uniform stages of growth also imply similarities and parallels. Thus such a theory also affords the means to approach data, to rationalize, and to reconstruct events in the past by using the analogy of the present. In a word, analogy serves as a kind of rational principle in Thucydides' speculative reconstruction of the past.

Rationalization has led us to the term rational principle. What relationship does the latter have to rationalism? To ask such a question serves to highlight the difficulties inherent in the term rationalism: it has become virtually meaningless, by being applied to every rational procedure in the ancient world.[23] The definition proposed above for ancient rationalism is the perception of a real/rational world opposed to the world of appearances. It follows that neither Herodotus nor Thucydides was a rationalist, though both employed rational principles and rational criticism to explain reality. In order to describe their procedures we are seeking a term broader than rationalism or rationalization. The term is rationality. For an appropriate definition one must turn again to Wartofsky: "Rational practice entails . . . not simply the use of concepts, but the self-conscious or reflective use of concepts; i.e. the critical attitude towards scientific practice and thought, which constitutes not simply scientific knowledge alone (which is its necessary condition), but the *self-knowledge* of science, the critical examination of its own conceptual foundations (or minimally, the readiness to bring such examination to bear at crucial times)."[24]

[23] See above, notes 20 and 21, for Jacoby's use of the term rationalism. Compare Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 1, "Herodotus and Pre-Socratic Speculation," pp. 156–165. Lloyd begins with Ionian rationalism, which he defines as the belief that reason is preeminent (p. 157). Ultimately, he stresses Herodotus' "common sense" and "thoroughgoing empiricism," even going so far as to propose that "Herodotus was basically a phenomenalist" (p. 159). The proliferation of philosophic terms is extremely confusing.

[24] M. W. Wartofsky, "Metaphysics as Heuristic for Science" in *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 3, ed. R. S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky (New York, 1967), p. 151.

The above, of course, describes scientific practice. But it applies equally to prescientific criticism and conceptual formulations. For, Wartofsky believes that metaphysics is a heuristic for science and that the classical metaphysical systems display the essential features of the kind of theoretical construction used in scientific practice. He states: "Further, the history of metaphysics reveals to us models of criticism in terms of which conceptual systems of great generality were constructed, torn down, modified, replaced, in which primitive conceptual formulations were developed by criticism, by elaboration, into the most highly complex and systemic theoretical constructs. (Merely to mention the Pre-Socratics, and the great alternative schemes of Democritus, Plato and Aristotle, suffices to make the point.)"[25] Wartofsky does not mention Herodotus or Thucydides. He could. For both historians made use of the accepted canons of logic and argumentation appropriate to their era. Both also used concepts appropriate to that era. In addition, they used them reflectively. Reflective examination includes the kind of skepticism, perception of contradictions, and skillful argumentation noted above. All these are rational procedures. In Thucydides' case, it also includes the acceptance and use of a highly complex theoretical construct. Thucydides had "a rational—that is a unified, coherent and critically appraisable—world-picture; in short, a model of reality."[26]

To conclude, it is rationality rather than rationalism we have discerned in our study of the ancient historians' uses of the past. The term rationality, or rationality as defined by Wartofsky, is extremely fruitful in that it embraces both ancient and modern practice. It thus allows skepticism and criticism to exist side by side with religion and other forms of

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 155, comments made in respect of "classical metaphysics." See also Goody, *The Domestication*, pp. 47-48. Goody believes that literacy or the embodiment of speech in a permanent form allows for a more systematic use of rational procedures. It permits more rigor in dealing with questions of truth and falsehood. In a word, it facilitates the reflective use of concepts.

irrationality, as in Herodotus. It also allows for the elaboration of theoretical constructs, a metaphysical system, to explain empirical reality, as in Thucydides. More important, it affords us the possibility of standing as spectators at the birth of the "miracle" those "remarkable" historians labored to produce.[27]

[27] In employing this metaphor I am in total accord with Goody's remarks about the "genius of the Greeks," cited above in note 4. The word "remarkable" is Wartofsky's. In *Conceptual Foundations* he entitles Chapter 4 "From Common Sense to Science: The Remarkable Greeks and the Origins of Criticism."

FOUR

Generalization, Process, and Event: Thucydides' Explanation of Brasidas' Successes in Thrace

IN CHOOSING the Archaeology as a starting-point for a study of ancient historiographic methodology, and in formulating a coherent theory of history on the basis of that excursus, I have remained very much aware of a genuine problem: the difference of the Archaeology from most of the rest of the *History*. The methods Thucydides used in the Archaeology may also differ from those employed in his reconstruction of contemporary events, which is the subject of the *History* proper. To be sure, the study began with the Archaeology just because it would allow us to see the historian reconstructing the events of a period far in the past, about which he could have no firsthand evidence, with the express aim of comparing its methodology with that of Herodotus' *Histories*. But are the conclusions reached valid for the rest of the *History*, where Thucydides did have firsthand evidence, both his own and others', and where he was aware of the difficulties inherent in reconstructing contemporary events? He speaks earnestly of his efforts to be accurate and his patient labor to discover "the details of what occurred in the war" (1.22.2). Clearly, we must study a portion of the *History* that deals with contemporary events, before it is possible to state with assurance that we have discovered the methodological principles employed by Thucydides.

As a more typical example of narrative, typical in the sense that it is contemporary, I have chosen Brasidas' *strateia* in Thrace, which comprises most of Book 4.78-135. A summary reading would suggest that it is classic historical narrative, and classic Thucydides, since, in a history that is avowedly military, it reconstructs mainly military exploits,

conquest and retreat, diplomacy, threats, and betrayal, and the numerous problems of sustaining an expedition in a distant land. But a genuine problem confronts us here. How are we to proceed, given Thucydides' wall of silence about his sources, a wall rendering a study of his critical method almost impossible.[1] It is easy enough to repeat the historian's statement of methodology in Book 1.22.2-4 with its explicit emphasis on accuracy and laboriousness, its awareness of the dangers of partiality and the imperfections of memory, and its avoidance of the "mythical" element, with all that may imply of romantic or exotic tales or even anecdotes. But can we, without knowing Thucydides' sources, ever appreciate the extent of his critical reflection or his internal criteria of truth? In the face of the historian's silence, then, what I propose is to turn at once to his principle of selection, in the hope that it may offer some clues to synthesis.[2] Do the generalizations and concepts that underlie Thucydides' synthesis here approximate those discovered in the Archaeology?

[1] See C. Schneider, *Information und Absicht bei Thukydides. Untersuchung zur Motivation des Handelns*, Hypomnemata 41 (Göttingen, 1974), pp. 26-28.

[2] In *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 3, corr. reprint (Oxford, 1962), Gomme a number of times expresses a kind of bewilderment at Thucydides' selection of detail. Noting, for example, that the historian does not explain why Brasidas approached Akanthos before other cities in Chalkidike, he wonders why Thucydides tells the reader nothing: "He is often, in the speeches, ready to generalize; in some cases, as for Amphipolis, he gives some of the strategic factors; but elsewhere, as here, his statement is as bare as the barest annals" (3:551). Later, Gomme suggests that "there is, always, an apparent capriciousness in Thucydides' choice of events worth narrating" (3:607). (Gomme does go on to qualify the last statement and stresses the word "apparently," because the reader does not know, in the case of omissions, for example, what led to them. They could be due to the unfinished state of the work.) Such comments, though isolated, reveal a certain uneasiness about the historian's principles of selection, even if that uneasiness is never formulated theoretically. A formulation is offered by de Romilly in *Histoire et raison chez Thucydide* (Paris, 1956), where she demonstrates the unifying force of a central theme in Thucydides' narrative. She uses the word "enchaînements," interconnections (or better, concatenations), which, she states, it was Thucydides' purpose to make clear (p. 26). To effect this purpose he consciously refused to isolate facts "comme événements" (p.

Thucydides has himself provided the key to his narrative of Brasidas' exploits in Thrace in a passage (81.2-3) often compared with Book 2.65,[3] for two reasons: both passages represent the historian's own evaluation of prominent individuals whom he admired, and both are of late composition, written many years after the events of the narrative of which they are a part. Chapter 81.2-3, written after the war in Sicily, is thus a retrospective judgment on Brasidas' qualities as a leader and diplomat, and the effectiveness of his personality and exploits both at the time (424-422) and many years later. First, his conduct toward the cities in the area of Thrace was exemplary, a display of justice and moderation, whereby he caused them to break away from the Athenian *arche*, most in revolt, some through treachery and capture. While Thucydides does not ignore the immediate advantages of a strong bargaining position and relief from war in the Peloponnese that Brasidas' success brought Sparta, he moves beyond this judgment to the effect of Brasidas' reputation many years later. His conduct is now converted to the two distinct and extremely significant qualities of *arete* and *xynesis*, which men either knew from their own experience, or accepted on the word of others.[4] This it was that later instilled in Athens' allies a strong inclination toward the Lakedaimonians: "For in being the first to venture abroad and in gaining an excellent reputation wherever he turned, he securely rooted an

23). She summarizes thus, p. 27: "Par conséquent, s'il est vrai que les événements, quels qu'ils soient, ne sont rapportés qu'en fonction des progrès du siège, ce n'est pas parce que le siège, en tant que tel, intéresse Thucydide: c'est parce que le siège est ce qui fait l'unité et l'enchaînement de ces divers événements."

[3] See Gomme, *Commentary*, 3:550, and also "Four Passages in Thucydides" in *More Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford, 1962), pp. 92-99. The precise passage in Book 2 is 65.4-13.

[4] *Arete* and *xynesis* appear separately in a number of individuals in the *History* and together are what characterize the rule of the Peisistratidai until the murder of Hipparchos (6.54.5). On *xynesis* see L. Edmunds, "Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis (3.82-83)," *HSCP* 79 (1975), 80 and n. 22 *ad locum*.

expectation that the rest were also like him." Brasidas' conduct and his qualities thus provided a model of what was required to undermine the Athenian *arche*.

If we accept this chapter as one holding the key to Thucydides' narrative in 4.78-135, it is not unreasonable to expect there a full depiction of Brasidas' character and his conduct, in short the manner in which he treated the cities in order to cause them to break away from Athens. We may also expect to find, as de Romilly did elsewhere, that the facts of the narrative are not related in isolation for their own sake but are unified around a central theme, or, as I would express it, are part of a process.[5] To anticipate, the central feature of the process here will, I suggest, be disunity. For chapters 78-135 describe the first significant disintegration of *arche*, a foretaste of a similar process that will occur after the Sicilian expedition. Here the vast collectivity of Athens, based on fear and *dynamis*, is threatened by Brasidas' appeal to the discontent of the cities within the *arche* and their desire for freedom and autonomy. But Brasidas' *strateia* is an unusual one, since it is an expedition by land, operating on distant terrain: he does not have the advantage of a navy or the kind of resources and power that both lead to and are a concomitant of seafaring. Can such a *strateia*, in causing disunity and disintegration, hope to achieve a unification of its own? Or, does Brasidas even aim at a new unity? Whatever the answer, it will become clear that at the heart of the process described in Book 4.78-135 are many concepts integral to

[5] See above, note 2. For a definition of the term process, see the Introduction. The entire process involves *arche*, its achievement, consolidation (unity and growth), maintenance, and finally crisis (breakdown and decline). Chapters 78-135 concern only part of the process, the beginning of crisis, which takes the form here of disunity and disintegration. Unfortunately, I have not found a term adequate to express the individual stages of process and thus make reference to the process of disunity and disintegration, the process of *stasis*, etc. It must be understood that disunity and disintegration are but a part of the stage I have called crisis (breakdown and decline), and crisis itself only one stage in a totality beginning with the achievement of *arche*.

Thucydides' theory of history as it was elaborated in the Archaeology.

The process adumbrated above has as a nucleus the winning in turn of Akanthos and Amphipolis, the former by diplomacy, the latter by conquest. To begin with Akanthos, Brasidas' success here, recorded in chapters 84–88, reveals in all its clarity the complex of inducements, on the one side, and feelings, on the other, that tempt men to revolt. They are summarized in chapter 88 as persuasive arguments, which induce belief and presumably hope, the threat of force, which produces fear, and oaths, which evoke trust. Let us look at this threefold complex, beginning with fear, which is mentioned first, from the moment Brasidas appears (84.2). This passage is an instance of the manner in which so often in the *History* fear hovers in the background, an added inducement to words of persuasion. It is hard reality as opposed to the ostensible altruism or idealism of the *logos*. Initially, fear for their crops induces the Akanthians to admit Brasidas, a fear which he substantiates in his speech by threatening violence (87.2, βιάζεσθαι), the devastation of their land. This violence he justifies as being for the common good, its aim not a new *arche*, but the autonomy of all. Fear for their crops then enters into the decision of the majority to admit Brasidas, though it is left unclear what weight it has *vis-à-vis* other considerations. Would the Akanthians have submitted so readily had Brasidas not arrived at a crucial moment, a *kairos*, when their crops were vulnerable? Secondly, the Akanthians put their trust in oaths sworn by the Spartan government, oaths for which they demand Brasidas' own pledge. Whatever difficulties may be involved in the word "allies" as used by Brasidas in chapter 86.1, the key word is "autonomy," repeated in chapter 88 as what the Akanthians themselves consider to be the substance of the oaths and what primarily influences their decision.[6] Such

[6] "Allies" here mean those who would stand in the same kind of relationship to Brasidas and to one another as the Greeks stood together against a common enemy in Book 1.18.2, referred to at Book 1.19 as a ξυμμαχία.

oaths are in a sense a counterweight to their fear, since acceptance implies a trust in Spartan respect for the gods, or, more precisely, for that unwritten code elsewhere threatened, or even shattered, by the moral breakdown attendant on war.[7] They act on faith, of course, for only time will reveal whether their trust in the Spartans, or in Brasidas himself, is misplaced. The same might be said for Brasidas' "seductive arguments," which on the surface also appear to be accepted on faith. While his speech, taken as a whole, runs the gamut of possible arguments, and while many of them may well be mere rhetorical *topoi*, there is surely some deeper significance, since Thucydides has chosen to attribute to Brasidas a speech of such length as to render the narrative of chapters 84 and 88 quite meager by contrast.

It is not the purpose of the present work to discuss Thucydidean speeches *per se*. Elsewhere I have analyzed his *logoi* at length and formulated a number of their characteristics. For the most part, whether direct or indirect, the *logoi* anticipate the narrative that follows, which is often, as here, quite meager in proportion to the preceding speech (or thoughts), but which provides confirmation that the plan or strategy, or the general reasoning on which it was based, was correct.[8]

In spite of Thucydides' use of the term "allies" in 1.18.3, by the beginning of the war in fact most of the original allies had become subjects without genuine autonomy, forced to remain in the Athenian *arche*. Book 1.99 describes why and how this process began. By stressing that the Spartans have no desire for *arche* (87.5), Brasidas offers reassurance to the Akanthians that they will not merely be changing one master for another. Both Crawley and Warner have captured the spirit of this passage, when they translate respectively: "and besides my object in coming is not by force or fraud to obtain your alliance, but to offer you mine to help you against your Athenian masters" and "it is we who want to join you and help you to escape from your bondage to Athens."

[7] See Book 3.82-83, Thucydides' general description and analysis of *stasis*, in particular the reference at chapters 82.7 and 83.2 to the violation of oaths, once believed sacred, men's attitude to which was somehow determined by the ἄγραφοι νόμοι. To break the latter, according to Pericles in the Funeral Oration (2.37.3), "brings acknowledged shame."

[8] Hunter, *Thucydides, the Artful Reporter* (Toronto, 1973), chap. 5 and p. 178.

On the other hand, most speeches in the *History* do not exist in isolation, but can be related to preceding portions of the narrative, thus revealing whether the speaker has learned from his own or others' experiences, including history, and how this comprehension or lack of comprehension of the truth inherent in past *erga* enters into both persuasion and prediction. In other words, facts, events, or *erga* are generally selected as part of a continuum of experience, involving narrative, speech, narrative (*erga-logoi-erga*).[9] Clearly then, whether the speeches *per se* are discussed or not, they must play some significant part in unifying the narrative around a central theme, what I termed the process of disunity.

To return then to a series of "seductive arguments" used by Brasidas that go beyond mere rhetorical *topoi*, there is in the speech an explicit link backward to an earlier portion of the narrative, as well as a link forward to the narrative that follows. The link to the past is Brasidas' use of the example of his success at Megara to persuade the Akanthians that, since the Athenians did not venture to engage him there in spite of their superior numbers, the former can put every trust in his ability to defend them against the Athenians here. His assurance hinges on an argument from probability, the unlikelihood (85.7, οὐκ εἰκός) of the Athenians' sending against them by sea a force equal to that in the field before Megara. If the Akanthians accept this reasoning and allow the example of Megara to influence their decision to revolt, and presumably they do, they do so on the basis of *erga* that have been twisted in the speech in such a way as to be persuasive, without transmitting the truth of what actually occurred at Megara. A close study of Book 4.66-74 reveals at once a number of facts which, by not being communicated to the Akanthians, lead to their deception. Chapter 73 is especially instructive. It is in "indirect style," that peculiar kind of Thucydidean narrative presenting a minimum of actual facts but in their stead a series of thoughts, predictions, and calculations on the part of the protagonists that are tanta-

[9] *Ibid.*, chap. 9, especially pp. 172-174.

mount to facts, because events then turn out accordingly. The upshot is that Brasidas, having failed to persuade the Megarians to admit him into their city, gambled on the possibility of victory by default. He deliberately left the initiative for battle to the Athenians, allowing for the chance that if they should refuse the challenge, he would achieve his aims without fighting. And this is what actually happened, as Thucydides puts it so succinctly (73.4, ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο). What is important here is the corresponding calculations of the Athenians, made in their decision not to accept this challenge. Basically, they were unable to balance the possibility of gains against the equal possibility of losses, if they began a battle against superior numbers. They thus refused battle and the gates of Megara were thrown open to Brasidas as victor. In fact, his superior numbers, which are recorded in 72.2, were the reason for his success.[10] The *erga* refute him and the Akanthians are deceived.

The detailed narrative of Book 4.66-74 is a fine example of Thucydides' principle of selection and the interconnection of parts of the *History*. The capitulation of Megara is not an isolated event but can be related to the description of *stasis* in Book 3, one kind of breakdown taking place in the Greek world.[11] At the same time it looks forward to the revolt of

[10] He had at least 6,000 hoplites with the recent acquisition of 2,200 hoplites and 600 cavalry from Boiotia. The composition of his initial force is recorded at chapter 70.1. The Athenians, on the other hand, had 4,000 hoplites and 600 cavalry (68.5). This is not to underestimate the fact of Brasidas' success or the correctness of his strategy and calculations, recorded at 73.1-3. As Gomme notes, *Commentary*, 3:534: "the fact remains that he achieved all he wanted without fighting; and the subsequent events of the summer, as it happened, confirmed his judgement."

[11] Events at Megara conform precisely to Thucydides' statement at Book 3.82.1, following his description of *stasis* at Kerkyra. Later, he points out, almost the entire Hellenic world was caught up in the process. (The word he uses is ἐκινήθη, reminiscent of κίνησις of 1.1.2.) In the split that ensued within each city, one side, the leaders of the *demos*, invited in the Athenians, while the other, the oligarchs, invited in the Lakedaimonians. War exacerbated this process, by giving those who wished to change the political system (νεωτερίζειν) a chance to solicit allies to assist them in achieving their

Akanthos, thus constituting the first link in another kind of breakdown, the disintegration of the Athenian *arche*. If the reader has failed to see this link, Thucydides makes it explicit in his later assessment of why the cities of Thrace were eager to revolt. Their confidence of success stemmed partly from Brasidas' account of the Athenians' refusal to fight at Megara, which Thucydides here describes as "seductive and untrue" (108.5, ἐφολκὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ ὄντα). True or false, the example of his success at Megara, in Thucydides' own judgment, constituted a form of persuasion. In other words, Brasidas' success and the security against reprisal it seemed to afford are essential to the process of disunity and disintegration he initiates in Thrace. To return to his speech to the Akanthians, its basic purpose is to make Akanthos yet another example in the eyes of the cities of Thrace. Brasidas, in fact, makes it quite explicit that it would be unacceptable for Akanthos to resist, because his failure to win over the first city to which he came would have a decidedly negative effect on his reception elsewhere (85.5-6). Without Akanthos' example to influence them the other cities would consider his promise of liberation hollow. So essential is Akanthos' example that he is prepared to use force, if diplomacy fails.

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aims. At Megara a group of exiles, driven out by the *demos* as a result of *stasis* (66.1, οἳ στασιασάντων ἐκπεσόντες ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους), were causing trouble by acts of plunder. When serious proposals about readmitting them were put forth and seemed on the verge of acceptance, the leaders of the *demos* entered into negotiations with the Athenian generals with a view to surrendering the city to them, since they considered this would be politically the safer course for themselves. There is no reason here to follow through this process in all its detail, though it should be noted that the entire passage is colored by the struggle of factions, the activities of which are determined by their relationship to outside forces. In the end the friends of the exiles admit Brasidas as victor, and soon after the departure of both Peloponnesians and Athenians, recall the exiles from Pegai. Chapter 74 in particular illustrates Thucydides' description of the negative effects of *stasis*. The strongest oaths mean nothing, as the party of the exiles, in power, arranges the condemnation and death of about one hundred Athenian collaborators, and then establishes a strict oligarchy.

Highlighted in this way, the purpose of Brasidas' speech anticipates the effect Akanthos' revolt will in fact have in the narrative that follows. This link forward is then given substance by some additional arguments that Brasidas uses, promises that, if accepted and fulfilled, will indeed make Akanthos an example of his conduct toward those cities that revolt, thus adding a new dimension to his reputation. In a sense his policy is summed up in the last line by the expression "the whole city" (87.6, ξυμπάσῃ τῇ πόλει), an exhortation to unity, at a time when most cities were torn by *stasis*. He himself is aware that Akanthos is divided, and that there are some who naturally fear individual reprisals.[12] To such people he offers his assurance that he has not come to take sides in factional disputes (86.4, ξυστασιάσων) or to impose on them any kind of political structure that may conflict with their own traditions. In his opinion, this would not be freedom at all but a new kind of slavery, worse than the control imposed upon them by the Athenian *arche*. This is a first instance of Brasidas' justice and moderation (81.2), conduct that is as yet untested, but that presumably influences the majority. Thucydides does not express an opinion on what influenced their vote, but he does attribute to Brasidas words that will have a significance in the future not just for the Akanthians, but for the other cities of Thrace. He encourages them to compare his (and the Spartans') actions closely with his words. This is precisely what the cities will do. Indeed, Thucydides appends to his account of Akanthos' revolt the simple statement that "not long afterwards Stagiros, an Andrian colony, also joined the revolt from Athens" (88.2). Once again in his later assessment of Brasidas, where

[12] At chapter 84.2 there is a reference to two factions, who differ (ἐστασίαζον) about admitting Brasidas. Notably the *demos* is in opposition. Once again the circumstances recall Thucydides' analysis of *stasis*, as well as its concrete manifestation at Megara. Once Brasidas is admitted, however, he makes a point of reassuring individuals that they need not fear their political opponents (86.3).

he generalizes about the latter's success, Thucydides picks up in particular one of the motives of 81.2, moderation: his behavior toward the cities was *metrion* (108.2). Since Akanthos is a major example of this behavior, it can only be assumed that he did fulfil his promises there, thus setting a pattern for cities like Stagiros and furthering the process of disunity and disintegration.

The capture of Amphipolis is Brasidas' crowning achievement, the very apex of the process unfolding in Book 4.78-135. While its detailed narrative is reminiscent of that employed to describe his success at Megara, the fullness of both passages contrasts sharply with the paucity of detail supplied about Akanthos, where the *logos* is central and disproportionately long compared to the narrative. One might be tempted at first to propose some rather obvious explanations of this contrast. Since Akanthos represents an example of Brasidas' diplomacy, the persuasive arguments used in his *logos* are naturally formulated with some care and at some length. It is equally natural that, since Thucydides was not merely an eyewitness, but an active participant at Amphipolis, its capture should be described in rich detail. To be sure, explanations of this sort are not without merit. In the case of Amphipolis, for instance, Thucydides' knowledge of the region, his long-standing influence there, and his role as *strategos* are valid reasons to expect his account to reflect this firsthand experience. Nor does he write out of scale because of this personal involvement, which must have affected him deeply, since it ultimately led to disgrace and exile. The detailed narrative of Amphipolis' capture is quite in proportion to the significance of its loss for Athens.[13]

This said, let us suggest another kind of explanation of this detailed narrative. If Akanthos represents mere promises, as well as some "seduction and untruth,"[14] yet some of these promises look ahead to Amphipolis, where their fulfil-

[13] Compare Gomme, *Commentary*, 3:584.
[14] Thucydides' words at chapter 108.5.

ment reduces to insignificance Brasidas' initial recourse to deception. By providing stunning evidence that Brasidas' promises are not hollow, but capable of genuine achievement, Amphipolis' capture represents a turning point in the process of disunity and disintegration initiated by Akanthos. The precise details of the narrative verify Thucydides' retrospective judgment, formulated in chapter 81, on Brasidas' qualities as a leader. For example, his much heralded vigor (81.1), unusual in a Spartan, is amply demonstrated here. Speed and surprise are characteristic of the man. Moving by night through a storm, he catches everyone at Amphipolis unawares and easily forces his way across the bridge to the very walls of the city, overrunning the whole territory outside and producing a major panic within.[15] The activist becomes once more the diplomat, when his expectations of betrayal are not realized. The circumstances are remarkably like those at Akanthos: there are factions, *staseis*, pro and con. Many too, in this case Athenians within the city, fear reprisal. Threatened by the prospects of Thucydides' arrival from Thasos with a naval force, Brasidas quickly takes stock of the situation and issues a proclamation offering moderate terms (105.2, τὴν ξύμβασιν μετρίαν). There is no need for a *logos* here, since the variety of arguments used at Akanthos are fresh in the reader's mind. Instead, Thucydides concentrates on the motives of Amphipolis' inhabitants. Their main feeling is one of relief that the proclamation is so just, as contrasted to what they feared. Even the Athenians, who are offered the same terms as the rest, share this feeling. The mood of the general populace alters in Brasidas' favor once they realize that they have been unexpectedly saved from danger and will retain their full rights. The city surrenders.

The full significance of Brasidas' capture of Amphipolis,

[15] His speed and surprise are facilitated, of course, by the treachery of a group within the city, mainly settlers from Argilos. Treachery is offered as one of several reasons for the ease with which he overcame the guard at the bridge, which was not at that period protected by the fortifications of the city.

which is the culmination of his achievements in Thrace, is underscored by Thucydides' own judgment in chapter 108, which in many ways merely confirms his evaluation in chapter 81.2-3. What stands out especially is his moderation, which, along with his self-proclaimed role as liberator, instilled fear in the Athenians that their allies would continue to revolt. The capture of Amphipolis is crucial for two reasons. First, it goes beyond mere promises and presents the subject cities with real evidence of Brasidas' "considerate behaviour" (108.3, πραότητα).[16] It serves as well to confirm all his promises made at Akanthos, thus adding to the example of the former's revolt an achievement so signal that Athens' subject cities actually begin to invite him into their territory "each wishing to be the first to revolt." Secondly, the capture of Amphipolis produces in these cities a genuine sense of security (108.4, ἄδεια), genuine in that it need no longer be based, as it was at Akanthos, on deception about Brasidas' success at Megara. As a result the cities "were full of confidence and believed there would be no reprisals against them" (108.5). Amphipolis is thus the high point of Brasidas' exploits, the positive effects of which are generalized in chapter 108.

But Thucydides does not restrict himself to positive generalizations in chapter 108. A new note is sounded distinguishing his judgment here from that formulated in chapter 81; the tone is negative, the result of retrospection, since, superficially at least, it appears quite unwarranted at this point in the narrative. He condemns the subject cities for vastly underestimating Athens' *dynamis*, for clutching at straws, as it were, by basing their judgment more on wishful thinking than on a sound calculation of future possibilities. The reader, having just read the detailed narrative of Brasidas' stunning success, must experience some surprise at Thucydides' comments, particularly his negative generalizations about human behavior.[17] The cities, he concludes, were car-

[16] Warner's translation, which I find difficult to improve.

[17] The opposition of hope and calculation (ἐλπίς versus λογισμός or, in

ried away by the pleasure of the moment. The narrative of chapters 102-107 compels careful study to see if there is anything within it to justify this remarkable intrusion, which must be based on the historian's knowledge of the ultimate failure of Brasidas' mission.

In the same chapter (108.7) Thucydides does, of course, indict the Spartans for ignoring Brasidas' request for reinforcements. Their refusal, he explains, was due partly to the jealousy of their leading men and partly to a shortsighted and strictly defensive policy. Such an attitude in itself indicates that the subject cities are quite wrong in believing that the Spartans have embarked on an energetic policy of undermining the Athenian *arche*. But this does not entirely explain Thucydides' condemnation and pessimism. Right from the start the Spartans had given only halfhearted support to Brasidas, seeking merely to divert the Athenians from attacks on their own territory, and incidentally to get rid of some troublesome helots, seven hundred of whom they sent to serve as hoplites with Brasidas. The rest of his army were mercenaries from the Peloponnese, and later a variety of allies, including Macedonians, Chalkidians, and others who joined him in the area of Thrace. In short, Brasidas' venture was a personal one, which he undertook in the full knowledge that he could not depend on a government not inclined to a serious offensive, but must recruit reinforcements in Thrace itself. This is in fact what he did.[18] In other words, Thucydides' condemnation of the subject cities must rest on some flaw in Brasidas' campaign that goes deeper than Spartan lack of initiative and support.

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the previous clause, βούλησις versus πρόνοια) is a common Thucydidean one. On the whole, the mass of mankind yield to the former, while only certain leaders or statesmen like Themistokles or Pericles are capable of the latter. See Hunter, *Thucydides*, pp. 142-144.

[18] See chapters 80-81 for Brasidas' original force and the Spartans' motives for supplying troops. In chapter 84 he marches against Akanthos with the Chalkidians and in 102 against Amphipolis with his allies from Thrace. At the battle of Amphipolis (5.6.4) Brasidas' forces include Thracian mercenaries, Edonians, Myrkinians, Chalkidians, and Amphipolitans.

Chapters 102-107, when reconsidered, do reveal another side to Brasidas' achievement at Amphipolis. The mass of details in chapter 103 describing his unconventional march makes it amply clear that timing was of the essence in the capture of the city. In fact, he took everyone by surprise, with the exception of his collaborators, who were ready for the opportune moment, the *kairos* (103.4). The unexpectedness of Brasidas' arrival, by producing a state of thorough confusion, in turn aggravated the deep divisions, or *staseis*, that already existed in the city, with some citizens ready to betray, others prepared to resist. The people were not united but quite suspicious of one another (104.1). At this point, Thucydides interjects an interesting speculation, introduced by the word λέγεται ("it is said"). Brasidas, he suggests, might have captured the city outright, had he moved against it at once and not allowed his army to turn aside for pillage. This suggestion, almost an innuendo, which tends to gain credence by the words νῦν δέ ("as it is") in the next sentence, is of some significance. For, if true, it would mean that all the rest of the narrative, from the inhabitants' refusal to open the gates through to their capitulations, again hinged on a minute subtlety of timing.[19] In addition, pillage on the part of his men is a problem that Brasidas will face again. While such pillage may merely indicate lack of control over his army, more realistic is the possibility that it was "almost a necessity" to forage for food at this point after so long a march.[20] In other words, the speculation could have been

[19] If Brasidas had captured the city at this point, the question of Thucydides' failure to save Amphipolis might never have arisen. Compare J. R. Ellis, "Thucydides at Amphipolis," *Antichthon* 12 (1978), 33. As for Thucydides' use of the unattributed λέγεται (it is said), Ellis points out that "this sort of anonymous opinion is a rarity" (p. 32).

[20] Gomme, *Commentary*, 3:577. Brasidas was, of course, dependent on his allies for food. Even before he left Sparta, those who were asking that an army be sent to Thrace promised to maintain it (80.1, τρέφειν). One of the first real setbacks Brasidas experienced on his arrival in Thrace was Perdikkas' reduction in the *trophe* he supplied his army. Out of pique at being thwarted by Brasidas, who did not see eye-to-eye with him about his

introduced to pinpoint a genuine difficulty with food supply. Apart from the fact that this recourse to plunder is not a good presage for the future, its consequences for Brasidas, Thucydides, and the Amphipolitans are vastly important.

Chapter 104 describes how Brasidas' expectations of betrayal went unrealized, allowing time for Eukles to summon Thucydides from Thasos, an island which the historian locates very carefully, by indicating that it was about half a day's sail from Amphipolis. Thucydides' response, he tells us himself, was immediate, for it was his intent to reach Amphipolis before it surrendered. In other words, timing was again of the essence. Thucydides then proceeds to motivate all Brasidas' succeeding actions on the basis of his own movements. Brasidas feared the naval reinforcements from Thasos, and on learning of Thucydides' influence in the region of Thrace, suspected that, once the historian arrived, his own chances of gaining the surrender of the city would vanish, since the people would expect Thucydides to act to protect them by bringing in allies by both sea and land. It was thus due to Thucydides and the fears and expectations he evoked that Brasidas issued his moderate proclamation which swayed the majority. Thucydides offers a number of minor explanations of this change of mood: the city had a mixed populace, with a minority of Athenians, and many in the city had relatives outside who had been taken prisoner. But the major reason for the change, the one he repeats, was the relief felt by the masses at so unexpected a turn of events. They no longer faced danger and there were to be no reprisals. In a few lines Thucydides describes the surrender, juxtaposing his own arrival the very same day. Again he underscores the element of timing by the next sentence: "Brasidas had just gained Amphipolis." That Thucydides arrived with all speed at a crucial moment is indicated by the fact that he managed to save Eion, which would otherwise have been

purpose in Thrace and in particular about his relationship with the Lynkestian king Arrabaios, Perdikkas cut the food he supplied from one half to one third required to maintain his army (83, especially 5-6).

lost by dawn. And though Brasidas did make a serious effort to take the town, he did not succeed.

This reconsideration of Thucydides' narrative leads to a number of new observations. First, though the word *tyche* never appears, it is surely implicit here. What strikes the reader at once is the sheer bad luck of the historian, in having circumstances conspire to cheat him of what might have been a victory. Related to the concept of *tyche* is that of the *kairos*, the opportune moment, which Brasidas seized again and again, but which evaded Thucydides, whose fate was determined by a matter of hours. This does not imply a criticism of Brasidas: clearly he was a formidable opponent, whose major ability was "to seize and exploit opportunities by imaginative and daring action."[21] What allowed Brasidas

[21] H. D. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge, 1968), p. 150. N.G.L. Hammond has written on the concept of *tyche* in Thucydides' *History* in *The Speeches in Thucydides*, ed. P. Stadter (Chapel Hill, 1973), "The Particular and the Universal in the Speeches in Thucydides with Special Reference to That of Hermocrates at Gela," pp. 49-59. After the Sicilian Expedition, he suggests, Thucydides' ideas began to change and he came to realize that intelligence and enterprise were not so decisive as he had thought earlier and that the "incalculability of the future" was the "main determinant of war" (p. 59). This realization Hammond dates to the year 405 and so to sometime after that date Hermokrates' speech at Gela, though he holds firm to his view, argued in 1940, that Book 1 was in the main composed early. In fact, the concept of *tyche* is found throughout the *History*, notably in Book 4 and even in Book 1, and not merely in passages presumed by Hammond to be late. Nor is it exclusive to Thucydides, but permeates the thought of his contemporaries, among them Euripides. Compare Schneider, *Information und Absicht*, pp. 95-110. For general discussions of *tyche* in Thucydides, see F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London, 1907); H.-P. Stahl, *Thukydides. Die Stellung des Menschen im geschichtlichen Prozess*, Zetemata 40 (Munich, 1966); and Edmunds, *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975). While none of the three last works deals with this passage, and while all have a different understanding of the concept and its meaning for Thucydides, taken together they do indicate the importance of *tyche* in the *History*. We shall discuss *tyche* further in the Appendix to Chapter Six, section A: *Tyche* in Thucydides' *History*. As for *kairos*, it is possible that as a result of his own experiences at Amphipolis Thucydides realized the importance of the "opportune moment," or at least its relevance for history. *Kairos* is also a term found in the work of his contemporaries

to exercise his imaginative leadership, and what reduced the situation to a matter of hours, and a missed opportunity for Thucydides, was the fickle behavior of the masses of Amphipolis. First, their confusion at Brasidas' sudden arrival and their suspicions of one another, the result of *stasis*, stood in the way of any kind of united resistance. Then the paradox of Brasidas' moderate terms brought about such a total change in their mood that they would not wait even the few hours until Thucydides arrived. Herein, it seems to me, lies the explanation of Thucydides' remarks about human behavior at chapter 108.4. Like the other cities of Thrace Amphipolis was deceiving herself as to the extent of Athens' *dynamis*; she was especially mistaken to believe that Brasidas could offer truly lasting safety and security. In short, the populace gave in to the whims and wishful thinking of the moment. But fickle human nature, important as it was to Brasidas' success and Thucydides' failure, is subsidiary to another point that emerges from the narrative. In attributing to Brasidas the fear of naval reinforcements and of Thucydides himself and the possibility he might stop the city from surrendering, Thucydides reveals that Brasidas' position was not at all secure. Clever as he was to alter his policy swiftly to a moderate one and thus win over the city, what does this change of strategy, based on fear, mean for Brasidas' campaign in Thrace? What if, contrary to his deception at Akanthos and his cleverness and good luck here, he should some day actually have to face not seven ships but the assembled might of Athens' navy? Even here he was unable to take Eion, once Thucydides arrived. In other words, Brasidas' major achievement in capturing Amphipolis and the safety and security against reprisals it seemed to offer, was still tantamount to a kind of deception, since he had yet to face Athens' *dynamis*. Hence the negative as well as the positive generalizations of chapter 108.

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and is very frequent in the pages of the *History*. This is merely a suggestion, of course, for it is impossible to state with certainty when and where Thucydides derived his views of *tyche* or *kairos*.

The suggestion has already been made that many of the concepts and generalizations integral to Thucydides' theory of history, as elaborated in the Archaeology, lie at the heart of the process of disunity and disintegration recorded in Book 4.78-135. At this point, therefore, we can go further and consider whether these concepts are employed at random, or whether like those in the Archaeology they are interrelated in such a way as to constitute the interpretative principles underlying his criteria of selection. In other words, is Thucydides' theory of history reflected in this passage, and, if so, did that theory guide him both in his selection of details and in the use he made of those details in reconstructing Brasidas' *strateia* in Thrace? The answer to both these questions is yes, for the entire passage can be shown to illustrate one of the several purposes discerned in the Archaeology, to reveal the problems and difficulties of *arche*, and the potential for loss and regression. While the Archaeology anticipated the decline of Athens through the disintegration of her *periousia*, her *dynamis*, and her *arche*, Book 4.78-135 is a concrete manifestation of one aspect of that process. Here Thucydides selects and interprets his data in such a way as to make clear how the problems of *arche*, including *stasis*, can actually lead to loss and regression, in a process of disintegration, which is checked by the Peace of Nikias and the death of both Brasidas and Kleon, but which will recur in the Ionian War and constitute one of the factors in Athens' decline and ultimate defeat.

Arche, one form of unity described in the Archaeology, has its own peculiar problems, bound up with the tendency of the unifying power to enslave and subject smaller cities and islands and then attempt to sustain the unity it has created by instilling fear in such subjects, and in its allies. Understandably then, these are the very problems to which the leaders of Athens refer, when they speak about the source of Athenian strength and power. Pericles, for example, uses a series of superlatives reminiscent of the opening lines of the *History* to characterize Athens' achievements, which, in his

eyes, represent the very apex of civilization. The adjective *megistos* is repeated to characterize her name, her *dynamis* (the greatest in history), her wars, and the very city itself (2.64.3).[22] But, in creating an *arche* that extends her control over an unprecedented number of Greeks, she cannot avoid the envy, hatred, and unpopularity that naturally attend such rule, frankly characterized here for the first time as a tyranny, with all the dangers that word implies (63.2). In this speech, as in his great speech in Book 1, Pericles emphasizes not merely the advantage but even the invulnerability afforded the Athenians by sea power (62.2 and 1.143.5). In his first speech too, which is neither so frank nor so pessimistic as his last, Pericles pinpoints the revolt of its subjects as one of the dangers an empire must face. Defeat at the hands of the Spartans, he warns, could mean the loss of the allies upon whom the Athenians' strength depends, for only their continued capacity to send out troops against these allies keeps them from revolting.[23] In other words, in time of war real problems and dangers face the unifying power, since its strength results from subject cities, which it rules like a tyrant, by fear, and which are always threatening revolt. This is precisely the understanding of the empire and its problems revealed by both Kleon and Diodotos in the debate about the punishment of Mytilene (3.37–48). The Athenian *arche* is a

[22] Other superlatives used in this one long sentence are πλεῖστα σώματα, "the lives expended in warfare"; πλείστων, "the Greeks they ruled"; and τοῖς πᾶσιν εὐπορωτάτην, along with μεγίστην, descriptive of Athens herself. Many of the concepts go back to the Archaeology, as does the use of verbs like κεκτημένην with *dynamis*, ἤρξαμεν, and ᾠκήσαμεν.

[23] Again in Book 2.62.2, in stressing the invulnerability afforded by sea power, Pericles uses the terminology of the Archaeology, τῇ ὑπαρχούσῃ παρασκευῇ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ. He goes on to contrast this *dynamis* with mere houses and land. Houses and land are also the subject of Book 1.143.5, where he urges the Athenians to disregard this form of wealth in favor of safeguarding the sea and the city. Of the strength that is theirs from the allies he uses the verb ἰσχύομεν, reminiscent again of the Archaeology. They must retain the capacity to make expeditions (στρατεύειν) against the allies.

tyranny that depends for its strength on the revenues of the subject cities. Both speakers assume that revolt is natural within an *arche*, though each has a different solution to offer, which, he believes, will prevent future revolts and so preserve precious revenues.[24]

If, on the other hand, the Athenian *arche* is viewed from the perspective of an allied city in revolt, it is also clear that fear holds the *arche* together. This at least is what the Mytilenaian envoys claim at Olympia in justification of their revolt (3.12.1), both confirming Pericles' admonitions and anticipating the debate of Kleon and Diodotos. In addition, the speech of the Mytilenaian envoys is significant for another reason. They actively encourage the Spartans to strike Athens where she is most vulnerable, not in Attika but among her allies, on whose revenues her strength depends. They are as clear about this last point as Kleon and Diodotos, but realize that what Sparta lacks is a navy, which they are prepared to supply.[25] This advice is extremely significant in that it approximates the advice that Corinth offered the Spartans

[24] It is Kleon who echoes Pericles in referring to the *arche* as a tyranny (37.2). Like Pericles too he uses the verb ἰσχύομεν to express the strength that is theirs from the revenue of the allied cities (39.8). Diodotos in turn picks up the words to argue against Kleon. Of revenue he points out, ἰσχύομεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους τῷδε (46.3). Note that Brasidas' justice and moderation are the very qualities that had once been characteristic of the Athenians as rulers, at least in their own view of themselves, as expressed by the envoys at Lakedaimon in the year 432. They acted with moderation (1.76.4, μετριάζομεν) and, though they could have used force, had they so chosen, they ruled by law and law courts. (See 1.77.2, with its contrast of βιάζεσθαι and δικάζεσθαι.) Moderation was also what Diodotos urged against the violent proposal of Kleon (46.4, μετρίως). He was quite aware of the consequences of rule based on violence, *bia*, which naturally provokes revolt in free men, who treasure autonomy. Based on expediency, his argument for moderation won the day. For a more thorough discussion of these passages, see my "Athens *Tyrannis*: A New Approach to Thucydides," *CJ* 69 (1974), 120-122. One must keep in mind Diodotos' words in reading Book 4.78-135, where free men respond, when the opportunity presents itself, for the most part exactly as he suggested. They prefer freedom and autonomy to *arche*, especially *arche* based on *bia*.

[25] 13.5-7. They use the verb ὠφελεῖται and then go on to specify whence

in 432. The latter ignored the advice then, as they will do now, in spite of promises to the contrary.[26] More important, this is also the precise understanding of the Athenian *arche* and its areas of potential problems that Brasidas has. But he, unlike previous Spartans, is prepared to put this understanding to the test of action, even if he must do so virtually alone as a personal venture with only the halfhearted support of his government.

It would be a fascinating study indeed to analyze the first three books of the *History* in the light of the varied concepts and generalizations that together form Thucydides' theory of history in the Archaeology. At this point, however, it must suffice to note the startling recurrence in the above passages of many of the terms employed in the Archaeology to describe the indices of civilization and the problems that certain states of the past faced at their pinnacle. The difficulties and dangers of *arche* reappear in these first three books. Thus, in Book 4 Thucydides' interest in Brasidas and the lengthy passage he devotes to narrating his exploits flow naturally from his concern with the problems of *arche*, which had ended in loss and regression before, and which would ultimately lead to the decline of Athens. In a word, the narrative of Brasidas' achievements is a synthesis based on this theory of history. Its purpose is to illustrate the reality of Athens' problems and the validity of her fears, by showing to what extent Brasidas' *strateia* initiated a process of disunity and disintegration.

To recapitulate, the heart of the process unfolds with remarkable efficiency, comprised as it is in a very few chapters, 81-88 and 102-108, most of which we have analyzed. It is a

Attika derives such "benefit," ἔστι δὲ τῶν χρημάτων ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἡ πρόσοδος.

[26] For Corinthian advice see Book 1.122.1, where, among other means of carrying on war, they urge the revolt of Athens' allies, again to deprive the Athenians of the revenues αἷς ἰσχύουσι. Their reference to the need for a navy to counter Athens' sea power is at Book 1.121.2-3. Compare the advice to Alkidas that he organize a revolt in Ionia. Its purpose would be to deprive Athens of τὴν πρόσοδον ταύτην μεγίστην οὖσαν, while involving her in the expense of sending her navy against the cities in revolt (3.31.1).

tight unity, framed by the judgment of the historian, which, in the case of chapter 81, anticipates the success of Brasidas and the reasons for it, looking far ahead to the Ionian War, and in the case of chapter 108, begins by repeating his positive evaluation of Brasidas' conduct and success. It ends with a number of negative pronouncements, pinpointing the limitations of Brasidas' *strateia* and anticipating the reasons for its failure. Details abound where they are necessary to ensure that the process is understood in all its complexity. At Book 4.66-74, for example, which precedes the process itself, but which will have a significant influence on it as an example of Brasidas' success, not a single detail of fact or motive is ignored. In describing why and how the Megarians admit Brasidas into their city, Thucydides affords the reader the information needed to criticize the latter's "seductive, untrue" arguments to the cities of Thrace. In the same way great precision of detail is employed in the narrative of Amphipolis' capture, where Brasidas' finest achievement is revealed as somewhat ambiguous and potentially not so secure as it might appear on the surface. Between these passages of narrative is the account of Akanthos, the barest of records, yet as important as the fuller narrative, in illustrating through the *logos* the way in which men and cities are won over, a process that will gather momentum once Brasidas has to his credit a few examples of genuine achievement, either revolt or capitulation. The process unfolding at chapters 81-108 is a cumulative one, in which Brasidas advances from deception to achievement, winning one allied city after another to his side. How does he effect this breakdown of Athenian *arche*? First, his unusual vigor and initiative are impressive: by marching to Thrace in the cause of liberation and employing his varied talents to defy the might of Athens successfully, he offers the cities there safety and security in revolt. Secondly, his moderate conduct, which rises above party strife, *stasis*, convinces the cities that he does not aim at a new *arche* but truly respects their desire for autonomy. The capture of Amphipolis, a masterful picture of vigor, sur-

prise, initiative, and moderation, represents the culmination of this process. To it, at chapter 108, Thucydides appends his judgment, validating for the first time Athens' long-standing fear, by pointing out that Amphipolis' loss deprived her of both timber for ship building and revenue, the very foundation of *arche*.[27]

Having demonstrated that Thucydides' criteria of selection are based on the same principles of interpretation that inform the Archaeology, let us now turn to another kind of intellectual process involved in historical narrative and examine the explanations Thucydides employed to achieve his synthesis. Historical explanation is a question about which a great deal has been written, not all of it useful to the student of Greek historiography, since the kinds of explanations employed by the ancient historian are quite different from those employed by the modern.[28] The latter takes, or at least should take,

[27] Chapter 108.1, χρημάτων προσόδῳ.

[28] See, for example, P. Gardiner's early work (1952), *The Nature of Historical Explanation* (Oxford, 1968). A useful collection of readings on the subject is to be found in *Theories of History*, ed. P. Gardiner (New York, 1959). The section entitled "The Nature of Historical Knowledge" includes extracts from works of W. Dilthey, B. Croce, and R. G. Collingwood. Selections from writers like C. Hempel and M. White, whose approach is nomological, fall under the heading "Explanation and Laws." Some of the views in this section (those of Dray and Scriven) represent reactions to the "extreme formulation of the nomological position . . . Hempel's famous covering law model" (G. G. Iggers, *New Directions in European Historiography* [Middletown, Conn., 1975], p. 34). They seek something less than law in history. Iggers' entire first chapter, "The Crisis of the Conventional Conception of 'Scientific' History," pp. 3-42, is worth reading for its exposition of three current conceptions of history, "a nomological, a hermeneutic, and a dialectical (Marxist) materialist approach" (p. 33). Generally speaking, Dilthey, Croce, and Collingwood belong to the hermeneutic tradition, which "ascribed a relatively minimal or even negative value to concepts and generalizations" (p. 33). Compare G. Barraclough, *Main Trends in History* (New York, 1978), chap. 1, especially pp. 11-17, "The Crisis of Historicism." For a useful survey of current social theories, see R. J. Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (Philadelphia, 1978). See too F. Châtelet's perceptive chapter in *La philosophie des sciences sociales de 1860 à nos jours* (Paris, 1973), Volume 7 of a series entitled *Histoire de la philoso-*

account of the social and economic, as well as the political, military, or diplomatic conditions that intersect at a certain juncture to produce an historical event or series of events. Thucydides neither described social and economic conditions nor understood social and economic causes.[29] Assuming then that the explanations of the ancient historian will not be precisely those of the modern, nor attain the same level of variety or sophistication, we must adopt a working definition of explanation that is broad enough to include both ancient and modern practice. W. B. Gallie's view affords us such a point of departure: "The historian's narrative attains explanatory status and the continuity which understanding requires when he shows that 'but for' a certain condition—perhaps a surprising one—what happened would not have occurred. *The historian's task*, in other words, *is constantly to discover the conditions making possible what actually happened*" (my italics).[30]

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phie, idées, doctrines, and edited by Châtelet himself. The chapter, "L'Histoire," pp. 210-241, a cameo history of history, notes, p. 231: "Une autre érudition apparaît, qui se dégage des lourdeurs positivistes du siècle précédent." He goes on to discuss historians in the *Annales* tradition.

[29] I have already had occasion to comment on the word economic in Chapter One, note 13, where I referred, among other writings, to M. I. Finley's *The Ancient Economy* (London, 1973). Finley not only distinguishes the word *oikonomia* from modern economics with respect to the subject matter and concepts the two involve, but also notes that the very word economics has had but a short history (p. 21). One need only peruse Part 2 of Fritz Stern's *The Varieties of History* to appreciate that the fragmenting of history into ancillary disciplines such as economic history and social history, each with its own particular methodology, is also a recent development. (In fact, this fragmentation of the discipline was one of the points of departure for Henri Berr in *La synthèse en histoire*: he proposed instead a comparative study of society.) In other words, it would be incorrect to expect Thucydides to evince interests or provide explanations, in general to raise questions, that can only come to mind once specific disciplines with specific methodologies are in existence. I argued similarly in Chapter One, note 33, about source criticism, a contribution of the nineteenth century to the discipline of history.

[30] This is W. H. Dray's summary of Gallie's view in *Philosophy of History* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), p. 19. It is based on his reading of Gallie's article "Explanations in History and the Genetic Sciences," reprinted in

With this general statement of the historian's task in mind, it is now possible to return to Book 4.78-135 and study the kinds of explanations employed there. To begin with Akanthos, "the barest of records," Gomme expresses bewilderment at Thucydides' omissions here: "Thucydides does not explain what reasons, political or strategic, made Brasidas approach Akanthos before other cities in Chalkidike: probably the need for a base on the Strymonian Gulf, with a view to his attack on Amphipolis. But why does Thucydides tell us nothing?"[31] What does Thucydides tell us in his narrative in chapter 84, to reverse the question? He is brief in the extreme, indicating only that there were factions in the city: on the one hand, a group that allied itself with the Chalkidians in inviting Brasidas in and, on the other, the *demos.* To be sure, *stasis* may be a necessary condition of defection from Athens, but is it also a sufficient condition? In other words, does *stasis* in and of itself constitute an explanation of defection, or is some specificity needed here? I believe the latter; thus, we cannot merely ignore the problem by assuming that "Thucydides implies that the majority of the people, not merely the leaders of a 'democratic' party, sided with Athens."[32] Instead, we might well ask some of the following questions: What was the relative strength of the two factions? Was the group working in alliance with the Chalkidians among those referred to in chapter 79.2, cities which had not revolted but joined in sending secret invitations to the Peloponnesians? Was their program freedom and autonomy for all, or merely a change of constitution in their own favor? Was there in fact general discontent in Akanthos, perhaps

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Gardiner's *Theories of History*, pp. 386-402. Dray criticizes it as "correct as far as it goes" but "an incomplete analysis of the historian's procedure." I agree with Dray, but find the statement appealing as a point of departure just because of its deficiencies. Dray's Chapter 2, "Historical Understanding," from which the above is taken, is valuable in that it summarizes some of the issues surrounding the problem of historical explanation.

[31] *Commentary*, 3:551.

[32] Gomme, *ibid.*

due to the increase in the tribute in the years 425-424?[33] We are in no sense apprised of the conditions that made revolt possible. Is this an instance of the "refus du particulier" or just a lack of solid information on Thucydides' part?[34] Given the lack of explanatory detail in chapter 84, one might logically proceed to the equally brief narrative of chapter 88, where certain explanations are offered of Akanthos' revolt. The majority were motivated by fear, then persuaded by Brasidas' appealing arguments. But we are still left in the dark as to the relative influence of fear and persuasion, or, in the case of the latter, as to the precise arguments that won over the majority, except that the latter were deeply concerned about their status as autonomous allies.

Let us compare the account of Amphipolis, where details, by contrast, abound. Notwithstanding the full narrative, are we really on any surer ground in attempting to establish the specific conditions that made the city's surrender possible? Again there were factions, one of which is described in some detail. It was a group of collaborators made up of settlers

[33] Gomme, *ibid.*, points out: "Akanthos had paid 3 tal. tribute until 428 (perhaps 5 tal. before 445); its subsequent payments and assessments are unknown." Thucydides, of course, seldom mentions the tribute, except in a most general way, as Gomme himself indicates, when he remarks (p. 500): "The strangest of all omissions in Thucydides is that of the increase in the tribute in 425-424 B.C." Thucydides does, however, include Akanthos among those cities that, according to the terms of the Peace of Nikias (5.18.5), were to pay the tribute assessed by Aristeides. Russell Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*, corr. reprint (Oxford, 1973), p. 52, says of the cities of Chalkidike: "They were to have independence in jurisdiction and should pay tribute according to the original assessment of Aristides, as contrasted with the inflated assessments of the war years, particularly that of 425." In Appendix 14, "Tribute Payments, 453-420 B.C.," Meiggs also shows three talents as the tribute of Akanthos down to the year 428.

[34] An expression used by de Romilly in "L'Utilité de l'histoire selon Thucydide" in *Histoire et historiens dans l'antiquité*, Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique 4 (Vandoeuvres-Genève, 1956), p. 50. There, using Thucydides' analysis of *stasis* as an example of his methodology, she shows how he strives for an abstract model of political turmoil, leaving aside concrete instances or individual variations.

within the city from Argilos and others who joined them in their plot under the influence of either Perdikkas or the Chalkidians. While we might again demand particularity, by asking the same series of questions posed above, the answers would no more be discovered here than at Akanthos. In fact, the suggestion of outside influence in the case of the latter is in effect the full explanation given for the betrayal of the city. On Brasidas' arrival the people of Argilos themselves revolted, and this, we presume (for the connection is not clear), served to incite their kinsmen in Amphipolis, with whom they had been intriguing.[35] Of numbers, program, general discontent, we once again hear nothing, but must attribute the betrayal to outside forces and their influence, without the knowledge of why this influence should be so effective. While Thucydides is remarkably precise in his description of Brasidas' march and attack, selecting his details to highlight speed and surprise, and so Brasidas' capacities as a soldier, the particulars he has ignored are equally remarkable in being similar to those ignored at Akanthos. Again one logically turns to later chapters to find reasons why the city capitulated so quickly, even though those who opposed betrayal were in the majority. What one discovers is an array of shifting emotions, at the center of which is persuasion and fear. In a situation of total confusion, and of suspicion, in which all were fearful, Brasidas' moderate proposals, followed by the open arguments of his collaborators, won the day.[36] Unexpected relief swept the majority along to surrender.

[35] The details of Argilos' revolt are meager indeed: its inhabitants had always been ὕποπτοι, viewed with suspicion, by the Athenians, and were actually plotting against Amphipolis. Gomme, *Commentary*, 3:576, speaks of jealousy. In fact, the revolt is not much more adequately explained than that of Stagiros, though, given the Argilians' intrigues with their kinsmen in Amphipolis, it would not be difficult to reconstruct their motives and plans. They did serve to guide Brasidas.

[36] See chapter 106.1 for the change of mood. Thucydides stresses the fact that the Athenians in the city were few in number, and the majority ξύμμεικτον. See below, note 46.

Let us look briefly at two more defections, Torone (chapters 110-116) and Mende (chapter 123), neither of which we have analyzed, but in both of which the conditions making defection possible were similar to those described at Akanthos and Amphipolis. The capture of Torone is essentially a doublet of Amphipolis' surrender, though the situation displays significant enough differences to merit a detailed narrative. In this instance Brasidas actually marched against a town held by the Athenians, entered the city by stealth, and took the Athenian garrison by force. From Thucydides' perspective it represents a further unfolding of the process of disunity and disintegration generalized at chapter 108. Again in selecting his narrative detail he draws a masterful picture of Brasidas' speed and surprise, his vigor, and finally his moderation.[37] Of particular interest, however, are the conditions that made Brasidas' achievement possible. Once again a few people, prepared to betray the place (110.1), had invited Brasidas to Torone. Unlike their counterparts at Amphipolis, however, they succeeded in admitting his force, whose loud and sudden entrance produced great consternation among the inhabitants (112.1). The result was confusion (113.1, ἐθορυβεῖτο), as the city was captured, followed by a moderate proclamation to those who had taken refuge with the Athenians and a speech to the Toronaians, which was, in Thucydides' words, very like the one made at Akanthos (114.3). Once again the narrative itself attains a kind of explanatory status, for the reader can certainly visualize how and even why events happened as they did. Still one feels some unease about the precise conditions that made Brasidas' success possible. Were the few referred to in chapter 110 his only partisans? Why was there an Athenian garrison at Torone anyway, and what was its relationship to the inhabitants? Had there been, and was there still, general discontent? While the modern historian must undertake to reconstruct

[37] Here too Brasidas arrived by night and ἔλαθεν the townsmen and garrison (110.1-2).

the capture of Torone and its explanation on the basis of details supplied by Thucydides, there is no compelling reason to accept the assumption that "again there is no evidence that the majority wanted to be quit of the Athenians; they may have been content though, or perhaps because, there was an Athenian garrison, and in spite of the fact that their tribute had been doubled, to 12 tal., in 430, and increased, probably, to 15 tal. in 425."[38] Why not the opposite reconstruction? Perhaps there was deep discontent in Torone. Hence the garrison. Hence too the secrecy and involvement of only a few in the plot to betray the city. Brasidas, understanding this discontent and knowing too that there were divisions, notably a pro-Athenian element, that might expect reprisals, was especially moderate in his appeal to the city's population. But of particulars, such as discontent, the relationship of forces, or numbers, Thucydides tells us nothing, as he concentrates once more on Brasidas' varied abilities and exploits and the emotions of the people of Torone.[39]

In his account of Mende's revolt Thucydides eschews the detailed narrative of Amphipolis and Torone, making Mende's defection a kind of footnote to Skione's. This is not entirely without precedent, as elsewhere Thucydides appends to a full narrative of Brasidas' success a mere statement of fact. For example, after Akanthos' revolt, he states only that Stagiros defected; similarly, after Amphipolis' surrender, a series of towns in Akte came over to Brasidas. What is interesting here is that Thucydides makes explicit the effect of Skione's example on the people of Mende, an explanatory

[38] Gomme, *Commentary*, 3:589.

[39] Historians have perhaps been studying the wrong passage, when they concentrate on events at Amphipolis for signs of partiality, self-defence, or self-justification on the part of Thucydides. While I would not go so far as to suggest that Thucydides narrated the achievements of Brasidas here by way of self-justification, it should at least be noted that at Torone the latter evaded and outwitted an entire Athenian garrison. Cumulatively, the details make it less and less surprising that Eukles and Thucydides were caught unawares.

factor we were left to assume in all the above instances. (Even at Amphipolis the prior fact of Argilos' revolt is made to seem, if only by juxtaposition in the narrative, to have influenced the collaborators.) The people of Mende, Thucydides explains, dared to revolt because they perceived Brasidas' resolution and drew their own conclusions from his failure to betray Skione in spite of the recent armistice. These feelings and conjectures may well be perfectly valid, but they do not in themselves constitute a valid explanation of the revolt of Mende. Such an explanation would require a detailed account of the actual circumstances that made Mende so discontent as to choose revolt, when the opportunity offered itself, even with an armistice in force. But there is an additional explanation, which indicates that the situation at Mende was quite similar to that in the cities we have already discussed. Mende too had a small faction of collaborators, somehow persuasive enough to force the majority contrary to their own "judgment" to follow Skione's example.[40] What motivated this faction was fear lest their plot be detected. To protect themselves they were prepared to jeopardize the future of the city as a whole.[41] One is driven to ask how a few conspirators could force an unwilling majority unless their arguments did in fact accord with the feelings of that majority. Thucydides gives neither the arguments nor the reasons for their acceptance.

We have not embarked on this study of Thucydidean explanations merely to lay bare the historian's limitations from a modern perspective by way of criticism, since our aim is not criticism but understanding. Nor is the above discussion

[40] *Gnome* is almost impossible to translate. I have chosen the single word, "judgment," to indicate the reasoning faculties as opposed to the emotions, a usage common in Thucydides. (The contrast of ὀργῇ and γνώμῃ at Book 2.22.1 is typical.) Warner construes it "better judgement" and Gomme "true intentions."

[41] Their self-interest is indicated by the words περὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς φοβουμένων τὸ κατάδηλον (123.2).

meant to be yet another instance of the modern concern with discovering and deploring Thucydides' omissions.[42] The mere fact, however, that so many scholars have expressed surprise and frustration at these perceived omissions is surely indicative of either some peculiarity of methodology on the part of Thucydides, or some inadequacy of insight on the part of such critics. Let us, instead, adopt the same approach to Thucydides' explanations as we did to his investigative procedures in Part I. Behind these procedures, we discovered, lay definite interpretative principles, a series of generalizations, which as a whole formed a coherent theory of history. In discussing inference based on probability, for example, we noted that such inference implies not only similarities but a body of generalizations. Where explanation is concerned, we are dealing with precisely the same sort of intellectual procedure, recourse to a body of accepted generalizations. To make such a statement is, of course, as banal as it is controversial. It is banal, because the place of generality in historical explanation has been fully discussed by countless works on the philosophy of history.[43] On the other hand, it is also controversial, because the nature of such generalizations is still debated, as is the very question of whether

[42] I shall not belabor this point, since I have a number of times cited references by Gomme to such omissions. See in particular his *Commentary*, vol. 1, "Notes on the Pentekontaetia," pp. 365-389, where he lists, and in some cases attempts to explain, omissions in the excursus. In spite of this excursus and Thucydides' certainty that he had revealed the "causes" of the war, no single period in Greek history has, paradoxically, provoked so much scholarly writing as the fifty years preceding the Peloponnesian War. O. Luschnat, *Thukydides, der Historiker* (Stuttgart, 1971), 1234-1237, discusses the "silences" of Thucydides along with a number of scholars' explanations of them, finally asking the sensible question (1237): "Wissen wir das alles wirklich, oder wollen wir da Dinge wissen, die Th. nie zu beantworten gesonnen war, weil er von anderen Voraussetzungen ausging als seine modernen Beurteiler?"

[43] See, for example, Gardiner, *Historical Explanation*, pp. 98-99 and R. Aron, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History. An Essay on the Limits of Historical Objectivity*, rev. ed., trans. G. J. Irwin (Boston, 1962), pp. 163-165.

this is in fact the procedure employed by the historian in explaining events.[44] At this point, however, it is sufficient that the working definition of historical explanation has been enlarged to include the idea of generality or generalization.

What are the generalizations implied in Thucydides' narrative of Brasidas' achievements in Thrace? Our last example, the defection of Mende is, I believe, instructive. Here, though the details are sparse in the extreme, Thucydides carefully selects one significant cause of the defection, the self-interest of a small group of individuals, who forced the majority to bring in Brasidas, out of fear, to cover up their own collaboration. This is surely reminiscent of the motives of the leaders of the *demos* at Megara (66.3), who entered into negotiations with the Athenian generals. They were prepared to surrender the city out of fear, because they believed that such a course would hold less danger for themselves

[44] For an exposition and criticism of Hempel's "covering law" model, see W. Dray, "Explanatory Narrative in History," *Philosophical Quarterly* 4 (1954), 15-27. M. Scriven, "Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanations" in *Theories of History*, ed. P. Gardiner, pp. 443-475, continues Dray's criticism, distinguishing between causal and other kinds of explanations as well as between laws and other generalizations, which he calls "truisms" or "normic statements which serve the role analogous to laws" in the study of behavior, history, or the social sciences (p. 467). This approximates my use of the term generalization in respect of Thucydides. For other kinds of explanations, see Iggers, *New Directions*, and Barraclough, *Main Trends*, both chap. 1. What Iggers terms "hermeneutic historicism" prevailed (and still prevails) from the time of Ranke well into the twentieth century. Its emphasis is on intuition (e.g., Ranke and Droysen) or understanding (e.g., Dilthey and Collingwood). In its concern with the unique and the individual it is idiographic, as opposed to nomological. As Barraclough points out, p. 13, "Fundamental to the historicist outlook was the distinction between nature and spirit and in particular between what was called *die Welt als Natur* and *die Welt als Geschichte*—that is to say, between the world with which natural science deals and the world with which history deals." He suggests that "in its greatest days, it represented a justifiable and healthy reaction against the exaggerated naturalism and scientism of positivist writing" (p. 12). In a word, "hermeneutic historicism" is a nineteenth- and early twentieth-century phenomenon. I do not believe that it is this kind of explanation discerned here in Thucydides' *History*.

than the recall of their opponents from exile. In discussing that passage, we related it to the description of *stasis* in Book 3. The capitulation of Megara was not just an isolated event but a concrete manifestastion of the process of *stasis*, for it conformed precisely to Thucydides' statement at Book 3.82.1. In every instance of defection studied in Book 4.78-135 *stasis* was a factor, whether in revolt, in capitulation, or betrayal. Yet *stasis* did not in itself seem a sufficient condition for these defections. Hence we asked for specific details in each instance and in particular for some evidence of discontent, some irritant like an increase in tribute. These at least are the kinds of explanations or explanatory details that a modern political historian would give and which modern readers have come to expect in narrative history. We asked in vain, however, since the existence of factions, *stasis*, does, in and of itself, constitute an explanation for Thucydides. *Stasis* implies a series of generalizations that, when combined with his understanding of the feelings and motives of the inhabitants of the cities of Thrace, make the particular events comprehensible in his terms, and so from his perspective render the omissions we perceive and the questions we ask irrelevant.

Let us consider Thucydides' analysis of *stasis* in Book 3, a passage which, I believe, holds the key to the process of disunity and disintegration unfolding in 4.78-135. For here in chapters 82-83 the historian describes certain features of the phenomenon, and sets forth certain generalizations about it. At their heart is a static and negative concept of human nature. What Book 3.82-83 describes is the unleashing of the destructive force latent in human nature, as all that held it in check, in particular, respect for laws, both written and unwritten, vanished in political turmoil. The result was the complete breakdown of civilized life in the *polis*. This *kinesis*, as Thucydides calls it, grew out of the division of the Hellenic world into two hostile camps, which gave rise in the individual cities to rival groups, the leaders of the *demos* and the oligarchs, who looked respectively to the Athenians and the Lakedaimonians. This pre-existing and already danger-

ous situation was then exacerbated by war, which offered such factions pretexts to solicit appropriate allies in their own interest. Self-interest is what emerges again and again throughout this passage. Thucydides does not speak of the *demos*, but the leaders of the *demos*, and their opponents, the few, both of whom saw and seized the opportunity to harm their enemies and to change the political system in their own favor (82.1). This and this alone is what Thucydides tells us about the beginning of the process, before embarking on a description of its manifold forms: "Many and dreadful were the calamities which befell the cities, the result of *stasis*" (82.2), human nature being what it is. . . .

We shall not follow Thucydides in his description of the horrors of *stasis* (82.3-7). Of primary interest is his perception of the rival factions, to which war offered pretexts and opportunities, even as it weakened the spirit of the majority, making them fertile ground for any kind of appeal or machination. What, in his view, motivated these *staseis*? Neither idealism, nor altruism, nor even genuine adherence to a professed political program. Thucydides makes it very clear that their motive was self-interest and self-interest alone: cupidity and ambition drove them to seek control of the government (82.8). As if this is not explicit enough, he proceeds to expose their specious shibboleths—whether democratic or aristocratic—as just a cover for their own desires. It was not the common interest about which they cared, but rather prizes for themselves. Hence the political struggles, which led to every kind of barbarity.[45]

[45] The vocabulary of chapter 82.8 should be noted. Thucydides' expressions for cupidity and ambition are πλεονεξίαν and φιλοτιμίαν; these in turn led to fanatical strife, φιλονικεῖν. *Pleonexia* is the most significant word, recurring as it does throughout the *History*. In *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism* (Oxford, 1963), trans. P. Thody, pp. 336-343, de Romilly discusses *pleonexia* at some length in conjunction with the "law of hubris" and the "law of force," pointing out that *pleonexia* "is a fault, into which Athens falls" (p. 336). Chapter 82.8 is thus a key passage, not merely for the explanation of events in Thrace, but for the *History* as a whole. Note again Thucydides' reference to the leaders of the parties οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι

As an example of Thucydides' principle of selection, and the interconnection of parts of the *History*, the account of *stasis* is rather like that of the surrender of Amphipolis. Events at Kerkyra, the first instance of *stasis*, are narrated with the utmost precision of detail. The *erga* are then followed by a lengthy passage in which the historian offers his own judgment of the events he has recorded and attempts some explanation of them by means of a series of generalizations, which will then be implicit to one degree or another in future instances of *stasis*. In discussing the capitulation of Megara, we already noted this technique, for there the detailed narrative both illustrates these generalizations and, more important, provides a link with events in Thrace, where another kind of breakdown, the disintegration of the Athenian *arche*, will soon begin. One level of explanation of the latter process is the existence within the cities there of *stasis*. In each instance one must assume the generalizations of Book 3.82-83. In turn this explains why Thucydides does not concern himself with specific details like political programs, numbers, or general reasons for discontent, and, furthermore, why he does not indicate the political system of a particular city, or his own political position *vis-à-vis* the various factions. What must be assumed is that, whatever the governing constitution, whatever the numbers and the programs of the *staseis*, whatever the level of discontent, the individuals involved were motivated by self-interest and aimed at prizes for themselves through gaining control of the government. If they worked openly, they used any altruistic slogan at hand to win to their side a majority that had grown

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προστάντες and his opposition of τὰ κοινά and ἄθλα. Ἐτόλμησαν is also important, as forms of τολμᾶν recur in countless passages, many of them, as here, negative. On *stasis* see also Edmunds, "Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis (3.82-83)," *HSCP* 79 (1975), 73-92. Edmunds believes that Thucydides' ethical sympathies "reflect an archaic pattern of ethical thought" (p. 74). Compare H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1971), p. 144: Thucydides' world "is the world of the traditional Greek religion."

dispirited by war and the necessities it imposed. If, with the same aim, they operated secretly, they still generated suspicion and confusion, when unity was required. Whatever Brasidas' own attitude, or professed attitude, to *staseis*, he usually marched on a city racked by private interests and lured on by outside forces, rather than one united against him.[46]

There is in addition implicit in Book 4.78-135 a second series of generalizations that Thucydides employs to express his understanding of the feelings and motives of the inhabitants of the cities of Thrace. Like the generalizations implied in *stasis* they are essentially an offshoot of his concept of human nature. Earlier we observed that fear is one of the bases of collective achievement, whether it be the *strateia* of Agamemnon, or the Athenian *arche*. In the case of the latter, in fact, illustrations from the text revealed that both sides, the leaders of Athens and the allies they ruled, were aware that *dynamis* and the fear it inspired kept the subject cities in check, and both took it for granted that these cities would

[46] There is, in fact, a basic opposition in Thucydides' *History* between private interests, ἴδια in some form, and τὰ κοινά, τὸ κοινόν, or ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις. Brasidas contrasts them nicely in the last two lines of his speech at Akanthos. In general, he professes to have come not to support a particular *stasis*, but to seek freedom and autonomy for the city as a whole, in the common interest (the latter suggesting some form of unity of the cities of Thrace against Athens). See Book 4.86.3-4 and chapter 87.4-6. This opposition is found again in Book 3.82.8, where Thucydides contrasts τὰ κοινά and τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῇ πόλει ξυμφόρου with the excesses of particular groups in power, who employ either an "unjust" vote or violence against their opponents. This is illustrated at Megara. The exiles, returned, swear to take the best counsel for the city, then, in power, choose out a group of their enemies and force the *demos* to vote openly on them (4.74). I myself believe that at Amphipolis Thucydides considered the mixed population one of the explanations of Brasidas' quick success, for such a population does not feel genuine loyalty to the city as a whole, or incline to unity. We shall have reason to return to this opposition, though at this point I am tempted to call attention to Hermokrates' uses of the opposition of τὰ ἴδια and τὸ κοινόν or ἡ Σικιλία πᾶσα in his speech at Book 4.59-64, an early plea for Sicilian unity. The opposition is basic to Thucydides' theory of history.

defect, should the opportunity present itself. Speaking in this vein in the Mytilenaian debate, Diodotos even goes so far as to describe the psychological process involved in revolt, prefacing it with a general truth about human nature. All men, whether individuals or cities, have a natural tendency (3.45.3, πεφύκασι) to do wrong, against which both law and punishment are ineffective. This said, he draws a complex picture of the emotions that produce "crime," and their interrelationship. Predominant among them are hope and desire. In addition, external circumstances, *tyche*, can aggravate the situation, by offering seeming opportunities, thus tempting both individuals and cities to irrational acts, the latter, in the quest for freedom.[47] Diodotos asks the rhetorical question: "What city has yet attempted revolt in the belief that the resources at its disposal, whether its own or those of its allies, were insufficient for the venture" (3.45.2)? He himself supplies the answer. Free men, ruled by force, naturally seek their autonomy in revolt.[48]

Once Diodotos' generalizations about human nature and the psychology of revolt are understood and assumed, they explain why the subject cities of Thrace vied with one another to be the first to revolt, following Brasidas' initial successes and the security they seemed to offer. Their actions merely confirm Diodotos' formulations. This is in turn made explicit at Book 4.108, the central point of which is precisely the irrationality that Diodotos described. The cities of Thrace were in a state of eager excitement to change the system, led on by a false feeling of security, by wishful thinking, and by

[47] English is inadequate to capture all that is implied in ἁμαρτήματα (45.1), though "crime" may come closer to the meaning of ἀδικήματα. I note that Warner makes liberal use of the words "crime" and "criminal," while Crawley insists on "error" or "offence." Compare Stahl, *Thukydides*, pp. 121-128. Note here for the first time the verb ἐπαίρειν (45.6), "to excite" or "stir up." It too will recur as an emotion induced in the cities of Thrace.

[48] 46.5. "Natural" here is not the same as in chapter 45.3 but expresses what one should expect or what is probable under the circumstances. "Understandably" might better express the distinctions implied in εἰκότως.

hope. Moreover, they fully enjoyed the pleasure of the moment.[49] In expressing these judgments, Thucydides actually rises above the particular events, as he did in his description of *stasis*, to set forth truths about mankind in general and its behavior. Once it is clear what motivated the cities of Thrace, and once the process of disintegration is fully in motion, Thucydides begins to dispense with repetitive detail. Little narrative, for example, is devoted to events at Skione and Mende. In the case of the former, when Brasidas arrives, again by night in a daring venture, and when he once again speaks as he did at Akanthos and Torone, the Skionaians are elated by his words, full of confidence one and all, including those who had previously been in opposition. Here even more than in earlier examples the reader is dependent for explanations on the psychological generalizations expressed throughout the earlier parts of the *History*. *Stasis* itself is ignored in the face of these overwhelming and irrational impulses.[50] At Mende, where Thucydides states that the majority were forced to join the revolt contrary to their judgment, he may well have in mind some tide of emotion like that at Skione, which caught up the Mendaians in the process, for they were full of confidence.[51]

Scholars have commented variously on Thucydides' psychology, in one instance characterizing his generalizations as "psychological laws," in another, as a form of "psychologism."[52] Perhaps this analysis of Book 4.78-135 serves to ex-

[49] I commented on chapter 108.4 at p. 131 and note 17, above. Here one can systematically compare Thucydides' vocabulary with the terms used by Diodotos (or better still, the psychological process as a whole). Note especially ἐπήρθησαν, "elation," at chapter 108.3.

[50] *Stasis* later emerges even at Skione (130.1, τι καὶ στασιασμοῦ ἐν τῇ πόλει), possibly originating among the dissidents won over initially by Brasidas' words. Note here again ἐπήρθησαν and θαρσήσαντες (121.1).

[51] Chapter 123.2, ἐτόλμησαν. On the irrational, compare Schneider, *Information und Absicht*, pp. 87-94.

[52] See de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism*, pp. 336-343. The chapter "The Theory of Athenian Imperialism," pp. 311-343, sets forth many laws, not merely psychological ones. (See above, notes 28 and 44, for

plain why some have not merely noted, but severely criticized his use of psychology, while others have come to believe that he was deeply affected, perhaps obsessed, by the irrational aspects of human nature.[53] In this regard, Châtelet makes a significant comment about Thucydides: "The idea of motivation—almost causation—is present in his thought."[54] "Almost causation" ("presque de causalité") must imply something less than, or different from, causation, as we understand it. Collingwood goes further and criticizes Thucydides thus: "It [psychological history] does not narrate facts for the sake of narrating facts. Its chief purpose is to affirm laws, psychological laws. A psychological law is not an event nor yet a complex of events: it is an unchanging rule which governs the relations between events."[55] Collingwood has expressed himself in a manner according well with this analysis. "Almost causation," to return to Châtelet, is, in my opinion, one way of expressing a form of explanation that falls short of causation, but is instead based on a series of unchanging rules that govern the relations between events. Throughout this analysis I have been scrupulous in the use of the term explanation rather than cause, because the former

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the distinction made in history between laws and other kinds of generalizations.) Châtelet, "Le temps de l'histoire et l'évolution de la fonction historienne," *Journal de psychologie* 53 (1956), 360-361, criticizes Thucydides' "psychologisme."

[53] See, for example, R. G. Collingwood's criticism below. Stahl, *Thukydides*, stresses the irrational in Thucydides, both *tyche* and human behavior. He states, p. 101: "Eine Verhaltensvoraussage kann offenbar höchstens in negativem Sinne gemacht werden: die Menschen werden aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach von ihrem Plan abfallen, oder, überspitz formuliert: *eine Konstanz der menschlichen Natur ist bloss in der Inkonstanz ihres Verhaltens gegeben*" (Stahl's italics). For a general discussion of human nature, including numerous comments on Stahl's work and references to earlier views, see Luschnat, *Thukydides*, 1251-1255. Compare Schneider, *Information und Absicht*, pp. 119-125. Edmunds, "Thucydides' Ethics," p. 85, believes that both Thucydides and Hesiod "present the ills of man as endemic in his present nature."

[54] "Le temps de l'histoire," p. 360.

[55] *The Idea of History* (Oxford, 1961), pp. 29-30.

not only includes, but is broader than, causal connection. For in explaining events, Thucydides did not describe the relationship of cause and effect, as it is now understood, but used unchanging generalizations about human nature and human behavior in order to link events together in a meaningful process. Though they may puzzle modern readers and leave them asking for specific circumstances, reasons, and causes in modern terms, these generalizations rendered events perfectly understandable to him, and doubtless to his contemporaries.[56]

If this view of Thucydidean explanation is accepted, it may have heuristic value for solving three problems that continue to provoke scholarly discussion but remain open, problems to which the answers should be self-evident, if Thucydides' purpose and methodology were as modern as some have assumed. Perhaps the reason contemporary historians are still debating the causes of the Peloponnesian War is that Thucydides did not give its cause or causes but explained it in some such manner as he explained the process of disunity and disintegration in Book 4.78-135.[57] Perhaps the reason no

[56] Cornford's work, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, especially Chapter 5, "Thucydides' Conception of History," is remarkable for its insights. In rejecting Gomperz' "inexorable causality," he states, p. 70: "And, besides rejecting this general conception, we must beware of saying that Thucydides looked for such entities as 'political factors,' 'relations of forces,' 'the natural foundation of historical phenomena,' 'universal forces which animate men.' We are not merely objecting to forms of words; we are protesting against the attribution to Thucydides of the whole class of categories and conceptions and modes of thought of which these and similar phrases are the expression. It is precisely in respect of these conceptions that modern history differs from ancient. They have been imported, but yesterday, from Darwinian biology and from branches of mathematical and physical science which in fifth-century Athens were undiscovered, and which, if they had been discovered, no one would have dreamed of bringing into connexion with human history."

[57] A recent work on this subject is Raphael Sealey, "The Causes of the Peloponnesian War," *CP* 70 (1975), 89-109. He reviews the arguments surrounding the words *aitia* and *prophasis* and the relevant bibliography, including G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972).

one has yet pronounced definitively on the popularity of the Athenian empire is that Thucydides himself did not so pronounce, but explained revolts and defections by means of psychological generalizations implicit in the narrative, though made explicit enough in certain judgments of his own and certain speeches. It was not discontent and its causes he chose to elaborate, as a modern political historian might do; instead he illustrated the natural propensity of free men to reject *arche* based on fear and violence and to strive at all costs for autonomy.[58] Perhaps, finally, the reason the historian's own political stance remains in doubt is that he saw both sides perpetrating barbarities, as the destructive force of human nature, common to all mankind, was unleashed, to end, not just in moral breakdown or the disintegration of *arche*, but in the decline of Athens, the highest point of civilization to that time. Thucydides looked to any constitution or any man who could hold these forces in check and divert them for a time into achievement.[59]

To conclude, let us now return to synthesis, with the following methodological principles in mind. Thucydides' criteria of selection in Book 4.78-135 are based on the same principles of interpretation that inform the Archaeology. In his reconstruction of Brasidas' *strateia* he selected and interpreted his data in such a way as to show how the problems

[58] See M. Chambers, "Studies on Thucydides, 1963-1967," *CW* 62 (1969), 249-250, for a series of articles on the character of the Athenian empire, including T. J. Quinn, "Thucydides and the Unpopularity of the Athenian Empire," *Historia* 13 (1964), 257-266; J. de Romilly, "Thucydides and the Cities of the Athenian Empire," *BICS* 13 (1966), 1-12; and H. W. Pleket, "Thasos and the Popularity of the Athenian Empire," *Historia* 12 (1963), 70-77. Chambers points out that de Ste. Croix's "The Character of the Athenian Empire," *Historia* 3 (1954-55), 1-41, "still inspires debate."

[59] See Luschnat, *Thukydides*, 1247-1250, who refers to, among other writings, M. F. McGregor's "The Politics of the Historian Thucydides," *Phoenix* 10 (1956), 93-102. I find myself in agreement with Stahl, *Thukydides*, p. 157, in his thesis "vom überparteilichen und über das Politische hinausgreifenden Historiker." See his criticisms of "die biographisch-politische Interpretation," pp. 25-26.

of *arche* can lead to loss and regression through a process of disintegration. This process and Brasidas' success he explained, in turn, by a series of generalizations, which he employed to link events in a meaningful way. The key word, of course, is process, for it implies an approach wherein the facts of the narrative are not related in isolation for their own sake but are unified by a central purpose.[60] In this study the term *unfold* has constantly been used to express movement and change. If we deny Thucydides a modern understanding of cause and effect, what then is meant by the unfolding of process? What, in other words, is the dynamic of the process in Book 4.78-135, and how does change come about? In the absence of causation, what kind of conceptual tools did the historian employ to explain the precise way in which disintegration began and continued?

Basic to the process are all the psychological generalizations discussed above, whether they are generalities about human nature and human behavior under normal circumstances, or whether they go further and express the psychology of revolt, the emotions of fear, hope, and desire pent up in the peoples of the subject cities, merely awaiting an opportunity for release, or whether they express, even further, the most destructive urges, such as cupidity and ambition, which come to the fore under the adverse circumstances of war and *stasis*. What Book 4.78-135 describes is the unleash-

[60] Compare de Romilly, *Histoire et raison*, p. 27, and note 2, above. In "Le temps de l'histoire," p. 360, Châtelet speaks of "des filiations claires entre les événements." In fairness to Châtelet, he does use the term cause in *La naissance de l'histoire. La formation de la pensée historienne en Grèce* (Paris, 1962), 1:209. In his long note 25 at pp. 287-288 he describes Thucydides' narrative as "rationnel et positif" and lists his various causes, which are, for the most part, what I would term motivations. Clearly, Châtelet had to make certain choices, as he himself indicates, in arguing his thesis about the relationship of Thucydides' thought to "l'idée d'un ordre propre au devenir sensible-profane de l'homme et le project de dévoiler au-delà des légendes." In rejecting Cornford for Gomme and introducing the notion of cause, he moved away from the insights of his earlier article. See also Appendix to Chapter Five, section C: "Causation" in Herodotus and Thucydides.

ing of these emotions, which are not benign, as they may be under normal circumstances, but potentially destructive, because they have been repressed and look for release, no matter how irrational. Worse still, they have been exacerbated by war and *stasis*. Brasidas, a man of persuasion and deception, but also of moderation and decency, unleashes these emotions, inspiring first trust and confidence, then elation, daring, and pleasure. The last three emotions he brings forth not merely through persuasion, but because he is a veritable whirlwind of daring, or *tolma*, a man whose vigor, speed, and cunning take the cities, and the Athenians, by storm, holding out the hope of endless success and permanent security from reprisal. What Brasidas represents is a *syntychia*, the appearance, or even the shock, of an external force, that begins the process of disunity and disintegration of the Athenian *arche*. Here one may recall Diodotos' description of mankind's natural disposition to "err." *Tyche* may join in giving men confidence and tempt them to dangers, no matter how inadequate their resources. The unexpected, a fortuity, produces the same irrational response in cities. Brasidas' *tolma* is just such a fortuity.

In the absence of the modern notion of causation, then, Thucydides uses the concepts of *physis* and *tyche* to explain how the process of disintegration began and gathered momentum. Once Brasidas' unexpected successes unleashed the pent-up forces of human nature, the latter seem inexorably to run their full course of irrational confidence and elation. In other words, there is a third concept, necessity (ἀνάγκη), which comes into play and dictates the way in which emotions will express themselves, and so the way in which the process unfolds.[61] If, with these concepts in mind, one were to reread Brasidas' exploits, it would be clear why Thucydides selected the narrative detail he did, especially the abun-

[61] Analysis of the text reveals that Thucydides explains change here in the same way as he does in other parts of the *History*. See my "Athens *Tyrannis*," p. 126, and Appendix to Chapter Six, section A: *Tyche* in Thucydides' *History*.

dant detail at Amphipolis. What interests him is the beginning of process, the shock that starts the downward movement of *arche* (or one of the shocks, for there are others). Initially, then, he reports every move of Brasidas and his effect on the emotions of the peoples of the subject cities until a kind of chain-reaction sets in. In the end the reaction of the cities can almost be predicted, or at least the generalizations at 108 make it clear what one is to expect, and one is not disappointed.

But the matter does not end here. Process is the key to Thucydides' *History*. As a method of synthesizing data it is very different from modern historical narrative. Modern narrative is linear, that is, it begins at the beginning and proceeds consecutively to the end, relating events for their own sake, and explaining them by reconstructing the circumstances, conditions, or causes that made them possible, and dating each with precision, not merely relative to one another, but in terms of an absolute time-scale, measured in years, months, and days. In process, on the other hand, there are no details related in isolation for their own sake or no causes provided to explain events *per se*. Nor is the narrative linear, so much as cumulative, with threads of meaning stretching back into earlier passages, which do not yield causes, but do reveal similarities and thus link one process to another. This explains why there is the illusion of cause when a process begins: in reality the events or circumstances are often merely a repetition of some previous situation or a confirmation of the judgments of the historian himself or the speakers in his *History*. Through this technique Thucydides establishes links between processes: *stasis* at Kerkyra, followed by an analysis of the general phenomenon of *stasis* and its role in the political and moral breakdown of the Hellenic world; *stasis* at Megara, a particular instance of the general phenomenon, which ends in the capitulation of the city to Brasidas; *stasis* at Akanthos and the example of Megara, employed by Brasidas to persuade the city to revolt; Amphipolis and Brasidas' daring and persuasion and Thucydides'

judgment linking certain revolts to deception about Megara. By now a new process of breakdown has begun, which includes *stasis* within it and has links back to instances of *stasis* that did not involve revolt. All that went before cumulates to provide a setting for movement and change, the unfolding of process. *Stasis* unleashes all the worst aspects of human nature, which war in turn exacerbates. Both *stasis* and war would in themselves make the subject cities of Thrace fertile ground for Brasidas. In addition, they feel all the emotions of free men ruled by force, who need only a sense of security, no matter how flimsy, to encourage them to seek their autonomy. Brasidas' persuasive arguments, the example of his achievements, and especially his daring, vigorous, and successful actions serve to unleash these emotions.

Here too one might note briefly that the shock of Brasidas' successes in Thrace and the loss they represent in *dynamis*—revenues, timber, etc.—will in turn serve to unleash destructive emotions in the Athenians. The anger that Kleon urged them to sate at the time of the Mytilenaian revolt, and that was diverted by Diodotos' moderation, bursts forth anew as a result of the indignation they feel at the revolt of Skione, a veritable island. As a result, they pass a decree to recapture the city and put its people to death, just as they did in the case of Mytilene. Again Kleon is involved, for he proposes the motion, but this time there is no change of mood, no debate, no moderate opposition.[62] Thus a third process begins with this subtle shift of the tyrant city to intemperance

[62] At Book 3.36.2 the Athenians decide ὑπὸ ὀργῆς to put all Mytilene's adult males to death and enslave her women and children. In opposition to Kleon's advice not to allow their anger to be blunted but to act at once, Diodotos cautions against speed and anger, the greatest obstacles to good counsel (42.1). He refers to the problems that result from the Athenians' general tendency to anger in making decisions (43.5), while conceding that on this occasion Kleon's speech may seem to them "more just," because it accords with their present state of anger (44.4). Compare Book 4.122.5-6, where the Athenians reject arbitration, wishing instead to send an expedition at once because of the anger they feel at Skione's revolt. When Mende revolts, they are even more furious (123.3, πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὀργισθέντες).

and open violence in the defense of her *arche*. Here the anger of the Athenians is linked directly to the process of disintegration in Thrace, which might, in our terms, appear to cause that emotion, but, in Thucydides' terms, rather unleashes it, for it was already present, though controlled. Ultimately, other shocks release other emotions and lead to the expeditions against Melos and Syracuse. All three processes, *stasis*, the breakdown of *arche*, and the varied emotions of the tyrant city, which, once unleashed, must run their course, cumulate to bring about the major point of regress in the *History*, the decline of Athens.

If process is accepted as the key to Thucydides' work, certain concomitants obtain. For process implies the following *differentiae* in the historian's perception of the movement of history and in the way he describes and explains it. Neither event nor chronology can have the same significance in the *History* as they do in modern historical narrative. Events *per se* held no interest for Thucydides, nor did he isolate events in his narrative. Rather he saw them as stages in a process, linked together in an inexorable unfolding, and essentially without meaning outside that process. In the eyes of the modern reader the capitulation of Megara, the revolt of Akanthos, and the surrender of Amphipolis are all events. For Thucydides, on the other hand, they were not just significant events, nor was it for this reason he devoted many chapters to what occurred at these three places. For him they represented the beginning of process, and the beginning concerned him most, because, once begun, a process then continues by a kind of inherent necessity. This process struck him as significant because it was linked to other processes, and cumulatively all would lead to the decline of Athens. Thus he asked himself not what caused this regress, but how did it begin, or here, perhaps, who began it. Brasidas began it at Akanthos and Amphipolis. Thus everything Brasidas said and did is reported in exquisite detail, as are the emotional reactions of the people of the subject cities, whom Thucydides himself judged at Book 4.108. These emotions

once unleashed, the process of disunity and disintegration unfolds inexorably. Myrkinos, Galepsos, Oisyme, etc. are swept along, events in modern terms, links in the process in Thucydides'.[63]

As for Thucydides' chronology, it is a question to which no one has found a satisfactory answer. Why did he consciously reject Hellanikos' chronological system, which would seem to approximate rather closely modern systems of dating by year, and which also accorded with ancient practice, as far as records were concerned? Why did he choose summers and winters, which are shifting entities and impossible to establish with precision on any calendar, and which, in any case, afford only a relative chronology within any given year? One can not really be satisfied with the answer that the variety of calendars used in the Greek city-states afforded him no uniform or predominant system, and so he eschewed calendars altogether. This would surely not have been an in-

[63] Here it should be noted that in the end Brasidas' *strateia* began to experience all the problems inherent in an expedition by land, operating on a distant terrain. I have already commented on Sparta's failure to support Brasidas with reinforcements, and thus his dependence on his allies both for fresh recruits and for food. Probably the most stunning setback he suffered was his alienation of Perdikkas as a result of his men's undisciplined ravages in Macedonia (128.4-5). Considering Brasidas an enemy, Perdikkas made peace with Athens and used his influence to prevent a Spartan army and παρασκευήν (supplies, perhaps) from even attempting to cross Thessaly (132.1-2). Who was now maintaining Brasidas' army? (The problem of *trophe*, already present at chapter 83, and possibly a factor in his delay at Amphipolis in chapter 104, recurs. See above, note 20.) By now too the Athenian navy was making its presence felt at Mende and Skione. Whatever his abilities as a soldier and a leader—and these will be illustrated again at the battle of Amphipolis (5.2-11)—it could be only a matter of time for Brasidas. There is almost a desperate quality to his attempt on Poteidaia (135). Least of all had he succeeded in achieving a new unification. Chapter 130 shows how *stasis* could in fact lead to serious losses for him, even as it did for Athens, as Mende dissolves into factions and its gates are opened to the Athenians. The above is, of course, merely a summary, for the failure of Brasidas' *strateia* deserves as detailed an analysis as we devoted to his initial successes.

surmountable problem, had he been as deeply concerned with chronological precision as some have believed.

Nor can one be entirely satisfied with the answer that his chronological system was based on campaigning seasons and so is quite understandable, even appropriate, in what is primarily a military history.[64] To accept this answer, however, is a clear admission that Thucydides did not have a modern concern for precise dates, and that chronology *per se* did not interest him. This is the very opinion expressed in Chapter One. A mere glance at the chronological references in Book 4.78-135 reveals vast imprecision, for example, "about the same time of the summer," "not long afterward," "the same summer a little before the harvest," etc.[65] Even though Book 2.2.1 does establish an absolute date for the beginning of the war, chronology is relative throughout the succeeding books, as it is in the Archaeology, the *Pentekontaetia*, and in all of Book 1. The reason is that Thucydides did not have the modern concept of time, which has produced particular concerns in the historian, but which has also provided him with the tools to deal with these concerns. All this seems so natural that layman and narrative historian alike cannot think of any event or occurrence without allotting it a year, month, day, even hour or minute, thus placing it on a line that stretches back thousands of years and that, it is presumed, will continue to thrust endlessly forward. Such concerns and responses were not, however, natural to Thucydides, as the Archaeology revealed. In the past he saw not a straight line but rise and decline, process and the repetition of process, the important stages of which, growth, achievement, peak,

[64] Both these views are put forward by Gomme, *Commentary*, 1:4-6. See Appendix to Chapter Four, section B: Thucydides' Chronology.

[65] Chapter 78.1, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦ θέρους; chapter 84.1, ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει εὐθὺς . . . ὀλίγον πρὸ τρυγήτον; chapter 88.2, ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτῳ; chapters 102.1 and 109.1, τοῦ δ'αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος; chapter 116.3, τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ χειμῶνος, etc. Compare Chapter One, note 45, for the chronological references in the Archaeology, which are similarly relative.

and regress he described. Also included in his history of the distant past were great gaps of time, which he did not attempt to explain or fill, since he accepted discontinuity. In the present too he saw and attempted to describe the same process, a civilization at its peak, entering the stage of decline and moving on a downward path. In such process, which repeats itself, and which has an implicit circularity, what import could dates on a linear scale have? If he recorded events only within a process and provided abundant narrative detail merely to show how the process began or what stage it had reached, dates recording such embedded events, mere links in a chain, are meaningless. It does not really matter what year or day an event occurred, but rather what is its relative place in the process as a whole. What may also be important for future generations is the length of time of the entire process (though this Thucydides recorded only synoptically), and relative to the entire process, the length of time of one of its parts, in this case, crisis and decline, which he did record in detail. How many months and years did it take the vast resources amassed by Athens (*periousia* and *dynamis*, the foundations and product of *arche*) to waste away? How many seasons within a single year did it take Brasidas to begin the process of disintegration of *arche*? *Sub specie aeternitatis* the particular day Amphipolis surrendered means little. But the speed with which Brasidas effected it, and the effect it had in turn on other cities is truly significant, for Brasidas' *strateia* represents the kind of shock that releases the irrational and destructive forces of human nature and thus illustrates the way disintegration and decline begin.

Disunity and disintegration began, Thucydides states, in the eighth year of the war, less than a year after Brasidas began his march, the same year in which Athens suffered defeat at Delion. This way of expressing time has its own internal coherence. It is not linear, however, nor would linearity have any point, since the various civilizations that rise and fall are not connected, and so are not stages in a universal and progressive history. The years and seasons thus express

a natural and simple sequence understandable to all men: at whatever point in the future they live and whatever species of calendar they use, they will grasp the meaning of the *History* and see how the process of decline begins, and how many years it takes to run its course. These years, broken down into natural units, seasons, expressive of what is perhaps a natural process, have a poignant quality, for they also measure moments in a tragedy.

In what follows I shall attempt to tie together the analyses of the Archaeology and of Brasidas' campaigns in Thrace, by considering briefly the first half of Book 2 (1-65). Does this justly famous portion of the *History* confirm the conclusions drawn about the procedures and concepts whereby Thucydides explained history? Does it illustrate his theory of history, of which explanation is a central part?

Let us begin with chapter 13, a statement of Athens' resources in the year 431. Thucydides presents this material in a speech of advice and encouragement, suitably put in the mouth of Pericles, the architect of Athenian policy at the beginning of the war. Here Pericles reveals publicly his reasons for optimism about Athens' superiority in war. In referring to the fleet, to the allies, and to the revenues on which the Athenians' strength is based (13.2), the speech harks back to the Archaeology and the *Pentekontaetia*. For what it records is the *dynamis* of Athens, her total resources, both men and *materiel*, amassed over several generations. They constitute the foundation of Athenian *arche*. This *dynamis*, set out in full detail, now exists in superabundance, *periousia*. It represents the result in the past, and the source in the future, of success in war. Chapter 13 is thus a view, from one perspective, of Athens' *akme*. Its complement is the Funeral Oration (35-46), a picture of this *akme* from another perspective, this time in a paean. The oration is first a memorial to those ancestors of the Athenians who left them a free land and an *arche*. At the same time, it does not ignore the present generation, who have brought the city to its pinnacle (36.3, ἐπηυξήσαμεν): they live in a flourishing condition, in every

respect self-sufficient. In particular, the oration describes the way of life, the political system, and the traits of character that raised them to such an exalted position. The city of Athens is, as a political whole, a happy blend of *nomos* and *physis*. Its citizens enjoy just sufficient freedom to allow their natural qualities, vigor and creativity, to find expression in positive achievements. This is due to the *politeia*, which through its institutions and laws (the latter both written and unwritten) exerts a healthy control over its citizens, by evoking in them a kind of fear and shame. In short, the city represents a balance of public and private concerns (37.2-3), even as its citizens have achieved a balance of the spirited and the deliberative sides of their nature. This well-balanced city, with its well-balanced individuals, has succeeded in amassing *dynamis* so spectacular that future generations cannot but admire it. Their accomplishments have made them worthy rulers (41.3, ὑπ' ἀξίων). There follow a number of antitheses between collective good and individual interests (for example, 42.3 and 43.2), in which the former, the *koinon*, is seen to transcend the latter.

The plague, which follows at once (47-54), inflicts a dreadful shock on this body politic. It is *tyche* at work. Its effects the historian first records in microcosm, describing the breakdown of the individual body, the human constitution. In the end the body lapses into a deep malaise, lacking both spirit and hope. The collective reaction is even worse, for the city as a whole experiences every form of *anomia*, all originating in the plague. In the face of such a shock and the uncertainty that it produces, mass behavior alters. That control, which the Funeral Oration described as the source of both individual and collective balance, vanishes: "Fear of the gods, custom-law of man—none continued to restrain them" (53.4). In disease the city is divided against itself. The effects of the plague are also seen in a change of mood at Athens. Afflicted by misfortunes, the people become angry at Pericles and blame him for the war. His final speech (60-64), again one of encouragement, sheds light on the true meaning

of the plague and the shock it has inflicted on the political organism. The speech is as earnest and frank as it is hortatory, for he believes that the city may not be beyond recovery, if it follows his advice. A major theme of the speech is one expressed in the Funeral Oration, the relationship of private and public, in this case, of personal and collective misfortune. A fortunate city can support the misfortunes of individuals, but the opposite is not the case. Their conduct then should be different. As it is, they are so overwhelmed by personal ills that they have ceased to concern themselves with the welfare of the collective (60.4, the *koinon*). To this central point Pericles will return, after acknowledging the nature and effect of the plague. It is a *metabole*, which, in coming suddenly and unexpectedly, has cowed their spirit. But the people of the Funeral Oration, who inhabit a *megale polis*, and who have characters worthy of that city, must endure the greatest misfortunes and not let their worth disappear (61.4, τὴν αξίωσιν), in other words, not lose those qualities that entitle them to rule. To preserve all this they should turn from their private afflictions to the welfare of the collective (61.4, again *ta idia* and *to koinon*).

Here then is to be seen the division and breakdown of the political organism, which was once vital and whole. The plague has disrupted the fine balance of both city and individual, and by its shock released all the negative aspects of human nature. Pericles' task is thus an urgent one, for he must instil in them that concern for the city as a whole that alone heals diversity and produces unity. To this end, he is very frank, revealing the true nature of Athens' *dynamis*, and the advantages that accrue from it. He also reveals the true nature of her *arche*: it is a tyranny, unjust perhaps to take, but dangerous to let go. He hints that Athens may face a danger greater than loss of empire, if she should lose her nerve (that is, think to live in a state of *apragmosyne*).

The text itself thus illustrates the way in which Thucydides perceived movement and change in history. *Tyche*, by inflicting a shock on the mass *psyche*, releases a whole host

of negative emotions. The result is disease, both individual and collective, physical and moral, and a *polis* divided and unbalanced. The historian has not yet mentioned the word *stasis*, but he is setting the stage for the appearance of that destructive phenomenon. There can be no doubt that he found in *stasis* one answer to the downward movement of history. *Stasis*, which, in his view, not only provided an outlet for *anthropeia physis* but even intensified all mankind's worst emotions and behavior, is thus central to his theory of history.[66] This theory the text of Book 2.1-65 also illustrates. In his two great speeches Pericles speaks as if he understands the message of the Archaeology, for he recognizes that Athens has reached the very pinnacle of civilization. He also realizes that the unity of Hellenes that the Athenian *arche* has effected is troublesome. His image of the tyrant city, which, having perpetrated injustice, must live in danger, is not a happy one. Here then, in his revelation to the Athenians, Pericles expresses the central subject of the *History*, the problems and dangers endemic in *arche*. In addition, he understands fully the potential for loss and regression. Hence the urgency of his attempt to heal the division of the *polis*, a foretaste of *stasis*, which has followed in the wake of the plague. He must return the city to unity and health and to a concern for collective good rather than individual misfortune. The city, unified under his leadership, may still possess a tyranny, but its people will remain worthy rulers.

Both Pericles' speeches ring with superlatives, describing Athens' accomplishments and her glory. They are meant to ensure that her name and memory will descend to posterity (64.3).[67] But as much as they are triumphant, they are also

[66] Compare Edmunds, "Thucydides' Ethics," p. 88: "The ethical inversions experienced in stasis are a particular expression of a general ineluctable tendency of human nature to invert the established and proper way of things. Stasis, as the expression of such a tendency, is inevitable and will recur." For Thucydides "stasis is always at least dormant."

[67] He mentions ὄνομα μέγιστον and μνήμη in respect of numerous achievements. In chapter 64.5 he speaks of ἐς τὸ ἔπειτα δόξα αἰείμνηστος. See also note 22, above.

ominous. For in contrasting hatred which is short-lived to splendor and glory which will live forever, Pericles is already looking far into the future, to a time when the odium of the rest of the Hellenes will have dissipated. There is in this speech more than a suggestion that the Athenians have accomplished all that is humanly possible and can go no further upward. But they can descend. And that is also suggested in Pericles' subtle use of the conditional, "even if now we give way." The biological metaphor of natural decline that follows is one of the first hints of inevitability in the *History*. For once the destructive force of *anthropeia physis* is released, the process of history, which began in unity and growth, must "run its course" and end in division, disintegration, and decline. This is *ananke*, inherent necessity. What form the downward process will take the historian himself reveals in the very next chapter (65), an evaluation of Pericles' qualities and accomplishments as leader. Again the familiar terminology recurs, except that here the ascent of the city to its pinnacle is attributed to Pericles' leadership. Under him Athens became *megiste*. He it was who provided the blueprint for survival in war, for he recognized far in advance the extent of Athens' *dynamis*. Once again Thucydides refines his notion of the *polis* and the reasons for its success under Pericles. The Athens whose institutions and citizens Pericles praised so highly was in fact only nominally a democracy: in reality it was the rule of one man. This aspect of Pericles' leadership Thucydides relates directly to his capacity to alter the moods and emotions of the masses, thus ensuring balance and stability in the political organism. Even the anger they felt toward him as a result of their personal hardships in war and plague (65.2, ἰδίᾳ) soon abated. Though they fined him, they came to realize that the city as a whole (65.4, ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις) required his talents.[68] Fickle the masses surely were, but at this point still able to put "the welfare of the collective" before their private misfortunes.

[68] See above, note 46.

In commenting on the process of disintegration that took place after Pericles' death, Thucydides explicitly contrasts his leadership with that of his successors. Here for the first time he employs the vocabulary of *stasis*: personal ambitions, private interests, individual honor and advantage.[69] Pericles' successors conducted their own affairs and those of their allies badly (65.7). Least of all did they have Pericles' capacity to control the masses and thus ensure the stability, balance, and unity of the *polis*. Quite the contrary. Their ambition allowed the "pleasures" of the *demos* to dictate public policy. Here then is the historian's own statement about the disease affecting the city. It is an intensification of the disease to the body and spirit first inflicted by the plague. Though the individual body regained its health, and though the collective too recovered for a brief span of time, yet the shock had unbalanced the city and divided it against itself. Cupidity and ambition were released. The results for the city were errors in policy, bad decisions. Through private squabbles over leadership the epigones reduced the affairs of the city to complete disorder. Ultimately, *stasis* prevailed until they were defeated in war. Even in this final defeat internal discord looms large (65.12).[70] Thus *stasis*, by intensifying the worst emotions and behavior of which *anthropeia physis* is capable, brings the *megale polis* with its *arche* down from its peak. Through this process, inevitable once begun, Thucydides explains Athens' descent.

Book 2.1-65 thus demonstrates that the theory of history found in the Archaeology and in Book 4.78-135 is reflected in the rest of the *History*. Once disclosed and formulated, the

[69] Note at chapter 65.7 κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη and ἃ κατορθούμενα μὲν τοῖς ἰδιώταις τιμὴ καὶ ὠφελία μᾶλλον ἦν. Compare Book 3.82.8.

[70] Note ἡμαρτήθη and ἐταράχθησαν in chapter 65.11 and περιπεσόντες ἐσφάλησαν in chapter 65.12. For another approach to some of the problems and concepts found in Book 2.1-65, compare J. de Romilly, "Les problèmes de politique intérieure dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide" in *Historiographia Antiqua* (Louvain, 1977), pp. 77-93.

theory ultimately becomes germane to every aspect of Thucydides' narrative. Of his principle of selection, for example, it can be seen that the details he recorded represent data carefully chosen and interpreted in the light of that theory. In fact, whatever form of reflection one studies, whether critical method or explanation, Thucydides' approach remains that of a historian writing in the fifth century B.C. This is understandable, since he did not have at his disposal the techniques or concepts, nor did he have the concerns, of a modern professional historian—the tools of source criticism and means of evaluating documents, a concern for events or chronology *per se*, or even an understanding of causation derived from the sciences. In a word, his methodology throughout the *History*, including his concepts and generalizations, is a uniform one, whether he reconstructed contemporary events or events far in the past.

FIVE

Cause, Event, and Chronology in Relation to Process: Herodotus' Explanation of Dareios' Retreat from Scythia

IN RECENT YEARS there has been a change in perception of the theme and purpose of the *Histories*. In the first place, concentration on the rise and fall of Eastern rulers, and in particular on the cause and meaning of their fall, has given way to an interest in the stages of the historical process that precede empire and expansion and its attendant injustice.[1] Secondly, there is a move away from seeing the *Histories* as "primarily a history of action."[2] Rather, it is believed that in Herodotus' work there is a "de-emphasis of the actual events into symptoms of an internal or metaphysical tendency."[3] In addition, this "de-emphasis" of the event and of chronologically narrated historical action has allowed scholars to relate numerous excursuses and so-called digressions successfully to the *Histories'* central theme. Thirdly, new modes of explanation have been proposed which differ from "cause." Analogy is one example: through analogy Herodotus renders his narrative intelligible. Whatever one thinks of the formulation "symptomatic historiography,"[4] it too is an attempt to come to grips with a mentality that did not see the world as a

[1] See Appendix to Chapter Five, section A: Herodotus and Process.

[2] H. R. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (Cleveland, 1966), p. 40.

[3] H. Wood, *The Histories of Herodotus. An Analysis of the Formal Structure* (The Hague/Paris, 1972), p. 28.

[4] The formulation is that of K. Reinhardt, "Herodots Persergeschichten" in *Herodot. Eine Auswahl aus der neueren Forschung* (Wege der Forschung 26), ed. W. Marg (Darmstadt, 1962), pp. 320-369 (also in *Geistige Überlieferung* [Berlin, 1940], pp. 138-184).

sequence of events with causes, but rather saw the permanent in a variety of times, places, and changing circumstances, saw, in a word, a recurrent and meaningful process.

To begin this discussion of process in Herodotus, we shall analyze a portion of Book 3 (chapters 17-25), Cambyses' expedition against the long-lived Ethiopians. For this brief but balanced piece of composition reveals a great deal about the historian's methodology. Laying aside for a time our usual tools of analysis, we shall first study the text with the aim of understanding precisely what meaning the passage conveys, or what it was intended to convey, to the listener, and what might have been Herodotus' purpose in presenting this material as he did.[5]

Three points are worthy of note at the outset, all of them somewhat unexpected in a passage of historical narrative. First, the "story" has a timeless quality. While it takes place at some point in Cambyses' reign, Herodotus introduces it only with the brief phrase, "after this" (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα), almost a sequential rather than a chronological connective.

[5] W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, 2 vols., corr. rpt. ed. (Oxford, 1928), p. 261, adopt a peremptory tone in their brief discussion of this passage: "The 'long-lived Ethiopians', as described by H., are a mythical people (cf. c.20). His account of them is partly based on Homer (Il. i.423; Od. i.23), partly on travellers' tales (c.18); its exaggeration is natural, as they live at the end of the world to the south-west (iii.114); so they are 'the tallest and fairest of men' (cf. the beauty of Memnon and ἀμύμονες, Il. i.423; Od. xi.522)." This does not accord with what we have discovered elsewhere about Herodotus' critical attitude to Homer. Whatever his sources, and he fails to mention them, again it is the manner in which he interprets them that will interest us here. Compare M. Hadas, "Utopian Sources in Herodotus," *CP* 30 (1935), 113-121. Hadas believes that the motive behind Book 3.22-23 "is like More's, namely, Utopian" (p. 113). He also discusses earlier references to the Ethiopians and would like to "establish the existence of ethnographic Utopias in the fifth century," though he admits, p. 115: "In the absence of remains their existence must be a matter of inference, but there is nothing inherently improbable in the assumption." Though it does not admit of proof, this approach to Herodotus' sources and his use of them "as a vehicle for implied criticism of current usages" (*ibid.*) is eminently more sensible than that of How and Wells. See too A. Lesky, "Aithiopika," *Hermes* 87 (1959), 27-38.

The rest of the passage is loosely held together in the same way by a series of temporal connectives—"afterwards," "next," "straightway," etc.[6] In other words, there is no indication of exactly when the expedition began, when it ended, or how long it lasted. Secondly, Herodotus does not reveal his sources nor does he comment at all on his informants, his attitude to them, or his own procedures of observation and verification, all that he made so explicit in portions of Book 2. Finally, the passage is constructed to a large degree from thoughts and speeches, its centerpiece being the *logos* of the Ethiopian king (chapter 21), which is followed by the king's dialogue with the Fish-eaters. On either side of these *logoi* are a series of thoughts and motivations attributed to Cambyses. Indeed, if one were to consider further that two chapters within this passage describe curiosities and customs, the main narrative is overwhelmingly composed of thoughts, intentions, and speeches.[7]

On the basis of this narrative, how might one reconstruct historical events or historical action? Among three planned expeditions, Cambyses himself led one against the Ethiopians. It was preceded by a reconnoitering mission carried out by some natives who knew the Ethiopian language. The expedition itself was a complete failure and ended in an incident of cannibalism in the desert. Defeated by the barren terrain, Cambyses retreated with many losses to his army. To isolate the historical action in this manner is of course to violate the integrity of the narrative and to lose all that Herodotus meant to convey by composing it as he did. Let us, there-

[6] Chapter 19.1, ὡς ἔδοξε . . . αὐτίκα; chapter 20.1, ἐπείτε δέ; chapter 21.1, ὡς ἀπίκοντο; chapter 24.1, μετὰ δὲ ταύτην; chapter 25.1, αὐτίκα; chapter 25.3, ἐπείτε δέ; chapter 25.4, πρίν . . . αὐτίκα . . . μετὰ δέ; chapter 25.5, αἰεὶ; chapter 25.6, ἐπεί δέ. Compare Chapter One, note 45 for Thucydides' similar use of such "chronological" connectives in the Archaeology.

[7] Chapter 18 is a description of the table of the sun and chapter 24 an account of the Ethiopians' coffins and mode of burial. This is not, of course, to suggest that these chapters do not have a significance in the passage as a whole, but that is another matter. Chapter 19.2-3 concerns Cambyses' intended expedition against the Carthaginians.

fore, reconsider this action from Herodotus' perspective, not just as a series of events but as events that are both motivated and explained. In short, what was the historian's own understanding of what occurred, or rather what did he want his listeners to understand? Chapters 17-25 concern a *stolos* and its failure, one of Cambyses' many expeditions of conquest and expansion. By reconstructing the motives and feelings of the king himself along with his activities, Herodotus brings into focus what thwarted the *stolos* and thus why the king failed in his intent. It would be simple enough to state that the desert defeated Cambyses, for he had the temerity to direct his expedition into one of the extremities of the world. Herodotus, however, explains the disastrous expedition somewhat differently and makes Cambyses alone responsible for its failure. Mad and senseless as he was, he made a complete error (25.5, ἁμαρτάδι), by acting in haste at the dictates of his emotions rather than employing his powers of reasoning. Provoked to anger by the report of the Fish-eaters, he failed to make any preparations in the way of sustenance for his troops (25.1, παρασκευὴν σίτου οὐδεμίαν), nor did he consider the nature of his destination. Herodotus himself comments on Cambyses' lack of sense in not turning back even after he learned that both his provisions and his pack animals had been consumed. To do so would have been the act of a wise man. Instead, he pressed on until a dreadful act of cannibalism instilled such fear in him that he decided to retreat. The *stolos* thus ended as irrationally as it began.[8]

[8] Cambyses begins with plans for three στρατηίας (17.1) and throughout the passage the verb στρατεύεσθαι is employed (e.g., 21.3, in the speech of the king; 25.1; 25.2; 25.3). The word *stolos* itself appears in chapters 25.7 and 26.1. For Thucydides' variation on the phrase πολλοὺς ἀπολέσας τοῦ στρατοῦ employed in chapter 25.7, compare Book 1.110.1, ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν . . . ἐσώθησαν, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι ἀπώλοντο and Book 7.87.6, his similar description of the losses suffered in the Sicilian expedition. Wood, *The Histories*, p. 62, also notes the irrationality of Cambyses' decisions. Throughout this analysis and in portions of what follows I do not make reference to Immerwahr, Wood, or Cobet so as not to hinder the flow of the discussion. It should be clear where our ideas and approach are similar and ultimately how this study differs from theirs.

According to Herodotus Cambyses thwarted his own expedition, inflicting serious losses on his army. But Cambyses' destructive emotions also have an explanation, for in the chapters preceding his hasty decision Herodotus has exercised great care in composing the *logos* of the Ethiopian king and his dialogue with the Fish-eaters to serve as a provocation. The listener is thus apprised of exactly what report reached Cambyses' ears and roused his ire. In other words, there is a direct link between the anger of Cambyses and the words of the Ethiopian king, and, if one proceeds even further back, there is a similar link between the *logos* of the king and the original deception employed by Cambyses in sending spies into Ethiopia. Both by its position and by its significance the speech of the Ethiopian king is the centerpiece, directing—almost overshadowing—the narrative of events. And yet Herodotus might equally well have reconstructed and motivated the expedition without the embellishment of the Ethiopian's words. Is it just another delightful curiosity or does it convey a message as central to his own philosophy as it is to this brief account of Cambyses' failure? Let us consider the substance of the *logos*. Up to this point Herodotus has depicted Cambyses' character and his reign very negatively. He is a tyrant, driven to endless conquest. The expedition he plans against the Ethiopians he precedes by a deceptive gesture of friendship, sending gifts to their leader in the hands of those who are actually spies. The latter carry out their mission, presenting their gifts and expressing Cambyses' desire for friendship. The Ethiopians, Herodotus has already revealed, are naturally superior people, the biggest and most beautiful of all mankind (20.1), and their king himself is chosen for his preeminence in size and strength. He is also intelligent and understands that he is dealing with spies.

The message of the Ethiopian king is threefold: an accusation, a challenge, and a veiled warning. First, having charged the spies with lying, the king proceeds to accuse Cambyses of being unjust. If the king were just, he points out, he would not desire a land other than his own nor

would he seek to reduce to slavery men who do him no wrong at all. Next he issues a challenge, in the presentation of a bow, the strength of which matches his own and to which Cambyses must prove himself equal before beginning his expedition. He ends on a note of warning. Cambyses should be thankful that the gods have not inclined the Ethiopians to covet the land of others. The superiority and disdain expressed by the king in his speech are matched by the qualities that emerge in the dialogue that follows, as he inspects the gifts of Cambyses and then displays some of the wonders of his own land. Even as the king initially was able to distinguish truth from falsehood, so he despises all forms of deception: dyed robes, myrrh, and the deceptive people who produce them. In addition, he laughs in scorn at the golden ornaments. Copper is what the Ethiopians value, and gold they use to make fetters. In other words, their land is not lacking in wealth, but its people are unacquainted with luxuries and with the values of the outside world. Finally, the king's pleasure in tasting the wine leads him to compare the diet and life-span of the two peoples. The Ethiopians live for one hundred and twenty years on a diet of boiled meat and milk, another illustration of their lack of acquaintance with luxury. In a word, their life is simple and self-sufficient, but productive of hardy people.[9]

At first glance, the purpose of the king's remarks seems clear enough. Cambyses' deception, presumption, and injustice are laid bare and scorned in such a way as to provoke his anger and with it a hasty, ill-prepared expedition. Thus there is a direct link established by Herodotus between the Ethiopian response and Cambyses' disastrous failure in the desert. And this transpires without his ever encountering those hardy people with their sturdy bows. They continue in peace, intrigued by his wine but otherwise not tempted to seek possessions beyond their own territory. Much as He-

[9] Herodotus himself surmises that their long life may be due to the unusual waters of a certain spring shown to the spies (23.3).

rodotus was interested in the reversal of Cambyses, the details he provides about that event continue to be matched by his comments on Cambyses' thoughts and character. In spite of its horrors and its potential for lengthy and elaborate description, the historical action is remarkably attenuated, deriving its drama and meaning only as the final point in an integrated whole, begun at chapter 17.

If it is the totality that interested Herodotus and led him to select his details in such a way as to make his meaning clear, that meaning surely goes beyond the tenuous—not to say fictional—link between the response of the Ethiopian king and Cambyses' defeat. In fact, he has deliberately and artfully created a paradigm, the meaning of which transcends the occasion, the events, and the historical action. It is not surprising that it has a timeless quality, for it matters little when or within what length of time Cambyses met his limits. What matters is an achronic truth. What Herodotus reveals is the manifold dangers endemic in *arche*, once it has reached the point of injustice toward others, specifically the desire for territory not one's own and the drive to enslave people who have done no wrong. This kind of injustice the Ethiopian king defines. Secondly, this real danger is aggravated by the ruler of the *arche*, if like Cambyses he is a tyrant and evinces all the faults of a tyrant: presumption, self-deception, and irrationality. For Cambyses' major failings, including disdain for reasoned judgment or *logos*, are archetypical of the tyrant. Thirdly, the paradigm reveals the dangers that confront a *stolos*, once undertaken, dangers that lurk in the very terrain itself, especially in lands at the extremities of the world, far from one's own territory. Supplies are a real problem. Then there are the people themselves. And here I would reject the notion of the "noble savage" or even the "primitive" opponent, which seems to imply an adulation of the uncivilized. Rather I would highlight those qualities that Herodotus attributes to the Ethiopians. They are free both internally and externally, for they are subject to no outside power nor to a tyrant at home. Instead they possess their

own territory, which the king calls an *arche*, and choose their king for his merits, in conformity with their own indigenous customs. Such a people love truth and hate deception. Their life is simple, peaceful, and self-sufficient, producing a folk who know no luxuries but who are very hardy. What if the tyrant, who himself and whose *arche* and subjects are quite the opposite, had actually to confront such a people? Defeat at their hands seems a possibility.

Several aspects of the historian's methodology emerge from the above. The first is the importance of the *logoi*, both direct and indirect, which are so disproportionate in length as to render the details of Cambyses' defeat quite meager by comparison. Nor do the *logoi* exist in isolation, but form the link between what precedes and what follows, and thus unify the narrative around a central theme. The *logoi* are in fact what allow Herodotus to interpret his data so as to produce this integrated whole. In the end the passage is not just a series of events or a history of chronologically narrated action but a process and a timeless paradigm. Without the *logoi* this would not be so, for they form the nucleus of the process, directing the listener to its meaning. And since the *logoi* are surely Herodotus' own composition, it becomes very clear that he composed this passage as he did with the purpose of conveying that meaning.

The Ethiopians, of course, did not defeat Cambyses, nor is it at all probable that there was any connection between the speech of their king and the failure of Cambyses' *stolos*. However, the very obscurity of these people and the paucity of details known about them has given Herodotus free rein to manipulate his material to suit his own purpose. Thus his story has all the qualities of a fairy tale, set at an unimaginable distance from civilization at one of the extremities of the world.

Paucity of detail or ease of manipulation certainly cannot be said to characterize the passage with which we shall deal next, Dareios' expedition against the Scythians, Book 4.83-142. Details here are plentiful. In fact, it appears to be the

same kind of classic historical narrative as Brasidas' *strateia* in Thrace. For it too reconstructs mainly military exploits and the problems of sustaining an expedition in a distant land. In other words, the passage can be read as a series of events or a history of chronologically narrated action. Thus it would seem exceedingly difficult for Herodotus to manipulate his material here in order to convey a meaning similar to that which emerged in Book 3.17-25.[10] The account of Dareios' Scythian expedition is similar to Brasidas' *strateia* in another respect as well: the historian makes no mention of his sources. Thus, we confront the same problem as in Chapter Four. How is it possible to proceed, given Herodotus' wall of silence about his sources, a wall that renders a study of his critical method impossible? What I propose is to adopt the same procedure as in Chapter Four. We shall begin by studying the historian's principle of selection, in the hope that it may provide clues to synthesis.

Here too I suggest that the facts of the narrative are not related for their own sake but are unified around a central theme. They are, in a word, part of a process, the same process as emerged in the account of Cambyses' campaign against the Ethiopians. The main features of the process are the *stolos* and its failure, revelatory of the problems and dangers endemic in *arche*, once it has reached the point of injustice to others. One reason for this failure is the nature of the terrain that the ruler attempts to conquer. On the other hand, the

[10] Compare Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 169. Immerwahr also believes, p. 106: "Contrary to common opinion, the Scythian *Logos* is not only one of the best-organized accounts in Herodotus, but also one of the most important." See his bibliography in note 85 *ad locum* for "adverse opinions on this *logos*." How and Wells, *Commentary*, Appendix XII, "The Scythian Expedition," pp. 429-434, by no means entirely adverse, delve into the difficulties and inconsistencies which troubled earlier scholars. They end on a negative note, pp. 433-434: "The whole narrative illustrates H.'s dependence on his sources. . . . The critical powers of H. were able to work on the history of Athens before his own day; they broke down completely across the Danube." As we shall see, Herodotus by no means slavishly followed his sources.

terrain cannot be separated from those who inhabit it, a free, independent, and hardy people. It shall become apparent, in addition, that though the central features of the process are the same, Herodotus has interpreted his data here in such a way as to give them a different emphasis. Thus new truths emerge as part of the process.

The Scythian *Logos* centers primarily on Scythia and the Scythians, as the Ethiopian *Logos* centered on the apocryphal speech and dialogue of the Ethiopian king. Beginning at chapter 102 the Scythians take the initiative against Dareios' approaching forces. Hence, some have divided the *Logos* into a march and a "campaign proper."[11] Between the two is the assembly of the tribal kings, whose councils are preceded by an ethnographic excursus describing the customs, and certain curiosities, of the various tribes. No one, however, in discussing the Scythian *Logos* and its structure, has perceived that the pivotal points of the narrative are in fact a series of *logoi*, speeches, both direct and indirect, much like the *logos* of the Ethiopian king, the centerpiece of Cambyses' expedition. Thus, our first task will be to establish the precise function and significance of these *logoi*. One such pivotal point is the council of the tribal kings, chapters 118-119, the speech of the Scythian messengers and the negative response of the kings, and following it, the plans adopted by the Scythians themselves to deal with Dareios, chapter 120.

The remarks of the Scythian messengers fall into three parts: "instruction," exhortation, and warning. The speakers begin by "teaching" (118.1) their assembled neighbors the facts: all Dareios' conquests and accomplishments up to that point, which include the bridge over the Bosporos yoking the two continents, the reduction of the Thracians, and the bridge presently being constructed over the Danube. In addition, they point out that it is his intent to subdue everything in his path, presumably the whole of the continent into

[11] Immerwahr, *ibid.*, p. 107. Compare Jacoby, *Griechische Historiker* (Stuttgart, 1956), 303, where the passage is divided into Die Kriegsvorbereitungen and Der Krieg.

which he has lately marched. Next—and here Herodotus changes to direct discourse—they urge their neighbors not to remain neutral and allow them to be destroyed but to unite in opposition to the invader. If not, they themselves will have no alternative but to leave the country or come to some agreement with the Persians. This, of course, has implications for the others. For, they warn, they are all equally the object of the king's expedition and he will not go away content with having subdued only the Scythians. Their proof? If the purpose of Dareios' march was to take vengeance on them because their ancestors once enslaved the Persians, he ought to proceed against them and only them, proving that they alone are the object of his expedition. Instead, he has done just the opposite and straightway subdued every inhabitant of the continent on his path, all the Thracians, including the Getai, their next neighbors.

The tribal kings are divided in their opinions. Though some would support the Scythians, Herodotus gives only the negative *gnome*, a short speech in direct discourse. The burden of this *logos* is curious indeed, for these northern tribesmen evince a most Herodotean concern for retributive justice. They refer repeatedly to wrongs done, who began them and so who is responsible for them, and their present consequences.[12] In short, they believe that the Scythians are guilty of wronging the Persians and beginning the war. Thus Dareios' expedition is in retaliation for their ancestors' invasion and, for a time, mastery of Persia. They themselves had no part in the original wrong and do not propose to be the first to commit wrong now. Only if Dareios attacks their land and makes a beginning of wrongs will they act. Otherwise they will remain neutral. In any case, they do not believe that the Persians have come against them, but against the guilty.

I have called these *logoi* pivotal, meaning that they consti-

[12] The word *adikie* echoes throughout this brief speech: 119.2, ἀδικήσαντες; 119.4, ἠδικήσαμεν, ἀδικέειν, ἀδικέων, and τῆς ἀδικίης.

tute a direct link back to the preceding narrative. The Scythian messengers, for instance, see to the very heart of the situation, revealing a precise and accurate knowledge of all that has occurred. Dareios' march and other accomplishments they describe most succinctly, stripping away the accretion of details that give the narrative its meandering quality. One way in which Herodotus achieves this effect in his account of the march from Susa to the Danube (chapters 83-98) is by focussing the attention of the listener on Dareios himself, his motives, his feelings, and his responses. The king enters, making his preparations, and later departs, hastening on his way, the Danube behind him. While these particular details are the very sort the modern reader spots at once and welds together into an historical narrative, often dismissing or ignoring other material as fanciful, digressive, or apocryphal, in actual fact this "other material" constitutes most of the narrative of the march. In that narrative what might be termed "events" are embedded in a portrait depicting the ruler, in his successive dealings with Artabanos, Oiobazos, Mandrokles, and Koes; he is somewhat presumptuous, somewhat deceptive and cruel, but also generous and basically sensible. The various wonders along the way, the Pontos, for example, and the river Tearos, are seen through his eyes. The former he surveys, while the latter so charms him that he erects an inscription commemorating his visit. The *leit motif* of the entire passage is the king's pleasure, even exultation.[13] Often geographic or other descriptive material that might be thought digressive, such as the measurements of the Pontos and the sources of the Tearos, is introduced in close connection with his feelings.

Most curious too is Dareios' passage into Europe, surely a significant "event," though significant in a different way in the historian's scheme of things. Herodotus marks the moment with a survey of distances and measurements, an ac-

[13] He takes pleasure in the bridge over the Bosporos (88.1, ἡσθείς); he experiences joy at the river Tearos (91.1, ἡσθείς); and he is very happy with Koes' advice (97.6, κάρτα τε ἥσθη τῇ γνώμῃ).

count of Dareios' inscription recording all the peoples in his army, and finally, most picturesque, the king's generous gifts to the architect of the bridge and in turn the latter's *mnemosynon*, a painting of Dareios crossing the bridge, appropriately dedicated and inscribed. But the actual passage into Europe is locked in one sentence (89.1) between two participles referring back to the gifts he gave Mandrokles and forward with instructions to the Ionians. Here is narrative composed for oral presentation with details chosen to fascinate the listener and hold his interest.[14] Thus one function of the Scythian messengers' *logos*, in conveying Dareios' advance to the assembled kings, is to disengage for the listener the true significance of Dareios' accomplishments.

The Scythians also emphasize Dareios' real purpose in Europe and the dangers he presents to everyone in his path. Significantly, they refer to the two continents, Asia and Europe. Dareios has subdued everything in the other continent and now intends to do the same in Europe. Up to this point the listener might well have assumed that Dareios' sole motive was vengeance and his object the Scythians alone. Certainly this is the impression created by the historian at the beginning of Book 4 (1.1-2 and 4) and at the start of the march itself, indeed throughout most of the *Logos*. For, in describing the nature of Scythia and the Scythians, Herodotus has emphasized the difficulties of attempting to conquer such a land and such a people. To be sure, the Scythians do acknowledge that the king is seeking vengeance, but they also stress that they are not the sole object of his expedition, and they can prove it (118.4). Dareios, they point out, has already subdued the Thracians. In particular, they mention the Getai, and with reason, for in the preceding narrative several chapters are devoted to this tribe, whom the historian describes as most brave and most just (93). And yet they were enslaved. This mention of the Getai is directed as much

[14] See Appendix to Chapter Five, section B: Herodotus, Literacy, and Oral Presentation.

at the listener as at the assembled kings. For, if the significance of their enslavement was not apparent at the point in the narrative where it occurred, no one could fail to remember their belief in immortality and the story of Zalmoxis and his alleged relationship to Pythagoras. In other words, within the narrative of the march Herodotus has highlighted the beginning of Dareios' wrongs, his first encroachment on the continent of Europe, and with it the injustice inherent in an expansive *arche*. It is the very injustice described by the Ethiopian king. Thus the warning about Dareios' real purpose, which the listener knows is valid, is the quintessence of the Scythians' *logos*. They more than hint at the conquest of all Europe, calling to mind Atossa's advice to her husband and the king's plans first against Scythia and ultimately against Greece.[15]

As so often in the *Histories*, the warnings of the Scythians fall on deaf ears. Not only do the tribal kings seem unaware of, or unconcerned about, the basic information conveyed to them, but they show an almost obsessive concern with *adika erga*, with beginnings and guilt. These, of course, are the historian's own concerns and take the listener back to the opening chapters of Book 1, where Herodotus professed to know who really began the *adika erga*. There too were beginnings, wrongs, and guilt, and from that point a series of

[15] Book 3.134. See How and Wells, *Commentary*, p. 297, who believe that "the historian in such narratives as these aims at dramatic propriety and not at historic accuracy." Compare J. E. Powell, *The History of Herodotus*, Cambridge Classical Studies 4 (Cambridge, 1939), pp. 50-51. Powell believes that this episode, along with a great deal of other material, is a later addition to an originally independent Persian history. He notes specifically that Dareios proceeds against Scythia from a motive of revenge, "just as if he had never promised Atossa to conquer Greece first and although no reason has appeared why that project should have been abandoned" (p. 51). Of such remarks Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 107, states that they "were primarily arguments for unity," although Powell did not himself realize it. Neither Powell nor How and Wells comment on 4.119. The latter devote only three lines to 4.118. It is clear that few scholars have taken Herodotus' *logoi* seriously.

retaliatory moves, among them, the Scythian expedition. For Herodotus deliberately connects Dareios' aggression against the Scythians with an invasion of Asia that occurred about one hundred years earlier.[16] The connection is tenuous, indeed, even if the tribal kings see it clearly and remain adamant about the Scythians' guilt and Dareios' purpose. By means of this brief *logos*, which indicates that there will be no unity against the Persians, Herodotus calls attention to the notion of *adika erga*. Thus he adds emphasis to the very point made by the Scythians, that Dareios himself is guilty of beginning wrongs by enslaving peoples in the continent of Europe like the Getai who are quite blameless. The speech is his way of underscoring once more the injustice of expansionism.

There can be no doubt that once again Herodotus has very carefully composed the *logoi* so that they form the nucleus of the process unfolding in Book 4.83-142, thus directing the listener to its meaning. But just as they are a link backward, so too they are a link between what precedes and what follows. The link forward is established by chapter 120, the plans adopted by the Scythians, once they realize their attempt at unity has failed. The entire chapter is in indirect discourse, introduced by a verb of resolution (120.1, ἐβουλεύοντο). It outlines step by step their strategy, which is briefly the following. First, they will not face the Persians in a pitched battle but carry out a scorched earth policy. Moreover, they will engage in a kind of guerrilla warfare, in which one of their three divisions will attempt to draw the advancing Persians toward the Tanais river, or pursue them, if they retire. Meanwhile, the two remaining divisions will similarly keep about a day's distance between themselves and the enemy but retire in the direction of those who refused to

[16] See 4.1.1-2 and 4, which Herodotus cross-refers to 1.104-106. Note too the kings' use of a divine explanation, in attributing the Scythians' former dominion and the present retaliatory expedition to ὁ θεός. Compare H. Stein, *Herodotos*, vol. 2, pt. 2 (Berlin, 1896), p. 109. Stein's comments on these *logoi* are minimal.

join in the alliance. Their hope is to force these tribes into the conflict. Later, they will turn back to their own land and, if they so decide, engage the Persians.

And thus it transpires, though not with total success. What is truly fascinating about the narrative that follows (chapters 121-125) is that every move of the Scythians and every response of Dareios has been anticipated in the *logoi*. After sending their wagons and families northward, their single division first discovers the Persians and lures them on, retiring eastward to the Tanais river. As long as there is flora, the Scythians destroy it before the advancing enemy. The latter, having crossed the Tanais river in pursuit, pass through a number of territories that have either been rendered barren or been deserted, until they reach the desert on the far side of the country of the Boudinoi. The Scythians meanwhile have veered back to their own land, disappearing. Dareios likewise veers westward in pursuit. Here he meets the two other divisions, who retire before him just as they had planned (125.2). Both armies enter the territory of those who refused to join the alliance. None of the tribes except the Agathyrsoi thinks to defend itself, as they had previously vowed to do, if attacked. Confusion reigns, as each tribe takes to flight.[17]

This technique of anticipation, wherein neither *logoi* nor *erga* exist in isolation but are interrelated, must once again be viewed as characteristic of a work composed for oral presen-

[17] R. W. Macan, *Herodotus. The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Books*, vol. 1 (London, 1895), p. 88, comments on the rhetoric of the passage, which he considers "remarkable." One of the repeated words he notes is ταράσσειν: thrice in 125.3, ἐτάραξαν, ταραχθέντων, and ταρασσομένων. It is picked up again in 125.4 as τεταραγμένους and 125.5 as τεταραγμένοι. Wood, *The Histories*, p. 108, notes: "The Scythians' strategy is to flee constantly NORTHWARDS (121; 125.5); that is, towards the region which in the preceding section Herodotus has taken the greatest pains to establish the obscurity of. No one knows what is North." (The capital letters are Wood's.) While it is true that the Scythians sent their families into retreat northward, in 125.5 it is not the Scythians but the other tribes, with the exception of the Agathyrsoi, who flee in confusion northward to the desert.

tation. The listener knows in advance the essence of what is to occur and amidst a mass of details—strange names and places—and a great deal of confusion, follows the main lines of the narrative. He thus understands the nature of that curious *sophie* whereby the Scythians have discovered how to make it impossible for an enemy to reach them. For the Scythians show themselves immune to conquest, impossible even to meet in battle.[18] They also show that they can make plans that take full advantage of their way of life, as they lure Dareios on, lead him through barren lands to the very limits of habitable terrain, to the desert, where food and other provisions will be impossible to procure. Even where their strategy fails and the natives flee rather than resist, this is not a success for Dareios, for he finds no people. All disappear in confusion, even as the Scythians disappear deliberately. In the end, Dareios is reduced to wandering. Of most of this the reader has been made aware in advance through the *logoi*. Hence it is all the more clear that Dareios is being manipulated into moves he did not plan. He seems to have no strategy himself but merely responds and reacts.[19]

The paradigm of Cambyses' Ethiopian campaign comes to mind, for in essence it is being repeated. In Book 3.25 Cam-

[18] See chapter 46, where Herodotus describes the Scythians' one very significant discovery, which is directly related to their nomadic way of life. He asks rhetorically how they can fail to be ἄμαχοί τε καὶ ἄποροι προσμίσγειν (46.3).

[19] How and Wells, *Commentary*, p. 342, underestimate the skill and thought Herodotus has devoted to this passage, when they state that "the campaign, though consistent, is not intelligible, and it is lost labour to try to make sense of this fancy picture." More significant is their comment on chapter 123, *ibid.*, "The Persians must have passed through the lands of the Agricultural Scyths (cc.17-18), but the land is described as all χέρσος; H. will not spoil a contrast by mentioning exceptions. He also ignores the great rivers; cf. cc.51-6." Compare Macan, *Herodotus*, pp. 85-88, for the "contradictions and improbabilities of the Herodotean narrative," among them the many rivers the Scythians and Persians would have had to cross, involving a span of time that makes nonsense of Dareios' return within sixty days. In other words, Herodotus has exaggerated the barrenness of the terrain and the extent of Dareios' wanderings.

byses was so enraged at the words of the Ethopian king that he hastily and irrationally led an ill-prepared expedition deep into a barren terrain. And though he never did meet the Ethiopians, Herodotus established a link between the words of their king and Cambyses' failure in the desert. The latter kept going forward, finding no one, until his *stolos* suffered enormous losses. Dareios is in much the same situation. While he does at least find and pursue the Scythians, and he is not depicted as angry or irrational, yet he is surely presumptuous in believing he can conquer such a people. Thus in response to their strategy he ends by wandering from one place to another, finding barren terrain or deserted country, but no enemy to fight. Here too it is tempting to suggest that the technique of anticipation employed by Herodotus is the antecedent of Thucydides' more studied use of the same technique. In both works the *logoi* play a significant part in unifying the narrative around a central theme.[20]

To complete this discussion of Herodotus' principle of selection, we shall consider briefly one more pivotal point of the narrative, the *logoi* of chapters 126-127. Like the earlier *logoi* they should reveal what influenced his choice of detail and what he meant to be of particular significance for his listeners in the preceding material. Chapters 126-127, comprising Dareios' appeal to the Scythian king Idanthyrsos and the latter's response, make explicit the success of the Scythians' strategy. The rapid movement and confusion of chapter 125, indecisive as they may have appeared to the listener, have perplexed Dareios. If he recalls the warnings of Artabanos about the "difficulty" of these people (83.1, τὴν ἀπορίην), he is nonetheless not ready to admit defeat. Still, he makes it clear that he has been reduced to wandering. That this

[20] In a word, the germ of a technique which is one of the most unusual characteristics of Thucydides' *History* is to be found in Herodotus. Nor is Herodotus' account entirely devoid of verbal echoes: both the *logoi* and the *erga* which follow are full of verbs beginning with ὑπό - ὑποφεύγειν, ὑπάγειν, ὑποστρέφειν, etc. We shall discuss this similarity between Herodotus and Thucydides in their use of the *logoi* more fully in Chapter Six.

is so should also come as no surprise, for Koes too warned him about the dangers of Scythia. Koes did not fear defeat in battle but rather that the Persians might be unable to "find" the enemy and so come to some harm in their wanderings (97.4). The listener, in other words, has been well prepared for the perplexity of Dareios. The king himself, however, is presumptuous enough to believe that the Scythians are in flight. He can conceive of only two alternatives. If Agathyrsos thinks himself capable of opposition, he declares, let him stop wandering and fight. If, on the other hand, he concedes his inferiority, let him also stop running and, in the appropriate manner, recognize Dareios as *despotes*.

The very mention of the words flight and *despotes* provokes a quick response from Agathyrsos, who explains that the Scythians' strategy is in no sense the result of fear. Indeed, there is nothing novel about their refusal to settle down and fight, since this is their usual way of life. He then proceeds to point out to Dareios the advantages of a nomadic existence. They have neither towns nor cultivated land, fear for which might speed them into battle (127.2, οὔτε ἄστεα οὔτε γῆ πεφυτευμένη). Again that curious *sophie*, which renders them "immune to conquest, impossible even to meet in battle" (46.3). Again too the listener understands this, for much of Book 4 has prefigured this revelation made to Dareios amidst his wanderings and in his perplexity. Twice in the early chapters of Book 4 the Scythians were described as a nomadic people who do not plough the land (2.2 and 19).[21] These brief descriptive comments then take on real significance in chapter 46, where Herodotus praises the one most important discovery of the Scythians, wherein they show their great wisdom. No aggressor can escape their land, while they, on the contrary, cannot be "found" or made to fight unless they so desire. The explanation of this *sophie* is that they do not have towns or fortifications. Rather they

[21] Chapter 2.2, οὐ γὰρ ἀρόται εἰσὶ ἀλλὰ νομάδες; chapter 19, νομάδες ἤδη Σκύθαι νέμονται, οὔτε τι σπείροντες οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀροῦντες.

depend on cattle and, having no settled abode, make their wagons their homes.[22] This too Dareios should understand, for Koes' warnings included a brief description of the land against which Dareios was about to lead his expedition (97.3).[23]

Chapters 126-127 are a turning point. In fact, Dareios has been thwarted, but he has yet to realize the genuine difficulty of his situation. Chapter 127 anticipates this realization, by establishing a link forward to the following narrative. First, Idanthyrsos declares that the choice of whether to fight or not lies with the Scythians. In chapter 128 the latter will take the initiative and change their strategy to a more aggressive one.[24] Secondly, so incensed is the king at the word *despotes* that he pledges to send Dareios not earth and water but other appropriate gifts.[25] Such gifts will indeed reach Dareios in his moment of deepest perplexity and ultimately have a profound effect on him. Finally, the word *despotes* provokes a second dangerous initiative on the part of the Scythians.

[22] Chapter 46.3, τοῖσι γὰρ μήτε ἄστεα μήτε τείχεα ἢ ἐκτισμένα . . . ζῶντες μὴ ἀπ' ἀρότου ἀλλ' ἀπὸ κτηνέων. Compare chapter 121, where the wagons in which their wives and children live move northward.

[23] ἐπὶ γῆν γὰρ μέλλεις στρατεύεσθαι τῆς οὔτε ἀρηρομένον φανήσεται οὐδὲν οὔτε πόλις οἰκεομένη. See Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 315, who comments on "the analogical structure of the world." In the *Logos* on the Ends of the World (3.106-116), for example, the " 'digression' on divine providence operating in the animal kingdom furnishes an analogy to history in general" (pp. 102-103). The real purpose of this *Logos*, he believes, "is to show how Darius is everywhere enclosed by the limits of a world that does not obey his dictates" (*ibid.*). Compare Wood, *The Histories*, pp. 93-111. Both note many analogies and a technique of prefiguration that begins in the first three books.

[24] Note, however, that there is one eventuality that would force the Scythians to fight, i.e., if Dareios were to discover and attempt to destroy their ancestral tombs (127.2). For the royal tombs of the Gerrhoi see chapter 71. Macan, *Herodotus*, p. 89, notes that Dareios had twice "in his wild chase" crossed the meridian of Gerrhos. Further details of Scythian burials are given in chapters 72-73.

[25] He recognizes as *despotai* Zeus, his ancestor, and Histie. For the Scythians' own belief in their descent from Zeus, see chapters 5-7 and for Histie, see chapter 59.

Their kings are filled with anger at the very suggestion of slavery.[26] Straightway, they send one division to confer with the Ionians guarding the bridge over the Danube.

Thus the *logoi* constitute a link backward and recall to the listener significant detail heard earlier but now repeated, so that he understands how Dareios' *strateia* is being thwarted. So too they prepare the way forward to new problems both for Dareios and for the Scythians. For Dareios, thwarted, will in turn thwart the Scythians, whom, it was said, no aggressor can escape. And this is truly significant, in that it will allow Dareios to live to carry out his plans to attack Greece. In addition, the thwarting of the Scythians is also part of the process unfolding in Book 4.83-142. For thus Herodotus conveys to his listeners how a free, brave, and independent people may fail in their attempt to put an end to the unjust expansion of *arche*.

If one considers the narrative and *logoi* of chapters 83-127 as an integrated whole, Herodotus' criteria of selection are seen to be based on the same interpretative principles as Book 3.17-25. Whatever his sources, Herodotus selected his details to produce a totality patterned on the Ethiopian campaign. We have already noted some of the generalizations he employed in interpreting and reconstructing both campaigns: the problems inherent in *arche*, the injustice of expansionism, and the real dangers that confront the *stolos* in a distant land. The above constitute the central features of the process that emerges in both passages. But in the Scythian campaign Herodotus interpreted his data not only to give a different emphasis to the process but also to reveal a whole new side of it. The different emphasis is connected with the dangers that confront the *stolos*, once undertaken. Such dangers exist in the terrain itself. What was implicit in the Ethiopian campaign, that is, that the people who inhabit that terrain also present a real danger, is explicit here. For the Scythians take

[26] As Macan, *Herodotus*, p. 90, notes: "Strictly speaking they had only heard the correlative δεσπότης."

the initiative and, by evolving a strategy allowing them to use to advantage their northern terrain and their peculiar way of life, force Dareios to wander interminably over a barren and deserted land. (Incidentally, what was explicit in the account of Cambyses' failure in the desert is implicit here: the problem of procuring supplies in an unknown land.) What emerges then is the capacity of a people to combine with the terrain in their own defense to thwart the conqueror. Thus, the Scythians go one step beyond the Ethiopians. For though both are paradigmatic of the simple, hardy, and independent people the *stolos* may confront, the latter actually resist the *stolos*.

A further truth, however, is beginning to emerge from the passage, a truth that Cambyses' expedition did not reveal. For the Scythian *Logos* illustrates the problems autonomous peoples, some of them even neighbors, experience in resisting an enemy in concert (κοινῇ), the problems of defensive unity. For instance, many of the tribes in the path of the *stolos* misinterpret the motives of the conqueror or cannot believe that he presents any danger to themselves, even when they hear the facts. Those like the Getai who are brave enough to resist openly and fight alone, soon succumb to slavery. Finally, when their lands are invaded and it is clear that unity and defense are necessary, these simple people are still unable to put up any resistance. They are taken by surprise and, lacking discipline, flee in confusion. As the narrative proceeds, the limitations of the Scythians and their kind will become even more apparent.

It is now possible to turn to the kinds of explanations Herodotus employs in his synthesis. How, to pose an obvious first question, does Herodotus explain Dareios' reversal in Scythia? And further, what does this imply about the body of generalizations to which he had recourse?[27] Chapters 126-127 were described as a turning point. By chapter 126 Dar-

[27] For a discussion of explanation, bibliography on explanation, and the use of generalizations in historical explanation, see above, Chapter Four.

eios has in fact been thwarted by the terrain and its people with their curious *sophie*. The reasons for the failure of Dareios' expedition seem clear enough, for the failure has been prefigured by detailed descriptions of Scythia and its dangers, by warnings, and by analogies. Herodotus, however, embellishes that failure with a series of further details, comprised in chapters 130-134. Far from considering these details "events," one might even go so far as to suggest that they are as apocryphal as the *logos* of the Ethiopian king and his dialogue with the Fish-eaters. As the historian has composed the work, however, chapters 130-134 are the highlight of the narrative, the real turning point. For they, just as much as the land and strategy of the Scythians, explain Dareios' reversal, though on a different level.

In chapter 131 Dareios is described as being "at his wits' end" (ἐν ἀπορίῃσι εἴχετο).[28] This is something of a paradox, for what in fact the Scythians have done is permitted the Persians to capture some of their cattle. Their aim is to make the Persians remain long enough in Scythia to suffer from the want of all supplies.[29] For they have already noted the Persians' confusion (chapter 130). This too is somewhat paradoxical, since Herodotus has just described a great wonder (129.1, θῶμα μέγιστον), the effect of mules and asses on the horses of the Scythians. The central point of chapter 129 is the total confusion into which the Scythians themselves were thrown by the sight and sound of these novel creatures. Thus the Persian confusion that follows is rather surprising.[30]

[28] Rawlinson's translation.

[29] As Macan, *Herodotus*, p. 91, notes: "They must have starved themselves to feed the Persians, for they had only kept just enough for their own wants, c.121 *supra*, to say nothing of the inconsequence of their action, in keeping their enemies' table supplied." Herodotus always keeps in mind the problem of supplies faced by a *stolos* in a distant and unknown land.

[30] Note Herodotus' cross-reference at 129.2 to chapter 28, where he points out that mules and asses are unable to endure the cold winters of Scythia. Though Herodotus introduces this scene as a great wonder, it is no mere curiosity. Ineffective as the confusion is here in damaging the Scythian initiative, the narrative has pinpointed an area of ignorance, and ultimately of

Be that as it may, Dareios finds himself in deep perplexity. Understanding this, the Scythian kings send him four strange gifts, a bird, a mouse, a frog, and five arrows. They leave it to him to comprehend their meaning. In chapter 132, another pivotal point in the narrative, Dareios himself and Gobryas put forth their respective *gnomai* about the significance of the gifts. For all his perplexity, Dareios is as presumptuous as ever and interprets them as a sign of the Scythians' surrender. Gobryas' interpretation is wiser, as it will later be revealed. To him all four gifts symbolize the real danger the Persians are in, and the possibility that they may not return home, but die in Scythia. The historian makes no comment. Nor is comment necessary, since the question of whose interpretation is the "correct" one is resolved in chapter 134.

All the strands of the narrative intersect in chapter 134. The Scythians again take the initiative and finally draw their forces up for the pitched battle so long desired by Dareios.

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weakness. In their retreat the Persians will successfully trick the Scythians by using these same asses. At 135.3 Herodotus will not need to interrupt his account of the retreat with explanations, for the listener should be well aware of the novelty of these creatures in Scythia. Again I consider this manner of highlighting significant detail in advance an aspect of a work composed for oral presentation. One continues to be impressed by Herodotus' control of his material. Indeed, so many details presented in the geographic and ethnographic portions of the Scythian *Logos* have import for the narrative of Dareios' campaign that one is forced to take issue with K. von Fritz, *Die Griechische Geschichtsschreibung* (Berlin, 1967), vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 146ff. He views Book 4 as analogous to Book 2, with material assembled early out of interest in geography or the problem of the continents and then later incorporated in the narrative of Dareios' expedition. "Dadurch ist die Erörterung des geographischen Problems selbst etwas weiter ins Innere des vierten Buches gerückt, als das im zweiten Buch der Fall war. Aber abgesehen davon ist die Anordnung analog" (p. 148). See too p. 152, where he refers to Herodotus "in seiner vorhistorischen Epoche." When and why Herodotus assembled his Scythian material is perhaps less significant than the extent of control he had over it. We have consistently discovered details relevant to Dareios' campaign. A thorough examination of the entire *Logos* from this perspective would, I am sure, produce many more. Book 4 is not so disconnected as is commonly believed.

A simple hare disrupts the proceedings, throwing the Scythians into confusion. With much clamor they set off in pursuit of the animal. Dareios, discovering the cause of the disturbance, is transformed. The scales fall from his eyes the moment he construes the Scythians' behavior as utter contempt for himself. Thus in an instant, not on the basis of counsel or reason, but as a result of an irrational act, his presumption and self-deception vanish.[31] He now accepts Gobryas' interpretation of the gifts as the correct one and seeks good counsel to ensure a safe return. Gobryas has the last word and explicitly acknowledges the "difficulty" of the Scythians (134.2), a difficulty that he knew by report but that he now fully comprehends from experience. Whether or not he truly believes it, he too refers to the Scythians as making sport of them. At Gobryas' instigation plans are set in motion for an immediate retreat.

What is the meaning of this remarkable scene with its swift reversal? Nowhere does the concept of cause and effect prove so inadequate. For clearly it would be ludicrous to suggest that a hare caused Dareios' reversal and retreat. Nor is this a species of the Cleopatra's nose theory of history—a mere accident that vastly changed the course of events. *Tyche* is not an operative force here, for the historian has prefigured this scene from the very beginning of the expedition. The operative "force" is rather the contempt of the Scythians and its effect on Dareios. It leads him to recognize their difficulty

[31] The word for contempt is καταφρονέουσι. It is quite common in Thucydides, where the contempt of an enemy can be a psychological advantage, and correspondingly a disadvantage to the contemned. See my discussion of the effects of contempt in *Thucydides, the Artful Reporter* (Toronto, 1973), pp. 96-97. Macan, *Herodotus*, p. 93, considers this rather a comic scene: "This incident lowers the pride of Dareios, and he comes to his senses: thus are great conversions effected upon small occasions!" Dareios, he believes, is being made ridiculous. Earlier at chapter 130 Macan suggests, p. 91, "it is necessary to fill up to the brim the cup of folly and confusion which is here presented to the Great King, for the edification of the Hellenes." In fact, as we shall see, it is the Scythians who are ridiculous. Dareios, who has shown himself sensible before, must at some point have the good sense to get out of Scythia.

and his own inability to conquer such a people. In other words, Herodotus explains Dareios' reversal as a change of mind. It is a personal reversal. And this is as it should be. For the concentration here on Dareios and his feelings and responses is the very same concentration noted in the early stages of his march. In chapters 83-98, it was discovered, "events" were embedded in a portrait of the ruler, and the various wonders he saw and pleasures he experienced along the way. The *despotes*, elated, must fall. Only here, since there is no defeat in the real sense, he must feel perplexed, reach his "wits' end," and ultimately experience reversal, by recognizing his own incapacity. Note how carefully Herodotus has set the scene for this self-revelation, though he might easily have proffered any number of more mundane explanations of Dareios' reversal. What the scene indicates about the historian's explanatory procedures is that motivation is their central feature. By concentrating fully on the *despotes*, Herodotus explains what happened in Scythia at the level of the *despotes'* motivation. Thus the Scythian expedition is the story of the feelings, moods, and perceptions of Dareios in response to the land and its wonders, the land and its peoples.

What then is the relationship of the motivation of the *despotes* to "types of causation" in Herodotus' *Histories* discerned by others? Immerwahr, for instance, has noted three kinds of causes: "immediate causes" like vengeance, "permanently operative causes, primarily expansionism," and also "metaphysical causes."[32] Let us attempt to put these "causes" in a different perspective. Above, we observed the

[32] "Aspects of Historical Causation," p. 264. The formulation, "types of causation," is also his, p. 251. See too J. de Romilly, "La vengeance comme explication historique dans l'oeuvre d'Hérodote," *REG* 84 (1971), 314-337. The beginning of de Romilly's work is especially valuable for its discussion of three different levels of "explication," based on three different interpretations of the *Histories*. She summarizes the views of Hellmann, Pagel, and Immerwahr, supplying bibliography. Compare R. Sealey, "Thucydides, Herodotos, and the Causes of War," *CQ* n.s. 7 (1957), 1-12 and A. E. Wardman, "Herodotus on the Cause of the Greco-Persian Wars," *AJP* 82 (1961), 133-150.

tenuous link Herodotus establishes between Dareios' aggression against the Scythians and an invasion of Asia that occurred about one hundred years earlier. Through that link the notion of *adika erga*, beginnings and guilt, is injected into the narrative. Ultimately it is highlighted in the *logos* of the tribal kings. By this means too a link is established between one process and another in the series of *adika erga* that Kroisos began. Thus, brief as the *aitie*-section may be (4.1 and 4.4), vengeance and retribution do have a place in Herodotus' account of the Scythian campaign.[33] I myself, however, would not designate this *aitie* as an immediate cause but rather as a long-standing ground of complaint, a grievance in a chain of grievances and counter-grievances.[34] Such an *aitie* appears to be genuine enough in Herodotus' scheme of things. For it is essential to motivate the *despotes* and encourage him to begin the *adika erga* anew. In the *despotes'* own mind his expedition is a form of retaliation.

Expansionism is also an Herodotean mode of explanation, as both Immerwahr and Wood have noted. The latter believes that the tendency to expansion is inherent in *arche*.[35] Note, however, that this inherent tendency remains latent until some desire or challenge captivates the *despotes* and so motivates him to act. Viewed from this perspective the scene with Atossa, whether apocryphal or not (3.134), is extremely important. For it sets out the kinds of arguments—inducements and challenges—needed to convince the *despotes* of his traditional responsibilities. Dareios has such great *dynamis* that it behooves him to add some new people or more *dynamis* to his Persian realm. Indeed, to Atossa it is reasonable that a man who is youthful and endowed with enormous

[33] The term *aitie*-section is Immerwahr's, *Form and Thought*, p. 107. It is also used by Wood, *The Histories*, p. 102.

[34] Compare Sealey, "The Causes of War," pp. 7-8. "Herodotos," he points out, "seeks the cause of a war in a grievance or a chain of grievances" (p. 8). See too Appendix to Chapter Five, section C: "Causation" in Herodotus and Thucydides.

[35] *The Histories*, pp. 45-46.

resources show forth some accomplishment so that the Persians might learn that they are ruled by a man.[36] Some of these arguments require further elaboration. War, Atossa points out, will keep Dareios' subjects busy and not allow them the idleness to plot against him. In addition, youth is the appropriate time for achievement, for as one ages, so too the vigorous mental powers of youth (134.3, αἱ φρένες) experience senescence and become dulled to everything. Atossa's words thus externalize the tendency to expansion as it is felt by the *despotes*. He may like Xerxes require a great deal of persuasion or like Dareios he may recognize in the words of the adviser his very own thoughts and intentions. But the tendency must find its expression through the *despotes* himself. The urges and desires of the *despotes*, no matter how they are aroused, are again central to Herodotus' explanation. For all the reasons given by Atossa, he needs war and wants more land, or some addition to his *arche*, which will constitute an achievement in the eyes of his subjects. In other words, though the tendency to expansion may be inherent in *arche*, it is also explained by Herodotus at the level of motivation. This in itself constitutes another reason for the concentration on the *despotes* from the beginning to the end of the process.

In sum, the desire to expand one's *dynamis* and *arche*, aroused in or already felt by the *despotes*, combines with some *aitie*, a grievance that produces in him the additional motive of vengeance or retaliation. Or, to formulate it differently, vengeance affords an outlet for, and gives direction to, urges and desires that are already present or should be

[36] Atossa's vocabulary approximates that of the proem to the *Histories*, ἔργα . . . ἀποδεχθέντα, which should "not go unrecognized." (See the discussion of this passage in Chapter Two, note 34.) Atossa believes that Dareios should φαίνεσθαί τι ἀποδεικνύμενον. She then challenges him, νῦν γὰρ ἄν τι καὶ ἀποδέξαιο ἔργον. Here is the precursor of Thucydides' ἔργον ἀξιόλογον, left unaccomplished by the tyrants (1.17). Collective achievement in the form of a *strateia* or a *stolos* was the peak of human achievement in his view.

present, if the *despotes* is a real ruler of men. Once released, however, these urges and desires become unfettered *pleonexia*, as the *despotes* conquers all in his path, guilty and innocent alike. Thus he adds to the chain of *adika erga* his own particular injustice, the kind of *adikie* described by the Ethiopian king. He desires land other than his own and seeks to reduce to slavery men who have done him no wrong. Dareios reaches this point with the enslavement of the Getai, as the Scythian messengers point out in their *logos*, warning the tribal kings that Dareios' real purpose is to conquer all. Dareios, who is drawn inexorably to commit injustice, now that his desire for more lands and peoples has been released, becomes himself the aggressor. In turn he is due to experience retaliation (*tisis*). His reversal is just such a "punishment."

In attempting to answer the question of how Herodotus explains Dareios' reversal in Scythia, we have been led to a second question: how does he explain the expedition itself? What "caused" it? What in fact our procedure has been is to view from a slightly altered perspective the generalizations that he employed in interpreting and reconstructing both the Scythian and Ethiopian campaigns. In each case he synthesized his data by means of the same configuration of generalizations, which constitute a process. What then we are seeking in this discussion of the explanatory procedures of the historian is the dynamic of process. How does change come about? In the absence of causation, what kind of conceptual tools did Herodotus employ to explain the precise way the process began?

The question Herodotus asked himself is not what caused the Scythian expedition. Rather he asked a question closely related to the one he posed in the opening chapters of the *Histories*, that is, who began the *adika erga*? Who took the next step in this chain of grievances and counter-grievances? What or who urged him to do it? The answers to these questions center very much on the ruler himself and the desires, irrational or otherwise, that he feels, or that are stimulated in him by others. He will, indeed must, increase his realm

by adding peoples and *dynamis* or, as Artabanos later expresses it, "he covets much" (7.18.2, τὸ πολλῶν ἐπιθυμέειν).[37] In this instance, he has an *aitie*, something to avenge, and so a direction in which to expand.[38] Thus far then this account of explanation in Herodotus has been worked out purely at the psychological level of the *despotes*: we have discovered what motivated him. In suggesting, however, that Dareios in his turn was due to experience retaliation for his own injustice, the result of unfettered *pleonexia*, we have raised the question of inevitability in two senses. If expansion is inherent in *arche*, are injustice, retribution, and reversal also inevitable? If so, and I have suggested this, in stating that Dareios' "reversal is just such a 'punishment,' " are the gods responsible for the process, both for its beginning in expansion, however justified, and for its end in reversal? In the case of the Scythian expedition, the answers to these questions vary much more than they do in respect of Cyrus' campaign against the Massagetai or Xerxes' expedition against Greece. Immerwahr, for instance, discerns in the *Histories* "a complex of human motivations and superhuman forces,"[39] choice and necessity. Elsewhere, however, he notes: "Metaphysical causation is almost entirely absent from the Scythian Logos: vengeance is para-

[37] Compare Atossa, who chides Dareios for οὔτε τι ἔθνος προσκτώμενος οὔτε δύναμιν Πέρσῃσι (3.134.1), and Xerxes, who pledges μηδὲ ἐλάσσω προσκτήσομαι δύναμιν Πέρσῃσι, since his ancestors κατεργάσαντο καὶ προσεκτήσαντο ἔθνεα (7.8a.1-2). Mardonios actually names some of the peoples whom the Persians have conquered out of desire δύναμιν προσκτᾶσθαι (7.9.2).

[38] It is clear from Mardonios' statements (7.9.2) that the Persians have conquered and enslaved peoples who have done them no wrong. An *aitie* is not necessary to expand one's *arche*. For the most part, however, Herodotus does not concern himself with such Persian conquests, because they are not part of the chain of *adika erga* which are his subject. A significant exception, where retaliation is not involved, is the Ethiopian Campaign. There Cambyses launched his *stolos* in anger against a people ἀδικήσαντα Πέρσας οὐδέν (7.9.2). Herodotus reconstructs the expedition as a paradigm of unjust expansion and punishment.

[39] "Historical Action in Herodotus," *TAPA* 85 (1954), 30.

mount, expansionism is quietly assumed."[40] Dareios, he believes, is "literally defeated by the limitless. In all other respects, his conduct in this campaign is excellent and quite different from the behavior of Xerxes in Greece. Darius is defeated in Scythia only by his unlimited desire for expansion."[41] Wood, by contrast, believes: "That Darius, unlike Cyrus, experiences no personal mishap in Scythia, signifies that the campaign is part of an impersonal process which affects the empire, not its kings."[42] One explanation of this is that "somehow Asia and Europe must remain apart."[43] As Wood expresses it more fully, "The metaphysical ground for this is Herodotus' concept of balance or equilibrium in all things."[44]

First, I would agree that the tendency to expansion is inherent in *arche*, and that *arche*, the basis of growth and power, becomes as well "the principle of destruction."[45] The process is inevitable, in other words. It is not, however, an impersonal process. As we have seen above, the inherent tendency must find its expression through the *despotes* himself. He must feel the urge to expand his realm and ultimately, when his *pleonexia* is released, conquer guilty and innocent alike. As Wood notes: "The history of the King is the history of his kingdom. . . . The later type of historiography [for example, Thucydides], starting from a different constitutional system [of the polis and democracy or oligarchy] merely applies the same principle to different circumstances and orders."[46] How does the *despotes* develop these desires and at the same time perceive, and seek retaliation for, some long-standing *aitie*? He is persuaded—by Atossa. But Dareios did not need such persuasion: he already recognized his responsibilities and in the fullness of his youth

[40] "Aspects of Historical Causation," p. 263.
[41] *Form and Thought*, p. 175.
[42] *The Histories*, p. 88.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 102.
[44] *Ibid.*, n. 11.
[45] Wood, *ibid.*, p. 46. Compare Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 154.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 63, n. 10.

felt the urge to build a bridge into Europe and make an expedition against the Scythians. I would suggest that in Herodotus' view it is the god, or gods, who implant this urge to expand in the mind of the *despotes*. The gods are thus the motivating force in the process of expansion and reversal. Since the Scythian expedition as a totality is patterned on Cambyses' Ethiopian campaign, and both are paradigms that prefigure Xerxes' *stolos* against Greece, there is no reason for Herodotus to supply in each instance every detail of the process. This would not just foreshadow but detract from the process writ large, Xerxes' grand reversal. If one believes that the gods play a role in Xerxes' decision to invade Greece and in his subsequent defeat, the divine cannot be absent here. In fact, the divine must be present, if Herodotus synthesized his data by means of the same configuration of generalizations. Since each process is modelled on the others, what obtains for one should obtain for all.

This said, it may be instructive to glance briefly at the beginnings of process, as it is elaborated in its totality in the opening chapters of Book 7, where Xerxes makes his decision to conquer Greece. All that has been adumbrated or merely hinted in earlier expeditions finds its full expression here. Xerxes recognizes his traditional responsibility not to remain still and feels obligated to rival his ancestors in honor, by adding *dynamis* to the Persian realm.[47] Like his father he intends to build a bridge into Europe to take vengeance on the Athenians who, he asserts, began the *adika erga* against himself and his father. To rival his father is a difficult matter, however, requiring him to aim at conquest of the entire world. No one will escape: guilty and innocent alike will feel the yoke of slavery.[48] Thus he begins by expressing the aim to perpetrate the *adikie* described by the Ethiopian king, the

[47] See above, note 37. Xerxes refers to a *nomos* he is following. His ancestors, he then points out, οὐδαμά κω ἠτρεμίσαμεν. He also speaks of divine guidance (7.8a.1, θεός τε οὕτω ἄγει).

[48] He will make everything one country, extending the Persian realm τῷ Διὸς αἰθέρι ὁμουρέουσαν (8γ. 2). οὕτω οἵ τε ἡμῖν αἴτιοι ἕξουσι δούλιον ζυγὸν οἵ τε ἀναίτιοι (8γ. 3).

kind of injustice committed in turn by Dareios in Scythia. There is no need to follow the debate in every detail, the additional arguments of Mardonios and the warnings of Artabanos both before and after Xerxes' dreams. Much has been written about this passage, a *locus classicus* for the *phthonos* of the gods, for *hybris*, and *pleonexia*.[49] Artabanos must be convinced that Xerxes' dream is a sign of divine will. And he is, when the dream warns him against attempting to avert the inevitable (17.2, τὸ χρεόν). In other words, when Xerxes rejected his responsibilities and would not begin the process, the divine forced him to begin it, and so to embark on the greatest *stolos* known to mankind (20.2).[50]

That Herodotus believed the gods played a role in this process is amply proven by his praise of the Athenians at Book 7.139.5. The Athenians, he points out, are correctly deemed the saviors of Greece. In choosing to keep Greece free, they were the ones who repulsed the king, they μετά γε θεούς, "next of course to the gods." Again, before the battle of Artemision he states explicitly that "everything was being done by the god to bring about some equality between the Greek and Persian forces" (8.13, ἐποιέετό τε πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ). Given these clear statements of the historian's belief in the divine, one is tempted to return to the curious *logos* of the tribal kings (4.119) and their obsessive concern with *adika erga*, with beginnings and guilt. In addition, the kings make some remarks about the divine that are curiously

[49] See especially 10ε and ϑ, where Artabanos describes the attitude of the god and the implications for mankind of ὁ θεὸς φθονήσας. Compare his further remarks at 16a.2. Immerwahr, "Historical Action," pp. 30-37, discusses in great detail the opening chapters of Book 7. See especially pp. 32-36 and bibliography *ad locum*. He thus concludes in *Form and Thought*, p. 313: "Through *phthonos* the divine preserves first of all the boundary between man and gods; but it also preserves the order of society by preventing conquest and absolute rule." Compare Wood, *The Histories*, pp. 152-156, in particular, p. 156 and n. 19 *ad locum*, where he comments on *hybris* as one of the "moments or instants of the compensatory mechanism of that balance in all things which he ascribes elsewhere (III 108) to τοῦ θείου ἡ προνοίη."

[50] Compare Immerwahr, "Historical Action," p. 33.

similar to the views of the historian himself. The same god, they point out, who permitted the Scythians' ancestors to be masters of the Persians for a time is now urging the latter on to retaliation.[51] This is reminiscent of the words of the Ethiopian king, who advised Cambyses to be thankful that the gods had not put it into the minds of the Ethiopians to acquire land other than their own.[52] Finally, there are the words of the Scythians to the Ionian tyrants, so like Herodotus' own, also uttered in respect of freedom. Let the Ionians rejoice that they are free, duly "thanking the gods and the Scythians" (136.4, θεοῖσί τε καὶ Σκύθῃσι εἰδότες χάριν). If one takes all these references together as expressive of Herodotus' own views, the divine is seen to be as much at work urging Dareios on to retaliation and *pleonexia* and finally reversal and *tisis* as it later urges on and punishes Xerxes. It is a part of the process. Nor is it correct to underestimate Dareios' reversal because he escaped with his life. Doubtless, if he had not sensed the "contempt" of the Scythians, they and the gods would have brought about a

[51] Chapter 119.3: καὶ ἐκεῖνοι, ἐπεί σφεας ὡυτὸς θεὸς ἐγείρει, τὴν ὁμοίην ὑμῖν ἀποδιδοῦσι.

[52] Chapter 3.21.3: θεοῖσι εἰδέναι χάριν. For a more detailed discussion of the divine and the way in which Herodotus viewed the gods, see Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, especially pp. 274-275 and 311-314, and bibliography *ad loca*. In commenting on Herodotus' attitude to local divinities, Immerwahr states, p. 299: "The dramatic use of local stories about particular divinities does not conflict with Herodotus' own religious beliefs. It is true that when speaking of his convictions, he often refers to his own belief in a general 'divine,' i.e. in an obscure power not clearly related by him to the gods of Greek tradition. . . . Herodotean religion combines the belief in the divine as a unified power with a limited trust in the stories of tradition." This statement accords well with our conclusions about Herodotus' attitude to tradition in Chapter Two. Immerwahr points out further, pp. 312-313: "History develops in accordance with principles of order because all nature is ordered by the divine." (He cites Her. 3.108.2.) "The main concern of the divine is the maintenance of balance; Herodotus has the phrase *theôn ta isa nemontôn* probably from contemporary epigrams. Such balance appears everywhere in nature and therefore also in history; the historian need not cite specific gods, because all gods have the function of preserving it."

reversal as horrendous as that experienced by Cambyses. Thus, his "revelation" does result in a limited punishment. However, it is limited not just because Dareios recognizes his own limitations, but because another group, the Ionian tyrants, now come into play and help thwart the Scythians. There is no reason to believe his retreat through Scythia was an easy one. Artabanos later uses it twice as a negative paradigm for Xerxes' elucidation (7.10a.2 and 18.2).[53]

The question that remains then is how does Herodotus explain the failure of the Scythians to put an end forever to Dareios' *strateiai*. For it too is part of the process and so part of the meaning Herodotus intended to convey through this paradigm. The Scythians are deceived and betrayed at every juncture, while at the same time they make a number of serious errors. In the first place, Gobryas counsels, and Dareios accepts, a retreat by night, in which the weakest soldiers and the asses are left behind. Thus the Persians trick the natives and get a head start. For the Scythians assume that the continued braying of the asses means the Persian army is still there.[54] When day dawns and the truth is out, the Scythians hasten in pursuit toward the Danube. One protagonist is on foot and quite ignorant of the way, there being no true roads in Scythia. The other is on horseback and knows all the short cuts. Thus the two armies miss each other (136.2, ἁμαρτόντες), and the Scythians reach the bridge first. Addressing the Ionians, they point out that the latter do not do the right thing (136.3, οὐ ποιέετε δίκαια) by remaining beyond the appointed sixty days. Now, with nothing to fear,

[53] For the view that Dareios "suffered heavy loss" in Scythia see How and Wells, *Commentary*, p. 432. Compare Macan, *Herodotus*, pp. 97-98, who describes the expedition as "the Scythian fiasco" (p. 98) and cites the same losses as How and Wells, eighty thousand men (based on Ktesias, *Pers.* 17).

[54] See above, note 30, for comments on the significance of Herodotus' introduction of the mules and asses in chapters 12 and 129. Gobryas actually proposes deception (134.3) in respect of their own soldiers. The entire plan thus serves a double purpose. See How and Wells, *Commentary*, p. 343, who note: "The Persians do here of necessity what (i.207.7) they had done against the Massagetae as a stratagem (cf. the use of καθαρός in 135.2 and in i.211.2)." Compare the deception of Cambyses, discussed above.

they should rejoice in their freedom and break the bridge.[55] They themselves promise to deal with the former *despotes* in such a way as to prevent any further *strateiai* on his part.

In fact, the Scythians have made themselves dependent on the Ionians, who turn to debate. The view of Histiaios the Milesian easily defeats that of Miltiades. For Histiaios convinces the other tyrants that their power depends on Dareios. If his *dynamis* is destroyed, none of them will rule any more, since each city will choose democracy rather than tyranny. Self-interest overcomes their first instinct to accept Miltiades' *gnome* and free Ionia. A plan is then set in motion to deceive the Scythians. Histiaios himself addresses the latter, pointing out how they are in fact destroying the bridge and promising total dedication to the task (139.2), for they are eager to be free. He then suggests that the Scythians seek out the Persians and on behalf of both parties wreak upon them the vengeance they deserve. For the second time, Herodotus points out solemnly, the Scythians put their faith in the Ionians, believing they speak the truth. For the second time too their search is in vain, for they miss the Persians (140.1). And for this Herodotus holds the Scythians themselves responsible (140.1). Their scorched earth policy is now their downfall. If they had not destroyed pastures and water alike, they would easily have discovered the Persians. As it is, they seek them out where food and water remain. But the Persians keep to their former course, despite its difficulties, and with Histiaios' aid escape across the bridge. For the second time, Herodotus repeats, the Scythians miss the Persians. There follows a bitter denunciation of the Ionians.[56]

[55] In chapter 133, their first conference with the Ionians at the bridge, the Scythians were fully aware of the arrangement that existed between them and Dareios. The plan they proposed there, that the Ionians wait the full sixty days, freed them of responsibility (133.3, αἰτίης) in the eyes of both Dareios and themselves. Another instance of Herodotus' own concerns being voiced in a *logos* of these native people.

[56] The Scythians judge the Ionians, if considered free men, the most base and cowardly of all peoples, but if considered slaves, the most fond of their master and the least likely to run away (142). Again this is Herodotus speaking. Macan, *Herodotus*, p. 97, describes the judgment as a "literary device of making the intelligent foreigner a mouthpiece for home truths."

Here then is the other side of process, the problem of defensive unity against the *stolos*. How can free men—free, that is, externally from a *despotes*—unite? How can they form a *koinon* and together take advantage of their peculiar terrain, which itself presents dangers to the conqueror? How ultimately can they thwart that conqueror? What the Scythian *Logos* reveals is the limitations of a simple people like the Scythians. First, the various tribes do not have the sense or foresight to unite or be united, though the Scythians explain the dangers to them, at one point even threatening to leave their country or come to terms with the Persians (118.2). Secondly, lack of discipline characterizes these tribes. For when their lands are invaded, they flee northward, totally confused. In fact, the same kind of confusion is also characteristic of the Scythians, as the incident with the hare makes evident. Far from being a disciplined force, able to confront an enemy in battle, they set up a clamor and run in pursuit of the hare. They may be independent and free and have natural courage, but they lack knowledge and skill (*episteme* and *techne*).[57] Their indigenous *nomoi* (and they shun all others) are insufficient to produce the kind of people who can confront an enemy in a disciplined fashion. One begins to appreciate why Herodotus stated that, apart from their one brilliant discovery, he did not admire them (46.2).

And what of their *sophie*, which might finally have starved Dareios into submission, had he been forced to wander interminably over their barren terrain? They lost this great ad-

[57] The Scythians were thrown into confusion (134.1, ταραχθέντων). This together with their clamor, induced Dareios to enquire about τὸν θόρυβον. Compare Thuc. 2.83-92, where a whole series of concepts, such as *apeiria* and *tolme*, *episteme* and *andreia*, etc., are contrasted both in the *logoi* and in the *erga*. The central point of the narrative of Phormion's exploits is ταραχή. See too Thuc. 4.125-127, where Brasidas pinpoints the shortcomings of an army of barbarians. They lack discipline and so attack or flee at will (126.5). Hence when the barbarians attack πολλῇ βοῇ καὶ θορύβῳ (127.1), their bravado collapses in the face of a determined and disciplined resistance. Both historians are employing the same set of concepts, but Thucydides is much more explicit in his use of them and the lessons to be drawn therefrom.

vantage through their own want of experience (*empeiria*). Again one may attribute this to their total rejection of foreign ways.[58] In any case, they are tricked by the novelty of animals not native to Scythia. They also experience certain disadvantages from their lack of civilized amenities, missing the Persians because they have no proper roads. Likewise they make all the wrong assumptions about the route the Persians will follow in retreat, and so miss them a second time. All this is understandable. In spite of their lack of experience they might eventually have starved Dareios out, had he been unable to escape. But they make one truly fatal error. Dedicated to freedom themselves, they cannot conceive of those who accept their position as slaves, because they benefit from it, men who reject freedom, even when it is offered them. Simple and guileless, they believe the Ionians are telling the truth, when they speak of their dedication and desire to be free. Thus they enable the tyrants to save Dareios from the inevitable effects of their *sophie*, their sole indigenous discovery worthy of note and their only weapon against an invader.[59] As a result, the *adika erga* will continue and the process begin anew with the Ionian revolt.[60]

[58] See especially chapters 76.1 and 80.5 for Herodotus' statement about the Scythian attitude to *xeinikoi nomoi*, in particular Greek ways. Chapters 76-80, the account of Anacharsis and Skylas, are narrated to illustrate how rigid the Scythians were in this regard. Herodotus attributes the death of both men to their adoption of foreign ways. Again significant detail highlighted in advance.

[59] Chapter 46. For Herodotus' use of λόγιον in 46.1 see A. B. Lloyd, *Herodotus, Book II*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1975-1976), 2:16, an interpretation which is most attractive here. (See above, Chapter Two, note 10.) It is becoming more and more apparent that Herodotus did not hold to a view of the noble savage, what Macan, *Herodotus*, p. 32, calls "the theory of the ideal savage." It seems to me that Wood, *The Histories*, p. 110, and in particular, Cobet, *Herodots Exkurse*, pp. 107-112, have overestimated this point. Likewise, I cannot agree with Cobet, who comments on chapter 46 that "dies ist auch zunächst der einzige Gesichtspunkt, der die Ethnographie mit dem historischen Geschehen verknüpft" (p. 108). He goes too far in suggesting a disconnection of the geographic and ethnographic portions of the Scythian *Logos* from the narrative of Dareios' campaign, the "historical action." See especially his remarks, p. 109.

[60] Compare Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, pp. 22 and 110-111. Wood,

The Scythian expedition, we noted above, prefigures Xerxes' *stolos*. This is not, of course, a particularly novel observation. Commentators have discerned manifold similarities at every stage of the two expeditions, not the least, the parallel between the Scythians and the Athenians. As Immerwahr states of the Scythian Campaign, "It begins with a march section which consciously foreshadows the march of Xerxes in Book 7." At the same time, the council of the Scythians and their neighbors "anticipates the councils of the Greek defenders in the account of the Persian Wars."[61] Wood also perceives the parallel between the Athenians and the Scythians: "It goes almost without saying that the Scythians themselves prefigure the Athenians, who to preserve their freedom desert their city, just as the Scythians to remain free flee constantly Northwards. The characteristic of the Scythians in which alone they resemble the Greeks is their ESSENTIAL characteristic, love of freedom."[62] Surely this remarkable parallel—and no one could deny that it is consciously wrought—deserves more study than it has received. For example, there are a number of serious contradictions in Immerwahr's pattern of western history, which the Scythians foreshadow, and in which, he believes, disunity and strife predominate. In the first place, a pattern of disunity is in itself something of a contradiction in terms. In addition, the pattern of the West is rendered even more perplexing by Immerwahr's view that the pattern of the ruler, that is, the pattern of eastern history, "is equally applicable to the Greek

The Histories, p. 46, points out that "by nature power is unchecked until subordinated to superior power." The Scythians do not constitute such a power. Thus they will remain as they are and not move into the stages of what Wood describes as the pattern of *arche, ibid.*, pp. 34-35, the pattern illustrated by the Persians themselves (Cobet's process). Cobet stresses that once the primitive opponent has tasted luxury, he will not be held back (*Herodots Exkurse*, p. 112). The Scythians are in no danger of entering this stage of the process.

[61] *Form and Thought*, p. 109.

[62] *The Histories*, pp. 106-107. Compare Cobet, *Herodots Exkurse*, pp. 114-116.

tyrants and kings."[63] His ultimate solution to this duality is to propose a distinction between the internal history of the Greeks and their external relations with one another and with the East: "The cycle of fortune governs the individual person and state, while strife in one form or another governs the relation of individual units. Of the two processes, the second is superior in that it renders states and individuals better able to cope with fortune. In this difference lies the superiority of the Greeks over the East."[64]

But is the West always superior to the East because the former is characterized by "European freedom in contrast to Oriental monarchy?"[65] Freedom is the basic characteristic of the Scythians, also Europeans, and yet they fail to cause "a change of fortune in the East."[66] The Scythians too experience disunity and strife, part of the pattern of western history. Far from making them superior or rendering them "better able to cope with fortune," the inability of the Scythians to unite the various tribes, that is, to form a *koinon* with a common strategy against the *stolos* is one of their limitations. It is part of Herodotus' explanation of their failure to put an end forever to Dareios' *strateiai*. Neither strife and disunity nor freedom itself can thus explain Greek superiority over the Persians. Secondly, what is the significance in the *Histories* of the early history of Media and Persia? Oriental monarchy is not necessarily any more characteristic of the East than freedom is of the West (as numerous Greek tyrants prove). Though synoptic in the extreme, Herodotus begins his *logos* about Cyrus' origins with a history of the Medes at a time when they are but newly freed from Assyrian rule and thus externally independent (*autonomoi*). What he proposes to relate is the way in which they fell under the sway of tyrants (1.95-96). Internally, the Medes enjoy a freedom rather like that of the Scythians. For they live in scat-

[63] *Form and Thought*, p. 237.
[64] *Ibid.*
[65] *Ibid.*, p. 233.
[66] *Ibid.*

tered villages without a *polis*. Their freedom, however, has a negative side, since they are plagued by "lawlessness" (*anomie*). It is this very *anomie* that allows Deiokes to make himself tyrant and ultimately unite the Medes in an *arche* (96-101). The same simplicity characterizes the Persians at the time when Cyrus exhorts them to free themselves from the Medes (1.126). Thus the process begins anew, though Herodotus does not enlarge upon Cyrus' consolidation of power but moves swiftly to the eventual result of the Persians' revolt: they ruled Asia (130.2).

In a word, all peoples begin in some simple and uncivilized condition (without cities, for example, or an acknowledged means of dispensing justice). Like the Scythians and Medes they may enjoy total freedom, that is, be both autonomous and free from a tyrant. But freedom can in some circumstances be tantamount to *anomie*. A tyrant is then always a danger whether in the East or in the West.[67] Finally, a people united in an *arche* under a ruler may ultimately face the dangers inherent in *arche*, the urge to expand felt by Deiokes' successor Phraortes (1.102). Paradoxically, it may be at the point of resistance to an aggressor that this inherent tendency "to covet much" takes hold.[68] And so the final stages of the process of history commence. Is there any reason to believe that the Athenians, in spite of their freedom, do not also face such a danger, having successfully resisted the Persians? Some are of the opinion that Herodotus wrote his work as a warning to Athens.[69] If then the Athenians prove them-

[67] See Wood, *The Histories*, pp. 37-43 and 130-133. His account of the tyranny at Athens is excellent.

[68] See Sandanis' warnings to Kroisos, as the latter was making preparations for his expedition against the Persians (1.71). This passage is especially significant in Cobet's analysis of the primitive opponent, summarized in Appendix to Chapter Five, section A. Compare his discussion of 1.71, *Herodots Exkurse*, pp. 111-112.

[69] Cobet, *ibid.*, pp. 114-116. Compare C. W. Fornara, *Herodotus. An Interpretative Essay* (Oxford, 1971), chap. 5, "The Archidamian War." In his review of Cobet's work in *Gnomon* 47 (1975), 329-334, Robert Drews praises Cobet's analysis of the theme of the primitive opponent and of "the

selves superior to Persia in this instance, it is not due to any inherent superiority of the West over the East. The process of history in its totality is the same for all peoples.

It is thus incorrect to distinguish a pattern of disunity and strife within western history. Strife there is, and disunity, both for the Greeks and Scythians. For the Scythians do indeed parallel the Athenians both in their love of freedom and in the difficulties they experience in the councils with their neighbors. What both illustrate are the problems of defensive unity. Where the Scythians failed, the Athenians succeed. Thus, the real issue Herodotus addresses is the following: Given the problems autonomous peoples experience in resisting an enemy in concert, problems that include the kind of disunity and strife experienced by the Scythians, how did the Greeks form a *koinon*? And here I would agree with Immerwahr's statement, "In Herodotus we observe the struggle of the Greek mind to conceive of Hellas as one."[70] Even more important, what qualities beyond freedom itself rendered them capable of defeating the Persians? In the case of the Scythians, we discovered that their indigenous *nomoi* were insufficient to produce the kind of people who could confront an enemy in a disciplined fashion. They lacked *episteme* and *techne* and their want of *empeiria* made them the easy victims of novelties and guile. The answer to the Greeks' success lies similarly in their *nomoi*, and in particular in their constitutions, which blend happily with and thus inform their natural qualities, their *physis*. The Athenians and Spartans especially—for Herodotus singles them out—have all the qualities the Scythians lacked, in addition to love of freedom. In their case, the latter is disciplined, and so di-

'typical situations' in which it appears." He continues, p. 332: "The theme is reflected in the last chapter of the *Histories* (where Cyrus observes that soft countries produce soft men), and Cobet is probably right in seeing it as Herodotus' main lesson, a lesson which he hoped the Athenians, among others, would heed." Compare Wood, *The Histories*, p. 193, and Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 234.

[70] *Ibid.*

rected. This point accepted, it becomes clear that Herodotus' concern with *nomoi*, their nature, derivation, and effect on the *physis* of mankind in all its variety, is a central theme of the *Histories*.[71]

To conclude, process is as much the key to Herodotus' *Histories* as it is to Thucydides' work. And as we have seen above, the same concomitants obtain. Events *per se* held no interest for Herodotus, nor did he isolate events in his narrative. Rather, it is the totality that interested him, a totality with a movement or unfolding of its own. Within that totality events are embedded and either go unemphasized, or are ignored completely, as the historian concentrates on the stages of process. The latter involves a distinct and distinguishable set of generalizations that form the basis of his synthesis. What emerges is the story of Dareios, who personifies *arche* and its inherent tendency to expansion. He it is who feels the urge to take revenge and to win new lands. He it is who experiences joy at his own accomplishments, and at the wonders along his march. He is exultant, presumptuous, and finally perplexed. In relation to each of these moods, significant details are narrated—the bridging of the Bosporos, the conquest of the Getai, the confusion and flight northward of the tribal peoples. These details, however, are not isolated as events but related with some emphasis because they represent the beginning of the transgression of Asia on Europe, the beginning of injustice, and the point at which the *despotes* begins to experience the problems and dangers of a *stolos* in a distant land. Amid a rich profusion of detail, the historian precludes doubt or confusion on the part of his listeners. He

[71] Herodotus' work deserves a thorough study aimed at discovering the influence of geography—climate, water, etc.—on *physis* and the interrelationship that exists in turn between the varied *physeis* and the kind of *nomoi* peoples develop or adopt. See, for example, the last chapter of the *Histories* (9.122), where Cyrus notes that soft countries produce soft men. One might begin by establishing the connection of the Hippokratic work, *Airs, Waters, Places*, with the *Histories*. Compare Wood, *The Histories*, p. 105, n. 19 and p. 106, n. 21 and Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 1:165-166.

will make his meaning clear, by directing his listeners to it. To this end he employs a series of *logoi*, the pivotal points of the narrative, threads leading both backward and forward. All apocryphal, like the real turning point of the narrative, the "event" with which the process culminates, the Scythians' pursuit of a hare and its profound effect on Dareios. As in the case of Cambyses' defeat, Herodotus has deliberately created a paradigm. But here the paradigm is not partial or one-sided: it is the entire process in all its stages. Nonetheless, its meaning is remarkably similar to that which emerges from Cambyses' expedition. It is similarly a meaning that transcends events and historical action, an achronic truth.

It goes without saying that chronology *per se* also held no interest for Herodotus. The "story" of Dareios has the same timeless quality as that of Cambyses. It is introduced "with a vague chronological reference to the Babylonian campaign, showing that Herodotus did not know its exact date."[72] The connection between this campaign and those that precede and follow is more thematic than chronological. It is a link in the chain of *adika erga*. Within the campaign itself even the sequential connectives that loosely held together the Ethiopian *Logos* are lacking. There is one instance of "afterwards" during the march (chapter 88); otherwise it is held together by participles and temporal clauses. In other words, there is no indication when the expedition began or how long the march took; that is, both absolute and relative chronology are lacking. At some point in this paradigm a significant span of time is established, the sixty days Dareios allows himself to return to the Danube (chapter 98). The sixty days are as one, undisturbed even by the phrase, "after this." Not only does the campaign in Scythia lack connectives, chronological or otherwise, but, as How and Wells observe, "It violates the laws of time and space."[73] They duly note the historian's inconsistencies, which are manifold and glaring. It does not

[72] Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, p. 107.
[73] *Commentary*, p. 432.

follow, however, that Herodotus' critical powers "broke down completely across the Danube,"[74] any more than they did in his researches into the distant past in Egypt. In addition, the view that the narrative illustrates his dependence on his sources must be qualified. In the first place, such a statement is a truism, for every historian is dependent on his sources. The important point is the way he interprets those sources, no matter whence derived. It is true that in this instance, unlike that of the Egyptian *Logos*, the historian does not permit his listeners to watch him at work, choosing, reasoning, and criticizing.[75] However, the very fact that he synthesizes his data so as to prefigure Xerxes' campaign, a synthesis prefigured in turn by the Ethiopian Campaign, indicates that he exercised considerable care and ingenuity in composing the narrative. It is both consciously wrought and informed by his own theory of history. Thus, whatever his sources, and their possible inadequacies and inconsistencies, the finished composition is thoroughly Herodotean.

The question of sources in respect of chronology cannot, of course, be completely overlooked. It is quite possible that Herodotus' informants did not know a precise chronology for the Scythian expedition, least of all, for Dareios' "wild chase" across Scythia. Possible, but also undemonstrable. The question which might be posed instead is what purpose a more precise chronology would serve in Herodotus' narrative of the expedition. Is it not equally possible that his system of "dating," vague and inexact in terms of a calendar, was perfectly adequate in his own eyes? As a kind of relative chronology, is it really so discordant with his procedures elsewhere? Within the rule of one man, one generation, he

[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 433–434.

[75] How and Wells, *ibid.*, believe the narrative "illustrates H.'s dependence on his sources." The phrase, "in this instance," must also be qualified. Significant parts of the Scythian *Logos* that precede chapter 83 do show Herodotus at work, using much the same logic and terminology as he did in Book 2. The entire beginning, up to about chapter 58, could be the subject of a study similar to Chapter Two.

narrates, relative to one another, a series of significant attempts on Dareios' part to consolidate or expand his *arche*: the conquest of Babylon, the campaign into Scythia, the suppression of the Ionian revolt, etc. This accords perfectly well with the kind of chronology many commentators believe predominates in the *Histories*, reckoning by generation. Or as Lloyd summarizes Herodotus' chronological system:

> He assumed or provided a chronological framework of king lists and events which are fixed vertically and horizontally in time. He then left it to the reader to orientate himself. All of his Greek readers, from their general historical knowledge, would be able to find some event which they could fix relative to themselves as having taken place so many years or so many generations before their own time (e.g., "in the time of my grandfather") and, given the intricate network of chronological information in the *Histories*, would quickly develop a feel for the major temporal relationships if they did not already possess one. . . . The scheme is, in short, the system of the genealogists adapted to the theme of the Persian Wars.[76]

Lloyd is also wary about regarding synchronisms in the *Histories* as "part of a carefully devised plan." Rather he believes that "generally they are there because they arise from the narrative itself."[77] In this he agrees with F. Mitchel, who demonstrated that for the mythical period Herodotus' chronology seems to be "an integral part of the story itself."[78] The Scythian Campaign represents a variation of that pro-

[76] *Herodotus*, 1:184–185. The following sentence completes the citation: "This they would leave in terms of genealogical chronology or they could convert to years on the basis—Herodotus would hope—of the scheme 3 γενεαί = 100 years, though some would doubtless prefer a 25, 30 or 40 year generation."

[77] *Ibid.*, p. 183. See also Appendix to Chapter Five, section D: Herodotus' Chronology.

[78] "Herodotos' Use of Genealogical Chronology," *Phoenix* 10 (1956), 61.

cedure. For there a precise span of time is integral to the narrative itself: the success or failure, perhaps even the life or death of Dareios, hangs on those dubious sixty days. In short, any listener could easily fix Dareios' reign in relation to his own time by genealogical reckoning, with a greater or less degree of accuracy, depending on his own view of what constituted a generation. Within that reign, the length of which Herodotus records (7.4), he would have a relative chronology for the Scythian expedition. In addition, within the expedition itself he would know the duration of the most significant part of it—the time it took Dareios to recognize his limitations and retreat from Scythia and Europe. When one considers that the events in question took place in the late sixth century, it is as unrealistic for modern commentators to ask for more precision as it is preposterous to imagine that Herodotus' listeners required it. As Mitchel notes caustically, "The mania for accurate measurement of time is a modern development."[79]

To develop Mitchel's point and take it out of the realm of the caustic, in Chapter One I cited Châtelet's remarks about the limitations of the ancient historians, one of which was lack of chronological precision. He attributed it to "a different psychic makeup."[80] Châtelet continues: "the need to determine chronology precisely arises only at the moment when, conjointly, there is available a concept of time that renders such chronology indispensable and the intellectual tools that permit it to be practised effectively."[81] Event, chronology, and time are inextricably connected. This study began with the proposition that the event is a modern notion. And what it has attempted to demonstrate is that He-

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

[80] "Le temps de l'histoire et l'évolution de la fonction historienne," *Journal de psychologie* 53 (1956), 356.

[81] *Ibid.* For an excellent discussion of time in early Greek thought from Homer to Aeschylus, see H. Fränkel, "Die Zeitauffassung in der frühgriechischen Literatur" in *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens* (Munich, 1955), pp. 1-22.

rodotus did not isolate events in his narrative but rather saw and described process. Clearly, an historian who does not isolate events does not require or will not develop a scheme of chronology to date events, a scheme that includes exact years and days.

This is not to deny Herodotus, or Thucydides for that matter, a certain kind of concern for chronology. Both were deeply interested in beginnings and attempted to fix them with all the precision at their disposal. But the instances in which they specified a "calendar" year are few, and so familiar as to need no repeating.[82] Elsewhere chronology is relative and in modern terms vastly imprecise as to specifics, some of which are, also in modern terms, significant events indeed (for example, Brasidas' capture of Amphipolis or Dareios' bridging of the Bosporos). In addition, though neither historian sought consistently to establish points in time, both did indicate duration of time. For in recording process, they more often asked themselves the question how long rather than when. Thus the listener knows how long it took Dareios, the Great King, to meet his limits in Scythia. It is not known how long he spent on the march. Instead, Herodotus stresses his confidence, elation, and presumption. And this is as it should be, if he is not to detract from the massive preparations and unwieldy march of Xerxes, which he will describe in exquisite detail. In foreshadowing the great expedition against Greece, he has nonetheless directed his listeners to those essentials that will recur, to permanence amidst change. This kind of historiography does not require

[82] Compare M. Pohlenz, *Herodot, der erste Geschichtschreiber des Abendlandes* (Leipzig, 1937), pp. 198-199, who points out that Thucydides' method of dating by summers and winters was already used by his predecessor in dating Xerxes' campaign. Thucydides probably derived this system from him. Mitchel, "Herodotos' Use of Genealogical Chronology," p. 66, considers Herodotus' chronology for the Persian Wars "straight-forward" and "well-wrought." I would qualify this description, as I did Thucydides' similar "straightforward" scheme in Chapter Four. Herodotus' chronology for the Persian Wars is similarly relative and thus in modern terms quite imprecise.

an elaborate chronology but fulfils its purpose if the listener grasps its meaning.

Finally, it is possible to return to the term "symptomatic historiography." As we have analyzed the procedures of the historian, it has become clear that it is correct to see in the *Histories*, on the one hand, a "de-emphasis of the actual events," and on the other, a meaning that transcends events.[83] In addition, in our discussion of the modes of explanation employed by Herodotus, the conclusion reached was that it is quite mistaken to abstract types of causation from his narrative, for example, to distinguish political from "metaphysical" causes. As correct and natural as it may appear, it has nothing to do with the categories of Herodotus' mind. Such levels of causation, which are modern and so anachronistic, distort the fluidity both of the process of history itself and of the dynamic of that process, as Herodotus perceived it. The essence of the latter is the interplay of human motivation and superhuman forces, some form of necessity.[84] The subtleties of that dynamic have been demonstrated above, as well as the generalizations on which it is based.

Here it only remains to return to another proposition with which this study began, namely, that Herodotus also ren-

[83] See Appendix to Chapter Five, section A: Herodotus and Process.

[84] It will be seen that I agree with Immerwahr's original formulation in "Historical Action." I also believe that in "La vengeance comme explication" de Romilly underestimates the subtleties of Herodotus' explanatory procedures in the Scythian expedition, when she perceives "un sentiment nouveau" in the last three books of the *Histories* (p. 334). There, she believes, "la vengeance s'efface devant la réflexion politique" and "en effet, les analyses politiques se multiplient et l'on trouve de nombreuses pages qui déjà préparent Thucydide" (p. 330). In fact, the explanations found in the opening chapters of Book 7 approximate those used by Herodotus to explain the Scythian expedition. In addition, there may be in Book 7 realistic calculation, prevision, and appeals to οἰκότα, indicating an emphasis on deliberation. But, like expansionism, de Romilly's "causalité politique," they too are present in the Scythian *Logos*. The council of the Scythians and their neighbors is an excellent example of both prevision and realistic calculation. In other words, the movement of thought from Herodotus to Thucydides is not to be discerned in any one part of the *Histories*.

dered his narrative intelligible by the use of analogy. By analogy I am not referring to the obvious examples, but to a whole mode of reasoning. In *Polarity and Analogy* G.E.R. Lloyd discusses and documents the prevalence of analogy as a type of argumentation in Greek thought. He begins by stating that analogy "fulfils two roles . . . to provide explanations and to control reality."[85] In addition, he notes its use as a source of hypotheses in early Greek science, though he qualifies the latter as follows: "they were generally treated as not so much a source of preliminary hypotheses, as the basis and justification of definitive accounts."[86] It is clear that the example or analogy of Dareios' Scythian campaign fulfils one of the roles noted by Lloyd. In rendering Xerxes' greater expedition intelligible, it helps to explain it.[87] Indeed, to discern similarity, recurrence, and permanence in these two processes, or even to employ terms like prefiguration or anticipation is an acknowledgement that Herodotus' mode of reasoning was, in a very basic sense, analogical. Moreover, it is possible to go further and designate the function of analogy in the *Histories* as heuristic, a source of hypotheses. Such "hypotheses" I have preferred to term *generalizations*. That is to say, the generalizations that Herodotus brought with him to his researches into the Scythian expedition, and whereby ultimately he synthesized his data, are, in very large part, based on analogy.[88]

[85] P. 178.

[86] *Ibid.*, p. 382.

[87] Lloyd, *ibid.*, p. 387, cites Artabanos' argument from past experience (7.10) as an analogical one. Where the historians are concerned, he restricts himself to examples of this kind and does not discuss the implications of this mode of reasoning for the *Histories* as a whole.

[88] For further discussion of analogy see below, Chapter Six.

Six Historical Process and its Implications for Herodotus and Thucydides

Configuration

By now it must be apparent that, in discussing the process of history, as it is perceived by both historians, we have been dealing with the same configuration of generalizations. To be sure, each begins his work with a war. Herodotus will tell, *inter alia*, of the grievance on which account Greeks and barbarians warred against one another. Thucydides, in words that echo his predecessor, also designates his subject as war, the war fought by the Peloponnesians and Athenians. Succeeding generations have fixed on the words of the respective proems and accepted war as the central subject of the two histories, considering these works the prototypes of military history. In Herodotus' case, even if one ignores the simple, yet suggestive *inter alia* (τά τε ἄλλα), which includes the great and wondrous accomplishments among both peoples, it should be observed that the notion of the *aitie* itself is a superficial one. Abstracted as it is from what follows, it is not a true index of the depth and richness of the historian's account of the wars and their antecedents. In no sense should it be mistaken for the cause of the wars, with all that such a notion implies. The grievance is but the tip of the iceberg. As if aware of this, Herodotus moves swiftly, in the remainder of the proem, to a number of significant and recurrent themes: injustice and injustices (*adika erga*), beginnings, responsibility, and finally the instability of human happiness. He ends, and so begins, with Kroisos the Lydian, whom he designates as a tyrant. Before the *arche* of Kroisos, he affirms, all Greeks were free (6.3).

As for Thucydides, there is no doubt he narrows the scope of his history, making no mention of wondrous accomplish-

ments. Significantly, he chooses not to describe his work as an *apodexis* but as one set down in writing (ξυνέγραψε). He will have occasion to address the question of listening and the expectations of listeners, before whom Herodotus recited his *apodexis*, though no doubt he has in mind as well those listeners who delighted in the *epideixis*, the public, often gaudy, display of the sophists or rhetors. They may well be disappointed by the dearth of "stories." So be it . . . (1.22.4).[1] Again a narrowing. But also in the first chapter a

[1] See Immerwahr, "*Ergon*: History as a Monument in Herodotus and Thucydides," *AJP* 81 (1960), 268-269, n. 17, who distinguishes between the active of ἀποδεικνύναι and the middle "to produce publicly." *Apodexis*, he points out, "derives in all cases but one from the middle and means 'production.' " In this he follows H. Erbse, "Der erste Satz im Werke Herodots" in *Festschrift Bruno Snell* (Munich, 1956), pp. 209-211. Neither addresses the question what a "public production" of one's work entailed in Herodotus' day. Erbse consistently refers to readers. By contrast, see E. A. Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 53-54, n. 8, who believes: "the publication and dissemination of the prose word conformed at first to the previous rules set by the poetic. There is no immediate break in habits, no sudden emergence of a reading public. The term *apodexis* in the proem to Herodotus surely implies oral publication . . . in the traditional epic manner, serving the epic purposes defined in the remainder of the sentence. . . . Protagoras published orally (D. L. 9.54) and the practice is continued by Isocrates (cf. *Antid.* init.)." The *apodexis* of Herodotus' *Histories* was, in the first instance, a reading in public, though without the negative connotations that came to attach themselves to the *epideixis*. For the latter as a method of instruction used by the sophists, see W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 3 (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 41-44. He specifically cites Thucydides as evidence for the nature of these gatherings (p. 41), noting that Kleon "accuses the Athenian assembly of behaving 'more like the audience at Sophists' displays than a serious deliberative body' (Thuc. 3.38.7)." I believe that Guthrie is correct when he states as well, p. 43: "Thucydides is contrasting himself with the Sophists when he says that his own work is not intended as a 'competition-piece for a single occasion' but a possession for all time." Thucydides also contrasts himself with poets and logographers at chapter 21.1. Both here and at chapter 22.4 he mentions listening, in the latter instance admitting frankly that his work is unadorned with stories. In so doing, he must be contrasting his history with that of Herodotus. In fact, I would go so far as to suggest that Thucydides considers his work "a possession for all time" rather than "a competition-piece" to be heard on a single occasion because it is a work composed, perhaps

phrase that approximates Herodotus' *inter alia* (1.3, ἐς τὰ ἄλλα). Moving in the sphere of superlatives—a war more worthy of note than those that preceded it, protagonists at their peak in all manner of preparation—Thucydides arrives at the *kinesis*. He will tell of a disturbance of unprecedented scope, affecting not just the Greeks but most of mankind. Again significantly, the term "disturbance" will recur in his description and analysis of *stasis*. The entire Hellenic world, he states, was ultimately shaken to its foundations by *stasis* (3.82.1). The *kinesis* in its magnitude indicates a subject that goes beyond war to the dire effects of war. For the *kinesis* is a disturbance threatening civilization itself. Thus it is not surprising that Thucydides turns in chapter 2 to the history of civilization, a past in which nothing attained the magnitude of the contemporary. It is at this juncture that he mentions wars and other matters. The Archaeology, which follows, is as much about other matters as wars. It concerns sea power, subject cities, colonies, revenues, and *dynamis*, the acquisition of which follows more basic achievements, and represents a peak of civilization. In a word, it concerns *arche* and its concomitants, collective achievement, the *stolos*, and finally war.

The central subject of the two histories is thus broader than the wars in which several generations of Greeks fought. That both historians begin with war conforms to their listeners' or readers' understanding of their own past, based either on tradition or on experience.[2] What both address,

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perforce in exile, for the eye, and thus for reading rather than listening. In this I agree with Havelock, *ibid.*, who describes Book 1.22.4 as a "self-conscious contrast," which "surely identifies the permanent influence of a MS stylistically composed for readers, as against the more ephemeral effects of a composition designed for recitation at an oral 'competition.' " See also Appendix to Chapter Five, section B: Herodotus, Literacy, and Oral Presentation.

[2] See E. A. Havelock, "War as a Way of Life in Classical Culture," *Valeurs antiques et temps modernes,* The Vanier Lectures, 1970-1971, ed. E. Gareau (Ottawa, 1972), pp. 15-78. Havelock stresses the immense influence of Homer on the composition of both histories and on the preoccupation of the historians with war. He himself attempts to uncover in both "an ideological

however, is the problems and dangers endemic in *arche*. And what both see in the past, as well as in the present, is a total process, beginning in some form of unity or unification and followed by development and growth to the point of control over others. This is *arche*, with its inherent tendency to expansion in the quest for more peoples, more revenues, more *dynamis*. Ultimately, this tendency results in unfettered *pleonexia*, which in turn leads to injustice, as the *despotes*, on the one hand, the city, on the other, seeks to enslave people who have done no wrong and in the end aspires to the conquest of the whole world. For by this point both *despotes* and city have a tyrant's nature and will not be deterred by rational calculations or warnings. They are full of presumption, self-deception, and covetous desires. They embark on a *strateia* or *stolos* of unprecedented magnitude against a distant land, a separate continent, for example, or a large, unknown island. This far-off land, about which they have many misconceptions, soon produces dangers of its own for the *stolos*. What seemed at the outset a virtue, bigness, becomes a weakness, for it turns the terrain itself into an enemy. Like all great expeditions far from home they face a problem of supplies: they are forced to divert their attention from warfare itself to the procuring of resources of all kinds. Even the most basic of necessities, food (*trophe*), becomes scarce: they live off the land, at times barely above the level of nomads. Meanwhile, the people against whom they have directed the *strateia* do not remain inactive. Though racked by ignorance, disbelief, strife, and disunity, they attempt to thwart the *stolos*. Out of the need to defend themselves, the most success-

framework inherited from epic" (p. 37). At one point he states, "Behind this arrrangement of Thucydides' narrative we can discern that plan of composition adopted by Herodotus and ultimately derived from Homer" (p. 55). It is surely reasonable to accept the view that Homer's grand theme, and the continuing popularity of the epic, influenced the historians. This in itself would serve to explain the choice of words in their respective proems, which mention wars within the first few lines, even though the subject of both works is much broader.

ful achieve a new unity, a *koinon* of Hellenes, one Hellas, a *koinon* of Sicilians, one Sicily. But in successfully defeating the aggressor, the defender may, like Cyrus, become in turn the aggressor, as the process begins anew. Herodotus remains silent about Athens' future. If a warning is intended, it resides in the *Histories* as a whole. It is, however, at this very point that Thucydides begins his *History*, briefly "digressing" into the past to describe how the Athenians acquired their *arche* and the *dynamis* that produced fear in the Lakedaimonians (1.97.2 and 118.2). From a simple *koinon* they reached a high point of civilization (89.1, ηὐξήθησαν), the kind of peak achieved by others before them and adumbrated in the Archaeology. Even within this fifty-year period or *Pentekontaetia*, which Thucydides calls a "digression," the Athenian *arche* has already been guilty of enslaving autonomous Greeks (98.4, the city of the Naxians). It has already launched a *megale strateia* against Egypt, an expedition represented by Thucydides as just short of total disaster (110). It has provoked its allies and produced such hatred in its subjects and such fear in the Lakedaimonians that the latter, reluctantly, begin the first ten-year war. These are but some of the problems and dangers to which *arche* gives rise, as they emerge from Book 1 of the *History*.

In short, the central subject of both histories is identical, as is the configuration of generalizations that constitute process, and that together produce a synthesis.[3]

Dynamic

If we move beyond the central subject of the two histories, it is clear that we have begun to identify basic similarities in

[3] Compare F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London, 1907), p. 237: "In the course of this study the conviction has been growing upon us that the comparisons commonly made between Thucydides and Herodotus are based on false assumptions and misleading." Cornford makes his own comparison, the groundwork for the kind of interpretation offered in the present study.

methodology between Herodotus and Thucydides. Take, for instance, the notion of process itself. It is the key to their works, and so to the *differentiae* of ancient historical narrative. As a method of synthesizing data, it is not linear, but cumulative, with links forward and backward connecting one passage, in fact one stage of process, to another. Process is also not a causal sequence. In order to describe its movement and change, for which the historians had no technical vocabulary, we have consistently had to employ terms like release and unleash. Process then unfolds. The implications of this kind of movement must be self-evident. Release implied something to be released. The links between stages, which in some instances represent a kind of chain reaction, indicate movement that is all but self-generating. The unfolding of process thus implies self-propulsion. Process, it has been noted, "must run its course." In a word, its end is inevitable.

If we take all of these attributes of process together, we are led to a series of questions. What or who releases or unleashes the stages of process? In particular, what begins it? What in fact is released? Where is it propelled, as it unfolds? If it continues at full force, where or when does it end? Can anything or anyone stop it? Note that, in posing these questions, we have avoided the word cause. This is done with the aim of replicating the thought process of the ancient historians, who similarly did not enquire into causes. Rather they asked about beginnings. What or who begins the process? Once unleashed, what stages does it go through? Where does it end? To answer these questions is to understand how Herodotus and Thucydides perceived, explained, and described movement and change. It is to understand the dynamic of process.

Having identified these general similarities, let us go a step further and particularize them. If the two historians asked themselves the same questions about the past, and the present, did they also provide similar answers? In other words, how closely do their modes of explanation approximate one

another? In the absence of the modern notion of causation, we concluded, Thucydides used the concepts of *physis* and *tyche* to explain how the process of disintegration began. There was also a third concept, necessity, which dictated the way in which the process unfolds. Of Herodotus, we stated that it is mistaken to search in his narrative for types of causation, which are not expressive either of the process of history itself or of the dynamic of that process, as he perceived it. What brings about movement and change in his *Histories* is the interplay of human motivation and superhuman forces, some form of necessity. Again a remarkable similarity, and one that begins to indicate that the ancient historians were dependent on the same "paradigm," to use T. S. Kuhn's terminology.[4] Again it is possible to go further and isolate the ways in which, in both historians, the dynamic of process is similar. First, their greatest concern is psychology or human behavior. For it is at the psychological level that release occurs. At the same time, some kind of superhuman force or forces usually play a role in this release. And finally, the process that is set in motion has an inherent necessity: it is inevitable.

If one proceeds to study more closely these similarities, this interplay of human behavior and superhuman forces, it soon becomes apparent that Herodotus and Thucydides have a somewhat different perception of the movement of history. Dependent though they were on the same paradigm, that does not preclude some measure of difference, or of cognitive and conceptual development from one to the other. Such difference is to be perceived at the level of the dynamic of process. For Thucydides, in addressing himself to the same central subject and in employing the same configuration of generalizations, confers a new life on them. In order to isolate this difference and development, let us begin with the

[4] For the definition of paradigm, see T. S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1970), and see too his "The Relations Between History and History of Science" in *Historical Studies Today*, ed. F. Gilbert and S. R. Graubard (New York, 1971), pp. 159-192.

simple proposition that both historians worked with a fairly static body of generalizations about human behavior. How does each employ these generalizations?

Motivation, we noted, is the central feature of Herodotus' explanatory procedures. In the first instance, he explains events at the psychological level. One might even deem the generalizations he employs a species of *topoi*, for they represent widely held and, for the most part, negative beliefs about the nature of the tyrant or *despotes*. (Herodotus uses the two terms interchangeably of the eastern kings.) His concern then is the psychology and behavior of the individual *despotes*. At times he may depict a personality, for example, that of Dareios, as a blend of deception, cruelty, generosity, and intelligence. Or he may employ the negative archetype of the tyrant, depicting the ruler, in this case, Cambyses, as suspicious, overbearing, and totally impervious to reason. In his narrative, Herodotus focuses on the moods, feelings, and responses of the *despotes*. Somehow the ruler is motivated—at times persuaded, challenged, or provoked—to expand his realm. Until he is so motivated, the tendency to expansion inherent in *arche* must remain latent. Through him the tendency becomes active. The *despotes* then experiences in his own person the problems endemic in *arche*, for he must add more to his realm. But in the quest for more he courts danger, and a personal reversal, by embarking on a *stolos*. Usually, he has reason enough, some *aitie*, a grievance that in his own eyes requires retaliation. Vengeance is thus added to the complex of urges motivating him. It aids in releasing the inherent tendency of *arche*, experienced in his person as the desire for conquest. Once released, however, the urge to expand and conquer becomes obsessive and ends in unfettered *pleonexia*, as the *despotes* directs his *stolos* against guilty and innocent alike. He commits injustice. The individual *despotes* thus represents the interplay of human behavior and necessity. The latter we termed a superhuman force because in the *Histories* it is possible to perceive the divine at work. The gods, who put it into the head of the *despotes* to covet others'

land, to seek vengeance, to expand, and finally to commit injustice, also ensure that the aggressor experiences retaliation. They, together with some "primitive opponent," a young and vigorous people, bring about his reversal.

Thucydides is also concerned with human behavior, though his perception of it has undergone certain transformations. In the first place, he is as much concerned with collective as with individual psychology. His analysis thus centers on the mass of mankind and its emotions and responses, which are an expression of *anthropeia physis*.[5] Secondly, in place of a single individual, the *despotes*, he studies the *polis*. He views it as a sentient organism, which may flourish in health as one vital body, or which may experience disease and division, one part opposing another.[6] Thirdly, *tyche* as a force inflicts

[5] Thucydides does, of course, focus on individuals and makes some effort to portray them with distinctive traits of character. See, for example, H. D. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge, 1968); D. P. Tompkins, "Stylistic Characterization in Thucydides: Nicias and Alcibiades," *YCS* 22 (1972), 181-214; and W. E. Thompson, "Individual Motivation in Thucydides," *C&M* 30 (1974), 158-174. But the backdrop for individual behavior and so individual psychology remains the city, the repository of collective psychology. Individuals advise, persuade, or deter the Athenians. Some, like Pericles, may have the ability to hold the collective together, leading "the city as a whole" and understanding its collective needs. Others, like Kleon and Alkibiades, motivated by private or personal concerns, appeal to one group within the city against another and so divide the collective. See above, Chapter Four, for an analysis of Book 2.65, a passage in which Thucydides reveals most clearly his attitude toward individuals and their role *vis-à-vis* the collective, his deep concern for the collective (*to koinon*), and his interest in collective psychology. Compare de Romilly, "Les problèmes de politique intérieure dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide," in *Historiographia Antiqua* (Louvain, 1977), pp. 77-78.

[6] For the use of analogies between the state and the living being, see G.E.R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy. Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought* (Cambridge, 1966), p. 295: "Not only was the cosmos sometimes represented as a state, or a living organism, but the state in turn was frequently compared with a living being in Greek political theories, and conversely the living organism is often described in the medical writers as a complex consisting of opposing forces or factions." It would go beyond the scope of this study to determine who precisely influenced Thucydides in his choice of this image. Certainly, it was already in use in his day, as it continued to be used by both Plato and Aristotle (Lloyd, *ibid.*, n. 1). Com-

shocks on this political organism. Such shocks are destructive enough in times of health, when some recovery can be expected. They are devastating when the city is weakened by division or *stasis*, which is a kind of disease. A *syntychia* then can release all the negative aspects of human nature, even those once kept in control and directed to positive achievements by good laws, fine institutions, and intelligent, farsighted leadership. Finally, if this point of sickness is ever reached, one part of the organism, a group of individuals motivated by self-interest, a faction, leads in the destruction of the whole. Often they appeal to the majority with shibboleths and designs of one sort or another. Some, perhaps all, may respond, if the necessary controls over human nature have been relaxed. This is especially the case if war has intensified life's hardships. The body struggles within itself, one part perpetrating barbarities on another in total disregard of law, tradition, and religion. For the city at the peak of civilization this affliction, in which *tyche* has a part, takes the form of bad decisions. The city acts in anger and greed. Urged on by demagogues and groups motivated by self-interest, it becomes a tyrant. It is capricious and cruel to those subject cities that seek their autonomy through revolt. *Pleonexia* unfettered, the city courts disaster, by seeking to expand its *arche* through conquest. In the end, it experiences loss and reversal in a massive *stolos*.

Here is the Herodotean configuration given a different perspective, the Herodotean dynamic transformed. One difference is Thucydides' concept of the *polis*, and particularly his image of the city as a living being. Using the analogy of

pare de Romilly, "Alcibiade et le mélange entre jeunes et vieux: politique et médecine," *WS* 89 (1976), 93-105, who discusses the influence of medical thought on political theory. She gives many interesting examples from the literature of the fourth century, especially Plato. See pp. 97-98: "Or cette unité profonde, cette collaboration vivante rapproche le bien de l'État de la santé d'un homme. . . . Inversement, tout excès en politique correspond à une maladie de l'État. . . . Plus nettement encore, la division représente une maladie: un État divisé est un État malsain; la moindre intervention du dehors peut précipiter en lui la maladie (République, 556e)." All three statements are based on Plato.

the plague, which he had himself perceived and even experienced, Thucydides introduced *stasis* into the historical process as a disruptive force that would in the end shake the entire Hellenic world to its foundations. *Stasis* was as destructive to life in the *polis* as it had been to civilization in the past, where it had brought about regress and decline. In addition, Thucydides saw *tyche* as an historical force that, through surprises and blows, unhinged men's *psyche*, at some times casting them down to despair, at others raising them to heights of elation.[7] In either case, *tyche* produced instability in the political body. Here then, in the *polis*, in *stasis*, and in *tyche*, which in their interplay produce change, resides the major difference between Herodotus and Thucydides. Hence the latter can take on a task more formidable than his predecessor, who described the behavior of an individual, the Great King and tyrant, and explained how he met his limits. At some point Thucydides must have posed to himself the following, rather complex question. It concerned the *polis*, an institution that he, like Herodotus before him, viewed as synonymous with civilization. How did a city of free men, renowned for their creative energies and initiative and their unique political system, the victorious city of Marathon and Salamis; how did the democratic city of the Athenians, which represented the highest point of civilization known to man; how did such a city meet its limits and descend from its peak? Rejecting the impulse of a jealous god, Thucydides had to bring some new forces into play. He also had to reflect very carefully on man, collective man, and his nature. The result is a new use of pre-existing concepts, and thus a conceptual development that afforded him the intellectual tools adequate to explain Athens' descent.

In a word, it is at the level of explanation that this study proposes a new relationship between Herodotus and Thucydides. For the difference between them resides in the way

[7] See Appendix to Chapter Six, section A: *Tyche* in Thucydides' *History*. Again Compare Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, chap. 13, "The Tragic Passions."

they perceived movement and change, that is, in the dynamic of process.

Time, Process, and Explanation

Event, chronology, and time, we observed, are inextricably connected. So far, however, we have not dealt with time at all but merely with chronology, and the chronological imprecision of the two historians noted by modern commentators. Once again the concept of process holds the key to their outlook, and so to these perceived limitations. For example, it is not possible to argue, particularly in the case of Thucydides, that their lack of interest in chronology *per se*, which resulted in a lack of concern for precise dates, has a technological explanation. They did not lack procedures for the measurement of time, that is, a "form of graphic record," such as a calendar, which is a prerequisite of accurate chronology.[8] Rather, it is a question of "a different psychic makeup," which has at its disposal appropriate, though also different, intellectual tools. In the past, and in the present, both historians saw process and the repetition of process, the important stages of which they described with more or less emphasis. Thus they did not isolate events but left them embedded within a process, links, as it were, in a chain of movement that unfolds with a kind of self-propulsion. Clearly, if they saw no need to isolate events, they also had no need for a scheme of chronology that would permit them to date events precisely, by days, or even by hours. And to be sure, both historians eschewed calendars and calendar dates, though such were available to them. Both employed a relative chronology, based on generations or natural units like years and seasons. Their method of dating thus represents not a chronological scheme in the modern sense but an interest in relative time within a meaningful process.

Attempts to grasp the nature of time itself in the ancient

[8] Goody, *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* (Cambridge, 1977), p. 45.

historians have led some to make a distinction between chronological and logical time.[9] The formulation originates with V. Goldschmidt and relates to philosophic thought and the architecture of a philosophic work. To speak of time in respect of the structure of a work, Goldschmidt observes, is to speak metaphorically, for such time is strictly methodological time. It is a time fixed in the structure of the work, like the time of a musical score.[10]

The distinction between chronological and logical time is an interesting one, which may explain some of the peculiarities noted in the passages studied in this work. For the notion of logical time offers a clue to the understanding of that timeless quality that was noted as a characteristic of Herodotus' narrative of both the Ethiopian and the Scythian Campaigns. For example, Dareios' sixty days in Scythia are as one, undisturbed even by the temporal or sequential connectives that loosely hold together the Ethiopian *Logos*. Instead, the details of the campaign are held together by a series of participles and temporal clauses. Chronological time is of no moment, just as the connection between this campaign and those that precede and follow is thematic rather than chronological. As far as strict chronology goes, neither the Ethiopian Campaign nor Thucydides' Archaeology is really very

[9] See I. Meyerson, "Le temps, la mémoire, l'histoire," *Journal de psychologie* 53 (1956), 340: "La succession des faits est logique chez Thucydide. . . . Le temps de Thucydide n'est pas chronologique: c'est, si l'on peut dire ainsi, un temps logique." Vidal-Naquet, "Temps des dieux et temps des hommes. Essai sur quelques aspects de l'expérience temporelle chez les Grecs," *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 157 (1960), 69, also believes that Thucydides was acquainted with two kinds of time, "un temps logique opposé à un temps historique." Both cite de Romilly's work as having demonstrated that the time of Thucydides' narrative is logical. Or as Meyerson, *ibid.*, describes it: "le récit d'une bataille est une théorie, comme le remarque avec penetration Mme de Romilly, et la victoire est un raisonnement vérifié. Le monde de Thucydide est un monde repensé, et son histoire une dialectique agie."

[10] "Temps historique et temps logique dans l'interprétation des systèmes philosophiques," in *Actes du XIe Congrès international de philosophie* (Bruxelles), (Amsterdam and Louvain, 1953), vol. 12, p. 10.

different from the Scythian Campaign—or more precise. The former is held together by adverbs such as "afterwards," "next," "straightway," etc., and the latter by connectives like "long ago," "later," "before the Trojan War," and "after the events at Troy." Neither historian establishes a fixed point to which these connectives relate. And while it is possible that Thucydides assumed in his readers a knowledge of the date of the fall of Troy, and thus did establish an epochal date, still it is not the fixed point in a chronological scheme. For many of the "events" before and after the Trojan War have no dates at all: they are relative to one another. Indeed, the first few chapters of the Archaeology, describing what happened "long ago," are quite timeless. Similarly, though the Ethiopian *Logos* does have a number of temporal connectives within it, there is no indication of exactly when the expedition began, when it ended, or how long it lasted. It merely took place some time after Cambyses' *strateia* against Amasis.

We are dealing here, for the most part, not with chronology, but with the structure of the narrative. No discourse, whether philosophical, rhetorical, or historical, explodes all at once. Truth does not emerge altogether, at a single stroke, but in stages, gradually, "that is to say, in different times and at different levels."[11] Such "times" and "levels" are also characteristic of historical discourse. If the three examples cited above are viewed from this perspective, it will be seen that we are dealing with logical rather than chronological time. Indeed, I would extend the argument and state that logical time is characteristic of Thucydides' *History* in general. For instance, it is true that Thucydides does record the year, the season, and even the part of a season, and he does employ many temporal connectives, which we viewed as a kind of relative chronology. The latter, however, are most imprecise and often serve little more than to bring order to the narrative. Or, as de Romilly notes, "Simple chronolog-

[11] Goldschmidt, *ibid.*, p. 12.

ical juxtaposition constitutes a time sequence which is both coherent and comprehensible."[12] Drama too and "raisonnement vérifié" give Thucydides' narrative a logic of its own. But so does process, which subsumes drama and reasoning, and which in its unfolding dictates order and structure. It has both a logical and a chronological time. Furthermore, the logic of process renders chronological precision in the sense of exact dates meaningless. These remarks apply equally to Herodotus' work, which has, to begin with, a much looser chronological framework than Thucydides'. Logical time is often the only kind of time in many of his *Logoi*. For they are totally devoid of chronology.[13]

The concept of logical time, for all it is a valuable one, does not lead to an understanding of the historians' concept of time itself. What is the nature of historical time, as both Herodotus and Thucydides perceived it? Many, for instance, have had the temerity to suggest that the Greeks did not have a linear, but a cyclic, view of time. In answer, their opponents have submitted their arguments to a *reductio ad absurdum*, ending with "the squirrel cage of hopeless cycles."[14] The result is a simplification—a choice between cycle and line, seemingly mutual opposites. But is it really so simple? Let us consider briefly the notion of cyclic time as it appears

[12] *Histoire et raison chez Thucydide* (Paris, 1956), p. 46.

[13] Originally I had not intended to deal with the distinction between logical and chronological time, since the bibliography seemed somewhat dated. On the other hand, the distinction has not made its way into current discussions of Thucydides or Herodotus. (It is rejected summarily by O. Luschnat, *Thukydides, der Historiker, RE*, suppl. 12 [Stuttgart, 1971], 1145.) My resolution was altered in the midst of a spirited discussion of Chapter One with James Day of Vassar College. The chronology of the Archaeology, as abstracted from the text in note 45, reminded him of the adverbial connectives found in an oration or a Platonic dialogue. He believed that such connectives in Thucydides are not necessarily chronological, but logical—or some mixture of the two. In an instant he had perceived Goldschmidt's distinction. The point thus seemed worth pursuing.

[14] Chester Starr, "Historical and Philosophical Time," *History and Theory*, suppl. 6 (1966) p. 28. Compare Momigliano, "Time in Ancient Historiography" in the same supplement.

in the works of some of the scholars already cited. I. Meyerson, for example, states the following: "Neither Herodotus, nor Thucydides, nor Polybius saw the entire course of human events as a linear sequence, indefinite, irreversible, and non-recurrent. In all three one finds the concept, dominant in Antiquity, of the cyclic course of men's actions and men's destinies."[15] Vidal-Naquet is somewhat more cautious, suggesting that the notion of cyclic time is often presented "in a superficial and hasty manner."[16] After posing a number of sensible questions, as well as introducing some new subtleties, he ends with the statement: "Pessimism is already noticeable in Thucydides. It is with him that the idea of cycle reappears in history."[17] Châtelet too is clear enough in his view that the ancients thought in terms of repetitive cycles, a circularity which, he believes, is connected with the nature of the *kosmos*. Though he also adds a caveat, he concedes that he does not have the space to devote to the "nuances indispensables," which are possible and necessary. He merely points out: "It is a question here of a general conception among the Greeks. Nevertheless, it remains the case that it embraces a wide diversity of notions and that, even, certain texts imply the idea of partial rectilinearity."[18] A suggestive statement, but it is not this line of thought that Châtelet follows. Rather he looks at a particular aspect of historical time that manifests itself in Thucydides' *History*: it is defined first as "temps de l'homme profane."[19] Hence, historical time is "un temps d'intelligibilité."[20] Though this is only one aspect, a first aspect, of historical time, it is a valuable formulation. It remains, nonetheless, a first aspect of historical time.

It is not "le temps de l'homme profane" I propose to dis-

[15] "Le temps, la mémoire, l'histoire," pp. 338-339.
[16] "Temps des dieux," p. 55.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 80.
[18] "Le temps de l'histoire," p. 363, and note 1 *ad locum*.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 360.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 361.

cuss here in the quest for the nature of historical time, but another side of Châtelet's work, and its implications for historical time. Châtelet ends his analysis of Thucydides by stating that neither the concept of "la réalité profane de l'homme" nor the introduction of "likely connections" in the narrative is sufficient to ensure the development of scientific historical thought: "It is still necessary to regard time as a universal medium where actual events follow one another irreversibly, events of which the chronological determination is essential to the truth of the discourse; the idea of the absolute novelty of each moment must be grasped."[21] This concept of time and the notion of the event, with which it is closely connected, did not develop in the ancient world. In order to find the first genuine formulation of such a concept of time Châtelet turns to Christian thought, as expressed in Augustine's *City of God*. There he discovers a continuity and an irreversible succession of events: "For repetition, it substitutes novelty; in opposition to future decline, and to the power of irrationality inherent in that future, it postulates the order of time wherein each moment, from the beginning, generates the following moment. That moment not only supports but also goes beyond the one that preceded."[22] In his later essay on history in *La philosophie des sciences sociales* Châtelet holds steadily to this point of view, seeing in Augustine's work unity and totality, time which has a direction. Earlier he merely stated that the event is a modern notion, connected with a particular concept of time: now he can locate the event in time: "It is precisely through this fissure that *the event* enters. It should be pointed out here that the analysis of the *City of God* lays the foundation of the gentle positivism of Seignobos."[23]

What we are doing here is approaching the question from

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 364.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 369-370.

[23] "L'Histoire," in *Histoire de la philosophie, idées, doctrines*, ed. F. Châtelet, vol. 7, *La philosophie des sciences sociales (de 1860 à nous jours)* (Paris, 1973), p. 213.

the opposite direction, in the attempt to arrive at an understanding of what is lacking in the ancient concept of historical time. It does not imply continuity, movement in one direction, or irreversibility. It is not a succession of unique events emerging from the continuous "flow of time" and "indiscriminately" comprised by chronological time, in the sense that "all events in the history of a people, a nation, or a civilization which take place at a given moment are supposed to occur then and there for reasons bound up, somehow, with that moment. Historians usually establish meaningful relationships, causal or otherwise, between successive groups of events, tracing the chronologically later ones to those preceding them."[24] These words describe the procedures of the modern historian. Indeed, we could go even further and attempt to locate the origins of this kind of history with its own particular concept of time and its massive concern for strict chronology, by returning briefly to Meyerson. The latter also discusses Augustine, and then moves forward to Hume and Ranke and the beginnings of scientific history. Hume he compares in many respects to Thucydides. The similarities of the two are indeed striking. But the differences should not be underestimated. They reside in the concept of time itself and in the attitude to chronology and the event. One of the principles Hume accepted was the linearity of historical time. In addition: "Hume is concerned about chronology and dates events carefully. He notes the important dates."[25]

Event, chronology and time, to repeat, are inextricably connected. But it is a certain concept of time, the heritage of Augustine, and a certain kind of chronology, made possible by all the techniques developed for dating events from Hume's day right to the present, the techniques of scientific history. In addition, another concept has crept in—"causal" relationships, the preoccupation of that same scientific his-

[24] S. Kracauer, "Time and History," *History and Theory*, suppl. 6 (1966) p. 66.

[25] "Le temps, la mémoire, l'histoire," p. 345.

tory. In fact, we can now enlarge the previous statement: event, chronology, time, and cause are inextricably connected. Here is the paradigm of modern scientific history, with its critical method, concern for objectivity, and, in imitation of the natural sciences, its search for causes and ultimately laws. A modern commentator has aptly criticized Hume's billiard ball mentality.[26] The billiard ball, it seems to me, is wonderfully expressive of the nature of event-oriented history. Events, precisely dated and linked in a sequence by chronology, have the same isolated quality as billiard balls. And the search for causes is sometimes just as mechanical as the clash of one billiard ball against another. But causes there must be to lend significance to the choice of events, and to show why some are more important than others. What in fact this represents is taking one's starting-point from history's *superficies*, and attempting to reestablish in a very formal, often artificial manner those very connections, that integrity, which the notion of the event destroys. We have returned to the world of Langlois and Seignobos. In discussing their advice to the historian, however, we also noted the views of early critics, whose concern was synthesis. Today it is possible to say that, as a result of their criticisms and those of their followers, history has experienced a reorientation, brought about by a change of paradigm. A look at some of these critics and their views of history will reveal that those views have a heuristic value in the quest for the ancient concept of historical time. They will indicate the way out of the *cul-de-sac* of cycle versus line.

F. Simiand's "Méthode historique et science sociale," published in *Revue de Synthèse historique* in 1903, preceded Henri Berr's book by almost a decade.[27] Like the latter it is a critique of Seignobos and "traditional" history. What Simiand is seeking is a new methodology, a way of organizing knowledge to substitute for what he terms "les cadres" and

[26] L. Althusser, "Elements of Self-Criticism" in *Essays in Self-Criticism*, trans. G. Lock (London, 1976), p. 127, n. 3.

[27] Reprinted in *Annales* 15 (1960), 83-119.

ultimately the "idoles de la tribu des historiens."[28] These are the "political idol," the "individual idol," and the "chronological idol." Of "le cadre chronologique" he states, "this method of organization, rough and empirical as it is, still weighs tiresomely, as we shall have occasion to see, on the procedures of current historical work."[29] He becomes more precise:

> The chronological idol leads consequently to a consideration of every epoch as equally important, to a conception of history as an uninterrupted reel in which every sequence is equally significant, to an inability to perceive that such and such a period is more characteristic, more important than another, that such and such a "crucial" phenomenon merits a searching study, while elsewhere insignificant repetitions of a known phenomenon constitute only sterile material, fruitless to develop; it consists, in short, in regarding every fact, every moment as indifferently worthy of study, and as susceptible to the same study.[30]

Simiand believes that traditional history's picture of reality is a sheer illusion. In place of it he proposes new "explanatory groupings" and an attempt to understand "the real relations of succession."[31]

Clearly, the notion of event-oriented history and with it the whole paradigm developed in and accepted by the nineteenth century is being dealt a severe blow. Nowhere is the result of this blow, and of those that were to follow, more evident than in F. Braudel's "History and the Social Sciences," published in *Annales* fifty-five years later.[32] It con-

[28] P. 117. The metaphor is Bacon's.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 118. He is especially critical of the concern with origins, which takes the place of the study and understanding first of "le *type* normal."

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 119.

[32] From *Economy and Society in Early Modern Europe. Essays from Annales*, pp. 11-42 (also in *Annales* 13 [1958], 725-753).

cerns history and time periods, the multiplicity of time, and the opposition between the instant and the long-term (*la longue durée*). Traditional history, which devotes itself to the short-term, the individual, and the event, produces "sudden, dramatic, breathless narrative."[33] For the event, Braudel points out, is explosive and blinding. Hence the time of the event, the short-term, is, above all, the time of chroniclers and journalists. It is "the most capricious and deceptive form of time."[34] One reason is that an event can acquire a whole host of associations. Thus, "as a result of the artificial (or genuine) game of 'cause' and 'effect,' so dear to the historians of the past, it can dominate a time period far beyond its own bounds."[35] The short-term, a year or a day, Braudel believes, may be an appropriate unit for the political historian of the past, but certain phenomena need other, larger units of measurement. He mentions a price curve or a demographic progression. Both are indicators of a new kind of narrative history, "the 'narrative' of the 'conjuncture,' the cycle or even the 'intercycle'; it offers us a choice of periods—decade, quarter-century and, at the outside, the half-century of Kondratieff's classic cycle."[36] Braudel speaks of levels, levels of historical time that can be grasped if one begins with "this concept of depth and semi-immobility; that is the centre around which everything revolves."[37] Finally, Braudel also discusses "unconscious history," that is, the history of the unconscious forms of social life, which he contrasts with event-oriented history:

> Men have always had the impression that the passage of time as lived by them is gained as things happen from day to day. Is not such conscious, clear history inadequate, as many historians have now long thought? Only

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

> yesterday linguists believed that everything could be learned from words. History had the illusion it could learn everything from events. . . . Unconscious history proceeds along ways that lie far beyond these flashes of light. Let us admit, then, that there is such a thing as social unconsciousness lying some way away from us.[38]

This unconscious history he relates to "conjunctural" time and to "structural" time. Braudel himself would proceed not just from the surface of history to its depths, but "from the event to the structures and models back to the event."[39]

Braudel is, of course, just one of a group, whose diverse interests range from "the quantitative history of *conjonctures*" to the "more subtle history of mentalities."[40] One other representative of the *Annales* "circle" deserves mention here—Lucien Febvre. Febvre was an exponent of total history, the "whole life" of an age or a region. This means a concern with economics, religion, politics, geography, in a word, with areas formerly set off in distinct compartments or disciplines. Braudel, repeating a statement of Febvre's, asks

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[40] G. G. Iggers, *New Directions in European Historiography* (Middletown, Conn., 1975), p. 67. See Chapter 2, "The *Annales* Tradition—French Historians in Search of a Science of History." Compare Châtelet, "L'Histoire," p. 232, where he states, in the midst of a discussion of historians in the *Annales* tradition: "En refusant aussi bien l'événement que la loi, la chronique que la sociologie, ils indiquent qu'ils sont hors de la triste problématique de 'l'événement' ou du navrant repérage chronologique; ils s'efforcent—pour éclairer le présent—de restaurer l'opacité des pratiques passées, dans leur diversité." This essay is an excellent *addendum* to Châtelet's earlier work on time. The event he now associates with a Cartesian perspective, p. 235: "il y avait des *faits*, datés et localisés, qui étaient produits ou recueillis par des agents conscients et qui pouvaient être compris par des enterprètes savants. Or, la pratique historienne prouve qu'il n'y a rien de tel: il y a des réseaux de connaissance . . . il y a des sociétés qui, selon leur problème, s'arrangent à produire des discours rassurants (ou déconcertants). Pour dire la même chose autrement, l'événement n'est pas de l'ordre de la *conscience* (une ou des consciences passées qu'une ou des consciences-connaissances actuelles feraient revenir comme témoin): il est *irruption*." Châtelet's italics.

with approval, "Is not history, as the dialectics of duration, in its own way an explanation of the total reality of social life?"[41]

How are the ideas of Simiand, Braudel, Febvre, and others, and their approach to history, relevant in the quest for the ancient concept of historical time? First, what this new paradigm represents is a perception of the limitations of the short-term, and with it a rejection of the event as the central focus of history. It seeks out recognizable, often quantifiable, patterns, conjunctures and cycles, long- and short-term movements that interact and intersect. More important, it sees history not as the chronological retelling of events but as the understanding of a totality of interrelated structures or levels. Totality and interrelationship are key concepts. For I would contend that the perception of totality and interrelationships is characteristic of ancient historiography. The concern for moments in a flow of time that has a direction represents a rupture with the procedures and outlook of Herodotus and Thucydides. The later, purely modern interest in events, with its attendant search for causes, is an even more severe break with their perception of reality and their understanding of their task. This is not to suggest that their totality involves social and economic structures, demographic progressions, or the movement of wages. At the simplest level, their world remains one of politics, in the broad sense of the word, the *polis* with its *politai*, debating and striving, erring and succeeding. They have no concept of the economy or of social classes in the modern sense, nor do they think to isolate levels or structures or divide reality in any way into the economic, the political, the intellectual, etc. In this they reflect the reality of the *polis*, which knew no institutionalized compartments such as politics, econom-

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 25. See now *Conjoncture économique, structures sociales. Hommage à Ernest Labrousse*, ed. F. Braudel *et al.* (Paris, 1974), especially Part 1, "Orientation Générale et Méthode," and the reflections there of Pierre Chaunu, Pierre Vilar, and Jean Bouvier on the work of Labrousse, Braudel, Simiand, and others.

ics, war, or religion. All these were integrated in one life, one view of the world. The *polites* was at once a soldier, a demesman, the head of an *oikos*, and the heir to the family's religious rites. Furthermore, these *politai* did not live in a neutral world. Nor did their enemies, a series of *despotai* and tyrants. Nor indeed did those peoples who lived around them, and who did not enjoy their kind of "political" life. In the historians' view, all men, both individual and collective, are repositories of *physis*. Depending on their particular *nomoi*, all men act and react in certain fairly predictable ways. This human nature also confronts forces in the universe, in Herodotus' view gods, which help or hinder, in Thucydides' view, chance and necessity, which play a somewhat similar role.

The world of the ancient historians, which reflects the integrity of life in the *polis*, and which knows no division of the "human sciences," is a total world with its own set of interrelationships, its own interplay of forces, and its own kind of movement. All this has been subsumed under the term *process*. Others have noted threads, chains, unity, all correctly, for process is a dynamic pattern with links and threads extending backward and forward in time. It is complex and cumulative. At times it unfolds slowly, as emotions build. When such emotions ultimately find a release, the latter may happen suddenly and lead to rapid movement. Process, viewed as a totality, has a beginning, certain predictable stages, and an end. It is objective, in the sense that its movement is not planned by the subjects of history: it is rarely even observed by them. It is semi-autonomous and ultimately beyond their control. At the same time it is propelled by their positive achievements or their failures. Thus the subject, whether *despotes* or *polis*, is not ignored, just never pictured as the embodiment of free will, isolated from other forces.

Historical time for Herodotus and Thucydides is processual time. Like an economic cycle of three years' duration, it may move through all its stages in a very brief period. For

example, both Cambyses' expedition against the Ethiopians and Dareios' Scythian Campaign, which follow the same pattern, last about a year. Both represent the same movement downward. But it is a movement that is brief and temporary, when set against the grand macrochrony of Persian *arche*, which began with Cyrus' defeat of Kroisos and continues to Xerxes' time—about seventy-five years. On the other hand, in Thucydides' macrochronic period, which extends from Mykale to the destruction of the long walls, also about seventy-five years, process may unfold with the imperceptible movement of a Kondratieff cycle. Fifty years of growth and achievement—walls, buildings, ships, wealth, allies, subject cities—but also adventures, dangers, and growing hatred and fear. Then swiftly fear finds an outlet in a declaration of war. The year is recorded forever and details heaped one on the other to mark the beginning. No one will ever fail to know who began the war, when it began, and in what manner, for it represents a turning point in the process. The war and the fortuity of the plague create the kind of hardships that are a fertile ground for *stasis* in the metropolis, the center of *arche*. It also affects her subjects. Filled with hatred and fear, desirous of autonomy at any cost, they listen to Brasidas. In a mere matter of months, within a single year, one whole area of the Athenian *arche* revolts, depriving Athens of revenues and other forms of *dynamis*. Like the revolt of Mytilene the shock of these losses unleashes anger in the *polis*, and leads to bad decisions. Here is a multiplicity of time. First there is slow development, process or part of process, which takes several generations. Then there are shocks that release a variety of emotions long held in control. Movement accelerates: years and even seasons become significant. In Sicily Athens literally rushes to defeat, even as the Syracusans in the same span of time slowly amass the skill and experience to effect the defeat. In both historians, whatever the length of the macrochronic, the process as a whole, the stages of that process are, with subtle variations, always similar. Isolated events are not of interest *per se*, nor

are their dates, but rather their relative place and significance within the process. What concerns the historians is tension and release, details that cumulate to a crisis or a turning point, which often results in some kind of chain reaction.

Analogy is the best way to clarify processual time and illustrate why, given the recurrent, strict chronology, the chronology of the short-term and the event, is unnecessary and inappropriate. Again the analogy is derived from economics, from the corpus of works of Marx and Engels. Braudel notes, "The genius of Marx, the secret of his enduring power, lies in his having been the first to construct true social models, starting out from the long-term."[42] Pierre Vilar is even more emphatic: "It is true that in *Capital* Marx gave us a 'construction of time' in the economic field, and that this is complex and not linear: a 'time of times' not measurable against everyday clock time, but adapted to each thoroughly conceptualized operation (labour, production, the rotation of different forms of capital)."[43] A student of *Capital* understands the distinction between the logical and the historical method, and will grasp at once the nature of process and the processual as being that which recurs, no matter what the time of the whole. Whether the latter is three, five, or twenty years it displays a similar multiplicity of time. Hence here too linear time and dates are inappropriate and may be ignored. Engels provides the briefest and most accessible example of this kind of process with its multiplicity of movement and of time. Here is his description of the recurrent industrial crisis of the nineteenth century:

> The stagnation lasts for years; productive forces and products are wasted and destroyed wholesale, until the accumulated mass of commodities finally filters off, more or less depreciated in value, until production and

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

[43] "Marxist History, a History in the Making: Towards a Dialogue with Althusser," *New Left Review* 80 (1973), 83 (also in *Annales* 20 [1973], 165-198).

> exchange gradually begin to move again. Little by little the pace quickens. It becomes a trot. The industrial trot breaks into a canter, the canter in turn grows into the headlong gallop of a perfect steeplechase of industry, commercial credit, and speculation, which finally, after breakneck leaps, ends where it began—in the ditch of a crisis. And so over and over again.[44]

In employing the above analogies, I am not suggesting an identity of approach between *Annales* historians or Marxist theorists and Herodotus and Thucydides. The way of seeing and organizing knowledge of both historians and theorists is significant for the present study in that it represents a way of " 'handling the same bundle of data as before, but placing them in a new system of relations with one another by giving them a different framework.' "[45] By making it clear how event, linearity, and even chronology, themselves historical, became in time limitations on the historian's view of the past, this change of approach frees us from the false paradigm we have hitherto been attempting to impose on the ancient historians. The latter employed their own particular

[44] "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific" in *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, ed. L. S. Feuer (Garden City, 1959), p. 100.

[45] Kuhn, *The Structure*, p. 85, cited from H. Butterfield, *The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800* (London, 1949), pp. 1-7. It cannot be stressed too much that this analysis is not repeating the anachronisms of "scientific history," by turning the Greeks into twentieth-century practitioners. There is no more identity of approach between twentieth-century historians and Herodotus and Thucydides than there was between them and nineteenth-century historians. The fifth century B.C. had its own paradigm, quite distinct from that of either the nineteenth or the twentieth century, even though there must be of necessity in historical practice some areas of continuity. (See below, Problematic.) What the "new history" of the twentieth century offers is a different measuring rod with which to approach the Greek historians. We are now aware, for example, of totality and interrelationships, in addition to event and cause. More important, we do not disdain generalizations and concepts—part of a theoretical framework, whether explicitly formulated or not—but realize that concepts and even theories are among the most basic intellectual tools of the historian.

concepts and their own prescientific methodology, which by no means involved a billiard ball mentality. Thus they were able to see totality, to seek out interrelationships, and to perceive and depict multiplicity of movement and of time.

Both Herodotus and Thucydides, we have noted, recorded the length of process as a whole with some precision. Herodotus, assuming in his listeners the ability to reckon genealogically, left chronological indications embedded in the narrative: Cyrus reigned twenty-nine years (1.214.3), Cambyses seven years (3.66.2), and Dareios thirty-six years (7.4). Thus one could, if one so desired, establish the time of the Persian *arche*, from the point when the Persians began to rule Asia (1.130.2) to Xerxes' massive defeat. In his *History* Thucydides made the same span of time more accessible to his readers. He specified a period of fifty years from the retreat of Xerxes to the beginning of the war (1.118.2). Later he stressed that the war lasted exactly twenty-seven years, until the Lakedaimonians put an end to the Athenian *arche* and destroyed the long walls and the Peiraieus (5.26.2). The time of the whole is thus the life-span of this *arche* with its walls and port. Having established a macrochronic period, both historians were particularly interested in beginnings. Thucydides, for example, recorded the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War with all the precision at his disposal, including a series of calendars.[46] For this was the turning point of Athenian *arche*. Microchronic time was for him seasonal, with the imprecision of seasons. But it did allow him to establish points relative to the beginning of the war, as well as to the total period of *arche*. Herodotus employed somewhat the same procedure, specifying, for example, the beginning of *adika erga*, Kroisos' subjugation of the Greeks (1.6), and in the Scythian Campaign the beginning of Dareios' *adikie*. These beginnings are in no sense precisely dated. In his account of Xerxes' expedition Herodotus also employed rough

[46] Compare Book 5.25.1, where he dates the end of the first ten-year war and the period of peace between the two wars.

indications of season, which the listener may relate to the one absolute date in his *Histories* (8.51.1), though not without some difficulty.[47]

In fact, it was duration of time that interested the two historians most. For they more often asked themselves the question how long rather than when. This, it seems to me, is the key to Thucydides' chronological system, which he himself considered accurate, more accurate than that of Hellanikos. Not only was it accessible to all Greeks, indeed, to all mankind in the future, but it revealed in years and seasons how long the *arche* lasted, how many years it took for the Athenians to reach the pinnacle of civilization, how many years to provoke resentment, hatred, and war, how many years the *megale polis* could endure war, and how many years hold out before her walls and port were destroyed. Both walls and a port, it should be observed, are indices of human achievement, characteristic of the high points of civilization recorded in the Archaeology. Within this downward movement the ravages of a single year or a single season are likewise recorded—the plague, *stasis*, revolt—all of which release destructive emotions and so speed up the process. Microchronic, seasonal time is always recorded in relation to the macrochronic. Mere points in time held no more interest for Thucydides than they did for Herodotus.

Both historians, we have noted, thought in terms of a total period of about seventy-five years. Though this is not three complete generations, if one employs genealogical reckoning, this span of time does allow three generations to produce young men ready for activity, be it expeditions abroad or defensive wars. Both historians express this time of restlessness and danger by means of a biological metaphor. "Asia," Herodotus states, "was aflower with men, and money aplenty was pouring in" (4.1.1), when Dareios felt the desire to take vengeance on the Scythians. Thucydides is more explicit about the availability of young men. In de-

[47] Compare Vansina, "Once Upon a Time: Oral Traditions as History in Africa" in *Historical Studies Today*, ed. F. Gilbert and S. R. Graubard (New York, 1971), pp. 432-433.

scribing the eagerness on all sides at the commencement of the war in 431, he states, "At that time too the young, who were numerous both in the Peloponnese and in Athens, welcomed war with enthusiasm out of inexperience" (2.8.1). Archidamos understands this and bases his strategy on the fact that "the Athenians were in full bloom in the numbers of their youth" (2.20.2), as well as prepared for war as never before. He is correct in his expectations of how the youth will react (21.2).[48] At the beginning of the second war Nikias speaks words that closely echo those of Herodotus. In pointing out that the Athenians have but lately had a respite from plague and war, he states that "both in money and in men they have reached a flourishing state" (6.12.1, ὥστε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ηὐξῆσθαι). He appeals to the older men against Alkibiades and his followers. In the end, all, both young and old alike, become enamoured of the expedition against Sicily (6.24.3). In discussing the preparations, Thucydides himself points out that the city had but recently recovered from the plague and the war: "because of the truce a fine crop of young men had reached maturity and money had accumulated" (26.2).

Plenteous resources, particularly money, and young men in the flower of their youth—here is a dangerous point, when the urge is felt most intensely to seek vengeance or retaliate against wrongs, or just to add new peoples and thus more *dynamis* to one's *arche*. Herodotus employs the expression οὐκ ἀτρεμίζειν, "to keep on the move," and he allows the youthful *despotes* to feel this urge and in the fullness of his youth, his powers at their height, seek to fulfil his traditional responsibilities.[49] Atossa voices such thoughts to Dareios,

[48] See Hunter, *Thucydides, The Artful Reporter* (Toronto, 1973), Chapter 1, "Archidamos' Invasion of Attika (Thuc. 2.10-22)," for a full analysis.

[49] Compare 1.190.1 for οὐκ ἀτρεμίζειν used of Cyrus. H. Wood, *The Histories of Herodotus. An Analysis of the Formal Structure* (The Hague/Paris, 1972), pp. 53-54, calls it "an ambiguous term, meaning in context that they were constantly engaged in expansion, not satisfied with ruling over what they had (cf. I 102), but also hinting at the existential instability of their fortune." See too his n. 63 *ad locum*.

who in fact needs little encouragement (3.134). The youthful Xerxes also understands and feels this urge to compete with his ancestors, "who never yet kept still" (7.8a.1). However, he will require several levels of persuasion to become entirely sure of himself. In Thucydides the youth of the *despotes* becomes the young of the *polis*, who are ignorant and inexperienced, and thus more prone to the emotions of the *despotes* than the older generation, who have experienced war and seen invasions. Much as at one time the young may intensify the Athenian capacity for *polypragmosyne*, in some situations they are far too volatile. Lacking in self-control, they undergo swift changes of mood. This becomes clear in the way Thucydides records their reaction to the invasion of Attika. The youth in particular want to go out and confront Archidamos, just as the latter predicted. Factions begin to form, urging one policy or the other (2.21.3). Pericles, of course, resists acting on the basis of this tide of irrationality, which culminates in anger against him. He does not allow the city to be divided, but keeps it united. This passage and the others cited indicate that Thucydides saw the young as a group which, if uncontrolled, could divide the city, the *koinon*, against itself. It is, however, the policy of the young Alkibiades that, in spite of the warnings of Nikias, seizes the imagination of old and young alike in the year 415. Emotion prevails over reason and they vote for war. Sharing as he does in the general ignorance of Sicily, Alkibiades increases their ardor with misinformation. His intensity is the intensity of the young, now again in full flower, eager to see the world, and sanguine about their own survival (6.24.3). The whole city, with the exception of those who feared to show their true feelings, is carried away by the policy of its most volatile and dangerous part.[50]

[50] Hunter, *ibid.*, p. 144. For other references to youth and inexperience see pp. 145-146. Compare de Romilly, "Alcibiade et le mélange entre jeunes et vieux," p. 93. De Romilly believes that Book 6.18.6 along with other passages is evidence that in Thucydides' time the idea was already current "que tous doivent jouer un rôle dans la cité et que la vie politique repose sur

Both historians thus emphasize the emotions of youth as a source, on the one hand, of energy and accomplishment, on the other, of inspiration for the *stolos* with its attendant dangers. This time of restlessness is part of an outlook that views the world in generations and that attributes change, in the sense of decline, to a generation that does not equal its ancestors. Xerxes, it has been long recognized, was no match for either Cyrus or Dareios. Nor did the successors of Pericles prove to be his equal: under them the city and the people who prevailed over Xerxes, won an *arche*, and reached the pinnacle of civilization ceased to be worthy rulers. The epigones, both leaders and masses, could not equal their ancestors. Here is a notion of time and degeneration that is almost primitive in the way it replicates the rhythm of the *kosmos*, where all things must in time decay. It does not mean the end, however. For health, youth, and vigor emerge elsewhere.

It is now possible to return to the antithesis between cycle and line. Those who reduce the problem to this level of simplification, in order to reject the notion of cyclic time, have merely succeeded in blurring the particularity of the Greek view and assimilating it to their own linear outlook. What is really at issue is the possibility of change, which "the theory of eternal returns" seems to deny.[51] Do cycles necessarily return to their point of departure? Clearly not, if one thinks

l'association et le mélange d'éléments divers." I would certainly agree with this statement, as well as another "courant de pensée" she suggests, p. 96: "une cité exige non plus seulement un équilibre entre ses éléments, mais une étroite association de tous ceux qui la composent. Elle doit être une collectivité et un tout." This is similar to my concept of the city as a whole or *koinon*. Unfortunately, as a representative of τὰ ἴδια, ἐπιθυμία, and *apeiria*, Alkibiades does not unite the city for good, but for the *megale strateia*, with all its lures and dangers. Like Kleon he can echo Pericles' words, with a twist, demonstrating the *apate* of the *logos*. (See below.)

[51] See Starr, "Historical and Philosophical Time," pp. 31-32. Starr is also worried about "denying creativity to mankind" (p. 34). Momigliano, "Time in Ancient Historiography," *passim*, discusses the "theory of eternal returns."

of the kind of cycles or intercycles that are the subject of Braudel's new kind of narrative history. The answer is also no in the case of the recurrent industrial crisis so vividly described by Engels, using the metaphor of the steeplechase. It may end "where it began," but this can never be identical with its point of departure. As Vilar notes, such "cycles" or "rotations" "*create new situations not only in the economy but in the social whole.*"[52] I would contend that cycle and change, cycle and new situations, are no more antithetic in Greek historiography than they are in economic history or economic theory. Throughout this work we have referred to permanence amidst change. What is meant by permanence? Why, in any case, did the two ancient historians seek out the recurrent or repetitive elements in the past and present? Why have they created a series of elaborate patterns and paradigms, rather than an endless sequence of unique events or unique individuals.

Let us review briefly the conclusions about Cambyses' defeat in Ethiopia. It had a timeless quality and a meaning that transcended occasion, events, and historical action. Moreover, by selecting his details to make that meaning clear, Herodotus deliberately created a paradigm. In the end, we concluded much the same about Dareios' defeat in Scythia. It too is a paradigm, revealing the problems of *arche*, the dangers of the *stolos*, etc. Both campaigns in turn prefigure Xerxes' *stolos* against Greece. As many commentators have noted, the similarities that exist at every stage of Dareios' and Xerxes' expeditions are manifold, including a parallel between the Scythians and the Athenians. In attempting to explain this procedure, none of these commentators has failed to note that we are dealing with analogy and its role in the *Histories*. Analogy makes material intelligible and thus helps to explain it. Considered both as a type of argumentation and as a mode of explanation, analogy looks ahead: it anticipates, prefigures, or foreshadows. Not that any of the

[52] "Marxist History," p. 83. The italics are his.

three expeditions, which are patterned on one another, are really similar. They display numerous differences, which any reader may easily discern. Cambyses never even met his enemy. Dareios did not face defeat so much as experience a revelation. Nor did the failure of either *despotes* represent a serious setback to Persian *arche*, let alone a genuine downward movement in the process of history. The failure is a personal one, just as the pattern of the ruler is, for the most part, derived from a stereotypical view of the tyrant and his motives and reactions.

The method of rendering material intelligible by analogy derives partially from the oral mode of composition or composition for oral performance. Verbal echoes, patterns, stereotypes, paradigms all seize the attention of the listeners.[53] They do not face the difficulties of a totally original composition, unique in its detail from beginning to end. Thus the listener knows in advance the essence of what is to occur and follows the main lines of the narrative. Larger clues also point ahead. For in employing this technique, Herodotus tends to emphasize parallels, if he does not actually create them. He does not eliminate difference, but stresses the recurrent and the permanent. I would suggest that this permanence has more to do with his own conviction of truth than a perception of a reality that returns to its point of departure. At the heart of both campaigns, the Ethiopian and the Scythian, there is an achronic truth. It is in fact this truth, signalled by certain key words, concepts, and patterned situations, which the historian wishes his listener to grasp and carry forward. *Aitie, arche, pleonexia*, the *stolos* are all part of it, as well as a series of *despotai* remarkably similar in character. If these essential features are seen as the recurrent, it is clear that there can be permanence amidst change, rulers and opponents who are at once similar and different.

But this is to view analogy from only one perspective, as a foreshadowing device. Let us consider analogy from the

[53] Compare Vansina, "Once Upon a Time," pp. 424-425.

opposite perspective, as a heuristic device for looking backward. We are presented with a kind of interrelationship between past and future, or past and present, in which the known, in this instance, the account of Xerxes' expedition and defeat, becomes a source of interpretative principles. For it supplies the historian with the generalizations whereby he interprets and reconstructs earlier campaigns. Consider the kind of data available to Herodotus about Cambyses and Dareios, vague details, derived from oral tradition—cannibalism in the desert, a mad chase across Scythia, an irresistible story of a hare and its effect, and an equally impressive account of sixty days, sixty knots, and an agglomeration of slavish tyrants. How was he to confirm or verify such details? Archives? Written records? Of course not. He could merely seek out another "witness." Given the distance from him in both time and space this might lead only to a variety of versions, among which he must choose in any case. Whatever his source or sources, what he actually did was to use the intellectual tool of analogy to render these data intelligible, drawing on details closer to him in time and place for generalizations, and stressing similarities rather than differences. In other words, we are dealing more with cognitive development in the late fifth century than a "theory of eternal returns."

Herodotus employed analogy as a source of hypotheses.[54] Hypothesis is, of course, a modern term and a modern heuristic principle, hence the preference here for the term generalizations. But the latter, based on analogy, do function as hypotheses in that they afforded the historian some principle of intelligibility whereby to approach and interpret his data. They remain at the preliminary stage, because he had neither the means nor the inclination to verify them by empirical observation or new data. Once again I need only cite G.E.R. Lloyd on the development in logic of the ability to distinguish essential differences as well as essential similarities: "it

[54] Compare Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy*, p. 382.

is not until Aristotle that we find a full exposition of the relationships of opposition and similarity."[55] Later he comments:

> The relationship of similarity tends to be assimilated to that of complete identity: analogical arguments were often claimed or assumed to be demonstrative, and the possibility that two cases that are known to be alike in certain respects may be alike in *only* those respects is generally ignored. . . . Again while "like" (in certain respects) clearly does not *imply* "the same as" or "like in other respects," experience teaches us that we may reasonably expect that things that are known to be similar at some points may well be similar at others.[56]

Lloyd also notes that "the construction of neat, comprehensive schemata"[57] remained a feature of fourth-century science. The word "schemata" may seem strong, but it is expressive of Herodotus' procedures. Earlier we referred to an analogical mode of reasoning and the synthesis of data by means of generalizations derived from analogy. What in fact that means is that Herodotus employed the logical tools and modes of reasoning available to him in the fifth century—with all their imperfections.

In sum, the perception of the recurrent and the permanent can be explained at a number of levels: the conventions of the oral performance, the tendency to search out and convey a truth or meaning, and a level of logical and critical development that afforded the historian limited intellectual tools.

[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 433-434.

[56] *Ibid.*, pp. 434-435. Lloyd's italics.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 439. Compare Marx Wartofsky, *Conceptual Foundations of Scientific Thought. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (New York, 1968), chap. 4, "From Common Sense to Science," pp. 63-95, especially his comments on the continuity of Greek and contemporary science, pp. 94-95. He stresses the conceptual formulations and frameworks of the Greeks. For hypotheses see Chapter 8, "Hypothesis and Experiment," especially pp. 183-190. Compare Mary B. Hesse, *Models and Analogies in Science* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1966).

One must take account of them all. By ignoring such subtleties, the oversimplification of cycle versus line obscures this profound *differentia* of ancient methodology.

This brings us back to the point where we began, Thucydides' Archaeology. In discussing the generalizations whereby he synthesized his data, we spoke of a preconceived theory, derived from the world around him and applied to the past for purposes of his own. We also noted a threefold purpose that led us to conclude that the Archaeology illustrates the repetition of process recurring in later pages of the *History*. This is, of course, to look forward, to prefigure or foreshadow in the manner of Herodotus. But already in Chapter One the opposite perspective was suggested. We observed there that Thucydides employed Athens as his model in elaborating a theory of power. In order to reconstruct the Greek motives for uniting against Troy, he also employed a thesis about power and fear that he derived from the present. Indeed, it was even suggested that many of his facts were anachronistic. Generalizations drawn from the present to interpret the past, generalizations which are part of a configuration the future will replicate, what is this but analogy? Analogical reasoning, together with the argument from probability and judgments based on observable vestiges, allowed Thucydides, like his predecessor, to reconstruct mankind's past, a task whose difficulty he acknowledged. Like his predecessor he read into it all the features of the known. In emphasizing the recurrent, he also constructed a "neat, comprehensive" schema.

Are change and development possible in such a schema, which sees regress and decline as as much a part of process as growth and achievement? Chapter Three already expressed the view that Thucydides' theory of civilization was "evolutionist." It involved advances in *techne*, and stages of development and culture that all mankind goes through at different times and in different places. Some people reach a pinnacle of civilization. Thucydides himself stressed quantitative development. Armies, navies, *dynamis*, all increase;

wars and expeditions get bigger. Qualitatively, there are some changes too. Long after the Creto-Mycenaean era the trireme was invented and the oldest known sea battle fought. These are advances in *techne*, though like most other technical achievements they may destroy rather than benefit those who use them. In the *History* the Athenians reach the kind of pinnacle prefigured in the Archaeology and then regress, ultimately, losing *arche*, walls, and port, the major indices of a civilization at its peak. But there is no reason to believe such regress and decline will reduce them to the level of humanity at the beginning of the Archaeology. They will not become mere nomads, without agriculture or communications by sea. Civilization will continue. Nor did the Athenians lose their *arche* in precisely the same way as Agamemnon did. Thucydides recognizes the differences. But he also depicts the same complex of problems and dangers, *dynamis* and fear that impress allies into service, repressed subjects, the *stolos* far from home, and finally *stasis*. There was no immediate successor to Agamemnon, merely discontinuity. Athens, however, cedes to a younger and more vigorous city, very like her former self. In the *History* Syracuse represents a city with the capacity to reach a pinnacle, with walls, a fleet, skill in seafaring, and allies.[58] Mankind in general does not return to its point of departure. But the capacity to reach the pinnacle does shift and those who once attained it and have declined do return to a sort of beginning.

[58] I have dealt at length with Syracuse in *Thucydides, the Artful Reporter*, especially in Chapters 7 and 9. There I concluded an analysis of Book 7.60-71 by stating, "What we have been witness to then is the decline of empire through the loss of these qualities in one people and their development in another" (p. 121). The qualities are *tolma* and *gnome*. The creation of patterns and paradigms is a predominant feature of Thucydides' *History*. In other words, the perception of the recurrent and the permanent, which we have attempted to explain at a number of levels in Herodotus' *Histories*, is also characteristic of Thucydides' purely contemporary work. Analogical reasoning, combined with the search for truth, tends even in the present to "the construction of neat, comprehensive schemata." We shall return to this point below.

Development moves elsewhere. This explains how there can be evolution and "progress," as well as regress and decline; change and development, as well as permanence. Again the permanent element in Thucydides' work is an achronic truth about *arche* and its dangers, about human nature, and about *stasis*. This truth is foreshadowed in the Archaeology, even as the analogy of the present is used as a heuristic device to interpret the past and implant that truth in it. In this process of analogical reasoning there is a constant interrelationship between past and present, which tends to transform "like in certain respects" into "like in other respects." It is evident why a cycle would emerge, and with it a cyclic notion of time, though a notion that is both complex and subtle. Again it is in large part due to the methodological tools available in the fifth century.

We end this discussion of time in the hope that it has at least begun to demonstrate a unified view, in which the peculiarities of ancient historical narrative, the concept of time, and the critical techniques or methodological tools available to the two historians are closely connected. They are all part of "a different psychic makeup."[59]

Central Problem: "Nomos/Physis" and Civilization

Here let us return briefly to the central subject of the two histories, that meaning or achronic truth that emerges again and again in a variety of times and places. In its totality it concerns the movement from obscurity to achievement and its dangers, as well as the movement in the opposite direction. Growth, achievement, and power move from people to people, often in the aftermath of conquest. Conversely, regress and decline also shift, as one people replaces another,

[59] For other views of time see Starr, *The Awakening of the Greek Historical Spirit*, rev. ed. (New York, 1972), Chapter 3, "The Framework of Time," and Chapter 6, "The Appearance of History," especially pp. 136-138, and B. A. van Groningen, *In the Grip of the Past. Essay on an Aspect of Greek Thought* (Leiden, 1953), Chapters 8 and 9.

again often through conquest. Note that the latter formulation is in fact a restatement of Herodotus' remark about human happiness, which "never remains in the same place" (1.5.4). Too much stress has perhaps been laid on the individual cycle of fortune, when in fact the process of history in its totality involves an entire people.[60] Herodotus himself suggests this when he refers to communities of men (1.5.3, *astea*) that, once great, have become insignificant, and vice versa. The "once upon a time" of this statement (τὸ πάλαι) is picked up in the Archaeology by Thucydides, who also tells of communities once great, but no longer so.

At this point one can begin to isolate the central problem of the late fifth century, which neither historian could ignore but which each in fact addressed in his own way, incorporating it in his history as an underlying theme. That theme concerns the interrelationship of *nomos* and *physis*. Herodotus, for example, everywhere records the *nomoi*, both indigenous and derivative, of those people who came within his purview. Or, as we concluded above, Herodotus' concern with the nature of *nomoi* and their effect on the *physis* of mankind is a central theme of the *Histories*. In the end that theme could be formulated thus: the *Histories* tells of a people whose *nomoi*, and in particular, whose constitutions, were such that they were able to form a *koinon* and thwart a massive *stolos*. A major part of the work records the positive accomplishments of the defenders, the qualities that won through in spite of disunity, strife, and betrayal. Herodotus

[60] For the subtleties involved in such a statement, see the discussion of explanation in Chapter Five. In agreeing with Wood that the tendency to expansion is inherent in *arche*, I argued that the process is not impersonal. This explains how the failure of both Cambyses and Dareios can be a personal one and not represent a genuine downward movement in the process of history. Only Xerxes' defeat is the latter, in that it offers the victor an opportunity to move against the defeated aggressor, just as Cyrus moved against Lydia. A new movement of a people from obscurity to achievement is thus suggested at the end of the *Histories*. Of course, it is more than a suggestion, for the campaign against Persia and the Athenian *arche* which followed were realities, known to Herodotus.

is unstinting in his admiration for both Athenians and Spartans, and for the constitutions that molded the *physis* of both peoples. He is optimistic about the *nomoi*, as he describes in detail what he merely hinted in the case of Cyrus' victories, the positive side of process, the success of a young and vigorous people against a *despotes*, whose contempt, blindness, and capacity for error are as massive as the *stolos* he leads. In the *History* Thucydides addresses the same general question, but his outlook is much more pessimistic. For he believes that the negative and destructive aspects of *physis* ultimately prevail. Thus he concentrates on those conditions and circumstances that bring into disrespect, that confound, the *nomoi* of the Athenians, one of those people whom Herodotus greatly admired. Thucydides' major concern is *physis* and its dangers, *physis* uncontrolled. Thus he describes the negative side of process in detail. He also follows Herodotus in devoting a major part of his work to the qualities and accomplishments of the defenders, the Sicilians, who like their counterparts in Greece itself, form a *koinon* amidst disunity and strife and defeat the *stolos*. As the cluster of indices of civilization at its peak reemerges in Sicily, there is more than a suggestion that Syracuse, young and vigorous, a democracy like Athens, will attain the height from which Athens has declined.[61] There is no suggestion, however, that human nature will ever be less dangerous. The obvious question arises. Can Syracuse control *physis* more effectively than, or even as effectively and as long as, Athens did, by diverting the natural qualities of her citizens to positive ends through her *nomoi* and by avoiding *stasis* at all costs? Thucydides' work in its incompleteness does not offer the reader an unequivocal answer to this question. There seems no reason to be optimistic.

[61] Both histories tell of rise and fall, the upward and downward, the positive and negative, sides of process. In this work we have concentrated on the negative side. It would be equally fruitful to study in detail the positive, Books 6-9 of Herodotus, and Books 6-7 of Thucydides. Such a study would allow a full development of the two historians' theories of civilization.

This underlying theme of both histories, sketched above in the briefest fashion, is part of a larger view of civilization itself. Herodotus and Thucydides differ in their idea of the way civilization develops. Thucydides is an evolutionist, who sees civilization emerging and developing along similar lines at different times and in different places. His is a speculative theory, involving very distinct and uniform stages of development, based on discoveries and achievements in *techne*. From a nomadic existence mankind progresses to some form of unity and control over those individuals whose cupidity and ambition produce *stasis* or are in some other way destructive of the common good. That unity can involve control of other people as well, smaller cities and islands, who become subjects and yield revenues. The various indices of civilization at its peak Thucydides describes with some precision in the Archaeology.[62] His evolutionism, however, must be qualified, for his theory of civilization is not an open-ended one, but one that combines evolution and progress with regress. Just as mankind everywhere experiences uniform stages of growth and accomplishment, so too those who achieve wealth and prosperity and reach civilization's peak, confront a similar series of problems and dangers, preeminent among them, *stasis*. The result is regress, disintegration, or total decline. In the Creto-Mycenaean era, for example, Greece was not yet a unity with a common name. Thus parts of Greece developed independently and progressed through the higher stages of civilization, under Minos, to *arche*, and ultimately, under Agamemnon, to the greatest collective achievement of the era, the expedition against Troy. The *stolos* against Troy and the *stasis* and migrations that followed it brought this early and brilliant civilization to an end. Notably, in that period Athens did not rise above the level of a poor agricultural community, a retreat for migrants from richer areas. Her full development

[62] See above, Chapter One and Chapter Three, where the influence on Thucydides of anthropological speculations and theories of evolution current in his day is acknowledged.

came only in the wake of the defeat of Xerxes' *stolos* by a united Greece. Necessity forced a defensive unity on the various cities, including its major power, Lakedaimon. Paradoxically, that necessity in the face of danger brought progress to the city of Athens, a navy, and with victory, allies, and ultimately hegemony in the prosecution of the war against Persia. By now, however, the unity of Greece as a whole had been sundered: Greece was reduced to polarities, Lakedaimon, a land power, and her allies and Athens, a sea power, with her *arche*. The city of Athens is clearly in the forefront of civilization in all the ways adumbrated in the Archaeology.

Several points are worthy of note in the above. Thucydides, we observed, pictured mankind as everywhere developing indigenously through the same stages of growth. In addition, just as in the Creto-Mycenaean era the development of civilization was uneven throughout Greece itself, so in his own day mankind was at different stages in different parts of the world. In discussing the custom of carrying arms, for example, he notes its prevalence among certain peoples in Greece, a custom retained from a previous, more dangerous period. All Hellas, he points out, once carried arms just like the barbarians. "The fact that these customs are still adhered to in parts of Hellas is evidence of a way of life which was once common to all its peoples" (1.6.2). In other words, there is still some unevenness of development in Greece itself, for people continue to live in a manner according with a stage that all go or have gone through, the level at which the barbarians still live. This point Thucydides repeats, when he states, "There are many other respects too in which one might show that the Greeks of old had a way of life similar to the barbarians at present" (1.6.6).

Uneven, yet uniform development also extends to Sicily, the Archaeology of which approximates that of Greece itself. For there the same general stages of growth recur. In Book 6.2-5, for example, Thucydides moves swiftly from the most ancient peoples, according to the poets, to the first in

human history, or as he puts it himself, to the Sikanoi, about whom there is a true account. They are migrants, who for a time give their name to the country, who tolerate fugitives from Troy, but who ultimately succumb to Sikeloi migrating from Italy. The latter conquer the Sikanoi and take the best parts of the land (2.5; compare 1.2.3), giving the island its name and occupying it for three hundred years, until the Greeks arrive. What follows is a series of foundations, dated relatively to one another, through which the Greeks establish their customs and a higher level of civilization, walled cities, for example. It is roughly synchronous with the age of colonization in Book 1.12.4, at one point referring to Ionians in flight from the Persians (4.5), and ending with a series of tyrants. Though Thucydides stated, tantalizingly, in Book 1.17 that the tyrants of Sicily outdid all others in power (*dynamis*), here he records neither their achievements nor their fall. Nor does he fill in the gap between the tyrants and the governments in Sicily, particularly the democracy of Syracuse, at the time of the Peloponnesian War. Sicily is left very much in a state of flux at the end of Book 6.5, a place of exiles, *stasis*, and much movement and removal of population. Necessity will, however, force a defensive unity on the various cities under the leadership of its major power, Syracuse.[63]

"In Herodotus," Immerwahr notes, "we observe the

[63] In his Archaeology in Book 1, except for the most fleeting references, Thucydides restricted his history of civilization to the Greeks in Greece itself. (See de Romilly, *Histoire et raison*, p. 279, for his omission of "tout ce qui n'était pas grec.") Here too he centers on the Greeks, who bring their civilization, their *nomima*, to Sicily. On the other hand, the barbarians who occupy the island do not develop to the higher stages of civilization, though clearly some of them are influenced by the Greeks. Thus in Sicily, given the presence of many barbarian peoples, there is, even more than in Greece itself, considerable unevenness of development, rendering its unification a difficult task. See Chapter One, note 17, where I suggest that Thucydides wanted "to keep Sicily in the background, a distant, rather unknown place with a history, or more precisely, an Archaeology of its own, saved for its proper place at the beginning of Book 6."

struggle of the Greek mind to conceive of Hellas as one."[64] Thucydides also conceived of a unity beyond the *polis*. In the first instance, such a unity approximated that of Herodotus: one Hellas or one Sicily unites to defend itself against invaders from abroad. In addition, Thucydides saw another kind of unity, one which, in going beyond the *polis*, was of an even higher order. This is the unity that *arche* brings, or perhaps enforces. Thucydides makes this clear in his evaluation of Minos' accomplishments. Not only did Minos control most of the Hellenic Sea and rule over the Kyklades, but through his powerful navy he brought an end to piracy, and the threat to civilized life the pirates posed. The negative side of *arche*, the subjection of islands and smaller cities, is counterbalanced by its positive achievements, wealth and power centralized in such a way as to afford security for all and ultimately the capacity to act collectively. The latter is manifested in the expedition against Troy led by Agamemnon. *Arche* differs markedly from a unity of equals, the one Hellas of which Herodotus conceived. The latter, as the struggle against Xerxes illustrates, could be very effective for defense. However, the very fact that it was a voluntary association made it prone to rupture. The cities who formed such a league, being autonomous, could also leave the organization, if they no longer saw a threat to their own security or if they were not inclined to engage in other forms of collective activity.[65] By contrast, *arche* under the leadership of a powerful city was not prone to this kind of rupture in that its members could not leave at will, nor could they refrain from collective activity. Though the latter might take the form merely of paying tribute and engaging occasionally in military service, such duties could not be evaded. Thus the powerful city at the center of *arche* could continue to amass resources and sustain her navy, in a word, to increase her *dynamis*, the source of security and the basis of "noteworthy achieve-

[64] *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (Cleveland, 1966), p. 234.

[65] See the *Pentekontaetia*, 1.94-95, especially 95.7, the Lakedaimonians' reasons for abandoning the campaign against Persia and leaving its leadership to the Athenians.

ment."[66] While the Archaeology affords mere glimpses of the possibilities of *arche*, both the Funeral Oration and Pericles' last speech are an elaborate testimony to the signal achievements of this form of unity that extended beyond the *polis*.

This is not to ignore the negative side of *arche*, the subjection of islands and smaller cities, referred to as enslavement for the first time in the *Pentekontaetia*.[67] The city at the center depended for her revenues and so her strength on peoples she ruled through fear and *dynamis*, peoples who chafed at their loss of autonomy. This relationship, with its potential for problems and danger, Pericles characterized as a tyranny. What in fact was Thucydides' attitude to this form of unity, which merited the highest praise for its accomplishments, but also evoked condemnation as a rule destructive of Greek freedom, based as it was on force rather than equality? Thucydides adopted the same attitude to the Athenian *arche* as he did to the tyranny of the Peisistratidai. As long as the tyrants were burdensome to none but ruled with *arete* and *xynesis*, showing respect for the existing *nomoi*, they were to be commended. For the accomplishments of the tyrants transcended the nature of their rule.[68] So with the Athenians. As long as they ruled by constitutional means rather than naked violence, as long as they displayed *arete, xynesis*, and *sophrosyne* and were the worthy rulers Pericles believed them to be, Thucydides accepted their tyranny. The achievements of *arche* as a form of unity beyond the *polis* transcended the true nature of such a rule. It is thus understandable why it is difficult to make assertions about Thucydides' attitude to the Athenian *arche*.[69] His attitude was quite ambivalent. Clearly, he lamented the disintegration and demise of such a power.

[66] 1.17, ἔργον ἀξιόλογον. The private concerns of the tyrants inhibited such achievement on their part.

[67] The reference is to Naxos at Book 1.98.4.

[68] See Hunter, "Athens *Tyrannis*: A New Approach to Thucydides," *CJ* 69 (1974), *passim*.

[69] See Chapter Four, note 58, for a list of articles on the character and popularity of the Athenian empire.

Yet he also believed that the successors of Pericles and the people they led were no longer the worthy rulers they had been. He could only hope that another *polis* might some day reach civilization's pinnacle. If the past were any guide to the future, the achievements of such a *polis* could well outshine those of Athens herself, and so be even more worthy of note.

Herodotus is, by contrast, a diffusionist. For him civilization develops through indigenous discoveries, which may then be transmitted from one people to another. His history of religion is illustrative. In the first place, the gods mankind worships are uniform. The various peoples learn of them, taking their "names" from one another, though ultimately most of the gods derived from the Egyptians, who knew of them first. The above implies that mankind is not the same age everywhere throughout the world, or this at least is what Herodotus believes. For he designates the Egyptians as the oldest people, a people coeval with the human race, having a history that extended back more than ten thousand years. By contrast, the Scythians are the youngest, for, according to their own account, they originated exactly one thousand years before Dareios' invasion (4.7.1). In this instance, Herodotus explicitly rejects indigenous tradition, proposing instead another *logos*: the Scythians were originally migrants from Asia (4.11-12). While he indicates the date of their arrival in Scythia, he does not pursue the matter of their age as a people. Nor does he attribute a precise age to the Greeks, but similarly reconstruct for them a migratory past, which ended in the welding of a series of tribes into one Hellenic people (1.56-58). In tracing the movement of the Dorians, he refers to the time of Deukalion (1.56.3). This is of course consistent with his view that *le temps des dieux* in Greece was actually a time of human history. Like the protagonists at Troy Deukalion and Kadmos were real people. In other words, the history of the Greeks as a group of tribes who had not yet coalesced antedated the Trojan War.[70] Whatever

[70] Again see A. B. Lloyd, *Herodotus, Book II*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1975-1976), 2:224-251, for the complexities involved in Herodotus' account of these early migrations, and in particular in his knowledge of the Pelasgians.

their precise age, the Greeks like the Scythians were significantly younger than the Egyptians.

All mankind, however, does not have the same capacity for discovery. Nor do all peoples evince an equal readiness to adopt foreign practices and *nomoi* and thus learn from others. Again Egyptians, Scythians, and Greeks illustrate this difference. The Egyptians, Herodotus stresses, always adhered to their own ancestral *nomoi* and adopted no foreign ways (2.49.3 and 79.1). This is partially explained of course by their great antiquity. But Herodotus goes further and states that they actually shunned foreign *nomoi* (2.91.1). He records an impressive list of Egyptian discoveries, evidence of a truly astounding capacity for invention. The Egyptians stand in the forefront of civilization's development. By contrast, the Scythians, who also shunned all foreign ways (4.76.1), evinced almost no capacity for indigenous discovery. Their one claim to *sophie* (and Herodotus does not underestimate its significance) was their discovery of a means to make it impossible for an enemy to reach them (4.46). Otherwise, they do not merit admiration. In this respect, the Scythians stand in stark contrast to the Egyptians. The Greeks are different again in being open to foreign ways. While Herodotus does not suggest that the Greeks were incapable of discovery, he is emphatic about their debt to Egyptian civilization. In recording a long list of customs, beliefs, and practices derived from Egypt, he indicates just how open the Greeks were to foreign ways and how ready to learn from others.[71]

The ideas elaborated above must be viewed in the light of a different sort of schema suggested in Book 1, which involves stages of development. Early mankind, or mankind before the institution of the *polis*, lives an extremely simple life in scattered villages without any central authority or acknowledged means of dispensing justice. Simple as this life is, it may, for a variety of reasons, end in tyranny. The ty-

[71] Compare Book 1.135: "The Persians are the readiest of men to adopt foreign ways." Herodotus follows this statement with a number of significant examples.

rant then serves to unite his people in an *arche* and in time may feel himself, or one of his successors may feel, the urge to expand and conquer other peoples, other territory.[72] Unfortunately, Herodotus presents this schema only in outline. The details he gives are, however, sufficient to allow one to state that it is very different from Thucydides' speculative theory of civilization's development. Thucydides' ideas have a complexity and a sophistication that bespeak a thorough grasp on his part of a distinct body of anthropological theories current in the late fifth century. Herodotus reveals no acquaintance with these theories, nor does he make it clear whether the stages of his schema are uniform for all mankind. In other words, there is no evidence that he believed, as Thucydides did, that civilization emerges and develops along similar lines at different times and in different places.

How might these two views of civilization—on the one hand, indigenous discovery and diffusion, and on the other, simple stages—be correlated? First, Egypt. Commentators have consistently suggested that Herodotus was impressed not just by Egypt's longevity but also by her immutability. In spite of a turbulent internal history, the Egyptians had remained much the same from time immemorial, disdaining foreign ways and adhering to *nomoi* quite the opposite of those of the rest of mankind. Though Herodotus records the conquest of certain individual kings and even whole periods of expansion, he makes no effort to use events in Egypt to illustrate the process of history, the movement from obscurity to achievement and its dangers. Egypt's past was a continuum.[73] The Scythians too, though a young people, were

[72] Compare Wood, *The Histories*, p. 38, who believes that "for Herodotus as for all ancient political thinkers, power arises from political ἀρχή, specifically from union and laws: both being means of subordination and organization." He sees this concept of power reflected in the early histories of Sparta and Athens.

[73] Compare Wood, *ibid.*, pp. 59-60, who points out (n. 3 *ad locum*): "Egypt is opposite in nature to all other nations. That is, its εὐδαιμονίη-cycle is not the tragic reversal from high to low exhibited in all other his-

immutable. Given their incapacity for discovery and their aversion to foreign ways, change or development on their part was minimal. Their one brilliant discovery in warfare was purely defensive, allowing them to escape, but not necessarily to face and conquer, an enemy, as Dareios' expedition indicates. There was little chance of conquest or aggression on their part, and with it the lure of novelties and luxuries that a conquered people often presents. Their very incapacity then, as well as their hatred of foreign ways, ensured that they would remain the same.[74] The Athenians were different again, for they had always taken from others. Thus they had both the capacity to learn and the potential for change and development. In a word, mutability was their characteristic. At the same time, they had shown themselves able to thwart an aggressor and to follow up their victories with vigorous action. Yet in the past, paradoxically, it was often at the point of resistance to an aggressor that the tendency "to covet much" took hold, as Sandanis had warned Kroisos.[75] One aspect of this truth Herodotus puts in the mouth of Cyrus himself in the last paragraph of the *Histories*. "Soft lands produce soft men."[76] Those who conquer the

tory, but from low to high: the stories of the treasure thief who became king of Egypt and of Amasis, with whom the Egyptian logos culminates, are the central images of II." This is one way of expressing Egyptian difference. It may well be, of course, that it is impossible to correlate completely the ideas expressed in the Egyptian *Logos* with views found elsewhere in the *Histories*. This question, however, does suggest a point of departure for a thorough study of Book 2 *vis-à-vis* the rest of the work.

[74] Again see Wood, *ibid.*, p. 110, who states of the Scythians: "In every sense of the word, they remain unaffected; they appear in the history of other nations, and have none of their own. We may admire the Scythians as noble savages who stand outside history and maintain their stand but we must constate that they also stand outside the tragic situation which Herodotus views as the essential characteristic of human existence."

[75] Specifically, Sandanis warned Kroisos against the Persians, "If they taste our good things, they will make them their own, and there will be no holding them back" (1.71.3). Note his reference to the gods, employing the very words uttered by the Ethiopian king (3.21.3).

[76] Book 9.122.3. He alludes to the consequences for a sturdy people, the product of a harsh land, if they should conquer a better land.

luxurious are in turn softened by luxury. Like Cyrus before them the Greeks have conquered a wealthy and by now luxurious people. They have already launched an aggressive campaign against the Persians. Is this the beginning of the tendency "to covet much?" Will they act as they have done in past and respond to foreign ways, taking up the luxuries of the barbarian? Does their nature and history as a people make it inevitable that they, like Cyrus, will someday experience the dangers inherent in *arche*?

No attempt will be made to answer these questions.[77] It is sufficient that we have begun to perceive differences in the way Herodotus and Thucydides addressed the central problem of the late fifth century. The interrelationship of *nomos* and *physis* is indeed an underlying theme in the works of both historians. However, their larger views of civilization itself, of which this interrelationship is but a part, derive from quite different sources. The exposition of these views has of necessity been summary. Clearly, this is a subject deserving deep and careful study, for the generalizations about civilization that each brought with him to his work rank high among their interpretative principles. As such they are basic to their respective theories of history, and so to the synthesis that each ultimately produced.[78]

[77] See Chapter Five, note 69, for references to Fornara, Cobet, and Drews, who see in the *Histories* a warning to the Athenians, reflected not the least in Book 9.122.

[78] A thorough study of the two historians' view of civilization and its development would involve a work as extensive as the present one. It is clear from this brief account of Thucydides' evolutionist theories that Democritus deserves very close attention. One need only peruse Chapter 6 of Havelock's *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics* (New Haven, Conn., 1957), entitled "The Political Theory of Democritus," to see at once many startling similarities between Democritus' views, as Havelock interprets them, and a number of conclusions we have drawn, quite independently, about Thucydides. Compare Chapter Three, note 12, for brief reflections on *stasis*. For a different view, in this instance in respect of *tyche*, see H. Herter, "Thukydides und Demokrit über Tyche," *WS* 89 (1976), 106–128. As for Herodotus, Immerwahr, *Form and Thought*, pp. 319-323, has touched thoughtfully on the concept of custom, noting, however, that it "deserves a fuller

Problematic

During this discussion we have made use of Kuhn's notion of the paradigm. On the one hand, it was suggested that modern commentators have been attempting to impose on the ancient historians a false paradigm, the paradigm of modern scientific history, developed in and accepted by the nineteenth century. On the other hand, the proposal was also made that the two historians were in fact dependent on the same paradigm, a term defined loosely as a way of seeing and organizing scientific knowledge. Kuhn himself states the following: "Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a particular research tradition."[79] He later points out:

> paradigms provide scientists not only with a map but also with some of the directions essential for map-making. In learning a paradigm the scientist acquires theory, methods, and standards together, usually in an inextricable mixture. Therefore, when paradigms change, there are usually significant shifts in the criteria determining the legitimacy both of problems and of proposed solutions.[80]

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investigation than can be presented here." Such a study might take as a starting-point a statement of Wood, *The Histories*, p. 105, "The customs and way of life of both Scythians and Egyptians are due to the peculiar configurations of the rivers in either land." It would concentrate on geography, climate, food, and especially drink in relation to the *physis* of a people and the interrelationship in turn of *physis* and *nomos*. Again Hippokrates deserves close attention.

[79] *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, p. 11.

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 108. For the epistemological and other problems involved in Kuhn's notion of the paradigm, see R. J. Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (Philadelphia, 1978), pp. 84-102. Bernstein summarizes the controversy and the voluminous "critical literature" it has produced (p. 242, n. 26). For full bibliography see his notes pp. 242-244.

The history of science is characterized by such changes in paradigms, and with them radical shifts in both perception and practice. Sharp discontinuities thus mark this history. Gaston Bachelard uses the concept of an "epistemological break" to express such discontinuity. Science progresses, in the face of obstacles, by mutations, breaks, moments of rupture, followed by moments of recasting (*refonte*) or reorganization of its bases. In this manner, the scientific outlook of each epoch undergoes fundamental reorientations. Bachelard's view of the history of science and its "revolutions" is very like that of Kuhn's. Though he does not speak of paradigms, he introduces the related concept of the problematic. This represents, at the simplest level, the sense of the problem, a development beyond his use of the mathematical metaphor of a field (*corp de problèmes*).[81] In criticizing the traditional notion of doubt, as expressed by Descartes, Bachelard states: "Universal doubt irreversibly pulverizes the given into a heap of heteroclite facts. It corresponds to no real instance of scientific research. Instead of the parade of universal doubt, scientific research demands the setting up of a problematic. Its real starting-point is *a problem*, however ill-posed. The scientific-ego is then a programme of experiments; while the scientific non-ego is already a *constituted problematic*."[82] Dominique Lecourt comments on this passage: "Thus for the scientist's work there can be no indeterminate unknown; the indeterminate unknown is of no interest to him; all his effort is on the contrary to specify the unknown."[83] The "constituted problematic," it seems to me,

[81] For a summary and analysis of Bachelard's views, see D. Lecourt, *Marxism and Epistemology. Bachelard, Canguilhem and Foucault*, trans. B. Brewster (London, 1975), pt. 1, especially pp. 79-80 and 84-86.

[82] Cited by Lecourt, *ibid.*, p. 80, from *Le rationalisme appliqué* (Paris, 1949), p. 51. Lecourt's italics. For a synthesis of Bachelard's views, see J.-C. Margolin, *Bachelard* (Paris, 1974), especially pp. 65-83, "Une épistémologie de la raison ouverte."

[83] *Ibid.*

approximates Kuhn's notion of the paradigm with its "normal science" and "particular research tradition."[84]

We are dealing, of course, with science and with the new epistemology to which modern science has given rise. Can this new epistemology, with its notion of the paradigm or the problematic, assist in illuminating the methodology of the ancient historians? The work of Michel Foucault would suggest that such an approach can have fruitful results in eras earlier than the modern scientific one and in fields of knowledge other than science and scientific theory. In *The Order of Things* Foucault employs the notion of the *episteme*, or epistemological field.[85] He distinguishes three such configurations of knowledge (*savoir*), the *episteme* of the Renaissance, the Classical age, and the modern era. Certain themes, he points out, may cease to be part of a culture's epistemological network. For example, from the seventeenth century "natural magic ceased to belong to the Western *episteme*."[86] In discussing the sciences of man, he states:

> We can see, then, how vain and idle are all those wearisome discussions as to whether such and such forms of knowledge may be termed truly scientific, and to what conditions they ought to be subjected in order to become so. The "sciences of man" are a part of the modern *episteme* in the same way as chemistry or medicine or any other such science; or again, in the same way as

[84] For a critical treatment of Bachelard, see R. Bhaskar, "Feyerabend and Bachelard: Two Philosophies of Science," *NLR* 94 (1975), 31-55. Among the weaknesses of Bachelardian epistemology Bhaskar notes are its psychologism, its linearity, and its view of epistemological obstacles as a product of the psyche of individual scientists. Bhaskar's is a Marxist critique, as is that of Ben Brewster, "Althusser and Bachelard," *Theoretical Practice* 3 & 4 (1971), 25-37. What both see as lacking in Bachelardian epistemology is a theory of ideologies.

[85] *The Order of Things. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (London, 1970).

[86] *Ibid.*, p. 365.

> grammar and natural history were part of the Classical *episteme*. But to say that they are part of the epistemological field means simply that their positivity is rooted in it, that that is where they find their condition of existence, that they are therefore not merely illusions, pseudo-scientific fantasies motivated at the level of opinions, interests, or beliefs, that they are not what others call by the bizarre name of "ideology." But that does not necessarily mean that they are sciences.[87]

Foucault's *episteme*, which is again akin to Kuhn's paradigm, is important in showing how one can fruitfully extend the use of such a concept to broader configurations of knowledge.[88] His work thus represents a brilliant experiment, suggestive of immense possibilities for reinterpreting the epistemological field of classical antiquity. First, however, it would be necessary to evolve an adequate methodology. Such a task goes far beyond the purpose of the present study. Thus, in what follows, I do not pretend to offer any more

[87] *Ibid.*

[88] Foucault has raised a storm of criticism. See, for example, Jean Piaget, *Structuralism*, trans. C. Maschler (New York, 1970), pp. 128-135. Piaget believes that Foucault "relies on intuition and substitutes speculative improvisation for methodological procedure" (p. 132). This has not deterred Foucault. See his complex elaboration of his views in *The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York, 1976). In the introduction, p. 15, n. 2, Sheridan Smith comments on the word knowledge, *savoir*, in the French title, *L'Archéologie du savoir*. "The English 'knowledge' translates the French '*connaissance*' and '*savoir*.' *Connaissance* refers here to a particular corpus of knowledge, a particular discipline—biology or economics, for example. *Savoir*, which is usually defined as knowledge in general, the totality of *connaissances*, is used by Foucault in an underlying, rather than an overall, way. He has himself offered the following comment on his usage of these terms: 'By *connaissance* I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it. *Savior* refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to be given to *connaissance* and for this or that enunciation to be formulated.' " See too Chapter 6, "Science and Knowledge," especially pp. 191-195, where Foucault defines the *episteme*. Critics remain vitriolic. See Vilar, "Marxist History," pp. 85-86.

than possible lines of approach, the primary aim being to justify the statement that Herodotus and Thucydides were dependent on the same paradigm. To this end, we shall consider another use of the concept of the problematic, which, as we have seen, is roughly akin to that of the paradigm and the *episteme*. This will enable us to arrive at a broad definition of the term *problematic*. Such a definition should in turn suggest what might constitute the configuration of knowledge within which the two historians worked.

The key to the task we have set ourself is Louis Althusser's concept of the problematic.[89] Following Marx, Althusser employs a spatial metaphor, that of a terrain or horizon. On this terrain a new problem may be produced, but unwittingly, and thus the problem may remain invisible to those who have produced it. Political economy, for example, "made '*a complete change in the terms of the*' original '*problem*,' and thereby produced a new problem, but without knowing it."[90] The emergence of such a new problem heralds the possibility of a transformation, a mutation, affecting the entire terrain or horizon, the possibility of a new problematic. Here is familiar terminology: transformation, mutation, even revolution. Of the problematic itself Althusser states: "This introduces us to a fact peculiar to the very existence of science: it can only pose problems on the terrain and within the horizon of a definite theoretical structure, its problematic, which constitutes its absolute asnd definite condition of possibility, and hence the absolute determination of *the forms* in which all problems must be posed, at any given moment in the science."[91] The problematic is a "definite theoretical structure," within which new problems may be produced, though they go unperceived, and so not fully answered, until there is a change of terrain and hence a change of the entire structure. In Althusser's view, Marx effected this in *Capital*:

[89] L. Althusser and E. Balibar, *Reading Capital*, trans. B. Brewster (London, 1970).

[90] *Ibid.*, p. 24. Althusser's italics.

[91] *Ibid.*, p. 25. Althusser's italics.

"Marx can see what escaped Smith's gaze because he has already occupied this new terrain which, in what new answers it had produced, had nevertheless been produced though unwittingly, by the old problematic."[92]

What must be stressed about this theoretical structure or framework is that it is not merely a world view, a coherent set of concepts, problems, and solutions appropriate to a given epoch. The unperceived, the invisible, and the absent are also important, and far from representing another space outside it, are included within the first space: "It is the field of the problematic that defines and structures the invisible as the defined excluded, *excluded* from the field of visibility and *defined* as excluded by the existence and peculiar structure of the field of the problematic."[93] The latter can only be reached by a "symptomatic" reading of the text, which divulges the undivulged. This, of course, is the task Althusser set himself in *Reading Capital*: "the disinterment, the production of the deepest-lying problematic which will allow us to *see* what could otherwise only have existed allusively or practically."[94] It is thus possible to see as well the problematic that constituted the background of Marx's works.

It is in this sense, then, that I employ the term *problematic* and introduce a kind of specificity that was absent in the use of the notion of the paradigm. The problematic is a theoretical space or framework within which certain definite concepts and problems are present, but wherein too those concepts and problems that are invisible, and so absent, are

[92] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[93] *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26. Althusser's italics.

[94] *Ibid.*, p. 32. Althusser's italics. In the glossary, p. 316, the translator Ben Brewster gives a succinct definition of problematic. But see Althusser's "A Letter to the Translator," pp. 323-324. The present study, which is here tentative and represents a *prospectus*, will make no effort to join in the current debate among Marxists and others on these matters. Althusser himself is still clarifying his concepts in answer to his critics. See, for example, "The 'Break,' " in *Essays in Self-Criticism*, pp. 107-118.

significant. The latter, as well as the former, may be divulged by a symptomatic reading.

How then might one seek to establish what constituted the theoretical framework or configuration of knowledge of the late fifth century? What was the terrain on which the two historians both posed problems and formulated answers? Given a definite horizon, what kind of problems was it even possible to pose? What concepts did they have ready to hand? Upon what distinct *corpora* of knowledge could they draw? In order to answer these questions it would be necessary to study certain of the "disciplines" and "sciences" of the historians' era. Among them would be the following: logic, in the sense of the accepted canons of reasoned judgment and argumentation (evidence, proof, explanation); rhetoric, the conscious application of the former to practical or epideictic ends; medicine, both observations and speculations about man and his nature, about airs, waters, and places (climate), and about man in relation to climate; physics, in particular those speculative theories about the nature of being and of the universe current in the latter half of the fifth century; finally, in some instances related to physics, anthropological speculations and theories of evolution.[95] The representatives of these bodies of knowledge to be singled out for particular study would include Hippokrates (the Hippokratic corpus), Protagoras, Gorgias, Anaxagoras, and Democritus. The aim would be to establish a series of lateral relations uniting the various "disciplines" and "sciences," that is, the branches of knowledge and in some instances the applied practice of the era. These would constitute, in Foucault's words, "a set of relations between sciences, epistemological figures, positivities, and discursive practices."[96] To grasp them in their totality, and thus to establish the theoretical framework or problematic, would make it "possible to grasp the set of con-

[95] The list is not inclusive. In the case of Herodotus, for example, one would have to consider geography.

[96] *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 192.

straints and limitations which, at a given moment, are imposed on discourse."[97]

The above is prospective, a task for the future. It is thus tentative and undeveloped. Nonetheless, it has been necessary to make such a broad statement of purpose in order to clarify the sense in which I speak of Herodotus and Thucydides in one breath, as it were, and assert that their way of seeing and organizing knowledge was similar. The task undertaken in this study has in fact been the rather more narrow one of studying the historiographic methodology of the two historians in isolation from their contemporaries and without reference to other bodies of knowledge. At this point, however, it is possible to make explicit certain unstated aspects of our reading of the texts of the two histories. I should like to call it a kind of symptomatic reading. Consider, for instance, the question of explanation. It is a modern notion, foreign to the fifth century. There was no body of writings, no theoretical work, on modes of explanation. Explanations did, however, occur in practice, having their basis in extant concepts, or even, in the case of the Herodotean divine, in religious belief. For some of these concepts the historians might have drawn consciously on other bodies of knowledge like the Hippokratic corpus. That cannot be stated with certainty. It is known, however, that the concept of *tyche* was very much "in the air." As deliberately as the historians applied their principles of explanation to their material, such principles need not all, or even for the most part,

[97] *Ibid.* Again it must be clear that the problematic of the late fifth century would differ enormously from that of either the nineteenth or the twentieth century. As one interesting example of particularity, my colleague, Juan Maiguashca, has suggested that multiplicity of time and the opposition of the short- and the long-term be seen as the interrelationship of the time of the gods (or perhaps *physis*), the time of the *polis*, and the time of individual man. Furthermore, one might well wish to go beyond a study of "positivities, and discursive practices," in attempting to grasp the distinctiveness of the configuration of knowledge of the fifth century, and consider the material reality within which discourse took place and texts were produced: the *polis* with its particular social and economic structure.

have been fully conscious in their own mind, in the sense of being elements in a systematic philosophy. In other words, from the mere fact that we have made them systematic, it does not follow that the historians formulated such a system to themselves. But system there is, with coherent principles and concepts, which a reading of the text discloses. Such a reading divulges the undivulged. It also takes us beyond the explanatory procedures of the historians. For we can begin to draw up a body of principles and concepts, part of the totality comprising the theoretical framework or epistemological field within which they worked. Based on a reading of their texts, we can begin to specify what no known textbook or treatise addressed systematically in that era. The same can be said about canons of logic and argumentation, deliberate procedures on their part, yet in many respects also unconscious, since they did not formulate all or perhaps even most such procedures systematically to themselves. Again a reading of the texts has permitted us to formulate them systematically. Finally, there is no reason to believe that either historian ever ratiocinated about the nature of time or was in any sense aware that his outlook was processual. Such notions were, however, part of their conceptual apparatus, divulged by a reading of the texts. For the historians they represent the given, part of the problematic of the late fifth century.[98]

[98] Some of the concepts and procedures divulged in this work would fall under Foucault's rubric, "discursive practices." Separate again, and different too from Althusser's "defined excluded," are those concepts that were absent from the epistemological field within which the historians worked. The concepts of cause and linear time are two examples. In my opinion, the terrain or horizon was such that these problems would not emerge. Only an entirely different configuration of knowledge would permit them even to be posed. This explains why I find the views of Starr and Momigliano unacceptable. (See the discussion of time above.) Momigliano can state in "Time in Ancient Historiography," pp. 10-11: "Greek philosophers were not forced by race or language to have only one view of time. Nor were the historians." This allows him—and Starr follows—to proceed as if individuals in quite remote and particular eras could voluntarily pick and choose the concepts they employed. A thorough study of the epistemological field

Communicative Mode: Cognitive Development

The similarities observed in the methodology of Herodotus and Thucydides are manifold. Both thought processually. In both, human behavior, in one form or another, is at the heart of process, human behavior in relation to superhuman forces. In addition, time for both is cyclic. Nor is their central focus the event, but a kind of totality with its own set of interrelationships, its own interplay of forces, and its own movement. Such similarities are more than manifold: they are fundamental. For categories such as process, time, and explanation, as well as their concomitants, the event and chronology, are central to the historian's craft. To point to fundamental similarities in the two histories does not, of course, preclude differences. Such differences we have also noted. For example, the two differed in their view of the way in which civilization developed. Thucydides' speculative reconstruction of the past is a brilliant application of his evolutionary theory. That theory is both complex and coherent, a major intellectual achievement of the fifth century, not the least in its application to history.[99] For it is a fruitful source of hypotheses or generalizations. In the end Thucydides' theory of civilization allowed him to convey the same message as Herodotus, and to address the same problems, in a manner he must have believed was more taut, more coherent, and more effective in communicating the truth to his readers. As a theoretical construct it reveals conceptual development beyond his predecessor. It is thus sim-

of classical antiquity would proceed in the opposite manner, delimiting the possible.

[99] The theory shares in the complexity and coherence of the larger conceptual framework produced by Democritus and other atomic physicists. Wartofsky, *Conceptual Foundations*, p. 82, comments positively on Democritus' "construction": "It was thus the last of the great rationalist-materialist world hypotheses of this early period of natural philosophy. This Greek atomism was thus the culmination of the tradition of natural speculation which gave rise to philosophy and physical science." Thucydides' "world hypothesis" also belongs in this tradition.

ilar to his use of the concepts *tyche, physis*, and *ananke*. For here too Thucydides displays more complexity and sophistication than his predecessor. These differences, however, do not represent a fundamental rupture with the past, an overturning of old ways, a reorganization of basic principles.[100] Rather Thucydides employed new concepts and a new theory, and with it some new generalizations, to bring into high relief the Herodotean process of history. Whether one uses the term paradigm, *episteme*, or problematic, the two historians worked within the same theoretical framework, on the same epistemological terrain. We must therefore direct the search elsewhere for another kind of difference between them, another kind of cognitive development from one to the other.

Let us return once more to Thucydides' statement of methodology at Book 1.21-22. Having recounted a series of difficulties faced by the historian dedicated to accuracy and truth, he ends with a criticism of the oral medium itself. Composition designed for public recitation was by its very nature at the mercy of listeners. For it must appeal to their ears, and to their whims. To that end, it might delight and amuse them with stories and curiosities. Or it might play on their emotions, employing every kind of rhetorical trick imaginable in the attempt to persuade them. Admittedly, such performances won prizes from an audience. But what

[100] Secularization, empirical observation, and realism seem, at least on the surface, to characterize Thucydides' *History*. Such characteristics must be qualified, however. For equally characteristic is recourse to biological metaphors, to static generalizations about human nature, to metaphysical notions like *ananke* and *tyche*, and to *topoi*. To consider the last, it is not surprising that Thucydides' tyrant city acts in many respects like Herodotus' tyrant. For in fact, Thucydides resorted to the same *topoi* about the tyrant as his predecessor. Tyrant city and tyrant thus play an analogous role in the two histories. Compare L. Huber, "Religiöse und politische Beweggründe des Handelns in der Geschichtsschreibung des Herodot," dissertation (Tübingen, 1965), pp. 137-139. In comparing Xerxes' speech to a number of speeches in Thucydides' *History*, Huber perceives some of the similarities we have noted in this study.

in the process happened to truth? The conventions of the oral medium could only obscure truth. Certainly, this was the case with the *epideixis*, the public display of the sophist or rhetor. The latter was a virtuoso, who dazzled his listeners with sheer technique. For him the *logoi* were not necessarily a means of communicating truth or, perhaps, any message at all. Quite the contrary. For the *logoi* had the strange power to evoke feeling in the listeners, to move them in turn over the whole range of human emotions. The rhetor used the *logoi* to play on their moods. Thus he and his *logoi* were more than deceptive: they were dangerous. Thucydides knew and understood this breed and clearly detested them.

But there was yet another sort who read for prizes: the logographer, who fascinated his listeners with his diverse, colorful, and at times exotic researches. Thucydides' predecessor Herodotus had been just such a man. First and foremost, he was a brilliant entertainer, renowned for his stories. Unlike the rhetors, however, he was basically well-intentioned, with a solid message to communicate. On occasion too he showed that he was aware of the problem of bias and the fallibility of memory. Unfortunately, he very often did not trouble to sift through his data and select the most reliable account. He allowed the recollections and impressions, sometimes even the preposterous stories, of any chance informant to decorate his *logoi*. What is more, in the tradition of Ionian *historie* (and in conformity with his own anthropological views) he introduced all kinds of distractions, geographic and anthropological curiosities, into what might otherwise have been a clear and pointed account of the failure of Persian *arche* in the face of Greek unity and achievement. It would take a perceptive listener indeed to discern the truth in all its clarity in this fascinating amalgam—or at least a truth that might be useful to mankind. For in the end the medium obscured the message.

This is the import of Book 1.21-22. It represents a fundamental criticism of the oral medium. In the case of the rhetors, it amounted to outright rejection of their deceptive

tricks. As for his predecessor, who did communicate a message, it was not the message Thucydides rejected. That he assimilated completely. Rather he rejected Herodotus' adherence to the popular conventions of the oral performance, which were anathema to seriousness, accuracy, and truth. He thus dedicated himself to a mode of communication so strict as to make that truth clear and thus useful to mankind forever.

In contrast to those whom he criticized, Thucydides set himself several goals in writing his history of the Peloponnesian War. First, he aimed, as he states himself, to communicate the clear truth (*to saphes*). But more than that he wished his readers to grasp how one arrives at the truth, in particular, how one separates truth from falsehood. In turn, this meant that he must uncover deception (*apate*) and show how it was perpetrated on the listeners by the *logoi*.[101] Thucydides sought to achieve these goals in a number of ways. First, he consciously eliminated stories and other diversions attractive to the ear that were the stock-in-trade of the oral performer. In so doing, he adopted standards of relevance that were strict in the extreme, refusing to record details just because he heard them. He also refused to offer his readers variants, as if it were a matter of mere indifference where the truth lay. Dedicated to accuracy, and believing that he himself was the best judge thereof, he made the choices as to

[101] For the *apate* of the *logos* see M. Untersteiner, *The Sophists*, trans. K. Freeman (Oxford, 1954), Chapter 5, "The Epistemology of Gorgias." The section entitled "The Encomium on Helen," pp. 101-131, is especially valuable. Part of his interpretation is based on Thucydides, Book 3.43.2 (note 23, pp. 125-126). The connection between Thucydides and Gorgias needs serious study, for the historian's epistemology could be considered a response to Gorgias. Compare C. P. Segal, "Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos," *HSCP* 66 (1962), 99-155. For another view of *apate* see M. Detienne, *Les maîtres de vérité dans la Grèce archaïque* (Paris, 1967), Chapters 6 and 7. C. W. Macleod has studied Thucydidean speeches in the light of ancient rhetorical theory in "Reason and Necessity: Thucydides III 9-14, 37-48," *JHS* 98 (1978), 64-78; and "Rhetoric and History (Thucydides, VI, 16-18)," *QS* 2 (1975), 39-65.

informants and their reliability, as to variants and their relative validity. It was, as he confesses, a difficult and painstaking task. Following his own strict principles, he produced in the end a work that was sparse and perhaps somewhat forbidding, pruned as it was of whole *corpora* of material, not only stories but accounts of geography, climate, customs, the concerns of earlier researchers.

The above techniques of composition are all extremely self-conscious. They can be used to full effect only if one recognizes the potential of composition for the eye rather than the ear—of writing. For writing allowed one not only to compose and recompose but to study, correct, and revise, dwelling at length and in private on one's manuscript until the eye was satisfied with its product. It permitted "a different kind of scrutiny of current knowledge, a more deliberate sorting of *logos* from *doxa*, a more thorough probing into the 'truth.' "[102] The result is a manuscript that yields far more to the eye than to the ear, for the reader could study it closely and discern what the equally close attention of the writer had implanted therein. He would discover an epistemology. And this Thucydides effected through a skillful and original use of one of the conventions of the oral performance since Homer, the speeches of the participants.

In discussing Brasidas' speech at Akanthos, we noted an explicit link backward to earlier portions of the narrative, as well as a link forward to the narrative that follows. This is one characteristic of Thucydides' speeches: they unify the narrative around a central theme, in the above instance, termed "the process of disunity." One can, however, be more specific about the word *link*, for Brasidas' speech also anticipates the effect Akanthos' revolt will have in the narrative that follows. Generally, this is the central feature of Thucydides' speeches, to anticipate the narrative in such a way that the latter provides confirmation that the plan or strategy, or the general reasoning on which it was based,

[102] Goody, *The Domestication*, p. 150.

was correct. Conversely, the link backward to the narrative that precedes can also be important, revealing whether the speaker has learned from his own or others' experiences (from *empeiria* or *paradeigma*). This technique is especially effective where two speakers confront each other in an *antilogia*. Both use all the rhetorical skill at their disposal to propose policy or strategy. In so doing, they predict the probable course of events and, ultimately, success, if the listeners are persuaded to adopt their advice. The listeners, however, face a dilemma. What intrinsic superiority has one *logos* over the other? What constitutes the truth, since both speakers argue from probability, and both seem equally persuasive? Indeed, sometimes the listeners are at the mercy of persuasion (*peitho*) in all its worst aspects, appeals to emotions like greed or fear, encouragement to disdain an enemy, based on overconfidence, or even slander of an opponent.[103] In a word, they are prey to the deception of the *logos*. But life usually changes this. For experience (*empeiria*), comprised in the narrative that follows, shows where truth resides, which *logos* was correct and why. The listeners learn, perhaps too late, who predicted correctly. Meanwhile, the reader also learns. For him earlier complexes of events exist as *paradeigmata*, model situations, the outcome of which he knows. By bringing this knowledge of the past with him into the present, he is equipped to compare and judge, even to predict.

In the end, we can state the following about Thucydides' concern for the truth and his deliberate "sorting of *logos* from *doxa*"—his answer to the deception of the *logoi*, and the way

[103] For a more detailed discussion of these views, with specific references to debates in the *History*, see Hunter, *Thucydides, the Artful Reporter*, especially Chapter 9, "Hermokrates' Counsels," pp. 149-175 and Chapter 10, "General Conclusions." Compare Goody, *The Domestication*, p. 50, for comments on the "deliberate deception of the orator": "By means of rhetoric, through the gift of the gab, the 'tricks' of the demagogue are able to sway an audience in a more direct way than the written word. . . . But, more than this, the oral form is intrinsically more persuasive because it is less open to criticism (though not, of course, immune from it)."

it was perpetrated on the listeners. For the reader, whatever his personal experiences, the *History* represents the accumulated experience of others. As a set of *paradeigmata*, completely accurate by the historian's standards, it is the basis of a *logos*, if the process of history should recur in his lifetime. Having shared so often in correct intellectual activity in the pages of the *History*, he should himself be able to predict the stages of process, see dangers, perhaps even prevent bad decisions. Least of all should he have deception perpetrated on him. For he understands the clear truth in the way Thucydides intended (1.22.4).

The above technique is immensely self-conscious, part of a work that is carefully wrought, corrected, and revised over a period of many years. Freed from the demands of the oral medium, the listeners at a public recitation, Thucydides gave his manuscript his full critical attention. His work thus represents a complete shift from ear to eye.[104] On the other hand, it must be noted that Thucydides effected this shift without breaking with the past entirely or discarding all the techniques of composition for oral performance. Rather he transformed these techniques, refining them in such a way as to take full advantage of a text composed for readers. For interrelated sets of *logoi* and *erga* were already present in Herodotus' *Histories*. Herodotus too composed many of his speeches to form the nucleus of an unfolding process. They establish a link both backward and forward, directing the listeners to the true meaning of what has transpired and of what will transpire. They thus anticipate in the manner of Thucydides. Nor are they devoid of the kind of verbal echoes used by the latter to ensure that the reader grasp the relationship between thought and action, *logoi* and *erga*. Herodotus' use of the *logoi* we viewed as characteristic of a work composed for oral recitation. The speech of the Scyth-

[104] Compare Havelock, *Preface to Plato*, n. 8, pp. 53-54, cited above in note 1, and his further comments on Thucydides in *Prologue to Greek Literacy* (Cincinnati, 1971), p. 60. He describes him as "modernised and literate, a singer no more but now a self-styled writer."

ian messengers, for example, set forth Dareios' march and other accomplishments most succinctly, stripping away the accretion of details chosen to charm the audience and hold its interest. The *logos* thus disengages for the listener the true significance of what has transpired. In fact, within the narrative of the march Herodotus did highlight the beginnings of Dareios' wrongs, his first encroachment on the continent of Europe, and with it the injustice inherent in an expansive *arche*. The enslavement of the Getai is an example. If its significance evaded the listener at the point where it occurred, it is now made clear, and the Getai themselves recalled, because of the fascinating details transmitted earlier about their belief in immortality. Anticipation too is a feature of the *logoi*, for the Scythians forecast every move of their own and every response of Dareios that will occur in the narrative that follows. This too we viewed as characteristic of a work composed for oral recitation. The listener knows in advance the essence of what is to occur and can thus follow the main lines of the narrative.[105] These links backward and forward characterize an oral work.

[105] For the most part, Herodotus' speeches have been ignored or ridiculed by commentators. An interesting exception is the work of Lieselotte Solmsen, "Speeches in Herodotus' Account of the Ionic Revolt," *AJP* 64 (1943), 194-207. Solmsen notes the close connection between speeches and events. The speech of Dionysios (6.11), for example, "forecasts the coming troubles and interprets their importance for the outcome of the battle" (p. 206, n. 19). She continues her work in "Speeches in Herodotus' Account of the Battle of Plataea," *CP* 39 (1944), 241-253. In both instances she firmly disagrees with A. Deffner, "Die Rede bei Herodot und ihre Weiterbildung bei Thukydides," dissertation (Munich, 1933). See too P. Hohti, *The Interrelation of Speech and Action in the Histories of Herodotus*, Commentationes Humanarum Literarum 57 (Helsinki, 1976). Hohti constructs a typology of the speeches and then examines the relation of the types of speech to their function. His main concern is motivation. Needed now is a work devoted to the speeches in the two historians, and the way in which Thucydides adopted and transformed the techniques of his predecessor, for the links that characterize an oral work are embedded in his *History*. Of course, the use of speeches is only one of a series of techniques employed in a work composed for oral recitation. Compare van Groningen, *In the Grip of the Past*, who concludes Chapter 4, "Narrative," with the observation: "The characteris-

Such techniques Thucydides adopted. But he used them in a much more systematic manner in a written text. By altering the medium, he also altered the content. As a result, his work evinces a level of systematic teaching and systematic knowledge not found in Herodotus' *Histories*. The distinction made here is between two stages in the effective use of literacy, two stages in a written text, one composed for oral recitation and one composed for reading in private. Certainly Herodotus was as much a conscious craftsman as Thucydides. For he too stood back from his work, scrutinizing it in part and as a whole. Writing enabled him to perceive contradictions, to criticize, and to present skillful arguments supported by evidence. His *Histories* is thus an affirmation of the kind of development in logic and rationality made possible by writing. In addition, no matter how meandering it may appear, it is actually immensely coherent and purposive, composed to convey a meaning to his listeners. Writing allowed Herodotus to "decontextualize" knowledge to a very high degree.[106] Not entirely, however. For he could never forget the setting, the context in which he must recite. He could not forget the listeners and their expectations and needs. Much of what distinguishes his work from Thucydides' results from his awareness of this audience, whom he must charm as well as instruct. His work represents a point

tics of the Greek narrative style have not yet been studied in a satisfactory way. Continued investigation will teach us much more about this matter. But already now it is clear that one of the striking features is the retrospective tendency, the stating of the outcome before telling the events leading up to it" (pp. 45-46). Van Groningen attributes this technique to a preference on the part of the Greeks. It seems to me that the "retrospective tendency" is again a feature of the oral medium which was transmitted to written works, or, in Thucydides' case, a work designed for reading. Here too is a point of departure for a thorough study of ancient narrative.

[106] For the word "decontextualisation," see Goody, *The Domestication*, pp. 13 and 78. See further J. Goody, M. Cole, and S. Scribner, "Writing and Formal Operations: A Case Study among the Vai," *Africa* 47 (1977), 289-300, especially p. 297.

of transition in the evolution of literacy: it is an oral work committed to writing.[107]

Thucydides' work evinces the same qualities as that of his predecessor: skepticism, logic, rationality. It is also coherent and purposive, conveying a message or achronic truth to its readers, and, consciously, to posterity. Thucydides considered it timeless perhaps just because it was not tied to an occasion. For unlike Herodotus he was able to decontextualize knowledge totally, disdaining the concerns of a listening audience. A well-wrought product, which satisfied him, his history would lead its readers to the clear truth, through study. Thucydides also went further than his predecessor in reflecting on truth. He realized that men could miss the truth, even when it was stated. They could be deceived by clever speakers, who appealed to their emotions and desires, and who used all the tricks inherent in the *logoi*. Having experienced the devastating effects of rhetoric, used by the epigones to further their own private interests and ambitions, the rhetoric that led to bad decisions, Thucydides concerned himself with the way in which it was possible to distinguish truth from deception. He tried to show how to learn from the past, by making his readers share in the decisions of the protagonists. His readers would learn that the grounds of knowledge were not mere words, *logoi*, which could deceive as well as persuade, but *logoi* that incorporated the accumulated experiences of mankind, *paradeigmata*, or history.

Here is a deliberate epistemology. Again this development on Thucydides' part does not represent a fundamental break with his predecessor. For Herodotus also attempted to sort *logos* from *doxa* and to teach his listeners through the example of the past. Analogy permeates his work. Indeed, the possibility of learning from analogy is made explicit in Artabanos' advice to Xerxes.[108] In other words, Herodotus too

[107] Compare Havelock, *Prologue to Greek Literacy*, p. 60, "In terms of the technology of the communication, Herodotus occupies a position poised midway between complete non-literacy and complete literacy."

[108] Chapter 7.10 and, most explicit, 18.2.

was concerned with truth, and on occasion, with the grounds of truth. Rhetoric intervened, however, and revealed to Thucydides the dangers of the *logoi* wrongly used. It made clear the possibilities and limitations of the oral medium. He was not content merely to teach by example and so convey a truth: he must show the very grounds of knowledge and truth, the basis of correct reasoning and correct prediction. He must make his readers, posterity, impervious to deception. To achieve this he transformed the communicative mode. The result is a level of epistemological awareness that is tantamount to a "cognitive discipline."[109] This "discipline," in turn, to which he devoted himself, led to a growth in systematic knowledge.

Taut and lean, with an inexorable logic that cannot abide digressions or fables, the *History* is a testimony to the possibilities of writing. Thucydides used those possibilities to the full. He might well have dedicated his work to his predecessor. For the purpose of Thucydides' painstaking labors was to ensure that the message of Herodotus never be lost to posterity.

[109] The term "cognitive discipline" is taken from J. R. Goody and I. Watt, "The Consequences of Literacy," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5 (1963), 331. In commenting on Plato's epistemological awareness, they suggest that such awareness "seems to coincide with the widespread adoption of writing" (p. 330). Their suggestion embraces Thucydides, who also participated to no small degree in "the long Greek enterprise of trying to sort out truth, *episteme*, from current opinion, *doxa*" (*ibid.*).

Appendix to Chapter One

A. Thucydides' Archaeology: Some Interpretations

Otto Luschnat, *Thukydides* in *RE*, suppl. 12 (Stuttgart, 1971), discusses the Archaeology and its problems (along with relevant bibliography) at 1144-1145 under the rubric, "Die Zeitrechnung des Thukydides," and at 1203-1205 under the rubric, "Das Problem der Entstehung des Werkes." The two most important early works on the subject are F. Bizer, "Untersuchungen zur Archäologie des Thukydides," dissertation (Tübingen, 1937) and E. Täubler, *Die Archäologie des Thukydides* (Leipzig, 1927). A. W. Gomme devotes a significant portion of his commentary, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 1, corr. rpt. ed. (Oxford, 1950), pp. 89-134, to the Archaeology and the numerous problems, some of them textual, addressed by earlier commentators. See too K. von Fritz, *Die Griechische Geschichtsschreibung* (Berlin, 1967), vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 575-598, and pt. 2 (Anmerkungen), pp. 263-274, and N.G.L. Hammond, "The Arrangement of the Thought in the Proem and in Other Parts of Thucydides I," *CQ* 2 (1952), 127-141.

J. de Romilly has written at some length on, and with great insight into, the Archaeology. In *Histoire et raison chez Thucydide* (Paris, 1956), she highlights two aspects of the Archaeology that seem incontrovertible. First, its thesis is a personal one based not on contemporary sources, but rather on Thucydides' own powers of reasoning, mainly arguments from probability, used to analyze "data" available to him (p. 242). Secondly, Thucydides consistently uses the present to make inferences about the past. Thus, in elaborating a theory of power, he employs Athens as his model, underscoring the two bases of the Athenian empire, Athens' fleet and treasure. In addition, his method, simplification and unification—his "schema," as she terms it—has led Thucydides to retrace a

coherent evolution, but eliminate "tout ce qui risquait d'être extérieur au système" (p. 284). Among other omissions he ignores the ups and downs of past civilization, stressing continuity, "une progression allant toujours dans le même sens" (p. 294).

In her later work, "Thucydide et l'idée de progrès," *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa* 35 (1966), 143-191, de Romilly adopts a somewhat different perspective. For there, she establishes a connection between Thucydides' theory of evolution in the Archaeology and ideas about progress extant in a variety of other writers of the fifth century. The stages of progress he describes are remarkably similar to stages elaborated elsewhere, and the agent of progress, need (χρεία), is identical. On the simplest level, de Romilly suggests that this kind of Protagorean interest in early civilization and its development is "caractéristique d'une certaine mode intellectuelle" (p. 159). If, however, need or necessity stimulates progress in the spheres of military techniques and political groupings, this also ends in progress in war, which in turn leads to moral breakdown. In other words, the same force, need, that stimulates progress in a technical sense, becomes the agent of human demoralization (p. 178). De Romilly differentiates Thucydides' concept of progress from the modern one, in that it does not look to an open-ended future, or look to a future at all, but is centered in the present and "un épanouissement exceptionnel," an *akme* as it were (p. 180). But if, as de Romilly continues, every *akme* gives way to decline, why should Thucydides elaborate a theory of evolution based on steady and continues progress in the Archaeology? In fact, de Romilly offers no explanation for this, but suggests that Thucydides' intellectual development might well have included interest in both theories of material progress and condemnations of human nature and its capacity for morality. Both viewpoints appear in the *History*, and even if the disaster of Athens did contradict earlier theories of progress, its effect on Thucydides was not to change these two seemingly contradictory viewpoints but to produce the deep

regret for past glory already evident in Book 2 (64 and 65), which is a presage of the full-blown nostalgia of the fourth century.

In "Thucydides' Historical Perspective," *YCS* 22 (1972), 47-61, A. Parry also perceives these two conflicting views of historical change. Thucydides, he points out, p. 55, "presents us, in the *Archaeology* as a whole—that is, including ch. 23—with two historical curves, two lines of historical development. One is the rise and fall of a series of civilizations. The Empire of Minos had to dissolve before the Empire of Agamemnon could be established, and Agamemnon's had ceased to exist by the time of the Tyrannies, while these in turn were variously undone to make way for fifth-century Athens and Sparta." Decline or regression is implicit here. On the other hand, Parry describes the second historical curve as "a line of continuous development, ignoring minor ups and downs, from earliest times—1.2.2—to Athens in 431 B.C." He sees Athens and the fall of Athens as "the final version of the historical process," and thus believes that Thucydides "stresses the creativeness of the early empires, presenting all history as a single trajectory, reaching a height in Periclean Athens, and coming to an end with the close of the 27-years War" (*ibid.*).

Some other recent studies of the Archaeology include H. Erbse, "Über das Prooimion (1,1-23) des thukydideischen Geschichtswerkes," *RM* 113 (1970), 43-69; F. Solmsen, *Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment* (Princeton, 1975), pp. 225-237; and L. Canfora, "Storia antica del testo di Tucidide," *QS* 6 (1977), 3-39. See too Canfora's discussion of the many problems of interpretation to which the Archaeology has given rise in "La préface de Thucydide," *REG* 90 (1977), 455-461.

B. Chronology in Thucydides' Early History

F. Bizer, "Untersuchungen zur Archäologie des Thukydides," p. 16, expresses one aspect of the controversy about

Thucydides' chronology, when he cites Jacoby in support of his contention that, in matters of chronological detail, it is wrong to expect of an author like Thucydides the same painstaking care (Jacoby's *obscura diligentia*) one would of a modern scholar. Jacoby himself, *Atthis. The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens* (Oxford, 1949), n. 74, pp. 309-310, notes that in the first part of the Archaeology Thucydides "deliberately avoids exact numbers, contenting himself with the general distinction of the epochs before and after Ἰλίου ἅλωσις (1.12.4; 14.1; cf. 6.2.3)." He also suggests that it seems due to the influence of Hellanikos "that Thukydides in the first part of the Archaeology on one occasion (1.12.3) dates by ἔτει μετὰ τὴν Ἰλίου ἅλωσιν. . . ." Compare von Fritz, *Griechische Geschichtsschreibung*, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 590. As for the precision about the Boiotian and Dorian migrations at 12.3, Gomme too, *Commentary*, 1:117, believes that Thucydides' dates may derive from Hellanikos. He describes them as "precise dates, fixed to the satisfaction of Thucydides and others, after much calculation, by the early logographoi, probably by Hellanikos in his Τρωικά."

As for Thucydides' precision about Ameinokles in 13.3, Gomme, *ibid.*, p. 122, comments: "It seems to me that Thucydides' 300 years ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου is much more like Herodotos' Ἡσίοδον γὰρ καὶ Ὅμηρον ἡλικίην τετρακοσίοισι ἔτεσι δοκέω μευ πρεσβυτέρους γενέσθαι καὶ οὐ πλέοσι than a date from *Annals*—deduced, like that of Herodotos, from various traditions rather than calculated from given figures." Jacoby, *Atthis*, n. 74, pp. 309-310, has a similar view: "In the second part he gives numbers, but he counts in the manner of Herodotos and the Parian Marble . . . ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου."

Perhaps the most succinct statement about Thucydides' chronology is that of F. Mitchel, "Herodotos' Use of Genealogical Chronology," *Phoenix* 10 (1956), 52-53. Mitchel believes that in the Archaeology Thucydides "like everyone else was dependent upon genealogical chronology when dealing with the mythical period." He criticized "accepted

tradition," an important part of which is "its chronology of 'received dates,' dates taken over from tradition or from other writers and not calculated by Thoukydides himself. There is not a date in the whole of the excursus of which we can say it was calculated, not just adapted, by the historian."

For another approach relevant to Thucydides' chronology, see J. Vansina, "Once Upon a Time: Oral Traditions as History in Africa," in *Historical Studies Today*, ed. F. Gilbert and S. R. Graubard (New York, 1971), pp. 432-433, and his comments on the relative chronology characteristic of many narrative sources of oral tradition. Compare his earlier work, *Oral Tradition. A Study in Historical Methodology*, trans. H. M. Wright (Harmondsworth, 1973). There Vansina discusses three systems used in the measurement of time. These include ecological time, which is measured by natural phenomena, the largest unit being normally a year or a season; and sociological time, which uses a calendar to calculate past periods of time longer than a year or a season, dating events "in relation to the years of a reign," for example, or "by the length of time since the foundation of a village at a certain site" (p. 100). Of particular interest in respect of Thucydides' "periodization" in the Archaeology is Vansina's third system, the division of the whole of the past into periods which split up "human beings into various social or political groups since the time of the first man," the relations between the groups being expressed by a genealogy (pp. 100-101). Vansina remarks about this system: "these represent the stages of development which the members of a society think their society has gone through: chaos, the beginnings of social organization, and the final establishment of the social system" (p. 101). All three systems can and usually do coexist. All three, it seems to me, find their equivalent in the chronology employed by Thucydides in the Archaeology.

Appendix to Chapter Two

A. Book 2: Problems and Predecessors

Book 2 is a portion of the *Histories* that has provoked an extraordinary number of controversies, whether about its date of composition, its purpose, its sources, or its relationship to the work as a whole, to mention just a few. No essay could ever do justice to the extensive bibliography. Truly seminal for Book 2 is Felix Jacoby's article "Herodotus" in *RE*, suppl. 2 (Stuttgart, 1913), 205-520, now published in *Griechische Historiker* (Stuttgart, 1956). For a review of some of the very early works, see Sir John L. Myres, *Herodotus. Father of History* (Oxford, 1953), p. 25. K. von Fritz, *Die Griechische Geschichtsschreibung* (Berlin, 1967) devotes a significant portion of his first volume to Herodotus, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 104-475, and pt. 2 (Anmerkungen), pp. 79-220. Among the commentaries on Book 2 consulted, which include W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, the most recent is A. B. Lloyd, *Herodotus, Book II*, 2 vols., *Introduction* and *Commentary 1-98* (Leiden, 1975-1976).

Those who accept Jacoby's developmental hypothesis and believe that Herodotus began as a geographer, following in the footsteps of his predecessor, Hekataios, view Book 2 as evidence for that hypothesis, since it is a diverse mixture of geography, ethnography, and history, an excursus that gives the impression of being a separate work. With some reason then many consider it an example of Herodotus' early writing. Von Fritz, for instance, adheres in his mature work to a view he originally put forward in "Herodotus and the Growth of Greek Historiography," *TAPA* 67 (1936), 315-340: Herodotus went to Egypt not as an historian, but as a practitioner of Ionian *historie*, seeking answers to problems of general geography. Though his journey widened his interests from geography to foreign customs and religion and

even history itself, yet that journey did not reveal to him the need for chronological order. "He had not yet found out that this was an indispensable foundation of true historiography" (p. 338). Compare *Griechische Geschichtsschreibung*, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 106-107, where he repeats his earlier view that the excursus concerns problems of general geography, pp. 139-140, where he particularizes these problems and relates them to Hekataios, and pp. 177-178, where he now proposes "historical criticism" as the one quality that makes an historian an historian: "so kann man kaum sagen, dass Herodots Aufenthalt in Ägypten seinen ersten Schritt zum Historiker bedeutet, wie es oben geschehen ist, ausser insofern, als er zum erstenmal ein, wenn auch noch so oberflächliches Interesse an Gegenständen genommen hat, die zu Gegenständen historischer Forschung werden *können*" (p. 178).

Von Fritz's thesis perhaps creates more problems than it solves, in suggesting that the intellectual development of Herodotus can be judged by how closely the different portions of his *Histories* approximate his own definition of history: if it is not critical, chronological, or causal, it must be early. Since Herodotus was not yet fully aware of the requirements of true historiography, he was still under the spell of his predecessor, or at least deeply influenced in his researches by Hekataios. C. W. Fornara, in *Herodotus. An Interpretative Essay* (Oxford, 1971), p. 16, has criticized von Fritz's approach thus: "To ask, therefore, 'What is Herodotus at this stage?' is to find a classification and lose the author. Merely asking whether he is a 'geographer' or 'historian' prejudices our judgement of what he is. It distorts the question at issue by focusing attention on such arid matters as whether a 'pure' geographer could have written this passage or a 'true' historian have written that." Fornara then proceeds to contrast the complexity, effortlessness, drama, and seriousness of Book 1 with the more primitive techniques of Book 2. In the latter Herodotus is straight-forward, journalistic, ostentatious, and amusing, without didactic purpose or philosophy. Thus, having rejected von Fritz's

preconceptions and methodology, Fornara arrives by a different route at much the same conclusion, that Book 2 "is the work of a younger man not yet in control of the techniques or in possession of the mental attitudes of the author of Book I" (p. 21).

In his *Herodotean Inquiries* (The Hague, 1969), p. 2, S. Benardete makes a simple statement about Herodotus which seems appropriate here, "Perhaps his foundations are not those of modern historiography but foundations that suited the intention he had in mind." Too many modern preconceptions underlie most speculations about Herodotus' development and most perceptions of what in his work may be early and what may be mature. Too little consideration is given to the question of what his intention might have been.

One naturally expects that the more vigorous unitarians might have solved this problem, by showing the relevance of Book 2 to the *Histories* as a whole. Should not the "hidden order" weld it to the rest (H. R. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus* [Cleveland, 1966], p. 324)? Immerwahr's introduction presents a brief but excellent survey of scholarship, documenting the movement to a unitarian approach, as well as offering a rationale for the study of structure. Some important predecessors are Max Pohlenz, *Herodot, der erste Geschichtschreiber des Abendlandes* (Leipzig, 1937); Ph.-E. Legrand, *Hérodote: Introduction* (Paris, 1932); and Sir J. L. Myres, *Herodotus. Father of History* (Oxford, 1953). While Immerwahr integrates Book 2 in the larger structure of the *Histories*, he forsakes the task of analyzing the Egyptian *Logos* in such a way as to show precisely how and why it is integral to the whole. He does, however, note a number of internal motifs that connect it with the work as a whole. The section on customs, he also suggests, represents an implicit connection with the campaign of Cambyses. Immerwahr ends his brief evaluation with the statement: "Both as an anthropologist and as a historian, Herodotus finds in the Egyptian material absolute standards by which to judge the Greeks, the Persians, and civilization in general" (p. 98).

Henry Wood, in *The Histories of Herodotus. An Analysis of the Formal Structure* (The Hague/Paris, 1972), adopts a similar attitude, pleading the impracticability of discussing the contents of Book 2 in the context of his work. He does suggest, however, that Herodotus' primary interest in Egypt was its immutability. Following Immerwahr, he relates the great length of the *Logos* to Persian conquest, for it "indicates the importance of that conquest and therefore the greatness of its conquerors" (p. 59). He refers specifically to Immerwahr's "Aspects of Historical Causation in Herodotus," *TAPA* 87 (1956), 260-261. In note 3, pp. 59-60, Wood also suggests three main causes for the importance of Egypt: its great antiquity, the superiority of its culture and wisdom, and the fact that it is "opposite in nature to all other nations."

Clearly, studies of formal structure like those of Immerwahr and Wood have failed to devote the kind of lengthy and detailed argument to Book 2 that is surely required if one is to establish securely the link or links that make the book integral to the larger structure of the *Histories*. There are other approaches, such as Justus Cobet's study of the excursuses, *Herodots Exkurse und die Frage der Einheit seines Werkes*, Historia, Einzelschriften 17 (Wiesbaden, 1971). Cobet believes that the *Histories* is a unity, in which geographic detail such as the description of Egypt in Book 2 is recorded not merely to make the historical action intelligible but to extend, describe, and understand the bounds of the known world, and further to arrange that material in a total world-picture (pp. 85-88). As space is expanded, so too is expanded, in the historical portions of these excursuses, man's field of experience, what man does in the world. In particular, in the Egyptian book Herodotus extends historical time far into the past. Indeed, Cobet believes that Herodotus' researches into ancient Egyptian history were motivated more by a desire to demonstrate the antiquity of the historical past than to record the facts of Egyptian history for their own sake (p. 128). The totality of the *Histories*, both historical narrative and excursuses and the phenomena they describe,

whether space, time, action, or process thus represents everything human, and its possibilities and limitations, including human knowledge. Cobet refers to O. Regenbogen, "Herodot und sein Werk. Ein Versuch" in Marg's *Herodot*, pp. 57-108 (also in *Die Antike* 6 [1930], 202-248) and H. Erbse, "Tradition und Form in Werke Herodots," *Gymnasium* 68 (1961), 239-257. He also cites W. von Leyden, "Spatium Historicum," *Durham University Journal* 11 (1949-50), 94: "The purpose of his researches into ancient Egypt appears to be rather a demonstration of the antiquity of the historical past than a study of Egyptian history for its own sake."

For a further discussion of recent works on Herodotus, see H. Verdin, "Hérodote historien? Quelques interprétations récentes," *L'Antiquité classique* 44 (1975), 668-685. Verdin divides these works into three areas, the composition and theme of the *Histories*, the political ideas of Herodotus, and his critical method.

B. Herodotus' Sources in Book 2

Herodotus' sources for the Egyptian *Logos* remain a vexed question, involving, among many problems, the identity of the priests and other "Egyptians," the historian's general credibility, not to speak of his credulity, and in particular his relationship to his predecessor, Hekataios. See now Lloyd, *Herodotus* 1, who devotes to Herodotus' sources a lengthy and thorough chapter (pp. 77-140), in which he concludes on a very positive note, stating, p. 140: "Among his Egyptian informants the priests loom large but there is no reason to claim, as is usually done, that they were of low grade, even *ciceroni*. The character of the lore derived from them is perfectly consistent with a provenance in the highest ranks of the hierarchy, though it would be a mistake to assume that the ἱρέες were always of the same class." In addition, he believes that Herodotus' dependence on Hekataios has

been exaggerated, and that it is mistaken to make the latter responsible for the rational elements in Book 2: "Finally, let it be emphatically reiterated that Herodotus' relationship to his predecessors involved a high degree of autonomy. He takes, tests, then uses and the synthesis is his own" (*ibid.*). He thus rejects the view of Heidel that Herodotus' account of Egyptian history "is a garbled rehash" of what Hekataios derived from the Egyptian priests and that "whenever Herodotus mentions ἱρέες as sources he means his predecessor" (p. 94, n. 26). Compare E. Lüddeckens, "Herodot und Ägypten" in Marg's *Herodot*, pp. 434-454 (also in *ZDME* 104 [1954], 330-346). Lüddeckens cites, *inter alia*, the work of the Egyptologist Wilhelm Spiegelberg, *Die Glaubwürdigkeit von Herodots Bericht über Ägypten im Lichte der ägyptischen Denkmäler*, Orient und Antike 3 (Heidelberg, 1926), and, while he admits that the problems of Book 2 may never be solved, he too rejects Heidel in favor of Spiegelberg (p. 444 and n. 38 *ad locum*).

Von Fritz's attitude to Herodotus is also a positive one. Certainly, he rejects the view that he plagiarized his predecessor (*Griechische Geschichtsschreibung*, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 409) and is prepared to take him at his word as to his travels and personal observations. Compare F. Jacoby, *Griechische Historiker* (Stuttgart, 1956), 392-419, Legrand, *Hérodote II*, pp. 24-35, Verdin, *De historisch-kritische Methode van Herodotus* (Brussels, 1971), pp. 96-100 with bibliography *ad locum*, and R. Drews, *The Greek Accounts of Eastern History* (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 80 and n. 131, p. 183, all of whom to one degree or another adopt a positive attitude to Herodotus. This has also been the attitude adopted throughout the present study: acceptance of Herodotus' statement of his procedures. B. Shimron, "Πρῶτος τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν" *Eranos* 71 (1973), 49, n. 8, makes an interesting comment in this regard: "The quality of this Egyptian source is, of course, irrelevant; for Herodotus it constituted impeccable evidence." If indeed Herodotus did accept much of what he heard in

Egypt as impeccable evidence—and I believe that is the case—the important point is the way he used that evidence and his purpose in verifying and recording it.

See too F. Lasserre, "L'historiographie grecque à l'époque archaïque," *QS* 4 (1976), 134, for the view that, in some instances, Herodotus consulted written evidence, often poetry, when he refers to indigenous tradition. Lasserre is less certain than Jacoby (*Griechische Historiker*, 392-396) about the predominantly oral nature of Herodotus' sources.

C. Herodotus and Hekataios

Like Herodotus, Hekataios, his predecessor, was critical of Greek myths. Von Fritz, *Griechische Geschichtsschreibung*, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 70, even goes so far as to state: "Denn dass für Hekataios die Genealogien nicht Selbstzweck waren, sondern ein Mittel, in die Geschichte der Vergangenheit, wie er sie aus den Sagen zu rekonstruieren versuchte, Ordnung zu bringen, ist schon aus den mit Namen bezeugten Fragmenten unmittelbar zu ersehen." He believes, however, that Hekataios' criterion for judging the truth of a tradition, its factual or historical core, was commonplace and trivial (p. 75). He differentiates Herodotus' method at 2.142.4 from Hekataios' thus, p. 183: "Rein abstrakt genommen hat also Herodot hier etwas mit der Mythenkritik des Hekataios gemeinsam. Aber es ist eine ganz andere Art der Kritik. Der Mythus wird nicht von innen heraus kritisiert, sondern ihm eine andere Tradition entgegengesetzt." By contrast, von Leyden, "Spatium Historicum," p. 91, cites Heidel to back up his belief that Hekataios discovered the *spatium historicum*: "Hecataeus, as has been pointed out, was amongst those early Greek thinkers who conceived of the succession and temporal dimension of cosmic periods in terms of immense lapses of historical time. Most probably, he himself laid the foundation of a definite chronological reckoning of past times, which could be achieved only on the assumption that

these times were historical and not mythical." Compare Drews, *The Greek Accounts of Eastern History*, p. 17, who cites Diels and Jacoby (n. 62 *ad locum*) to affirm: "At any rate, Hecataeus emerged from his Eastern travels with his confidence in the essential truth of the legends unscathed, and with new arguments which would make possible a correction of these legends: he could now refer to the 'learned men' of the East for proof that the Greeks had distorted the *logoi* by introducing the gods and the supernatural into what were after all only human affairs."

L. Pearson has some balanced remarks on this question in his commentary on the fragments of Hekataios relating to Egypt in *Early Ionian Historians* (Oxford, 1939), pp. 81-83, where he concludes, "There is no tradition preserved that Hecataeus related anything about Egyptian history" (p. 82). In commenting on F. 20 of the *Genealogies*, he states: "Hecataeus shows his eagerness to prove the origin of many Greek customs in Egypt by his refusal to believe in the Phoenician origin of the alphabet; according to his account it was not Cadmus but Danaus who brought letters to Greece" (p. 102). The strongest assertion he can make, however, amid many suppositions, is that "Hecataeus liked to connect Greek mythological characters with that country" (p. 103). My own reading of the fragments in Jacoby's *FGrH*, vol. 1, indicates that both Pearson's and Drews' assertions may also be too strong. Hekataios' derivation of Greek customs and mythological characters from Egypt hinges on a few fragments where "it seems likely" (Pearson, *ibid.*, p. 102). Indeed, the best evidence we have for the way Hekataios worked is Herodotus himself (2.143): no extant fragment uses the authority of the Egyptian priests to criticize Greek tradition. See von Fritz's lengthy discussion of Jacoby's views about the problem of Herodotus' relationship to Hekataios, *Griechische Geschichtsschreibung*, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 118-121, n. 1, and the probability, and it remains nothing more than a probability, that certain chapters of the *His-*

tories reflect similar enquiries and reasoning on the part of Hekataios. For example, Jacoby himself believed, *Griechische Historiker*, 2740-2741, that though Hekataios' experience in Egypt, as recorded by Herodotus at 2.143, might have produced in him a psychological disposition toward a systematic reworking of the "historical" traditions of the Greeks, the real effect of the Egyptians' lengthy past on his work was in the sphere of theology. Von Fritz concludes his discussion thus, p. 121: "Nur die Annahme, dass Hekataios durch den Widerspruch zwischen den ägyptischen Traditionen und den griechischen Sagen zu seiner historischen Sagenkritik angeregt worden sein könnte, hat eine gewisse Plausibilität, aber auch nicht mehr. Für die weiteren Folgerungen, die Diels und Jacoby daraus gezogen haben, kann sie jedoch, selbst wenn sie an sich richtig sein sollte, allein nichts beweisen." It appears then that von Leyden's picture of Hekataios' procedures is purely speculative, and even Drews' more cautious description is undemonstrable.

See Lloyd, *Herodotus*, 1:127-139, for Herodotus' relationship to Hekataios, a discussion of the extant fragments of the latter aimed at "delivering a determined assault upon the almost universal tendency to overrate Hecataeus at Herodotus' expense" (p. 135). Lloyd asks the question, p. 136: "Is it not abundantly clear that Hecataeus' work must have been a curious amalgam of rationalism and fantasy, a character, moreover, which is only to be expected and easy to explain? Hecataeus lived at the end of the Sixth Century B.C. and would still not have been emancipated from the influence of epic poetry whose authority was destined to last in some form or another throughout antiquity." He stresses both the gap in time and the difference in the development of Greek thought that separated the two. Compare Lasserre, "L'historiographie grecque," pp. 113-118. Lasserre discusses those qualities that some believe make Hekataios' writing the first true historiography: empiricism, rationalism, and historical criticism. Lasserre is dubious about all three. Rather, he believes that

Hekataios produced only one true novelty, the historicisation of the heroic period by a rational chronology. Thus he concludes, p. 118: "Il nous apparâit donc beaucoup plus comme le continuateur de la tradition épique que comme le précurseur d'Hérodote, réserve faite . . . de son oeuvre géographique."

Appendix to Chapter Four

A. Problems in Thucydides' Account of Brasidas' Campaigns in Thrace

Like every portion of Thucydides' *History* this one, and in particular chapters 102-108, has given rise to its own problems, to which generations of scholars have devoted themselves. Here it might be instructive to outline briefly their concerns, if only to differentiate my approach from theirs. Luschnat, *Thukydides, der Historiker, RE*, suppl. 12 (Stuttgart, 1971), 1097, provides an insight into the problem by the very rubric under which he discusses Brasidas and his exploits, "Die Strategie des Thukydides." Basically, it concerns the historian himself as a soldier, why he was at Thasos and so arrived too late to save Amphipolis, and whether he can, indeed must, be held responsible for its loss and for neglect of his duty as a *strategos*. First then, the passage has excited interest because of the all too rare details it provides of the historian's biography and the speculations that it allows the armchair military scientist. See, for instance, Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 3, corr. reprint (Oxford, 1962), 3:584-588, for a lengthy discussion of what Thucydides might or should have done.

Secondly, the question has been asked again and again: is Thucydides objective in narrating events in which he himself played a significant role and as a result of which he was subsequently judged culpable and exiled for twenty years? The answers range from "strict impartiality . . . towards himself as historian, to his real work" with "no attempt at self-defence" (Gomme, *ibid.*, pp. 587 and 584) to an underlying "apologia" (F. E. Adcock, cited by H. D. Westlake, "Thucydides and the Fall of Amphipolis," *Hermes* 90 [1962], 277, n. 2) and even "a very skilful self-justification against the

charges which led to his banishment" (Westlake, *ibid.*, p. 276).

To show how these two problems are connected, we need only cite a few passages from Westlake's work. He comments on Amphipolis' surrender, p. 284: "An attack on Amphipolis at this stage supported by traitors inside the walls might well have been successful, and in that event many of its citizens, especially those of Athenian birth, would doubtless have been killed or captured. It is implied that they were much indebted to Thucydides whose influence was largely responsible for the offer of terms whereby they were able to escape unharmed." Westlake also believes, p. 286, that the historian "implies more than once that, had his squadron been close at hand, it might well have saved Amphipolis (104,5; 105,1; 106,1)." The fact that Thucydides did not explain why he was at Thasos Westlake considers a deliberate omission because its introduction "would not have strengthened and might have weakened his case for his own defence" (p. 287). For an even stronger indictment of Thucydides, see J. R. Ellis, "Thucydides at Amphipolis," *Antichthon* 12 (1978), 28-35.

Book 4.78-135 is also a passage that commentators have considered "early," "that is, composed not long after the events—say, not later than 418 or 417." The citation is from A. W. Gomme, "Four Passages in Thucydides" in *More Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford, 1962), p. 98 (also in *JHS* 71 [1951], 70-80). By implication I take this date (suggested in reference to Book 4.12.3) as the one Gomme would propose for most of the narrative in Book 4, since he states in his opening paragraph that the narrative surrounding the four passages, which are all demonstrably late, "must be early, relatively early" (p. 92). H. D. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge, 1968), p. 14, accepts Gomme's view of Book 2.65 and Book 4.81: "Each of these passages shows some discrepancies with the narrative in which it is set; accordingly both are believed, with good reason, to be

later additions to the narrative, which may therefore be presumed to have been written relatively early."

While the above problems are not without interest and cannot be ignored, we have not confronted them directly in this analysis, partly because they may well be insoluble *per se*, but more particularly because concentration on solving this kind of isolated problem might have obscured the broader significance of the passage as a whole. In studying Book 4.78-135, however, I have found no reason to alter the views put forward in my article, "The Composition of Thucydides' *History*: A New Answer to the Problem," *Historia* 26 (1977), 269-294, that the work as it is now extant was begun as late as the year 407.

For further discussion of some of the above and many other problems in this portion of Thucydides' work, see C. Schneider, *Information und Absicht bei Thukydides. Untersuchung zur Motivation des Handelns*, Hypomnemeta 41 (Göttingen, 1974), pp. 11-20.

B. Thucydides' Chronology

Systematic, often lengthy, discussions of Thucydides' chronology can be found in Luschnat, *Thukydides*, "Die Zeitrechnung des Thukydides," 1132-1146; G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972), pp. 323-328 (a useful summary); and K. von Fritz, *Die Griechische Geschichtsschreibung* (Berlin, 1967), vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 662-663 and 784, and pt. 2, pp. 293-297, especially n. 5, a list of recent works on the question. A. W. Gomme deals with the problem of chronology in *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 4 vols. (Oxford, 1954-1970), 1:1-8, where, in discussing Thucydides' rejection of Hellanikos, he states that in a narrative of a war with its campaigning seasons "he needed a 'natural,' that is, the solar year; and this is in effect what he uses" (p. 5). Gomme refines this point of view in *Commentary*, vol. 3, in his appendix, "Note on Thucydides' 'Summers and Winters,' " pp. 699-715. Here he believes that

"Thucydides meant by the first and last days of summer a fixed time of the solar year, the same every year. It was one familiar to and accepted by his readers; hence he does not say what the dates were" (p. 705). This thesis, and its extension by Pritchett and van der Waerden to include the parapegma of Euktemon, is soundly criticized by B. D. Meritt in "The Seasons in Thucydides," *Historia* 11 (1962), 436-446, who argues that Thucydides' seasons were elastic and that, "If he was 'familiar with the work of contemporary scientists in the calendric field,' his history gives no sign of it" (p. 440). In a later article, written with M. F. McGregor, "The Athenian Quota-List of 421/0 B.C.," *Phoenix* 21 (1967), 88, he makes the following statement: "Thucydides did not reckon the end of winter and the beginning of spring by any fixed calendar, but by the accident of the season's climate, whether it was still cold or commencing to be warm." Generally, in the three authors cited above there is a move away from Gomme's belief that Thucydides operated with a precise astronomical year. In criticizing Pritchett's view, for instance, de Ste. Croix asks, p. 325: "And how often does Thucydides try to date events even 'within a few days'? In view of fifth-century attitudes to chronology, why should he *want* to do so?" (See too A. Andrewes' difference from Gomme in *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 4:18-20.)

For the difficulties of trying to correlate observations according to the various Greek calendars, see de Ste. Croix, *The Origins*, p. 324 and note 19 *ad locum*. Von Fritz, *Griechische Geschichtsschreibung*, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 295, n. 5, points out the "enormen Unregelmässigkeiten des offiziellen attischen Kalenders," a source of difficulty and confusion, if Thucydides ever had thought to proceed as Macan wished he had, "boldly and systematically dating events by Attic years, months and days of the month" (cited by von Fritz). Like de Ste. Croix, von Fritz, in vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 784, is also aware that to demand such precision of the historian is anachronistic. One can go further, using comparative material. In *Montaillou. The Promised Land of Error*, trans. B. Bray

(New York, 1978), pp. 277-282, E. Le Roy Ladurie discusses concepts of time in the fourteenth century which differed from " 'the time of the Church' " and " 'the time of the merchant.' " Such time he calls "the special time of the farmer, the shepherd and the craftsman." For instance, p. 277: "The people of Montaillou and Ariège in general indicated the divisions of the night by means of visual, aural or physiological references such as *after sunset, at nightfall, at the hour of the first sleep, at the hour half-way through the first sleep, at cock-crow*, or *when the cock had crowed three times*" (Ladurie's italics). In addition, in ordinary rural circles references to the lunar calendar were avoided, as were the names of the days of the week, with the occasional exception of Sunday. "People spoke of eight days or fifteen days rather than one or two weeks." The people of Ariège also referred to a " 'half year.' " "This had the additional advantage of lending itself to the usages of transhumance, which divided the year up into winter and summer pasturage" (p. 278). Dates were often fixed by reference to natural phenomena such as "*at the season when elms have put forth their leaves.*" Harvests and other agricultural work, for example, the wine, wheat, and turnip harvests, also provided points of reference (p. 279).

Perhaps scholars have been complicating a very simple matter. I would suggest that Thucydides' readers did not think in terms of a calendar but referred to time in the same way as the people of Montaillou and Ariège. They would thus easily comprehend the historian's dating by seasons and by harvests and other agricultural work.

There is a variety of opinion about Thucydides' attitude to, and use of, Hellanikos' *Atthis*, the date of publication of which is generally believed to be after the years 407-406. The date is Jacoby's in *FGrH* III b i, p. 5, and accepted by von Fritz, *Griechische Geschichtsschreibung*, vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 479 and by Otto Lendle in "Die Auseinandersetzung des Thukydides mit Hellanikos" in *Thukydides*, Wege der Forschung 98, ed. H. Herter (Darmstadt, 1968), pp. 661-682, especially p. 674 and n. 36 *ad locum* (also in *Hermes* 92 [1964], 129-143). Lendle

sets forth, rather convincingly, the way in which Hellanikos might have influenced Thucydides. Noting the discrepancy in the *History* between Book 5.20.1 and Book 2.1, where there are two beginnings proposed for the war, the invasion of Attika and the attack on Plataia, he suggests that a number of passages were written in reaction to Hellanikos' *Atthis*, to use in a polemic against him, and inserted in an otherwise finished text. Book 5.20 and 5.26 were conceived at this time and required few other changes to the text, merely the insertion of Book 1.97.2, Book 2.1, and the officials named in Book 2.2.1. Lendle's major conclusion is that Thucydides recognized the necessity of a system of chronology with absolute fixed points and exact dating, though he undertook to establish this only for the work as a whole (p. 681). Without addressing myself to the Composition Question, which I have discussed elsewhere, I would merely stress the kind of chronological system that Thucydides used initially and chose to leave throughout his *History*, and which in Book 1.97.2 and Book 5.20.2-3 he defended for its own peculiar accuracy against Hellanikos, whether he derived certain absolute dates from him or not. Lendle describes it as "einer Kombination von relativer und jahreszeitlicher Angabe" (p. 679). Basically Thucydides' system was a type of relative chronology and this he continued to prefer, even though he established a fixed point for the beginning of the war in Book 2.2.1.

Appendix to Chapter Five

A. Herodotus and Process

The concept of process is not foreign to Herodotean scholarship as it was to studies of Thucydides. At one level or another, and with some variations in emphasis and terminology, scholars have located a process of history in Herodotus' work. Generally, the discovery of process also leads to the delineation of forms of explanation other than cause and effect. In addition, interest in process usually results in a perception in the *Histories* of a meaning that transcends events. Here then the aim will be to summarize the conclusions of three recent scholarly works, since this study builds upon them. The works are H. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (Cleveland, 1966); H. Wood, *The Histories of Herodotus. An Analysis of the Formal Structure* (The Hague/Paris, 1972); and J. Cobet, *Herodots Exkurse und die Frage der Einheit seines Werkes*, Historia, Einzelschriften 17 (Wiesbaden, 1971). We shall concentrate on their views as to the subject of the *Histories*, the process of history central to it, and the modes of explanation employed by Herodotus.

Immerwahr devotes his first chapter to the subject of the *Histories*. While he does not underestimate the complexity of the question, he soon narrows the scope of his enquiry, by proposing that "Herodotus' history is primarily a history of action" (p. 40). Its subject is the growth of the unified power of Asia under the Persians, the latters' attempt to extend their empire beyond the borders of the continent of Asia, and the failure of this attempt. Among the history's many themes, one which unifies the work is the disregard shown by the Persian kings for the separation of continents, an indication of their "hybris in seeking world dominion" (p. 44). This subject, however, cannot be separated from the Greek view of the importance of their fight against Persia. Thus the his-

tory is also patriotic history and the Greeks "the exponents of a particular way of life" and the "representatives of a whole continent" (p. 45). In addition, Herodotus "showed by what laws in the world of history absolutism was bound to fail" (*ibid.*). While Immerwahr stresses that individual happenings must be "viewed together as parts of an orderly process" (p. 148) and that the pattern of history is to be seen in all the events treated in the *Histories*, he is at his best when he descibes the pattern of eastern history. As he points out: "Since the work deals primarily with the East, it is easier to observe the rise and fall of Eastern kings than the growth of the Greek states" (p. 154). In noting that "*the very conditions that give rise to greatness are also the conditions of downfall*" (*ibid.*), he alludes to a process of nature, analogous to the historical process, which limits excessive growth. (The italics are Immerwahr's.) In fact, these two processes seem to combine in a "natural process of history," whereby "in the decline of Asiatic power the plurality of historical forces was re-established" (p. 188). It is this natural process to which he returns in his conclusion. There he proposes the existence of a natural order whereby the continents of Europe and Asia are separate and equal and a balance of world forces achieved through *metabole*. Furthermore, the principles of order by which history develops are due to the divine: "Through *phthonos* the divine preserves first of all the boundary between men and gods; but it also preserves the order of society by preventing conquest and absolute rule" (p. 313). Given the many sides to his concept of process, Immerwahr naturally perceives in the *Histories* a rich array of explanations from human motivation, including vengeance, as a cause of historical action, to divine causation, which usually accompanies such historical action and parallels human motivation. In addition to causation as such, he calls attention to Herodotus' use of analogy, prefiguration, and pattern. Of the latter he notes that the cumulative weight of examples of one recurrent pattern "forces the reader to accept the Herod-

otean interpretation of Xerxes' ill success in the Persian Wars as a decisive defeat" (p. 78).

In his opening pages Wood enlarges the subject of the *Histories*, by translating the second line of the proem as "what becomes of men." This translation stems from his rejection of those "who try to limit history and the historical work to a chronological retelling of events." As he himself notes, his own view of Herodotean history makes it difficult "to see by what criteria irrelevance is to be judged" (p. 10). Thus he indicates that unlike some of his predecessors he will be concerned with the relation, or relevance, of digressions to the main narrative and theme. The latter he considers to be twofold. The first aspect "is metaphysical, and concerns the existential nature of man, as defined in Solon's speech in I 32," which Wood studies "principally in the operation of retribution" (p. 15). The second is the account of the *aitie*, or *adika erga*, between the Greeks and the barbarians. While Wood's process of history might in many respects be equated with Immerwahr's pattern of eastern history, in actual fact, by emphasizing different stages in that process, he enlarges its scope. Thus East and West, the Persian kings and Athens and Sparta, appear at points in a continuum or perhaps a cycle. In order to effect this he elaborates a pattern of *arche*, "which embraces certain relations between the concepts of BEGINNING, RULE, LIBERTY, CHANGE and LAW"(p. 34). The total process involves a society that begins in obscurity, dispersed, weak, even lawless, and develops laws and a constitution, that is, *arche*. Conquest of surrounding nations follows, based on a desire for land (characterized as *pleonexia*), and results in the injustice of expansionism, which is liable to retribution. Thus *arche*, the basis of growth and power, becomes as well "the principle of destruction" (p. 46). Important too is Wood's view that "the total process alone, in which each incident moves, confers meaning on the incident" (pp. 66-67). The latter is connected with his concept of explanation in the *Histories*, the way in which Herodotus "saw the interrelation of events, and thereby their form

as history" (p. 17). Rejecting cause and effect as insufficient, Wood proposes analogy, both in the historical process and in nature, as a formal device for making the material intelligible and for creating an intelligible pattern. Anticipation, prefiguration, and repetition are all elements in this analogical mode of explanation. Thus, events, through being part of a totality (or a meaningful process), are transformed into knowledge.

Cobet again enlarges the subject of the *Histories*, by closely connecting ethnography, geography, and history. As descriptions or expansions of time, space, and activity, the various *logoi* comprise everything human, including human knowledge. In addition, they reveal the limitations imposed by the different parts of the world and the ways in which mankind has responded to them. Thus the excursuses are not just background to the historical action but combine with it to present both a dynamic and a static side to reality. In fact, what at times might appear to be isolated or self-contained excursuses are often connected with other passages in the main narrative or elsewhere by certain "typical situations." The typical situation with which Cobet deals most fully is that of the primitive opponent, for example, the Massagetai, Ethiopians, and Scythians, all of whom live in simplicity, self-sufficiency, and peace (pp. 101-114). The harshness of their surroundings produces in them a hardiness, which allows them to disdain their civilized aggressor and his way of life. For their own part, they evince no desire for conquest of others' land but rather consider unprovoked aggression unjust. Each instance of a primitive opponent represents an analogy, the meaning of which derives from its "typical" quality. In looking at the process of history, Cobet studies in some detail the obscurity and freedom of Wood's beginning. In turn, he connects it with Immerwahr's pattern of eastern history, by arguing that fate or the divine need not be a factor in the campaigns of the aggressor. What is common to all three campaigns (against the Massagetai, the Ethiopians, and the Scythians), and reveals the utter senselessness

of such aggression, is the slight gains possible in victory over such opponents, and yet the real dangers inherent in failure. For, and this is important and a variety of warners point it out, once the primitive opponent has tasted luxury, he will not be held back. The Persians themselves illustrate this process, by beginning as a primitive opponent, moving on to conquest and aggression, and finally experiencing defeat at the hands of other primitive opponents. Thus in Cobet's work can be seen the totality of the cycle of human affairs, which, he believes, Herodotus set forth as a lesson for the Athenians, the primitive opponent who defeated Xerxes (pp. 114-116). Like Wood, Cobet sees analogy, prefiguration, and repetition as Herodotean modes of explanation, and like Wood too he believes that the concept of cause and effect is insufficient. Rather he discovers in the *Histories* a symptomatic treatment of events in which the historical significance of events lies in what is symptomatic or revelatory for mankind in general, in a word, in a meaning that transcends events.

B. Herodotus, Literacy, and Oral Presentation

In *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963) Eric Havelock argues powerfully against widespread literacy in the fifth century. He states, p. 38: "It is fair to conclude that the cultural situation described by Plato is one in which oral communication still dominates all the important relationships and valid transactions of life. Books of course there were, and the alphabet had been in use for over three centuries, but the question is: used by how many? and used for what purposes?" Havelock uses the term "craft literacy, in which the public inscription is composed as a source of referral for officials and as a check upon arbitrary interpretations" (p. 39). As for the poet, he believes that he can write for his own benefit and thus acquire "increased compositional skill, but he composes for a public who he knows will not read what he is composing but will listen to it" (*ibid.*). It is this public

for whom Herodotus wrote and to whom he read (p. 53, n. 8). Arguments to the contrary, for considerable literacy in Athens, are to be found in E. G. Turner, *Athenian Books in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries* (London, 1952), and F. D. Harvey, "Literacy in the Athenian Democracy," *REG* 79 (1966), 585-635. S. Flory's recent article, "Who Read Herodotus' *Histories*?" *AJP* 101 (1980), 12-28, takes a view opposite to Turner and Harvey and, on the whole, in support of Havelock, that there was "considerable illiteracy in the 5th century" (p. 18, n. 24).

Flory's main argument is that Herodotus' work was "too long and therefore too unwieldy to become truly popular in its author's day" (p. 12). This view he supports by addressing three issues: the length of the *Histories*, the level of literacy, and the validity of using allusions in tragedy and comedy to prove the work's popularity. He concludes that certain intellectuals, members of the Athenian elite, had read Herodotus. "And it was only this small group which, according to our estimate of the size of Herodotus' book and the literacy of his day, was equipped to read and appreciate the *Histories*" (p. 26). While Flory is not concerned with Herodotus' listeners, he makes it clear that oral recitation, or lecture, was the only mode of presentation whereby Herodotus could reach any but a very small circle. Compare L. Canfora, "Il 'ciclo' storico," *Belfagor* 26 (1971), 653-670, and B. Gentili and G. Cerri, "Written and Oral Communication in Greek Historiographical Thought" in *Communication Arts in the Ancient World*, ed. E. A. Havelock and J. P. Hershbell (New York, 1978), pp. 137-155. A. D. Momigliano, "The Historians of the Classical World and their Audiences: Some Suggestions," *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa* 8 (1978), 59-75, reviews the evidence for Herodotus' lectures, but remains uncertain about public readings of historical works in the fifth century. He admits only that it is a "probability that Herodotus read his work in public" (p. 62).

C. "Causation" in Herodotus and Thucydides

Much has been written about Thucydides' concern for cause, usually signifying his use of the words *aitia* and *prophasis*, and some valuable findings have resulted. For example, ever since L. Pearson's "*Prophasis* and *Aitia*," *TAPA* 83 (1952), 205-223, it has been usual to distinguish between *aitiai*, incidents such as Kerkyra and Poteidaia, which are not true causes, but complaints or grievances providing the occasion for war, and *prophaseis*, "explanations in defence of one's action," especially the "true reason" for the war, the fear engendered in Sparta by Athens' rise to power. (See too Pearson's "postscript" to his earlier discussion, "Prophasis: A Clarification," *TAPA* 103 [1972], 381-394.) Compare G. M. Kirkwood, "Thucydides' Words for 'Cause,' " *AJP* 73 (1952), 37-61. Kirkwood believes that all meanings of the word *prophasis* are subjective, indicating mental attitudes, such as a motive or pretext, or the state of mind engendered by various *aitiai*.

Both Pearson and Kirkwood employ a semantic approach and do not concern themselves with the larger philosophical issues involved in the notion of cause. As a result, the "true reason" for the war scarcely gets beyond the level of motivation, in the sense of excuse or justification. Quite correctly, then, scholars like Sealey, "Thucydides, Herodotos, and the Causes of War" and D. Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1969), have found this view of the "truest cause" unsatisfactory, stressing instead the growth of Athenian power. In his discussion of Thucydides and inevitability, which includes an appraisal of earlier views of the historian's notion of cause, Kagan concludes with the statement that "Thucydides meant us to think that the war was inevitable once the Athenian Empire was permitted to come into existence" (p. 366). Both Sealey and Kagan, it seems to me, perceive that something has been lost in the exclusive concern with the words *aitia* and *prophasis*. (Compare A. Andrewes, "Thucydides on the Causes of War," *CQ*

53 [1959], 223-239, an article dealing mainly with the Composition Question.)

Study of causal vocabulary, and its absence or presence in both historians, continues: it is the central theme of H. R. Rawlings III, *A Semantic Study of Prophasis to 400 B.C.*, Hermes, Einzelschriften 33 (Wiesbaden, 1975). Following a discussion of the Thucydidean and Hippokratic causal fields, Rawlings concludes that Thucydides' medical terminology is remarkably similar to that found in *Ancient Medicine*. In general Thucydides was familiar with the Hippokratic school and adapted "medical terminology and methodology to political history" (p. 77). Rawlings believes, "When Thucydides speaks of a πρόφασις τοῦ πολέμου he parallels precisely the Hippocratic πρόφασις τοῦ νούσου. He adapted a medical term with which he was familiar in order to clarify his views of those events which preceded the war" (p. 78). However, in Rawlings' view, the Hippokratic term *prophasis* has little causal force: it refers to events preceding an illness such as might have the effect of precipitating that illness: "*Prophasis* was not a primary, sufficient, or necessary cause." And this is the sense of *prophasis* Thucydides applied to Kerkyra and Poteidaia (1.118 and 146). "Thucydides is simply doing a diagnosis of the illness that was the war: Corcyra and Potidaea were a precipitant of the conflict. They were not necessary causes or even sufficient causes; they were almost accidental; they were obvious to anyone; the war could have occurred without them; they precipitated the war, just as in 2,48,3 a prior illness precipitated the plague" (p. 79). Rawlings' major proposal is to distinguish *prophasis*, in the sense of precipitant, from the truest *prophasis* of the war, which is broad enough to include not only the fear provoked in the Spartans but the power of Athens, the way that power was established, and the traits of character (*tropoi*) the Athenians evinced in establishing it. Thucydides, Rawlings concludes, has, in his truest *prophasis*, "distilled the essential elements from the events of these years and provided us with a critical analysis of the preconditions of the war based on a

character study of the Athenians" (p. 90). It is this very use of a more scientific vocabulary to make causal distinctions that separates Thucydides from Herodotus. "The two historians thus point out the same kinds of causal elements; the difference lies in the vocabulary" (p. 95).

I quote Rawlings at some length in order to illustrate the direction of this kind of study. That there is anything particularly "scientific" about Thucydides' vocabulary used in reference to the "truest cause" is open to challenge. The distinction between precipitants and preconditions, based on modern conceptions of historical causality (Rawlings, *ibid.*, pp. 95-97), while systematic, tells us little more than we have known all along: Thucydides, like Herodotus before him, distinguished incidents of an immediate nature or "exciting" causes from antecedents that were of remote origin and constituted long-standing problems, tensions, hatreds, etc. Momigliano, however, has pointed out in "Some Observations on Causes of War in Ancient Historiography" in *Studies in Historiography* (New York, 1966), pp. 117-118: "He [Thucydides] is far superior to Herodotus in explaining the actual conduct of the war with which he is concerned, but he is much less convincing than Herodotus in discovering the remote origins of the war." Momigliano also believes, p. 118, "Thucydides tried to understand the mind of the people who decided to fight rather than the traditions and interests which were involved in the fight." We are thus brought back to Cornford's view (to which Momigliano refers with some approval) that "the ancients looked simply and solely to the feelings, motives, characters of individuals or of cities" (*Thucydides Mythistoricus* [London, 1907], p. 66). And it seems to me that this is all Rawlings has unearthed in his interpretation of the "truest *prophasis*," the character of a people or city that ultimately produced fear in another people. (See also F. Robert, "Prophasis," *REG* 89 [1976], 317-342. And see above, Chapter Four, note 56, for a longer statement of Cornford's view. Compare my own view of the causes of the Peloponnesian War, which parallel the

causes of the Sicilian expedition, in *Thucydides, the Artful Reporter* [Toronto, 1973], p. 130. *Aitiai* "serve as a pretext for a war. . . . But the real reason for the conflict is deep-rooted human emotions," fear and greed.) Curiously, most analysts, including Rawlings, hasten over or ignore altogether Thucydides' use of the notion of the truest *prophasis* at 6.6.1 (τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει), where it refers to the real reason for the Athenian expedition against Sicily, as opposed to the motives alleged. The real reason is nothing more subtle than desire and greed (6.24, ἔρως and διὰ τὴν ἄγαν τῶν πλεόνων ἐπιθυμίαν; compare Nikias' warnings at 6.13.1).

The present study approaches the question of causation in quite a different manner, convinced that an exclusive concern with the two historians' causal vocabulary loses something of their particular cast of mind and outlook. Concentrating instead on historical explanation, it seeks to discover the nature of the generalizations or concepts which Herodotus and Thucydides used to explain events. (See above, Chapter Four, notes 28 and 43.) Explanation in this sense is omnipresent in both histories and need not be signalled by the presence of any one word or group of words. In Chapter Four, for example, we analyzed Thucydides' explanatory procedures without reference to either of the two words for cause discussed by others. (Among those who also do not restrict themselves to causal vocabulary are Immerwahr, "Aspects of Historical Causation" and de Romilly, "La vengeance comme explication historique." See above, p. 201ff., for a discussion of types of causation found in Herodotus' *Histories*, and see too Appendix to Chapter Five, section A: Herodotus and Process.)

The levels of explanation that have been discerned in both histories, part of the historians' interpretative principles, directly reflect the kinds of problems and questions that they addressed in the fifth century B.C. They also reveal the kinds of intellectual tools available to them to solve problems or answer questions. These include far more than complaints and grievances, retaliation, and vengeance (immediate causes)

or, for that matter, pretexts and real reasons, stemming from emotions like fear and greed, and motivation in general, whether of individuals or cities (profound causes). At a deeper level, explanations also include views of human nature and human behavior, notions of rise and decline, at times inevitable rise and decline, of both kings and cities, and finally concepts of the divine, of fate, and of chance, which have a metaphysical dimension. Some of these levels of explanation must affect the historians' attitudes to the causes of war in general, and so to the outbreak of a particular war or wars. For the most part, however, they are ignored or lost in analyses exclusively concerned with causal vocabulary.

To return to Rawlings, I am not suggesting here that he is wrong to resort to modern conceptions of historical causality for the purpose of analysis. Without such tools one would make but little sense of Greek history, remaining at the level of the actors' views of themselves and their motives. The use of the notion of structure is a case in point. (See P. Burke, *Sociology and History* [London, 1980], Chapter 2, "Social Structures.") My own use of the term *explanation* is another. What the distinction between precipitants and preconditions allows us to do is see just how far the ancients approximated and perhaps anticipated modern procedures without the benefit of notions like causation or causality, derived mainly from modern science, let alone vocabulary to express such notions. (See Chapters Two and Three for a discussion of Herodotus' early approximation of source criticism.) Approximation and anticipation, however, do not constitute identity. Just as the ancients had no concept of the economy, so they had no notion of "a primary, sufficient, or necessary cause." These terms derive from modern science. (See Marx Wartofsky, *Conceptual Foundations of Scientific Thought. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* [New York, 1968], *passim*, and R. Harré, *The Principles of Scientific Thinking* [Chicago, 1970], Chapter 4, "Laws of Nature.") They are useful insofar as they elucidate the thinking and

procedures of the two historians. They exceed the limits of their usefulness once they begin to obscure the particularity of the ancient outlook, by suggesting an identity between twentieth-century practice and that of Herodotus and Thucydides. For the use of similar scientific terminology in modern analytical philosophy, see W. Dray, "A Controversy over Causes: A.J.P. Taylor and the Origins of the Second World War" in *Perspectives on History* (London, 1980), pp. 69-96.

D. Herodotus' Chronology

A. B. Lloyd reviews the problem of the chronological framework of the *Histories* in *Herodotus, Book II*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1975-1976), 1:171-185. Based on 2.142.2, he believes that Herodotus adopted the equation that three generations equal one hundred years. In this he agrees with Mitchel, "Herodotos' Use of Genealogical Chronology," pp. 63-64, who strenuously rejects the view that Herodotus ever broke down the original equation into a generation of thirty-three and one third years. As Lloyd sums up the question, p. 177, "The very fact that the length of a generation, irrespective of the source, is allowed to fluctuate so much in Herodotus' *Histories* proves that such exactitude was the last thing in his mind." Two studies that stress that genealogical chronology is the only system used by Herodotus are D. W. Prakken, *Studies in Greek Genealogical Chronology* (Lancaster, Pa., 1943) and W. den Boer, "Herodot und die Systeme der Chronologie," *Mnemosyne* 20 (1967), 30-60. Both believe, however, that Herodotus did convert a generation into a fixed number of years (Prakken, *ibid.*, pp. 19-20, thirty-three and one third years, and den Boer, *ibid.*, p. 37, forty years). See too den Boer's *Laconian Studies* (Amsterdam, 1954), chap. 1, pp. 5-25.

Lloyd also rejects the scheme proposed by H. Strasburger, "Herodots Zeitrechnung" in Marg's *Herodot,* pp. 677-725 (also in *Historia* 5 [1956], 129-161). He deals at some length

with its *Rückgrat*, the Medo-Persian and Lydian King Lists, the synchronisms which form its ribs, and its "peg date," the archonship of Kalliades (8.51.1), which he considers "the weakest link in Strasburger's argument." For, as he points out, p. 183: "If Herodotus had intended to use such a key date in his scheme he would not have left it embedded in Book VIII, almost at the end of his work, but would have brought it as near to the beginning as possible." Compare den Boer, "Herodot und die Systeme der Chronologie," who also argues against Strasburger's scheme, stressing in particular the difficulties in trying to fix an absolute date on the basis of 8.51.1. He concludes, p. 35: "Das bedeutet, dass man auf die grössten Schwierigkeiten stösst, wenn man die Daten des athenischen Jahres in Monate und Tage unserer Zeitrechnung umrechnen will. Man muss deshalb stets wieder feststellen, dass Herodot—ohne unsere Hilfsmittel—nicht imstande bewesen ist, eine Umrechnung in 'absolut fixierbare' Daten zu vollziehen." For von Fritz's view see *Die Griechische Geschichtsschreibung* (Berlin, 1967), vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 364-426, and pt. 2, pp. 173-199.

For oral traditions in general and the methods presently used for converting relative into absolute chronology, see Vansina, "Once Upon a Time: Oral Traditions as History in Africa," in *Historical Studies Today*, ed. F. Gilbert and S. R. Graubard (New York, 1971), pp. 432-435. "Most of the time," he points out, p. 433, "one must work with very rough indicators of structural time age-sets, genealogies, and lengths of reign." He alludes briefly to the difficulties arising from "the variability of averages of generations and lengths of reign from one culture to another" (*ibid.*).

Appendix to Chapter Six

A. "Tyche" in Thucydides' History

The title of Lowell Edmunds' recent work, *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), expresses succinctly a basic Thucydidean opposition, that of *tyche* and *gnome*. The antithesis goes back to Cornford, who stated: "The two factors—γνώμη, human foresight, purpose, motive, and Τύχη, unforeseen non-human agencies—divide the field between them. They are the two factors—and the only two—which determine the course of a series of events such as a war" (*Thucydides Mythistoricus* [London, 1907], p. 105). Cornford's view of *tyche* is, of course, immensely controversial, and Edmunds rejects it outright. Indeed, one of Edmunds' major aims is to refute the idea that Thucydides viewed *tyche* as a superhuman agency or force. For Thucydides *tyche* is merely "that which is unexpected or contrary to calculation" (p. 207). Thus, whatever appeal to *tyche* Thucydides allowed the actors in his *History*, he himself excluded it as an historiographic principle.

Cornford, it seems to me, was on the right track in describing *tyche* as an objective force. On the other hand, it is not necessary, in the context of the present study, to follow Cornford further and see *tyche* as "unknown and incalculable agencies" that may intervene at critical moments (p. 106). It is sufficient to perceive that *tyche* is not just a subjective factor, that which men fail to calculate in advance or foresee, but is rather a structural element in the *History*. It is thus very much an historiographic principle of Thucydides. For *tyche*, fortuity, has a role in the historical process.

Let us attempt to consider the matter from a somewhat different perspective. Again, it seems to me that Cornford was correct to discuss *tyche* in the context of Thucydides' notion, or, in this instance, his lack of a notion, of causal

law. For what is at issue here is cause. More particularly, what is at issue is the central concern of the historian—change. How does Thucydides explain change? *Tyche* is central to change in the *History*, and as such amounts to an historical force. Consider, for example, the exploits of Harmodios and Aristogeiton (Book 6.54-61) or the successes of Demosthenes at Pylos (Book 4.1-41). In both instances, Thucydides explains change in the same manner. Or, as I concluded in "Athens *Tyrannis*," p. 126: "In the account of Harmodios and Aristogeiton . . . purely personal acts result in a series of coincidences, which in turn result in a new kind of tyranny, but one inherent in the very nature of the institution and ultimately inevitable. So, on a broader scale the purely personal, unplanned activity of Demosthenes leads to a series of fortuities, which, in unleashing an entirely new spirit in the δῆμος, undermine the democracy and set Athens on a course of bald imperialism, inevitable given the nature of empire and of subject peoples." Thucydides describes the murder of Hippias as a piece of bad luck, δυστυχία, the result of an erotic coincidence or *syntychia*. The good fortune of Demosthenes has been the subject of numerous studies, including that of Cornford, Stahl, *Thukydides. Die Stellung des Menschen im geschichtlichen Prozess* (Munich, 1966), and de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism*, trans. P. Thody (Oxford, 1963). See too Hunter, *Thucydides, the Artful Reporter* (Toronto, 1973), Chapter 4, "Demosthenes' Adventures." The present study has already noted a number of important examples of *tyche* in the *History*, such as the plague and Brasidas' unexpected arrival in Thrace. For other instances of *tyche*, see Stahl, *passim*, and Hunter, *Thucydides*, p. 147. There is no need for the word *tyche* to be present for a fortuity to occur and influence the historical process.

But precisely what role does *tyche* have in the historical process? For it is surely a commonplace to describe *tyche* merely as the unexpected or what is contrary to calculation. More significant is its effect on the collective mentality. Whether *tyche* or a *syntychia* is the result of a failure to use

reasoned judgment, *gnome* (the personal acts of Harmodios and Aristogeiton and Demosthenes), or whether it represents an unexpected occurrence, a sheer fortuity descending on a people (the plague or Brasidas' arrival), it has a devastating effect on men's minds. It unleashes the irrational, in the case of good fortune, by tempting men to further successes, and perhaps to their ruin, and in the case of bad fortune, by evoking anger, indignation, or despair. In a word, *tyche* releases all that is negative in human nature. In Thucydides' terms, it releases the irrational, in modern terms, it causes the breakdown of the collective mentality. And that breakdown is the central feature of change in the *History*. *Tyche* is an historical force because it brings about that change.

Glossary

Adika erga. Unjust acts or deeds
Aitia (*aitie*); pl. *aitiai.* Grievance, ground of complaint; accusation
Akoe. Tradition, accounts heard; the act of hearing
Ananke. Necessity, inevitability
Anomia (anomie). Disregard for law, unwritten law, or custom
Anthropeia physis. Human nature
Antilogia. Dialogue, answering speeches; opposing arguments
Apate. Deception
Apodexis. Publication, public reading
Arche. Empire, hegemony
Demos. The people; supporters of democracy, opponents of the few (*oligoi*), of oligarchy, and its supporters
Doxa. Opinion (as opposed to knowledge)
Dynamis. Power
Eikos; pl. *eikota.* Probability
Empeiria. Experience
Episteme. Knowledge
Erga. Acts or deeds; the narrative portions of both histories, specifically contrasted by Thucydides with the *logoi* or speeches of the protagonists
Gnome. Judgment, reasoned opinion
Idia. Private interests, individual concerns
Kairos. Opportune moment
Koine. Collectively, in common
Koinon. The collective, what is common to all
Kyklos. Circle, cycle
Logos; pl. *logoi.* The portions of both histories representing the speeches of the protagonists, whether in direct or indirect discourse; in Herodotus, an individual account

or tradition, a series of which, *logoi*, constitute the *Logos*, e.g., the Egyptian *Logos*

Metabole. Sudden change, reversal

Mythos. Story, fable, myth

Nomos; pl. *nomoi*. Law, custom; custom-law

Paradeigma. Example

Pentekontaetea. The period of fifty years from the end of the Persian Wars to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War

Periousia. Surplus

Phthonos. Envy

Physis. Nature (often in opposition to *nomos*, "culture")

Pleonexia. Greed, the desire or attempt to grasp for more

Polypragmosyne. Curiosity, restlessness, drive to be constantly active

Semeia. Signs; evidence

Stasis; pl. *staseis*. Political turmoil, "party" strife; faction

Stolos. Expedition

Strateia. Expedition

Syntychia. Chance occurrence, fortuity

Techne. Skill, technical ability or ingenuity

Tekmeria. Sure signs, proof

Tisis. Retribution, punishment

Trophe. Provisions, forage, supplies

Tyche. Luck, chance, fortune

Xynesis. Intelligence

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