



Seascapes

Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures,
and Transoceanic Exchanges

EDITED BY

JERRY H. BENTLEY

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SEASCAPES





Perspectives on the Global Past

Jerry H. Bentley and Anand A. Yang

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Dedicated to the memory of
Nadine Ishitani Hata
colleague, collaborator, friend

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Acknowledgments

The essays in this volume originated at a research conference on “Seascapes, Littoral Cultures, and Trans-Oceanic Exchanges” held in February 2003 at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. The conference represented part of a larger effort to build bridges between the various fields of area studies scholarship that focus on well-defined world regions by accentuating the links between them, thereby contributing to the development of transregional and global historical analysis. The idea of drawing area studies associations into dialog emerged in 1995 as a project of the American Historical Association (AHA). Conceived by Sandria B. Freitag (then executive director of the AHA) and the Program Committee planning the AHA annual meeting of 1996 (cochaired by Renate Bridenthal and Patrick Manning), it was later developed as a series of grant proposals for two research conferences and three summer seminars for community college instructors, all held at the Library of Congress.

It would have been impossible for this family of projects to succeed without the intense collaboration of educational institutions, funding agencies, scholarly associations, and energetic individuals. The AHA and the Library of Congress provided an institutional home for the projects in Washington. Arnita Jones, executive director of the AHA, generously supported the projects both with her own time and with AHA staff resources. Particular thanks go to AHA staffers Debbie Doyle and Brandon Schneider, both of whom devoted enormous time and energy to the projects. At the Library of Congress, Carolyn Brown, Prosser Gifford, and Les Vogel offered gracious hospitality in making the Library’s incomparable resources and facilities available to project participants. Under the leadership of Executive Director David Berry, the Community College Humanities Association provided essential logistical support. Funding for the projects came principally from the Ford Foundation. Thanks go especially to the Foundation’s enterprising program officer, Toby Alice Volkman, and its visionary vice president, Alison Bernstein, both of whom supported the projects as efforts to build constructively on the legacy of area studies scholarship, which the Ford Foundation itself had generously sponsored for more than fifty years. The editors would

also like to express particular appreciation to Debra Sasaki for her careful attention as she helped prepare the book for publication.

Planning for the “Seascapes” conference was the work of a steering committee chaired by Jerry H. Bentley representing the World History Association and Renate Bridenthal representing the AHA. Other members of the Steering Committee representing area studies associations and other constituencies included David Newbury from the African Studies Association; Thomas Bender, Volker Berghahn, Nadine Ishitani Hata, Arnita Jones, and Dane Kennedy from the AHA; Kären Wigen and Anand A. Yang from the Association for Asian Studies; David Berry from the Community College Humanities Association; Ann Twinam from the Conference on Latin American History; Thomas Holloway from the Latin American Studies Association; Carolyn Brown and Prosser Gifford from the Library of Congress; and Leila Fawaz from the Middle East Studies Association.

On February 25, 2005, the steering committee lost one of its most dedicated and faithful members when Nadine Ishitani Hata died peacefully following a lengthy illness. Nadine was a woman of both courage and grace. She was a scholar and teacher, an administrator and educational leader, a wonderful colleague, collaborator, mentor, and friend. In recognition of her support for the “Seascapes” conference as well as her many contributions that made the world a better place, this volume is dedicated to the memory of Nadine Ishitani Hata.

Introduction

Kären Wigen

To judge from movie marquees, tourist brochures, or bestseller lists, seascapes loom large in the public imagination. Yet on the mental maps of most scholars, oceans are oddly occluded. Geographically marginal to the grids of academic inquiry, the watery world seems to fall between our conceptual cracks as well. When not ignored altogether, maritime topics are routinely relegated to subfields on shipping or migration, pirates or fisheries. That ocean basins are sliced in half on our classroom maps only reinforces their academic invisibility. By contrast, the prestigious, central fields—as defined not only by cartographers but by doctoral committees, job listings, and publication categories—are overwhelmingly conceived in terrestrial terms.

Yet current events have a way of challenging scholarly convention. Rediscovered as a crucial space of globalization—and one with a fragile and imperiled ecology of their own—oceans have swung insistently into view in recent years. And slowly but surely, scholarly attention has followed. Tentatively at first, in experimental forums, new networks for scholarly exchange have sprung up around maritime basins, crossing traditional boundaries of state and civilization as well as discipline. The issues raised vary from field to field, as do the methods for addressing them. Broadly speaking, historians tend to view the ocean as a highway for intercontinental exchange, highlighting transoceanic interactions and the creole cultures they have spawned. Social scientists more often approach the sea as an arena of conflict, whether for trading privileges or resource rights. And humanists prefer to probe the elusive contours of the oceanic imaginary in film and fiction, map and metaphor.¹ Despite their disparities, what all such efforts share is a shifting of the frame: an effort to move the seas from the margins to the center of academic inquiry. In their different ways, each holds up a “seascape” to scholarly view.

Most such efforts to date address individual oceans, and for good reason. After all, outside the hydrological sciences, ocean-oriented research is only now evolving out of established fields that have historically been rooted

on land: imperial histories, national literatures, and, latterly, feminist, labor, and postcolonial studies. Rare is the scholar who trained within the still nascent domain that might yet become maritime sociocultural studies. Rather, for the most part, individuals who originally studied one or another landed society have at some point followed their subjects out into adjacent ocean space. The result is a burgeoning but fragmented body of work, framed within individual basins: the enclosed waters of the Black or Mediterranean Sea, the wider Atlantic, the Indian Ocean hub, or the sprawling Pacific.² Yet the kinds of problems that draw scholars into maritime topics in the first place tend to resist fragmented inquiry. Since seafaring humans are caught up in truly global webs, even a colossal fragment like the Pacific Ocean is not big enough to contain most oceanic themes. In practice, the skeins of maritime connection—whether in the realm of idioms and ideas, diasporic dispersals, imperial projections, scientific linkages, or strategies of resistance—quickly transcend the confines of a single ocean.

The conference at which the present volume was born was inspired by a bold but simple proposition. What if members of these emergent water-based communities were put in conversation with each other? What would happen if ocean-oriented scholars were brought together, not around a single body of water, but across far-flung places and times? Such a venture would be, of necessity, institutionally ambitious. To canvas such a fragmented field required appeals to every Area Studies association in the United States. In addition, to underwrite an inter-area conference of this kind required unprecedented cooperation and support from the Ford Foundation, the Community College Association, the American Historical Association, and the Library of Congress. But the undertaking was ambitious—and risky—in an intellectual sense as well. Bringing people together around an open-ended theme like “seascapes” was one thing; producing significant results was another. Absent the common ground provided by communities of specialization, would meaningful scholarly conversations take place? And if they did, would those conversations resonate beyond the conference itself?

The three dozen scholars who converged on the Library of Congress for a snowbound weekend in early 2002 answered the first question with a resounding “yes.” The conferees, while biased toward history, represented a remarkable range of disciplinary, area, and institutional affiliations. Some had lived on the littoral or studied seafarers for years; others had been pulled into their topics almost inadvertently, drawn to the water in pursuit of migratory subjects. For most, it was exhilarating to encounter others who were equally compelled by the sea. But it was also exhilarating to discover an intellectual field where the fundamental questions were all still in play.

This was one conference whose participants did not share—and could not imagine—a single set of axioms, priorities, or procedures. Even the historiographical reference points of the contributors were widely divergent. While it became clear that scholarly canons are forming for individual basins (particularly in the relatively well-developed Atlantic and Indian Ocean literatures), interocean paradigms remain very much up for grabs. The only assumption shared by the “Seascapes” conferees was that oceans matter. The consensus animating the meeting—and undergirding this volume—was that maritime peoples, environments, and dynamics deserve to be investigated, theorized, and taught in their own right.

How that might be done is another matter, as this diverse collection reveals. The first set of papers (by Gillis, Van Tilburg, and Gaynor) explores a handful of critical *constructs* for maritime studies: islands, littorals, ships, and sea space itself. The second set (by Phillips, Casale, Gould, and Karras) examines *empires*, tracing a series of efforts by territorial states to project their power across water. The third group of authors (Ward, Cogley, Faussette, and Balachandran) draws attention to *sociologies* on ship or at port, while the fourth group (Tai, Shapinsky, and Rediker) examines the worlds of smugglers and pirates, quintessential maritime *transgressors*. Before turning to the larger issues that these essays collectively engage, a brief overview of each is in order, if only to convey the richness and texture of the empirical settings in which scholars are developing their perspectives on seascapes, maritime histories, littoral cultures, and transoceanic exchanges.

CONSTRUCTS

The exploration of fundamental oceanic constructs begins with John Gillis’s expansive meditation on what he calls “Atlantic Oceania.” Gillis calls on us to rethink early modern history from an island-centric perspective. He contends that the years from 1500 to 1800 constituted a distinctive moment in the European geographical imagination: a time when islands took on an importance that they only later ceded to continents. This “Age of Islands” was discernable in multiple registers, from literature and maps to wars and revolutions. Renaissance intellectuals tended to think of the world archipelagically, imagining island utopias well into the nineteenth century. At the same time, European expansion overseas took the form of archipelagic empires, creating a capitalist geography where access to goods mattered more than control of territory. As the critical nodes in far-flung networks of trade, Gillis tells us, “islands were the most traded, fought over, renamed, cherished, and forfeited lands in the early modern period.” His richly footnoted

survey sketches the crucial roles that islands played in early modern commerce, navigation, and migration, as well as in the political and industrial revolutions that brought the era to a close.

Hans Van Tilburg directs our attention to another fundamental category: the ship itself. For Van Tilburg, maritime vessels are not just tools of transoceanic exchange, but products of that exchange as well. Through the contrasting histories of the California junk and the Hawaiian sampan, his essay reveals the striking range of trajectories for particular types of craft. In California, the junk effectively vanished. Once the “physical end of a very long trade diaspora” that had turned the Sacramento delta into a frontier of maritime China, the West Coast junk fleet was effectively set adrift by the anti-Chinese Exclusion Acts of the 1880s and 1890s. Forced sales put the boats into the hands of owners who lacked the skills to reproduce them, so that today they remain solely as archaeological specimens. In Hawai‘i, by contrast, the sampan survived enlistment by the U.S. Navy in the 1940s to emerge in the postwar period as an “engineered cultural hybrid,” manned by multinational crews. Both cases challenge scholars’ habit of assigning national labels to different types of maritime craft. We emerge from this lively essay with a new appreciation of the ship as a mobile, mutable cultural form. As Van Tilburg pointedly concludes, the attempt to nationalize inanimate objects in the effort to maintain boundaries at sea can only work against cultural exchange.

The final contribution to this section is by Jennifer Gaynor, who attends to notions of the sea itself. Her chapter considers how conceptions of sea space have been integral to political imaginaries in Southeast Asia, where geopolitical notions of place have long included not just a *homeland* but the seas as well. In modern Indonesia an increasingly territorialized notion of space has in turn shaped ideas of ethnic difference and the position of “sea people” in particular. The keyword here is “*nusantara*,” a concept that originated in fourteenth-century Java as a term of reference for other islands, but that evolved over time into a more encompassing and decentered concept denoting the archipelago as a whole. Borrowing the terminology of Thongchai Winichakul’s *Siam Mapped*, Gaynor argues that *nusantara* came to constitute the “geo-body” of Indonesian nationalism: an abstract geographical signifier that was a model *for*, rather than a model *of*, what it purported to represent. And having been transformed into an icon of pan-Indonesian nationhood for anticolonial nationalists, it subsequently became an idiom through which the state could claim ownership of all material resources within and below the waters between the archipelago’s islands. Cartographic conventions aided in this appropriation, for whereas places

on land stood *for* various groups of people, the same principle could not be applied to people associated with the seas. “Sea people,” apparently lacking a particular place on land from which they might claim to hail as a group, came to occupy a kind of structural blind spot, their lack of a homeland marking them as “gypsies” in the colonial imagination.

Gaynor’s paper ends with a meditation on the erosion of local autonomy in the Southeast Asian littoral, a tragedy with parallels in many other places. As political imaginaries become increasingly territorialized, she finds, people who make their living on and from the sea have paradoxically been marginalized from the political process. For while hardly isolated from other people and places, they are isolated in relation to administrative structures and centers. She observes that sea people in modern times, to their detriment, have not formed the kinds of ethnic patronage networks that are supported by territorial administrative structures. Such was clearly not the case for those metropolitan power-holders who carved out successful maritime empires, however, as our next contributions make clear.

EMPIRES

Part II turns to the transmarine empire, a geopolitical form that has arisen repeatedly across the last millennium of global history. The chapters in this section offer, as it were, a top-down perspective on seascapes: the perspective of metropolitan elites who attempted to project their power across the water. Focusing on the Iberian empires, Carla Rahn Phillips reminds us that this was no easy task. Her fundamental question concerns the daunting challenge of colonial logistics in the age of sail: how were early modern states able to sustain global empires, she asks, at a time when transoceanic exchange was both infrequent and fragile? As she points out, the Spanish empire in the Americas held together politically for more than 300 years, in a space that came to include over 12 million square miles and over 15 million people. Given the slowness of early modern communications and the vulnerability of seafaring craft, how was that possible? Rahn’s answer highlights “the intricate fabric of public and private traditions and institutions that Iberians carried with them overseas.” Crucial here were traditions of seafaring and mariners’ guilds; an empire-wide framework of written law; a variety of models for colonial rule, from captaincies to royal charters; a modular bureaucratic structure of local councils and committees; a common Catholic faith; elastic networks of community and kin; and above all, the unifying figure of the king. Rahn insists it was not the crown that controlled the colonies, but rather the colonists who controlled the colonies in the name

of the crown. What empowered them to do so, in the end, was their strong sense of inhabiting a shared emotional space with kin and countrymen at home, despite the vast oceans in between. That conviction, she concludes, was essential to the Spanish empire's remarkable resiliency.

The next essay offers yet another perspective on early modern seaborne empires, focusing on their intimate relationship to geographical discovery and reconnaissance. Giancarlo Casale draws attention to the striking parallels between the European discovery of the Atlantic realm and the simultaneous Ottoman discoveries in the Indian Ocean. These parallels have gone virtually unnoticed, he claims, because modern scholars have assumed that the Ottomans were already familiar with the Islamized realm into which they advanced after 1517. On the contrary, Casale's careful research reveals that the Ottomans were surprisingly ignorant of medieval Islamic geography—a body of scholarship that was nearly as foreign to them as it was to their European contemporaries. In a sense the Indian Ocean realm was as much a “New World” for the Ottomans as the Americas were for the Portuguese. Moreover, the first eyewitness accounts of the Indian Ocean by Ottoman authors bear a striking resemblance to contemporary Western accounts of the Americas, reflecting similar concerns with assessing the economic resources, technological sophistication, and military potential of the newly discovered territories. Casale's chapter chronicles how quickly Ottoman scholars moved from a state of almost total ignorance about the world of the Indian Ocean to a comfortable familiarity, the product of both firsthand experience and sustained intellectual commitment. In short, the “age of discovery” was not just a European phenomenon; it was a process whose limits far exceeded the traditional boundaries of western civilization.

The third paper in this section, by Eliga Gould, maps the legal geography of the English-speaking Atlantic during the long eighteenth century. Gould examines the idea that the western and southern Atlantic lay beyond the pale of European law, constituting a region where law-abiding peoples were free to engage in practices that would have been unacceptable in Europe. This notion, shared by Americans and Britons alike, was critical to both English-speaking empires in the wider Atlantic, where “Weber's theoretically distinct categories of legal accumulation and lawless aggression remained explicitly intertwined.” This geographical construct manifested itself in the doctrine of autonomous spheres: one, the European quadrant of the globe, where the law of nations applied, and another, beyond the so-called lines of amity, where they did not. Such a division made it possible for Europeans to act with impunity, and even to wage war on each other, in the

Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, while maintaining peace (or “amity”) in Europe and its nearer waters. In a word, might made right beyond the line.

Although the doctrine of autonomous spheres lost its formal legitimacy in European international relations after the mid-eighteenth century, the presence of overlapping claims, and the absence of clear boundaries, allowed people on the margins of competing empires to continue engaging in local violence and undeclared warfare. This was especially true at sea. “Not only were ships thought to be places of rough manners and casual violence, but the waters through which they sailed often lay beyond the control of even Europe’s mightiest navies.” In dealing with native peoples, lawless behavior was further justified by the conviction that indigenous societies had no law. Gould concludes by showing that Americans found reasons of their own to perpetuate the geographical division between Europe and the western reaches of the Atlantic world.

The following essay, by Alan Karras, probes a case study from a maritime zone of continually contested sovereignty: the colonial Caribbean, where French, Dutch, British, and Spanish interests collided. Karras argues that Adam Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment provide a crucial intellectual context for thinking about this fragmented maritime world. As he wryly notes, “no place within eighteenth-century Atlantic America can better illustrate the human propensity to ‘truck, barter, and exchange’ by challenging legal restrictions than can the Caribbean islands.” Aided by physical distance from their respective metropolises, white islanders in the region readily transgressed any policies that interfered with local business, turning Caribbean ports into places where locals trafficked in legal interpretations as well as in consumer goods. This chapter elaborates a three-part typology of Caribbean ports, distinguishing officially recognized trading sites (those endowed with customs houses responsible to the metropole) not only from licensed “free ports” (where duties were typically much lower) but also from a third type of settlement, where trade was neither officially monitored nor legally recognized. Monte Christi, a vibrant example of the latter, became the site of a flourishing illegal trade. But it did so at the expense of the law. Karras concludes that the mercantilism of the Atlantic world came to an end because illegal smuggling ate away at its foundation, undermining the colonial political framework. As he memorably puts it, “the propensity to consume, in short, trumped any laws put in place to regulate it.”

Taken at a conceptual level, these papers identify four signature features of transmarine imperialism. Phillips’s focus on maintaining symbolic and affective bonds, Casale’s highlighting of exploration and discovery, Gould’s

clarification of legal frameworks, and Karras's emphasis on commercial regulations together begin to inventory the parameters and preconditions for the transmarine projection of power. Whatever elements one might add to this list, there is no question that social networks, geographical knowledge, legal codes, and customs regimes have all been essential elements of the imperial arsenal. Nor can there be any doubt that each has posed special problems at sea. These papers sketch the contours of a fascinating new field focused around just such problems.

SOCIOLOGIES

Part III, on maritime sociologies, shifts our gaze toward the very different "bottom-up" seascapes of working men and women. Kerry Ward's essay kicks off this section by plunging us deep into Eliza Gould's lawless zone. Ward's research on the Cape of Good Hope provocatively challenges prevailing conceptions of global oceanic space in the early modern period. In contrast to schemes that characterize port cities as either "Asian" or "Atlantic"—and that often go on to identify the Asian sphere with commerce and the Atlantic with war—her careful research illuminates Cape Town's position as both an oceanic and a historiographical crossroads. Lacking any indigenous connection with Indian Ocean shipping networks (or, indeed, any local orientation toward the sea), Cape Town grew up specifically to serve European ships that traveled *between* the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. This transregional role gave it a highly transient population; the settlers, slaves, sojourners, sailors, soldiers, convicts, and exiles who thronged the city's streets were usually on their way to somewhere else. Ward shows why it is crucial to remap the port city within sojourning networks if we are to grasp its social character.

The next essay focuses on another mobile maritime community, that of Caribbean sailors. Informed by Paul Gilroy's work on the Black Atlantic, Alan Copley asks why Caribbean seamen have had such a disproportionate influence in the worlds of labor organization and black political consciousness. His suggestive chapter begins by stressing the dire labor needs of military and merchant shipping, especially in the second half of the eighteenth century. Given the low pay, bad food, heavy work, harsh discipline, and high mortality rates that came with the job, recruitment was never easy, and captains struggling to fill out their rosters turned to whatever supplies of labor they could find. As a result, large numbers of unfree blacks throughout the Caribbean went to work on either military or merchant ships. After the British Emancipation Proclamation of 1834, the sea continued to provide one of the few viable avenues for black employment. The rise of steam from the 1840s onwards only raised the demand for non-British laborers, who

were typically hired to fill the dirty and dangerous positions of fireman, stoker, coal trimmer, cook, and steward. Over the course of the nineteenth century, these seafaring laborers joined a many-streamed diaspora, dispersing along all the international trade routes and across all the oceans of the world. Cogley suggests that Afro-Caribbean seafarers may have been socially, culturally, and ideologically prepared for this experience in ways other groups were not. Wherever they went, West Indian seamen founded local families and created creole communities. Yet it remained for the Caribbean islands themselves, with their strong face-to-face networks centered on family, church, and school, to provide the social base from which black seafarers would shape the language, culture, and “idiom of freedom” throughout the Atlantic world.

Risa Faussette hones in on another group of Caribbean maritime laborers, the waterfront workers of the West Indies. Trapped in the lowest-paid sector of the workforce, but exploiting their strategic location in the commercial nodes of maritime empires, these men emerged as the vanguard of the urban labor movement throughout the Caribbean basin. Faussette’s story begins in the late nineteenth century, as the withdrawal of British capitalists from the Caribbean allowed American investors to move into an increasingly neglected and easily penetrable colonial zone. West Indian workers migrated along the resulting cusp between a declining British imperialism and an emerging American maritime state in the western Atlantic world. Yet the coming of American capital failed to alleviate their impoverishment, setting in motion a pattern of recurrent inter-island migration as working men searched for a living wage. Their circuit of migratory labor, she finds, established lines of communication between various enclaves along the maritime avenues of trade, giving West Indian migrants a cosmopolitan awareness of labor issues beyond their region.

One of those enclaves was Panama, whose massive canal project in the first years of the twentieth century created a temporary surge of labor demand. As canal construction wound down after 1903, authorities took aggressive policies to depopulate the zone. In response, West Indian workers developed strategies and institutions to mobilize rapidly for protest. By reading working-class newspapers of the era and conversing with radical sailors passing through the Zone, Faussette tells us, Caribbean dockworkers were able to grasp that port-city laborers occupied a pivotal place in international commerce. Well aware of victories won around the world by similar laborers (reflected in the higher wages paid to their counterparts in other Atlantic ports), the men understood that their work was of strategic importance in the emerging structure of international commerce. Yet their movement was

ultimately broken, prompting a massive exodus to the United States—and revealing the need for scholars of labor history, like the people they study, to cross national boundaries.

G. Balachandran wraps up the section on oceanic sociologies by drawing attention to a group of whom remarkably little is known: the so-called lascar sailors from India. Aside from recent histories that attempt to recover a multicultural past for Britain, he finds, Indian seamen have been almost invisible in academic literature. The colonial state did everything it could to render their everyday presence invisible; shipowners resisted any inquiries that might increase the danger of regulation; and white British sailors resisted incorporating colonial sailors into their unions. Yet Balachandran finds that their very neglect paradoxically enabled Indian seamen to evade both the state's and the unions' disciplinary regimes until the eve of World War II. It also gave them the autonomy to adapt in their own ways the many ideas, beliefs, and modes of action that they encountered in the various worlds through which they passed. His essay probes the complexities of these men's growing colonial subjectivity in the wake of World War I: a double-edged sword that brought rights and opportunities even as it imposed new disciplines.

Together, these papers shine a powerful light on the subaltern worlds of the maritime working class. They remind us that transmarine empires everywhere have been built on the backs of laboring men and women, often under brutally coercive conditions. Whatever other operations such empires deployed, all have depended on forceful systems for drafting and disciplining a large, dispersed, and mobile labor force. At the same time, every case on offer here highlights the resilience and resourcefulness—in short, the agency—of the workers themselves. If keeping maritime manpower in line proved problematic, it was largely because sailors and dockworkers inhabited an expansive social world; not just capital and commodities, but visions and strategies of resistance as well moved easily along the sea lanes. As a result, the maritime world created both brutal disciplinary regimes and spaces of refuge for those who would flout the law. It is to this maritime underworld that the last section of the anthology turns.

TRANSGRESSORS

The final set of papers deals with maritime subversives. Emily Sohmer Tai opens this section with an essay on piracy in the medieval Mediterranean, challenging scholars to conceive maritime predation as a means both of drawing and contesting boundaries. Tai's research reveals a deep cleavage

between land-based political interests, which sought to extend their jurisdiction over the sea, and commercial interests, which typically resisted this territorialization. Maritime theft in the medieval Mediterranean, she argues, signaled contention not merely for material resources but for political advantage as well. The doges of Venice hired corsairs — effectively state-sanctioned pirates — to assist in their project of “marking water.” Genoa likewise used corsairs to extend its control to Levantine island outposts. While merchants are often said to have welcomed such expeditions as protection from piracy, Tai finds evidence that merchants were ambivalent about the territorialization of their commercial highway, and may have shared the pirate’s mental map more than that of the prince. Maritime experience, she suggests, invited Europeans who relied on the sea to imagine political space as fluid and fragmented, even as the sea afforded them mobility to transcend political rivalries in ways their inland kin could not.

Peter Shapinsky follows with a fascinating look at medieval Japanese piracy. In the fragmented world of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Japan, pirate-lords wielded formal authority over maritime space and populations at the heart of the archipelago. In analyzing their social and economic roles, Shapinsky eschews a terra-centric perspective, from which pirates are seen as seafaring bandits on the periphery. Instead he looks on them as littoral powerholders who engaged in both licit and illicit maritime activities. A pirate-lord’s domains typically consisted of a network of fortifications and private toll barriers located at various choke points of the Inland Sea. They typically oversaw trade in marine products (including shellfish, fish, and seaweed), as well as providing protection for merchant and pilgrim ships, but most of their wealth came from anchorage and safe-passage tolls. This pioneering essay shows how armed denizens of the medieval Japanese coastlines took advantage of their maritime superiority to negotiate the continuum of pillage and patronage, carving out their own space in a parcelized polity.

Marcus Rediker closes the collection with a disturbing look at crime and punishment in the early modern Atlantic, a world of class warfare where disciplinary brutality met with violent resistance. In Rediker’s account, ships and harbors were not only tools of trade but sites of bloody public ritual, where merchants and pirates were locked in a “dialectic of terror.” In the mid-eighteenth century, pirates were hunted with a vengeance and, when caught, were hanged with great fanfare. These public rituals afforded officials a chance to enact their power (and to instill fear in those sailors who yearned to join the pirate bands). Yet they might also afford the condemned a last stage for enacting defiance, mockery, and rage. For pirates knew well the uses of public theater. On the high seas, Rediker finds, rebel crews would

turn the deck of a captured ship into a stage for an oppositional ritual of their own, called the “Distribution of Justice.” In this symbolic inversion of power, abusive captains would be beaten in the same social space where they had inflicted punishment on their crews. Analyzing these reciprocal, if highly unequal, rituals allows Rediker to recast both ship and port as staging points for an early modern theater of terror.

LOOKING FORWARD

As these brief descriptions suggest, the research presented in this volume showcases a wide-ranging sample of work on maritime worlds. If the collection as a whole represents more than the sum of its parts, it is because these careful case studies provide tools for refining the still crude categories through which scholars are attempting to apprehend seascapes, maritime histories, littoral cultures, and transoceanic exchanges. It seems only fitting, then, to close this introduction by reflecting on how these studies might be put into dialog with other seminal works in the growing field of interocean studies. By my reading, the papers here highlight three interconnected challenges for that nascent field: those of space, time, and knowledge.

First, with regard to space. Approaching human society from the water is prompting scholars to think afresh about such basic elements of geography as distance, scale, and boundaries. For starters, these papers make it clear that maritime social-cultural history as an analytical project requires an expansive spatial vision, extending not only from the ships to the docks but bridging multiple regions of the ocean and including littorals and their hinterlands as well. Beyond that dictum, however, generalizing about oceanic social geography is a dicey matter. When the medium itself is fluid and moving, what is a meaningful measure of distance? When a given littoral community may be engaged simultaneously in dockwork, near-shore fishing, and interoceanic voyaging, how are we to think about scale? When the same sea is both barrier and connector—an elusive target for legal regimes and police powers alike—how are we to think about boundaries? Finally, since meaningful regions of interaction at sea are seldom coincident with the reach of any single polity and its archive (as land regions often are), how is a scholar to demarcate an area of study in the first place?

If anything, these papers underscore the need to engage these fundamental issues of spatiality on a case-by-case basis. Among the many discoveries on offer here, perhaps the most important is the irreducible specificity of different maritime worlds. Particular seas have particular geographical configurations, and those differences of geography have historically trans-

lated into very different sets of possibilities and constraints for those who lived on or near their shores. Where some bodies of water are relatively enclosed, others are vast and open-ended; where some are crossed by predictable seasonal winds, others have more erratic weather. Likewise, where some have relatively small and steep drainage basins, others are connected by navigable rivers to millions of miles of productive land. This point has been raised eloquently by Alan Villiers, in his evocation of how geography has conditioned trade and empire differently in the North and South Atlantics. Villiers notes of the North Atlantic that the length of its vast coastline, the tremendous area drained by the rivers flowing into it (some four times that draining into the entire Pacific), the great inland bays and seas that open from it on both sides, the wealth and power of its bordering lands, the profusion of good harbors, and the richness of its fisheries have all combined to give the North Atlantic an irrefutable centrality in the modern capitalist world system. The South Atlantic, by contrast, is a very different division of the ocean: its coastline is simple, its fronting continents are narrow, it harbors no great inland seas, and few great rivers empty into it.³ But geography plays no less a role on a smaller scale. As the chapters by Shapinsky, Karras, and Tai in this volume reveal, the intricacies of a particular coastline, the distribution of islands, and the location of strategic choke points shape not only shipping circuits but patterns of empire and piracy as well. Due to these and other differences, the pattern of interaction in any one sea-region may be useful to scholars elsewhere less as model than as foil.

One can hardly help recalling here the scholarship of Fernand Braudel, whose musings on the relationship between water, land, and history in the Mediterranean have inspired virtually all scholarship in this area to one degree or another. Gaynor discusses Braudel's paradigm explicitly, noting that a model developed for an enclosed basin does not easily apply to the much more open-ended waters of Southeast Asia. There, in contrast to the historical Mediterranean, maritime communications did not lead to long-lived transmarine polities. Yet the absence of political unity did not render this or any other ocean a "vast stretch of neutral water." On the contrary, Gaynor finds that even waters that do not share the enclosed geography of the Mediterranean can nonetheless offer symbolic and material resources for landed states—and thus remain hotly contested in imperial, national, local, and ethnic contexts alike. In short, it may be best to think of spatial models like Braudel's as akin to the oceangoing craft studied by Van Tilburg: simultaneously vessels and products of exchange, they must remain open to transformation and modification in the process of their travels.

Closely related to the issue of space is that of time. Compared with the

stable conventions for marking eras on land, maritime periodization is remarkably fluid. Part of the reason is that maritime life itself has taken shape in a sort of floating temporal interstice. Before the modern era, the rhythms of life around a given ocean followed discrepant temporal schemes, dictated by the individual communities, empires, or state systems along its various shores. With mastery of currents and winds, however, the connecting function of the sea itself helped to push those discrepant timelines into rough synchronicity, first across individual basins and later across the globe. Where oceans once divided, seas came to connect. After the fifteenth century, an increasing density and scale of interregional interaction led to the forging of a single world system, and oceans were a major site in which that process played out.⁴ Indeed, the modern world system has been *defined* as an oceanic system. This shifting role of oceans at once permits and requires creative thinking about time, rendering periodization a high-order conceptual challenge for ocean-centered studies.

One scholar who has devoted extensive thought to this matter is geographer Philip Steinberg. Steinberg schematizes the social construction of ocean space over three millennia, first under a trio of distinctive nonmodern societies (in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Melanesian worlds) and then under successive global capitalist regimes (merchant, industrial, and postmodern). Intriguingly, he finds that each of the latter echoes features from one of the earlier regional models. From roughly 1500 to 1800, Steinberg tells us, the primary construction of the global sea was as a Mediterranean-style “force-field.” Channeled circulation was a defining political-economic activity under mercantilism, and so the states of the era constructed the sea as an arena in which they claimed stewardship rights to distinct ocean routes, but did not attempt outright possession. In the industrial capitalist era, the key economic activity shifted from circulation across space to investment (and disinvestment) in specific production and consumption sites. Since these sites were located almost exclusively onshore, the deep sea became defined as a great void, idealized as outside society. This posited a global sea less on the model of the Mediterranean than on that of the premodern Indian Ocean: an asocial space between societies. Over time, however, Steinberg sees the latest iterations of capitalism as giving rise to increasingly rigid territorialization of the sea—a practice with premodern parallels in Micronesia.⁵

Complementing Steinberg’s scheme is a landmark essay by Michael Geyer and Charles Bright on the history of globalization. In Geyer and Bright’s narrative, the mid-nineteenth century represents a turning point, both for the evolution of the world system in general and for the role of oceans in particular. Until that point, they write, global development rested

on a series of overlapping, interacting, but basically autonomous regions, each engaged in processes of self-organization and self-reproduction. In this world, oceans served above all a *distancing* function. Contacts between the key regional centers extended across space through physically liminal zones—oceans and deserts—which doubled as social buffers (inhabited by microstates, pirates, and nomads). These zones of transition were crucial both for the conduct of commerce and for the exercise of power. After the crises of the mid-nineteenth century, however, deeper and more frequent contacts among all regions forged a new synchronicity, as regional interactions were lifted to an unprecedented pitch of “sustained, continuous, competitive, and often violent contact.” In the process the connective function of oceans came to supercede their earlier distancing function. The margins and peripheries that had once assured distance evaporated, the spaces between regions of once-autonomous development collapsed, and even the self-contained mental worlds of the various regions gave way to “new global imaginations.”⁶

The contributions in this volume, if put into conversation with Geyer and Bright’s geo-history of globalization and Steinberg’s models of maritime interaction, can be used to flesh out periodization schema both for individual seas and for interocean history on a global scale. Tai and Gould, for example, document important moments in the forging of transmarine ties across individual basins (the Mediterranean and Atlantic, respectively). Gillis’s chapter, for its part, elaborates on the role of islands in the mercantilist era’s “empires of access,” while Gaynor’s narrative documents the erosion of seafaring peoples’ control over the littoral zone under the modern nation-state. Clearly, however, much pioneering work remains to be done in this area. In a sense, charting the historical contours of maritime sociocultural development is as complex an undertaking as charting the geographical contours of the seas themselves.

While many more issues are raised by the chapters in this book, the last one I will address here is the question of knowledge. The history of the sea is not only a material story; it is an intellectual story as well. In the context of the current project, issues of knowing are raised in at least two discrete ways, for oceans come into play here both as objects of knowledge and as sites where knowledge is produced and circulated.

Oceans as objects of knowledge figure prominently in the contributions by Casale, on Ottoman exploration and geographical writing, and by Gaynor, on Indonesian ideas of sea space. Where Casale emphasizes the accumulation of objective knowledge of particular currents and coasts, Gaynor stresses the ideological nature of oceanic constructs. Seeing maritime “unity” as itself an ideological notion, Gaynor focuses on how social divisions are ef-

faced within this language, and on how political visions are, in effect, political imaginaries that “use different versions of the space of Southeast Asian seas—different seascapes—as their vehicle.” Strikingly, the force of cultural ideas is no less evident in Casale’s story of Ottoman exploration. After pointing out the parallels between European and Ottoman cartography in the sixteenth century, Casale closes by ruminating on a signal difference: the decision of the Ottomans not to adopt the printing press (a decision that was itself rooted in religious belief). Over time, the absence of printing would be felt to a greater and greater extent, for as European geographical works grew exponentially through the seventeenth century, Ottoman production of discovery literature began to taper off. Intriguingly, Casale assimilates this development into a trans-Mediterranean “intellectual division of labor”: one in which Ottomans and Portuguese alike—as expansive frontier states—produced new geographical knowledge, while the task of compiling and publishing was left to more developed printing centers in Italy and Germany. In tandem with Gillis’s observations on the signal importance of print media in diffusing island images during the early modern period, these findings draw attention to the role of media in shaping not only oceanic knowledge but maritime ideologies as well.

The second agenda for an intellectual history of maritime worlds is to consider the sea as a site of intellection. Important here is the role of oceans not only as highways or conduits for the movement of ideas, but equally as spaces of imaginative projection. The highway or conduit function is highlighted in the second half of this volume in the half-dozen studies that illumine the social and political networks of the maritime working class. Both Copley and Faussette depict Caribbean seamen and dockworkers as fully plugged in to far-flung information networks, confirming Gilroy’s characterization of the African diaspora as an “internation” demarcated less by its roots in the African continent than by a living tissue of ties across the Atlantic Ocean.⁷ Likewise, Karras and Rediker reveal a similar web of information and strategies as circulating in the Atlantic underworld of smugglers and pirates. Little wonder that the sea and the seaboard have often been cast as places of license, heresy, and sedition.⁸ Indeed, all of these contributions resonate with a central theme in maritime studies: the notion of the sea as a heterotopia. As many scholars have noted, marine-based social formations have long served as models for social change in landed societies. Islands in particular—as Gillis so vividly documents—have served as sites where new modes of freedom (and control) can be imagined and implemented. But as Rediker’s concluding chapter reminds us, it is crucial not to romanticize the

results. To borrow Steinberg's formulation, maritime worlds have historically been arenas where modernity's control-freedom dialectic is played out, rather than arenas where that dialectic is overthrown.⁹

Last but not least, it is worth considering the relationship between oceanic perspectives and scholarly knowledge. Most current categories of social analysis were initially developed to understand land-based societies. How those categories need to be transformed by perspectives from the sea—and how far they can be stretched, bent, and reworked to accommodate ocean-centered realities—is perhaps the most important unresolved agenda hanging over this collection. Balachandran's description of lascar sailors would equally fit many of the other people who figure in these texts. "Neither peasants nor proletarians, palpably committed neither to ship nor harbor, sea nor land, port nor hinterland, town nor village, urban nor rural, industry nor agriculture, Asia nor Europe, 'modern' nor 'traditional,' [they are] distant stragglers after the neat categories that have helped to frame our social imaginations." Whether this means that maritime scholarship can and should give rise to an alternative set of social categories is another question. Is it possible, as both Gaynor and Tai speculate, that common experiences at sea enabled sailors, merchants, and even pirates to develop a distinct subjectivity—one that resonated within their communities and their own life stories beyond their careers at sea? If so, will ocean histories yield new constructs and new metanarratives to frame our social imaginations? Or will their value lie rather in replacing such fixed categories in favor of discrepant temporalities and amphibious identities (both inside and outside modernity, as well as on and off the sea)? The answer to that question, like so many others raised in this rich collection, lies in the offing. May such questions prompt wider participation in this exciting project of scholarly exploration.

NOTES

1. Compare Steinberg's insight that "three perspectives form the basis for most studies of human-marine interactions: the ocean as resource provider, the ocean as transport surface, and the ocean as battleground or 'force-field.'" Steinberg accordingly prefers a tripartite model of the social construction of ocean space, one that simultaneously involves uses (political economy), regulations (territoriality), and representations (discourse). See Philip E. Steinberg, *The Social Construction of the Ocean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 11, 32.

2. For useful entry points into this "new thalassology," see the lively review essays by Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell (on the Mediterranean), Alison Games (on the

Atlantic), and Matt Matsuda (on the Pacific), published as a special forum on "Oceans of History" in the *American Historical Review* III (2006): 717–780.

3. Alan Villiers, *The Western Ocean: Story of the North Atlantic* (London: Museum Press, 1957), pp. 13–15.

4. Jerry H. Bentley, "Sea and Ocean Basins as Frameworks of Historical Analysis," *Geographical Review* 89 (1999): 215–224.

5. Steinberg, *Social Construction of the Ocean*; for a summary, see pp. 207–209.

6. Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, "World History in a Global Age," *American Historical Review* 100 (1995): 1045–1046.

7. Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

8. André Wink, "From the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean: Medieval History in Geographic Perspective," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44 (2002): 436.

9. Steinberg, *Social Construction of the Ocean*, p. 192.

Constructs



Islands in the Making of an Atlantic Oceania, 1500–1800

John R. Gillis

The events of history often lead to the islands. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that they make use of them.

—Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*

Civilizations think about islands in very different ways. The inhabitants of precolonial Polynesia saw themselves as inhabiting a sea of islands, connected rather than divided by water and thus more like an aqueous continent. “Their universe comprised not only land surfaces, but the surrounding ocean as far as they could traverse and exploit it,” writes Epile Hau’ofa, “Their world was anything but tiny.”¹ For them the sea was home, a place rather than an interval between places. Connected to the sea around them, islands were not perceived as small or insular. They were the center of the world, and every bit as up-to-date as any mainland.

Europeans and North Americans brought a very different understanding of oceanic islands to the Pacific. For them the sea was a void rather than a place, and what they perceived from their continental perspectives as islands in the far sea appeared small, remote, and isolated whatever their size or proximity. For them the Pacific isles were not only spatially but temporally distant. Joseph-Maria Degerando wrote in 1797 that the traveler there was “exploring the past; every step he makes is the passage of an age. Those unknown islands that he reaches are for him the cradle of human society.”² The notion that Pacific island cultures represented undisturbed examples of earlier stages of mankind continued to dominate western anthropology until relatively recently.

But these contrasting understandings of islands should not obscure the degree to which something like a sea of islands once existed in the Atlantic itself. During the early modern period its islands were closely connected

with one another and constituted a world of their own, very much at the leading edge of the developments of the day. Atlantic cosmographies differed in important respects from those found in the Pacific—the sea, for example, remained a non-place for most westerners—but islands took on an importance that they only later ceded to the continents. This chapter attempts to explain why what might be called an Atlantic Oceania came into being in the period from 1500 to 1800.

I

We have such difficulty recovering the history of this Atlantic Oceania because according to the western historiographical canon laid down in the nineteenth century, history begins and ends at the edges of continents, and dwells almost exclusively on their interiors. “Although history is ostensibly about people, it has tended to become overwhelmingly about ‘lands,’” writes Ian Steele. “Countries are given histories that can portray areas of soil as living social, economic, and political beings, whereas oceans are viewed primarily as vast and empty moats between those histories.”³ In the story as it is usually told, that which lies beyond the shores is either the prelude to or the aftermath of the grand continental narratives.

But what if we were not so attached to the myths of continents, less enamored of a continental telos that would have us believe that everything begins and ends at the shoreline? It might be possible to imagine other narratives, especially for the early modern period, when oceans played more important roles than continents, becoming historic places in their own right. There is every reason to do so because, as J. H. Parry has demonstrated, “The Great Age of Discovery was essentially the age of the discovery of the sea,” reminding us that “for the most part, the explorers sought not new lands, but new routes to old lands.”⁴ Waters that had been obstacles now gave unprecedented access. Before the fifteenth century, “the Ocean led nowhere; in the next centuries people would see it led everywhere.”⁵

In this revised narrative, history moves off rather than onshore. The Atlantic becomes a sea of islands linked as much to one another as to continental littorals. The Chinese saw it that way, publishing a guide in 1701 that lumped together Europeans, Africans, and Americans as the “people of the Great Western Sea.”⁶ In this rewriting of history, it would not be territory itself but access to territory that would be of central economic, political, and social importance. The extraterritorial, including seas and rivers as well as islands, would come into their own as agents rather than as passive objects of continental imperatives.

As the geographer Philip Steinberg has pointed out, during the early modern period “the sea was fought over not as a space to be possessed but to be controlled, a special space within world-society but outside the territorial states that comprised its paradigmatic spatial structure.”⁷ Charles Maier has reminded us that “territoriality has not been a timeless attitude in human societies,” and the relationship between land and sea has been sensitive to the changes in the meaning of territorial sovereignty over the centuries.⁸ A longer perspective, taking into account the early modern period, enables us to see that lands we call continents were not always as important as they have been in the past two hundred years. One could even venture to say that in the initial stages of western modernity islands were of greater significance. Calling the period 1500–1800 the great age of islands not only alters our sense of periodization, but invites a reconsideration of history’s continental bias.

We need to accept John Pocock’s invitation “to let our mental vision travel out into a diffusion of pelagic cultures lying beyond ‘Europe’ and ‘civilization’ as conventionally imagined.”⁹ This is the only way to recapture the true relationships of lands, oceans, and islands, and to give them historical as well as geographical parity. The cumulative effect of the Age of Discovery was to alter many Europeans’ conception of both land and sea. The oceans became something between rather than something beyond.¹⁰ Perceived as more like great lakes than a single body of impassable water, and no longer placeless, the Atlantic and the Pacific could be seen as connecting rather than separating all lands, islands as well as continents. As a consequence, Europe’s sense of itself was profoundly altered. From being the Cap d’Asia on the western margin of a single Afroasian-European landmass known in the Middle Ages as *Orbis Terrarum*, Europe came to see itself as being the center of the world.¹¹ No longer itself a frontier, it acquired its own frontiers, temporal as well as geographical, the most important of which was the sea itself.

II

The discovery of the Americas was unintended, and, as Robert Lopez once preceptively remarked: “Indeed, for a moment it looked as if Europe would reject the unresolicited gift of 1492.”¹² Europe was absorbed by its own internal problems and would soon be fissured by the Reformation. The Black Death a century earlier had solved the overpopulation problem, making it very difficult to get its people to settle the New World. Most who ventured overseas were looking for both a quick return on their investment and an equally quick return home. During the sixteenth century it was gold and silver that lured the Spanish onshore.¹³ The French and English launched

similar searches for treasure, but when these proved unsuccessful they had to settle for fish and furs. These enterprises did not involve permanent settlement until the seventeenth century, however, and, when settlement finally happened, it was first on islands, not mainlands. Fishing required no continental connection at all, while the fur trade was in the hands of well-organized Native American peoples. The North American continent was by no means empty, and initially, inland settlements were not only difficult but unnecessary as far as trade was concerned. Europeans were content to visit the coasts on a seasonal basis, taking advantage of the already well-defined trading networks of Native Americans. Fishermen had early on set a precedent for the use of islands by camping on them in the summer months. Newfoundland and islands along the New England coast served this purpose well in the sixteenth century, but never led to permanent populations.¹⁴

Islands had the advantage of being accessible to the mainlands but fortifiable against the Native Americans onshore. Islands therefore became forward bases in both fishing and fur trading. Sable Island, a whaling station off Nova Scotia founded by the Marquis de la Rock, became the first French colony to last more than a year. But its colonists were minor criminals rounded up for the purpose of settlement, and in 1603 they turned on their guards and escaped their island prison, thus ending the enterprise.¹⁵ The Dutch had their trading post on Manhattan Island, and the English also looked to islands, first to Roanoke and then Jamestown, for their first permanent settlements. But the colony on Roanoke Island was a failure, and Jamestown came close to disaster. It was only when a suitable export crop, tobacco, proved profitable that the inland dimension of the Virginia experiment was assured.¹⁶

The preference for islands was second nature to Europeans, who had been developing what David Ringrose calls "island empires" long before they ventured beyond the Pillars of Hercules.¹⁷ Beginning with the crusades, the islands of the Mediterranean had been strategic stepping stones. As Fernand Braudel described it, Europeans moved "crab-wise from rock to rock," rarely going far inland.¹⁸ When the eastern Atlantic islands began to attract European attention in the fourteenth century, their discovery and colonization was a multinational enterprise. By the mid-fifteenth century there existed what Felipe Fernandez-Armesto has called the "Atlantic Mediterranean," projecting itself gradually south and west from the Canaries and Madeiras to the Cape Verdes and Azores. On the African coasts, islands served Europeans as trading posts and prisons for slaves awaiting transshipment.

The expansion farther west was therefore not such a great leap as we

have been led to believe by those who see 1492 as representing a great historical turning point. On the contrary, its late medieval origins are now reasonably clear. Europe's maritime technology and navigational skill had been honed by centuries of experience. But no less significant was insular romanticism and late medieval millenarianism, without which the thrust westward is inexplicable.¹⁹ Columbus believed that the discovery of islands was a prelude to the Second Coming. And islands continued to hold pride of place in millenarian dreams, which were increasingly oriented toward the west in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.²⁰ Divine providence did not lead automatically from sea to land, and destiny did not become landlocked until the nineteenth century, when the future finally departed from islands and attached itself to continents.

During the Renaissance many Europeans came to think of the world archipelagically. This facilitated the shift from closed cosmologies of the Middle Ages, where everything was perceived as analogous to everything else, to a fractured perspective in which "insularity comes to stand for a kind of knowledge, a distinctly partial knowledge that counters the totalities of institutions and regimes."²¹ Insularity in the early modern period seemed liberating rather than confining, for each island could be imagined as a different world, offering new possibilities to a Europe which had for so long conditioned to thinking according to one model of the universe. This was the moment when the *mappaemundi*, showing a single earth surrounded by an impassable ocean, finally gave way to vision of multiple lands and seas. It was also the time of the *isolario*, or books of islands, compendiums of facts and fictions organized around chapters on islands, real and imagined, which encouraged speculation on the diversity of the world's peoples and cultures, reflecting but also facilitating the process of global encounters that Europe had embarked upon.²²

Thinking archipelagically, Europeans initially understood the Americas to be islands. A firm distinction between islands and continents was slow in emerging, and Australia was also perceived as insular when it was first encountered in the eighteenth century. Islands remained the favored location for western dreams and fears throughout the early modern period. Edenic and utopian isles would continue to fill the mental maps of Europeans until the nineteenth century.²³ Later, islands were viewed as instruments for a more secular kind of progress and the objects of scientific exploration. Richard Grove has argued that islands like St. Helena were the world's first laboratories for environmental science. Islands were particularly appealing because they were "in practical environmental as well as in mental terms, an

easily conceived allegory of a whole world.”²⁴ Islands were also sites for early anthropological speculation. But, above all else, they were political assets and economic prizes.

III

“The Sea is the only Empire which naturally belongs to us, conquest is not in our interest,” wrote the Englishman Andrew Fletcher in 1698.²⁵ Few of the great ancient empires had relied on sea power; nor had the states of Asia bothered to militarize their adjacent seas. But now Europe used the one resource that gave it an advantage, namely, its skill in shipbuilding and navigation, to create something quite unprecedented, what Charles Boxer felicitously christened seaborne empires.²⁶ With the exception of Spain, Europe’s American empires were more insular than continental.²⁷ It will be remembered that the initial objective of the voyages of discovery was trade, and trade on the European, African, and Asian coasts was often conducted from islands.²⁸ The islands of the Caribbean were easily mistaken for Asian archipelagos. Initially the Spanish were not looking for empty lands, but trading partners; islands “were best if they were inhabited, preferably by docile and industrious people.”²⁹ The Spanish would ultimately find riches on the American continents, but other European powers did not readily follow them inland. Northern European empires tended to hug the coasts and focus on islands.

“When we think about the expansion of Europe we often conflate an oceanic presence—or a bounded presence on an island or a littoral—with continental territorial control,” writes Elizabeth Mancke.³⁰ She rightly notes that, with the exception of New Spain, control of the seas and islands was not just a prelude to territorial possession, but an end in itself. As for the northern European powers, which would surpass Spain in the development of commercial capitalism, empire was a matter of access, not of possession. The interiors of Asia, Africa, and much of the Americas remained inaccessible until the nineteenth century. Europeans were content to let the peoples of the interior, whether they be African slavers or Native American fur traders, control that end of the business. Indeed, they preferred it that way.³¹ What was desired was access to the goods, including slaves, that were produced in the interiors. This was best achieved by control over the coasts and coastal islands. The success of just such a strategy in the Mediterranean in the late Middle Ages led to its extension to the African coast in the fifteenth century, and its ultimate projection to all the world’s regions by the end of the eighteenth century. In some cases, islands actually exercised sovereignty over mainlands. In order to encourage migration to the Cape Verde archipelago,

the Portuguese sovereign granted its first settlers a monopoly of trade on the creeks and shores of Senegal, causing them to be known thereafter as “the rivers of Cape Verde.” In the New World, Barbadians played a crucial role in the colonization of South Carolina.

Island empires were empires of access, not possession. As Steinberg has demonstrated, Europeans did not regard the oceans as something to be possessed, but as a force field of struggle for control over key sea routes and nodal points. In the prevailing theory of mercantilism, trade was the primary source of wealth, and “the sea was an important connecting space to be dominated as a means of controlling trade.”³² The oceans were regarded as extraterritorial, and islands were thought of, not as integral parts of the home country, but as pawns to be traded on a world chessboard of power politics. The European powers were even willing to trade away their own nationals when it suited them. To secure their monopoly on the world nutmeg trade, the Dutch were willing to offer Manhattan for the tiny islet of Run in the Banda archipelago of Indonesia. There is no question but that islands were the most traded, fought over, renamed, cherished, and forfeited lands in the early modern period.³³

In the absence of a standing navy, the licensing of seagoing privateers also allowed kingdoms to make claims with little or no cost to themselves. In the long term, a distinction between noble privateers and plebeian pirates would have to be drawn, but that did not happen until the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries when freebooting began to complicate internal European politics, and monarchies found it necessary to place tighter controls over their surrogates on sea as well as land.³⁴ By the mid-eighteenth century European states felt they had no choice but to make the settlers pay for their own protection. When new taxes and laws were imposed, the loyalties of the colonists were sorely tested. The result was that the continental parts of the empires of access broke away. Significantly, most of the islands (with a few exceptions like Haiti) remained more or less loyal, and today virtually all that is left of European imperium is insular.³⁵

IV

If the politics of Atlantic Oceania in the early modern period were feudal in origin, their economies were anything but medieval. While land continued to be the basis of European status, wealth, and power at home, this was not the case in the Atlantic world. It was access, not possession, which offered the greatest rewards for the commercial capitalism that gained its greatest momentum on the sea, not on land. This was an extraterritorial economy

in which money was to be made in transactions between widely scattered markets. Merchants invested in inventory, not directly in production. In a system that resembles in some ways the economics of current global capitalism, merchants left it to the producers to shoulder the costs of the instruments of production, labor discipline, and time lost when demand fell and the labor force was idled. Urban merchants warehoused both raw materials and finished products in what were called at the time “factories,” but they preferred to keep production at a distance.³⁶

Access to sources of slaves required no possession of African territory, something that was in any case beyond the power of Europeans to achieve against the overwhelming strength of the African kingdoms and the deadly effects of tropical diseases. It cannot be said that the African coast belonged to any European nation during this period. The Dutch and the English successfully competed with the Portuguese for supremacy in the carrying trade that changed hands several times. A similar strategy of access also applied to the third leg of the triangular trade, namely, the plantation economies of the New World. As long as Europeans controlled the waterways, the extensive coastline of the Caribbean islands guaranteed them access while denying their African captives exit. The same thinking applied to places where white convict labor was imported. It is no wonder that some of the first permanent colonies, staffed with prisoners, were islands. The greater the proportion of coast to interior the better, for smaller islands like Barbados had no hinterlands to escape to. But even larger islands like Jamaica were preferable to the mainlands, and so began the long and tragic association of islands with both slavery and incarceration.

In the seventeenth century, when sugar was king, the Caribbean islands were the world's richest prizes, changing hands frequently irregardless of the national origin of their inhabitants. The idea of launching a war solely to protect their nationals, as the British did in the so-called Malvinas/Falklands War of 1982, would have been unthinkable in an era before modern nationalism.³⁷ In the early modern period island economies were multinational affairs. The fishing islands of the North Island were occupied by men of various origins, who in some instances elected an “admiral” from their own ranks to maintain order for a season.³⁸ Ships under foreign flags were tolerated by local authorities as long as duties were properly paid and authority ritually acknowledged. Even when mercantile controls were tightened in the eighteenth century, the new rules were easily evaded. Smuggling was endemic on islands, where the abundance of coastline was an invitation to free trade. The same sea moats that made islands so attractive to plantation

development, made them virtually free ports for most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.³⁹

Merchant capitalists treated the plantations in the same way they dealt with their hinterland producers in Europe. They rarely invested directly in the production process, leaving its windfalls and risks to the plantation owners. They were no more eager to be in possession of these places than were the royal authorities, who left planters with an enormous amount of power, not only over the lives of their workers, but over themselves. Indeed, by the later eighteenth century many of the sugar islands had, like the mainland economies, developed separate identities, still recognizably European, but claiming liberties that even the most privileged subjects of the home country would not have dared to assert. In many ways, feudalism lingered much longer in the New World. The power of local authority, hierarchical ways of thinking, insularity—all these remained alive and well there.⁴⁰

The settlers continued to operate under the assumptions of the empire of access longer than did their countrymen back home. When, in the second half of the eighteenth century, monarchies became more absolutist in their territorial ambitions and more competitive with one another, they began to exercise a greater measure of control over Atlantic islands and littorals. This was first met with appeals to honor “ancient liberties” by those who held concessions there. Liberals like Adam Smith also supported American claims to independence on the basis that this was consistent with the notion for free trade.⁴¹ But the monarchs saw only the threat to their authority, and ultimately the English coastal colonies were forced into armed rebellion. By the early nineteenth century the continental elements of the empires of access lay in ruins.⁴²

v

The archipelagos of Atlantic Oceania did not feel small and remote to islanders themselves. Given considerable free rein, settlers came to regard the sea as belonging to them, drawing the world closer, expanding rather than shortening their horizons. During the early modern period it was land, not sea, that created the greater sense of remoteness and insularity. It was the continents that were filled with blank spaces, while the oceans remained crowded with islands, large and small, and with images of ships plying the well-known sea routes between them.

The sea and its islands loomed large in the early modern European imagination. Indeed, maps exaggerated not only the number but the size

of islands. Just as the mythic islands of Antilia and St. Brendan had once filled the ocean void, so now known islands were represented, as T. Bentley Duncan observes, as “monstrously swollen, enlarged out of all proportion to the continental land masses.” The Madeira archipelago, which is about the size of Long Island, was portrayed as the size of the present state of New York. In the maps of the sixteenth century, “the huge islands emphatically assert their presence in the mid-Atlantic and furnish graphic testimony to both the psychological and practical significance of islands to men of former times.”⁴³

It is safe to say that for many islanders the sea was not a limit to but an extension of their possibilities. It has been said of the multiethnic and polyglot merchants of Funichal in the Madeiras that they were “men of true ‘Atlantic’ outlook, at home on two or three continents.”⁴⁴ In the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, peoples of the African, European, and American littorals often had more in common with one another than they did with the residents of their hinterlands. Coastal Africans who had a long history of interaction with Europeans have been called for good reason “Atlantic creoles.” Coastal Africans who found themselves in the Americas constituted a distinct group, quite different from inland Africans who were later imported to stock the plantation economies. “Black life in mainland North America originated not in Africa or America but in the netherworld between the continents,” writes Ira Berlin. Atlantic creoles were prominent in the New Netherlands but also in New Orleans and the Chesapeake region. Many were free people, who farmed, traded, and even owned slaves.⁴⁵ They often intermarried with Europeans and Native Americans living in the coastal regions. On Kent Island in the Chesapeake there existed a triracial community of Europeans, Africans, and Native Americans who managed to hold their own until finally overwhelmed by the Maryland planter elites in the later seventeenth century.⁴⁶

It was not uncommon for the people of the European, African, and American littorals to identify more with the sea than with the hinterlands. The small scale of many islands precluded self-sufficiency, made them dependent on other islands and mainlands, and thus precluded isolation. And the tendency to see the world as one vast archipelago persisted through the eighteenth century.⁴⁷ The concept of continents did not appear until the sixteenth century, and it took a very long time before North America was mapped as a separate landmass.⁴⁸ New England was originally thought of as an island, and California was depicted as insular until the eighteenth century.⁴⁹ In the sixteenth century the English, having cut themselves off from their continental connections, began to think of themselves archipe-

logically. As Jeffery Knapp has argued, the sixteenth-century English came to see themselves as a chosen people, whose insularity was proof of spiritual strength, and who would make of this a virtue and conquer the Atlantic “by means of littleness.”⁵⁰ Colonies in America allowed John Donne to think of “this Iland, which is but the Suburbs of the old world, a Bridge, or Gallery to the new.”⁵¹ The British were convinced that islands were conducive to liberty and the vanguard of economic as well as political progress. Ignoring the issue of slavery, the *Encyclopedia of Britannica* of 1797 assured its readers that “by the unerring and unalienable laws of nature, the people who live on an island are or may be entirely free.”⁵²

“Europe’s experiments in conquest, colonization, and commerce clung like a ship’s barnacles to the littoral of the world ocean or sought out offshore islands surrounded by sea moats,” writes Stephen Pyne.⁵³ These coasts and islands came to constitute distinctive worlds, with their own dynamics. To be sure, this Atlantic sea of islands was to have a much stronger continental flavor than its Pacific counterpart, but it would be wrong to think of it as European, African, or American. As the leading historian of the eastern Atlantic islands has put it: “the islands made signal contributions to the Atlantic world in general. If there had been no islands, seventeenth century maritime commerce would have been distinctly different, and navigation itself appreciably more difficult and more hazardous.”⁵⁴

Islands were also crucial to the peopling of the New World. The reluctance of Europeans to leave their homelands and settle the New World voluntarily meant that the process of the Europeanization of the Americas came later than is usually thought.⁵⁵ Outmigration from islands was to become a major factor in the Atlantic world. Islands were particularly subject to overpopulation because, without hinterlands to absorb their surpluses, the only way to survive was to leave. Often these migrants were young men, who would leave their wives and children behind to sign onto a passing vessel, especially the lucrative whaling ships. With the money earned at sea, they might then establish themselves on some other shore, later sending for their families. They might even return in old age, a pattern that still today prevails on many islands without the resources to support their younger populations.⁵⁶

It was not really until the nineteenth century that continents became what Alfred Crosby calls “Neo-Europes.”⁵⁷ Islands were the first Neo-Europes, but they did not remain so for long. The Azores, for example, became the nodes in the great flows of goods and peoples, and as such they were “neither of Europe nor of the Americas.”⁵⁸ By 1700 the people of the Cape Verde islands had their own distinct identity. Mixtures of peoples

characterized most Caribbean island populations; there, as elsewhere, island cultures were hybrids.⁵⁹ William McNeill has noted that it was in this period that sea frontiers superseded steppe frontiers “as the critical meeting point of strangers.”⁶⁰ Islands were classic “middle grounds” beyond the lines of ordered territoriality, where all kinds of new identities were formed and reformed in the early modern period. Insularity, which was later to acquire the meaning of narrowness and stasis, was at that time associated with plenitude and mutability.

The peopling of the Americas was as much an Atlantean as an African or European project. Many of the first settlers on isles and coasts of the Americas were themselves islanders.⁶¹ They preferred to face outward to the sea. “God performed no miracle on New England soil. He gave the sea,” writes Samuel Eliot Morison.⁶² For most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries New England was as closely connected with the Caribbean, with Madeira and the Cape Verdes, as with the British Isles. The Azores were particularly closely connected to New England through whaling, a connection that never completely disappeared even when that economy collapsed.⁶³

Sharing a continent with a well-developed multitude of Native American “nations,” the European littoral settlers occupied a kind of borderland, acting as intermediaries between two worlds, agents for indigenous traders as well as European merchants. Movement inland was by no means assured or desired. Indeed, westward destiny was a myth created much later to legitimize a continental identity that had formed only in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.⁶⁴ Until then, the thirteen mainland British colonies were more archipelagic than continental, connected more by sea rather than by land transport and belonging to a network of islands and littoral enclaves that stretched from the Shetlands to the Malvinas/Falklands. In the course of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries it even seemed as if the colonists were being drawn ever more to the sea rather than into the interiors of the continent.⁶⁵

There was nothing at all insular about the islands or the islanders. Many, like the Cape Verdeans, learned by necessity to feel more at home on the South and North American continents than in their native isles. Ties of trade stretched from the salt islands of the south Atlantic to the fishing outports of Newfoundland. The Yankee cod fleet would sail first to the Cape Verdes to pick up salt before heading for the northern fishing banks.⁶⁶ People from the Hebrides adapted easily to Cape Breton Island, and Nantucket was closer in many ways to the Azores than it was to Massachusetts.⁶⁷ Islands

served islanders in the same way oases served desert nomads. Island populations were as polyglot as the crews of the vessels that paid them call, and they owed their loyalty and identity more to the sea of islands than to any continent.⁶⁸

VI

It was from its mastery of the seas, not lands, that Europe experienced its first great economic boom. The wealth accumulated through its archipelagic empires of access would find its way back to the continent, partly to be invested in land, partly to capitalize new industrial enterprises that would ultimately overturn the old order of things. But by the late eighteenth century the boundary between land and sea became more definite. The notion of a continuous coastline came into being as new nation-states began focusing on their interiors, defining more sharply the boundaries between inside and outside.⁶⁹ The rebellious North American settlers declared themselves to be “continentals,” and Tom Paine used the argument that if God had meant them to remain British subjects he would have never placed an ocean in between. Edmund Burke thought that, short of draining the Atlantic, there was no way that the Americans could be denied independence.⁷⁰ The sea, that thing which for three centuries had been perceived as tying the Atlantic world together, was no longer seen as doing so. In the nineteenth century the division between land and sea became absolute, and islands also lost their power of connectivity. Only in the nineteenth century, did insularity become associated with narrowness and backwardness.⁷¹

It was not so much that commercial ties had weakened or that distances had gotten somehow greater, but in the age of steam, ships began to bypass islands, reinforcing their isolation and producing a sense of insularity that has haunted them ever since. In the era of industrial capitalism and the nation-state, history turned its back on Atlantic Oceania, forgetting that it had ever existed. The nineteenth-century progressive imagination turned inland to focus on roads and bridges, ignoring waterborne forms of transporation. No longer stepping stones to the future, islands retreated into the mists of history, waiting, like castaways, to be rescued from oblivion.⁷²

NOTES

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Vessels of Exchange The Global Shipwright in the Pacific

Hans Konrad Van Tilburg

Maritime ethnographers and archaeologists have always held the ship to be more than a simple inanimate object. Instead, it is a complex cultural artifact, a record of specific seafaring traditions and regional variations. And ships, which carry numerous items of trade, can themselves be traded, altered, and redefined. The transoceanic exchange in this case is the adoption and continued use of traditions in nautical technology, in shipbuilding. The ships are signposts of sailors on the move across the Pacific. The focus is on two case studies of the vessel as artifact—Chinese junks in California and Japanese sampans in Hawai‘i. As these examples will make clear, this process of nautical exchange involves deeper questions of identity not only for the sailor migrants, but for the ships themselves. For, unlike many other objects, ships (which so easily cross national boundaries) have an almost human-like aura, and certainly a recognized international status. They are born or launched, have working careers, and then are decommissioned and oftentimes sent to the great beyond—Davy Jones’s locker. Many are spoken of in almost biographical terms. The phenomenon of the seemingly animate vessel and its nationality plays an important part in the process of the cultural exchange of vessels.

The first example comes from the West Coast of the United States in the mid-nineteenth century. Overseas Chinese laborers, most often credited with mining operations and railroad construction, also opened the fishing industry on the California coast. No one knows who the first shipwrights or fishermen were in this case, but junks were being constructed in California as early as the 1860s. In San Diego and Roseville, where fishermen sailed coastal waters between abalone camps, the two- or three-masted *hong xian tuo* style predominated. In the San Francisco Bay area, where the shrimp grounds were within the close protection of the bay, the single-masted *cao chuan* style was more familiar.¹ Like many coastal fishing vessels from Southern China, the bows of these types were pointed, and the transoms

round. Solid watertight bulkheads divided the interiors into separate compartments. All hull planks were edge-joined by iron nails, and all holes filled with a material known as *chunam*, a mixture of lime and fiber and tung oil. Sails were lug designs with bamboo battens.² These were the same vessels the shipwrights in China were used to building; the only difference was in the type of material (redwood) used in construction. The styles represented relatively low, open vessels built for the nearshore and protected waters fisheries. Ironwood for masts and rudders, and other implements such as anchors and nets, were imported directly from China. Of course, their builders would not have referred to them as junks, but as specific regional types of fishing craft or *fanchuan*, sailing vessels. What is a junk? The term junk may be a derivative of *jong*, a Southeast Asian word for small craft recorded in the sixteenth century by European sailors.

Operating from small fishing villages and camps, the Chinese exploited the relatively untouched and abundant squid, abalone, fish, and shrimp resources in the shallow inshore waters of California. Much of the product was sent back to China, as American tastes at that time did not tend toward such items. Instead of competing for diminishing resources in crowded Guangdong province waterways, California's Chinese migrants found themselves amid a fortune of some of the most prized delicacies of the Asian market. No doubt the work was hard, and immigrants missed their homes and families, but one can only imagine what the transition from China to the untapped riches of California's shores was like. One author attributes the rapid success in the new fishery to the fact that fishing represented the one sector of the economy where there were few race-based restrictions and only minimal competition with white Californians.³

In 1897 there were twenty-six separate Chinese shrimp camps circling San Francisco Bay.⁴ These camps, early in the history of this industry, mainly benefited the Chinese homeland. Thousands of tons of dried fish, abalone, and shrimp, and the shells of the shrimp for fertilizer, along with abalone shells for beads and buttons and jewelry, were exported to China by the fishermen and their agents in San Diego and San Francisco. Products flowed from the junks to the camps to the agents in the city and then across the Pacific on steamships, many of which were crewed by Chinese sailors.⁵ The California junks were the physical end of a very long trade diaspora, an economic link, and a very Chinese one at that. Madeline Hsu has addressed this trade phenomenon, finding the process highly organized. Remittances from the minefields and railroad gangs, along with the dried fish and shrimp and squid, were shipped back to Hong Kong via the *jinshanzhuang*, informal

business associations which assured that profits returned to villages on the mainland.⁶ Was the edge of maritime China, as far as fisheries were concerned, really the Sacramento delta?

Chinese junks were considered alien vessels, and by maritime law were not required to be registered, inspected, or otherwise documented as were domestic vessels. This was most troubling to immigration officials in San Diego, where the junks plied the coastal waters between California and Mexico. San Diego and nearby Roseville were centers of major junk construction, supplying some of the largest and fastest vessels in the vicinity.⁷ And between international borders there was a need for speed. Junks could outsail Mexican patrol boats. Abalone camps on California's Channel Islands occasionally served as way stations for Chinese immigrants being smuggled into the state.⁸

Discrimination against Asians on the West Coast has been the subject of numerous other studies, but it also spelled the end of the Chinese fisheries in California. The Scott Act of 1888 prohibited types of Chinese laborers from returning to the United States. The amendment to the Geary Act of 1892 specifically named anyone "taking, drying, or otherwise preserving shell or other fish for home consumption or exportation" as a laborer banned from reentering the country.⁹ The prohibition included vessels crossing the three-mile territorial limit. In short, Chinese fishermen were forced to sell, and many of the junks were given new identities as American vessels. Ships that previously had no name became known as the *Acme*, the *Chromo*, the *Alta*, and the *World*.¹⁰ Such American-owned vessels finally became eligible for regular documentation and formal inclusion in the *Lists of Merchant Vessels of the United States*. Officially they were described as either sloops or schooners by the inspectors, not junks. And many continued operation, not as fishing vessels, but in the niche occupation of smuggling cargoes such as guano between Mexico and California. Opportunities for smuggling shellfish and guano across the border with Mexico did not diminish, but *increased* when American ownership caught up with the Chinese junks.

Some of the reaction to Chinese junks may be attributed to the general antipathy toward the Chinese sojourners themselves. Local observers did not find junks quaint and exotic (see sampans), but objects of ridicule and contempt. In 1886 a local newspaperman found them to be "a cross between the Puritan *Mayflower* and the recently demolished Sea Nymph Bath House on one side, and a pile driver and Noah's Ark on the other."¹¹ Junks in general were seen as misshapen, ancient, or evil things. One nineteenth-century writer found Chinese ships to be "typical of a class of devil ships, because to the student of folk tales there can be no more significant symbol or embodi-

ment of evil than the dragon or serpent. The Junk . . . is the very spirit of evil moving upon the face of the waters, a terror so real that it conquers even cupidity and curiosity.”¹²

Chinese fishing practices were also called into question. Intensive marine exploitation by a small group was seen as a threat, and cries that the “Mongolians” were devastating the resources joined the chorus of anti-Chinese agitation on the West Coast. Similar movements targeted Chinese crews on American and Canadian transoceanic steamship lines.

The story of the California junks is only one part of a wider phenomenon, that of junk construction in the Pacific. On Matupit Island of New Britain during the mid-nineteenth century, the Chinese merchant Lee Tam Tuck, known locally as Uncle Ah Tam, established himself as a shipwright. He worked alongside the German colonial authorities, serving as a conduit for migrant southern Chinese in search of overseas opportunities. Many Chinese worked at Ah Tam’s shipyard before moving on and finding work with the German companies or branching out and becoming independent traders.¹³ By 1910 Ah Tam’s empire included a wholesale and retail store, one hotel, several plantations, a gambling den, a brothel, an opium house, and two shipyards. Chinese shipwrights also built and operated junks on the beaches near Darwin, Australia. These were used in the lumber trade in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹⁴ The annual reports of the Government of the Northern Territory include some brief information on their registration and tonnage. It is likely that these junks, and those from Ah Tam’s shipyards, also reflected specific regional designs of some kind from China. So these Pacific junks were Chinese junks?

Construction of junks in California stopped with the anti-Chinese Exclusion Acts. The vessels passed into American hands and shortly thereafter vanished from the maritime scene. Only in the past few decades has interest in the California junks been rekindled. Traces of vessels have been found near China Camp in Marin County, and the remains of fishing camps on San Clemente Island have been recorded. John Muir of the National Park Service constructed a replica of a Bay Area shrimp junk during the summer of 2003, but for the most part these vessels have slipped from memory.

The second example appears in 1899 when Gorokichi Nakasugi, a shipwright and fisherman from Wakayama prefecture in southern Honshū, arrived by steamer in Hawai‘i. He was part of a wider labor migration to locations all around the Pacific, but Nakasugi brought with him an artifact that would open the commercial tuna fishery in Hawai‘i. On the deck of the steamer was a traditional thirty-four-foot Japanese sailing sampan.

What is a sampan? Unfortunately, the word is rather vague. Originally,

the term comes from the Chinese language, meaning three (*san*) boards (*ban*), and describes a small simple skiff. The authoritative *Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea* defines these craft as “typical small and light boats of oriental waters and rivers. . . . The harbor sampan usually has an awning over the center . . . the coastal sampan [is] fitted with a single mast and junk-type sail.”¹⁵ But the use of this term has always been fairly loose. One source claims that if a water buffalo can go on board athwartships, then the vessel in question is a junk; but if the animal has to lie down fore and aft (or perhaps could not board at all), then it is probably a sampan.¹⁶ Interestingly, the only thing that can really be said about the term sampan in Hawai‘i is that it usually implies some kind of Japanese, rather than Chinese, influence. Sampan, like the terms junk and dhow, is a cross-cultural hybrid, a word that implies familiarity among a mixture of groups, but no longer attributable to a single culture.

To be more specific, then, the sampan brought to Hawai‘i in 1899 was a wooden-hulled, square-sailed boat reminiscent of traditional designs that were hundreds of years old. The 1899 sampan possessed elements of the Yamato-gata style Japanese fishing vessel, a distinctive and historic Japanese craft built for open-water conditions.¹⁷ The light square sail rig was common on traditional Japanese craft. The wide keel and tall stem and diagonally nailed edge-joined planking and prominent bulkheads were Asian features indicative of maritime traditions hundreds of years old. Large-scale Japanese shipbuilders had been encouraged by the Meiji government to reform their construction practices post-1868 and adopt western construction techniques in order to build larger vessels, but the older traditions lived on in small beach-built fishing craft of the southern Japanese islands. Nakasugi’s sampan had elements of a surviving relic.

Traditional Japanese ship features were thus imported from southern Honshū to the rough open waters around the Hawaiian Islands. With continuing labor migration, Japanese vessels and Japanese sailors soon found employment in the offshore fishing industry. Kewalo Basin on O‘ahu began to see larger amounts of *ahi* (yellowfin tuna) and *aku* (skipjack tuna) unloaded on the docks. The picturesque setting inspired more than a few paintings and poems dedicated to the bright blue hybrid boats of the exotic local fishing fleet. One report states that Nakasugi was so successful that he actually received death threats from other local fishermen.¹⁸ Japanese fishermen opened the commercial tuna industry in Hawai‘i in conjunction with the innovation of modern packing plants, for it was the ability to can tuna for a distant market that really made possible the expansion and modernization of the fishing fleet. This industry benefited American canneries, and was

not an exclusive link to Japanese villages as was the case with the Chinese fisheries in California.

With time, these vessels began to change. Gasoline engines were fitted into boats beginning in 1905, and more suitable marine diesels by 1927. Shortly thereafter the prominent deckhouse made its appearance. With its flat work space aft and its high bluff bows for shouldering aside deep ocean swells, the sampan became perfectly adapted to the rough waters between the islands. These modifications were not planned, but were incorporated on an individual basis by Japanese-trained local shipwrights. Other boat builders immigrated to Hawai'i and formed profitable local or family shipyards.¹⁹ Men like Gorokichi Nakasugi, Seichi Funai, Joichi Tanimura, Mankichi Murakami, and Kametaro Nishimura continued in the trade practiced by their fathers, while finding room for certain modifications in Hawai'i. Some of these changes were learned while repairing *haole* or western vessels visiting from the mainland.²⁰

By 1940 there were over 450 sampans in the territory of Hawai'i, making the commercial fishery the islands' third largest industry after sugar and pineapple. At this point the larger *aku* boats ran into certain operational limitations. These sampans relied on live *nehu* or anchovies for bait, only a percentage of which survived the tossing and rolling bait wells. Canneries on the mainland had already switched to purse seining for tuna, eventually bringing in twenty times more fish than the Hawaiian industry. Since schools of tuna in clear water can see better and thus avoid the huge nets, the *aku* sampans were stuck with the traditional pole-and-line method.²¹ But there were other problems in store for the Japanese sampan fleet.

It was not social tension over jobs, but the growing international tensions between Japan and America in the 1930s that brought increased scrutiny of the fishing fleet in Hawai'i. Military planners feared that Japanese nationals, many of whom were illegal immigrants smuggled on board steamships from Wakayama prefecture, had almost complete control over a wide-roving fishing fleet. Many of the larger powered sampans were over eighty feet in length, with ranges as extensive as 1,500 miles. These vessels observed few, if any, regulatory restrictions. U.S. law at that time required that only American-made and American-owned vessels be documented, and foreign fishing vessels under five net tons operated with impunity. Thanks to certain loopholes in shipping regulations, sampans and other powered wooden vessels were allowed to deduct 75 percent of their machinery spaces from their calculated net tonnage. Thus long-range sampans could qualify as minor five-ton craft. Sampans filed no clearances for any destinations, nor any paperwork regarding their crews. They were not crossing any boundaries

into foreign waters. This was indeed a kind of gray zone, where “foreign” vessels operated in a far-ranging domestic fishery.

Establishing control over the Japanese fishermen and their fleet was an important issue for the U.S. Navy. Were these vessels spying for an increasingly aggressive Japan? Were they supplying submarines? Or changing crews at sea and transporting agents to the islands? One secret document sent from a planning committee to the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District stated that the sampans were “manned in large part by alien Japanese whose loyalty to Japan as opposed to the United States is a practical certainty. . . . Their personnel would, in time of war, serve to provide Japanese vessels with a sufficient number of able, competent pilots thoroughly familiar with all local waters. . . . They can obtain exact soundings by means of weighted fishing lines. . . . They would serve as a means of secretly landing intelligence or sabotage agents shortly prior to war.”²²

Such fears developed into near hysteria in northern Australian waters, where aerial patrols were discussed as a way to keep track of the sampans. One report spoke of “how evil has grown in and around the Torres Straits.”²³ The immigration service in Hawai‘i stepped up its operations, and by 1940 most of the *mikkosha* (illegal crew) had been deported back to Japan.²⁴ Confiscation of fishing sampans by immigration officials began many months before the December 7th attack.

World War II had the single largest impact on the sampan fishing industry. The restrictions on the overseas Japanese during wartime have been documented elsewhere; the fishermen were only one group of many that suffered. The local fishermen—those who survived accidents during and after the attack—found the going quite difficult. On December 7th American fighter planes intentionally strafed several sampans. At least three landing parties on sampans were “confirmed” between Barbers Point and Nānākuli on O‘ahu. Planes engaged these targets “returning fire” as stated in the report.²⁵ Again on December 12th sampans were strafed off both the Kailua and Kohala coasts. There was no real cause for these attacks as there was no invasion of the islands. The landings were fishermen fleeing for their lives by grounding their vessels. But economic sanctions played a greater role in the demise of the sampan fleet.

During the war operational restrictions and outright confiscations of vessels sometimes owned by foreign nationals proved devastating to the fishery. By the end of 1942, the annual yield was down by a staggering 99 percent.²⁶ Remaining boats were limited to operating only during certain narrow hours in a few selected nearshore areas. Others were removed from the fishery altogether for inshore naval service. The larger *aku* boats req-

quisitioned by the navy underwent stability studies, and modifications were carried out to make the vessel more suitable for armament. They were to be used in a number of capacities. "Until the need for offshore sampans is satisfied, every craft capable of mounting depth charges must be acquired for that use."²⁷ The traditional blue paint was changed to white, and the sampans began to patrol island waters. Sampans like the *Fuji Maru* became the YP-183.²⁸ Frequently they received newer, more powerful three-cylinder diesel engines and depth-charge racks. The identification and control problem for these foreign-built sampans was solved: they were "enlisted" in the U.S. Navy.

Like the junks, the sampans in Hawai'i were only a part of a larger Pacific story. Japan pursued the deliberate mechanization of its fishing fleet prior to World War II, increasing the tuna catch to about 200,000 tons by 1940.²⁹ War damage affected sampans throughout the Pacific, but certain locations recovered following their decline. The Japanese commercial tuna fishery in Chuuk boomed in the 1930s.³⁰ Following the war and the lifting of the MacArthur Line in 1952, Japan again pursued the development of the tuna fishery in Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Fleets were quickly rebuilt, except in Hawai'i.

In the islands the fishing fleet never recovered following World War II. Today there are only a handful of prewar sampans remaining, all now known by non-Japanese names (*Kula Kai*, *Neptune*, *Orion*, *Corsair*, and *Sea Queen*). There are few Japanese left today who still go to sea in sampans. The owners and crews are mostly Hawaiians, local Koreans, and Micronesians.³¹ Yet the image of the Japanese sampan in Hawai'i, unlike the junks of the West Coast, has achieved a certain lasting fame.

The sampans in Hawai'i have always evoked interest. Anthropologists from the Bishop Museum sailed the South Pacific on sampans; President Roosevelt, while on vacation in 1934, did all his deep-sea fishing on board local sampans.³² Jack London traveled inter-island on sampans. Elvis swung his hips and entertained the local crew on board a prewar sampan in his 1962 movie *Girls! Girls! Girls!* Today the older wooden sampans show up on napkins from Waikiki's Fisherman's Wharf. They also make a colorful appearance in the margins of tourist maps of the islands. Artists continue to depict them in watercolors. One vessel graces the interior of Sam Choy's local lunch restaurant. A portion of another projects outwards from a wall into the second floor of the local maritime museum.

Their construction, on a very limited basis, continues. A local shipwright has created a fiberglass sampan with the lines similar to the older wooden craft. The steel fishing vessel *Nisei*, launched in 1996, features cer-

tain traditional design elements alongside dual Detroit diesels and full electronics. NOAA's National Marine Fisheries Service once proposed that the multipurpose sampan design be officially promoted for use by local Pacific island fisheries.³³ Though not as numerous as before, the sampan remains as a distinctly recognizable type. Interestingly, all of these postwar incarnations among the Hawaiian Islands are known not as Japanese sampans, but as Hawaiian sampans. Their adaptation to the multicultural society in Hawai'i is complete.

In the one case, we are left with the Hawaiian sampan, a vessel survivor in terms of image and actual examples. In the other, we have the story of the vanished junks, once a familiar sight on the West Coast but now the subject only of relatively narrow research and certain archaeological projects. Some exchanges are apparently more successful than others.³⁴ Both sampans and junks brought designs familiar to Asian seafarers to foreign shores. Both were central to the commercial exploitation of marine resources to the point of organized resistance by other groups. Both were classified as foreign vessels, though built locally, and were therefore capable of evading certain regulatory measures. Chinese and Japanese fishermen were both artificially forced from their occupations by direct action. At some indefinite point, though, Japanese sampans became Hawaiian sampans, while Chinese junks never became California junks.³⁵

Junks arrived too early. There were no modifications for them to undergo, no canning plants that would boost the fishery beyond its nineteenth-century limits. Drying the products and shipping them to China via steamer was the mode of operation throughout the junk period. By the time transportation and marketing technologies had changed, Chinese ownership, and the construction of junks, had ceased. And Hawai'i in the 1930s was not California in the 1880s. Though the U.S. Navy was nervous enough about the Japanese fishing fleet, the dynamics of labor migration, the social setting and ultimately the acceptance of cultural imports differed between the two locations. The territory of Hawai'i proved more culturally flexible than the state of California. The locals would say, in short, that Hawai'i has *aloha*.

Of course, the exchange of nautical technology is based on more than just cultural perceptions and timing. Realities of function and design always matter at sea. Chinese junks in California were copies of specific shallow-water southern Chinese fishing vessels, designed for inshore operation on protected waters. They were relatively low, open boats, built for the pursuit of shallow-water species like shrimp and abalone, and ultimately unsuitable for offshore conditions. The protected shallow coastal waters in California grew to be intensely occupied, exploited, and, thus, controlled. Japanese

sampans, on the other hand, were designed to pursue a blue-water prey, built for wider-ranging offshore operations. The sampans in Hawai'i took on the high bluff bows and stable hard-chined hulls of vessels more suitable for the open ocean, and operated far beyond the reach of local enforcement efforts. These designs ultimately found use in other roles demanding vessels with good sea-keeping qualities. More importantly, the design made the successful transition from sail to diesel power, and thus was adopted into naval use. These design realities played a role in the exchange of vessel design and in the adoption and adaptation of the boat's foreign identity.

The Pacific exchange of junks and sampans raises the broader question of ships and national identities. National recognition of foreign vessels in local use proved to be a particular concern in each case. Under established international law, all commercial vessels must have a single national identity; in other words, they must operate under a single flag. The concept of the "genuine link" is usually central to the granting of this recognition. There must be some tangible national (not just economic) connection between a state and a ship in order for status to be granted. Eligible vessels are (1) owned by nationals, (2) directed by national officers, (3) staffed by national crew, and/or (4) built by nationals.³⁶ Flag states are then responsible for all internal organization and control of the ship no matter where it may be, and no other nation may exercise authority over it. Flag vessels are elements of sovereign territory. Where, then, do these foreign-built local fishing boats fall with regard to nationality? Could America complain to either Japan or China that their fishing vessels were operating beyond all control? The home countries had perhaps an economic link but no national connection with these sampans and junks. The solution in both cases was to acquire the ships forcibly and complete the paperwork, and this was done. Foreign sojourners and their vessels existed in a tenuous position. People were sent back, but ships could be relabeled. The navy redefined sampans as patrol craft. The *Merchant List* redefined junks as schooners or sloops, according to the number of masts. The vessels were renamed in the fullest sense of the word. In the case of both the junk and the sampan, this brought the fisheries to a quick end because American citizens, who could own but not rebuild the artifacts, replaced the original immigrants. The sea may be a highway, but the need to nationalize inanimate objects in the effort to maintain boundaries at sea worked against the overall cultural exchange.

The question of identity provides a rich category for historical and cultural interpretation. What is the identity of a ship? Ships have a birth or launching, a life span, and a death or final disposition. Ships have documents of registry or enrollment depending on whether they are in the foreign or

domestic service, along with an operating license or certificate specifying the nature of their trade. These have been compared to a combined birth certificate, health certificate, and passport.³⁷ Under admiralty law, ships themselves may be arrested, a legal action taken against an object rather than an individual or personal property.³⁸ American vessels have official home ports. Some have ships' husbands or managers. As artifacts these ships are some of the most anthropomorphic items known, replete with a rich body of folklore and superstition.³⁹ But vessels are also firmly bound to their culture of origin by use, by design, and by documents expressing their nationality. The vessel-citizen analogy should not be stretched too far, though, for vessels are not people, nor people vessels. Immigrants cannot walk on water. Nor can they carry their friends as well as possible contraband to land on unpatrolled shores. The barrier that impedes national guards from boarding foreign vessels is not any special status of a certain crew member, but the sovereign nature of the ship itself.

Ships cannot easily be divorced from their cultural context, meaning their identity. Ships that are separated from their identities become objects without official recognition, without national status. This can be threatening to the state (particularly given the current heightened state of security). Stateless vessels on the high seas have usually been associated with pirates—that is, with enemies of all nations. The definition of modern piracy is based on the question of national jurisdiction.⁴⁰ Although certain circumstances did once exist that allowed vessels at war to deceive the enemy by use of false flags, these situations were clearly defined and limited to a specific and short interval within the chase.⁴¹ National status has never been taken lightly on the high seas. Flags are all the more important on the mobile and fluid surface of the sea. The sea is a poor barrier, porous at times, making necessary special efforts on national and international levels to plug the gaps. Such efforts had to be made to nationalize junks and sampans.

Were these permanent cultural transoceanic exchanges of artifacts (ships) in the Pacific? In other words, were junks and sampans successfully re-identified as legitimate vessels? In the case of Japanese sampans, the answer is a qualified yes; ships and crew had to undergo considerable modifications in the process, but the vessels managed to shift their context and, to a certain extent, they managed to survive. They became Hawaiian sampans, registered fishing vessels in American waters. Perhaps their subsequent "Hawaiian" nature was a matter of creation or *creolization* instead of inheritance. Benedict Anderson, author of *Imagined Communities*, might agree. According to Anderson, the nation or state defines itself in a variety of ways, not all of which are strictly predetermined by the distant past. Why keep their

Japanese culture of origin at all? The sampan shared in the economic and maritime lives of two worlds, the Japanese fishermen and the Hawaiian canneries. Their successful and seaworthy design was relatively fixed; their cultural identity was more flexible.

Some have postulated that this shift in cultural identification is rarely accomplished. What might Nicholas Thomas, author of *Entangled Objects: Material Culture and Colonialism in the Pacific*, think? In Thomas's view, cultural meaning stems from the original society and is not easily transmitted by the mere exchange of the actual object. But modified sampans can find new meaning. Some might argue that the *Hawaiian* sampan is something new, not the continuation of any single cultural tradition. Instead, it is an engineered cultural hybrid.

In the case of the Chinese junks, no such vessels or their partial remains are museum items now, and they are not found in shipyards and boat harbors. Junks were not modified, but only changed ownership. They had been used mainly for the benefit of the Chinese and shared little with local organizations before they were seized. They played no role in the Imagined Community of the West Coast. Among ordinary people they stimulated little comprehension, let alone exciting any praise. Only now are we beginning to understand what they even looked like.

The California junk and the Hawaiian sampan have raised certain issues regarding ships and oceanic exchange. They show that the tools of exchange themselves can be interpreted as cultural items, as records of the past. They themselves can be traded, sold, modified, renamed, given new identities, cherished, or forgotten. They are artifacts that seem to us somehow alive, with functioning national identities. The U.S. Supreme Court stated this best in the 1910 case of *Tucker v. Alexandroff* (vessel), 183 U.S. 424, 438:

A ship is born when she is launched, and lives so long as her identity is preserved. Prior to her launching she is a mere congeries of wood and iron—an ordinary piece of personal property—as distinctly a land structure as a house, and subject only to mechanics liens created by a state law and enforceable in the state courts. In the baptism of launching she receives her name, and from the moment her keel touches the water she is transformed, and becomes a subject of admiralty jurisdiction. She acquires a personality of her own; becomes competent to contract, and is individually liable for obligations, upon which she may sue in the name of her owner, and be sued in her own name. Her owner's agents may not be her agents, and her agents may not be her owner's agents. She is capable, too, of committing

a tort, and is responsible in damages therefor. She may also become a quasi bankrupt; may be sold for the payment of her debts, and thereby receive a complete discharge from all prior liens, with liberty to begin a new life, contract further obligations, and perhaps be subjected to a second sale.⁴²

It would be a shame and a loss to constrain the interpretation of ships to the category of technological development, of purely inanimate functionality. They were and are intimately involved in almost everything that takes place at sea and are an inseparable part of our social construction of the maritime realm. Exactly how that involvement plays out in other locations besides sampans in Hawai'i and junks in California remains to be seen. Ships are, though, both unique features of the maritime realm and appropriate fascinating symbols of transoceanic cultural exchanges.

NOTES

1. G. R. G. Worcester, *A Classification of the Principle Chinese Sea-going Junks* (Shanghai: Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1948).
2. Archaeological investigation confirms construction details; see J. Muir, "One Old Junk is Everyone's Treasure: The Excavation, Analysis, and Interpretation of a Chinese Shrimp Junk at China Camp State Park" (Master's thesis, Sonoma State University, 1999).
3. Donald H. Estes, "Silver Petals Falling: Japanese Pioneers in San Diego's Fishery," *Mains'l Haul* 35, nos. 2 & 3 (1999): 29.
4. Robert Nash, collected documents, Chinese Historical Society of Southern California, Los Angeles.
5. Robert J. Schwendinger, *Ocean of Bitter Dreams: Maritime Relations between China and the West* (Tucson, AZ: Westernlore Publishing, 1988).
6. Madeline Hsu, "Trading with the Gold Mountain: *Jinshanzhuang* and Networks of Kinship and Native Place, 1848–1949" (paper presented at the Maritime China Symposium, University of California at Berkeley, March 1998).
7. Linda Bentz, "Redwood, Bamboo and Ironwood: Chinese Junks of San Diego," *Mains'l Haul* 35, nos. 2 & 3 (1999): 16.
8. Mark Allen, ed., *Mains'l Haul* 35, nos. 2 & 3 (1999): 27.
9. Murray K. Lee, "The Chinese Fishing Industry of San Diego," *Mains'l Haul* 35, nos. 2 & 3 (1999): 13.
10. Not all shipwrights name their ships, or ascribe to them specific gender. Chinese junks often carried characters referring to good luck or profit, but these may not have been names as such.
11. Bentz, "Redwood, Bamboo, and Ironwood," p. 16. For detailed discussion of American commentary on Chinese junks, see H. Van Tilburg, "Misunderstood Junks: The Western View of Chinese Maritime Technology" (PhD diss., University of Hawai'i, 2002).
12. Wilbur Bassett, *Wander-ships: Folk-stories of the Sea* (Chicago: Open Court Pub-

lishing Company, 1917), p. 92. Are these perceptions influenced by the long history of piracy in Southeast Asia?

13. David Y. H. Wu, *The Chinese in Papua New Guinea: 1880–1980* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1982), p. 21.

14. Nick Burningham, email message to author, July 14, 1998.

15. *The Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea*, Peter Kemp, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 748.

16. Co-Quan Nghien-Cuu, *A Handbook of Junks of South Vietnam* (Republic of Vietnam: Combat Development and Test Center, 1962), p. iv.

17. Basil Greenhill, *The Archaeology of Boats and Ships* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 107.

18. Rob Tomasetti, “A Survey of a Wrecked Vessel at Kona Coast State Park” (unpublished report, Marine Option Program, University of Hawai‘i, Honolulu).

19. Leslie Nakashima, “Sampan Boat Building,” *Advertiser*, March 10, 1934.

20. Ibid.

21. Jesse Bowman, “The Trouble with Aku,” *Beacon* 13, no. 11 (1973): 17.

22. Declassified document dated November 1, 1935, record Group 181, National Archives and Records Administration, San Bruno.

23. “Japanese Shell Poachers,” *Pacific Islands Monthly* 4, no. 8 (1934): 18.

24. Sampan papers, Hawai‘i Maritime Center archives, Honolulu, Hawai‘i.

25. Ibid.

26. Rick Gaffney, “History of the Hawaiian Sampan,” *Hawai‘i Fishing News* 2, no. 3 (1979).

27. Sampan papers.

28. The wreck of the YP-183 was surveyed by a University of Hawai‘i field school in 1997.

29. David J. Doulman, *Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Island Regions* (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1987), p. 58.

30. Mark R. Peattie, *Nanyo, the Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1988), p. 139.

31. Robert P. Chenoweth, “Hawai‘i’s Aku Sampans: Historic Treasures Still at Work” (unpublished report, Anthropology Department, University of Hawai‘i, Honolulu).

32. Robert Lau, “Iron Men on Wooden Ships,” *Paradise of the Pacific* 48, no. 8 (1936): 23.

33. Robert T. B. Iversen, “A New Use for an Old Idea: A Small Multipurpose Hawaiian Style Fishing Boat for Developing Fisheries in Island Areas,” in Johanna M. Reinhart, ed., *Small Boat Design* (Manila: ICLARM Proceedings, 1975), pp. 54–61.

34. Who is not familiar with the kayak derived from high-latitude skin boats? Or the Pacific double-hulled catamaran?

35. The vessel associated with fishing in the San Francisco Bay area is the low-sided felucca.

36. Louis B. Sohn and Kristin Gustafson, *The Law of the Sea* (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1984), p. 5.

37. Carl E. McDowell and Helen M. Gibbs, *Ocean Transportation* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1954), p. 326. In terms of communications, ships today have call signs, satellite identity numbers, maritime mobile service identification numbers, and telex addresses.

38. William McFee, *The Law of the Sea* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1950), p. 15.

39. Such traditions are now changing. The U.S. Navy has recently switched to the neutral “it” rather than “she” for all ship designations.

40. Jack A. Gottschalk and Brian P. Flanagan, *Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The Rise and Threat of Modern Piracy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), p. 34.

41. Donald A. Petrie, *The Prize Game: Lawful Looting on the High Seas in the Days of Fighting Sail* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), p. 148.

42. George L. Canfield and George W. Dalzell, *The Law of the Sea: A Manual of the Principles of Admiralty Law for Students, Mariners, and Ship Operators* (New York: Rothman and Co., 1983), p. 5.

Maritime Ideologies and Ethnic Anomalies

Sea Space and the Structure of Subalternity in the Southeast Asian Littoral

Jennifer L. Gaynor

Conceptions of sea space have been integral to political imaginaries in Southeast Asia.¹ While in other parts of the world, national ideologies were often expressed in relation to a *homeland*, for Indonesia and the Dutch East Indies before it, geopolitical notions of place included the seas in increasingly explicit and more territorialized ways. Touching on imperial, colonial, national, and postnational settings, this piece concentrates on how the space of the seas was articulated in maritime ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In addition to examining maritime ideologies from different historical moments, I also explore how they may inform our understanding of changes in the configuration of social difference, especially in the region's littoral. Maritime ideologies offer a privileged view into political imaginaries, yet they also suggest how structures of governance underwent changes during the late-colonial and post-independence periods. Linked to increasingly territorialized notions of space and belonging, these structures continue to play an important role in shaping Indonesian ideas of "ethnic" difference and the anomalous position of "sea people."

The piece begins with a look at the "free seas," Hugo Grotius's *Mare Liberum* written in the early seventeenth century. Despite its mercantile underpinning, the *Mare Liberum* was composed in an anti-imperial setting, opposed to Iberian domination in both hemispheres. A similar conception of sea space as the common inheritance of all mankind appears in the remarks of a contemporaneous Southeast Asian ruler who protested Dutch attempts to monopolize trade. In contrast with these anti-imperial views, the late-colonial seas of the region appear along with their island chains in a grand image of archipelagic empire, "Insulinde." Another notion of archipelagic space, "Nusantara," came to represent the nation. Reinvented in the nineteenth century, this Javanese word from fourteenth-century texts was originally a term of reference for others, outside of Java. Only later did

it signify an archipelagic expanse, and then a unitary national territory. The Malay expression *tanah air* prefigured this nation-centered usage. Meaning “land (and) water” or “land of water,” early twentieth-century anticolonial nationalists used “Tanah Air” to refer to the space of national belonging, much as people elsewhere might use the term “homeland.”² Finally, I draw attention to the most recent incarnation of Nusantara in emergent visions of the archipelago as an Islamic political space. Like earlier maritime ideologies, this rendition of sea space in a postnational Southeast Asia proffers an alternative political imaginary.

WHY “MARITIME IDEOLOGY”?

It has often been said that the seas in Southeast Asia, rather than an obstacle or hindrance, are a unifying factor for the peoples who live along the region’s rivers and coasts.³ The seas also provide a geographical framework for discussing the possibility of regionwide themes.⁴ Comparing Southeast Asian seas with the Mediterranean, the historian O. W. Wolters pointed out that in Fernand Braudel’s portrayal, the unity of the Mediterranean was created by the movements of people over the sea routes—movements that facilitated the growth of urban-based trade. In Southeast Asia, however, maritime communications did not lead to similar permanent and substantial polities.⁵ Wolters reckoned that when we examine the sea’s influence on shaping history in Southeast Asia, we do not stumble upon a useful theme, for in his view the seas there fit into a polycentric landscape.⁶ Nevertheless he went on to suggest another way that the seas *did* have an impact on the region’s history, namely, the influence they exerted on the possibilities for an intraregional communality of historical experience. It was in connection with this idea, rather than any Southeast Asian “Mediterranean,” that Wolters argued for a “single ocean” stretching from East Africa to South Asia and on to the coasts of China. He viewed this “single ocean” as a “vast zone of neutral water . . . with a genuine unity of its own.”⁷ This view usefully locates the seas as a mediator of historical experience shared between disparate places. Yet the proposition that this sea space was part of a “vast zone of neutral water . . . with a genuine unity of its own”—our different temporal foci notwithstanding—provides a sharp contrast with my aims here. For Southeast Asian seas have in fact been a symbolic and material resource significant to imperial, national, local, and ethnic contexts. Whatever sea-related “unities” have appeared as natural, the seas have hardly constituted a “neutral” medium. On the contrary, they have been the terrain, as it were, of contestation.⁸

The view of ideology employed here does not reduce it to the notion of an illusion, a mask, or false consciousness. Rather, ideology here primarily concerns the representation of unities where, if not contestations, social divisions certainly abound.⁹ Particularly noteworthy in this regard are formulations of apparently legitimate political visions for social groupings—for collectivities either explicitly named or simply presupposed—whose internal differences are effaced. Such apparently legitimate political visions may also be called political imaginaries. Those I focus on below use different versions of the space of Southeast Asian seas—different seascapes—as their vehicle. Like other political imaginaries groping for legitimacy, the maritime ideologies I examine reach back to the past for “names, battle cries and costumes” and project this “time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language” onto claims *in* the present and *for* possible futures.¹⁰

A history that looks at ideological forms—discourses in which multiple social divisions are effaced—is *by no means* a substitute for studying either the multifarious things that people do or their empirical distribution in a production process. This is an important caveat. Yet ideological discourse is a crucial part of the social. Once we recognize that ideology operates through language and that language is a medium of social action, we must also acknowledge that ideology is partially constitutive of what, in our societies, is “real.” Ideology is not a pale image of the social world but is a part of that world, a creative and constitutive element of our social lives.¹¹ To study ideology, then, is to study, in part, how these creative actions serve to sustain the organization of power in unequal social relations.¹²

EMPIRES REAL AND IMAGINED

While I trace a history of the region’s seas as an area that, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, became increasingly territorialized, it should be mentioned that in an earlier period European sovereigns staked claims to exclusive privileges in enormous swathes of ocean. Often discussed as dividing the seas between Spain and Portugal, the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas is best understood as an allocation of routes for movement and spheres for exploration, rather than as an apportionment of boundable, claimable territory.¹³ Nevertheless, this and other Luso-Spanish treaties of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries did create a new politicization of ocean space¹⁴ wherein efforts to exclude others did not go uncontested.¹⁵

Certainly the Dutch disputed such efforts, and the seas of Southeast Asia were a crucial arena for their contestation. The legal treatise *Mare Liberum*, or *Freedom of the Seas*, composed by Grotius in 1604–1605, argued against

the ownership of the high seas, and it did so in the interest of Dutch trade. Part of a larger work, *De Jure Praedae* (DJP), or *The Law of Prize and Booty*,¹⁶ it was composed after a decision by the Amsterdam Admiralty Board investigating the seizure of the Portuguese vessel, the *Sta. Catarina*.¹⁷ The *Sta. Catarina* was seized in 1603 near the mouth of the Johor River and the present-day Straits of Singapore by the Dutch captain—later admiral—Jakob van Heemskerck who sailed under a precursor of the newly established VOC or Dutch East India Company.¹⁸ The Admiralty Board resolved that the vessel was lawfully seized and her cargo confiscated in an act of war.¹⁹ Whether the services of Grotius—a scholar of law and classics and a theologian—were sought to provide the strongest possible legal and moral justification for the Dutch action,²⁰ or rather, in an apologia, to popularize it,²¹ the framework in which Grotius interpreted this capture was not just about trade rivalries and retaliation for damages suffered by Heemskerck's expedition. It was also about the United Provinces' revolt against Iberian domination and the extension of this struggle to the waters of Southeast Asia.²²

Even before the *Sta. Catarina*'s capture in 1603, we find that Grotius himself considered Dutch military exploits in the waters of the Indies in light of the revolt against Spain. Grotius celebrated the exploits of the Dutch army and navy from 1588 to 1609 in a series of elegiacs called the Maurice Epigrams. In one of these poems, *Itinera Indicana* or *Expedition to the East Indies*, composed in 1602, he writes of a fleet that comes far from the Northern sky, or hemisphere, "a free people, Batavians by name; sole hope and effort lest both skies know a single master."²³ The Batavians, in other words, were the only hope for preventing Iberian dominance in both hemispheres. Grotius here refers not simply to the Dutch settlers at Batavia (contemporary Jakarta) on Java, but also to the ancient Batavians who provided the Dutch with a myth of descent from magnificent ancestors predating Spanish rule. This myth, represented as a historical continuity, helped to justify the United Provinces' revolt against Spain. *Itinera Indicana* thus provides a lens onto Grotius's understanding of the Dutch presence overseas: it had both anti-Iberian and anti-imperial significance. Ironically, the events that spurred the composition of the DJP would, in turn, anchor the efforts of the Dutch to expand their own influence in the region.²⁴

Grotius based his arguments in the DJP partly on the notion that the act of preventing or actively impeding a party from exercising a right bestowed by nature is in itself a sufficient legal ground upon which to initiate and wage a just war.²⁵ Based less on natural law than on more theological grounds, the ruler of Makassar in 1615 put forward a notion similar to "the free seas" in protest against the Dutch: "God has made the earth and sea,

has divided the earth among mankind and given the sea in common. It is a thing unheard of that anyone should be forbidden to sail the seas. . . .”²⁶

In the seventeenth century, the South Sulawesi state of Makassar, which had a large-scale transit trade in spices from the Moluccas, had no choice but to fight the VOC’s efforts to gain a monopoly in the nutmeg and clove trade. During Dutch negotiations for a treaty in 1659, Makassar’s Sultan Hasanuddin objected to the prohibition of trade with Company islands and ports. It ran counter to the commandment of God, he said, “who created the world in order that all people should have the enjoyment thereof, or do you believe that God has reserved these islands, so far away from the place of your nations, for your trade alone . . . ?”²⁷ Within a decade, with the help of Makassar’s rivals, Ternate and the Bugis realm of Boné, the Dutch took over the port of Makassar, dramatically altering the dynamics of trade and power in the region.

Despite his mocking tone, Sultan Hasanuddin’s rather prescient remarks neatly describe an archipelagic vision of empire that appears in the mid-nineteenth-century work of the famous Dutch author Multatuli. Multatuli’s novel *Max Havelaar* decries the treatment of the native Javanese under the yoke of colonialism and bemoans the equivocal position of an official who tries to ameliorate their conditions. This, however, is no anticolonialist tract, but a reformist rallying cry. The author-cum-narrator threatens:

Deliverance and help, by legal means, if *possible*, by the *legitimate* means of force, if *necessary* This book is only a beginning. I shall wax in power and keenness of weapons, in proportion as shall be necessary. God grant that it may not be necessary! No! It will *not* be necessary! For I dedicate my book to You, William the Third, King, Grand Duke, Prince—more than Prince, Grand Duke and King—EMPEROR of the glorious realm of INSULINDE, that coils yonder round the Equator like a girdle of emerald²⁸

Although concerned with the suffering of *Javanese* peasants under colonialism, in seeking a way out of their predicament and his, Multatuli envisioned an entire *archipelagic* realm of which perhaps he himself, or William the Third, would be the rescuer and emperor. The realm, “Insulinde,” a name that he coined by combining *insula*—“island” and Ind(i)ë, was the brainchild of a loyal—if critical—imperial subject. This mythic image of the entire archipelago as a political space prefigured later colonial and nationalist spatial imaginings that explicitly included the seas together with the archipelago’s islands.

Similar territorial myths of dominion were supported by the work of colonial cartographers and hydrographers who, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, began to map in earnest the maritime features of the region²⁹ and to incorporate coastal waters as part of colonial territory.³⁰ Maps were used as a quasi-legal means to reconstruct the property histories of the new colonial possessions, legitimizing the spread of colonial power.³¹ They thus reworked what were acknowledged in other legal contexts to be the coasts of independent native realms.

G. J. Resink worked hard to bring to light these other legal articulations in which native realms were still recognized as independent and to deflate the territorial myths of extensive colonial control outside of Java before the twentieth century.³² Resink had a keen eye for noting the passing remarks of colonial officials, remarks that show, for instance, that the independence of the allied realms and vassal principalities on Celebes was recognized between 1871 and 1881 by courts of every level in the lesser Netherlands East Indies. What Resink shows, I would like to stress, is that certain lands, which officials considered to be independent realms, still—in the legal sense—had shores that were not washed by the waters of the Netherlands East Indies in the late nineteenth century.³³ In other words, at that time there had not been a sense of the Netherlands East Indies as a unified territory, least of all one that encompassed the entire archipelago. It is important to bear this in mind, for Multatuli's vision of Insulinde and the dominance of subsequent maritime ideologies seem to obscure these historical circumstances.

Following the capitulation of realms outside of Java between 1905 and 1915, the waters of the archipelago increasingly became the object of scientific attention. Scientific discourse and practice composed part of the arsenal by which the Dutch appropriated these waters. By 1922 one could learn about ocean science in the colony by reading the popular book *De zeeën van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië* (*The Seas of the Netherlands East-Indies*). Scientific chapters discussed sea depths and soundings, the temperature and salinity of the water, the biology of the seas, its geology, the tides, and the delineation of coasts. The chapter on biology contains two environmental sections: the sea as an environment for animals, and the sea as an environment for plants. One finds here no mention at all of *orang laut* or “sea people”—the various people whose lives were closely associated with the waters. Although the maritime realm was also their “environment,” they were not studied under the rubric of scientific discourses about the sea.³⁴ Yet, within discourses of colonial knowledge produced about “natives” it was also difficult to locate “sea people,” who were dispersed, peripatetic to varying degrees, and who

claimed no land as collectively theirs or to which their “origins” might be traced.

Just as colonial mapping did not recognize the presence and practices of upland shifting agriculturalists, the littoral zones that sea people lived in and the waters they traversed were likewise generally not considered to be places in which people resided. This contrasted markedly with how places *on land* began to index groups of people in colonial knowledge about “natives.”³⁵ As with late colonial administration and military operations, the organization of this knowledge worked largely within a discourse of mapping.³⁶ Particular places on land stood *for* groups of people in a way that was not applicable to sea people. Apparently lacking a singular place on land from which they might claim to hail as a group, sea people occupied a kind of structural blind spot. While their “lack” of a homeland and their mobility earned them a place in the colonial imagination as “sea gypsies,” the land-oriented organization of colonial governance and the association of specific lands with particular groups of “natives” created a structure in which sea people did not seem to “fit,” and through which they began to appear out of place.³⁷ This out-of-placeness persisted despite more explicit incorporation of the seas in colonial geographic imaginaries, and even when these borrowed terms from indigenous sources.

The introduction to *The Seas of the Netherlands East-Indies* provides an illustration of how the Dutch appropriated Javanese geographical knowledge. In its discussion of the historical background to the research, Marco Polo’s travel notes are downplayed as “not of any oceanographic importance,” for

the beginnings of our knowledge lie not with Marco Polo. One seeks it (it speaks for itself) in the knowledge of the natives themselves. It is the *Nagarakertagama* (1365) which, through an enumeration of many geographic proper names, demonstrates that the Javanese of the fourteenth century were acquainted, even though only superficially, with the whole of our “East,” from Sumatra *including* the Malay peninsula to the west coast of New Guinea, and thus, from their own experience, had acquired a certain degree of familiarity with its coasts and principal channels.³⁸

In this passage, Javanese enumeration of other locales is used to express the sweep or expanse of colonial territory: the whole of *our* East. Yet the Javanese term that came to represent this sweep, *nusantara*, did not mean “archipelago” and still less “Dutch empire in the East.” Rather, this term,

as used in the fourteenth century, referred to the *other* islands, that is, those beyond Java.³⁹ In the next section I examine the permutations “*nusantara*” underwent as an emblem of archipelagic national space.

SPACES OF NATIONALIST UNITY

Images of political unity were crucial to the success of the anticolonial movement, and calls for national unity had been clearly voiced as early as the 1928 Youth Congress in Batavia. These calls explicitly included the seas in the space of the future nation. The Sumpah Pemuda or Youth Pledge of the 1928 Congress adopted the ideals of one nation, one language, and one “homeland.” However, the term used was not “homeland” but *tanah air*, which can mean “land (and) water” or “land of water.”

“*Tanah*” denotes land or soil, and cognates of this Malay term were widely used in place names. These vaguely defined “lands” became more carefully demarcated as the authorities drew the boundaries of administrative units. Yet, unlike the *tana Bali* of the Balinese and the *tana Jawa* of the Javanese, the region’s sea people, while maintaining attachments to particular places, had no taken-for-granted “homeland” and thus developed no ideologically primordial attachment to a locale from which they could collectively be said to come. Although *tanah air* includes the waters, it has a specifically nationalist referent and does not allude to any particular subgroup.⁴⁰

Nusantara, since at least the mid-twentieth century, has basically served as a synonym for *tanah air*. As mentioned above, the term can be traced to fourteenth-century Javanese texts where it meant “the *other* islands,” as seen from Majapahit Java. The self-consciously colonial appropriation of this term of Javanese derivation implicitly exaggerated the reach of a Majapahit “empire,” thus serving both Javanese pretensions as well as those of the Dutch who claimed to want to restore the luster of the glorious “Indianized” states of Java’s pre-Islamic past.

While these colonial connotations of an authentic Javanese imperial past persisted, more recent usage of *nusantara* denotes a national space in which the Javanese frame of reference has largely fallen away. Since the mid-1940s *nusantara* has clearly stood for the whole archipelago as it encompasses national space. Contemporary Indonesians give it a believable, if mistaken, folk etymology. The folk etymology asserts that *nusa*, from the Javanese for “island,” and *antara*, modern Indonesian for “between,” combine to represent the *islands between* the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean (or the China Sea), or refer to the *islands between* the Asian mainland and Australia.

Bernard Vlekke used the term in his book, *Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago*, published in English in 1943.⁴¹ He was the first to see that the history of “Indonesia”—a term already in scholarly use for a century—had begun to vacillate *between* a colonial history of the Netherlands East Indies and a national history of Indonesia.⁴² The 1943 edition was reprinted in 1977, but in revised versions from 1959 and 1960 the title was indeed changed to *Nusantara: A History of Indonesia*,⁴³ a change that registered the anticolonial nationalist revolution following the end of World War II.

A complex period of “regional rebellions” followed the revolution, fraught with tension over inequities between Jakarta and the “outer islands” as well as friction between civilian politicians and the transforming military. As part of its effort to bring these “regional rebellions” to a close, in 1957 the central government issued a statement of national unity called the Djuanda Declaration, in which *nusantara* was reinvented.⁴⁴ This Declaration asserted national territorial unity on the basis of what was ostensibly bequeathed by the former colonial power. It differed, however, from earlier, colonial visions of territory by having not just a narrow strip of coastal zone around each of the islands, but including instead *all* of the waters between Indonesia’s many islands within a single body. It marked the creation of a national “geo-body,” an abstract geographical signifier that was a model *for*, rather than a model of, what it purported to represent.⁴⁵

This new geo-body, which included all of the intra-island waters, resonated with the early nationalist formulation of *tanah air*, while it simultaneously invoked a supposedly imperial Javanese past. In this way a notion of the precolonial past was used to underwrite a presumption of Javanese supremacy with pseudohistorical legitimacy.⁴⁶ It should not be forgotten that the Djuanda Declaration’s particular reinvention of *nusantara* was intended not simply to buttress national unity, but quite explicitly to justify measures taken against “rebellions” in “the regions” in the name of “national security.”

Heavily promoted as a national ideology since 1973,⁴⁷ the “Nusantara Concept” (Wawasan Nusantara) gained even further legitimacy with Indonesia’s participation in the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which lasted from 1973 to 1982. In this third UNCLOS, the Djuanda geo-body of Nusantara gained an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a 200-nautical-mile swath around an imaginary line connecting the outermost points of all the islands. Like the colonial use of maps in an earlier time, the new *nusantara* borders reconfigured a property history. In this international context of legal discourses, the Nusantara

Concept was used to justify state ownership of all material resources within and below the waters between the archipelago's islands as well as within the EEZ.

Most nations involved in UNCLOS had both strategic and material concerns. Strategic concerns included rights of passage through certain waterways, and material concerns focused primarily on deep-seabed minerals and ownership of sub-seafloor hydrocarbon resources—hence the deeply felt disappearance of East Timor from the Nusantara geo-body, leaving few legal grounds to contest the loss of the resource-rich Timor Gap. Such material interests also underlie ongoing disputes over the ownership of particular small islands and the EEZs that would be extended by sovereignty over them. One factor in deciding territorial disputes over such islands is the question of whether they support a “permanent settled population.” However, like colonial mapping, this criterion does not recognize that historically sea people have lived intermittently on many of the small islands that dot the waters of the region.

ANOMALOUS ETHNICITY AND THE NEW NUSANTARA

Perhaps nothing in Indonesia better illustrates the use of place as an icon of “identity” than Taman Mini—the Mini Theme Park of the high Suharto era that John Pemberton writes about so revealingly in *On the Subject of “Java.”* The park presents emblems of “cultural” difference from various parts of the archipelago to people for their self-recognition as Indonesian subjects. Such emblems of difference include, among other things, styles of dress and architecture. The *pièce de résistance*, however, is the park's pond, which contains the archipelago in miniature. Through it, people are meant to read isometric relations between the particular places, and the presumably distinct peoples, of Indonesia.⁴⁸ Of course, sea people are nowhere to be found in such a scheme, for there is no place in the pond that represents for them, what is, for others, a notion of “their land.” While on the one hand, the archipelago in miniature iconically manifests the national motto “Unity in Diversity,” on the other hand, the bounded pond taken as a whole is an iconic representation, not just of the space of the nation, but of the EEZ-expanded Nusantara.

A focus on such ideological structures of ethnic difference and the production of national subjects makes for a remarkably flat picture that irons out social complexity and hierarchy. Yet it is against precisely this structure of apparently equivalent differences that sea people come across as a kind of ethnic anomaly. Their romanticization as sea gypsies in the colonial period

gave the impression that most sea people were always on the move. This same image under the present rubric of “formerly nomadic” facilitates the sense that they no longer move anywhere at all. Indeed, over roughly the past century there has been a great deal of settlement both by choice and by government policy. However, just as sea people were not itinerant in the romantic fashion of the colonial image, it is also not the case that they no longer get around nautically. Yet, viewed as formerly nomadic sea gypsies, they are now nevertheless widely considered to have lost their authenticity.

Sama and other sea people in Indonesia have, moreover, been relentlessly subjected to primitivizing discourses, which cast them as the inverse of the “modern” and the “developed.” In the Suharto period they were administratively classed with *masyarakat terasing* (isolated peoples) or *suku-suku terasing* (isolated tribes). *Terasing* here has two meanings, and there is slippage between them: it means “secluded,” “separate,” “isolated” on the one hand and “very foreign” or “exotic” on the other. What sea people have often been isolated from, however, are not other people and places—they have continually been involved in some degree of travel and trade. Rather, they have become isolated in relation to administrative structures and their centers.

The cause of this is not physical distance, but social distance and a perception of inconvenience: small islands and coastal settlements must often be reached by boat, and civil servants consider them out of the way. Yet even when the way is clear and not so far, officials are generally reluctant to get into boats they consider risky with people they sometimes call “*primitif*.” The apparent “lack” of collective identification with a particular place on land has prevented sea people, for their part, from forming the kinds of ethnic patronage networks that are supported by territorial administrative structures. Even when, for instance, Sama people do manage to rise in the bureaucracy, they may shed their ethnic markedness and “disappear” to would-be clients. Not only in terms of infrastructure then, but also for structural-ideological reasons, many sea people have become administratively marginal, surviving, and in some cases flourishing, on the edges of governance.⁴⁹

One is tempted to look to them for an alternative maritime ideology, yet it is hard to find any evidence for such a thing. Although associated with the waters, with lives that often revolve around the tides, since sea people have been scattered throughout the region and have had no history of political unity, there has been no context in which they might ideologically objectify the space of the seas. While they may, then, consider themselves as “belonging” somehow to maritime and littoral worlds, they apparently have not produced explicit discourses that represent the seas and coasts as a collectively salient political space.⁵⁰

As outlined at the beginning, this chapter attempts to trace a history that looks at ideological forms—discourses in which multiple social divisions are effaced—an approach that complements other types of analysis. What I have argued is that the space of the seas has been a crucial part of political imaginaries at different historical moments in Southeast Asia and particularly in Indonesia. As part of political imaginaries, sea space became increasingly territorialized, while at the same time, people of the littoral came to be viewed as more, or perhaps less, than just another ethnic group. Romanticized as sea gypsies, their putative origins as a group not traced to any particular land, sea people eluded the impetus to found ethnic “identity” or historical “origin” on place. Like “gypsies” elsewhere, they reveal a dominant structure of equivalent ethnic oppositions through their implicit placement outside of it—a kind of anomaly to that structure, despite increasing encompassment of the seas. What I have done here is sketch a broad sequence of maritime ideologies, rather like a stone skipping over the surface of history. More than simply a sequence, however, I have tried to show how these maritime ideologies reach back to the “past” and then use that “past” to project a design from the political present into the future.

The UNCLOS-inspired Nusantara was the height of attempts to use this term to represent a precisely delimited Indonesian territorial unity. After Suharto’s fall in 1998, the “regions” began to call for decentralization. Coupled with the referendum and independence in East Timor as well as other violent conflicts in a number of areas, fears mounted that Indonesia might disintegrate.⁵¹ National anxiety resurrected the acronym NKRI—Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (the United State of the Republic of Indonesia). But there was little talk of “*nusantara*” as an emblem of national unity.

The latest incarnation of *nusantara* appears amid concerns over Islamic radicalism in the region. In late 2001 and early 2002 a series of arrests were made under Malaysia’s and Singapore’s internal security acts, detaining people connected with the militant groups Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM). These groups reportedly had the goal of setting up a union of Islamic states, or a single entity, variously called Nusantara Raya, Darul Islamiah Nusantara, or Daulah Islamiah Nusantara.⁵² Malaysian and Singaporean authorities have made much out of calls to establish an Islamic state as evidence of possible links to al-Qaeda. But calls like this have become such a common theme among militant groups in Indonesia that, as the International Crisis Group has noted, it is hard to see how, by itself, this indicates much of anything.⁵³ By itself it does not indicate much. However, taken together with the other maritime ideologies

sketched here, in which the space of the sea forms an important resource in the production of powerful political imaginaries, this example illustrates a reformulation that draws on earlier similar terms, but turns them toward a new agenda. In this it is much like Insulinde, *tanah air*, and earlier versions of *nusantara*, taking a “time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language” and projecting them onto a new political project and possible futures.

NOTES

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1. The focus here is primarily on Indonesia, yet sea space has also been integrally important to the political imaginaries of the Philippines and Malaysia.

2. As in Indonesia, Malaysians also used Tanah Air to refer to their country.

3. George Coedès, *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968), pp. 3–4.

4. O. W. Wolters, *History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), p. 35. Analogies with the Mediterranean are inescapable. Heather Sutherland offers an overview and cautions against pitfalls in “Southeast Asian History and the Mediterranean Analogy,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (2003): 1–20.

5. Wolters, *History, Culture and Region*, pp. 36–37. He did not, therefore, view the Mediterranean as a fitting analogy for the region’s seas. Compare G. Carter Bentley, “Indigenous States of Southeast Asia,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 15 (1986): 275–305.

6. Wolters, *History, Culture and Region*, p. 38. He used the metaphor of “mandala” polities to describe this “polycentric landscape.”

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 38–39.

8. Philip Steinberg similarly argues that the “world-ocean” has been perceived, constructed, and managed under modernity in various ways by competing interest groups; see his *The Social Construction of the Ocean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

9. I am indebted to John B. Thompson’s work on ideology, especially his attention to the work of Castoriadis, Lefort, and Bourdieu. Thompson sought to redirect the study of ideology away from the search for collectively shared values, and, as with shifts in the study of “culture,” to aim investigation instead at “the complex ways in which meaning is mobilized for the maintenance of relations of domination”; see *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 5, 35.

10. Quoted fragments are from Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 15.

11. Thompson, *Theory of Ideology*, pp. 5–6.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 6. Limitations of space preclude a discussion of Bakhtin and how el-

ements of language are historically transformed through the concreteness of present circumstances.

13. Steinberg, *Social Construction of the Ocean*, p. 86.

14. Elizabeth Mancke, "Oceanic Space and the Creation of a Global International System, 1450–1800," in Daniel Finamore, ed., *Maritime History as World History* (Salem, MA: Peabody Essex Museum and Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2004), p. 150. Also see Elizabeth Mancke, "Early Modern Expansion and the Politicization of Oceanic Space," *Geographical Review* 89, no. 2 (1999): 225–236. Rather than view the oceans as an arena of international law per se, Benton illustrates how, in early modern legal practice, ships and their captains were representatives of "municipal" authorities: "vectors of crown law thrusting into ocean space"; see Lauren Benton, "Legal Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the Origins of Ocean Regionalism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 47, no. 4 (2005): 704.

15. Hanns J. Buchholz, *Law of the Sea Zones in the Pacific Ocean* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), p. 2.

16. Hugo Grotius, *De Jure Praedae Commentarius. Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty. A Translation of the Original Manuscript of 1604*, trans. G. L. Williams and W. H. Zeydel (New York: Oceana Publishing, 1964) (hereafter cited as DJP).

17. On the occasion of its composition, see Peter Borschberg, "Hugo Grotius, East India Trade and the King of Johor," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 30, no. 2 (1999): 225–248; Peter Borschberg, "The Seizure of the *Sta. Catarina* Revisited: The Portuguese Empire in Asia, VOC Politics and the Origins of the Dutch-Johor Alliance (1602–c.1616)," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 33, no. 1 (2002): 35; James Brown Scott, ed., Hugo Grotius, *The Freedom of the Seas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1916), p. vi; Charles Wilson, "Hugo Grotius and His World," in *The World of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645)* (Amsterdam: APA-Holland University Press, 1984), p. 7.

18. Grotius incorrectly places the incident in the Straits of Malacca. See Borschberg, "*Sta. Catarina*," n. 12, p. 34.

19. DJP, p. 378, cited in Borschberg, "Hugo Grotius," p. 226.

20. Scott, *Freedom of the Seas*, p. vi; Wilson, "Hugo Grotius and His World," p. 7.

21. Borschberg, "*Sta. Catarina*," pp. 31, 56.

22. The *Sta. Catarina* incident should be seen against the background of the union of Spain and Portugal under Hapsburg rule by 1580, and by 1590 the extension of attacks to Portuguese targets by Spain's avowed enemies—England and the United Provinces. In this context, Stadholder Prince Maurice of Orange instructed Dutch captains under the VOC's predecessors to "defend" themselves against any party that might impede their voyage or inflict harm, and to seek reparations for damages suffered. DJP, p. 376, in Borschberg, "*Sta. Catarina*," p. 50.

23. Arthur Eyffinger, *Inventory of the Poetry of Hugo Grotius* (Assen: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1982), p. 94, located by first-line index; Hugo Grotius, *Hug. Grotii Poemata, Omnia*, editio quinta (Amstelodami: Apud Joh. Ravesteynium, 1670), p. 276. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of John Blankenship for all translations from the Latin.

24. See Borschberg, "*Sta. Catarina*," for details on the longer-term impacts of the incident: the consolidation of the Dutch presence in the region, the opening of the China and Japan markets to the VOC, the securing of Johor's independence vis-à-vis regional

powers, and the eviction of Portugal as a maritime and land-based military force from the Straits of Malacca.

25. Borschberg, "Sta. Catarina," p. 56.

26. Quoted in G. J. Resink, *Indonesia's History Between the Myths: Essays in Legal History and Historical Theory* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve Publishers Ltd., 1968), p. 45; from F. W. Stapel, "Het Bongaais verdrag: De vestiging der Nederlanders op Makassar" [The Bonggaya treaty: The establishment of the Dutch in Makassar] (Diss., University of Leiden, 1922), p. 14 and n. 2.

27. Stapel, *Verdrag*, p. 62, in Resink, *Indonesia's History Between the Myths*, p. 46.

28. Multatuli, *Max Havelaar or The Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company*, trans. Roy Edwards (Penguin, 1987 [1860]), p. 320. Emphasis and capitalization in the original. I have edited out the original's use of ellipses for effect.

29. See Eric Tagliacozzo, "Hydrography, Technology, Coercion: Mapping the Sea in Southeast Asian Imperialism, 1850–1900," *Archipel* 65 (2003): 89–107.

30. See Gerke Teitler, *Ambivalentie en Aarzelings: Het Beleid van Nederland en Nederlands-Indië ten aanzien van hun Kustwateren, 1870–1962* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1994).

31. Benedict Anderson, "Census, Map, Museum," in *Imagined Communities* (London and New York: Verso, 1991), pp. 173–176.

32. A point also noted by Barbara Harvey. See Barbara Sillars Harvey, "Tradition, Islam and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950–1965" (PhD diss., Cornell University, 1974), n. 66, p. 47. Resink, *Indonesia's History Between the Myths*.

33. Resink, *Indonesia's History Between the Myths*, pp. 136–138, 141–142, 165, 182–183.

34. Koninklijk Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap, *De Zeeën van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië* (Leiden: Brill, 1922).

35. See also David Ludden, "Presidential Address: Maps in the Mind and the Mobilization of Asia," *Journal of Asian Studies* 62, no. 4 (2003): 1063–1064.

36. See Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1994), p. 310; and Anderson, "Census, Map, Museum," esp. p. 184.

37. Similarly, Trouillot remarks that Jews and gypsies were in an awkward position not accounted for by a here/elsewhere dichotomy. Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), n. 21, p. 143.

38. S. P. l'Honoré Naber, "Chapter I," in *De Zeeën van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië*, p. 2. Emphasis in original.

39. Mpu Prapanca, *Desawarnana (Nagarakertagama)*, trans. Stuart Robson (Leiden: KITLV, 1995), canto 79.3 on p. 82, canto 83.5 on p. 85; *Calon Arang*, 10, BKI 82, cited in Gonda, "Additions to a Study on Sanskrit anta-, antara-, etc." BKI 112, no. 4: 402; P. J. Zoetmulder, *Old-Javanese-English Dictionary* (Leiden: KITLV, 1982). Resink came to the same point through different sources. He cites C. C. Berg, "De Geschiedenis van pril Majapahit" (The history of young Majapahit), I, IV (1950–1951), n. 11, p. 512, in Resink, *Indonesia's History Between the Myths*, pp. 21–22.

40. It has carried this nationalist sense in Malaysian usage as well.

41. Bernard H. M. Vlekke, *Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1943).

42. Resink, *Indonesia's History Between the Myths*, p. 18. Vlekke owed the title to Ki Hadjar Dewantara.

43. *Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago* (New York: Arno Press, 1977). *Nusantara: A History of Indonesia* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1959). *Nusantara: A History of Indonesia* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960).

44. The Djuanda Declaration was later ratified in 1960. Earlier in 1957 martial law had also been declared.

45. Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped*, p. 130.

46. This was rather like Grotius invoking, “a free people, Batavians by name,” a poetic reference to a myth of glorious ancestors set out as a proposition of historical continuity.

47. This was the same year in which oil prices shot up, and the remains of Indonesian political parties were fused into two groups barred from organizing below the district level.

48. John Pemberton, *On the Subject of “Java”* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); see also Patricia Spyer, “Diversity with a Difference: Adat and the New Order in Aru (Eastern Indonesia),” *Cultural Anthropology* 11 (February 1996): 25–50.

49. I elaborate this concept in a publication in preparation. There is a certain craft—interpretive and practical—involved in taking advantage of this position in order to survive materially and socially.

50. Given the right political circumstances and means of communication, this could conceivably change. A historical alternative maritime ideology may be a pipe dream, but one may nevertheless reconsider regional sea space from the perspective of sea people’s practices, precisely the task I took up in my dissertation, “Liquid Territory: Subordination, Memory and Manuscripts among Sama People of Sulawesi’s Southern Littoral” (University of Michigan, 2005). In addition to analysis of livelihood and political economy, it explores maritime practices through stories of relocation in Sama tales of the past, through the circulation of related oral narratives and Bugis-language manuscripts, as well as through memories of conflict avoidance in the coastal zone.

51. These fears were serious enough to warrant public affirmation of support from the United States. See “U.S. Backs Indonesian Territorial Integrity,” *The Jakarta Post*, February 18, 2000, p. 2.

52. Lee Shi-Ian, “13 KMM Men Held under ISA,” *New Straits Times* (Malaysia), January 5, 2002; Derwin Pereira, “A Potent Force with Network in the Region,” *Straits Times* (Singapore), January 20, 2002; “Militant Groups’ Growing Tentacles,” *Straits Times* (Singapore), January 26, 2002; “Unmasking Radical Preachers,” *Straits Times* (Singapore), February 10, 2002; Brendan Pereira, “KL Arrests Religious Leader for Terror Links; Ties to Group Planning Union of Islamic States under Probe,” *Straits Times* (Singapore), February 23, 2002; Singapore government press statement on ISA arrests, January 11, 2002; (Sidney Jones), “Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the ‘Ngruki Network’ in Indonesia,” *Indonesia Briefing* (Jakarta/Brussels: ICG-International Crisis Group, August 8, 2002), p. 3.

53. “Ngruki Network,” p. 18.

Empires



The Organization of Oceanic Empires

The Iberian World in the Habsburg Period

Carla Rahn Phillips

Globalization arguably began, not with the voyages of Columbus, but with the treaties that claimed to divide the non-European world into Portuguese and Spanish spheres of influence, including exclusive seaborne channels of exploration and communication. In the early sixteenth century both Iberian powers established commercial and governmental outposts in the Americas in accordance with those treaties and reached agreement regarding spheres of influence in Asia. Nonetheless, the rulers of Portugal and Spain each saw their interests as spanning the whole globe. By the late sixteenth century various other European powers challenged the monopolies claimed by the Iberian states, which were ruled by the same Habsburg monarchs from 1580 to 1640.

Although the empires of Portugal and Spain officially remained separate during the joint monarchy, royal officials made policies for defense, trade, and shipping for both empires in the same global context, relying on the tenuous and problematical means of transoceanic exchanges. Ordinary citizens in Portugal, Spain, and their overseas empires had to function in a global context as well, even as they made personal decisions based largely on local concerns. How did they manage that, and how did they regard their relationship with their kinfolk and compatriots across the seas? By examining such issues, and by treating Portugal, Spain, and their overseas empires together during the Habsburg period, we can gain a clearer sense of what early globalization meant to the Europeans who lived it.

Each of the Iberian empires encompassed a collection of territories and peoples all over the globe, posing extraordinary difficulties for government organization, yet each empire was remarkably successful in terms of longevity and cultural cohesion. The Portuguese empire in Brazil lasted well into the nineteenth century, and a few enclaves in Asia lasted well into the twentieth century. The Spanish empire in the Americas held together politically for more than 300 years; in the early nineteenth century it encompassed over twelve million square miles and more than fifteen million people. Scattered

remnants of Spanish colonies in the Americas and Asia lasted until 1898. What explains that longevity and cultural cohesion? The answer, it seems to me, relates to the intricate fabric of public and private traditions and institutions that Iberians carried with them overseas.

One essential Spanish tradition was the bureaucratic structure of advisory, thematic, and territorial councils, linked to permanent and ad-hoc committees (*juntas*) within the government.¹ Evolving from medieval councils in both Castile and Aragon, the structure accommodated the Italian territories linked to Aragon, the American territories claimed by Castile, and— from 1580 to 1640—Portugal and its empire. In other words, the administration of overseas territories was fully integrated into Habsburg bureaucratic structures. Councils and committees met regularly to discuss matters within their purview and communicated with one another and with the monarch through written consultations. During the dual monarchy that linked Spain and Portugal, their imperial administrations remained largely separate bodies, but they were joined to the same head, so to speak, for sharing information and coordinating action. For personnel, the structure as a whole drew upon a pool of highly trained and dedicated professional bureaucrats.

Among other things, the Habsburg bureaucratic structure made it possible to organize fleets for worldwide commerce and defense—an immense task. For the late sixteenth century I have estimated that several hundred vessels and more than forty thousand men sailed on Spain's commercial and military fleets to Spanish America each year.² For military use the Habsburg monarchs embargoed and leased the services of privately owned ships and their crews to supplement the small number of ships owned by the crown—in effect using them as a reserve arsenal and source of manpower. The Portuguese fleets to India and Brazil employed far fewer ships and men, but the maritime population was nonetheless prominent in a total of only one million to one-and-a-half million Portuguese.³ The government had to resort to various expedients to provide ships' crews and colonists for the Portuguese empire in a way that did not depopulate the metropolis.⁴ With so many Spaniards and Portuguese and their families involved in transoceanic trade and defense, I would argue that citizens in the home countries and the empires could feel that they were part of the same mental, social, and emotional space, even though they were thousands of miles apart. I will return to this point later.

The Habsburg bureaucracy took an active interest in the ships used both for trade and for defense, because the continued existence of the Iberian empires depended upon the performance of those ships. During the dual monarchy, the government sponsored an ongoing debate about the ideal size

and shape of vessels used for transoceanic shipping. Officials solicited the opinions of numerous Portuguese and Spaniards expert in ship design, mathematics, shipbuilding, and trade.⁵ Their treatises discussed ship sizes and configurations for both American and Asian trajectories, and government officials were well aware of the different requirements for each. Informed by expert opinion, the government issued several sets of regulations—in 1607, 1613, and 1618—defining ship sizes, configurations, and operating norms for voyages between Spain and America. Parallel discussions took place regarding the best ships for voyages between Portugal and Asia. The regulations aimed to ensure the safety of crews, passengers, soldiers, and merchandise, and to encourage the construction of ships that could be adapted to military use in wartime.

We can glimpse the issues involved by reading the minutes of a committee in Madrid that considered Portuguese finance during the reign of Philip III (1598–1621, known as Philip II in Portugal). Fray Luis de Aliaga, the king's confessor, chaired the committee, which habitually met in his monastic cell. At one meeting on January 9, 1614, they discussed ships. In addition to Aliaga and the archbishop of Braga, who had served as the Portuguese governor in India, the committee included Luis Mendes de Vasconcelos, expert in both African and Indian Ocean trade and defense, and the bishop of the Canary Islands, well versed in Atlantic ships and shipping. In the course of their discussion, the committee considered a range of issues: the size and configurations of ships used for trade to India; norms for loading and sailing long-distance vessels; sailing conditions in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans; Dutch activities in Asia; the comparative cost of building ships in Lisbon versus India; labor supplies in both venues; the quality and availability of several kinds of Asian hardwoods, copper, and tin; and the political situation on the Malabar coast.⁶ In other words, to discuss ships, they had to have an impressive grasp of conditions in Portugal's eastern empire as a whole.

The most demanding tests of the bureaucratic system of councils and committees concerned defense of Iberian claims to territory and trading rights. Portugal and Spain both claimed monopolies on trade with their colonies from the earliest days of empire and had to defend those monopolies against other Europeans who had every reason to challenge them. How did bureaucrats in Lisbon and Madrid organize military expeditions to Asia and America during the Habsburg period? Portuguese enclaves were strung out over the eastern hemisphere from Lisbon to Macau, linked by sea voyages that took months at best and were shaped by the annual pattern of winds, currents, and weather in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.⁷ After

the Dutch mastered the route to the Spice Islands at the end of the sixteenth century, they challenged the Portuguese openly in some venues and negotiated with local rulers for competing trading privileges in others.⁸ Despite the ability of bureaucracies in Madrid and Lisbon to organize imperial shipping, it proved impossible to send timely reinforcements to Portuguese settlements under attack or to repel well-armed interlopers. During the seventeenth century the Dutch squeezed the Portuguese out of many of their former strongholds. Eventually the Portuguese held only a few isolated enclaves in Africa, India, and China, although thousands of individual Portuguese settled outside the enclaves as well, adapting to local conditions.⁹

Like the Portuguese, Spaniards faced enormous difficulties in establishing and maintaining a base in Asia, in part because they were bound by treaties not to follow the Portuguese route around Africa, but instead had to sail westward from Europe to America and then to Asia. It took decades for Spanish mariners to discover a return route back across the Pacific, but as soon as they did—in 1565—they established regular trade between their settlement at Manila and New Spain (Mexico). Nonetheless, Spanish Manila, like the Portuguese enclaves in Asia, was largely on its own in terms of defense. It was simply too difficult for the metropolis, or even for New Spain, to provide timely reinforcements. Although the Habsburg government encouraged Portuguese and Spaniards in Asia to cooperate with one another during the dual monarchy, conflict continued to mark relations at the borders of the two empires—in Asia as well as America.

The bureaucracy was better able to organize defensive efforts for the Americas, because they were closer and far quicker to reach from Europe. During the dual monarchy Portuguese and Spanish colonies in the Americas faced serious threats from enemy fleets and privateers in wartime and from pirates in peacetime. In addition, the Habsburg government experienced chronic deficits of funds, ships, and men because of wars in Europe. Nonetheless, when Dutch forces captured the Brazilian port of Bahía in 1624, the crown organized a powerful combined force of Portuguese and Spaniards to recapture the town and its port for Portugal. In carrying this out, the government relied heavily on another Iberian tradition that served as an organizing principle for empire: the crusading heritage of both Portugal and Spain, who had each fought intermittent wars against Muslim forces established in the peninsula in medieval times. In 1625 the Habsburg monarchy shaped its military response to the Dutch in Brazil as a latter-day crusade against invaders who were defined as both heretics and rebels.¹⁰

Roman Catholic faith and traditions served as organizing principles for both Iberian empires. It is safe to say that the vast majority of Portuguese

and Spaniards identified themselves as loyal Roman Catholics—often militantly so. During the medieval reconquests there was considerable cultural interchange among Christian, Muslim, and Jewish communities in Iberia. Nonetheless, Catholicism emerged from that period as the strongest marker of the dominant community, which grew increasingly hostile toward Muslims and Jews in their midst. Early in the period of overseas exploration, both Spain and Portugal forced their minority communities to choose between conversion and exile, and religious inquisitions prosecuted and persecuted converts who were suspected of backsliding. The rise of Protestant Christianity in the sixteenth century enhanced the sense of Portuguese and Spaniards that they were besieged soldiers defending the true faith.

The institutions of Catholic religious identity reinforced community identity at home and abroad. For ordinary citizens Catholicism permeated daily life at the most basic levels, from church rites and annual rituals of religious observance in countless villages and towns, to the efforts of missionaries in imperial outposts around the world. To the extent possible, Portuguese and Spaniards took their faith and all of its social and communal trappings with them when they migrated. Transplanted across the oceans, religious life provided a constant reminder of who they were and a sense of continuity with the homelands they had left behind.

The Catholic faith also served as an entry point into the Iberian empires for other Europeans who served the Habsburgs as soldiers or sailors. Navies in early modern times suffered from chronic manpower shortages, especially in periods characterized by active trade and warfare at the same time. Although some states were loathe to crew official navies with foreign sailors, the Iberian Habsburgs openly recruited foreigners—as long as they were Catholic. Often 20 percent or more of sailors on Spanish vessels, including warships, were foreign-born in the late sixteenth century, despite the legal limit of 12 to 15 percent. Many of the foreign sailors came from Portugal, even before the dual monarchy began.¹¹ Although royal officials worried about having large numbers of foreigners on royal vessels, religious loyalty seems to have been accepted as a partial substitute for national identity. Foreign sailors who served the Spanish crown could earn rewards and pensions equal to those of natives. In sum, Catholic religious traditions proved useful in defining and organizing the global empires of Spain and Portugal and in uniting them during the dual monarchy.

Secular traditions also helped to organize the Iberian empires. The naval and mercantile fleets that connected Portugal and Spain to their colonies relied on the ability of shipwrights and supply contractors to prepare the fleets, on traditions of seafaring and mariners' guilds to command and

crew the vessels, and on merchants' guilds to organize trade. Merchant fleets might seem tangential to political and imperial organization, but in the case of Portugal and Spain, commercial as well as military fleets were overseen by government bureaucrats and royal councils.¹² The government also worked with merchants' and mariners' guilds through India House in Lisbon and the House of Trade in Seville. In other words, trade cannot be separated from political and imperial organization.

Imperial fleets of all sorts relied on public-private partnerships, blending the traditions of each component part into the broader enterprise—but how? That question leads into a broader examination of how government and society functioned in Iberia. In various research projects over the years I have often admired the ability of bureaucrats in various outposts of the Iberian empires to deal with the whole world at the same time, despite the vast distances, logistical difficulties, and diverse local conditions that affected their decision-making. Their inclusive approach and impressive grasp of the complexities involved helped Spain and Portugal to maintain control over empires that spanned the globe. What shaped that inclusive approach?

One source was the tradition of written law under royal sponsorship, which governed bureaucrats and ordinary citizens alike. At a personal level the framework of written law meant that you could write your last will and testament in Bahía or Mexico City with the expectation that it would be proved and implemented in Lisbon or Seville; you could arrange a business deal in Burgos or Oporto with the expectation that it would be enforceable in Manila or Macau. Individuals differed in their relationship to the law and how they viewed it, depending upon their social status, wealth, occupation, birthplace, ethnicity, and other variables. Moreover, overlapping jurisdictions, differences between civil and canon law, and legal norms at various levels of administration made the legal landscape highly complex and contested.¹³ Nonetheless, citizens in Spain and Portugal regularly had recourse to law to manage their affairs and clearly thought they had a right to equal justice as members of the community and subjects of the crown. That legal framework accompanied Spaniards and Portuguese abroad, and subjects of the crown in the Iberian empires seemed to expect that the efficacy of law was not diminished by its passage across the oceans. Their basic trust in royal justice and the law, I would argue, enabled the Habsburg monarchy to reign over empires of enormous proportions, with minimal expense and personnel.

Traditions of governance in Iberia also contributed to the framework for the Iberian empires. Early Portuguese forays overseas, after the medieval reconquest of territory from the Muslims, established enclaves in the

Atlantic Islands. In their later exploration of the African coast in search of a route to India, the Portuguese could not establish large, land-based colonies, given the strength of local African rulers and the small population of Portugal. Instead, they replicated the procedures developed during the reconquest and early Atlantic exploration: the king granted trading privileges and allotted captaincies to individuals to administer in the name of the crown. The establishment of trading companies and captaincies was Portugal's only viable choice in Asia as well, because of the small scale of Portuguese emigration and the strength of local rulers. The system also worked in Brazil, where most of the early Portuguese colonists stayed close to the coastline and avoided the vast interior regions, making it easier to maintain their physical and emotional connections to the metropolis and to control the colonized space. Despite the power of the captaincies, locally elected councils (*cámaras*) established by Portuguese settlers could and did challenge their authority, using Portuguese traditions of local government. The Habsburg monarchs brought Portuguese colonial administration more under royal control, with a local government structure similar to that in Portugal itself.

The structure of the Spanish empire also began with enclaves in the Atlantic Islands, where individuals received administrative, judicial, and economic power in return for exploring, claiming, and administering land in the name of the crown. On his first two voyages Columbus used the captaincy model of a tightly controlled enterprise based on monopoly privileges, a model he understood from his Genoese background and his earlier trading ventures. Some of the economic arrangements used by Spain in the Canary Islands—especially the plantation structure for growing sugar—evolved from this model and were later replicated in the Spanish empire in the Americas.¹⁴ Before Columbus's third voyage, however, Queen Isabella and King Ferdinand rescinded the monopoly privileges they had granted him, and before his fourth voyage they sponsored the ventures of several other explorers who hoped to plant colonies across the ocean.¹⁵

Ultimately, Spanish colonization in the Americas relied, not on the captaincy model, but on ancient Iberian traditions. The Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, and Muslims had established numerous colonies in what the Greeks called Iberia, the Romans called Hispania, and the Muslims called Al-Andalus. In medieval times, as Christian forces pushed the Muslims southward, the crown granted lands and jurisdiction to crusading military orders, religious institutions, and towns in exchange for loyalty and a promise to defend the reconquered lands. Frontier towns founded during the reconquest received royal charters defining the extent of territory and authority that the crown granted them and attracted settlers by the promise of land, tax ben-

efits, and privileges as citizens. By the late fifteenth century, Castile was a mosaic of largely self-governing, contiguous municipalities.¹⁶ At the village level, every household shared in governance, either by election or in a cycle of rotation. In larger towns and cities the crown appointed emissaries to town councils, but these *corregidores* depended on the cooperation of local officials to implement the royal will. The parliament of Castile—the Cortes—began in the twelfth century as an assembly of representatives from the major towns in the realm, which by extension represented the whole municipal mosaic.¹⁷ Any town, whether or not it sent delegates to the Cortes, could correspond directly with the crown and might even send a few local officials to petition the monarch in person.

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of municipal identity as an organizing principle of Spanish life. Most Spaniards had grown up within self-governing townships in the municipal mosaic of Spain and presumably thought of a municipal structure as the natural way to organize society. Spaniards colonizing overseas customarily formed themselves into a municipality and elected a town council as their first collective act; the new town became the legal embodiment of their community, linked directly to the crown. By 1519, when Hernán Cortés left Cuba for the Mexican coast, there were already several dozen Spanish towns established on Cuba. And when Cortés decided to ignore his instructions from the governor of Cuba, he and his men formed themselves into a municipality. Legally speaking, the Aztec Empire was conquered by the municipality of Veracruz, with Cortés as its town captain. The town council of Veracruz then petitioned King Charles I (by then, Charles V the Holy Roman Emperor) to ratify the conquest carried out in his name.¹⁸

The laws of 1573 that prescribed how towns in the Spanish colonies were to be founded and governed merely confirmed what had been common practice since Spaniards first went overseas. Nearly all of today's principal cities in South America were founded between 1500 and 1650.¹⁹ Once recognized by the crown, colonial towns were expected to move as quickly as possible toward self-sufficiency and self-governance, under the overarching authority of the monarch.²⁰ The resources to support the bureaucracy overseas were supposed to be generated by tax revenue on production and trade, collected and administered locally, though the crown also expected sufficient imperial revenues to fund the royal agenda in Europe. Paradoxically, however, the larger the empire grew, the more private profits and public revenues remained in America to support local economies, administration, religious and cultural activities, and defense.²¹

As the empire grew in size and complexity, the small army of bureau-

crats administering it had to deal with vast distances, logistical difficulties, and diverse local conditions and populations. The crown appointed the viceroys of New Spain (Mexico) and Perú (South America). The viceroys in turn appointed a certain number of subordinate officials. Other officials were chosen locally. Written laws, most notably the huge compilation called the *Laws of the Indies*, provided a framework for imperial administration, and all officials faced a judicial review (*residencia*) at the end of their terms in office, with fines and other punishments imposed for wrongdoing.²²

Viceroyalty customarily collected a fee from the men they appointed, and in some periods viceroys themselves paid a “pecuniary service” to the crown in exchange for their appointments, on the assumption that only qualified men would be eligible to pay the fee and be appointed. Obviously, reality sometimes belied assumptions, but many well-educated and upright men could defend traditional practices on the basis of their value to imperial governance. Viceroys could be more effective in enforcing the royal will if they brought their own men with them, rather than being dependent upon the local power structure. Even with their own men in subordinate offices, however, viceroys were in the delicate position of representing the monarchy while having to rely on the local power structure to provide additional manpower and funds for government expenses.

To carry out their duties, bureaucrats relied not only on legal and administrative traditions, but also on social traditions in Iberia that bound individuals to one another in a network of reciprocal benefits and bound the citizenry as a whole to the crown. It was in the interests of the crown to allow local elites to govern and profit from the colonies, as long as they remembered that the crown held ultimate control. And it was in the interests of local elites to remain loyal to the crown because that was the key to fulfilling their social and political ambitions. In short, the traditional ties that bound Iberian elites to the monarchy promoted social stability at home and proved to be eminently portable and adaptable as Portugal and Spain created global empires.

The bureaucracy’s sense of continuity and professional identity was reinforced by the standard trajectory of their careers. As Portugal and Spain developed centralized monarchies in medieval times, royal officials were shifted around from place to place and were held accountable for their terms in office. If they served the crown well, they could expect to be promoted to a higher position somewhere else. Imperial procedures overseas worked much the same way, though the scale changed enormously. Portugal founded no universities in the colonies, preferring to educate its imperial elite in the peninsula. But men who graduated from universities in Spanish America customarily spent

time in Spain to advance their careers. A standard trajectory for officials in both the Portuguese and Spanish empires involved moving back and forth across the oceans between posts in the colonies and posts back in the metropolis. A young man who came out of university in Portugal or Spain might begin his career with a minor post near home, then go to Mexico or Goa, and end up on a royal council, with several other stops in between.²³

Men involved in the imperial bureaucracy seem to have experienced it as a whole, even though its component parts were scattered around the globe. In reading through hundreds of memoranda and reports from Spanish officials during the early modern centuries, I have been struck by the familiarity and continuity of the documents, whether they were written from a provincial capital near Madrid or from Lima, thousands of miles and many months away from the seat of the monarchy. Reading the reports, you would not guess that the officials were even aware of their remoteness—though they clearly were—let alone that they fretted about that remoteness. In that way, imperial administration was like cyberspace in the modern world. Wherever they were, officials wrote as if they were part of the same bureaucratic enterprise. That attitude held enormous importance for political and imperial organization, but how was it formed and maintained across space and time? And why did ordinary citizens of the Iberian empires accept the governance structure of a remote monarchy? The answers to those questions, it seems to me, were embedded in the Iberian social structures and traditions alluded to earlier.

Family defined the most basic of personal loyalties in Iberia as elsewhere. In addition to the steady flow of published work on demography and kinship in the past several decades, a number of scholars have explored the effects of transatlantic migration on families.²⁴ Migration had the potential to both weaken and strengthen family ties, and its effects varied from migrant to migrant. On balance, family loyalties seem to have been strong enough to provide a sense of continuity between Portugal and Spain and their overseas colonies and to contribute to the formation of cohesive communities at home and abroad. Apart from feeling a natural loyalty based on blood kinship, individuals knew that family networks could be useful in gaining privileges, preferment, and jobs, and family networks were reinforced by repeated demonstrations of their utility, based on loyalty and reciprocity.

At the upper reaches of Iberian society, individuals in official posts routinely sponsored kin for jobs and royal favor and helped to arrange their marriages, a process that could take years if the parties were scattered around the world. Outside the family, membership in the orders of Santiago, Calatrava, Alcántara, and others in Spain, and Santiago and the Order of Christ

in Portugal, created elite networks within the broader ranks of nobility, and their members considered themselves of higher status than their fellow nobles. Such networks spanned the oceans and provided a sense of continuity from generation to generation among the ruling elites in both Spain and Portugal.

Inheritance patterns provided similar linkages. Individuals in Portuguese and Spanish colonies abroad routinely left bequests to relatives here, there, and everywhere, even when they had not seen one another for decades. In many cases the testator did not even know if his or her heirs were still alive. Wills written in the colonies also commonly included bequests for religious organizations and charities back home and sometimes included detailed instructions for the burial of at least part of the testator's mortal remains—a heart, for example—back home as well.

Men and women who abandoned their family responsibilities when they traveled across the seas may have thought that the benefits of independence outweighed the loss of traditional support networks, but some of them discovered that it was not easy to sever the ties of family and community. If a man left his wife behind in Iberia and married someone else in the colonies, there was a fair chance that his action would not go unnoticed or unpunished. Cases of bigamy regularly surface in the records of state as well as church,²⁵ because the Portuguese and Spanish states took an active role in supporting stable families at home and abroad. Family ties linked the whole of traditional society together in early modern Europe, and they seem to have been particularly strong in Iberia.

Similar links extended an individual's network based on loyalty and reciprocity beyond the family to individuals both higher and lower in status and wealth. Numerous examples of such links existed among the officers and men who manned the imperial fleets of Portugal and Spain. We might think of sailors as rootless individuals, rarely staying anywhere for more than a few months, or as "citizens of the world," exempt from stultifying community norms at home. Yet many Spanish sailors retained strong emotional ties with their home towns, and shipboard command and social structures were often shaped by the presence of regional communities among the men on board. Many of the captains general in Spain's Indies fleets, besides appointing their relatives to various posts, also selected men from their home provinces in preference to other sailors when they had a choice. On land as well, ties of nonfamilial affinity were often defined by municipal and regional identity: marriages, business partnerships, and many other relationships depended upon where families originated in the old country.

As mentioned earlier, members of the bureaucratic elite in both Por-

tugal and Spain often traveled back and forth between the metropolis and the colonies for education, practical experience, and career advancement, preserving and reinforcing ties with kin and professional colleagues in the process. Local communities in the metropolis had every reason to remember distinguished native sons and daughters who returned to their hometowns after living abroad, investing part of their fortunes in local building and charitable works. As a result, the citizens of quite remote towns and villages in Iberia felt a real connection to the overseas empires, and the exploits of local emigrants inspired a continued flow of Iberians across the seas—some four or five thousand Spaniards a year in the Habsburg period, for example.²⁶

If municipal citizenship and community were central to the Portuguese and Spanish sense of identity, citizenship also involved an assortment of rights, duties, and privileges. As Iberians transplanted their community structures across the seas, the question arose as to how to define citizenship in that new context, and, by extension, how to define the community, especially when colonial cities included various ethnic groups and mixtures of local peoples and immigrants.²⁷ Not surprisingly, the immigrants to Iberian colonies tended to identify with one another more than with local peoples, regardless of distinctions based on status, wealth, or even race. Research on the early colonial period has shown that Africans in the Iberian colonies, even when they remained slaves, were more closely aligned with Europeans than with Indians.

Overall, family and community seem to have been elastic concepts that stretched from tiny villages, towns, and cities all over Portugal and Spain to nearly every corner of the known world where Portuguese and Spaniards migrated. Migrants not only felt connected to their home communities by nostalgia or memory, but also by a sense of continued attachment and citizenship. For example, traditional Iberian organizations such as religious brotherhoods in a town parish might include members in colonies around the world, because they carried their communal identity overseas with them. Whether or not their physical connection with Iberia was reinforced by transoceanic travel, their mental and emotional connections with their ancestral homeland persisted. Moreover, membership in some parish-based brotherhoods could blur distinctions of wealth and status, thus strengthening community identity. The extension of local religious brotherhoods to a global context helps to explain social cohesion abroad as well as at home.

The key to effective bureaucratic, familial, and communal networks in the Iberian world lay in their relationship to the highest point in society—the monarchy, ultimate source of legitimacy and favor. The continual flow of transoceanic paperwork regarding governance, plus petitions asking and

granting favors from the crown, reminded everyone of the reciprocal relationship that bound them together. That relationship was easier to nurture in the presence of the monarch, more difficult to nurture in its physical absence. Throughout the Iberian empires, however, periodic rituals kept the relationship not only alive, but vibrant.²⁸ Viceroy in Lima and Mexico City organized lavish public events to honor the king's birthday and other days of importance for the royal family, such as the birth of a prince or princess—no matter that it took months for the news of a birth to reach the Americas and that the celebration might be sadly out of date if the royal infant had died in the interim. If and when such tragic news arrived, the viceroy's court would simply go into mourning and stage solemn funerary rituals as a further public display of loyalty and connection to the monarchy.

These public performances of respect and obedience ensured that the monarch remained a real presence in the empire, and the royal image was present at every performance. In a well-known painting of the 1625 victory of Portuguese and Spanish troops over Dutch interlopers in Bahía mentioned above, Captain General Fadrique de Toledo gestures toward a tapestry showing King Philip IV being crowned with the laurels of victory by Minerva, goddess of wisdom, and the king's chief minister, the count-duke of Olivares. In the left foreground, Portuguese settlers minister to a Spanish soldier wounded in the battle. Defeated Dutch soldiers kneel before the image of the king, and the combined Hispano-Portuguese fleet rides at anchor in the left background. Underscoring the broader significance of the victory, Philip IV stands above fallen figures representing treachery (France), discord (England), and heresy (the Dutch rebels). The artist Juan Baptista Maino summed up in this composition the official definition of the dual Habsburg monarchy: Portuguese and Spaniards joining forces in faraway Brazil to defeat their common enemies, all in the symbolic presence of the king. Reality was much more complicated than that, but the official view is most pertinent here.

Loyalty to the royal person was freely given; it could not have been enforced. In both the Portuguese and Spanish empires, and indeed in Portugal and Spain, the crown maintained a minimal military presence. Spanish viceroys in the Americas had to rely on local militias for defense, and on local merchants and other members of the elite to fund all sorts of governmental functions. The notion of absolute monarchy in Europe used to be understood in rigid terms that equated theory and practice. In recent decades, however, historians have rediscovered the practical limits to absolute power and the need for negotiation to carry out the royal will at all levels.²⁹ Royal authority rested on patron-client relations and the principle of reciprocity,

which was well understood at the time. We have merely rediscovered what contemporaries already knew. The crown did not control its colonies; the colonists controlled the colonies in the name of the crown. Enforcement mechanisms relied on the implied psychological distress that would result from forfeiting the king's favor.

I would argue that royal authority was strongest when it fulfilled the requirement to act for the well-being of the citizenry and when it rewarded loyalty with tangible benefits. In the Iberian case, colonists overseas were empowered to run local government in the king's name. It should come as no surprise that members of colonial elites often ran local affairs to benefit themselves and their families as well as the crown, but we miss the point if we simply denounce their self-serving actions as cynical and hypocritical. The officials I study, whatever their actions, seem to have felt real loyalty to the crown and recognized that all good things flowed from the monarchy. When necessary, they put their money where their mouths were, submitting to extraordinary tax levies in times of war, and passing the hat to launch defensive fleets that were, by rights, the crown's responsibility. In other words, they willingly took on part of the burden and expense of imperial governance because they recognized it as a shared burden from which they benefited.

Overall, the strength and resiliency of Habsburg imperial administration seems to have relied on strong ties of loyalty and reciprocity between the monarchy and its subjects, under the rule of law. Those ties had developed over the centuries, as Iberian frontier societies were shaped into monarchies that, in theory at least, were centralized and powerful. In practice, Iberian monarchs had far less power than theory claimed. Instead, they sat atop structures formed from intersecting networks that began with families and spread outward to connect with local communities and the rest of society and upward to connect with the monarchy. Members of the imperial bureaucracies of Portugal and Spain, loyal to the crown and grounded in the same traditions that shaped their fellow citizens, had the confidence to administer overseas empires that lasted for centuries, despite the challenges posed by early globalization. In the event, the vastness of the oceans could not dilute the powerful brew of tradition.

NOTES

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Maritime Labour Market, 1570–1870 (St. John's, Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic History Association, 1997), pp. 329–348, esp. 331–337.

3. A useful overview is Vitorino Magalhes Godinho, “The Portuguese Empire 1565–1665,” *The Journal of European Economic History* 30, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 49–104. See also Frédéric Mauro, *Le Portugal, le Brésil et l'Atlantique au XVII^e siècle (1570–1670). Étude économique* (Paris: Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, Centre Culturel Portugais, 1983).

4. Timothy J. Coates, *Convicts and Orphans: Forced and State-Sponsored Colonizers in the Portuguese Empire, 1550–1755* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).

5. C. R. Phillips, “Manuel Fernandes and his 1616 ‘Livro de Traças de Carpintaria,’” *American Neptune* 60 (2000): 7–29. The tables provide comparative information about the configurations of real and theoretical vessels of various sizes.

6. Untitled document (Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana), transcribed with a commentary in C. R. Phillips, “Ships and Men for the Portuguese ‘Carreira da Índia’: The View from Madrid in 1614,” in Jesús M. Usunáriz Garayoa, ed., *Historia y humanismo. Estudios en honor del profesor Dr. D. Valentín Vázquez de Prada*, 2 vols. (Pamplona, 2000), 2:225–237.

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11. Pablo Emilio Pérez-Mallaína Bueno, *Spain's Men of the Sea: Daily Life on the Indies Fleets in the Sixteenth Century*, trans. Carla Rahn Phillips (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 55–62.

12. For Spain's Atlantic trade, the classic work is Pierre and Huguette Chaunu, *Séville et l'Atlantique, 1504–1650*, 8 vols. in 12 (Paris: SEVPEN, 1955–1960).

13. See Lauren Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), chaps. 1 and 2.

14. Louis-André Vigneras, *The Discovery of South America and the Andalusian Voyages* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, for the Newberry Library, 1976).

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20. Anthony Pagden, “Identity Formation in Spanish America,” in Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden, eds., *Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500–1800* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 51–93. See also Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain, and France, 1492–1830* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995).
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25. See Alexandra Parma Cook and Noble David Cook, *Good Faith and Truthful Ignorance: A Case of Transatlantic Bigamy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991).
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27. Tamar Herzog, *Citizenship and Community in Eighteenth-Century Spain and Spanish America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003).
28. See, for example, Alejandro Cañeque, *The King’s Living Image: The Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico* (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 119–155.
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The Ottoman “Discovery” of the Indian Ocean in the Sixteenth Century

Giancarlo Casale

Vasco da Gama’s successful voyage around the Cape of Good Hope in 1497 has long been recognized as a major turning point in world history, marking the beginning of direct and continuous contact between the civilizations of Western Europe and the Indian Ocean. Much less well known to modern scholarship, by comparison, is the Ottoman Empire’s rival and contemporaneous expansion into the lands of the Indian Ocean following Sultan Selim I’s conquest of Egypt in 1517. Because the Ottoman state and the merchant communities of the Indian Ocean shared the same religion (Islam), most modern scholars have simply assumed that they also enjoyed a kind of *de facto* familiarity with one another long before the sixteenth century began. But in many ways, prior to the conquest of Egypt, the Ottomans were even less aware of the geography, history, and civilization of the Indian Ocean than were their contemporary Portuguese rivals. The subsequent development of direct contacts between the Ottoman Empire and the Indian Ocean thus represents a kind of Ottoman “discovery” of an entirely new part of the globe, closely resembling the much better-documented European discoveries of the same period. To understand how, let us first briefly compare the state of medieval Western and Islamic geographical knowledge of the Indian Ocean *before* the voyages of exploration, and consider where the Ottomans fit into this overall picture.

EUROPEAN AND ISLAMIC GEOGRAPHY AND CARTOGRAPHY AS A BACKGROUND TO OTTOMAN DISCOVERY

Originally, the civilizations of both the medieval Christian West and the Islamic Middle East shared a similar basis for their knowledge of the Indian Ocean: the geographical traditions of the Greco-Roman world, and in particular their synthesis embodied in Ptolemy’s *Geographia*. During the centuries following the first Muslim conquests, however, scholars in the lands of Islam were able to expand significantly on this body of knowledge,

thanks in large measure to the development of a vast Muslim trading network that spanned the entire length of the Indian Ocean. As they voyaged along the routes of this network in ever greater numbers, Muslim merchants and scholars soon began to compose works about the places they had visited, and Muslim pilots and ships' captains started compiling itineraries and other navigational guides for practical use on the sea lanes. The earliest such works date back as far as the ninth and tenth centuries, and their production continued virtually uninterrupted right up to periods contemporary with early Ottoman history.¹ By the time of the first great European voyages of discovery, therefore, Islamic geographers had access to a large and constantly expanding body of literature dedicated specifically to the Indian Ocean and its border lands, and enjoyed a much deeper and immediate understanding of this vast world area than their predecessors from the ancient world.²

Conversely, European geographic knowledge of the Indian Ocean in the post-Ptolemaic era seems to have developed in almost exactly the opposite direction. In theory, at least, the examples of medieval Western *mappaemundi* that have come down to us are, like the scholarship of Islamic contemporaries, also based on precedents from the classical Greco-Roman world. But in practice, Western *mappaemundi* seem to have served as an ideal representation of the cosmic order of the medieval Christian universe rather than an attempt to represent the world realistically, and they display a profound ignorance of the Indian Ocean and indeed of any region of the world east of Jerusalem.³ Much the same can be said of the other main type of medieval European map, the more technically sophisticated portolan chart. Although imminently practical in design and of obvious use for maritime navigation, portolans are at the same time even more geographically circumscribed than *mappaemundi*, making no attempt at all to depict the world outside the familiar confines of Europe and the Mediterranean basin.⁴ Collectively, portolan charts and *mappaemundi* are graphic testaments to the characteristically inward-looking and isolated state of Western civilization during this period.

Around the turn of the fifteenth century, however, there appears to have been a rather dramatic change in the previously parochial intellectual orientation of European geographers. The earliest evidence of this shift is the appearance in the Western Mediterranean of the first "Catalan world maps"—a new type of cartographic representation, heavily influenced by Arab scholarship, in which Asia, Africa, and the Indian Ocean all started to appear in a somewhat realistic and recognizable form.⁵ Meanwhile, other European scholars, especially in Italy, were becoming increasingly committed to the intellectual agenda of Renaissance humanism, a learned movement that strove to advance knowledge through the recovery of texts from

the ancient world. Eventually, humanism would have a transformative effect on the Western world view, by paving the way for the widespread reintroduction of Ptolemaic geography.

Specifically, in the year 1400 the famous Florentine humanist Palla Strozzi brought the first known version of Ptolemy's geography from Constantinople to Florence. With his encouragement and the cooperation of the Byzantine scholar Manuel Chrysolorus, a translation of the text into Latin was completed by Jacopo Angeli da Scarperia in 1406, followed by the maps themselves a few years later. By mid-century, no less than four separate groups of cartographers were engaged in multiplying copies of the *Geographia* and its maps, and in 1477 one of these versions became the first map to be published as an engraving.⁶ By the 1480s thousands of copies of Ptolemy's maps were being printed and diffused throughout Europe, and such was the prestige and authority of these classical texts in the minds of humanist scholars that they rapidly superseded and replaced maps of all "older" varieties.⁷

Thus, by the turn of the sixteenth century the state of geographic knowledge in the West was both dynamic and curiously regressive. The newly recovered classical texts upon which European scholars now relied were a vast practical improvement over the *mappaemundi* inherited from their own medieval past. Yet at the same time, these supposedly "state-of-the-art" texts were more than a thousand years old. Although they had undergone, in the intervening centuries, countless revisions, improvements, and additions by scholars working in the Islamic world, Westerners remained, in their enthusiasm for the original texts, largely ignorant of these advances. As a result, the body of geographic knowledge to which the Western European intellectual tradition had access on the eve of the discoveries, especially with regard to the Indian Ocean, was roundly inferior to its Islamic counterpart.⁸

OTTOMAN IGNORANCE OF ISLAMIC GEOGRAPHY

Where are we to place the Ottomans within this schema? Because of the general superiority of Islamic scholarship, it has commonly been assumed that the Ottomans, as representatives of a state destined to become the Islamic empire par excellence of the early modern period, must naturally have been well acquainted with the achievements of Islamic geographers from an early date.⁹ However, given the almost total lack of detailed modern studies on the subject, such an assumption remains unsubstantiated by any empirical evidence. To be sure, there is no lack of early works of Islamic geography to be found in the libraries and manuscript collections of Istanbul. Some of

these, in fact, are so old as to predate the founding of the Ottoman state by at least several centuries. Yet until we know more about these manuscripts and under what circumstances they were acquired, it remains an open question how many of them were actually available to Ottoman scholars during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and how many were brought back from the Arab lands only much later, following the conquests of the 1500s.¹⁰

For the time being, what we can say with certainty is that, at least with reference to the Indian Ocean, the Ottomans were decidedly *unfamiliar* with the relevant Islamic corpus. A review of the inventories of the major Ottoman manuscript collections shows that a surprising number of well-known and widely circulated Islamic works on the subject seem to have been completely unknown in Ottoman learned circles prior to the sixteenth century.¹¹ There is no evidence from any Ottoman collection, for example, that prior to the sixteenth century Ottoman scribes copied any of the most important early travel narratives or itineraries. It also seems extremely unlikely that any Ottoman in this period ever read the early fourteenth-century narrative of Ibn Battuta, even though this famous author is perhaps unique in having visited both India and the Ottoman lands during the course of his extensive journeys.¹² Similarly, although Marco Polo and later Portuguese explorers reported having examined nautical charts of the Indian Ocean drafted by local Muslim navigators, we have no evidence that any such maps ever reached Istanbul.¹³ In fact, from the entire classical Islamic geographical corpus there are only a handful of works that we can confidently conclude were copied in large numbers and circulated among Ottoman scholars prior to the sixteenth century, of which by far the most popular was Zakariyya al-Kazvini's fanciful cosmography, the *'Acā'ibu'l-Mahlūkāt* (The wonders of creation).¹⁴ By contrast, Ibn Majid, the Arab mariner and contemporary of Vasco da Gama, tells us that he consulted more than forty different works in the compilation of his guide to navigation on the Indian Ocean.¹⁵ Perhaps unsurprisingly, his text too was unknown to the Ottomans until the 1560s.

Further evidence for this trend can be measured by examining the rate at which relevant texts in Persian and Arabic were translated into Turkish, an important gauge of the breadth of audience a given work could reach. Here the figures are stark indeed: from the entire fourteenth century, just one such translation exists; from the fifteenth, only two; and all three of these were translations of the same work: al-Kazvini's *'Acā'ibu'l-Mahlūkāt* mentioned above.¹⁶ Thus, despite the lack of detailed research on this subject, all of the available evidence points to one conclusion: with the possible exception of a small circle of *medrese* scholars, the Ottomans had virtually no access to Is-

lamic geographical information about the Indian Ocean before the sixteenth century.

On the other hand, learned men in the empire do seem to have been well informed about the latest advances of European geography. Surprisingly the pre-sixteenth-century maps housed in Ottoman collections are almost without exception of the types most characteristic of contemporary European production: portolan charts, including one by the Majorcan master Johannes de Villadestes;¹⁷ Catalan-style world maps, including a fragment of an extremely early work dating from the 1370s;¹⁸ and several versions of Ptolemy's *Geographia*. Of this last type, the oldest example is an undated Byzantine manuscript from which the scholar George Amirutzes of Trabzon completed a translation into Arabic by order of Sultan Mehmed II in 1465—only a few years after the first printed versions of the *Geographia* began to appear in Europe.¹⁹ A later version, dated from 1481 and including thirty color maps, is a copy of the printed Italian edition by the Florentine humanist Francesco Berlinghieri, which even features a personal dedication to Sultan Mehmet from the author himself.²⁰

In short, on the eve of the great “Age of Discoveries” of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was in a singular position. An Islamic state on the verge of a series of conquests that would bring it for the first time into contact with the Muslim civilization of the Indian Ocean, it was nevertheless almost totally ignorant both of this civilization itself and of any of the Islamic works dedicated to it. Meanwhile, Ottoman scholars kept extremely well informed about the latest advances in a Western geographical tradition that remained, despite its dynamism, equally ignorant of the outside world. As we shall see, this unusual orientation was to establish a pattern for the sixteenth century as well, as the expanding cultural and intellectual horizons of the West and the Ottoman Empire continued to develop in tandem.

THE CONQUESTS OF SELIM THE GRIM

The Ottoman discovery of the Indian Ocean began in earnest at the start of the sixteenth century, and closely coincided with the reign of the great Sultan Selim the Grim. In keeping with an Ottoman tradition harking back to at least the days of his grandfather Mehmet the Conqueror, Selim was an avid collector of maps and geographical texts, and throughout his reign both sponsored local scholars and actively sought out the latest productions from Western Europe. Unlike his grandfather, however, Selim cultivated a particular taste for works relating to the world outside the confines of

the Mediterranean—an indication, perhaps, of the unbridled scope of his political ambition. Examples from his personal collection include a planisphere (no longer extant) that he had made to specifications in a Venetian workshop,²¹ as well as the highly unusual *Hitāyname*, a firsthand account of a voyage to China composed by the Ottoman merchant Ali Akbar.²² By far the most important Ottoman geographer to emerge under Selim's patronage, however, was the Mediterranean sea captain Piri Reis, who ranks even today among the most respected and widely recognized Ottoman learned men of the entire early modern period.

Piri Reis's world map of 1513, his first known work and the one that has received the most attention from modern scholars, has come down to us only in fragmentary form, and the portion that included the Indian Ocean is regrettably no longer extant. Nevertheless, the connection between this map's creation and the prospect of future Ottoman expansion in the Indian Ocean is explicit, as it was presented by its author to the sultan in Cairo just a few short weeks after Selim's triumphant conquest of Mamluk Egypt. Diplomatic records reveal that Sultan Selim subsequently entered into negotiations with Muzaffar Shah II of Gujarat about a possible joint strike against the Portuguese in Goa,²³ leading at least one modern scholar to speculate that the missing portion of the map may have been separated intentionally, so that Selim could make more convenient use of it in planning future military campaigns in the Indian Ocean.²⁴

Such plans, if they did exist, died with the sultan in 1520, but Piri Reis was to continue his work under the patronage of the powerful Ibrahim Pasha, grand vizier to Selim's son and successor Suleyman the Magnificent. By 1526 Piri had completed an expanded edition of his Mediterranean atlas, the *Kitāb-ı Bahriye* (Book of the sea), which included as an introduction the first written text in Ottoman Turkish to contain specific and detailed information about both the geography of the Indian Ocean and the latest navigational techniques of Western explorers.²⁵ Based on a combination of Western and Islamic sources, composed in rhyming verse, and written in clear, easy-to-understand language, the introduction to the *Kitāb-ı Bahriye* seems above all designed to convey to a wider audience the intellectual excitement that the author himself felt about new discoveries in the Indian Ocean. In reference to his own earlier world map, for example, Piri Reis writes: "Before this I . . . made maps in which I was able to show twice the number of things usually contained in the maps of our day, having made use of new maps of the Chinese and Indian Seas which no one in the Ottoman lands had hitherto seen or known. In the same way the information presented here is a summary."²⁶

Both as a whole and individually, the works of Piri Reis are true masterpieces of Ottoman geography. But they are also, despite their obvious originality, completely in keeping with a by now long-established tradition of Ottoman scholarship. It is most definitely not the case, as more than one modern study has attempted to argue, that there was something incongruous or extraordinary about Piri Reis's openness to Western geography; nor is it true that he was somehow shunned by the "conservative Ottoman establishment" because of the originality of his ideas.²⁷ As we have seen, Piri Reis's works were consistently commissioned by no less than sultans and grand viziers, and there was certainly nothing new about his use of European sources *per se*. The principal difference between Piri Reis and his predecessors is to be found not in the Western origin of sources, but rather in the vastly improved breadth and accuracy of information that such sources now could offer.

In fact, Piri Reis's atlas and maps were only some of the many works that became available to the Ottomans during these same years thanks to the efforts of the grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha. Another such example, found today in the map collection of Istanbul's Topkapı Palace, is a chart of Magellan's circumnavigation of the globe that has been identified as a copy, made by the official Portuguese court cartographer Pedro Reinel sometime between 1522 and 1524, of his own original chart of 1519. This remarkable work contains the first record of the discoveries made by Magellan in the Western hemisphere, the most up-to-date information from Portuguese voyages in East Africa and Southeast Asia, and is considered to be the earliest known example of an equidistant polar projection on a terrestrial map, a technique not employed regularly until the 1560s.²⁸

Such a document would normally be considered a precious state secret by the Portuguese authorities, kept under lock and key in the archives of the Casa da India. Its acquisition by the Ottomans was thus a remarkable accomplishment, and doubtless the result of an epic tale of international cloak-and-dagger espionage about which we regrettably know almost nothing. About all we can say is that Ibrahim Pasha, whose keen interest in geography and cartography was commonly remarked upon by foreign diplomats, was almost certainly involved.²⁹ While it is only speculation, the most likely scenario seems to be that Ibrahim Pasha acquired the map with the help of the Venetian geographer Pigafetta, who had personally participated in the Magellan expedition and is known to have returned to Italy by 1524.³⁰ How Pigafetta himself might have acquired the map, however, will likely forever remain a mystery.

Yet another important contribution that Ibrahim Pasha made to Otto-

man geography was to resuscitate the career of Selman Reis, a freelance Ottoman corsair who had led the last Mamluk naval expedition to the Indian Ocean in 1515. Following the Ottoman conquest of Egypt, Sultan Selim had ordered Selman arrested for serving an enemy power, and he was still officially out of favor several years later (although he seems to have been released from physical confinement after Selim's death in 1520). Fortunately for the corsair's career, Ibrahim Pasha realized that Selman's experience made him uniquely qualified to supply information about the current situation in the Indian Ocean. In 1525 he ordered Selman to travel to Jiddah and inspect the now derelict Mamluk fleet still stationed there, and to report back with an inventory of the available vessels and a recommendation about how best to put them to use.³¹

This report, submitted by Selman in the following year, differs from all earlier Ottoman documents on the Indian Ocean in that it was based, at least in part, on firsthand experiences of travel in the region.³² Although concise (106 lines of text), it describes in varying detail all of the major areas of the Indian Ocean littoral, from the Swahili coast, Ethiopia, and the Yemen to the subcontinent and the Indonesian archipelago, including estimates of the strength of Portuguese military garrisons in Hormuz, Goa, and Malacca. Throughout, it takes careful note of the economic resources of various areas, their general level of technology, and the ease with which they could be conquered and held by Ottoman forces—all in a manner strikingly similar to contemporary Western accounts of the discoveries. Witness, for example, Selman's description of Ethiopia, which echoes in both tone and content reports brought back by European visitors to the New World at precisely the same time. He writes: "The capital of the province of Abyssinia is in fact called Bab al-Muluk, the infidels of which are bare-footed and weak footmen with wooden bows and shields made of elephant hide. Yet these people are dominant in that country for there is no one to put up resistance against them. God knows best, but I say that it would be easy to take not only the town called Tabarah [on the Nile] with a thousand men . . . but also the entire province of Abyssinia."³³

Selman's report included several such recommendations about future imperial policy, advocating the military occupation of Yemen and the Swahili coast as well as the conquest of Ethiopia, and suggesting that the Portuguese strongholds of Hormuz, Goa, and Malacca were all vulnerable and should be considered as potential military targets. Unfortunately, we have no specific information about how this report was received by Selman's superiors, but it remains a fact that during the following decades the Ottomans tried to implement almost every one of the policy recommendations it con-

tained. Selman's report is thus the closest thing we have to a blueprint for future Ottoman expansion in the Indian Ocean. With the delivery of this document, the Ottoman Age of Discovery had truly begun.

OTTOMAN SCHOLARSHIP ON THE INDIAN OCEAN 1550–1600

The following quarter century, from 1525 to 1550, witnessed rapid and almost continuous Ottoman expansion along the northwestern littoral of the Indian Ocean. Military campaigns included the occupation of Aden, Mocha, Basra, and the coasts of Sudan and Eritrea; the destruction of the Portuguese fortress in Muscat; and, less successfully, abortive sieges of Bahrain, Hormuz, and the Portuguese stronghold of Diu in northwestern India.³⁴ But by the late 1550s the largest of these campaigns had come to an end, and something approaching a *modus vivendi* was achieved between the Ottomans and their new Portuguese neighbors. And as peace brought greater opportunities to trade and explore, a new generation of Ottoman scholars turned their interest toward the Indian Ocean as never before. Significantly, although imperial patronage continued to play a role in this process, its importance was superseded by a genuine and widespread growth of interest among the Ottoman learned classes, curious about what was for them an entirely new and unfamiliar world area.

Of all of the works to appear during this period, maps display the most obvious European influence. While drawing inspiration from the West, however, Ottoman draftsmen were careful to adapt imported models to their own special needs. The beautifully drawn mid-century map of El-Hajj Ebu'l-Hasan, for instance, is in essence an Arabic-language version of a standard Western-style portolan chart, but with one surprising innovation: the bottom margin has been extended to show the coast of Africa in its entirety, including the Cape of Good Hope, Madagascar, and the southern Swahili coast.³⁵ In order to fit the traditional contours of a portolan chart, the form of the African continent has been distorted significantly and the Horn of Africa truncated, while many of the meticulously labeled place names along the coast are hard to identify and possibly imaginary. Clearly of little use as a guide to navigation, the chart instead serves a didactic purpose: to demonstrate visually the opening of the Mediterranean world and the existence of new geographical knowledge about the circumnavigability of Africa that traditional cartographic forms are inadequate to express.

Later Ottoman mapmakers seem to have taken this lesson to heart, by creating entirely new maps that completely abandoned these older forms. One such example, the anonymous and relatively recently discovered *Atlas-i*

Hümâyûn (c. 1570), features a chart conceptually similar to that of El-Hajj Ebu'l-Hasan but unconstrained by the dimensions of a standard portolan template. Using a new orientation and a more sophisticated projection, while forsaking the cumbersome system of place names characteristic of portolans, it manages to depict all of the Mediterranean, the Arabian peninsula, the northwestern corner of the Indian Ocean, and the northern half of Africa in a single, minimally distorted image.³⁶ In the same vein, the roughly contemporary *Walters Deniz Atlası* includes a projection of the Indian Ocean in its entirety, the first known Ottoman map to focus exclusively on this world area.³⁷ Even more interestingly, both of these maps are found in bound volumes that otherwise appear to be direct copies of a popular new genre of Mediterranean atlas developed in mid-sixteenth-century Italy. The insertion of these original maps of the Indian Ocean, which are absent from Italian editions, bears witness to the special importance this new region held for consumers of maps in the Ottoman market.

Meanwhile, such adaptations of the latest Western cartography were accompanied by an even larger number of works inspired by traditional Islamic geography. In some cases these amounted to simple translations into Turkish of important texts like Istakhri's *Mesâlikü'l-Memâlik* (The paths of kingdoms) or Ibn Zunbul's *Kanûnu'd-Dünyâ* (The code of the world), previously available only in Arabic. Other texts, however, such as Sipahizade Mehmed's *Evzah'ül-Mesâlik fî Ma'rifeti'l-Buldân ve'l-Memâlik* (The location of the paths to the knowledge of countries and kingdoms) or Mehmet Aşık's *Manâzırü'l-Avâlim* (The vantage points of the worlds), can be classified as original syntheses of classical Islamic geography, but redesigned with an eye for the special needs of a growing Ottoman audience.³⁸ In this respect too, Ottoman scholarship exhibited certain parallels with developments in the West, for it was during precisely this same period that European scholars began to publish systematic compilations of the new geographical knowledge gained from the discoveries.³⁹ To a surprising extent, the systems Europeans devised for organizing this information were inspired, like these new Ottoman synthetic works, by examples from classical Islamic geography. The enterprising Venetian publisher Giovanni Battista Ramusio, for example, openly advocated adopting the Arab geographers' method of cataloging information, which he described in the preface to his famous *Navigazioni* as an "*ordine veramente bellissimo*."⁴⁰

Finally, the growth of direct Ottoman economic and diplomatic ties with the Indian Ocean fostered the production of numerous works based neither on Western nor Islamic precedents, but instead on information gar-

nered from the Ottomans' own firsthand experiences. First among these is certainly *al-Barḳ al-Yamānī fī'l-Fathī'l-'Osmānī* (The sword of Yemen in the conquest of the Ottomans), a narrative history of the Ottoman penetration of the Yemen, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Sea completed in the year 1580.⁴¹ Authored by the distinguished cleric Kutbeddin Mekki (a.k.a. al-Nahrawali), the son of a Muslim immigrant from Gujarat who was intimately familiar with the political world of the western Indian Ocean, the work remains even to this day the most comprehensive account of the exploits of Ottoman military and naval commanders in the area. Of similar significance is the monumental *Münşe'ât-ı Selâṭin* (The writings of the sultans), completed in 1575 by Feridun Beg, then head of the Ottoman chancery.⁴² An enormous compendium of primary documents of importance to various aspects of Ottoman history, the *Münşe'ât-ı Selâṭin* is also the first to include verbatim copies of all diplomatic correspondence between the Ottoman sultans and political leaders throughout the Indian Ocean, including the Mughal emperors and the sultans of Gujarat.

Alongside such weighty tomes, authored by Ottoman officials with privileged access to government documents, there also emerged a number of more popular treatises based on verbal accounts from merchants and other travelers. In 1582, for example, the scholar Seyfî Çelebi penned a short historical geography of Asia that included several chapters on the recent political history of India, as well as a description of the most important contemporary rulers of the subcontinent, Ceylon, and Sumatra.⁴³ Also of note is Mustafa b. Ali al-Muvakkīt's *İ'lāmu'l-'İbād fī A'lāmi'l-Bilād* (A public announcement of the milestones of countries), a curious little work that simply presents a list of 100 important cities between Morocco and China, giving their geographical coordinates and their distances from Istanbul. In its introduction, the author provides an excellent, if anecdotal, illustration of the general cultural atmosphere in which this work and others like it were produced. He writes: "Among the common people, the number of days and months it takes to travel between Istanbul and the various cities of the world has become a popular topic of conversation, and even if some of the things that are said on this subject are correct, the vast majority are known to be untrue, since some people are inclined to intentionally exaggerate distances, and others simply make them up off the top of their heads."⁴⁴ The author, as he explains, is writing to set the record straight about this important topic of contemporary debate.

Given this cultural milieu, one would naturally expect to find a large number of firsthand accounts of travel in the Indian Ocean alongside the various other kinds of works already discussed. Frustratingly, quite the opposite is true, although in many cases we have conclusive evidence that Ottoman-authored travel narratives once existed that are today no longer extant. There are, for example, several later references to an account by the merchant Ahmed b. Ibrahim al-Tokadi of his voyage to India during the 1580s, even though no copies of the original text have yet been recovered.⁴⁵ Similarly, the scholar Fethullah Arif Çelebi is known to have composed a narrative of Hadim Suleyman's expedition to Gujarat titled the *Sefernâme-i Süleymân* (The travel book of Suleyman), of which no known copies survive.⁴⁶ Frequent references in the Ottoman State Archives' *Mühimme Defterleri* (Registry of important affairs) also make it clear that imperial officials in border provinces like Basra and the Yemen kept informed about events through contacts in the traveling merchant community, and regularly sent back reports of their findings to the central government. Alas, these reports too seem to have disappeared over the course of the intervening centuries.

Nevertheless, in the few cases where Ottoman travel narratives have survived, they consistently prove to be among the most interesting texts of any available from the period. At least one such account has come down to us indirectly, in a letter written from Constantinople in 1562 by the Austrian ambassador Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq. He records having conversed with "a wandering Turk who had traversed almost the whole of the East, where he said he had made acquaintance with Portuguese travelers; then, kindled with a desire to visit the city and kingdom of Cathay, he had joined some merchants who were starting hither."⁴⁷ Unfortunately, Busbecq fails to provide any specific details about this individual's experiences in the Indian Ocean, but he does devote several pages to describing his voyage to China, a region about which contemporary Europeans had very little firsthand information. In doing so, his writings serve as an important reminder that the transfer of information about the discoveries between Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire was not always a simply one-sided affair.

An even more interesting example of an indirectly preserved Ottoman travel narrative is to be found among the diplomatic records of the Topkapı Palace archives. Ostensibly, the document in question is a letter written to Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent from the independent Muslim ruler of Aceh (northern Sumatra)—a lofty designation that probably explains its

survival down to our day. However, a close reading of the text reveals that it was in fact the work of an obscure Ottoman traveler, known only as “His Majesty’s Servant Lutfi” (*Lütfi bendeleri*), who seems to have made a round-trip voyage from Istanbul to Sumatra sometime between 1563 and 1566.⁴⁸ Its contents include a detailed geographic and ethnographic description of the Maldivé archipelago; an overview of the political orientation of the most important military and economic powers in the Indian Ocean; and an evaluation of Portuguese military strength in the region, in addition to a description of the trials and tribulations that the author himself suffered during his journey. It also makes explicit reference to numerous other Ottoman agents living in Aceh and elsewhere in the region, indicating that Lutfi was no isolated traveler, but part of a much larger movement of people, goods, and ideas. With any luck, future research in the libraries and archives of Istanbul will reveal more detailed information about such Ottoman traders and adventurers.

Finally, no discussion of late sixteenth-century Ottoman travel literature would be complete without a mention of the career and works of Seydi Ali Reis. Scion of a distinguished family of Ottoman seamen, head of the Ottoman arsenal in Galata, expert in mathematics, astronomy, and celestial navigation, distinguished man of letters and an accomplished poet, Seydi Ali was also the protagonist of one of the most remarkable travel adventures of his time. Sent originally by Sultan Suleyman to take command of the imperial fleet in Basra and bring it safely to Suez by means of the Arabian and Red seas, Seydi Ali was ambushed by a Portuguese squadron while en route, caught in a ferocious storm, and eventually shipwrecked off the coast of northwest India. His ships destroyed, he determined to return to Istanbul by traveling overland through Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran, and upon his safe arrival composed a narrative of his journey, the famous *Mir’atü’l-Memālik* (Mirror of countries).⁴⁹

During the course of this journey Seydi Ali also gathered source materials for a groundbreaking navigational handbook, the *Kitābu’l-Muḥīt* (Book of the ocean sea). Based on a combination of his own experiences, personal interviews with local navigators, and a large number of contemporary works in Arabic previously unknown to the Ottomans,⁵⁰ the *Muḥīt* and its author are perhaps the most emblematic example of the accomplishments of a remarkable generation of Ottoman scholars. In the space of just a few decades, these men had moved from a state of almost total ignorance about the world of the Indian Ocean to a comfortable familiarity that was the product of both extensive firsthand experience and sustained intellectual commitment.

CONCLUSION: THE OTTOMANS AND THE AGE OF DISCOVERY

While the aim of this brief survey has been to emphasize similarities in the development of Ottoman and European discovery literature, at least a word must also be said about the characteristic of Ottoman scholarship that most dramatically distinguished it from its Western counterpart: its failure to adopt the printing press. Perhaps surprisingly, the Ottomans' resistance to printing seems to have negatively influenced cultural production in the Empire only marginally during the sixteenth century itself, although with time its absence would be felt to a greater and greater extent. By the seventeenth century, as the number of new European works continued to grow exponentially, Ottoman production of discovery literature seems actually to have begun to taper off.⁵¹ Individual scholars like Katip Çelebi and Ebubekir al-Dimişki were still able to make important contributions to the field. But overall, the enormous costs associated with copying manuscripts by hand, combined with the lack of identical "standardized texts" that only printing made possible, appear to have seriously hampered the Ottomans' ability to collectively improve upon their "state of the art." Even as late as the nineteenth century, medieval Islamic cosmographers such as al-Kazvini were still among the most popular and widely distributed geographical authorities in the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottoman experience would therefore appear to provide strong evidence in support of the famous "Eisenstein thesis," which credits printing technology for decisively transforming the "Renaissance" into a sustainable and self-reinforcing movement that was categorically different from periods of intellectual ferment at other times and in other places.⁵² On the other hand, one must resist the temptation to associate printing and "Western civilization" too closely, since even within Western Europe the application of printing technologies was by no means uniform. The Portuguese of the sixteenth century, for example, were just as limited by the manuscript character of their cultural production as were the Ottomans, and even the greatest contributions of Portuguese geographers, such as Duarte Pacheco's *Esmeraldo*, João de Castro's rutters, and João de Lisboa's *Livro da Marinharia*, all remained unpublished.⁵³ The few Portuguese works that did appear in print, including the *Livro de Duarte Barbosa* and Tomé Pires's *Suma Oriental*, were published not in Portugal but in Italy, just as Ottoman works such as Tunuslu Hajji Ahmed's world map and Salamis b. Gündoğdu al-Salihi's *al-Bustān fī Acā'ibi'l-Arḡ ve'l-Buldān* were published in Venice.⁵⁴

In this sense, perhaps the best way to understand the development of

sixteenth-century Ottoman discovery literature is to see it as part of a larger trans-Mediterranean “intellectual division of labor.” The subjects of young and vigorously expanding states on the frontiers, including the Ottoman Empire as well as Portugal and Spain, physically traveled to the far-flung corners of the world and returned with information about the places they had visited; the separate task of compiling, organizing, and publishing this information was left to the more developed printing centers of Italy and the Low Countries. Such a view would imply that the “Age of Exploration” cannot be understood by focusing only on the narrow story of intellectual development within Western Europe itself. From an intellectual as well as a physical standpoint, “discovery” was a process whose limits far exceeded the traditional boundaries of Western civilization.

NOTES

1. See George Hourani, *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Medieval Times* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

2. Fuat Sezgin, *The Contribution of the Arab-Islamic Geographers to the Formation of the World Map* (Frankfurt am Main: Institut für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, 1987), pp. 20–23.

3. David Woodward, “Medieval Mappaemundi,” in J. B. Harley and David Woodward, eds., *The History of Cartography Volume One: Cartography in Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Europe and the Mediterranean* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 286–370.

4. Tony Campbell, “Portulan Charts from the Late 13th Century to 1500,” in Harley and Woodward, *History of Cartography*, pp. 371–447.

5. G. R. Crone, *Maps and their Makers: An Introduction to the History of Cartography* (London: Hutchinson's, 1964), pp. 39–46.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 68–75.

7. Sezgin, *Contribution of the Arab-Islamic Geographers*, pp. 40–46.

8. See Robert Finlay, “Crisis and Crusade in the Mediterranean: Venice, Portugal and the Cape Route to India (1498–1509),” *Studi Veneziani* 28 (1994): 45–90; also Jacques Le Goff, “The Medieval West and the Indian Ocean: An Oneiric Horizon,” in Anthony Pagden, ed., *Facing Each Other: The World's Perception of Europe and Europe's Perception of the World* (Burlington: Ashgate/Variorum, 2000), pp. 1–19.

9. See, for example, Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam and World History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 203.

10. To date, the only rigorous paleographic study of an Ottoman geographical text is Karen Pinto's research on a cluster of seven late-fifteenth-century Ottoman copies of al-Istakhri's *Kitābu'l-Masālik wa'l-Mamālik*. See Karen Pinto, “Ways of Seeing 3: Scenarios of the World in the Medieval Cartographic Imagination” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2002), pp. 56–118.

11. There are two principal catalogs of the major Islamic geographical works available to the Ottomans: Cevdet Türkay's *İstanbul Kütüphanelerinde Osmanlılar Devrine Ait Türkçe-Arapça-Farsça Yazma ve Basma Coğrafya Eserleri Bibliyografyası* (Istanbul, 1958); and Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Coğrafya Literatürü Tarihi* (Istanbul, 2000). There is no comparable guide for Ottoman map collections. For an overview, see Ahmet Karamustafa, "Military, Administrative and Scholarly Maps and Plans of the Ottomans," in Harley and Woodward, *History of Cartography*, pp. 209–227.

12. Only a handful of manuscripts of Ibn Battuta's travels are to be found in Istanbul, and none of them dates conclusively to the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries. See Türkay's catalog for the extant manuscripts.

13. See G. R. Tibbetts, "The Role of Charts in Islamic Navigation in the Indian Ocean," in Harley and Woodward, *History of Cartography*, pp. 256–262.

14. A. Adnan Adivar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim*, 6th printing (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2000), p. 29.

15. G. R. Tibbetts, *Arab Navigation in the Indian Ocean Before the Coming of the Portuguese, Being a Translation of the Kitāb al-Fawā'id fī Usūl al-Bahr wa'l-qawā'id of Ahmad b. Majīd al-Najdī* (London: Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1981).

16. İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Coğrafya Literatürü*, pp. 1–13.

17. Istanbul, Topkapı Saray Müzesi Kütüphanesi, G.I.27.

18. M. Destombes, "Fragments of Two Medieval World Maps at the Topkapı Saray Library," *Imago Mundi* 18 (1964): 234–244.

19. Adivar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim*, pp. 34–37.

20. Topkapı Saray Müzesi Kütüphanesi, G.I.84.

21. Antonio Fabris, "The Ottoman Mappa Mundi of Hajji Ahmed of Tunis," *Arab Historical Review for Ottoman Studies* 7–8 (1993): 33.

22. See Lin Yih-Min, "A Comparative and Critical Study of Ali Akbar's Khitaynama with References to Chinese Sources," *Central Asiatic Journal* 27, nos. 1–2 (1983): 58–78.

23. J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont, "Une Lettre de Qāsim Šīrvān à Muzaffer Šāh du Gujarat: Les Premières Relations des Ottomans avec l'Inde," in R. Vesely and E. Gambar, eds., *Zafarnama Memorial Volume of Felix Tauer* (Prague: Enigma, 1996), pp. 35–49.

24. Michael M. Mazzaoui, "Global Policies of Sultan Selim 1512–1520," in D. Little, ed., *Essays on Islamic Civilization Presented to Niyazi Berkes* (Leiden: Brill, 1976), pp. 224–243.

25. Piri Reis, *Kitāb-ı Bahriye*, 4 vols. (Ankara: Ministry of Tourism and Culture of the Turkish Republic, 1988).

26. Ibid., 1:43.

27. See, for example, Svat Soucek, "Piri Reis and Ottoman Discovery of the Great Discoveries," *Studia Islamica* 79 (1994): 121–142.

28. Marcel Destombes, "The Chart of Magellan," *Imago Mundi* 12 (1955): 65–88.

29. On Ibrahim Pasha's interest in geography, see Nicolas Vatin, "Sur Quelques Propos Géographiques d'Ibrahim Pacha, Grand Vezir de Soliman le Magnifique (1533)," in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont and E. Van Dunzel, eds., *Comité Internationale d'Études Pré-Ottomans et Ottomans, VIth Symposium, Cambridge 1st–4th of July 1984* (Istanbul: CIEPO, 1987), p. 323.

30. Destombes, "Chart of Magellan," p. 88.

31. A principal source for the career of Selman Reis is the sixteenth-century chronicle of Kütbeddin Mekki, discussed at greater length below.

32. See Salih Özbaran, "A Turkish Report on the Red Sea and the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean (1525)," *Arabian Studies* 4 (1978): 81–88.
33. Ibid., p. 86.
34. See Salih Özbaran, "Osmanlı İmperatorluğu ve Hindistan Yolu: Onaltıncı Yüzyılda Ticaret Yolları Üzerinde Türk-Portekiz Rekabet ve İlişkileri," *Tarih Dergisi* 31 (March 1977): 66–146.
35. Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, H.1822.
36. Thomas Goodrich, "Atlas-ı Hümayun: A Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Maritime Atlas Discovered in 1984," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 10 (1985): 84–101.
37. Thomas Goodrich, "The Earliest Ottoman Maritime Atlas: The Walters Deniz Atlası," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 11 (1986): 25–44.
38. Adıvar, *Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim*, pp. 93–94.
39. W. D. C. Randles, "La diffusion dans l'Europe du XVIe siècle des connaissances géographiques dues aux découvertes portugaises," in *La Découverte, Le Portugal et L'Europe Actes du Colloque de Paris les 26, 27 et 28 mai 1988* (Paris: Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, 1990), pp. 269–278.
40. Quoted in Justin Stagl, "The Methodising of Travel in the 16th Century: A Tale of Three Cities," in Pagden, *Facing Each Other*, p. 147.
41. Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Nahrawali, *al-Barḳ al-yamānī fī al-fath al-'othmānī*, ed. Hamad Jasir (Riyad: Dār al-Yamāmah lil-Bahth wa-al-Tarjamah wa-al-Nashr, 1967); in the seventeenth century, the Arabic text was translated into Ottoman Turkish under the title *Abbāru'l-Yemānī*, Istanbul, Süleymaniye Ktp., Aya Sofya 3091.
42. Feridun Beg, *Mecmū'a-yı Münşe'at-ı Selātin*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, AH 1264/AD 1847).
43. Joseph Matuz, *L'ouvrage de Seyfi Çelebi* (Paris: Librairie A. Maisonneuve, 1968).
44. Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, K.893, f.91a.
45. İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Coğrafya Literatürü*, pp. 72–73.
46. Cengiz Orhonlu, "XVI. Asrın İlk Yarısında Kızıldeniz Sahillerin'de Osmanlılar," *Tarih Dergisi* 16 (July 1961): 14.
47. E. S. Forster, ed. and trans., *The Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople 1554–1562* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968), pp. 205–207.
48. For an analysis and full transcription and translation of this document, see Giancarlo Casale, "His Majesty's Servant Lutfi: The career of a previously unknown sixteenth-century Ottoman envoy to Sumatra based on an account of his travels from the Topkapı Palace Archives," *Turcica* 37 (2005): 43–81.
49. A. Vambery, ed. and trans., *The Travels and Adventures of Sidi Ali Reis in India, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Persia During the Years 1553–1556* (London: Lanzac, 1899).
50. M. Guadefroy-Demombynes, "Les Sources Arabes du Muhit Turc," *Journal Asiatique*, 2nd series, 20 (1912): 347–350.
51. İhsanoğlu, *Osmanlı Coğrafya Literatürü*, p. lxxiv.
52. Elizabeth Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformation in Early Modern Europe*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
53. Vitorinho Magalhães-Godinho, "The Portuguese 'Carreira da India' 1497–1810," in J. Bruijn and F. Gaastra, eds., *Ships, Sailors and Spices: East India Companies and their Shipping in the 16th, 17th, and 18th Centuries* (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1993), p. 36.
54. On the publication of Tunuslu Hajji Ahmed's map, see Fabris, "Ottoman Mappa

Mundi,” pp. 32–33; on the *al-Bustān fī ‘Acā’ibi’l-Arḥ ve’l-Buldān*, see Olga Pinto, “Una rarissima opera araba stampata a Roma nel 1585,” in *Studi Bibliografici: atti del convegno dedicato alla storia del libro italiano nel V centenario dell’introduzione dell’arte tipografica in Italia, Bolzano, 7–8 ottobre 1965* (Florence: L. S. Olschki, 1967), pp. 47–51.

Lines of Plunder or Crucible of Modernity? The Legal Geography of the English-Speaking Atlantic, 1660–1825

Eliga H. Gould

As Max Weber wrote in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, the essence of modern capitalism is its commitment to quotidian regularity, gradual accumulation, and the rule of law; but for these qualities, the ethos of the commercial bourgeoisie would be indistinguishable from that of the premodern brigand. For Weber, the chief exemplar of capitalism's rational side was Benjamin Franklin.¹ Perhaps that is why historians have so eagerly sought modernity's roots in the western Atlantic, with the American colonies supplying what Robin Blackburn calls the "forced draught" of change in areas as varied as market discipline, social and racial hierarchies, popular sovereignty, and national identity.² As Weber's juxtaposition suggests, however, modernity captures only one dimension of Britain's eighteenth-century expansion. Whether we consider the founding of white colonies of settlement, the dispossession and enslavement of non-European populations, or the onset of the "age of democratic revolution," the British Atlantic's development was no less indebted to piracy and other forms of irregular violence, all of which Weber believed to be antithetical to both capitalist rationalism and, ultimately, modernity.

Taking as its focus the long century between the English Restoration and the aftermath of the American Revolution, this chapter examines the implications of this double ethos for the legal geography of the English-speaking Atlantic. In particular, it explores the interdependence between the British and American commitment to the rule of law, which both peoples took to be a benchmark of their own modernity, and the strongly held conviction that the western and southern Atlantic was a place of contested sovereignties, diminished legalities, and warring imperialisms.³ Simplistic, distorting, and offensive though the perception was, Britons regarded both Africa and the Americas as a zone distinct from Europe—a region where even "law-abiding" peoples (metropolitan as well as creole) were free to engage in practices that were unacceptable in Europe. Far from being a per-

spective unique to Britain, moreover, the notion that the extra-European Atlantic lay beyond the pale was shared by many Americans and exerted a powerful influence over how they understood their own situation, both before and after the Revolution. Even as the two English-speaking empires affirmed their own modernity, Weber's theoretically distinct categories of legal accumulation and lawless aggression remained explicitly intertwined in the wider Atlantic, and the ethos of both the British Empire and the United States continued to depend on their situation in a region where acts of impunity were the norm.

This violent construction of the outer world presupposed the law-based character of international relations within Europe. Despite the recent attention that scholars have paid to the xenophobic strands of Georgian patriotism, Britons tended to regard Europe as a zone of law and civility—"the most civilized Quarter of the Globe," as an English pamphleteer wrote in 1743.⁴ In its account of the capitulation of the British garrison on Minorca in 1782, the *Annual Register* made a point of noting the "kindness and tenderness" with which the French and Spanish treated the ragged defenders as they surrendered their arms. "It has been assured," wrote the journal's anonymous correspondent, "that several of the common soldiers of both armies [i.e., of France and Spain], were so moved by the wretched condition of the garrison, that involuntary tears dropped from them as they passed."⁵ In extolling such humanitarian tendencies, Britons did not hesitate to claim a special role for themselves. As an Irish pamphleteer observed in 1779, Europe's modern history would have been an unrelenting story of slavery and impoverishment, "but for the intervention of Great Britain."⁶ If the British were sure of their place in Europe's civilized consortium, however, they readily conceded that this commitment to the law of nations was not unique to them but was one manifestation of what the Swiss jurist Emer de Vattel called "the honour and humanity of the Europeans."⁷

There was obviously an element of wishful thinking in this depiction of international relations, as anyone who had experienced warfare on the Continent could attest. Not surprisingly, the British tended to be especially unforgiving of infractions by their mortal enemy France—"the most Christian brute," as a pamphlet detailing French outrages in the Netherlands styled Louis XV during the 1740s.⁸ Yet even when European powers violated formal treaties and agreements, writers tended to assume at least a residual willingness to abide by the "humane customs of civilized nations," as Francis Hutcheson wrote in his system of moral philosophy, and many took such customs as a sign of broader historical trends.⁹ "Europe hath for above a century past been greatly enriched by commerce and polished by arts," observed

East Apthorp, Anglican vicar of Croydon, in 1776. "Whoever compares the present age with the last, will discern an almost total change to have taken place in the manners, the customs, and the government of Christendom."¹⁰

The law that underlay this progressive development was clearly a European construct, "a system of artificial jurisprudence," in the words of William Paley, based on the diplomatic customs and formal conventions of the Continent's principal powers.¹¹ Despite its cultural specificity, however, British jurists (in common with thinkers throughout Europe) held the law of nations to be universal, with norms that were as binding in the woodlands of North America as at Europe's center. This was partly because of the need to regulate relations between the imperial powers of Europe and to prevent them from subjecting each other's colonists to what Bristol's Society of Merchant Venturers termed "uncivilized sistem[s] of war."¹² In Britain's case, the notion of a global jurisprudence derived added force from the doctrine that settlers who emigrated overseas retained all the rights of natural-born subjects, including the full protection of both common law and the law of nations. As William Blackstone noted in the *Commentaries*, the latter formed such a fundamental part of the British constitution that it was "adopted in its full extent" wherever English law was in force. Were the situation otherwise, wrote Blackstone, contracts between merchants would be worthless, foreign treaties would lose their force, and Britain could expect neither friendship nor mercy from other governments; in a word, its people "must cease to be a part of the civilized world."¹³

This commitment to international law was readily apparent in the administration of Britain's overseas empire, including the sovereignty that Britain exercised on the high seas and the treaty rights it extended to conquered possessions with extensive Catholic and non-Christian populations, notably Quebec and Bengal. Of the British Empire's various parts, none appeared to be more securely within the pale of both the European law of nations and English common law than the colonies of settlement that stretched from Newfoundland to the Lesser Antilles. In the words of the English radical John Wilkes, the colonies were such integral parts of the British nation that there was "no difference between an inhabitant of Boston in Lincolnshire, and of Boston in New England."¹⁴ Wilkes, of course, did not speak for all Britons. Yet his formulation did not differ substantially from the one that the ministers of George III enshrined in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the American Stamp Act (1765). Based on a line that followed the crest of the Appalachian Mountains, the Proclamation drew a sharp distinction between the Indian lands to the west and the colonies of settlement to the east and south, including Quebec, East and West Florida, and Grenada. West

of the Proclamation Line was international space where Britain's authority depended on treaties with "the several nations or tribes of Indians with whom we are connected"; on the other hand, the Proclamation recognized both the older colonies and Britain's new possessions (except Quebec) as common law polities, whose "laws, statutes and ordinances" should conform "as near as may be agreeable to the laws of England."¹⁵ As the Stamp Act showed, an important corollary to this greater British identity—at least in British eyes—was that Parliament could tax Britons in America on the same terms as it did Britons in England, Scotland, and Wales.¹⁶ Naturally most colonists rejected Parliament's claims to fiscal supremacy; however, few questioned Thomas Whately's assertion that the "British Empire in Europe and in America [is] . . . the same Power" and that the "Mother Country" and the colonies were "one Nation."¹⁷ In the words of the assembly of Jamaica, there was no question that Britons in the colonies were "entitled to the benefit and protection of the laws of England and to the rights and privileges of Englishmen."¹⁸

If the law of nations afforded minimal safeguards everywhere, however, it served another, darker purpose, which was to legitimate a far less exacting conduct toward people beyond the pale of its protection, including, under certain circumstances, Europeans. Indeed, into the early years of the eighteenth century, the British—in common with the other maritime powers of Europe—assumed that the law of nations did not apply (or did not apply with equal force) in those parts of the world that lay beyond the so-called "lines of amity," the imaginary quadrant formed by the Tropic of Cancer and a prime meridian that bisected the Atlantic west of the Azores. As developed by European adventurers during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the doctrine of autonomous spheres made it possible for Europeans to wage war in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans, while maintaining peace (or "amity") in Europe. Occasionally, governments reversed this relationship with wartime pacts of colonial neutrality, in effect permitting subjects beyond the line to pursue nonbelligerent activities that were (at least ostensibly) inimical to metropolitan interests. More typically, Europeans recognized distinctions between the two zones by concluding "truce[s] to be observed in Europe"—in the words of the seventeenth-century jurist Samuel Pufendorf—while continuing hostilities "in the East or West Indies."¹⁹ As Oliver Cromwell allegedly said, on learning that English forces had captured French Acadia in 1655, it was well known that "everyone could act for his own advantage in those quarters."²⁰

The upshot was an international regime where Europe's maritime powers subscribed in varying degrees to the principle that "might makes right

beyond the line,” with governments tolerating or, on occasion, deliberately promoting extra-European acts of war and piracy even as they maintained cordial relations at home. A vivid illustration of this dichotomy—even after Britain agreed to end the practice in the Treaty of Madrid (1670)—was the impunity with which English privateers preyed on Spanish shipping in the Caribbean, irrespective of whether a state of war existed between the two powers in Europe.²¹ In the two decades following the Peace of Utrecht (1713), the concept of autonomous international spheres likewise enabled Britain and France to maintain cordial relations in Europe, while their colonists and Indian auxiliaries engaged in protracted warfare along the borders of northern New England and Nova Scotia.²² Indeed, as late as the start of the so-called War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739) with Spain, some people hoped—in vain, as it turned out—that the British government could go to war in the West Indies without endangering the general peace of Europe.²³

By middle decades of the eighteenth century, the doctrine of autonomous spheres was no longer a formally acknowledged part of European international relations in the extra-European Atlantic.²⁴ Nonetheless, three factors tended to preserve the region’s character as a zone of impunity at least partially distinct from Europe. The first was the absence of clearly delineated, universally recognized European jurisdictions and boundaries, which enabled people on the margins of the great overseas empires to engage in local acts of violence and undeclared warfare. To many Britons, the Atlantic Ocean provided the clearest example of this jurisdictional confusion—and, often, chaos. Not only were ships thought to be places of rough manners and casual violence, but the waters through which they sailed often lay beyond the control of even Europe’s mightiest navies.²⁵ Despite the annual tribute that Britain paid to the Barbary States of North Africa, the possibility of being captured by Muslim corsairs remained the subject of special interest, to say nothing of terror and fascination.²⁶ On other occasions observers noted the maritime world’s reputation for unconstrained masculine violence, as in Daniel Defoe’s horrific tale about the twenty-one members of Captain Thomas Anstis’s “brutish” crew who “successively” forced themselves on a female captive and “afterwards broke her Back and flung her into the Sea.”²⁷ No doubt influenced by such stories, Anna Maria Falconbridge spent her first night on board the vessel that would carry her husband and her to Sierra Leone terrified “that a gang of pirates had attacked the ship, and would put us all to death.”²⁸ Although often apocryphal or of dubious provenance, tales like this conveyed an obvious lesson. Men and women who ventured beyond the waters of Europe abandoned many of the safeguards that the law afforded in metropolitan England.

The violent tendencies of ambiguous and ineffective jurisdictions were also evident in what William Burke called the “savage” European propensity to contest “the Sovereignty of Deserts in *America*,” both along the inland reaches of North America and in the Caribbean.²⁹ In British eyes, the most vexing of these disputes arose from Spain’s claim to all lands and waters not explicitly ceded to other European powers—what the bishop of Norwich ridiculed in 1739 as an absurd pretension to “absolute sovereignty in the American Seas.”³⁰ Although France’s claims were less extensive, similar jurisdictional problems bedeviled Anglo-French relations in the West Indies and parts of North America.³¹ Even Britain’s overwhelming triumph during the Seven Years’ War did not entirely resolve these conflicts. In the British settlements on Honduras Bay, the mixed-raced inhabitants continued to be worried about their own ambiguous status under the Anglo-Spanish Treaty of Paris (1763), which permitted them to cut logwood and mahogany for the British market while affirming Spain’s sovereignty over the settlements themselves.³² Into the later eighteenth century, Britain continued to engage in brinkmanship and low-level hostilities throughout the Caribbean and the South Atlantic, notably with France over the contested status of the Turks Islands (1764) and Spain during the Falkland Islands crisis of 1770.³³

Compounding the violence spawned by the wider Atlantic’s overlapping claims and boundaries was the British Empire’s loose-knit structure, which freed both “natural born” British colonists and non-European subject peoples to wage war without official sanction. Once again some of the clearest examples came from what Blackstone called Britain’s “maritime state.”³⁴ Speaking in 1746 of depredations by colonial “privateers in America and the West Indies,” the Lords of the Admiralty claimed they were powerless to regulate such activities because the governors who commissioned them “alone have power to curb [their] insolencies.”³⁵ As late as the 1790s both friendly and neutral powers—including, notably, the United States—complained of the freelance depredations of West Indian privateers and the colonial prize courts that legitimated their irregularities.³⁶ On occasion, such autonomous acts of violence even spread to England’s own ports and shores. During the Liverpool seamen’s strike of August 1775, some 2,000 sailors idled by the Revolution’s disruption of the slave trade seized firearms and cannon, destroyed the houses of several “obnoxious persons,” and bombarded the Exchange. One person “could not help thinking we had Boston here.” But most observers regarded the strike’s violence as “accidental”—a bloody but characteristic symptom of the “ungovernable people” who manned the nation’s merchant marine.³⁷

Although constraints on Britain’s imperial capacity were especially

conspicuous on the high seas, the government's authority was often no more extensive over the colonists and subject peoples on their distant shores. To the regular officers who participated in the conquest of Canada (1759), the New England troops serving alongside them seemed utterly unreliable—"democratic" enthusiasts to a man, who fought the French and Indians (often savagely) when it suited their purposes but who disobeyed any order that contravened their provincial terms of enlistment.³⁸ If anything, this blend of violence and autonomy was even more pronounced with respect to the empire's non-European subjects. In 1775 the governor of St. Vincent claimed he had no control whatsoever over the island's "black Caribs" and blamed the shortcomings of the recent treaty with them on their "bold and turbulent" behavior and on their "Mixture with the dregs of the french . . . among whom are many runaway Negroes."³⁹ Even the native peoples of North America, whom the British public had a tendency to sentimentalize, were credited with the most hideous atrocities, including arson, torture, infanticide, and cannibalism. The Indian captivity narrative became so familiar in Britain that Tobias Smollett parodied the entire genre with the character of Lieutenant Obadiah Lismahago. A penniless Scot recently returned from the colonies, Lismahago regaled the cast of *Humphrey Clinker* (1771) with stories of being captured and tortured by the "Badger tribe" near Fort Ticonderoga, after which he was elected their *sachem* and married to a princess about whose neck hung "the fresh scalp of a Mohawk warrior."⁴⁰ Despite the involvement of the Royal Navy and, increasingly, the British Army, Britain's eighteenth-century expansion depended heavily on collaboration with such groups, many of whom—European creole no less than Indian and African—subscribed to "irregular" norms of war and diplomacy and over whom metropolitan officials exercised limited control.

If the violence that the British and their European rivals visited on each other could be appalling, a third distinction between Europe and the extra-European world was the brutality with which Europeans treated the region's indigenous inhabitants. In the aftermath of *Somerset's Case* (1772), observers frequently reiterated Blackstone's (misleading) dictum that a slave became free "the instant he lands in England."⁴¹ By contrast, native peoples in the outer Atlantic were thought to inhabit political societies that—in Vattel's words—"observe no law," or, more precisely, no law in the highly systematic, codified form that existed in Europe.⁴² As the African slave trade demonstrated, the members of such societies accordingly enjoyed diminished or nonexistent rights under English common law and the law of nations. Indeed, despite the law's muted hostility to slavery in England, only an enlightened minority disputed that merchants on the coasts of Africa

were engaged in a legitimate commerce involving prisoners who enjoyed none of the safeguards afforded prisoners in Europe. Although Anna Maria Falconbridge claimed to “wish freedom to every creature formed by God,” she described Africa as a place where three-quarters of the population “come into the world, like hogs or sheep, subject, at any moment, to be rob’d of their lives by the other fourth.” While such conditions persisted, wrote Falconbridge, “I cannot think the Slave Trade inconsistent with any moral, or religious law,” and she concluded that it actually promoted the continent’s “happiness . . . by saving millions from perdition.”⁴³

Although perceptions of Native Americans differed in that the British regarded them as subsidiary allies rather than slaves, commentators did not hesitate to claim equally broad rights in places like the Ohio Valley. According to most experts, the reputedly “primitive” character of Indian society—evident most notably in the absence of a recognizable system of private property—gave both British and colonial agents the authority to dispose of “vacant” native lands, by conquest and unilateral appropriation if gentler means did not suffice.⁴⁴ Not everyone accepted this way of thinking, of course. As Samuel Johnson observed at the start of the Seven Years’ War, the struggle between Britain and France for control of North America resembled nothing so much as “the quarrel of two robbers for the spoils of a passenger.”⁴⁵ For people who shared Johnson’s qualms, however, an impressive battery of thinkers, including Locke, Pufendorf, and Vattel, confirmed that it was entirely legal for European settlers to seize “land of which the savages stood in no particular need, and of which they made no actual and constant use.”⁴⁶

Taken together, such assumptions made the extra-European Atlantic—including, significantly, much of North America—seem like a zone of endless possibility, what the literary critic Stephen Greenblatt has described as a place of “wonders” that those with the necessary resources were free to exploit to the full.⁴⁷ At times, descriptions of this wondrous state could take on a spiritual, almost rhapsodic quality. As the English hymnist John Newton wrote of his years as a slave ship captain, life at sea “necessarily” lacked the benefits of “public ordinances and christian communion,” but it also gave the “religious sailor” a rare opportunity “to observe the wonders of God in the great deep, with the two noblest objects of sight, the expanded ocean, and the expanded heaven.”⁴⁸ Indeed, the outer Atlantic was capable of yielding profound insights, unimpeded by the trappings of excessive civility and refinement. As the nascent radical John Cartwright noted of a Labrador woman who accompanied his naval vessel to England in 1769, immense structures like the hospital at Portsmouth and St. Paul’s cathedral made a

“wonderful impression,” but her greatest surprise—which Cartwright, in turn, found deeply revealing—came when she learned that an Englishman could be hanged for attempting to “go into the woods and kill venison.”⁴⁹

Just as often, the miraculous served more sinister purposes, as in the preamble to a Bermuda statute of 1730, which attributed the lenient treatment of whites who murdered “Negroes Indians Mulattoes and other Slaves” to the way “things are wonderfully altered” in Britain’s American colonies.⁵⁰ Yet another example of this kind of imperial license was the rapidity with which Britons everywhere came to speak of 1759 as an *annus mirabilis*, a year of wonders when the king’s forces conquered distant lands on a scale that seemed to belie Britain’s commitment to the liberties of Europe in Europe. In each instance the tenuousness of the law beyond Europe created an environment both uncertain and remote. Despite the colonists’ allegiance to metropolitan forms and customs, there was a danger that even natural-born Britons who spent too much time overseas might—in the words of John Newton—adopt “the tempers, customs, and ceremonies of the natives, so far as to prefer [their new] country to England.”⁵¹ When he wrote these words Newton was thinking of Africa; however, his words were no less applicable to the rest of the British Atlantic.

By the eighteenth century’s final quarter, Britons and Americans thus had two different models with which to explain the Atlantic world’s legal geography—one that emphasized the modern, law-based character of colonial society, the other the legal conflict and violence of the zone in which the colonies were situated. In many ways, of course, the two models were compatible, even complementary. Although colonists lived on intimate terms with Indians and Africans, the reputed absence of formal systems of law among both groups left settlers theoretically free to establish political systems based entirely on the common law of England. The result, according to many observers, was a far-flung polity that shared a remarkably uniform heritage. “The British dominions consist of Great Britain and Ireland, divers colonies and settlements,” wrote the English agronomist Arthur Young in 1772. “The clearest method is to consider all as forming one nation, united under one sovereign, speaking the same language and enjoying the same liberty, but living in different parts of the world.”⁵² The earl of Chatham invoked the same unified image in his final, desperate plea for Anglo-American reconciliation in 1777; there was simply no reason, he insisted, why Britain’s colonists “should not enjoy every fundamental right in their property, and every original substantial liberty, which Devonshire or Surrey, or the county I live in, or any other county in England, can claim.”⁵³ The British Empire obviously contained millions of people who did not fit this

Anglicized model; however, the law's blindness to Vattel's people without law made it all too easy for Britons everywhere to accept a vision of the empire as an extended consortium of English fragments.

Ironically, the clearest indication of the British Empire's identity as a global, law-based consortium was the language that Americans used to justify their decision to secede. Although the Declaration of Independence severed ties with Britain, it proclaimed as its larger purpose the Thirteen States' intention to "assume among the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and Nature's God entitle them." Shorn of rhetorical flourishes, this meant, at the very least, assuming the same rights as the other independent states of Europe; it also signified a determination to take an active role in European treaty relations—as trading partners if not as permanent allies. As Richard Henry Lee observed in laying his momentous resolution of June 7, 1776, before Congress, "necessity . . . calls for Independence, as the only means by which foreign Alliances can be obtained."⁵⁴ Even Lee's fellow Virginian Thomas Jefferson, often depicted as the founding father of American isolationism, acknowledged the need for commercial treaties with Europe's maritime powers, especially those (like Britain) "having American territory."⁵⁵ As Secretary of State Edmund Randolph reminded the British ambassador in 1794, "the United States were without the European circle," but that did not mean they were excluded from the "modern" law of nations. To suggest otherwise would be to deny them the fundamental rights of nations "because they are sovereignties of a recent date, and in the western hemisphere."⁵⁶

Many Britons, of course, were less sanguine about the Republic's place in Europe, let alone its modern, law-abiding character. Throughout the Revolutionary War, conservatives predicted that the wayward colonies would become havens of lawlessness and piracy, international outcasts given to warring among themselves, and tempting objects for the intriguing courts of Europe.⁵⁷ Even after adoption of the Federal Constitution of 1787, many assumed with Lord Sheffield that the "unsettled condition of the American States" made them unreliable treaty partners.⁵⁸ Metropolitan writers also gave full play to widespread perceptions of the United States as a land of slavery and coerced labor. In the words of a pamphlet from 1796, ostensibly written to dissuade young Englishmen from emigrating to Virginia and Kentucky, even poor whites in America felt slavery's detrimental effects, laboring under indentures whose terms exposed them to "every species of brutal insolence and overbearing tyranny."⁵⁹ Viewed from this standpoint, the American Revolution simply perpetuated the violent norms that the British had long attributed to the western and southern Atlantic.

Naturally, Americans resisted being stigmatized as a “marauding” power outside the pale of Europe, but many found reasons of their own to perpetuate the geographical division between Europe and the western reaches of the Atlantic world. In the well-known formulation of Washington’s Farewell Address (1796), the great *desideratum* of American politics was to extend the commercial relations of the United States with foreign nations while having “as little *political* connection [with them] as possible. . . . Europe,” Washington explained, “has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns.”⁶⁰ As the outrage over Jay’s Treaty (1794) showed, Washington’s diplomatic preferences were hardly those of all Americans, but in this he spoke for most citizens of the new Republic.⁶¹ “It is the true interest of America to steer clear of European contentions,” wrote Thomas Paine in *Common Sense* (1776). “The commerce by which [America] hath enriched herself, are the necessities of life, and will always have a market while eating is the custom of Europe.”⁶² In a sense the projectors of American independence embraced key features of the old lines of amity, only in place of barbarism and violence they envisioned a zone of natural law and justice unencumbered by the corrupt diplomatic customs of Europe.⁶³

Each of these constructions spoke more to cultural perception than to political reality. Nonetheless, the American Revolution had two far-reaching, deeply tangible consequences. The first was to begin the Atlantic world’s transformation into a “modern” state system comparable to that of Europe, and to produce a corresponding diminution in the space that lay beyond either international or municipal law. Among the clearest indications of this vanishing “middle ground” was the near-simultaneous decision by Britain and the United States in 1807–1808 to outlaw the Atlantic slave trade.⁶⁴ Because the Atlantic world’s changing legal geography was preeminently a transformation in relations between states, abolishing the commerce in human beings did not directly threaten the “domestic” policy of holding slaves. Still, the joint action was momentous and created a standard that British jurists, in particular, regarded as sufficiently binding to merit enforcement under the law of nations. Within a decade the British Admiralty Court at Sierra Leone was invoking the terms of the American statute to condemn American slave ships apprehended off the coast of West Africa.⁶⁵ Despite resentment of such judicial unilateralism in the United States, even Southern slaveholders were not insensitive to its underlying logic. Following the insurrection on board the slave ship *Creole* in 1841, and the American vessel’s subsequent diversion to British Nassau, a Louisiana court held that

the colony's authorities were entitled to liberate any slave that entered British waters. Although the decision was overturned in 1853, the successful attorney in the original case, Judah Benjamin, was a prominent member of the New Orleans bar and later served as the Confederacy's secretary of state.⁶⁶

Although less liberationist in its effects, the second consequence of the law's expanding reach was every bit as significant. As Richard White has shown in his study of European-Indian relations in the Great Lakes region, the growing rapprochement between Britain and the United States played a key role in the disappearance of the interior "middle ground" within which settlers and Indians had interacted on terms of cultural—and legal—equality.⁶⁷ Although the phenomenon has yet to receive comparable attention elsewhere, the same fate befell the Seminoles of Florida, the black Caribs of St. Vincent, and Jamaica's Leeward Maroons.⁶⁸ In each instance the growing preeminence of relations between internationally recognized states rendered the autonomy of political entities without such status all but impossible to maintain. Significantly, only on the French island of Saint Domingue did a large non-European population avoid descent into clientage and dependency, but the Haitian Republic was also unique—if only partially successful—in making a bid for full membership in the Atlantic world's burgeoning state system.⁶⁹

If the outer Atlantic was becoming modern in ways that Weber would have recognized, however, even the American Republic never entirely shed its character as a place beyond the line. To be sure, the international transformation wrought by the great democratic revolutions tended to obscure the new order's origins in acts of piracy and irregular warfare. But while men and women on both sides of the basin did call a "New World into being"—to paraphrase British Foreign Secretary George Canning's response to Latin America's wars of independence—that world was less a repudiation than a restatement—and in some cases an intensification—of key features of the old order.⁷⁰ The United States in 1825 was more clearly subject to the international rule of law than British America had been fifty years earlier, and it was unambiguously independent, possessing all the rights of a European nation; however, it was still in a zone clearly distinct from Europe, with few obstacles to the domestic exploitation of slaves, the removal of Indians within its jurisdiction, and expansion into "unoccupied" territory beyond its borders. In effect, the modernization of the Atlantic world's legal geography occurred without displacing the long-standing notion that Europeans beyond the line could do things that Europeans in Europe could not.

NOTES

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61. Under the treaty, the United States promised to compensate Loyalists for losses during the Revolution; in return, Britain granted American merchants limited privileges in Canada and the West Indies and agreed to evacuate posts in American territory it surrendered in 1783. Critics viewed the treaty as a capitulation to the former imperial master.

62. Thomas Paine, *Common Sense* (1776), in Jack P. Greene, ed., *Colonies to Nation, 1763–1789: A Documentary History of the American Revolution* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1975), pp. 276, 278.

63. See esp. Peter S. Onuf, *Jefferson’s Empire: The Language of American Nationhood* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000).

64. In abolishing the slave trade, Congress was acting in accordance with article 1, § 9 of the Federal Constitution (1787), which called for such a step by 1808.

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67. Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

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Transgressive Exchange Circumventing Eighteenth-Century Atlantic Commercial Restrictions, or The Discount of Monte Christi

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In *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith asserted that human beings have a propensity to “truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.”¹ In this view of the world, trading developed because individual people knew—almost innately—what they wanted, as well as how and where to acquire it. But residents of the eighteenth-century Atlantic World were not free to engage in any commerce that they might find advantageous. Instead, an extensive series of commercial regulations defined acceptable trading partners, products for exchange, and methods of distribution. Such governmental constraints interfered with consumer behavior too heavily, according to Smith, and led to his critique of the pre-1776 mercantile economy.²

The British government, for example, required that all colonial produce first be carried to a British port in a British-owned ship, even if such produce was finally destined to a market in France or Germany. Spanish law forbade all foreign ships from entering any of Spain’s colonial ports, even if Spain could not satisfy all of its colonists’ consumer demands. France, Spain, and Britain all licensed only selected ports in their home markets to trade with the colonies. Import duties for colonial produce were high, effectively raising prices for European consumers. Policies such as these effectively denied individual consumers, on both sides of the Atlantic, not just choice but also the ability to seek and engage that which (and those who) could most help them accumulate. Smith pointed out that “merchants and manufacturers have been by far the principal architects” of these restrictions and regulations. In this view government helped one group of people at the expense of everyone else.³ This might also be considered a usurpation of the property rights of consumers—at all economic levels.⁴

Mercantilist regulation had, in general, a deleterious effect on consumers everywhere. In Smith’s mind, “[t]he monopoly of the colony trade . . .

like all the other mean and malignant expedients of the mercantile system, depresses the industry of all other countries, but chiefly that of the colonies, without in the least increasing, but on the contrary diminishing, that of the country in whose favour it is established.”⁵ The Atlantic World’s regulated and inorganic economic system undermined the ability of consumers on both sides of the Atlantic to create their own trading communities, as Smith believed that they were naturally inclined to do. Or did it?

Indeed, consumers on both sides of the Atlantic, individually and collectively, effectively circumvented those mercantilist policies that they believed were deleterious to their needs. The human propensity toward consumer-driven exchange that Smith had identified thus overcame the governments’ artificial efforts to restrict it. Perhaps most importantly, both individuals and groups of consumers succeeded in transgressing the system far more frequently than either contemporary officials could safely acknowledge or than those who now study only statutes could possibly conceive.⁶ That they were able to get away with doing so while asserting legal equality with those in Europe ought not to be surprising. This could, in fact, be thought of as a global consumer challenge to the existing legal regime.⁷

Perhaps no place within eighteenth-century Atlantic America can better illustrate the human propensity to “truck, barter, and exchange” by challenging legal restrictions than can the Caribbean islands. Because the major European colonial powers each controlled multiple noncontiguous territories within this seascape, a nationally diverse regional population regularly encountered each other. Though French, Dutch, British, and Spanish subjects all lived under different laws, usually created in and imposed from across the vast Atlantic, the survival of the islands’ residents—if not their prosperity—depended on local circumstances much more than it did upon imperial policy.⁸ Aided by their physical distance from Europe, as well as the Caribbean islands’ many isolated beaches and coves, white islanders easily and willingly transgressed those policies and statutes that impeded their ability to transact exchanges with each other. These regional and illicit interactions can be sharply focused by examining the region’s ports, for because of these conditions Caribbean port towns became places in which the local populations effectively—frequently illicitly—exchanged not just produce and consumer goods but also legal interpretations.⁹

THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY Caribbean effectively had three distinct kinds of ports. The first group, about which most is known, consisted of officially recognized cities. Each one had a customs house or at least officials stationed

there whose responsibilities had them inspecting ships that entered or departed the harbor. As part of their official responsibilities, many of these officials were charged with collecting the appropriate amount of import and export duties. The names of such places will be well known, even to those who have never been to the West Indies: Bridgetown, Cap Français, Havana. It is easy to imagine how the law could be circumvented in these places when it got in the way of an exchange; and indeed, widespread fraud and corruption can easily be documented.¹⁰

The second kind of Caribbean port consisted of officially licensed “free ports.” Designed specifically to draw in residents from neighboring islands under the control of a different imperial power, these ports were, at least in a certain sense, legally sanctioned centers of illegal commerce. In almost all cases for which records still exist, one or both of the trading parties violated commercial policies of either the home country or the host island. For example, the British tried to entice Spanish residents in Cuba to break Spanish laws by trading in a nearby colony’s free port. A few examples of such places at various times in the eighteenth century include Kingston, Martinique, St. Eustatius, and St. John’s, Grenada.¹¹ Though the customs establishment remained a presence in these places, and was periodically accused of corruption, normally high rates of duties were officially, and dramatically, reduced or eliminated in an effort to attract and retain foreign commerce. This would have helped to create an international legal regime of the kind that Lauren Benton discusses in *Law and Colonial Cultures*.¹²

The third kind of port, and the one with which this essay is concerned, was perhaps the most common. These ports were neither officially monitored nor legally recognized. Yet they grew up organically, meaning that residents of these towns (and their surrounding hinterlands) naturally engaged with residents of other towns (and regions) in order to get what they needed. They fulfilled, in other words, their Smithian propensities to “truck, barter, and exchange,” almost completely outside the gaze of European imperial officials. The principal example of this kind of port to be considered here is Monte Christi, on the island of Hispaniola.

Most Atlantic historians have probably never heard of Monte Christi. Even so, the town’s significance as a place in which the human proclivity to consume fiercely confronted mercantilist regulations designed to check that very behavior ought not be underestimated. Located on Hispaniola’s north coast, astride the border that separated the island’s French and Spanish colonies, Spanish-controlled Monte Christi illustrated the ways in which colonial residents from all of the American empires rewrote those imperial statutes that served European mercantilist interests at the expense of colo-

nial residents. These Caribbean acts of legal noncompliance were, in many respects, more effective in furthering the interests of colonial consumers than those asserted in North America in the decades just before the American Revolution. British North Americans confrontationally and aggressively challenged those policies with which they disagreed in the years after 1763. Yet those who lived in Monte Christi, along with those who came to trade there, remained superficially supportive of problematic regulations even as they actively and quietly undermined them. Residents of this kind of port city assumed control of their own consumer needs, as Smith believed natural. They did not rely upon European governments to sanction or prohibit their behavior. They simply rewrote law through transgressing it.¹³

Most scholars would consider Monte Christi little more than a minor settlement, given that its usual population consisted of only about one hundred poor Spanish subjects.¹⁴ Nevertheless, during its heyday as a center for contraband commerce in the mid- to late eighteenth century, *several hundred* oceangoing ships annually called into its harbor. That would amount to several ships per inhabitant—an astronomical amount for the time period. Many of these vessels came from British North America, where European-imposed laws forbade trade with either the French or the Spanish.¹⁵ Still others came from islands elsewhere in the Caribbean. Because almost all sailings to Monte Christi by ships other than Spanish-licensed vessels violated Spanish law—if not also those of another European state—there is scarce documentation for voyages to the port. Having said that, however, enough ships faced interdiction on their return voyages to leave historians with an ample supply of data on the mechanisms by which the port operated.

Monte Christi's "lieutenant governor" wrote to William Shirley, governor of the British Bahamas, in March of 1760.¹⁶ The Spanish official asserted that an English privateer, based in New Providence (now Nassau), illegally captured five Spanish vessels.¹⁷ The lieutenant governor of Monte Christi claimed that he had licensed the five ships to sail from the port under his control only as far as the neighboring French colony of St. Domingue. The ships were to return loaded with goods that were required "for the Encouragement of the new Settlement under [Monte Christi's] Government."¹⁸ *British* privateers would thus have had no reason to stop, let alone capture, these ships.¹⁹ Though Britain and France were at war, these were represented to be, at least ostensibly, neutral Spanish ships. Of course, *French* shipping would have been subject to British arrest and seizure—but these particular ships had Spanish licenses. British Governor Shirley therefore needed to learn why the ships had been seized before he could answer his Spanish colleague. It is, then, possible to see the overlapping national legal regimes

yielding to an emerging international legal regime—one that Caribbean residents were negotiating for themselves.

Fortunately for Shirley, the five arrested ships had already been brought into the British Court of Admiralty in Nassau for official condemnation, sale of the cargo, and division of the proceeds. Before any division of the prize could take place, however, the court needed to determine the answer to the question of the ships' nationalities. If they were French ships, they were lawful wartime prizes; the ships and their contents could be divided between the privateers who captured them and the British government.²⁰ On the other hand, if the ships belonged to Spanish subjects, restitution would obviously be required—as Spain and Britain remained at peace in 1760—since there would have been no legal reason for a British seizure other than the ships having eluded British customs.²¹ Governor Shirley asked the Admiralty Court to share copies of all pertinent documents and depositions.

The court complied with the governor's request. Shirley, who had recently arrived in Nassau after having been governor of Massachusetts, then glimpsed that which was already well known to most regional populations. Shirley learned of Monte Christi's important role in facilitating extralegal exchange by evading territorial, and therefore legal, boundaries. The Bahamian governor remained uncharacteristically diplomatic while standing his ground.²² Shirley maintained that the English privateers acted appropriately. Moreover, he asserted that Monte Christi had manufactured its own problem. Governor Shirley delicately "reminded" his Spanish counterpart what the captured licenses (or passports), which the Spanish official had in fact signed, actually mandated. The first ship (*Nuestra Señora de Alta Gracia*) had permission to "carry the Effects permitted [by Spanish law], and to bring some eatables and provisions for the use of Monte Christi, and *for no other port*" [emphasis mine]. If the Ship's master violated his instructions then any cargo aboard was to be "answerable."²³ The second ship had been instructed to bring "the fruits and eatables of the Earth from the French colonies to Monte Christi for the *Encouragement of the New Settlement There*."²⁴ A third ship (*Nuestra Señora de Socorro*) was licensed "to carry such Goods as are permitted to the French Colonies, and to bring from thence *some provisions for the City of Monte Christi, and no other place*."²⁵ The remaining two ships had similar charges.

This meant that altogether a total of five oceangoing vessels received simultaneous permission to bring back produce from the French colony to be consumed in the Spanish port; no mention was ever made of shipping the imported French produce to other Spanish settlements on Hispaniola.²⁶ But the port's one hundred or so consumers could not possibly have consumed all

of the imported “eatables and provisions” on the five ships, given their small number. William Shirley therefore concluded that his Spanish counterpart must have known that the Spanish ships, by bringing to Monte Christi more than could be consumed, were planning to export the French products, quite possibly to British colonies in the region or in North America. This was clearly transgressive behavior.²⁷ Since British privateers captured the ships in French waters, and France was at war with Britain, the capture seemed legitimate to the British.

But it was worse than all of that; the ships’ captains had further evaded the official Spanish legal regime. Rather than confront a colleague, Governor Shirley diplomatically pointed this out. The holds of these captured ships, in contravention of their licenses, contained *no food at all*. The cargo instead consisted of “Sugars, Molasses, Rum, Indigo, and Coffee, the produce and manufacture of the French settlements.” They were “without any of the usual and necessary papers for proving them to be the property of Spaniards.” Since there was no dispute about the ships having been to French ports on Hispaniola, what was in them must have been French.²⁸ The cargoes were French, in British eyes, simply because there was no record of duties having been paid either for the export from Monte Christi to Europe or another colony; nor was there a record of duties having been paid for the import into Monte Christi from St. Domingue. The British admiralty judge therefore could condemn the cargoes as French, making them legal prizes of war.

But what of the ships themselves? Governor Shirley admonished his Spanish counterpart that though enough evidence existed to order the ships condemned and sold, he would see that they were released. What evidence did Shirley have against the ships? He again used the passports that the Spanish governor had approved. The ships did not adhere to instructions; they both had on board products that were not “eatables,” such as sugar, and they had far more of it than Monte Christi’s small population could ever use, at least before it spoiled. Shirley claimed that “a most unwarrantable and prejudicial Commerce to the Interests of Great Britain is carry’d out with the French of Hispaniola thro’ the Channel of Monte Christi, whereby the French are frequently furnished with great Quantities of Money, Contraband, and other Goods, in exchange for their Sugars and the other produce and manufactures of their Settlements.”²⁹ The Spanish ships had thus given aid and comfort to Britain’s French enemies, thereby violating principles of neutrality. But because the ships were Spanish-owned, he allowed them to be returned to Monte Christi with a warning that such behavior was unacceptable. The ships were once again placed in the service of Monte Christi’s few consumers and its many traders.

The port certainly had a great deal of experience in dealing with non-Spanish customers; indeed, it made its living from such people. Spanish commercial law appears to have been largely irrelevant in that port. British ships (from Britain, from the North American colonies, or from neighboring Caribbean islands), along with those from other European nations, regularly docked in Monte Christi's harbor, paid the Spanish governor *cash*, and were then given a Spanish license to enter the port. (Non-Spanish ships were not allowed in Spanish colonies; Monte Christi's governor broke Spanish law when he issued these passes.) Next, the visiting ships unloaded their foreign cargoes directly onto Spanish-licensed ships, like those captured by the privateers. The goods being transferred would be counted and then the foreign traders would pay the Spanish governor another fee, usually a piece-of-eight, for every hogshead of molasses or other product that was destined to the French on the frontier's other side. In exchange for this consideration, the governor overlooked the Spanish residents who loaded and unloaded foreign cargoes in the harbor at Monte Christi and who shipped them aboard Spanish boats to foreign ports—and then did the same on the return voyages. They also paid their governor a fee for this service, taken out of the wages they earned for their services.³⁰

In return, the British and other foreign traders received Spanish money and French luxury goods, as well as French sugars, molasses, and other tropical produce—such as coffee. These products then entered the European marketplace as British produce; they usually remained on board the ships and then were clandestinely added to the final tallies at a pre-export inspection in the last American port that they visited before heading to Europe. Tropical products generally fetched higher prices in protected British markets than they did in protected French ones.³¹ And because the foreigners paid the French producers in St. Domingue for their products and goods in advance of them being entered into the market, consumers there benefited doubly. Not only did they get cash before they shipped their produce, they also received a higher price than they would have done by following legal channels. In fact, the port of Monte Christi—and others like it—allowed consumers across the Atlantic world to escape from policies that injured or restricted their consumer propensities. As Benton claims, albeit in a slightly different context, “local institutional practices sometimes offered opportunities for capital accumulation that colonial agents sought to preserve.”³²

Resorting to diplomatic language, Governor Shirley let his Monte Christian counterpart know that the British had noted Monte Christi's *modus operandi*. Rather than accuse the lieutenant governor of fraud, Shirley asserted that the Spanish crews found means “to protect their [illicit] French

Cargoes with Spanish papers” by using “some misrepresentation or Imposition (as I doubt not it must be) to obtain Certificates from you, Sir, that the same were puchas’d by Subjects of Spain, residing at Monte Christi.”³³ Governor Shirley claimed to have seen documentation that a British ship had a cargo of Spanish sugar, purchased at Monte Christi, aboard it. Shirley knew for a fact, he said, that the sugar was French and had been loaded at St. Christopher’s. “[T]here is a very large Quantity of the pernicious Trade,” Shirley maintained, “carry’d on at Monte Christi.”³⁴ In this way the Bahamian governor revealed some additional ways in which individual consumers—and their agents—found ways to evade European-created rules that obstructed colonial property acquisition and, through it, capital accumulation. Mercantilist policy, without directly saying so, attempted to control consumer demand by using tariffs and prohibitions.

If tiny Monte Christi had a sizable amount of organized illicit commercial activity, it should come as no surprise that much bigger and more populous ports, such as Kingston in Jamaica, also regularly participated in illegal commerce—which could, in itself, be considered an international legal regime. These larger ports, which had more officials visibly stationed in them, faced more consistent and regular scrutiny. As in the smaller ports, local consumers and their merchant suppliers frequently found ways to challenge the laws that impeded their abilities to “truck, barter, and exchange,” while simultaneously impeding any official efforts to enforce the problematic statutes.

Monte Christi was an active port, despite its small size. It regularly employed passive tactics to circumvent the law and operate beyond the notice of enforcement officials. At the same time, larger ports—with more official oversight—utilized much more confrontational and assertive tactics to beat back any governmental challenges to their illegal behavior. Though European merchants had induced their various governments to promulgate policies that favored them, the benefits did not apply evenly to all commercial people. In many cases eighteenth-century Caribbean merchants found the restrictions placed upon them to have deleterious consequences for their economic advancement. Many broke ranks with their European counterparts and the policies that they supported. Instead, they forged alliances with their counterparts in other islands and, frequently, on the American continent. Commerce outside the legally prescribed channels happened with regularity in these places as well.

With Britain and France still fighting a war in July 1761, British Rear Admiral Holmes wrote to the secretary of the Admiralty in London from his Jamaica post. Holmes reported that he had recently offended several Jamaica merchants.³⁵ He had done so by acting to suppress the illegal trade that

he supposed Jamaica's residents carried on with the Spanish and French on Hispaniola. This trade almost certainly took place through Monte Christi, though it could also have been carried on in a few other places on the larger island. A number of Jamaica's most prominent residents attempted to get Admiral Holmes to relax his opposition to the trade. They first tried the "soft" approach. But Holmes knew better. In his report to the Admiralty, Holmes claimed that he was "soothed, caressed, and flattered, but all to no purpose."³⁶ Because Jamaica's traders and other influential consumers could not eliminate his opposition to their lawbreaking with this approach, several prominent Jamaican merchants decided to work behind his back in order to undermine his ability to enforce British commercial policy. Indeed, Holmes believed that the Kingston merchants entered into clandestine deals with French ships to capture or destroy British naval ships. He thought that they had created a sort of private naval harassment force—much like privateers, though without the local governor's approval. Though this might have created a temporary nuisance for the British fleet in the area, the Jamaican merchants' policy failed to have the desired effect. The British Navy had quite literally "gotten in the way" of the island population's propensities to exchange one thing for another when it did not succumb to French harassment.

But the Jamaican merchants were not so easily mollified. Desperate to end their own government's harassment of their contraband commerce, several Kingston merchants clamored for a meeting of their commercial colleagues. In this meeting, they discussed constructing the "proper Measures for the 'better Protection of the Trade of this colony.'"³⁷ There ought to have been nothing wrong with this, since it sounded above board. But when Admiral Holmes learned of the merchants' plans, he became extremely agitated. His pride in and commitment to his profession had been challenged. Holmes believed that the merchant meeting strongly implied that the British Navy could not adequately defend and protect the island's trade from foreign aggression. Why else would the merchants be having such a meeting? He strongly resented the public participation in such a meeting; he also vowed to continue, and strengthen, his efforts to stop illegal trade between places like Jamaica and Monte Christi. Holmes again asserted that the Jamaican merchants were trying to find a way around the British Navy in order to continue their trade. The meeting, he believed, showed them to be nothing but, as he called them, a "Motley Group of Defamators."³⁸

After they held their meeting, a number of the most well-known and powerful attendees went to Admiral Holmes's house and presented him with "their insolent, false, and abusive letter." Holmes did not reply to their letter. Instead, he became even more convinced that these people had something

to hide. They simply *must* be engaged in some clandestine commercial venture. In this instance he practiced guilt by inference and association. He did, however, have recent events that supported his view. The ship *Gua-deloup* had recently been condemned in Jamaica's Admiralty Court. Like the five Monte Christi ships that ended up in the Bahamian Admiralty Court a year earlier, this ship "had a false Spanish Pass, was navigated by Spaniards, and [was] taken, coming from the [French] Ports in Hispaniola, with French Produce."³⁹ Holmes believed that the ship and its cargo did not belong either to the Spanish, as claimed, or to the French, as the evidence indicated. He believed instead that the ship's cargo, if not the vessel itself, belonged to several Jamaica merchants—who happened to be participants in the Kingston meeting. These merchants, Holmes maintained, illegally imported French sugar into Jamaica by claiming that the ship used to carry it from St. Domingue to Jamaica had actually originated in a distant Jamaican port—and therefore was not subject to import duties.⁴⁰ In this way the island's merchants increased their rate of return from that which they could have expected had they followed the law and engaged in trade with only Jamaican produce—or paid the heavy duties that were required to import legally foreign goods and produce. Admiral Holmes, who seemed to epitomize the incorruptible official, was outraged that such a scheme could take place at the highest levels of Jamaican society.

But outrage about such activities somehow does not seem the appropriate response. The merchants' illegal and extralegal activities and schemes developed because commercial rules and regulations were not properly suited to local economic conditions. Such policies did not allow individual Caribbean residents to assert easily their "propensity to truck, barter, and exchange." As a result, they found the official legal policies under which they lived to be confounding. In order to remedy their situations, many created trading communities that at once allowed them to acquire goods they wanted to consume while simultaneously challenging those restrictions that, when enforced, served to hold their economic growth and development in check. In short, they created new, more pluralistic legal regimes through negotiated authority. Colonial officials charged with enforcement were often frustrated when they got to the Caribbean; it should, however, not be surprising to learn that enforcing unpopular statutes could make life truly miserable for such officials. A fair number of them eventually acquiesced, becoming more like the lieutenant governor of Monte Christi than Rear Admiral Holmes.⁴¹

The law, especially if we think of it as a European institution, became the largest casualty in the negotiations over the creation of a pluralistic legal regime. The port towns, with their easy access to individuals from differ-

ent societies and economies, made legal evasions and challenges relatively simple. American ports challenged European ones, at least metaphorically, for control of the ways in which consumption took place across the Atlantic world. When all is said and done, the colonial ports facilitated, if they did not specifically encourage, legal transgressions. From the European perspective, this could be seen as a small, but consistent colonial rebellion against the state. At the same time, at least from the Atlantic colonial perspective, these conflicts pointed to the creation of new pluralistic legal regimes, where authority was negotiated and where institutions mattered much less than considering the law and its relationship to property, as Benton suggests.⁴²

Caribbean residents understood by the middle of the eighteenth century that their region's ports provided them as much, or even more, opportunity than did those in Europe. The cost of legally enforcing commercial restrictions could be made to outweigh, if it did not already do so, any benefit that such enforcement produced for the institutions of the European state, like the treasury. As the eighteenth century progressed, the Caribbean white population continued to circumvent the laws from which they did not benefit; rarely did they even consider the open resistance of the kind that happened in North America in 1776.⁴³ The European mercantilist legal regime in the Atlantic World slowly ended not because European governments abandoned their protectionist and restrictive policies, but because island residents undermined the mercantile system at its very foundation. If consumers refused to accept limits on their consumption, and the law could be easily violated, the system would collapse under the weight of its irrelevance to the population who lived under it. In fact, this happened slowly but steadily as the eighteenth century transitioned to the nineteenth. The propensity to consume, in short, trumped any laws put in place to regulate it.

NOTES

1. Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Oxford ed. (1993), p. 21. This is a "selected" edition based on the 1976 Glasgow edition of the work edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner.

2. While it goes beyond the scope of this chapter to enter into an extended discussion of Smithian economics, we ought to notice that his criticism of Britain and its American colonies are found in *Wealth of Nations*, Book IV, chaps. 1–3, and 7.

3. See Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, p. 378.

4. See Lauren Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), esp. p. 23.

5. Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, p. 355.

6. See Benton's discussion about the relationship between colonial populations, state, and intermediaries, in *Law and Colonial Cultures*, pp. 7–30.

7. This idea is also considered in Eliga H. Gould, "Lines of Plunder or Crucible of Modernity: The Legal Geography of the English-Speaking Atlantic, 1660–1825," which appears in this volume. In particular, Gould correctly asserts that the Atlantic World was a place of "contested sovereignties, diminished legalities, and warring imperialisms" (p. 105). At the same time he argues for a kind of legal equality between those in the colonies and those in Britain. Though an extension of his argument, it is clear that residents on both sides of the Atlantic found ways to satisfy their needs as consumers by consistently evading those sections of the laws that they found incompatible with their particular and local needs.

8. This argument is a variation of the one that Benton makes in *Law and Colonial Cultures*, p. 3 ff.

9. See also Gould, "Lines of Plunder." Gould sees this as "the absence of clearly delineated, universally recognized European jurisdictions and boundaries, which enabled people on the margins of the great overseas empires to engage in local acts of violence and undeclared warfare" (p. 109). I would argue, in fact, that these acts of violence were not random but rather clustered around efforts to regulate trade and, through it, consumer behavior.

10. For one example, see Aline Helg, *Liberty and Equality in Caribbean Colombia, 1770–1835* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), pp. 85–86. Also see Alan L. Karras, "Custom has the Force of Law: Local Officials and Contraband in the Floridas and the Bahamas, 1748–1779," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 80 (Winter 2002): 281–311, and Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures*, p. 46, for a similar discussion on the West African coast, at Mina.

11. The best general work on the region's free ports remains Frances Armytage, *Free Port System in the British West Indies: A Study in Commercial Policy, 1766–1822* (London: Longmans, 1953). While Armytage's primary sources come from British archives, she also makes some references to Spanish and French primary source material.

12. Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures*, pp. 23–24.

13. Indeed, Gould correctly asserts that the "great democratic revolutions tended to obscure the new order's origins in acts of piracy and irregular warfare" (p. 116). I would argue that it also obscured its contraband past. Caribbean colonial consumers were, in many respects, better served than those in the newly formed United States, because they continued to be able to avoid those laws that impeded consumption while those in the United States were increasingly subject to European ideas of law.

14. For the population figure, see William Taggart's Declaration, April 21, 1760, The National Archives of the UK (henceforward TNA): Public Record Office (henceforward PRO), CO 152/46, p. 267. Also see Alan L. Karras, "Smuggling and Its Malcontents," in Jerry H. Bentley, Renate Bridenthal, and Anand A. Yang, eds., *Interactions: Transregional Perspectives on World History* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005), p. 142.

15. See William Taggart's Declaration, April 21, 1760, p. 267. William Shirley reported a figure of from 400 to 500 ships annually. See Shirley to William Pitt, August 1, 1760, TNA: PRO, CO 152/46, p. 265. Also see Deposition of Martin Garland, May 31, 1787, TNA: PRO, CO 5/1068, p. 18. For a discussion of laws being violated, see Alan L. Karras, "Custom Has the Force of Law: Local Officials and Contraband in the Floridas and the Bahamas, 1748–1779," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 80 (Winter 2002): 284–285.

16. This letter is available in original copied form. See "Copy of the Lieutenant Governor of Monte Christi's Letter to Governor Shirley dated St. Fernando de Monte Christi, 1 March 1760," TNA: PRO, CO 152/46.

17. Ships that were deemed "enemies," meaning that their countries were at war with

each other, could legally be captured. Countries that were at peace with each other should have had no cause to capture each other's shipping. In 1760 Britain and France were at war. Britain and Spain remained at peace.

18. William Shirley to Lt. Governor of Monte Christi, March 26, 1760, TNA: PRO, CO 152/46, f. 261 (verso).

19. It is, however, conceivable that French ships could have stopped them. It bears mentioning that trade with Spanish-licensed ships within French territory would have been forbidden under the French *Exclusif*. This is just one example of how the various European states' economic policies intersected and overlapped in the Caribbean. It is also easy, then, to understand how residents of one state might get permission to violate the laws of another state. See Armytage, *Free Port System*, pp. 32–38; and Jean Tarrade, *Le Commerce Colonial de la France à la Fin de l'Ancien Régime: L'évolution du régime de «l'Exclusif» de 1763 à 1789*, 2 vols. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), esp. 1:101–112.

20. Condemned prizes were divided into three shares: one third to the state, one third to the judicial official who conducted the case that resulted in the condemnation, and another third to the ship's crew. All of those individuals thus would have had a personal financial interest in seeing the ship condemned.

21. In fact, such a case did happen—in 1752. I have written about it in “Smuggling and Its Malcontents,” p. 144.

22. Local officials ran the risk of alienating either the populations that they governed or neighboring colonial governing officials. As a result they found themselves in extremely difficult positions from time to time. This encouraged them to bend the law to the will of the communities in which they had to live. Failure to do so could make a place ungovernable or could alienate otherwise powerful allies. See Alan L. Karras, “Custom Has the Force of Law,” and Benton, *Colonial Legal Regimes*, p. 95.

23. William Shirley to Lt. Governor of Monte Christi, March 26, 1760, TNA: PRO, CO 152/46, f. 261 (recto).

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid, f. 262 (verso).

26. This sort of trade beyond what had been licensed, of course, also took place in the British world. That being said, there were nevertheless legal ways around the proscription. One could argue extraordinary circumstances: drought or hurricane, and/or destruction of the food crops, always pointing to the risk for starvation, especially of the slaves. This happened almost yearly in many Caribbean islands in the years after the American Revolution. It had the effect of allowing prohibited articles to continue to enter the market. Consumer propensities once again trumped legal prohibitions.

27. Spanish ships picked up French manufactures in the French ports and then passed them on to visiting British ships from North America and elsewhere in the Caribbean. The Spanish also brought some of these goods to Cuba and Puerto Rico, and brought into the French and Spanish territories North American and British products that had been prohibited. In short, the Spanish at Monte Christi were facilitating contraband trade throughout the hemisphere.

28. William Shirley to Lt. Governor of Monte Christi, March 26, 1760, TNA: PRO, CO 152/46, f. 262 (recto). Had the ships been legally cleared from a Spanish port, there would have been an indication that duty had been paid upon them to the Spanish Government, for either import or export. The cargoes had no such papers, leading Shirley to conclude that they had never been entered into a Spanish port and therefore the king of Spain's

revenue had been defrauded. Because they had not been properly cleared into the Spanish ports, the cargoes remained French—and therefore liable to seizure—since France and Britain were at war with each other.

29. William Shirley to Lt. Governor of Monte Christi, March 26, 1760, TNA: PRO, CO 152/46, f. 263.

30. See also William Shirley to William Pitt, August 1, 1760, TNA: PRO, CO 152/46, p. 265, and for the list of fees and prices current, Shirley to Pitt, April 10, 1760, TNA: PRO, CO 152/46, p. 269.

31. See also Andrew O'Shaughnessy, *An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), pp. 61–62.

32. Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures*, p. 22. Benton's argument works here when one acknowledges that the "local institutional practice" developed in response to colonial law; it was not an indigenous practice—except insofar as Smith's human propensity to "truck, barter, and exchange" holds true.

33. William Shirley to Lt. Governor of Monte Christi, March 26, 1760, TNA: PRO, CO 152/46, f. 263 (recto).

34. Ibid.

35. Copy of a Letter Rear Admiral Holmes to John Cleveland, Esq. Secretary of the Admiralty, July 23, 1761, TNA: PRO, CO 137/61, f. 37 (verso).

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., f. 38 (verso). The group numbered among its members several of the wealthiest island residents, including Zachary Bayly, Augustin Gwyn, and Simon Taylor.

38. Ibid., ff. 37 (recto) and 39 (recto). If, for example, Holmes were removed and a more pliable official put in place, the clandestine commerce might be more easily carried out.

39. Ibid., f. 38 (recto). He also singles out Robert Stirling as someone who is trading illegally with the French. For a discussion of Stirling's career, see Alan L. Karras, *Sojourners in the Sun: Scots Migrants in Jamaica and the Chesapeake, 1740–1820* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 72–75. Trading in French produce, of course, was illegal at all times, but liable to seizure absent a treaty of peace.

40. Very often "droghing passes" were required for travel between ports on the same island. They too were the subject of fraud and transgression, either through forgery or through bribery, of the sort described above for Monte Christi. The British Navy was always on the lookout for those ships who could not produce the appropriate pass or whose passes seemed bogus.

41. See Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures*, pp. 204–205. This case differs from Benton's, in Uruguay, in that the plural legal regime in Uruguay was created through negotiations between settlers and indigenous residents. In these cases the settlers had become the indigenous residents, and the European "enforcers" and officials took on the role of Benton's settlers.

42. See *ibid.*, pp. 18–24.

43. For one such illustration, see Andrew O'Shaughnessy, *An Empire Divided*, pp. 89–92.

Sociologies



“Tavern of the Seas”?**The Cape of Good Hope as an Oceanic Crossroads
during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries***Kerry Ward*

The Cape of Good Hope was the major crossroads for European ships traversing the Atlantic and Indian oceans between Europe and Asia, until the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Situated at the southernmost tip of the African continent, the stunning vista of Table Mountain, the spectacular scenery of the Cape Peninsula, and the tumultuous seas helped give rise to the romantic notion that the Atlantic and Indian oceans actually met at Cape Point.¹ Today this fiction fuels Cape Town’s tourist trade—every year thousands of tourists traipse to the tip of the Cape Peninsula to gaze at the water where they imagine the oceans collide (the actual meeting point has been designated Cape Agulhas ninety miles further up the southeast coast from Cape Point). But the Cape of Good Hope was indeed metaphorically a meeting point between the Atlantic and Indian Ocean shipping systems during the early modern period, even though the early image of the Cape as “tavern of the seas” has privileged the view of the Cape settlement at the expense of a broader perspective incorporating both land and sea. The Cape was one of a series of refreshment posts established along major shipping routes. It was also part of an economic zone that comprised both legitimate and illegitimate trade on land, and legal and illegal shipping and plunder at sea. Any history of the Dutch Cape needs to keep both land and sea in sight, as this was the contemporary perspective of the world inhabited by those who came to the Cape.

After Bartholomew Dias rounded the Cape in 1488, Portuguese mariners became familiar with the southern African coastline as they made their way along the African coast and intervened aggressively in indigenous trading networks around the Indian Ocean.² From the sixteenth century, fluctuating numbers of European merchant vessels flying flags from England, France, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands stopped at the Cape of Good Hope to reprovision their ships with fresh water and meat bartered from the local Khoikhoi. Some of these encounters led to violent clashes,

particularly when Europeans tried to kidnap locals and their children or steal livestock. The most famous of these clashes was the utter rout of the Portuguese in 1510, which resulted in the death of the retiring viceroy of India, Dom Francisco d'Almeida. Various European claims to sovereignty over the Cape were not seriously followed through with occupation, despite the increasing regularity of visiting ships sealing the reputation of the Cape as a refreshment stop. The English were the first to eye the Cape as a potential possession. The chartering of the English East India Company in 1600 and the subsequent increase in shipping provided the stimulus, and in 1611 senior merchant Thomas Aldworth wrote to one of the Directors: "[the Cape] is almost half way on the route from Europe to the Indies, and will be no less convenient for our journeys than is Mozambique to the Portuguese and if His Majesty were pleased . . . choose a hundred men each year from those sentenced and send them to this new settlement."³ This experiment was implemented half-heartedly in 1615, when only a handful of convicts were left to fend for themselves at the Cape, a number far too small to defend their camp. By 1616 those who had survived attacks from the Khoikhoi had retreated to Robben Island, and the new convicts sent to reinforce the settlement begged to be hanged rather than left behind. The unfortunate fellows were later rescued by another English ship, ending the first attempt at European settlement of the Cape.⁴

Competition between the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie—VOC) and its English counterpart finally prompted the Dutch to officially occupy the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. Following the abortive attempt at establishing a penal colony, the English crown had not officially authorized an ongoing claim to the Cape. Despite perpetual fears of Dutch officials at the Cape of an invasion by rival European powers, the Company was able to maintain exclusive control of this oceanic crossroads for almost the next 150 years. Nevertheless, the sense of insecurity that Company officials expressed in terms of their control of the Cape reflected the volatility of the region in terms of asserting territorial sovereignty over competing claims by indigenous inhabitants and foreign powers and securing the sea lanes for legitimate shipping.

The settlement that sprang up at the Cape, particularly the port town itself, bore the indelible imprint of the Dutch East India Company empire. It was the particular trajectories of the various networks that comprised the Company empire, and its management of the Cape as a provisioning stop for European shipping, that determined both the character and the role of the Cape as a crossroads of the Atlantic and Indian oceans. Yet simultaneously, the Cape was part of a subregional shipping and trading network,

most intensely focused on the southwest Indian Ocean, but also extending to St. Helena in the Atlantic Ocean. The Cape formed one of several strategic refreshment posts that were planned, established, and sometimes abandoned, in what could be termed the crucial Southeast Atlantic–Southwest Indian Ocean zone.⁵ The concept of a zone is used here to bring into a single framework a series of strategic ports on islands and on the African coast that functioned primarily as refreshment stations, although over time they were either abandoned, marginalized, or became increasingly differentiated from one another as colonies developed according to the economic imperatives of imperial networks and the global economy.⁶ This chapter also examines the Cape metaphorically as a crossroads for scholarly debates on colonialism, empire, urban history, and oceanic history. Cape Town intersects with the emerging literature on “oceanic worlds” by being part of both the Atlantic and Indian ocean worlds at this time, while not conforming to the major patterns of either, although it is rarely included in the academic literature on these systems. I engage with the literature on the nature of port cities as oceanic entities and argue that it is inadequate to categorize the Cape according to these typologies.

CAPE TOWN’S URBAN HISTORY

Describing Cape Town as “the tavern of the seas” is an ambiguous reference to the way that the urban history of the city has been written, as well as the way it was characterized historically during the Dutch East India Company period. Charles Boxer speculated on who first gave the town the appellation of *de Indische Zeeherberg* (tavern of the Indian Ocean), which was already in common usage by the eighteenth century when the Swedish surgeon-botanist Carl Peter Thunberg, traveling to the Cape in 1772, described it as “[a]n inn for travelers to and from the East Indies, who, after several months’ sail may here get refreshments of all kinds, and are then about half way to the place of their destination, whether homeward or outward bound.”⁷ Amateur historians have often employed the term to write antiquarian histories of Cape Town that linger on the cosmopolitanism of the Cape and the raucous adventures of the sailors ashore, telling tales from a European, masculine perspective.⁸ The exception is the prolific local historian of the Cape, Jose Burman, who has published numerous books on the Cape maritime realm, drawing on both archival and travel accounts, which integrate both land and sea in a way that accurately mirrors elite contemporary perspectives and draws on the more nautically accurate image of “the bay of storms.”⁹ However, the “tavern” image still has currency in the Cape Town public

imagination: “tavern of the seas” is the title of a humorous anecdotal column by David Bigg in the daily newspaper *The Cape Argus*. This anecdotal representation of *de Indische Zeeherberg* was also revived in a few of the numerous publications that were generated by Dutch public interest in the 400th anniversary celebrations of the VOC in the Netherlands during 2002.¹⁰ These share in the land-based perspective of the Cape that largely ignores the sea as a social realm.

Overall, the academic scholarship on Cape Town’s urban history since the 1980s consciously turned away from Eurocentric perspectives and developed within the anti-apartheid aims of revisionist history in South Africa into the writing of the social history of communities. Commentators examined British colonialism from the nineteenth century onward and the impact of imperial connections and influences on the city. The increasing use of oral history methodologies in reclaiming “hidden pasts” and “people’s history” accelerated the trend toward focusing on the evolution of apartheid in the twentieth century. The Dutch East India Company period, the first 150 years of urban history, remained relatively understudied.¹¹ Robert Ross has written one of the few essays situating the growth of Cape Town in a comparative colonial context within an analysis of its integration into world capitalist markets.¹² Maurice Boucher’s analysis of foreign shipping at the Cape in the mid-eighteenth century is the only work that concentrated on the maritime realm.¹³ The culmination of this generation of research was the publication of the two-volume illustrated popular history of Cape Town.¹⁴ The first volume of this urban social history situates the history of Cape Town in the context of the Cape as having pre-existing indigenous communities that traded with, and were forcibly displaced by, European merchants and, later, colonists. It balanced indigenous history with the onset of Dutch colonialism, which was based on the use of imported slave labor, mostly from the Indian Ocean. Although it briefly acknowledged the transient maritime populations of the Cape, its focus as an “urban history” was by definition land-bound.

Slavery and bonded labor characterized colonial society at the Cape for almost the next two centuries, until emancipation under British rule in 1834.¹⁵ Locally based historians and historical archaeologists of the Cape have been active in popularizing the history of slavery and emancipation to give communities and educators access to this research, as postapartheid school history curriculums and community history projects have developed.¹⁶ The renewed interest in the Dutch period at the Cape coincided with the dismantling of apartheid in the 1990s and the re-interpretation of the role of heritage and national monuments in Cape Town, particularly the Castle

of Good Hope, the Slave Lodge, and Robben Island.¹⁷ New scholarship has emerged on the structure of the Company and its personnel, including Company slaves, and the growth of Cape Town within its cosmopolitan transoceanic empire. Nigel Worden has recently compared the development of Cape Town to Port Louis in Mauritius as having the same role and structure within their respective Dutch and French mercantilist empires in the Indian Ocean.¹⁸ Worden convincingly argues that Cape Town and Port Louis had more in common than other ports in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean networks. Gerald Groenewald's doctoral research brings Cape Town's urban history full circle back to the tavern of the seas. Not only has Groenewald elaborated on tavern culture as a major site in the multiethnic social world of the resident and transient underclass at the Cape, but he has begun to reexamine the role of this trade in generating wealth that created members of the Cape elite in a way that fundamentally alters the perception of the rural or mercantile basis of the ruling class at the Cape.¹⁹ Yet despite these important contributions, the social history of the Cape in maritime perspective during the Company period is not a focus of attention in South African scholarship as it has been in Dutch scholarship of the VOC.²⁰

CAPE TOWN IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND ATLANTIC OCEAN WORLDS

I launch my examination of Cape Town's place among the port cities of the Indian Ocean from discussions among historians of Asia in the late 1980s.²¹ At that time Southeast Asianists were seeking to extend their historiographical debates about the nature of Southeast Asia as a historical entity by examining one of the region's most obvious unifying cultural features—its urban past.²² This was analyzed in terms of the growth of walled cities with orientation to the sea along riverine systems that linked hinterland to coast on the mainland, and examined various permutations of this pattern in the archipelago.²³

The singularly international orientation of Southeast Asia throughout its history has been determined by the maritime configuration of the region and the important role it has played in mediating trade, first, between west and east Asia, and later, between the west and China. By providing international emporia at strategic locations where high value local and imported products were stocked, Southeast Asia became the area of convergence for goods moving between the oriental and occidental regions from as early as the third century A.D.²⁴

Change and continuity within the Southeast Asian port-city system very much depended on fluctuations in trading relationships with China before the seventeenth century. Individual port cities waxed and waned, but the system was fairly coherent in its patterns of trade. The “concentricity of entrepot and polity was almost a universal phenomenon in Southeast Asia.”²⁵

The increased presence of European traders who forced their commercial interests by the use of political interference backed by military force precipitated the decline of specific indigenous port cities. This accelerated from the mid-seventeenth century with the focus of European trade shifting to those ports occupied, conquered, or established by Europeans and with their marshalling of forced and free indigenous labor. The conquest of Melaka in 1511 by the Portuguese, and its subsequent conquest by the Dutch in 1641, precipitated the city’s decline from the most cosmopolitan emporium in the world. But it stimulated the growth of alternative indigenous entrepôts like Aceh in northwest Sumatra, Banten on the northwest coast of Java, and the coastal sultanates of the Malay peninsula. Then in turn, port cities like Banten that were not conquered militarily by European powers further stimulated the establishment of European-controlled rival ports designed specifically to divert already existing trade patterns and link them to direct sea routes with Europe. A case in point was the conquest of the port-city Jayakarta in 1619 by the Dutch East India Company. Renamed Batavia, this former Bantenese vassal port gave the Company’s Asian capital the same strategic maritime position along the Straits of Melaka that had given rise to the classical maritime empire of Srivijaya and would ensure the success of Singapore in the modern era.²⁶

The characterization of the Asian nature of these Southeast Asian and Asian port-polities was problematic because that geographical definition proved to be too narrow.²⁷ Although Frank Broeze claimed that his notion of “Asia” came from Edward Said’s more expansive cultural definition of the concept in *Orientalism*, the inclusion of East African port cities in both books showed the limitation of defining these port polities as Asian.²⁸ There has been a reluctance to embrace the idea of the Indian Ocean as a category of analysis within this literature, partly because omitting port cities on the South and East China seas ignores one of the most crucial areas in the extended trading networks of the region.²⁹ The unifying factor of urban forms in Broeze’s *Gateways of Asia* is that: “[t]he foundations of most if not all Asian port cities ultimately rests on indigenous fishing villages . . . It would not be too much to see the origins of Asian sea faring in the myriad of fishing communities which, to a very large extent, still stretch along much of the littoral of the continent and its islands.”³⁰

Cape Town as an Indian Ocean or Asian port city grew entirely without direct contact with indigenous Indian Ocean shipping networks and was not part of this Asian network. It was exclusively tied into European shipping patterns across the Atlantic and Indian oceans. There is no evidence that Asian, African, or Arabic ships ever entered Table Bay before the nineteenth century. Nor could indigenous hunter-gatherer or pastoral societies in the Western or Eastern Cape prior to European settlement be characterized as fishing villages although ocean and coastal produce was used in their diets. The orientation of indigenous societies in the region was not primarily toward the sea.³¹ Trading relations between African societies in the geographical area of modern South Africa were conducted through overland routes. Although these contacts were ancient, they did not rely on riverine communications and did not resemble the upstream-downstream hierarchical relationships between Southeast Asian communities linked to the coast.

The Dutch settlement at the Cape functioned primarily as a refreshment post, a hospital for ships' crews, and a repair dock for European ships plying the waters between Europe and Asia.³² Export trade from the Cape fluctuated; the expansion of the rural economy did not keep pace with the demands of the port settlement and ships until the eighteenth century. By the late eighteenth century, however, the Cape was exporting produce to Europe, Asia, and Mauritius although the Company did not allow free access to these markets.³³ The number of ships entering the Cape roadstead fluctuated seasonally and annually depending on a number of factors. First, the state of alliances between the Netherlands and other European states determined which ships had permission to enter Table Bay. The Company officials could deny anchorage or provisions to foreign ships; but supplying these services was profitable for the Company, and more particularly for the colonists, so it was problematic for the Company to deny these demands or curtail private trade. The Daily Diary of the government at the Cape reflects their constant anxiety regarding whether ships entering the roadstead were to be regarded as friend or foe.

Between 1700 and 1714 over 1,000 ships anchored in Table Bay, with only 64 percent of these belonging to the Company. While the numbers fluctuated during the mid-eighteenth century, they increased significantly in the later decades of the century. Combined with the annual fluctuation in the number of ships was the seasonal nature of shipping in general. Ships were most commonly in harbor for approximately a month during the southern hemisphere summer and autumn, so there could be a massive seasonal influence on the urban population of the Cape in any one year.³⁴ The popu-

lation of the Cape was therefore tied to its role as a port city and did display a seasonal pattern similar to that in Indian Ocean port polities dependent on monsoon winds for their main trading networks. However, the patterns of these sojourning populations were quite different in size and duration than those of most other Indian Ocean ports, including the ports controlled by the European merchant shipping empires. The exclusively European-based shipping networks that visited the Cape isolated it from the broader patterns of trade in the region and from alternative African and Asian shipping networks; the town was therefore not a major trading entrepot. The ethnic composition of ships' crews also changed over the course of the Company period, with an increasing proportion of Asian and African crew members sailing on European ships. Stressing the European nature of shipping concentrates on the ownership of vessels not on the people actually sojourning at the Cape and the other refreshment stations in these transoceanic networks.

An alternative perspective in examining the structure of Cape Town as a port city is to turn westwards toward the Atlantic Ocean. The concept of an Atlantic World is more established within academic discourse than the emerging conceptions regarding an Indian Ocean World.³⁵ South African historians originally turned to models of slavery in the New World in their examination of Cape slavery, rather than looking eastward at forms of slavery that existed within societies from which the majority of slaves sent to the Cape were extracted.³⁶ As John Thornton has powerfully argued, any consideration of the Atlantic world must have as one of its central premises the examination of the role of Africans in the making of this oceanic world.³⁷ Nevertheless, the regional analysis is based upon the emergence of these networks from the early modern period. Unlike the Indian Ocean trading networks, which have existed since antiquity, the Atlantic World is indeed the product of European merchant shipping.

One problem in applying Thornton's insights to the Cape is the complexity of indigenous African interactions with the South African maritime realm. Khoikhoi and Xhosa were not recruited to, or enslaved within, maritime transoceanic forced migration, nor were they recruited into the seafaring populations. Khoikhoi capture or enticement onto European ships during the Company period is so rare that historians have identified the major figures individually, particularly as they were recruited to act as translators. Nevertheless, the chances of unknown Khoikhoi individuals having boarded ships voluntarily or against their will is more likely than not, and travelers' accounts are sometimes suggestive in this regard, including that of the French director-general of Madagascar, Etienne de Flacourt, who visited

Saldanha Bay in the *Saint Laurent* on October 14, 1648. "The Director-General wished to take two boys with him to France, but the Hottentots would have none of it. He brought out his two Madagascar Negroes in uniform and wearing swords, but instead of admiration this called forth only mirth."³⁸

Analyses of Atlantic port cities established by European powers have emphasized their multiple functions as commercial, administrative, and strategic defensive settlements. But this is also a commonality with most Indian Ocean port cities.³⁹ Stressing the multiple elements of the Atlantic port city, and their origins in European colonialism, bears direct comparison with the main functions of Cape Town. Atlantic port cities were similarly not tied into preexisting indigenous shipping and long-distance trading routes; nor did the indigenous populations there constitute major elements of the seafaring population.⁴⁰ European colonial shipping provided the impetus for trans-Atlantic shipping and retained a monopoly on the ownership of oceanic transportation. It was European ships harboring in colonial Atlantic port cities that transported goods and people from the interiors of the lands bordering the ocean.

The trade in African people as commodities to the port cities of the colonial Americas and Caribbean during the trans-Atlantic slave trade also bears some comparison with Cape Town. One of the major sources for Cape slaves was the southeast Indian Ocean zone, particularly Madagascar. The Cape colony relied on slaves transported from around the Indian Ocean to serve as its colonial workforce. While indigenous Khoikhoi were variously incorporated into the rural labor force, the port city itself at the Cape was more dependent on slave or freed labor than that of Khoikhoi. However, this portrayal still ties the Atlantic port cities into a rather static characterization of the common foundations rather than exploring the diversity of their historical trajectories within multiplicities of oceanic, subregional, and local networks. Like ports in the Americas and Caribbean, Cape Town's role within the southwest Indian Ocean changed over time as the growth of its rural economy enabled it to become an exporter of produce as well as an importer of slave labor within the subregion. The complexity of racial definitions and perceptions of imported, indigenous, and creole populations were commonalities within the majority of port-city populations outside Europe in both the Atlantic and Indian oceans.

CAPE TOWN AS A TRANSOCEANIC PORT CITY

Historians of the Indian Ocean have already acknowledged that the multiplicity of long-term and complex networks of association across and around

the ocean make it difficult to define a unified concept of the region.⁴¹ Eric Tagliocozzo's long-term overview of common experiences in the transformation of the Indian Ocean is analyzed in terms of large-scale economic and social processes.⁴² He employs Michael Pearson's concept of "littoral societies" as communities extending inland from the coast that are influenced by their relationship with the port, an influence that weakens with geographic distance.⁴³ This concept of a littoral society has the advantage of integrating the harbor town with its hinterland, in a way similar to earlier analyses of Southeast Asian indigenous port polities. Tagliocozzo identifies three major littoral regions on the boundaries of the Indian Ocean: the eastern littoral including Southeast Asia; the northern littoral incorporating South Asia; and the western littoral of East Africa. Incorporating East Africa within an analytical category of the Indian Ocean schema takes into account the major dynamics of indigenous trading networks both on the African coast and within regional African-Arabic and cross-oceanic patterns of trade, balancing a reconceptualization of the Indian Ocean within its major continental and subcontinental coastlines.

But one of the problems with examining port cities or littoral societies is that doing so downplays the importance of shipping as the process of voyaging rather than in terms of transportation of commodities or people from point A to point B. Cape Town was a site within a shipping network that accommodated large numbers of people either on a permanent basis or a seasonally transient one. When one considers this major feature of Cape Town as an oceanic crossroads rather than concentrating on the urban history of its fixed population, the incorporation of the movement of people as settlers, slaves, sojourners, sailors and soldiers, convicts, and exiles comes to the fore.

Cape Town emerged within the Company period as a littoral society fundamentally engaged with the intersections of multiple imperial networks of trade, information, and migration across the Atlantic and Indian oceans. The Dutch imperial networks are of primary importance because the Company, by virtue of its territorial possession of the Cape and its harbors, was able to control access to these shipping networks as they intersected with the city. David Hancock's characterization of the Atlantic world has direct resonance for the Cape.

[T]o accentuate inter-imperial behaviour over intra-imperial behaviour would be to miscast reality. One really needs to present both. In its identification of a community more-or-less oceanic, the Atlantic history perspective, if it is to be anything more than boiled-over imperial history, must accentu-

ate cross-boundary exchanges. . . . At the same time, it extends our understanding of how real people constructed their commercial, social and cultural lives out of plural demands and influences, especially how marginal members of society wove together threads from local and international sources to create syncretically new social phenomena and cultural forms. . . .⁴⁴

Instead of examining the process of movement itself, Cape Town can be examined as a node in these networks of movement across the Atlantic and Indian oceans that bring into focus both rulers and ruled as engaged in different forms of migration. This perspective contrasts with that of Ross and Telkamp, who claim that "cities were superfluous to the purposes of colonists. . . . From the point of view of the colonists, the cities were . . . necessary evils, as they were parasites on the rural producers, competing with the colonists in the process of surplus extraction."⁴⁵ One cannot separate production from consumption in the case of Cape Town as a tavern of the seas.

Revitalizing the concept of refreshment station within oceanic networks shifts the focus of regional orientations away from the Atlantic and Indian Ocean divisions. The Cape could therefore be compared with a number of sites in the Southeast Atlantic and Southwest Indian Ocean. Boucher points out that by no means all European ships stopped at the Cape of Good Hope in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: "Cadiz, the Brazilian coast and the islands of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans sheltered many ships; St Helena in particular was used by British East Indiamen . . . Portugal, with an anchorage at Mozambique . . . made little use of Dutch facilities in Southern Africa."⁴⁶

Moreover, once the French had secured a base in the Mascarenes, particularly Madagascar and Mauritius, they no longer needed to stop at the Cape either. The implication of this regional perspective is that the Dutch Cape begins to share commonalities with settlements like Jamestown, St. Helena for the English; Port Louis in French Mauritius; and Cape Verde, Angola; and Mozambique for the Portuguese. But this still gives a somewhat static picture of this vibrant zone. During the early modern period the major European shipping powers were constantly trying to wrest control of these strategic ports from one another, or looking for alternative sites to rival those already established. Jamestown in St. Helena was colonized in turn by the Portuguese, British, Dutch, and reconquered by the British. Similarly Dutch, French, and British ambitions in Mauritius and Madagascar were originally aimed at establishing victualing stations, as well as engaging in the slave trade in the latter island.⁴⁷ The Dutch failed to maintain posts at

both Rio de la Goa and Mauritius partly because the consolidation of the Cape made these other posts superfluous in terms of allocating precious Company resources necessary to secure a self-sustaining settlement.⁴⁸ In the mid-1660s French aspirations to establish a refreshment post at Saldanha Bay up the west coast near the Cape were forestalled only by the Company sending a garrison of soldiers to occupy the territory.⁴⁹ “Ceremonies of possession” were by the mid-seventeenth century more formulaic among the European powers than they had been in the conquest of the New World.⁵⁰ Both the French and Dutch took pains on several occasions between 1664 and 1671 to knock down each other’s wooden marker posts claiming possession of Saldanha Bay, although the matter was eventually settled by the changing political fortunes in France, which caused them to literally abandon their stake.⁵¹ These seemingly trivial defacements of wooden markers were the subject of diplomatic incidents that could justify hostilities between European powers. Competing claims over the region of Natal were also perceived as a threat by the Company, although the area was not colonized until the nineteenth century under British rule. There were as many failures as successes in this coastal zone in terms of setting up viable refreshment and trading posts. Taken together, all these attempts make the refreshment post zone of the southeast Atlantic and southwest Indian Oceans fertile territory for reconceptualizing the history of early modern colonialism.

NOTES

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1. Robert Ross, *Cape of Torments: Slavery and Resistance in South Africa* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983). Ross points out that the Portuguese mariner Bartholomew Dias named the Cape “Cabo Tormentoso” (Cape of Torments or Cape of Storms) because of the storms he endured, but the name was later changed to Cabo de Bonne Esperanze (Cape of Good Hope) when it was realized that it opened up the sea route to the Indian Ocean. It is this latter name that prevailed for the region through Dutch, English, and South African rule (p. 1).

2. Portuguese mariners relied on Arabic sources for their knowledge of the region. Although Arabic seafarers did not make the Cape part of their shipping networks, they were aware of its geography.

3. Quoted in Jose Burman, *The Bay of Storms: The Story of the Development of Table Bay 1503–1806* (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1975), pp. 18–19.

4. Ibid., pp. 19–24.

5. Grant Evans, "Between the Global and the Local There Are Regions, Cultural Areas, and National States: A Review Article," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 33, no. 1 (February 2002): 147–162. Evans's review of O. W. Wolters, *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives*, rev. ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1999) is very suggestive in revising the Southeast Asian debates on what constitutes a coherent region of analysis. It is these debates on the nature of "Southeast Asia" that have made me rethink the Cape in a regional perspective.

6. The outer limits of the larger network of refreshment stations include the Canaries and the Cape Verde Islands, Ascension and the Azores, Trinidad, Cadiz, and Bahia, all of which were tied into the trans-Atlantic navigation that included potential stops at the Cape in a multi-stop journey. For a discussion of these navigation routes, see Maurice Boucher, *The Cape of Good Hope and Foreign Contacts 1735–1755* (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1985), p. 10.

7. Carl Peter Thunberg, quoted in Charles Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600–1800* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 273. Boxer's chapter on the Cape is entitled "The Tavern of Two Seas," pp. 273–301.

8. P. W. Laidler, *A Tavern of the Ocean* (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Ltd., 1926). J. F. Craig, *The Tavern of the Seas* (Cape Town: United Tobacco Companies, 1949). Lawrence Green, *Tavern of the Seas* (Cape Town: Timmins, 1947). For an institutional history that employs the same metaphor in its title, see H. O. Hofmeyer, *Rotary in the Tavern of the Seas* (Cape Town: Gavin and Sales, 1953). The most recent publication using this well-worn title is T. V. Bulpin, *Tavern of the Sea: The Story of Cape Town, Robben Island and the Cape Peninsula* (Cape Town: Fish Eagle, 1995). See also, Christopher Saunders, "Methodological Issues in South African Urban History," unpublished paper, p. 17.

9. Jose Burman has published over thirty books on the Cape; those dealing primarily with the sea include: *Safe to the Sea* (Kaapstad: Human and Rousseau, 1962), *Great Shipwrecks Off the Coast of Southern Africa* (Cape Town: Struik, 1967); *Strange Shipwrecks of the Southern Seas* (Cape Town: Struik, 1968); *Who Really Discovered South Africa* (Cape Town: Struik, 1969); *Waters of the Western Cape* (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1970); *The Bay of Storms: Table Bay, 1503–1860* (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1976); and with Stephen Levin, *The Saldanha Bay Story* (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1974) and *The False Bay Story* (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1977).

10. Math Verstegen, *De Indische Zeeherberg: De Stichting van Zuid-Afrika door de VOC* (Zaltbommel: Europese Bibliotheek, 2001). M. Barend-van Haaften and B. Paasman, *De Kaap Goede Hoop halverwege Indië. Bloemlezing van Kaapteken uit de Compagnietijd* (Hiversum: Verloren, 2003).

11. Christopher Saunders, "Cameos and Class: Cape Town's Past Uncovered," *Studies in the History of Cape Town*, 7 vols. (Cape Town: Cape Town History Project, Department of History, University of Cape Town, 1979–1994), 6:1–3.

12. Robert Ross, "Cape Town (1750–1850): Synthesis in the Dialectic of Continents," in Robert Ross and Gerard Telkamp, eds., *Colonial Cities: Essays on Urbanism in a Colonial Context* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 105–122.

13. Boucher, *Cape of Good Hope*. For earlier work on the Cape maritime realm, see, for example, Johannes Grobbelaar, *Die retoervloot aan die Cabo* (Kaapstad: Nasionale Pers, 1950); C. de Villiers, "Die Britse vloot aan die Kaap 1795–1803" (Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 1967). Lance van Sittert, writing on the development of Cape fisheries from the late nineteenth century, is one of the few historians writing in English to integrate

the maritime realm into this new social history. Lance van Sittert, "The Handmaiden of Industry: Marine Science and Fisheries Development in South Africa 1895–1939," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 26, no. 4 (1995): 531–558; "South Africa's Sea-going Proletariat: The Trawler and Line Fishermen's Union, 1939–1955," *International Journal of Maritime History* 1 no. 2 (December 1994): 1–44; "Labour, Capital and the State in the St. Helena Bay Fisheries c. 1856–1956" (PhD diss., University of Cape Town, 1992).

14. Nigel Worden, Elizabeth van Heyningen, and Vivian Bickford-Smith, *Cape Town: The Making of a City: An Illustrated Social History* (Claremont, South Africa: David Philip; Hilversum: Verloren, 1998). Vivian Bickford-Smith, Elizabeth van Heyningen, and Nigel Worden, *Cape Town in the Twentieth Century: An Illustrated Social History* (Claremont, South Africa: David Philip, 1999).

15. Ross, *Cape of Torments*. Nigel Worden, *Slavery in Dutch South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee, eds., *The Shaping of South African Society*, 2nd ed. (Cape Town: Maskew, Miller, Longman, 1989). Robert Shell, *Children of Bondage* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England for Wesleyan University Press; Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994).

16. Nigel Worden, *The Chains that Bind Us* (Kenwyn: Juta, 1996).

17. See, for example, Harriet Deacon, ed., *The Island: A History of Robben Island 1488–1990* (Belville: Mayibuye Books; Claremont, South Africa: David Philip, 1996). Lalou Meltzer, *The Castle* (Cape Town: William Fehr Collection, 2001).

18. Nigel Worden, "Cape Town and Port Louis in the Eighteenth Century," in Gwyn Campbell, ed., *The Indian Ocean Rim: Southern Africa and Regional Co-operation* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 42–53.

19. Susan Newton-King, "Company Castle and Control: The Social, Moral and Emotional World of Servants and Slaves of the Dutch East India Company in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Cape Town," National Research Foundation, South Africa, 2002. Gerald Groenewald, "The Culture and Economy of Taverns, Inns and Lodging Houses in Dutch Cape Town 1652–1795" (PhD diss., University of Cape Town, forthcoming). See also Groenewald's earlier work on the evolution of Afrikaans that also refers to taverns as sites of linguistic exchange. Gerald Groenewald, "Slawe, Khoekhoens en Nederlandse Pidgins aan die Kaap, ca. 1590–1720: 'n Kritiese Ondersoek na die Sociohistories Grondslae van die Konvergensieteorie oor die Onstaan van Afrikaans" (Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2002), p.184.

20. See, for example, J. R. Bruijn and E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, *Muiterij: Oproer en berechting op schepen van de VOC* (Haarlem: De Boer Maritiem, 1980). Herman Ketting Jr., *Leven, werk en rebellie aan boord van Oost-Indiëvaarders 1595–1650* (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2000). Caroline Hanken, *Sebalds reizen: Het verlangen van de zeeman in de zeventiende eeuw* (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 2001).

21. Frank Broeze, ed., *Brides of the Sea: Port Cities of Asia from the 16th to the 20th Centuries* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1989). J. Kathirithamby-Wells and John Villiers, eds., *Southeast Asian Port and Polity—Rise and Demise* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990).

22. Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680*, vol. 2, *Expansion and Crisis* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993); see esp. chap. 2, "The City and Its Commerce," pp. 62–131.

23. Reid, *Expansion and Crisis*, p. 85.

24. J. Kathirithamby-Wells, "Introduction: An Overview," in Kathirithamby-Wells and Villiers, *Southeast Asian Port and Polity*, p. 1.

25. Ibid., p. 2.

26. Nicholas Tarling, ed., *Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

27. Frank Broeze, ed., *Brides of the Sea*, revised as Broeze, ed., *Gateways of Asia: Port Cities of Asia in the 13th to the 20th Centuries* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1997).

28. Frank Broeze, "Brides of the Sea Revisited," in Broeze, *Gateways of Asia*, p. 8. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

29. For macroanalyses of the Indian Ocean system, see Janet Abu-Lughod, "The Indian Ocean System: Divided into Three Parts," in *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 251–352. K. N. Chaudhuri, "The Setting: Unities of Discourse" and "Comparative Civilizations of Asia: Structural Integration and Differentiation," in *Asia Before Europe: Economy and Civilization of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 19–70.

30. Broeze, "Brides of the Sea Revisited," pp. 10–11.

31. These Cape coastal communities were known by the Dutch as *Strandlopers* (beachcombers); they were fisher-scavenger peoples who were defined by their absence of cattle. Richard Elphick, *Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa* (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1985), p. 24.

32. Boucher, "The Cape and Foreign Shipping, 1714–1723," *South African Historical Journal* 6 (November 1974): 5–6.

33. Worden, "Cape Town and Port Louis," pp. 44–45.

34. Worden et al., *Cape Town*, pp. 52–53. The main source for Company shipping is J. R. Bruijn, F. S. Gaastra, and I. Schoffer, *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th Centuries*, 3 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979).

35. Participants at the conference "Cultural Exchange and Transformation in the Indian Ocean World," organized at UCLA by Edward Alpers and Allen Roberts in April 2002, concluded that scholars might be better off talking about Indian Ocean Worlds in the plural rather than the singular. Arasaratnam's overview of Indian Ocean historiography doesn't mention urban history as one of the major themes in the field. S. Arasaratnam, "Recent Trends in the Historiography of the Indian Ocean, 1500–1800," *Journal of World History* 1 (1990): 225–248.

36. For one of the earliest analyses of the Cape slave trade, see James Armstrong and Nigel Worden, "The Slaves, 1652–1834," in Elphick and Giliomee, eds., *Shaping of South African Society*, pp. 109–183.

37. John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1800*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

38. Burman and Levin, *Saldanha Bay Story*, p. 14.

39. Franklin Knight and Peggy Liss, eds., *Atlantic Port Cities: Economy, Culture and Society in the Atlantic World, 1650–1850* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991).

40. Indigenous Africans, Americans, and Caribbean islanders obviously engaged in extensive riverine and localized sea travel and commerce, but they did not navigate trans-oceanic voyages.

41. Both Abu-Lughod and Chaudhuri leave the southwest Indian Ocean out of their

units of analysis. See Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony*; Chaudhuri, *Asia before Europe*. Richard Hall's popular history *Empires of the Monsoon: A History of the Indian Ocean and Its Invaders* (London: Harper Collins, 1996) does make an attempt to traverse the length and breadth of the ocean.

42. Eric Tagliocozzo, "Trade, Production and Incorporation: The Indian Ocean in Flux, 1600–1900," *Itinerario* 1 (2002).

43. Michael Pearson, "Littoral Society: The Case for the Coast," *The Great Circle* 7 (1985): 1–8.

44. David Hancock, "The British Atlantic World: Co-ordination, Complexity, and the Emergence of an Atlantic Market Economy, 1651–1815," *Itinerario* 2 (1999): 10. Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker's conceptualization of the emergence of a multiethnic trans-Atlantic working class is also evocative of the Cape. "The circular transmission of human experience from Europe to Africa to the Americas and back again corresponded to the same cosmic forces that set the Atlantic currents in motion, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the merchants, manufacturers, planters, and royal officials of northwestern Europe followed these currents, building trade routes, colonies, and a new transatlantic economy. They organized workers from Europe, Africa, and the Americas to produce and transport bullion, furs, fish, tobacco, sugar, and manufactures"; Linebaugh and Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), p. 2.

45. Robert Ross and Gerard Telkamp, "Introduction," in Ross and Telkamp, *Colonial Cities*, p. 1.

46. Boucher, "Cape and Foreign Shipping," p. 5.

47. Vijayalakshmi Teelock, *Mauritian History: From its Beginnings to Modern Times* (Moka, Mauritius: Mahatma Gandhi Institute, 2001).

48. P. J. Moree, *A Concise History of Dutch Mauritius 1598–1710* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1998).

49. Sidney Welch, *Portuguese and Dutch in South Africa 1641–1806* (Cape Town: Juta, 1951), pp. 216–217.

50. Patricia Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492–1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

51. Burman and Levin, *Saldanha Bay Story*, pp. 28–34.

That Turbulent Soil Seafarers, the “Black Atlantic,” and Afro-Caribbean Identity

Alan Gregor Cogley

By these shores I was born. Sound of the sea came
in at my window, life heaved and breathed in me then
with the strength of that turbulent soil.

—Edward Kamau Brathwaite, *The Arrivants*

SEASCAPES AND CARIBBEAN IDENTITY

For much of their history, from the dawn of human settlement to recent times, the islands of the West Indian archipelago have been peopled by the product of seaborne diasporas. Beginning with the Amerindians over 5,000 years ago, the ebb and flow of human conflict and expansion has contributed to successive waves of inward and outward migration affecting the Caribbean basin, each of which has left an imprint on the land and on the societies that emerged there. The sea has been a source of livelihood and of food, a route for commerce and communication, a bringer of danger and opportunity to Caribbean people. Politically, the Caribbean sea has both united and divided the people of the region, by turns tantalizing with the sense of shared space and frustrating with the reality of physical separation. Little wonder then that “that turbulent soil” is central to Caribbean culture, consciousness, and identity, or that the sound of the sea echoes through the work of Caribbean writers from Jean Rhys to Kamau Brathwaite, Derek Walcott, and Benito Rojas.

The sea occupies a particularly important place in Afro-Caribbean identity. The ocean crossing to the Americas in the stinking holds of European slave ships severed connections with the African homeland and ruptured traditional networks of family and kinship. The sea thus became a barrier enforcing separation and symbolizing loss. However, in the shared trauma of the Middle Passage, seeds of new relationships were sown. Thus

the term “shipmate” became a familiar mode of address among enslaved Africans on the plantations in the Caribbean; for some the “shipmate” bond even became a way of replacing kinfolk networks left behind in Africa.¹ At the same time, for Afro-Caribbean people, the way home—spiritually and symbolically, as well as physically—would always lie eastward across the Atlantic Ocean. So the sea also came to symbolize freedom and the hope of return to the Motherland.²

This chapter is concerned with one aspect of the multifaceted relationship between Afro-Caribbean people and the sea: the relationship between seafaring and Afro-Caribbean identity from the pre-Emancipation era to the first half of the twentieth century. Seafarers have been critical historical actors in world history for several reasons. First, it was seafarers—and not the mill workers of early industrial England or other land-bound groups—who were the principal pioneers of modern industrial wage labor.³ Second, as Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh have shown, seafarers were also the main pioneers of a multiethnic, international working-class consciousness. They led many of the earliest organized labor struggles on both sides of the ocean in ports all along the Atlantic seaboard.⁴ Third, black, and especially Afro-Caribbean, seafarers were harbingers and key transmitters of a new, radicalized, black political consciousness—which included pan-Africanist ideas—throughout the Atlantic World in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus the history of Afro-Caribbean seafarers is of particular importance in understanding the rise of what has been termed the “Black Atlantic.”⁵ In tracing their history, this article will seek to sketch their role in shaping the modern Atlantic World.

SEAFARING AND SLAVERY IN CARIBBEAN SOCIETIES

The aggressive mercantilism of the northwestern European powers during the seventeenth and eighteenth century was accompanied by a huge growth in international merchant shipping. The Atlantic became a bustling crossroads of international trade, with a volume and intensity unknown in prior human history.⁶ The great trading nations of Britain and France also acquired substantial fleets of warships to protect their rapidly expanding trading and colonial interests overseas. The Caribbean was a focal point of much of this maritime activity as innumerable ships arrived carrying cargoes of slaves and departed carrying cargoes of sugar, cotton, tobacco, and other commodities. The close proximity of colonies belonging to rival powers in the region, as well as the frequent depredations of pirates, ensured that it was a major center of naval activity too. This had significant demographic effects

on strategic ports, such as Bridgetown in Barbados and Kingston in Jamaica, as well as on free ports open to ships of all nations, such as St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands, the populations of which were often swollen by hundreds, sometimes thousands, of "maritime transients." In addition to seafarers, they included traders, mercenaries, and adventurers of every type.⁷

The growth in military and merchant shipping made heavy demands on the international labor supply, especially in the second half of the eighteenth century (the period of the Seven Years' War, the American Revolutionary War, and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars).⁸ Low pay, bad food, heavy work, harsh discipline, as well as the dangers from accident, war, disease, and storms ensured that seafaring was rarely seen as an attractive profession, and with experienced seafaring labor in short supply, the press-gang was used frequently during this period to round out the crews of British navy ships.⁹ Seafaring labor was particularly difficult to obtain where a long voyage was anticipated because mortality rates among crewmembers tended to climb the longer a ship was out of port. In the West Indies and on the West African coast, where fevers that afflicted Europeans abounded, crews were frequently decimated.¹⁰

Captains struggling to handle undermanned ships turned to whatever alternative supplies of labor they could find: in the Caribbean much of this labor was black and enslaved. Slaves were taken aboard to assist in loading and unloading cargo as ships moved from island to island, or otherwise to take the place of crew who had died or deserted. Slave owners in the Caribbean in search of business opportunities quickly learned that experienced "Sailor Negroes" could be hired out to passing ships for a handsome profit.¹¹ Many young slaves began a career at sea when they were taken aboard ships to act as personal servants to ship's officers. Olaudah Equiano was sold as a young boy to the captain of a British merchant ship in Virginia: he acted as the captain's steward and accompanied him when he was called up to serve in the Royal Navy during the Seven Years' War. During battles at sea he acted as a powder monkey. Later he was sold to a merchant in Montserrat, who employed him as a cargo-handler and lighterman. As an experienced "Sailor Negro" during the 1760s, Equiano sailed to ports throughout the Caribbean and along the southeastern seaboard of colonial America, even acting as captain on his master's schooner on a couple of occasions.¹²

An analysis by Barry Gaspar of a list of vessels and crews belonging to Antigua in 1720 found that black seamen "were concentrated on small, open craft with an average carrying capacity of 2.14 tons, powered largely by oars and used mainly for coastal traffic and trips to nearby islands."¹³ Anecdotal evidence suggests that a similar pattern existed in many other islands of the

Caribbean during the eighteenth century. Census figures for Bridgetown, Barbados, in 1817, indicate that 469 out of an enslaved population of 9,297 were engaged in occupations related to the “manning, servicing and maintenance of vessels.”¹⁴

If slaves were an important labor resource for merchant shipping in the Caribbean during the eighteenth century, they were no less valuable to augment the crews of naval vessels. In 1794, during the revolutionary wars with the French, the British government reimposed the requirement (first included in the Navigation Acts in 1664) that the officers and three-quarters of the crew of all British ships engaged in foreign trade should be British subjects, and that all seamen involved in the home trade should be British. However, the importance of enslaved black seafarers as an additional source of naval manpower is indicated by the fact that the Act stated that a person could be defined as British by “birth, naturalisation, denization, conquest or service.” This definition clearly included blacks resident in Britain’s West Indian colonies, as well as a number of African-Americans who had served with the British navy since the American Revolutionary war. The use of slave labor was made explicit in clause eight of the Act, which stated “that in the navigation of the seas of the Americas and the West Indies, from any port of America and the West Indies to any port of America and the West Indies, any Negroes belonging to any person or persons being or having become His Majesty’s subjects . . . may be employed as British Sailors, Seamen or Mariners, in manner heretofore practiced.”¹⁵

FREE BLACK SEAFARERS IN THE ERA OF SLAVERY

In societies where enslavement was the norm for people of African descent, free blacks were an anomaly. Nevertheless, there were a small, but growing number of free people of color in the Caribbean by the end of the eighteenth century. Many of these were able to make lives for themselves at sea, beyond the stultifying boundaries of plantation-dominated, slave-holding societies. The capacity to shape one’s own destiny by earning a wage was obviously of critical importance in a context in which economic opportunities for black people were few and far between. In addition, some black seafarers found that the hardships and dangers they shared with white colleagues at sea helped to promote an atmosphere of nonracial egalitarianism and mutual respect unknown ashore. According to Marcus Rediker, aboard pirate ships this atmosphere of comradeship among shipmates could become formalized into an “alternative social order.”¹⁶

It should not be forgotten, however, that a free black seafarer in the era of slavery was always in danger. It was not unknown for a black seaman to sign on to a ship only to find at the end of the voyage that its unscrupulous captain had pocketed his pay and sold him into slavery. In the mid-eighteenth century Admiral Frankland of the British Royal Navy considered the use of “the woolly race” aboard ship a personal affront and sold into slavery any “free negroes” he found among the crews of captured French ships.¹⁷ Fortunately, experienced seafaring labor was generally considered too valuable to waste in this manner. Probably a greater danger was presented by the press-gang, which swept up seafarers of every hue and nationality, notwithstanding the restrictions laid down in the Navigation Acts.¹⁸ Equiano relates how as a free black seaman, he barely escaped the press-gang while on a voyage to England, and the Jamaican-born black radical Thomas Wedderburn was press-ganged twice during his time as a seafarer in the late eighteenth century.¹⁹

Moreover, if seafaring provided blacks with opportunities for economic and social freedom, it was freedom of a strictly limited sort. The traditional romantic image of the seafarer as a restless adventurer, divorced from the land and the concerns of land-based society, has sometimes disguised the fact that it was above all the impulse of capital accumulation that lay behind the rapid expansion of merchant and navy shipping in the eighteenth century. Shipowners hired captains who could maximize their profits and were attracted especially to those with a reputation for driving a ship and its crew hard. Concern for the welfare of the crew hardly figured in their calculations. As Rediker has pointed out, it was no accident that members of a crew were referred to from the late seventeenth century onwards simply as “Hands.”²⁰ There was probably little to choose between the daily experience of free and unfree labor at sea in these years.²¹ Furthermore, precious few seafarers could hope to climb in the shipboard hierarchy from fo’castle to quarterdeck or to save enough from their meager wages to buy themselves a more comfortable and prosperous life ashore. The career trajectory of Henry Sinclair, a “man of colour” born in Kingston, Jamaica, in April 1770, was not untypical, except perhaps for its longevity. He first went to sea as an “apprentice” in 1776, at the age of six; according to his “Seaman’s Ticket” he was still working as a seaman at the age of seventy-five almost seventy years later, in the lowly position of ship’s cook.²² A seafarer’s life at sea was often one of brutal, grinding, and poorly paid drudgery; when ashore, he frequently faced suspicion and harassment, with a cot in the local doss house his only refuge as his accumulated “stake” dwindled away in the gap between his last voyage and the next.

The Emancipation Proclamation throughout the British Empire in 1834, although hedged round with qualifications to protect plantation owners from labor shortage, at last opened the possibility of a legitimate escape from plantation labor for many former slaves. While the islands remained largely monocrop economies and became increasingly prone to cyclical bouts of economic depression, the sea offered blacks one of the few viable alternatives for paid employment.

A growing number of Afro-Caribbean men looking for work at sea coincided with the introduction of steamshipping from the 1840s and a resulting increase in the demand for unskilled seaborne labor. Steamships required few sailors of the traditional type, schooled in the intricacies of rigging and sail, but they needed many more new types of seafarers, such as firemen and stokers to feed the furnaces and trimmers to bring coal from the bunkers, as well as many more cooks and stewards to serve both more passengers and larger crews.²³ Crew lists and census returns during the latter half of the nineteenth century indicate that the rise of steam was accompanied by a rise in the proportion of non-British seafarers, including West Indians, serving in British ships. This trend was facilitated by the final abolition of the Navigation Acts and especially the repeal of provisions restricting the number of foreigners serving on British ships in 1851. As a Board of Trade Committee on the Manning of British Merchant Ships commented in 1896: "Since the repeal of the navigation laws . . . the whole world has been open as a recruiting ground to British shipowners, who have not been hampered in their selection by any restriction as to colour, language, qualification, age, or strength. Consequently the British-born seaman has had to face competition with foreigners of all nationalities, not excepting negroes and lascars . . ." ²⁴ Shipowners justified the switch away from British seafarers on more than cost grounds. A shipmaster for the company of Anderson and Anderson wrote in 1886: "I cannot say there is less desertion nor less insobriety in the British Seamen, nor are they more provident than formerly, while the West Indians and the Scandinavians are respectful, sober, and as a rule, much better clothed."²⁵ By the 1890s more than one in five of the seafarers aboard British ships had not been born in Britain. They included a large number of lascars, a variety of Europeans, Somalis, Arabs, West Africans, Chinese, and North and South Americans, as well as West Indians.

Although black seafarers gradually infiltrated every position aboard merchant ships from cabin boy to captain during the nineteenth century, on sailing ships they were most often employed as cabin boys, servants, stew-

ards, and cooks, the jobs that were generally considered the lowest in the pecking order. The job of ship's cook, for example, was an unenviable one, given both the meager amount and generally poor quality of the food served at sea. Inevitably the cook bore the brunt of the crew's anger when he failed to work the requisite miracle that would turn weevil-infested rations into edible meals. Black seafarers who filled these positions in disproportionate numbers often suffered brutal treatment and other forms of victimization from the officers and other crew members.²⁶ It is perhaps indicative of the struggle they faced that several noted black boxing champions in Britain during the nineteenth century had first learned to defend themselves aboard ship.²⁷ Meanwhile, on steamships, black seafarers were also found in disproportionate numbers in the inhospitable surroundings of the stokehold as firemen and trimmers, largely because of a racist belief on the part of shipowners that blacks worked better in the stifling heat than whites. Data from the United Kingdom census in 1901 reveals the general pattern of these years. Over a third of the West Indian seafarers found aboard British ships by that date were deck hands (596), but almost another third (463) were stewards and cooks (including 4 women). Most of the remainder (271) were to be found in the engine room department as firemen and trimmers.

The traditional practice of ships engaged in trade between the Caribbean islands and along the American coast taking aboard additional crew to assist in handling cargo continued into the twentieth century. Generally these workers did not appear on ships' articles at all and were not counted in official statistics. In 1896 the Committee on the Manning of British Ships heard evidence that steam lines operating between North and South America via the Caribbean routinely took on extra men en route who were not added to ship's articles: "We pass, two and a half days after leaving New York, the Bahama islands, and we have established there a small colony of coloured men, and about a dozen of these men join each ship, and they go round until she comes past that island, on the return, and they are landed again. These men assist the crew in loading and discharging cargo, and also assist the trimmers in trimming the coal ready for use, and although they do not appear in the ship's articles they are practically additional men to assist in the several duties of the ship. After two or three years experience they are found to be very useful men on board ship at all points."²⁸ Often the best opportunities for Afro-Caribbean and other black seamen were not on the large passenger and cargo liners of the major companies, but on tramp ships, whether sail or steam. Sixty percent of British merchant tonnage was made up of tramp ships by 1914. Tramps did not follow regularly scheduled routes but moved from port to port in search of cargoes, discharging and picking

up men as they went. Many men serving on such ships came from the Red Sea ports of Aden and Yemen, from the Somali coast and Zanzibar, as well as from the many ports of call in the Caribbean. Tramp shipping provided black seafarers with a degree of freedom and of opportunity that was seldom found on ships of the great steamship lines. The story of the sailing vessel *Pedro Gorino* provides an outstanding example of this. Owned and skippered by the African-American adventurer Harry Foster Dean, the *Pedro Gorino* operated out of Cape Town at the turn of the century, taking advantage of trade opportunities available along the South African coast during and immediately after the South African War. Several West Indians were members of his all-black crew, including the first and second mates.²⁹

The seafarers who served in tramp ships were the flotsam and jetsam of the Atlantic trade, usually poorly paid, eking out their lives ashore between voyages in hostels or in one of the hundreds of nameless boarding houses that were to be found in every port on the Atlantic seaboard. They were joined by men who had dropped out of the ethnic labor pools of the great steamship companies for one reason or another. Afro-Caribbean seafarers were a unique subset of this larger group. For them, dispersal along the international trade routes and across the oceans of the world was simply their most recent experience of diaspora. They were socially, culturally, and ideologically prepared for it in ways that other groups were not. Thus, wherever they went, they quickly established homes away from home. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Afro-Caribbean seafarers intermarried with local women and fathered children in virtually every major port from Newfoundland to Valparaíso in the Americas, and from Liverpool, Cardiff, and London in the British Isles to Cape Town on the southern tip of Africa. They were joined in these communities by other black seafarers: Arabs from Aden and Somalis from northeast Africa, Nigerians and Kroomen from West Africa, African-Americans, and even South Sea islanders. Thus the seeds were sown of new socially and culturally distinctive black communities all around the fringes of the Atlantic.³⁰

THE BLACK ATLANTIC: SEAFARERS, POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS, AND AFRO-CARIBBEAN IDENTITY

Seafarers were in the vanguard of the formation of the international working class. The result was that the task of pioneering methods of cooperation, association, and collective struggle against capitalist exploitation fell largely to them. In this regard seafaring labor had significant advantages; bonds born of close cooperation and community aboard ship could provide

patterns for collective resistance ashore. In all this, black, especially Afro-Caribbean, seafarers took a full part, bringing with them the full repertoire of slave resistance to add to the arsenal of modern wage labor. Throughout the eighteenth century members of this “multiracial, multiethnic, international working class” led episodes of popular struggle in ports all around the Atlantic world. Crispus Attucks, a runaway slave and seaman of twenty years standing who had lived in the Bahamas, is an outstanding example; he died at the head of “a motley rabble” protesting against the Stamp Act in Boston Harbor in 1770 and thus became one of the first martyrs of the American Revolution.³¹

Not surprisingly, governments and shore-based elites on both sides of the Atlantic during the eighteenth century became concerned about the “contagion” carried by seafarers—a contagion of ideas and strategies to promote resistance that might easily spread to workers ashore. This contagion might prove particularly virulent when the seafarers were black. In London, where a small free black population had become permanently settled, including a number who had been seamen, the authorities resorted in 1787 to what would become the time-honored policy of offering such “undesirables” “repatriation”—in this case, to the new colony of Sierra Leone in West Africa.³² Despite these efforts to expel them from the body politic, blacks continued to play a prominent part in the radical working-class movement in England in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Apart from Equiano, who wrote and campaigned against the iniquities of slavery, the Jamaican Robert Wedderburn was a noted radical pamphleteer, while another Jamaican, William Davidson, was executed for his part in the Cato Street Conspiracy in 1819. All three had been seafarers. Of the three, it was probably Wedderburn, with his “rough, salty language” and “truculent libertarianism,” who most clearly exemplified the culture of the seafarer in his life ashore.³³

In the slave-based societies of the Caribbean and the southern states of America, the authorities had particular cause to be concerned about radical black influences; the eighteenth century had seen numerous slave revolts, culminating in the Haitian revolution in the 1790s. Slave owners complained constantly that seamen and runaway slaves were circulating subversive ideas from neighboring islands and colonies. In 1822 Denmark Vesey, the former slave of a sea captain from St. Thomas in the Danish West Indies, was tried and executed for his alleged part in planning a slave rebellion in South Carolina, after the prosecution claimed he had sought to stir up the local slave community with stories of the Haitian revolution.³⁴ In the ensuing panic a “Negro Seaman’s Act” was passed which required “that free Negro

employees on any vessel which might come into a South Carolina port be imprisoned until the vessel should be ready to depart." If the captain of the vessel declined to pay the expenses for the detention or refused to take the seaman away, the seaman could be deemed an "absolute slave" and sold. Similar laws followed in North Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, and Florida. They persisted until swept away finally by the American Civil War.³⁵

Throughout the Caribbean, the ending of slavery was followed by the slow, painful emergence of a black peasantry, struggling to break free from the dead hand of the old plantation economy. At the same time a burgeoning informal economic sector, which had begun as a mitigating feature of slave societies, became increasingly important during the post-Emancipation era in the creation of new economic, social, ideological, and political spaces in these societies. Deep-water seafaring and associated activities such as fishing, whaling, piloting, shipbuilding, and repairing, ferrying cargo and passengers in small boats, loading and unloading on the wharves—not to mention illegal activities such as smuggling, wrecking, and even small-scale piracy—were all part of this sector. So also were services provided for seafarers in port by black women, such as boarding houses, rum shops, and prostitution. Together they helped to shape the language, culture, and idiom of freedom in the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Caribbean. Similarly, in many territories across the Caribbean the earliest Afro-Caribbean political associations in the twentieth century were formed by seamen, lightermen, and wharf workers. They included the Trinidad Workingmen's Association, the Barbados Working Men's Association, and the British Guiana Labour Union. These were the prototypes for the first popular political parties in the Caribbean, which would lead the fight for political independence in the region in the mid-twentieth century.

Afro-Caribbean seamen were also key transmitters of radical political ideas and movements to other parts of the Black Atlantic world in these years. The Garveyite newspaper, *Negro World* (founded by the Jamaican Marcus Garvey), and the Communist organ, *Negro Worker* (edited by the Trinidadian George Padmore), both relied on a network of black seafarers for their international distribution during the 1920s and early 1930s. Wherever in the Atlantic world Afro-Caribbean seafarers settled, they posed a challenge to their host societies in social, cultural, and political spheres. In South Africa, members of the Afro-Caribbean community played a seminal role in the formation in 1919 of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union, the first mass black trade union in South Africa's history, and later helped to radicalize the local African National Congress branch in Cape Town. A few years later, in 1937, one of the founders of the radical National

Maritime Union in the United States (an affiliate of the CIO), and its first vice-president and secretary, was a Jamaican seaman named Ferdinand C. Smith. He was later declared an “undesirable alien” and deported under the terms of the McCarren-Walter Act.³⁶

Unfortunately, working-class solidarity was always vulnerable to attack from both employers and the state along ethnic lines. In Britain, for example, West Indian seamen had fought alongside whites for trade union recognition and higher wages in ports such as Cardiff, Liverpool, and London in the early twentieth century. During the First World War hundreds died serving on British merchant ships as they helped to maintain Britain’s maritime lifeline. But in the postwar scramble for jobs their white comrades quickly forgot any notion that British and West Indian seafarers might join in common cause. During 1919 West Indian and African seafarers were subjected to verbal and physical attack by white seamen on the streets of several port cities. In this racist climate the British trade union movement proposed the institution of a “British-first” hiring policy, which also specified that preference should always be given to the hiring of white over black Britons. Eventually, under the terms of the Alien (Coloured Seamen) Order of 1925, West Indian and African seafarers were required to register with the authorities as aliens unless they could provide satisfactory documentary proof of British nationality. Many West Indians had such documentation, but were nevertheless forced to register as aliens; those “coloured aliens” who did not have guaranteed employment aboard ship were liable for immediate deportation. This racist onslaught drastically reduced the number of Afro-Caribbean seafarers in the British mercantile marine. Thousands were left destitute in expatriate black communities, or back home in the Caribbean, where they were a seedbed (along with demobilized black troops) for emerging anticolonial labor movements. It was only with the onset of the Second World War that the demand for Afro-Caribbean labor on British ships began to revive.³⁷

CONCLUSION

The reasons for the often pivotal role played by Afro-Caribbean seafarers in shaping political consciousness in black communities throughout the Atlantic World—as well as at home in the Caribbean—are complex. It is possible only to list a few in these concluding paragraphs. First, the Caribbean contains a collection of societies peopled exclusively by seaborne diasporas, in which a large proportion of the population live within sight and sound of the sea. Innumerable representations of the sea in Caribbean literature, music,

and other forms of cultural expression attest to the significance of the sea in Caribbean identity and consciousness. At the same time the intersection of imperial histories in the waters of the Caribbean over the past 500 years has made the region a critically important zone or “node” of interaction in recent human history. This interaction is expressed through the continuing, multiple, inter- and extra-regional migrations of Caribbean people, and through two intimately linked and continuous processes: the melding and remaking of Caribbean cultures and the mixing of ethnicities. Caribbean experience has shown that these processes, sometimes called “hybridization” or “creolization,” need not be destructive of preexisting identities, but creative, leading to new forms of social, cultural, and political consciousness.

There is no doubt, too, that the long struggle against slavery played a central role in the shaping of Afro-Caribbean identity. As Paul Gilroy, Orlando Patterson, and others have argued, this struggle informed the burgeoning intellectual discourse on the nature of freedom in the Western world, a discourse in which black (including West Indian) intellectuals played a prominent part. At a more practical level, the experience of generations of resistance to slavery provided a repertoire of resistance and struggle upon which the international, multiethnic working class could draw.

In the course of discussion at the “Seascapes” conference at which this essay was first presented, much was made of the notion of “cognitive maps” on which peoples and societies based their actions. Enough evidence has already been adduced to suggest that unique conditions pertained in the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Caribbean that helped shape these cognitive maps in Afro-Caribbean seafarers. In addition to those factors already mentioned, the prevalence of what Rex Nettleford has called small, “people-sized” communities in the Caribbean, where everyday life is negotiated through a series of deeply imbedded local networks, is key; central to these negotiations are family and kinship ties, the free peasant village, the fraternities, the churches, and the schools.

The erosion of the economic purpose of empire in the Caribbean in the century following emancipation of the slaves in the mid-nineteenth century and the decline in profitability of cane sugar scattered Afro-Caribbean people to the winds in the wider Atlantic world as labor-migrants. Yet it was the late imperial project to engineer profitable post-imperial relationships in the Caribbean through education, social welfare, and political reform that helped equip these labor migrants with the skills they would need — literacy, numeracy, and civic skills of various kinds — to flourish in a wider context. Afro-Caribbean seafarers had the skills to stand up for their rights wherever they might find themselves in the modern world.

Most important, however, was the attitude or world view they carried with them. Afro-Caribbean seafarers tended to combine the internationalist, cosmopolitan perspective of the independent labor migrant with a strongly localized feeling of rootedness in, and identification with, the Caribbean islands. Culturally and ideologically, the hallmarks of Afro-Caribbean people abroad were self-confidence, adaptability, openness, and a “malleability of identity”—a capacity to shift like sand on a beach to suit whatever circumstances they faced. However, they never lost the sense of the “local”—that connection to the place “where their navel string was buried.”³⁸ Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that so many Afro-Caribbean labor migrants sent remittances to families left at home in the Caribbean despite absences stretching into years, or dreamed of return to the islands at some future date. In short Afro-Caribbean seafarers could be—and often were—members of several different communities simultaneously, but never lost their overriding sense of “Caribbean-ness.”

St. Lucian Nobel Laureate Derek Walcott alludes to a consciousness of this sort in his epic poem *Omeros*, as he ranges back and forward across the Atlantic Ocean to evoke and encapsulate the elements of Caribbean identity. “Caribbean-ness,” Walcott suggests, is a function of the diasporic condition—and especially of the experience of seaborne diasporas common to all Caribbean people. In the final analysis, then, culture, society, and identity in the Caribbean islands—and in Caribbean people wherever they may be found—cannot be understood without reference to the sea:

*... let the deep hymn
of the Caribbean continue my epilogue;
may waves remove their shawls as my mourners walk home
to their rusted villages, good shoes in one hand,*

*Passing a boy who walked through the ignorant foam,
and saw a sail going out or else coming in,
and watched asterisks of rain puckering the sand.*

—Derek Walcott, *Omeros*, chap. 64:1

NOTES

1. Michael Craton, *Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), p. 49. St. Lucian poet Derek Walcott's dedication *Omeros*, his Nobel-Prize-winning epic poem on the Caribbean, reads, in part, “For My Shipmates In This Craft.”

2. The sea provided much more than a mere dream of freedom. The terrain of many of the smaller islands of the Caribbean meant that the only realistic prospect of a permanent escape from slavery in these territories was flight overseas. Neville A. T. Hall, "Maritime Maroons: *Grand Marronage* from the Danish West Indies," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 42, no. 4 (October 1985): 476–468; Hilary Beckles, "From Land to Sea: Runaway Barbados Slaves and Servants, 1630–1700," *Slavery and Abolition*, 3rd ser., 6, no. 3 (December 1985): 79–94.

3. N. A. M. Rodger, *The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy* (London: Fontana, 1988) p. 29; Marcus Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 288–290.

4. Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, "The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves and the Atlantic Working Class in the Eighteenth Century," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 3, no. 2 (September 1990): 225–252; Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: The Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (London: Verso, 2000).

5. Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (London: Verso, 1993).

6. Ronald Hope, *A New History of British Shipping* (London: John Murray, 1990), p. 296; Ralph Davis, *The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1962).

7. Julian S. Scott, "Crisscrossing Empires: Ships, Sailors and Resistance in the Lesser Antilles in the Eighteenth Century" (paper presented at the conference on "The Lesser Antilles in the Age of European Expansion," Hamilton College, October 9–11, 1992), pp. 3–7; Pedro Welch, *Slave Society in the City: Bridgetown, Barbados 1680–1834* (Kingston, Jamaica and Oxford: Ian Randle Publishers and James Currey Publishers, 2003), chaps. 3 and 4.

8. Christopher Lloyd, *The British Seaman 1200–1860: A Social Survey* (London: Collins, 1968); Hope, *British Shipping*, p. 248. According to one estimate for England and Wales alone, by 1800 almost 300,000 men were seafarers of all types out of a total population of approximately 12 million.

9. Peter Kemp, *The British Sailor: A Social History of the Lower Deck* (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1970), p. 162.

10. Rediker, *Devil and the Deep Blue Sea*, p. 47.

11. Scott, "Crisscrossing Empires," p. 10; M. Cohn and M. K. H. Platzter, *Black Men of the Sea* (New York, 1978), pp. 1–4.

12. Paul Edwards, ed., *The Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa the African, Written by Himself* (London: Longman African Writers Series, 1994), pp. 33–42, 44–67, 77–92.

13. Barry Gaspar, *Bondsmen and Rebels, A Study of Master-Slave Relations in Antigua* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), pp. 110–112, table 5.3. Gaspar notes that every large plantation with a frontage to the sea would have had a loading dock and owned a boat crewed by slaves to transport goods to and from market.

14. Welch, *Slave Society in the City*, p. 85.

15. "An Act for the further encouragement of British mariners; and for other purposes therein mentioned," 34 G.III. c.68, British Parliamentary Papers, *Statutes at Large Vol. 18: The Statutes of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 31–35, Geo.3, 1793–1795*.

16. Equiano describes the dismay of his shipmates on one occasion when it was learned that he had been sold to a new master: Edwards, *Life of Olaudah Equiano*, p. 61; Rediker,

Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, chap. 6. Welch suggests the “camaraderie” between black and white seamen may have carried over into the taverns and brothels ashore, with interesting implications for the social order in slaveholding societies such as Barbados; Welch, *Slave Society in the City*, p. 92.

17. Frankland’s comments are cited in R. Pares, “The Manning of the Navy in the West Indies, 1702–63,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4th ser., 20 (1937): 31–60.

18. Pares, “Manning of the Navy”; W. Jeffrey Bolster, *Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 30–35.

19. Edwards, *Life of Olaudah Equiano*, p. 36.

20. Rediker, *Devil and the Deep Blue Sea*, pp. 288–290.

21. Rediker suggests that many ships’ captains considered terror a key management tool aboard ship; see M. Rediker, “The Pirate and the Gallows: An Atlantic Theatre of Terror and Resistance,” chapter 14 in this volume.

22. Henry Sinclair, “Register Ticket No: 24,750,” National Archives, London, BT 113/13.

23. By 1890 the total labor force on British merchant ships of all types had climbed to a peak of over 250,000 men; “Report of the Committee appointed by the Board of Trade to Enquire into the Manning of British Merchant Ships. 1896. Volume One” (c.8127) in *British Parliamentary Papers: Reports From Commissioners* (26), Vol. 40 (1896).

24. “Report of the Committee . . . to Enquire into the Manning of British Merchant Ships. 1896. Volume One,” § 26.

25. Letter contained in “Report to the President of the Board of Trade, and to the Royal Commission on Loss of Life at Sea, on the Supply of British Seamen, the Number of Foreigners Serving on board British Merchant Ships, and the reasons given for their employment; and on crimping and other matters, bearing on those matters, by one of the Assistant Secretaries to the Board of Trade” (c.4709) *British Parliamentary Papers: Accounts and Papers* (22) Vol. 59 (1886).

26. A so-called “humorous yarn” about a trick played by a fellow crew member on a “nigger cook,” which ended in the cook receiving a beating, featured on the front page of the inaugural issue of *Seafaring: Organ of the Seafaring Class* 1, no. 1 (July 7, 1888).

27. See “Appendix I. Prize-Fighters, 1791–1902,” in Peter Fryer, *Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain* (London: Pluto Press, 1984).

28. Evidence of Rt. Hon. A. B. Forwood, M. P. in “Report of the Committee . . . to Enquire into the Manning of British Merchant Ships. 1896. Volume Two: Minutes of Evidence and Appendices” (cd.8128), § 33116.

29. Harry Foster Dean (with S. North), *Umbala: The Adventures of a Negro Sea Captain in Africa and on the Seven Seas in His Attempts to Found an Ethiopian Empire*, new ed. (1929; repr., London: Pluto Press, 1989), chap. 7.

30. In the United Kingdom, examples of such communities include Tiger Bay in Cardiff, St. Paul’s in Bristol, Stepney in East London, and Toxteth or “Liverpool 8” in Liverpool.

31. Linebaugh and Rediker, “Many-Headed Hydra,” p. 236.

32. Stephen J. Braidwood, *Black Poor and White Philanthropists: London’s Blacks and the Foundation of the Sierra Leone Settlement 1786–1791* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1994).

33. Paul Edwards, *Unreconciled Strivings and Ironic Strategies: Three Afro-British Authors of the Georgian Era* (Edinburgh: Centre for West African Studies, 1992). Wedderburn

had sailed aboard a privateer and served in the Royal Navy as a main gunner and top station hand. During the 1790s he saw action in the navy against the French; Iain McCalman, ed., *The Horrors of Slavery and Other Writings of Robert Wedderburn* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991) pp. 6–7.

34. John M. Lofton, Jr., “Denmark Vesey’s Call to Arms,” *Journal of Negro History* 33, no. 4 (October 1948); Michael P. Johnson, “Denmark Vesey and his Co-Conspirators,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 58, no. 4 (October 2001).

35. Philip M. Hamer, “Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seaman Acts, 1822–1848,” *Journal of Southern History* 1, no. 1 (February 1935): 3–28; Philip M. Hamer, “British Consuls and the Negro Seaman Acts, 1850–1860,” *Journal of Southern History* 1, no. 2 (May 1935): 138–168.

36. Tony Martin, *Race First: The Ideological and Organizational Struggles of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association* (1976; Dover, MA: The Majority Press, 1986); Winston James, *Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia: Caribbean Radicalism and Early Twentieth Century America* (London: Verso, 1998) p. 71; Alan Cobley, “Far From Home: The Origins and Significance of the Afro-Caribbean Community in South Africa to 1939,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 2 (June 1992): 349–370; Philip S. Foner, *Organised Labor and the Black Worker 1619–1973* (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 226–227, 285.

37. Laura Tabili, *“We Ask for British Justice”: Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). On the varying fortunes of Afro-Caribbean seafarers in the second half of the twentieth century, see Alan Cobley, “Harrison’s of Liverpool and Seafaring in Barbados: A Case-Study of Sea-borne Colonial Labour,” *Journal of Caribbean History* 29, no. 2 (1995).

38. This is a common phrase in the Caribbean, implying that a person is “spiritually bound” to a place: Richard Allsopp, *Dictionary of Caribbean English Usage* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 401.

Race, Migration, and Port-City Radicalism: West Indian Longshoremen and the Politics of Empire, 1880–1920

Risa L. Faussette

“Girl, your brother Alonzo may not come back, and we may just never see him again, so how come you don’t seem to show no pain?”
Before I coulda answer she, me sister continue to run off at the mouth . . .

“Panama was no place to die” . . . she said.

—Carlos E. Russell, *An Old Woman Remembers*

The association of migration to Panama with death, as the epigraph to this chapter suggests, reflected the harrowing conditions of building one of the world’s most complex waterways. Although West Indian workers were commonly viewed as shiftless, ignorant, and unreliable tropical laborers, they performed the lowest paid and most dangerous assignments on the isthmian canal project. Subject as they were to exhaustion, disease, explosions, and landslides, an estimated 15,000 West Indians perished in Panama during the canal construction era.¹ Injuries and accidents resulting in death became so common among West Indians that “the greeting ‘Well, who’s dead this morning?’ became a common salutation on the Zone.”²

Of all the workers on the Canal Zone, the black dockmen who loaded and unloaded the ships that plied the ports between North and South America and across the Caribbean were among the most despised classes of labor on the isthmus. Valued only for the strength of their brawny backs, black longshoremen were treated as highly expendable laborers. While ports throughout the world were known for their rough-and-ready longshoremen who brawled at a moment’s notice, in Panama the prevalence of corporal punishment inflicted by white dock foremen on black longshoremen cast a colonial taint on waterfront labor relations. Consequently, when white dock supervisor, Frank Raymond, shot Belfield Carter, a Barbadian longshoreman, in a scuffle that began when Carter jumped a payroll line, the inci-

dent galvanized the West Indian longshoremen into political action. The Isthmian Dock Strike of 1919 that emerged from the simmering bitterness over Carter's death and the racialized double standard in waterfront wages, served as a prelude to the Great Silver Strike of 1920. Moreover, the protest, which began among dockworkers, spread to other laborers and illuminated the militant contours of Caribbean working-class radicalism that had been forged through the maritime networks of early twentieth-century migrant laborers along the west bank of the Atlantic world.

The evolution of maritime radicalism in the English-speaking Caribbean occurred within the context of shifting imperial relationships. Struggling to survive the reconfiguration of turn-of-the-century Anglo investments in the Caribbean basin, dislocated West Indian workers migrated en masse to port cities across the Atlantic region in search of a living wage. Denied sufficient access to land ownership and unable to prosper in the declining post-emancipation sugar zones, Afro-Caribbean workers found themselves subject to the vagaries of unstable domestic labor markets that were increasingly disrupted by the unpredictable whims of foreign capital. Often trapped in the lowest paid sector of the workforce but able to utilize their strategic location in the commercial nodes of maritime empires to disrupt the import-export industries upon which imperial prosperity depended, West Indian waterfront workers emerged as the vanguard of the urban black working-class movement throughout the Caribbean basin.³ Highly mobile and politically astute, these longshoremen protested the economic degradation that characterized colonial regimes and critically appraised the appropriation of black labor as they migrated along the cusp of a declining British imperial zone and the emerging American maritime state.

While the English-speaking islands remained within the formal political domain of the British Empire, the rise of American corporate monopolies, in Jamaica and Barbados especially, drew the islands within a second imperial orbit of economic control. American economic investment not only disrupted local labor markets, but it also influenced landownership policies that dislocated rural West Indian peasants who were then forced to migrate into "developing" areas in search of employment. This push-and-pull effect of foreign capital put a distinctive stamp on patterns of post-emancipation working-class formation, as thousands of West Indians resorted to frequent inter-island and transoceanic migration in search of a living wage.⁴ The subsequent emergence of scattered Caribbean enclaves throughout the port towns of the Americas indicated both the rapid transformation of colonial structures and the response of the dispossessed workers to the disruptive effects of inter-imperial maritime rivalry.

As England steadily decreased its financial investments in and military patrol of the Caribbean, the United States, having long envied the far-reaching tentacles of British maritime commerce, eagerly pursued economic opportunities in these coveted imperial arenas.⁵ By the close of the nineteenth century the total value of American imports to Jamaica surpassed the volume of British imports by 45.1 to 44.7 percent respectively.⁶ By the end of World War I the United Fruit Company had gradually acquired over \$4 million in railways, hotels, real estate, and land in Jamaica, and American investors capitalized various enterprises such as the Jamaica Consolidated Copper Co., the Commercial Cable Co., and the Jamaican Railway Co.⁷ Lured by the prospect of lucrative profits in a neglected and easily penetrable colonial zone, the United States quickly invested more than \$30 million dollars in the British West Indies (\$25 million in Jamaica alone) and eventually poured another \$30 million into Panama.⁸ In retrospect, the turn-of-the-century withdrawal of British troops did not indicate a relaxation of colonial control: the exploitation of the Caribbean peasantry had merely shifted from one taskmaster to another.⁹

West Indian workers, displaced by faltering island economies and shifting imperial relationships, circulated from one port to another in response to fluctuating demands for labor. As members of the transient labor markets that emerged and declined with the expansion and contraction of various export economies across the Caribbean basin, West Indian migrants often exhibited a cosmopolitan awareness of labor issues beyond the confines of their region. Their interactions with other migratory laborers, their history of survival despite being subject to multiple imperial powers, and their fluid movement between ports, allowed them to engage in both spontaneous rebellion and collective organization as they resisted colonial modes of labor control.¹⁰

Of all the West Indian enclaves that evolved from this rapid circuit of migration, none was more demographically distinct than Panama. A rather small province with only 400,000 inhabitants at the dawn of the century, Panama absorbed over 200,000 West Indians during the era of canal construction.¹¹ Jamaicans and Barbadians alone comprised 49 percent and 33 percent of the Panama Canal Zone work force respectively.¹²

From the outset, the Isthmian Canal Commission (ICC) viewed West Indians as a source of cheap labor to be tightly controlled. The Canal Zone police "used spies, deportation, strike-breaking, intimidation, and diplomatic intervention" to ensure the workforce remained cooperative.¹³ Not only did the American police units harass and extort money from the West Indian workers, but the ICC also allowed the Panamanian police to threaten, arrest, and deport men who refused to work for the canal.¹⁴

The legal system was governed by the hierarchy of race; justice seldom prevailed. The Canal Zone administration relegated black Caribbean workers to the *silver* payroll where they were paid 30 to 75 percent less in wages than the white Americans on the *gold* payroll; white Americans also received free housing, paid vacations, and medical services. As scholar Julie Greene has aptly summarized:

[T]he gold and silver system these officials adopted for managing labor originated at the highest levels of the US federal government and quickly flowered into an all-encompassing form of segregation. The government paid silver employees far less, fed them unappetizing food, and housed them in substandard shacks where vermin and filth prevailed. Gold workers earned very high wages and terrific benefits, including six weeks paid vacation leave, one month paid sick leave every year, and free travel within the Zone.¹⁵

Engineer John Stevens openly acknowledged his preference for racial segregation as did Colonel Goethals, the chief engineer after 1907. Goethals openly stated it was “customary in these tropical countries for white men to direct the work and for Negroes to do the harder parts of the manual and semiskilled labor. . . . It is not compatible with the white man’s pride of race to do the work which it is traditional for the Negroes to do.”¹⁶

The completion of the Panama Canal in 1914 exacerbated racial tensions as Colonel Goethals advocated an aggressive strategy to decrease the workforce. American citizens on the gold payroll had first priority when it came to staying on the payroll, but 75 percent of the silver roll employees lost their jobs between 1913 and 1921.¹⁷ Determined to depopulate the zone quickly, police officials arrested over 7,000 workers in 1912, alone, charging West Indians with subjective petty violations such as public disorder and vagrancy. As Michael Conniff has shown, the highest number of convicts detained occurred in 1913, which coincided with the massive layoff of 10,000 West Indians when the excavation process came to an end.¹⁸

In response to the Canal Zone administration’s discriminatory housing and labor policies and rising police harassment, silver workers established organizations to lobby for their interests. In March 1915 Victor de Suze, from Grenada, organized the Colon Federal Labor Union (CFLU) with 1,500 supporters. West Indians, who comprised 44 percent of Colon’s population, quickly flocked to the new organization. Growing steadily, it soon had over 8,000 members and revenues of almost \$2,000 per month.¹⁹ A year later Samuel Whyte formed the Isthmian League of British West Indians to

lobby for rent-free quarters. The Isthmian League also produced the short-lived newspaper *The West Indian Progress*, which briefly joined the widely circulated *Panama Star and Herald* in publicizing the plight and interests of the West Indian community. Shortly thereafter, during the fall of 1917, West Indian workers met at a local school to organize the Silver Employees Association. Samuel Whyte, who spearheaded the Isthmian League, served as its first president. While it was not organized as a labor union per se, the Silver Employees Association compiled statistics on the costs of living and appealed to the governor's moral sentiments to bring about improved Canal Zone policy toward the silver workers.²⁰

Consequently when labor relations at the wharves became increasingly strained in 1917, West Indian workers had already established a politicized public culture and developed the institutional structures necessary to protest their plight on the Canal Zone. Angered over wage differentials, inflation, and racial violence, the black dockworkers threatened international maritime trade by calling a strike on the Canal Zone piers. Tensions along the wharves and at the Cristobal coaling station were rising when a white dock foreman, Frank Raymond, shot Belfield Carter, a Barbadian longshoreman on the piers in March 1917. When Carter defended himself against police officer Maurice Hershkowitz, who tried to prevent him from jumping the checkout line, Raymond intervened and shot Carter with the officer's gun.²¹ According to a petition sent to the British consul, the court never issued a warrant or investigated the matter.

The shooting of Belfield Carter was not an isolated incident. The CFLU complained bitterly that American soldiers on the Zone routinely shot black Canal Zone workers without being charged.²² In one petition sent to the authorities, the CFLU demanded a court martial to be held for the American soldier who brutally beat William Leacock and fatally shot Gladstone Brereton to death. According to the petitioners, the soldier publicly discharged more than six shots and then threatened to shoot the frightened onlookers as he walked away, "leaving the lifeless body of the deceased on the floor."²³

From 1917 through 1918 a rising sense of racial militancy began to surge at the union hall, where impromptu stump speeches became a standard part of working-class gatherings. According to the police records, Giff Sobers, a laborer from the coaling station, "denounced the white race," and the following month, a dockworker named Bennet "made a stirring speech, denouncing the foremen, and bosses in general, for their inhuman treatment to the coloured employees there."²⁴ Labor activist E. A. Reid exclaimed "that it was a shame how Raymond shot down a negro on the docks" and

then criticized the men for passively watching instead of retaliating against the authorities.²⁵ As late as May 1919—a full two years after the incident occurred—Morales, a radical Panamanian who belonged to the CFLU declared:

This is the time for negroes to organize. Do you think if the 200 of you dock laborers were organized when that white man shot that negro on the dock in cold blood he would have been shot? Do you think that would have happened if you were organized? No. If you want to prevent the repetition of that, join the union. That man was shot and no redress could be got from consular representative, a parson, or not even from the judge. That white man has got a medal for shooting that negro. Do you want to prevent, when you get up in the morning and go one way in search of work while your wife is compelled to go to those white people and beg them for permission to scrub their floors? You will prevent that if you join the union.²⁶

With labor unity on the rise and a collective sense of racial injustice pervading the atmosphere, the isthmian dock strike erupted on Friday, May 2, 1919, when Governor Chester Harding notified the Panama Railroad officials that the longshoremen had been granted the eight-hour rule according to the federal labor policy of the United States.²⁷ Local 1009 of the International Longshoremen's Association, the union for the white men who supervised the Panama Canal piers, welcomed the decision.²⁸ But when the superintendent of the Panama Railroad announced that the hours of dockworkers on the silver payroll would be cut from nine to eight hours per day without any increase in their substandard hourly wage to compensate for the loss of wages, the West Indian dockworkers walked off in protest. The silver dock strike lasted thirteen days, and before the month was over the United Fruit Company sued the Panama Railroad for "hundreds of thousand dollars" as its perishable commodities sat rotting along the wharves.²⁹ The strike triggered a wave of protest across the Zone, a pattern that would be repeated in the Great Silver Strike of 1920. More than 1,500 other employees joined the silver dock men as sympathy strikes spread to the electrical workers, carpenters, laundry workers, ice-plant and machine shop laborers, dock checkers, coaling plant workers, and commissary employees.³⁰

By Saturday, May 3, the day after the governor's announcement, the silver dockmen, who earned 17 cents an hour, requested "an increase of 40 cents per hour, [and] time and a half for overtime and night work."³¹ The coaling station also came to a standstill as the loading men employed there

quickly followed suit. While the United Fruit steamship, *Cartago*, sat in the harbor loaded with 750 tons of freight, down at the union hall the silver men turned the impromptu protest into an official strike action, stirred by the inspiring speeches of Dr. Samuel P. Radway, the Jamaican president of the Colon chapter of Marcus Garvey's organization, the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), and African migrant James Henry Seymour, who directed the local Landship Society.³² The Colon Federal Labor Union, already an established gathering place for working-class protest, provided the meeting hall, lodging, food, and some funds to support the striking men.

The mass meetings held during the two-week protest revealed the ideological core of early twentieth-century Caribbean working-class radicalism. There was a confrontational philosophy that opposed economic exploitation, embraced a growing sense of racial militancy, and contained sacrificial notions of Christian martyrdom with an ardent expectation of divine retribution.³³ By keeping abreast of the international working-class movements of the era, and holding conversations with radical sailors passing through the Zone, Caribbean dockworkers were able to place their local struggle into a broader spectrum in which port-city maritime laborers served as a pivotal key to international commerce. As such, they ceased to see themselves as an isolated group of degraded workers, but rather as the human cornerstone upon which the economic foundation of the Panama Canal Zone stood.

The men held mass meetings each night to strategize, exhort one another, and raise money to sustain themselves. Greatly influenced by the tenets of Garveyism, the men repeatedly referred to passages from the Bible, sang hymns, and asserted their racial identity in ways that gave spiritual and cultural meaning to their political action. Attendance ranged between 1,500 to 1,800 men on most nights, with attendance swelling as sympathy strikes swept the Zone. Since other workers were able to identify with the injustices of the gold and silver system, they frequently joined the dockmen to publicly denounce the racism of the Panama Canal officials.

The fact that the silver men were risking everything they had seemed to fuel their determination and heighten their sense of martyrdom. One worker announced: "Even Christ to save sinners had to sacrifice his life, and we are disposed to even sacrifice our[s] . . . then to be oppressed any longer by these agents of white democracy."³⁴ An adamant pipefitter asserted with pride that "we are new niggers and we want our own doctors, lawyers, preachers and teachers . . . I am not afraid of nothing, as I have said, I am prepared to die for the cause of my race."³⁵ With a trenchant critique of the

racial limits of democracy, Stuart added: "If we don't get the 40 cents, we are prepared to starve in Colon even if they have to bury us in trenches along the streets of Colon when the cemetery is full."³⁶

The imagery of death and martyrdom for a higher cause appeared side by side with visions of racial resurrection. Buoyed by newspaper reports of labor uprisings sweeping the world, the strikers were convinced that it was time for the silver men to "stand up for [their] rights as a free race"—one protestor stridently proclaimed that "the old nigger is dead and the resurrection of the new nigger has come."³⁷ This sense of racial pride and rebirth came with the expectation that the new black men, once resurrected, would have different roles to play in society. Drawing from their racialized interpretation of Christian theology that had its roots in Bedwardian and Garveyite principles, the dockworkers viewed the triumphant resurgence of the black race as a matter of divine providence. Dr. Radway, a Garveyite physician, referred to the strike as "the handy work of God," and Duncan Henry, chief delegate, declared: "God has said that the Ethiopians shall strike her hands, and the time has now come, so let us now take it into consideration that the hands of God is in this strike!"³⁸

Throughout the strike the men demonstrated their cosmopolitan awareness of the escalation of class conflict across the globe and encouraged themselves by the victories won by other laborers. Reading a Spanish language newspaper, Gilks called attention to the "different strikes in the world, [in] Jamaica, Buenos Aires, Cuba, France, and England." He proclaimed: "[T]hey have gotten what they struck for and I cannot see why we cannot get what we are asking for."³⁹ Thompson, a checker on the wharves, added: "I assure you that the world at large are seeking for their rights and are we West Indian negroes going to allow ourselves and family to be pressed under the white man's feet?"⁴⁰

At the core of the protest was the issue of American federal policy as it pertained to maritime wages. Once the West Indian longshoremen discovered that the United States Shipping Board had established emergency wartime labor accords, such as the North Atlantic Agreement, which stabilized Atlantic seaboard longshore wages at 65 cents per hour to keep pace with inflation, they became convinced that the Panama Canal Zone officials were deliberately undermining President Wilson's policy. Since the Panama Canal Zone was under the legal authority of U.S. Governor Harding, the striking men, despite their British citizenship, felt entitled to the labor provisions ensured by the American state. Thus when George, a plumber who joined the protest, overheard white officials discussing the federal maritime wage levels in effect in the United States, he informed the strikers: "[W]e

are claiming only 40 cents when our salaries should be 65 cents per hour.”⁴¹ Convinced that the culprits skulked in Panama and not Washington, DC, George added: “When President Wilson get to learn that we are asking for 40 cents and our original salaries should be 65 cents per hour, I believe too, myself gentlemen, that some of these men will go to prison in the United States.”⁴²

To protest the large discrepancy between their wages and those paid in other ports, the silver men sent a letter to the Canal Zone Silver Board stating that even the low wages paid in the Caribbean islands were higher than those at the Canal Zone. They emphasized how West Indians “furnished the brawn and muscle necessary to make the canal possible” and suggested that if the Canal Zone administration wanted to avert further discontent, pay raises were needed immediately.⁴³ Their threat was grounded in an awareness that their work was of strategic importance in the emerging structure of international commerce. From the outset of their mass meetings, the strikers proclaimed that the “dock men are the key and the door and also the foundation of the Panama Railroad, and their houses are standing on that foundation, and if you pull out the foundation the house will fall.”⁴⁴ The dockworkers clearly understood that any cargo destined for the docks that was usually transported from the hinterlands by the railroad would remain sitting on the wharves unless they loaded the ships. And their outrage over low wages and substandard living conditions only escalated as they interacted with radical sailors who stopped by the union hall.

Canal Zone officials kept the union hall under surveillance during the strike. Authorities dispatched police officers to record meetings and informants to sabotage coalition-building between the unionists and the local Garveyites. Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association had quickly proliferated across Central America and the Caribbean, taking deep root in many of the scattered West Indian enclaves that resulted from ongoing waves of labor migration. With “twenty-three branches in Costa Rica and forty-seven in neighboring Panama,” any successful alliance between the Garveyites and the labor agitators could potentially threaten the political and economic structures that maintained highly profitable export economies, which depended upon thousands of underpaid West Indian workers.⁴⁵

Official anxiety over the influence of outside agitators was not without cause. By the tenth day of the strike, Mr. Sinisterra, a Spanish-speaking worker who often interpreted for the Panamanian silver workers during the protest meetings, suddenly announced that two representatives from the Longshoremen’s Association of New York were on their way to investigate the protest.⁴⁶ Although the two representatives never showed, the next morning,

Vladimir Rudow, a Russian sailor, entered the hall and advised the men to send a cable to the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) in New York to inform them of their labor conditions. When the striking dockworkers promptly took Rudow's advice and contacted the ILA, Governor Chester Harding signed a deportation order, which declared Rudow to be an "undesirable person" and the police immediately evicted him from the Canal Zone.⁴⁷

Shortly thereafter an unnamed English sailor, who attended the union meeting while waiting for his ship to set sail, stepped forward to address the men. Demonstrating his knowledge of maritime wages, the sailor told the men that back in the United States it was a well-known fact that "the cheapest work on the globe is being done down here on the Isthmus."⁴⁸ He then encouraged the dockworkers to seek support and get "enlisted in some good union, [with] those bigger fellows in the states such as longshoremen and other laborers, they will vindicate your cause."⁴⁹ The sailor then emphasized the high wages of U.S. longshoremen and closed by stating "all over Europe and in the United States, Cuba, and all other republics, they are all getting good money, and why cant you?"⁵⁰

In similar fashion Thomas Murphy, an Irish seaman, urged the 600 strikers to organize themselves because "the masses are never beaten in a strike."⁵¹ He condemned racial segregation, passed out radical literature, recommended that the men establish connection with the Rand School, praised the Wobblies, hailed the Bolsheviks, then warned that "President Wilson did not practice what he preached" as he left.⁵²

Governor Arcia of Panama came down to the union hall to discourage the strike, but the men persisted. The attention they received alarmed Canal Zone officials. Marcus Garvey joined the public critique of the Canal Zone in an article titled "Conditions in Panama" that appeared in *The Negro World*, the official newspaper of the UNIA. After denouncing the "injustice, prejudice and discrimination [in] the island of Panama," Garvey wrote a scathing critique of the racial politics of modern empires.⁵³ According to Garvey, "Both the British and American governments are agreed on many things, among which is the dictum that the NEGRO MUST BE KEPT IN HIS PLACE . . ."⁵⁴ For this reason when blacks encountered racism, relying upon "constitutional or any other kind of juridical appeal" would not result in justice. Since both Britain and the United States were imperial powers, juridical appeals regarding racial discrimination would merely be a case of "appealing from Caesar to Caesar."⁵⁵ Instead, Garvey declared: "[W]e suggest organization along the line of Industrial Unionism with the ultimate aim of bringing all the workers of an industry into ONE BIG UNION."⁵⁶ Not surprisingly, when Canal Zone officials got wind of Garvey's intention

to visit the isthmus that September, Governor Harding “dispatched a cable to the State Department’s Passport Control Division advising their refusal for Garvey to undertake this visit.”⁵⁷

By June the men informed Sam Heald, the superintendent of the Panama Railroad Company, that they had received official information regarding the wage rates paid by steamship companies in New York.⁵⁸ Angered that the hourly longshore wage paid by the shipping companies operating boats between the Canal Zone and the States ranged between 65 cents to \$1.00 per hour, the men bitterly complained: “[I]n other words the ships we load and unload on the Isthmus at \$1.53, & \$1.60 per day, are loaded and unloaded in New York at \$5.20, \$6.40, \$7.20 & \$8.00 per day.” The vast discrepancy in pay infuriated the silver men. Armed with evidence of blatant discrimination, the men threatened to shut down maritime commerce in the Canal Zone in July:

This is rank wickedness on the part of the Canal Zone officials; all deck hands are in possession of this information, as it was spoken [and] broadcast at the union halls in Colon & Panama, as we are quite determined that these poor animals of beast of burden of the Canal government shall get some of the profits of Panama Railroad, in giving them a reasonable salary to alleviate the starving conditions of their families; if this increase is not forthcoming by July 1, we intend seeing that these unfortunates stop work, until they are given reasonable salaries to live on, and we will do it when the bay is filled with ships because we know they will be able to hold out this time, as they have the sympathy of the whole canal silver force which is absolutely dissatisfied themselves.⁵⁹

The Canal Zone administrators, however, were already aware of the wage differentials in longshore pay scales. In fact they had previously compiled detailed information regarding the differential in wages for longshoremen in the United States and Panama, the increases in the standard of living at the Canal Zone, and even the current rate of pay in various Caribbean islands. Thus the substandard wage scales of the silver workers and the accelerated wages paid to the gold payroll employees did not result from administrative oversight, it was intentional. In January 1918 the secretary of the Panama Canal Zone Executive Department wrote that the gold dock foremen and stevedores “claim they are not receiving the benefit of the full 25 percent over States rates” but acknowledged that “our colored dockmen who receive from 15 cents to 17 cents an hour” have occupations that correspond to the New York longshoremen who earn 40 cents an hour.⁶⁰

The West Indian dockworkers remained determined to gain wages comparable to continental port rates, so they contacted the International Longshoremen's Association and applied for membership. They obtained an ILA charter, and the silver men successfully established colored Local 1073 where membership quickly grew.⁶¹ They maintained that "as dock laborers and checkers working for the Panama Railroad and the various steamship companies, [we] have experienced great difficulties for the time we were working on the Isthmus. The time has just arrived when we as negroes must get together and unite ourselves in one body so as to be able to live properly and decently. Today in the United States labor is at a big demand and the men in every phase of life are being well paid."⁶² Meanwhile, Local 1009, the union local for white waterfront employees, refused to recognize the existence of the newly formed West Indian local, despite their union charter.⁶³

Matters finally came to a head when the Canal Zone officials discovered that one of the ILA vice presidents from New Orleans was coming to the isthmus to address the working relationship of "the Gold Longshoremen Union of the Canal Zone, in proper harmony with the Colored Longshoremen Union."⁶⁴ The ILA representative expressed an interest in resolving the relationship between the two locals, but for their part the West Indian Local 1073 desired to use the occasion to discuss better wages and free housing, so they could obtain "the same rights and privileges as the gold employees."⁶⁵

Canal Zone officials intervened, and the police questioned the ILA representative as soon as he arrived. When Thomas Harrison, the fourth vice president of the ILA Gulf Port Division, admitted he planned to help organize black dockworkers, Governor Harding summoned him before the leaders of the white ILA local the next morning.⁶⁶ Harrison, intimidated by the confrontation, "assured the Governor that he would make no effort to organize the negroes until he had investigated the situation on the Isthmus. . . ."⁶⁷ Effectively silenced, Harrison briefly visited with the white local, side-stepped meeting with colored Local 1073, and quietly left the island.

This incident revealed the boundaries of West Indian working-class agency in the age of empire. While the silver men successfully established a local chapter of the ILA and fought tenaciously to obtain higher wages that the union had secured during the war years, their basic premise was faulty in that they assumed that officials in Washington, D.C. desired that the silver employees receive economic justice. In a petition sent to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker on December 6, 1919, Local 1073 repeatedly requested an opportunity to discuss the double standard wage scale and deteriorating working conditions at the Canal Zone. As one silver worker adamantly stated: "President Wilson today [is] fighting for democracy, and he should

know and learn of the conditions and situations that is taking place on the Canal Zone. I say, gentlemen, he would not stand for it.”⁶⁸

Unfortunately for the silver workers, the initial purpose for establishing the Canal Zone ran counter to their interests. According to the 1921 Report of the Special Panama Canal Commission, “the Panama Canal was constructed for two purposes (a) as a commercial enterprise and (b) as a measure of national defense.”⁶⁹ As a commercial enterprise, the United States expected the Zone to turn a profit or at least break even. The prospect of operating at a deficit after spending \$485 million to construct the canal was simply not palatable, particularly if the expenses pertained to paying higher wages to inefficient, thrifless tropical laborers.⁷⁰

In fact the widespread use of West Indian labor was a tactic pursued by American officials in their quest to finally challenge the British commercial hegemony in the western Atlantic. With the British economy disrupted by the outbreak of World War I, the United States seized every opportunity to surpass British maritime dominance in foreign trade.⁷¹ Thus, just as the British resorted to using higher percentages of colonized laborers in their maritime workforce in their fight to keep their market share of foreign trade against other competitors, the United States also incorporated a greater share of colonized labor in this era of Anglo-American maritime rivalry.⁷² As one American official in the Canal Zone stated: “You know that British competition with the United States in Merchant Marine is based largely upon the lower rate of pay to British labor.”⁷³ Therefore in order for the United States to challenge the British domination of the seas, access to cheap maritime labor became a necessity.

Convenient only when docile, the Caribbean workers became troublesome when they challenged the split labor market upon which imperial enterprise stood. Their resistance was, in the long run, both their strength and their downfall. When the 1921 Special Panama Canal Commission Report recommended increasing the ranks of silver workers because the costs of gold employees had significantly raised the operating expenses of the canal, Secretary of War John W. Weeks firmly overrode their recommendation. While Caribbean workers were economically profitable, their labor militancy made them politically dangerous. Secretary Weeks concluded: “Tropical labor will not be employed in responsible positions which involve any element of the national defense, or where such employees might imperil the proper operation of the canal.”⁷⁴

In sum, the activism of the dockworkers during the 1919 isthmian dock strike provides a window through which we can assess the political tenor of post-emancipation working-class culture in the age of Anglo-American

imperial rivalry. Aware of their strategic importance to the expansion of maritime commerce, these black longshoremen used their role at the hubs of imperial exchange to challenge the structure of the colonial labor market. Through the maritime linkages they maintained with itinerant sailors, Garveyite followers, and migrant kinsmen, West Indian dockworkers utilized knowledge obtained from the maritime grapevine and circulating radical newspapers in an attempt to appropriate the benefits of continental war-time labor accords and to contest racial exploitation in the Canal Zone.⁷⁵ Militant, organized, and radical, these men protested their exploited role in the world of maritime enterprise. Their history not only illuminates the importance of colonial labor markets to the rise of U.S. imperialism, but it also exemplifies how colonial laborers “moving through time and space according to rhythms and relationships of their own, drew from, ignored, constructed, transformed, and defied claims of the nation state” in their response to American maritime expansion.⁷⁶

NOTES

The epigraph is taken from *An Old Woman Remembers: The Recollected History of West Indians in Panama, 1855-1955: A Prose-Poetry Monologue* (Brooklyn: Caribbean Diaspora Press, 1995).

1. Bonham C. Richardson, “Caribbean Migrations, 1838–1985,” in Franklin W. Knight and Colina A. Palmer, eds., *The Modern Caribbean* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 210.

2. Edwin E. Slosson and Gardner Richardson, “Life on the Canal Zone,” *The Independent* 60, no. 2990 (March 22, 1906): 656.

3. Walter Rodney has argued that it was “on the wharves and the sugar estates, [that] the working class vanguard demonstrated that it had achieved a sound grasp of the historical process of labor exploitation and that it knew the situation of colonial and oppressed races to be especially backward.” Walter Rodney, *A History of the Guyanese Working People, 1881–1905* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 197.

4. Bonham C. Richardson, “Caribbean Migrations,” pp. 206–213.

5. Lance E. Davis and Robert J. Cull, “International Capital Movements, Domestic Capital Markets, and American Economic Growth, 1820–1914,” in Stanley Engerman and Robert E. Gallman, eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States*, vol. 2, *The Long Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 740. Cecilia A. Karch, “The Transport and Communications Revolution in the West Indies: Imperial Policy and Barbadian Response, 1870–1917,” *Journal of Caribbean History* 18, no. 2 (1983): 39.

6. Edward W. Chester, *The United States and Six Atlantic Outposts: The Military and Economic Considerations* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1980), p. 57.

7. Robert W. Dunn, *American Foreign Investments* (New York: B. W. Huebsch and Viking Press, 1926), p. 136.

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South Asian Seafarers and Their Worlds c. 1870–1930s

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Despite providing the plots and the characters for some outstanding works of historical scholarship in which they appear to offer uncovered redoubts of lost ideals (whether revolutionary republicanism or radical Afro-American cosmopolitanism), seafarers have not been an enduring focus of interest to the historical profession.¹ What is true of seafarers in general is no less true for Indian seafarers. In 1944 Indian seamen stranded in California by the war were hired to play extras in crowd scenes in the film *Calcutta*. This might have been a metaphor for their roles and visibility in contemporary society and modern scholarship.

Until about two decades ago Indian seamen in international merchant shipping languished as an invisible underclass in historical studies of the industry.² They also remain largely absent to this day in histories of India and Indian labor. Neither peasants nor proletarians, palpably committed neither to ship nor harbor, sea nor land, port nor hinterland, town nor village, urban nor rural, industry nor agriculture, Asia nor Europe, “modern” nor “traditional,” Indian seamen were distant stragglers after the neat categories that have helped to frame our social imaginations. Freely relativizing and interrogating such boundaries by the act of crossing them repeatedly, their self-evidently fluid and unstable locations meant that Indian seamen have also eluded the attention of those whose object it has been to critique and move beyond these markings.

Such is the extent of their invisibility that even as excitable and uncontrollable participants in that characteristic form of political expression in the historiography of the faceless, rootless “mob” in India—namely, the urban riot—Indian seamen are to be found only on the fringes.³ Sometimes they appear as the silent and dispensable accoutrements of political or public ritual, filling up auditorium seats and crowding political meetings of aspiring Indian politicians in Britain, as carriers more than as objects of radical propaganda and as the collective cover and mask for revolutionary anticolonial activists endeavoring to elude capture while making their ways across

the world to Weimar Germany or Soviet Russia.⁴ Indian seamen became objects of overt repression when they struck work in 1939, shortly after war began, and of ostentatious concern in 1942 when Britain feared the implications for the war effort of the intensification of the independence movement in India. And shortly afterwards, in 1947, they were conscripted into competing nationalist projects, as Partition disrupted their living and working itineraries.⁵

This chapter attempts to interpret the role and agency of Indian seamen in another light—in which they were neither drudges nor dupes, and in which they attempted to make some sense of their experiences and of the exotic and the unfamiliar, and developed collective and individual strategies of survival. Their very neglect by the state and their fraught relations with the trade union movement in Europe paradoxically enabled Indian seamen to evade their disciplines practically until World War II. It also endowed them with a degree of autonomy that helped them negotiate and adapt in interesting ways the congeries of ideas, political and social beliefs, and modes of action that they encountered or accumulated in the various worlds which they inhabited or through which they passed.

The first section of this essay begins with a brief discussion of Indian seamen in international merchant shipping. The second section focuses on the attitudes toward Indian seamen of the state, shipping agencies and officials, and British trade unions. The manner in which Indian seamen used their knowledge and experiences to negotiate their way through a world in which they were handicapped by class, race, nationality, and colonial subjection forms the subject of the third and fourth sections. Section five offers a brief conclusion.

I

Endowed with capital assets that were literally mobile, owners of international merchant vessels have traditionally had access to an international labor market. With the repeal of the navigation laws, the ascendancy of steam, and the building of canals (which together reduced the vagaries of going to sea, shortened voyages, transformed the nature of seafaring work, and facilitated more flexible recruitment practices), British shipowners in particular began to employ increasing numbers of foreign workers from the middle of the nineteenth century.

In 1891 seamen other than British accounted for over 22 percent of those employed on board British vessels.⁶ Every conceivable nationality was represented, but as wages on British ships fell behind what American and

European seamen could earn ashore, and as British and European workers acquired a reputation for militancy, an increasing proportion of crews came to be recruited from Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean.⁷

The proportion of Indian seamen in particular rose steadily in the early years of the last century. In 1891 24,000, or 10 percent of the nearly 240,000 seamen employed on British vessels, were classified as “lascars and other Indian seamen.” By 1914 this figure had more than doubled to 52,000 (about 17.5 percent).⁸ British vessels employed over 50,000 Indian seamen on the eve of the Depression, about 40,000 during the 1930s, and nearly 60,000 at the height of the World War II.⁹

The reasons for this rise were simple: wages of Indian seamen engaged on special articles of agreement known as Indian or “lascar” articles were the lowest in the industry. In 1914 these were about a quarter of British wages, and they fell to a sixth in 1919. Indian seamen also cost less to house and provision on board their vessels than European or for that matter Arab or Chinese seamen. They also worked considerably longer hours and followed a watch system of “all hands at all times.” In the words of a retired ship master and author of a polemical work defending their employment, Indian seamen were “more completely the servants of the shipowner while under engagement than any other group of men doing similar work that shipowners have ever had to do the work for them.”¹⁰

II

In the view of British trade unionists and commentators, with such “unmanly” docility went an inaptitude for the sea and cowardice in crisis. “Expert” testimony at the inquiry into the loss of the *Roumania* by a Captain N. Hamilton of the Indian Staff Corps, who claimed to know “these lascars in India . . . up on the hills,” held that they were “absolutely useless in cold weather. . . .”¹¹ For a writer in the *Hull Daily Mail* these “coolies . . . [lacked] ‘two o’clock morning courage,’” which was the “great trait of the British character.”¹²

This was an enduring stereotype. From the 1890s, ships voyaging to ports on the U.S. northern Atlantic seaboard in the winter months were not allowed to engage Indian seamen for fear that they would be unable to withstand the region’s harsh wintry conditions. These restrictions were relaxed without any incident during World War I but reimposed and maintained until 1939 only because of trade union pressure in Britain. Nevertheless the image of Indian seamen as cowardly coolies incapable of coping with cold weather or an emergency was regularly renewed during these years.¹³

But it was not the only one. According to Captain W. H. Hood, the Board of Trade Manning Committee (1896) felt the inability of Indian seamen to withstand cold climates was grossly exaggerated, and witnesses before the committee said they had never seen “smarter crews.”¹⁴ Nor was the image of docility uncontested. Even in the 1890s and 1900s, long before Indian seafarers’ unions emerged in any recognizable shape or form, employers and shipping officials spoke of the “air of independence” of Indian crews and their ability, contrary to the stereotype, to look after themselves, the extent of “corporate” solidarity among them, and their capacity for combination.¹⁵

What these contrasting images reflect is the shifting, unstable, and contingent nature of representations of Indian seafarers. It was a staple in the arguments of British trade unions that Indian seamen were “coolies.” Indeed, referring to them as “lascars,” with the original Persian term’s evocation of conscript laborers employed to carry loads for armies, camps, and trading caravans, was part of this tactic of depiction. It passed out of explicit *official* usage in India in the 1920s.¹⁶ Yet it continued to be used in Britain, and as late as 1973, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O) found it necessary to warn officers that “the terms ‘native,’ ‘Asiatic,’ or ‘Lascar’ are not to be used in reference either to passengers, crew or people ashore.”¹⁷

This instability is reflected in the representational opportunism of P&O, the imperial shipping company par excellence. Its size, market share, and close ties with the state made P&O the most vocal defender of Indian crews, of which it was also the largest employer. When the *Pall Mall Gazette* wrote adversely on the ability of Indian crews while reporting the loss of its *Nizam*, the P&O wrote a lengthy rebuttal, praising the courage of the ship’s crew and of Indian seamen in general.¹⁸ However, because its vessels, unlike those of its competitors who wanted the winter restrictions on Indian crews lifted, did not sail yet to American ports, the P&O attempted to discourage competition in the labor market from other shipping companies by adding its voice to doubts about the ability and efficiency of Indian crews in cold climates.¹⁹

Laws relating to the employment of Indian seamen were more elaborate in some respects than those for other Indian workers or seamen of other nationalities. Legislating and enforcing them produced voluminous quantities of official documentation. Yet anyone studying these documents is struck by their sheer administrative minutiae, and how poorly they reflect on the knowledge that the state and shipping companies claimed to have about Indian seamen. No aspect of the working lives of Indian seamen would have been hidden from view, yet nothing seems to have held the attention of the

state and employers that could not be assimilated to clichés, stereotypes, and platitudes. Thus information about where the men belonged, what they did while not at sea, the paths and networks that brought them to Bombay or Calcutta for engagements, how they eked out a living in these cities while awaiting engagements, the manner in which they were recruited, etc. were all retailed until the 1920s from fixed templates. Little of this knowledge was produced through inquiry or even the systematization of the information that state agencies such as the police would already have had in their possession. This state of affairs lasted until the 1920s, when trade unions of Indian seamen began to emerge and to produce, challenge, and manipulate knowledges about themselves.²⁰

The state's lack of interest may be traced to two causes. Never in acute short supply except in wartime, easily mobilized, engaged, and regulated, and rarely a major threat to the state or to public order, seamen ranked low, until the 1920s, in the investigative priorities of the Indian state. In the 1880s employers' complaints about difficulties in procuring reliable crews in Calcutta were insistent enough to provoke a public inquiry, but not apparently so serious as to warrant reforms that might weaken their control over recruitment and indirectly over their crews.²¹ Thereafter shipowners employing Indian seamen, who made up a powerful interest both in colonial India and imperial Britain, resisted inquiries that, while deepening the state's knowledge about Indian crews, might increase the danger of substantive regulation. What remained was the residual risk for the state of having to provide for Indian seamen reduced to destitution abroad. This risk was minimized through apparently "paternalistic" regulations that, besides laying out the minimum diet and warm clothing rations for Indian seamen, prohibited their discharge abroad and made shipowners liable for returning them to India. This was indeed the colonial state's bottom line: as long as shipowners kept Indian seamen invisible and out of the kind of trouble that might draw unwelcome attention to their conditions or force difficult choices upon it, the state would not bother with matters such as recruitment, working conditions, and wages.²² With this implicit compact, allegations that Indian seamen were unskilled coolies and so forth were met with template responses affirming their skill or masculinity. Indian seamen belonged to "lascar or maritime races"; the deck crews were hereditary seamen possessing long familiarity with and experience of the sea; Punjabi firemen, most of whom would have got their first glimpse of the sea from their ships, belonged to the "northern and warlike races of India" and possessed a "manly character."²³

Indian seamen were mostly silent witnesses to this ironic denouement.

But other ironies offered opportunities for protest and agency. The employment of Indian seamen on British vessels was justified on the ground of their being colonial subjects. Tucked away behind this formal right was the substantive fact that subsidies paid for by the Indian peasantry enabled British shipping companies to monopolize large-scale shipping in India and displace local competition. Though it reflected structural and relational hierarchies and served as a tool of control and discipline, colonial subjectivity also signified a bundle of rights including that to live and work in Britain. This right was intended to be notional rather than real—thus the restrictions on discharging Indian seamen at ports outside India. But as discussed in more detail below, it soon became an actual one for many Indian seamen who successfully jumped ship to work for higher wages in Britain. Though the imperial state soon qualified such rights, tightened policing, and placed new procedural and other checks on their ability to find work, Indian seamen found ways to challenge or get around these restrictions. Once Indian seamen deserters were ashore in Britain and the ships that brought them had departed, it was often impossible in normal times to force them to return to the colony. An instrument of control had thus acquired the sharp edge of dissent.²⁴

While affirming the skilled and “manly” character of Indian crews abroad, the colonial state was ambivalent about constituting the Indian seaman as a worker. Some of the apparatus of control in modern workplaces, such as a system of fines, existed. But in practical matters of recruitment and discipline the state was content to follow employers and regard Indian crews as little more than extended kin groups, the secret of whose cohesion as a work gang lay in the authority of the *serang* (an indigenous boatswain or petty officer) with whom the crew already had ties of subservience from land. Such descriptions reinforced the image of Indian seamen as premodern “coolies” and further disempowered them in the global labor market. They also made reforms of a vitiated and corrupt recruitment process impossible. Contesting the stereotypes proffered by the state and the shipping companies therefore became a crucial objective for Indian seamen’s unions.

III

From the interwar years, collective and individual initiatives of Indian seamen were marked by efforts to break out of the “coolie” ghettos to which the state, employers, and western unions sought to confine them. We may identify several markers of “coolie” status, indeed more widely of their supposed “difference” in the maritime labor market: wage levels, working conditions,

including the watch system, and long, unregulated working hours, methods of recruitment and discipline, and restrictions on discharges abroad and on employment on ships sailing in winters to U.S. north Atlantic ports.

Indian seamen explored collective activity as a means of reducing or eliminating these markers of difference. Indian seamen shared several subjective experiences with the factory workers of Bombay and Calcutta. Maritime labor activity did not also lend itself easily to trade union organization, particularly in India, where seamen faced many displacements in the course of their working lives. Yet seamen's trade unions were among the first to emerge in India, and by the 1920s they had become an established presence at the chief recruiting ports of Calcutta and Bombay.²⁵ There were doubtless important domestic and external factors that lent impetus to this development, notably the growth of political activity in India, the founding of the International Labor Organization (ILO), and its institution of regular tripartite maritime conferences. But the early development of seamen's unions owed equally to the agency of the men themselves.

There is some evidence that already by the late nineteenth century Indian seamen had begun to develop some form of a modern political consciousness. The diary of an Anglican preacher records as "typical" an encounter at which his remarks about the warm reception recently accorded the prince of Wales in India (1875–1876) were greeted by Indian seamen with the retort that the British raj would soon cease and that "soldier and sarkar would be driven to their little home" in the west. Cholerick with anger, the preacher gloated about the end of "Mohammedan power," of "Turkey crumbling, Persia helpless, Egypt anglicized, India conquered, and Bokhara, the city of learning, taken by the Russians," provoking a huge uproar that, the preacher confessed, was kept from turning violent only by the boatswain's whistle.²⁶

Colonial officials attributed the early birth and endurance of Indian seamen's unions "in the absence of any actual strike history" to the "direct contact of the men themselves, afloat and in home waters, with western trade unionism." *Serangs* and stewards took the lead, but in its early years the Indian Seamen's Union in Calcutta appears to have been made up of a core of 300 to 400 men of all ranks. For a brief period during the 1920s, Calcutta's Quarter-masters' Union also appears to have succeeded in enforcing a closed shop.²⁷

As a matter of interested debate, since it concerned wages and other terms of engagement as well as the wider question of "difference," Indian seamen's unions quickly began to challenge the view that Indian seamen were small peasants who went to sea only to supplement their mainly rural

incomes. In the template accounts of employers and the state, seamen came from their villages to Calcutta and Bombay in search of engagements that they found through *serangs* who were also their village headmen and intermediaries in the labor market. Indian seamen's unions, especially in Calcutta, produced an alternative narrative about seamen's identities, their relationships with one another, and to the *serang* and their work that affirmed the autonomy and individuality of Indian seamen while underscoring their ability to come freely together for engagements under a foreman. This narrative complemented and supported the agitation by Calcutta seamen against corrupt recruitment practices in the 1920s and 1930s and for a roster-based system in which recruitment was based on the length of time a seaman had been ashore without a ship.²⁸

From the mid-1920s, Indian seamen began looking tentatively beyond India for allies and support. This was potentially fraught. Since the 1890s, British seamen's unions had made the elimination of the employment of cheap foreign labor a major goal. From the early 1900s, opposition was focused on Chinese and Arab workers. The wartime increase in the presence of Asian, African, and Caribbean seamen in Britain, the outbreak of racial riots in postwar Britain, and the slump in trade and shipping intensified this opposition, to which the British authorities responded by sponsoring schemes to repatriate colored seamen residing in Britain. Opposition to the employment of Indian seamen was particularly intense at the first maritime session of the ILO at Genoa in 1920.²⁹

Indian seamen's unions sought affiliation with the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), where they began to raise the problem of corrupt recruitment practices. Representatives of Indian seamen also attempted to establish direct contact with British and other seamen's unions. But the latter responded with little enthusiasm, and the ITF also largely lost interest in Indian seamen's affairs during the 1930s. The onset of the Depression also saw the intensification of the labor campaign to exclude Indian seamen from British ships.³⁰

Fundamentally, British seamen's unions refused to acknowledge Indian seamen as workers and recognize their unions as potential interlocutors, let alone partners. And when they did so during the Second World War, it was with the objective of using recognition as a means of disciplining Indian trade unions and helping to establish "responsible trade unionism" in the colony. In both these respects British seamen's unions shared the approaches and attitudes of employers and the imperial state.³¹

The refusal to dignify Indian seamen as workers and to recognize their unions produced two effects. First, the latter quickly came to outflank Brit-

ish unions from the left and lay claim to a more militant form of politics. This was not difficult since the National Union of Seamen and its predecessors were deeply implicated in protocorporatist arrangements with the state and shipping companies since at least the First World War.

The militancy of the Indian unions and the moderation of the British unions produced some paradoxical results. At the first maritime session of the ILO in Genoa in 1920, the Indian workmen's delegate, selected by the colonial state and guided by its officials and shipowners' representatives, voted against the working-hours convention that, as it happened, failed to pass by a solitary vote. The Genoa conference had also been exercised by the issue of exceptional treatment for Indian seamen demanded by shipowners and the colonial state, and opposed by the British and other European seamen's representatives who were all united together in support of the convention.

But by 1936, when a working-hours convention was proposed again at the maritime session of the ILO held that year in Geneva, tables had turned. Indian seamen's unions rejected any exceptional treatment that would force their members to work longer hours than seamen from the other countries and deny them overtime pay. They also backed the convention's proposal for a fifty-six-hour week at sea and a forty-eight-hour week at port, an Indian seamen's delegate, Aftab Ali, playing a crucial role in securing its passage. Yet not only did Britain's National Union of Seamen reject the Geneva convention and negotiate a longer working week (of sixty-four hours at sea and fifty-six hours at port) for seamen on British vessels, it also accepted exceptional treatment for Indian crews by agreeing to a longer transition for them, unregulated hours on sailing days, and overtime compensation in the form of time off rather than wages!³²

Despite attempts by Indian unions to deploy a more universalistic idiom of working-class solidarity, the British unions' persistent refusal to dignify them as workers instead of condemning them as coolies ironically meant that universalist categories and aspiring subjectivities of class were remorselessly dominated by those of race, nation, and empire.

IV

Though widely regarded as another marker of their inferior status and an issue of collective concern, unions of Indian seamen avoided making an issue of the rules restricting their discharge abroad for fear of confronting British seamen's unions. Even though geographical and seasonal restrictions on the employment of Indian seamen were forcing many companies to discontinue

employing them, eliminating these restrictions was also not an overt objective of Indian unions in the 1920s. Even during the Depression, when Indian seamen were being replaced in increasing numbers by Chinese and Malay crews, Indian unions took up these restrictions cautiously, through resolutions and petitions rather than agitations.³³

On the other hand, ships began to breach these regulations on a regular basis during the 1920s and 1930s. Inquiries revealed that such breaches usually took place with the active consent and collusion of the vessels' Indian crews. From the 1930s there were also more frequent reports of Indian seamen jumping ship at Singapore, acquiring Malay certificates, and engaging on articles that did not contain these restrictions and offered higher wages in the bargain.³⁴

Thus markers of difference where collective union initiatives might attract the opposition of British seamen's unions were largely left to ships' crews or individual seamen to negotiate. Initiative by individual seamen mainly often took the form of desertion in pursuit of work and residence at British ports. Desertions grew particularly pronounced during the interwar years and the Second World War, and by 1945 a few thousand Indian seamen had jumped ship to re-engage on British articles or seek jobs in harbors, mines, and factories. Peddling cloth and household wares was another activity that they soon made their own, while the more enterprising and successful ones established dockside boardinghouses and cafés in working-class neighborhoods that became important nodes in the networks of circulation of Indian workers in Britain. By now liaisons and marriages between Indian seamen and European women were also becoming common enough for public officials and middle-class commentators to regard them as a pressing "social problem."³⁵

A majority of Indian seamen who deserted their vessels and sought employment ashore did so in Britain. But desertions were also frequent at other ports, such as Singapore, at European ports, and, despite restrictions on the landing of Asian seamen, at U.S. ports as well. The career of "John" Mohamed Jan (or Mohamed Ali John) illustrates, without any claim to being emblematic, the possibilities and dangers facing an enterprising Indian seaman willing to use the possibility of employment at sea as a means of exploring opportunities in the industrial west.

Jan Mohamed was born in the Ferozepur district of Punjab in 1897. He first signed up to serve on a British vessel in 1914 and continued going to sea during the war. In 1918 his ship, the *Gorsemore*, was torpedoed, and Jan Mohamed was decorated for heroism. Landed in Britain with the rest of the *Gorsemore's* crew, Jan Mohamed soon got himself a British discharge

book and engaged to serve on British vessels. He was discharged from one in London in May 1919 and left for India shortly afterwards as a passenger. Later the same year he joined a vessel at Bombay bound for New York. Jumping ship at New York, Jan Mohamed worked there and in Detroit for some years, acquiring in the process a bank balance of \$250 and clothes and other possessions. In June 1921, as John Mohamed Ali, he also became a naturalized American citizen, only to lose his citizenship in October 1923 following the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the Bhagat Singh Thind case that its definition of "Caucasian" in the famous *Ozawa v. the United States* (1922) case did not apply to those born in India.

But unlike Thind or the less-well-known Niaz Mohammed, who also arrived in the United States as a merchant seaman and worked in the auto industry in Detroit before becoming a successful Californian farmer, Jan Mohamed was forced to return to India.³⁶ After a short spell in India, Jan Mohamed arrived in Antwerp in April 1925 on a Finnish ship the *Navigator* that he had boarded as a stowaway in Bombay. But upon being discovered, he entered the ship's articles as a European seaman. Denied entry into Britain at Harwich, where he had arrived from Antwerp, Jan Mohamed stowed away once again and arrived in Leith in May 1925. A few days later he had walked all the way to London where, in the words of one Whitehall official, Jan Mohamed "proceeded to assume an . . . international, importance by his applications to the Board of Trade and this Office in connection with a claim for war risks compensation, and to the American Consulate General in connection with funds deposited in New York." For someone who was unlettered and was said to speak very little English, Jan Mohamed appears to have been very persuasive: Whitehall soon issued him a passport for the United States, and in September he found a ship bound for New York.

According to his discharge book, Jan Mohamed signed off at Hong Kong at the end of January 1926. He resurfaces in the records in September 1929, when he arrived at Antwerp aboard *Malines* and tried yet again to land at Harwich. Once more denied entry, Mohamed managed to enter Britain with practiced ease as a stowaway through Poole. Soon he was knocking on Whitehall doors for a passport that would enable him to travel to Belgium and trade in silks. Refused a passport, Jan Mohamed was obliged at the end of January 1930 to accept a travel document enabling him to proceed to India. But he did not return to India, and six months later, in July 1930, persuaded Whitehall to issue him a certificate of identity and nationality. No longer a problem as an "alien," nor evidently destitute (though how he supported himself is not at all clear), Jan Mohamed disappears now from the official records, only to reappear in wartime intelligence reports as a public

speaker—he spoke in Hindustani and “broken English” according to one report—at pro-Indian independence political meetings in the Midlands!³⁷

Jan Mohamed was an unusually itinerant seafarer. But some of his contemporaries, such as Niaz Mohammed referred to above, also appear to have used maritime employment to seek their fortune in distant lands. Aftab Ali too jumped ship on his maiden voyage to the United States in the early 1920s in search of work, education, and experience, only to return to Calcutta within a few years to become a trade union activist, a leader of Calcutta’s seamen’s union, and, a couple of decades later, the first Minister for Labor in East Pakistan.³⁸ Some, such as Charlie Abdul, seem to have jumped ship in search of adventure or in protest (or both).³⁹ However, most Indian seamen who decided to pursue occupations abroad would have already spent many years at sea on Indian articles of agreement. Among the better known were Tofussil Ali, who was probably the first Indian to own a boardinghouse in London in 1913; it soon began to do roaring business because of the patronage of shipowners looking for accommodation for their crews ashore in London. Ayub Ali Master jumped ship in the United States in 1919, but later established a boardinghouse and café in East London that was widely known to Bengali sailors around the world by its street address, “Number 13,” as the first refuge of deserters.⁴⁰ Surat Ali arrived in Britain during World War I; there he combined several roles: boardinghouse keeper, supplier of crews and ship-chandler, trade-unionist who also founded an Oriental film artistes union, communist activist, wartime reservist and air raid warden, and, according to some accounts, a police informer.⁴¹ Other prominent deserters included Tofussil or Tahsil Meah, Surat Ali’s rival in East London, who was deported from Britain for his nationalist political activities;⁴² Ghulam Rasul (or Glamour Sole as he once styled himself), who after an early career at sea became a peddler, small businessman, and at one stage a communist activist in Britain;⁴³ and M. A. Majid, who established himself as an organizer of Indian seamen and a labor broker in Singapore.⁴⁴ An interesting subaltern attempt at a crossover identity or self-representation is offered by the case of the Indian seaman at a South Shields port, Jiwan, who represented himself as Ji Wan!⁴⁵

Besides working in mines and factories, and owning or running boardinghouses and cafés, scores of Indian seamen turned to peddling and petty trade.⁴⁶ This strategy became so widespread that the image of the Indian “coolie” was briefly supplanted in the British imagination by that of the “peddler.” London had a substantial concentration of Indian peddlers beginning in the 1920s. In the early 1930s, that is, about the same time that Gandhi’s foreign boycott and civil disobedience campaigns were under way in India,

newspapers in the Midlands, the northern parts of England, and Scotland began to publish alarming reports about the presence of Indian peddlers in these areas.⁴⁷ Local tradesmen complained of competition, while the Bolton Chamber of Commerce proposed a boycott of Indian peddlers! Referring to the latter proposal, a leader in the *Manchester Guardian* remarked that such a move “would at least serve to illustrate just what an economic boycott is and just what causes it.” Gandhi, the paper speculated, may have sent Indian peddlers

to illustrate a principle that mere words have proved inadequate to explain. . . . It is possible. He is a wily mahatma, fond of exposition by parable. Or it may be that India, in the first flush of her new nationhood, is emulating the methods of our own great Empire. These inconsiderable pedlars, like the Elizabethan traders who after many perils and difficulties were able to buy and sell in India to their own great enrichment, may be called by future historians merchant adventurers, founders of an empire.⁴⁸

Police officials shared the alarm. Reporting an increase in the peddlers’ licenses granted to Indians, a Liverpool police officer wrote that “in all the villages and suburbs . . . one sees . . . coloured pedlars going from door to door.”⁴⁹ A CID official confirmed that Indian peddlers were present “in all the surrounding villages and suburbs,” travelling “even to the remotest villages.” Most were deserters who made no secret of it when applying for licenses. “This goes to prove the extent of their knowledge as to our powers of dealing with them.”⁵⁰

V

Most studies of colonial workers in metropolitan contexts focus on their structural incorporation and subjection. This is a valid, important, even a legitimately central, emphasis. Yet it carries some dangers, notably the tendency to reproduce shared metropolitan and local elite representations and stereotypes about these workers, their subjectivities, and their capacity for agency.

The world of seafaring in this period was a harsh and unequal one: shipowners were tyrannical employers, ships oppressive workplaces, and officers oppressive bosses. States acquiesced in the oppression. Merchant vessels also employed vast numbers of low-paid colonial seamen, who in addition to enduring oppressive conditions suffered the indignity of being an under-class of “coolies” deprived of support and solidarity from western workers.

Indian seamen were especially vulnerable because besides low wages and long working hours, the means that employers and the state used to regulate them, such as hiring and control through intermediaries, and restrictions on their movements, engagements, and discharges, affirmed their difference as “coolies,” standing, if at all, only in the penumbra of freedom.

The derogatory collective appellation was never entirely abandoned. Yet from World War II the means of disciplining Indian seamen became more nuanced. Apart from concerns emerging directly from the war, the new strategy also reflected the success of Indian seamen, whether individually or collectively through their unions and as shipping crews, in eluding the disciplinary mechanisms characteristic of their mode of employment and exposing in some degree presumptions of power and privilege in discourses of inclusion and equality—be it the imperial rhetoric about inclusive colonial subjecthood, the wartime rhetoric about democracy, or British trade unionists’ claims of international working-class solidarity.

To some extent the nature of the agency hinges on the challenges to which it responds. But in situating the actions of Indian seamen in international shipping, we should not ignore their fluid, blurred, subjectivities, and their always evolving travelogs of experiences and ideas. Indian seamen inhabited many more states than colonial workers who are all too often condemned as “premodern” by employers, the colonial state, and historians. It is easy to overdo the contrast. Yet we need to be alert to the possibility that their voyages and experiences enabled Indian seamen to develop distinct subjectivities that perhaps also resonated within their communities and their own life-stories outside and beyond their careers at sea.

NOTES

Much of the research for this chapter was undertaken with the help of a grant from the Swiss National Science Foundation, which is thankfully acknowledged.

1. Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000). W. Jeffrey Bolster, *Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).

2. Conrad Dixon, “Lascars: The Forgotten Seamen,” in R. Ommer and G. Panting, eds., *The Working Men who Got Wet* (St. John’s, Newfoundland: Memorial University Press, 1980). Frank Broeze, “The Muscles of Empire: Indian Seamen and the Raj, 1919–1939,” *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 18, no. 1 (1981). Rozina Visram, *Ayahs, Lascars, and Princes* (London: Pluto Press, 1986) provides an account of the “lascar” presence in Britain since the early eighteenth century; the politics of racial difference are explored in Laura Tabili, *“We Ask for British Justice”: Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain*

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); also see in this connection, G. Balachandran, "Conflicts in the International Maritime Labour Market: British and Indian Seamen, Employers, and the State, 1890–1939," *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 39, no. 1 (2002).

3. Kenneth McPherson, *The Muslim Microcosm: Calcutta, 1918 to 1935* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1974).

4. See the police intelligence reports in British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections (OIOC) L/PJ/12/46 and 12/47.

5. Public Record Office, London (PRO), MT9/5879 M. 221, Reports of the Secretary, Calcutta Liners' Conference.

6. Dixon, "Lascars," p. 281. Ronald Hope, *A New History of British Shipping* (London: J. Murray, 1990), pp. 383, 392.

7. National Archives of India (NAI), Government of India, Finance and Commerce Department, Statistics and Commerce Branch, (hereafter GI, FC-SC), March 1901, 135–42 A, enclosures to A.M.'s note, October 8, 1900, pp. 46–51.

8. Dixon, "Lascars," p. 281; these numbers understate the increase because until the 1900s the term "lascar" often included Chinese, African, and Arab crews hired at ports in British India, as well as crews shipped from Colombo and Singapore.

9. *Daily Herald*, May 24, 1939; Hope, *British Shipping*, pp. 383, 392.

10. Captain W. H. Hood, *The Blight of Insubordination: The Lascar Question and Rights and Wrongs of the British Shipmaster including the Mercantile Marine Committee Report* (London: Spottiswode and Co., 1903), pp. 49–50.

11. PRO, Board of Trade, MT9/469B, M 4354/1894, note, March 8, 1893.

12. January 16, 1902.

13. For three widely separated instances over fifty years, see PRO, MT9/469B, Commons question by J. H. Wilson, March 1893; OIOC, L/E/7/1123, Commons questions on the sinking of the *Egypt* in 1923; and L/E/9/970, Commons question, October 17, 1940.

14. Hood, *Blight of Insubordination*, pp. 10–13.

15. NAI, Revenue, Agriculture, and Commerce Department (RAC), Commerce and Trade (CT), Merchant Shipping (MS), June 1877, 9–22 A; GI, CI-MS, November 1905, 1–11 A, Bombay Chamber of Commerce to the government, June 15, 1904; RAC, CT, August 1876, 1–17, complaint of the Bombay shipping master; Finance and Commerce (FC), Statistics and Commerce Branch (SC), May 1886, 640–50 B, views of the chairman of the Committee on Seamen's Recruitment in Calcutta; GI, FC-SC, October 1889, 512–20 A; October 1892, 566–75 A.

16. NAI, GI-60-MI/31, September 1931, 1A, note by C. A. Innes, June 5, 1922.

17. National Maritime Museum (NMM), Greenwich, P&O 7/8, Asian crew manual.

18. *Pall Mall Gazette*, February 16, 1881 (copy in NMM, Greenwich, P&O, 101/8).

19. NAI, GI, CI-MS progs, 18–29 A–December 1907, P&O's letter to Secretary of State, December 12, 1906.

20. G. Balachandran, "Searching for the *Sardar*: The State, Precapitalist Institutions, and Human Agency in the Maritime Labour Market," in B. Stein and S. Subrahmanyam, eds., *Institutions and Economic Change in South Asia* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996); G. Balachandran, "Circulation through Seafaring: Indian Seamen, 1890–1945," in C. Markovits, J. Pouchepadass, and S. Subrahmanyam, eds., *Society and Circulation: Mobile Peoples and Itinerant Cultures in South Asia, 1750–1950* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003).

21. Balachandran, "Searching for the *Sardar*," pp. 213–215.
22. For a discussion of the making of this compact in the context of lodgings ashore in Britain, see Tabili, "*We Ask for British Justice*," pp. 58–66.
23. The template response was enshrined in the Mercantile marine committee, *Report* (British parliamentary papers, Cd 1607, vol. 1, London, 1903) §14–16.
24. Balachandran, "Conflicts," pp. 82–90; Tabili, "*We Ask for British Justice*," pp. 122–134.
25. Broeze, "Muscles of Empire," pp. 45–48.
26. J. Salter, *The East in the West or Work among the Asiatics and Africans in London* (London, 1896?), chap. 10.
27. NAI, GI, CD-LS, June 1922, 1–30 A, Bengal Government, Department of Industries, note, September 1921. By now many Indian seamen possessed British trade union "tickets."
28. Balachandran, "Searching for the *Sardar*."
29. OIOC, L/E/9/970, note on "Genoa Convention on Seamen, 1920," March 24, 1934; more generally L/E/7/1350, f. 1256. Even British communists organized Indian seamen only in secret in order not to lose the support of white seamen: L/PJ/12/143, "Indians in London," secret intelligence report, June 2, 1923.
30. Both the *Seaman*, which was the newspaper of the national union of seamen, and the *Daily Herald*, which spoke for the Labor Party, carried several reports between late 1929 and the summer of 1930 demanding the elimination of "Chinese, Lascars, Kroo boys, etc. from British ships"; see for example the *Seaman*, November 29, and the *Daily Herald*, December 8, 1929. Balachandran, "Conflicts," pp. 87–90; more generally Tabili, "*We Ask for British Justice*," pp. 81–112.
31. Balachandran, "Conflicts," pp. 93–100.
32. PRO, MT9/2778 F. 3308, letters between Foley (Board of Trade) and Bates (a Liverpool shipowner), March–May 1938.
33. OIOC, L/E/9/970, Indian Trade Union Federation resolution, September 12 and National Seamen's Union resolution, December 26, 1932; petition to government of Bengal, April 30, 1932.
34. Several instances are noted in OIOC, L/E/9/970. With the crews complicit, masters offered transparently flimsy excuses, the captain of *Baron Vernon* claiming he could not read the articles because of "an exceptionally dense fog practically all the way across" to Boston!
35. PRO, MT9/3952 F. 6457, "An investigation into conditions of the coloured population in a Stepney area," May 1944. Similar studies were conducted at other places.
36. On Niaz Mohammed, see http://www.pbs.org/rootsinthesand/f_moh_home1.html, accessed April 5, 2005.
37. This account is based on OIOC, L/E/7/1390 F. 2503, L/PJ/12/645, and PRO, HO45/13750.
38. Caroline Adams, *Across Seven Seas and Thirteen Rivers: Life Stories of Pioneer Sylheti Settlers in Britain* (London: Eastside Books, 1987), pp. 59–64.
39. NAI, MS-CI, 17–24 A; between 1904 and 1908 Abdul jumped ship at Takoma, Shanghai, Hong Kong, London, Cardiff, and Bahia, refusing at London and Cardiff to work his way out of Britain unless offered European rates of pay.
40. On Ayub Ali and Tofussil Ali, whose later career she appears, however, to confuse with that of Surat Ali, see Adams, *Across Seven Seas*, pp. 41–44.

41. Adams, *Across Seven Seas*, p. 44, though it is not clear whether the reference is to Surat or Tofussil Ali; also Rozina Visram, *Asians in Britain: 400 Years of History* (London: Pluto Press, 2002) pp. 239–253; OIOC, L/PJ/12/630, L/PJ/12/646, L/E/9/976, L/E/9/977; PRO, MT9/3657 M. 14184.
42. OIOC, L/PJ/12/452 and L/PJ/12/630.
43. OIOC, L/PJ/12/50, intelligence report, August 26, 1925; L/E/9/972, pp. 146–166.
44. Modern Records Centre, Warwick (MRC), NUS papers, MSS 175A Box 126; PRO, ADM1/22978 and ADM1/22979.
45. PRO, HO45/15774, South Shields chief constable's letter, March 22, 1929 and November 7, 1931.
46. For accounts of others, see Adams; also Yousuf Choudhury, *Roots and Tales of the Bangladeshi Settlers* (Birmingham: Sylheti Social History Group, 1993). Comparable life stories are not available for seafarers from other regions of the Indian subcontinent.
47. The *Glasgow Weekly Record*, October 18, 1930; also see the *Manchester Evening News* and the *Manchester Evening Chronicle*, March 20, 1931; the *Daily Despatch*, March 23, 1931.
48. The *Manchester Guardian*, March 20, 1931.
49. Thomas M. Blagg to chief inspector, Liverpool, October 28, 1930, in OIOC, L/E/9/962.
50. Report to chief constable, November 26, 1930, in OIOC, L/E/9/962.

Transgressors



Marking Water

Piracy and Property in the Premodern West

Emily Sohmer Tai

Discourse around the political entity, or *polity*, has often been informed by concretized notions of what Marvin Becker called the “territorial state”—defined by Max Weber as a “compulsory organization with a territorial basis.”¹ Weber’s reference to compulsion nonetheless implies that the state is an improvised, artificial construct.

In this essay I argue that maritime theft, or *piracy*, exposes the economic and political dimensions of a consequent antagonism between land and sea, originating in the ways in which water submerges the territorial parameters that support a state’s claim to sovereignty. While the ostensible objective of maritime predation is economic gain, I show that maritime theft should also be understood as competitive interaction between political interests that seek to territorialize the sea and commercial interests that resist this project of territorialization. Thus, maritime theft can represent contention not merely for material resources, but for *political capital*—political advantage utilized either to reinforce or challenge territorial order.

Studies of world piracy have focused principally upon contingent definitions of piracy as privately motivated maritime theft in the context of imperial systems from antiquity to the present.² My conclusions, however, are drawn from my study of interaction between Europeans in the Mediterranean basin over the twelfth through fifteenth centuries.³ The overlooked utility of the medieval Mediterranean as a spatial and temporal frame for examining piracy presents what I suggest is a modest case for “bringing” medieval Europe “back in” to the broader enterprise of studying world history.⁴

Contingencies in the definition of medieval maritime theft were configured by the conditions of its practice among the various lordships, civic republics, and monarchies that adapted the legal formulations of the Roman *imperium* and the classical *civitas* to claim title to polity in medieval Europe.⁵ Medieval jurists echoed Roman law in terming the pirate *hostis humani generis* (enemy to all mankind).⁶ Medieval statutory law condemned indiscriminate maritime thieves to capital penalties. The *piracy* these sea-robbers

practiced was distinct, however, from selective maritime theft, conducted at the behest of a sovereign polity against merchant shipping that was flying the standard of that polity's political and economic rivals. Medieval statutes alternately termed this practice *ire ad piraticam* (to sail or go as a pirate) and *ire in cursum* (going "in cursum"), from which may be derived a verb, *corsairing*, and a noun for those who undertook it, *corsairs*.⁷

Specialized scholarship has studied the way in which initiatives to distinguish pirates from corsairs supported the growth of the western European polity between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries through the extension of sovereignty over the means of justice and the use of force.⁸ On the seas, force was the prerogative of corsairs, often appointed as admirals (*admirati*) to wage the *guerre de course*, plundering the merchant cargo of rival powers in operations often indistinguishable from those of what might be termed "conventional" wartime fleets. Practiced alongside, or in between, periods of belligerence, sanctioned maritime theft offset the fiscal burdens of competition among European polities for economic hegemony and political control over what Fernand Braudel has termed the "smaller seas" of the Mediterranean basin.⁹ Corsairs figured prominently, for example, in a series of conflicts fought between the medieval maritime republic of Genoa with its rivals Venice and the Crown of Catalonia-Aragon between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries.¹⁰

Corsair captains further asserted sovereignty over seascapes in voyages of patrol to counter unsanctioned piracy along disputed waterways and littorals. The maritime republic of Venice presents one of the clearest examples of how these operations assisted the project of territorializing maritime space, or "marking water," in a manner that replicated imperial behavior in microcosm. The transactions of Venice's governing Senate echo the Roman expression *mare nostrum* in characterizing Venice's adjacent Adriatic sea as *nostro culfo/gulfò*. Frederic Lane, Alberto Tenenti, Irene Katele, and others have studied the role that Senate-appointed "Captains of the Gulf" played in the process of enforcing these proprietary claims in expeditions of protective surveillance about the Adriatic and Venetian colonies in the Aegean. Piratical activity created a rationale for Venetian captains to interrupt shipping flying the flag of polities hostile to Venice and execute foreign corsairs as "pirates."¹¹

The maritime republic of Genoa similarly utilized corsairs to advance parallel aspirations to dominion over Levantine colonies and Genoa's adjacent Tyrrhenian basin. Genoa nonetheless faced competition for the latter from the Crown of Catalonia-Aragon and resistance from smaller towns along the Ligurian coast. Factions within Genoa's merchant nobility mean-

while resorted to piracy in struggles for civic control. Such conditions gave rise to essentializing stereotypes of the Genoese as pirate that may be noted in both medieval sources and contemporary Genoese historiography.¹²

Modern scholarship has interpreted the utilization of corsairs to protect trade and suppress piracy as evidence of an alliance between emerging polities and their subject urban nobility, who acted as agents of maritime commerce, or *merchants*. Polities sought maritime dominion. Merchants welcomed the protection corsair expeditions afforded from piracy, characterized as an “anti-economic activity.”¹³ Such formulations nest medieval European experience within broader analyses that attribute the rise of capitalism in the sixteenth-century West to cooperation between commercial interests and the nascent western European state.¹⁴ References to the obstructions—actual and anticipated—that pirate and corsair activity posed to trade in merchant letters and archival records appear to substantiate these assumptions.¹⁵

Other evidence nonetheless suggests that projects to territorialize the seas and control maritime theft were more ambivalently perceived by merchants, who often shared a common outlook and experience with corsairs in the medieval Mediterranean. The parameters of this connection may be literally discerned in visual sources for the medieval Mediterranean: portolan charts. Earliest dated to the thirteenth century, portolan charts are distinctive as the sole category of medieval European maps that endeavor to depict space accurately. As Daniel Smail has shown, mapping traditions in the medieval West were limited largely to the idealized *mappaemundi* that represented Jerusalem, the Heavenly City, in their center. But in these portolan charts, over 180 of which are extant, appear some of the earliest physical representations of western European towns. As may be noted in the two fifteenth-century charts reproduced from the collection of the James Ford Bell Library (Figures 12.1 and 12.2), images of the sea were bordered by depictions of land marked with symbols to signify geographical features like mountain ranges, and banners to denote political loyalties.¹⁶

The contrasts evident in these maps suggest a tension between territorially bounded land and unmarked sea. The Mediterranean of these medieval portolan charts is a vast highway between a catena of coastal way stations. The practical objective of portolan mapping projects was to render this highway manageable and navigable. Yet these charts appear to have been produced with a secondary aim of *territorializing* the sea. Depictions of maritime space are intertwined with renderings of coastal territory. The relative strength, size, and commercial importance of varying towns along these coastlines are coded in contrasting reds and grays.¹⁷ Occasionally, partisan loyalties arising from these disparities compromise exactitude, as when



Figure 12.1. Petrus Roselli, *Portolan Chart*, c. 1466 (Bell 1466mRo). Courtesy of the James Ford Bell Library, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

the late fifteenth-century Albini de Canepa depicted his native Genoa as larger than Venice.¹⁸

Although portolan charts served principally as tools of merchant navigation, they also appear to have assisted the project of corsairing. The earliest chart is said to have been executed for the Genoese admiral Benedetto Zaccaria. King Peter IV the Ceremonious of Catalonia-Aragon (1336–1386) required every ship armed for naval aggression in his domain to be equipped with at least two portolan charts.¹⁹

Simply as an aid to navigation, the contours of the portolan chart suggest that the Mediterranean highway unified corsairs and merchants. Archival records that document the investment—and even participation—of medieval merchants in privateering ventures suggest this unity could seed explicit collaboration.²⁰ Maritime experience meanwhile afforded a mobility that enabled merchants and captains to transcend the political rivalries that divided territorial Europe. A body of literature written by and for merchants complemented the visual instruction of the portolan chart with glossaries of foreign terms and currencies, along with strategies for success in lands rendered strange by differences of language, religion, and culture.²¹ In his *Libro dell'arte di mercatura* (The book of the art of the merchant, 1458), the fifteenth-century Benedetto Cotrugli advised colleagues to be flexible in choosing their city of residence according to the favor local laws accorded




Figure 12.2. *Albini de Canepa, Portolan Chart, 1489 (Bell 1489mCa)*. Courtesy of the James Ford Bell Library, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

commerce. For Cotrugli, the mobility merchants acquired at sea allowed a means to escape the constraints of territorial sovereignty.²²

Mobility was also reflected in the composition of pirate and corsair crews. For practitioners of maritime theft, the sea became a nexus for cross-cultural and cross-political alliance. Corsairs, as purveyors of what Thomson has called “extra-territorial violence,” made their services available as a species of market commodity, which could be purchased for pay across civic, political, and religious lines.²³ The thirteenth-century Venetian Marino Sanudo Torsello, for example, describes pirate and corsair expeditions in the Aegean manned by Venetians, Genoese, Provençals, and Catalans.²⁴ Venetian and Catalan sources document the service of Genoese corsairs to monarchs of Castile, France, and Sicily, as well as Byzantine emperors.²⁵ A cartulary, preserved in the Antico comune division of Genoa’s Archivio di Stato, documents similar diversity among participants in a Genoese patrol expedition to counter piratical activity off Corsica and Sardinia in 1402. Of the 178 crewmembers, 63, or 35 percent, hailed from points beyond Genoa, including the Byzantine Levant, and sites under the jurisdiction of Venice and the Crown of Aragon.²⁶

Alongside their charge to patrol adjacent waters, corsairs bore an ad-

ditional duty to compel merchants to confine themselves to commerce with political allies. The open space of the maritime highway worked, nonetheless, against such a project—which merchants, for their part, often actively sought to undermine. A vast body of archival records indicate that the commercial network of the medieval Mediterranean comprehended not merely Europeans subject to various jurisdictions hostile at home in Europe, but Muslims and Byzantines as well.²⁷ Notarial documents from the Archivio di Stato in Genoa detail a steady trade in commodities, particularly salt, within the western Mediterranean basin that consistently linked subjects of the Crowns of Castile, France, Catalonia-Aragon, and Naples with residents of Genoa's Ligurian coastal towns.²⁸ Merchants sometimes ran significant risks to conduct this trade. The Raspe registers that record the decisions of Venice's civic attorneys, the *Avogadori di comun*, for example, document the imposition, on October 23, 1347, of a £500 fine upon a captain who had sold grain in defiance of current prohibitions.²⁹ An entry of 1378 records the imprisonment of Romeus de Gualfredi of Chioggia for sailing *ad terras inimicorum*—presumably to Genoese territory—to load a salt cargo during Venice's war with Genoa over Tenedos (1378–1381).³⁰

Throughout the Mediterranean, corsairs and admirals were accordingly allowed considerable latitude in their authority to enforce commercial restrictions. Various passages in the foremost compilations of medieval maritime law and custom, the thirteenth-century *Llibre del Consolat de Mar*, indicate that corsair captains were free to seek and seize cargo designated as “enemy” in times of belligerence, or *contraband*, even aboard allied, or “friendly” ships, uninhibited by any elaboration of what would come, by the seventeenth century, to be known as *neutrality*.³¹ Corsairs were even authorized to inflict torture to discover infractions.³² In 1412, for example, the Venetian captain Antonio Faso was tortured by Genoese corsairs for defending Catalan merchants and cargo aboard his ship.³³

The comprehensive powers wielded by corsairs, together with the absence of neutrality, carried hazards for medieval merchants. Some captains abused their authority to board and search vessels to camouflage acts that crossed from corsairing into piracy. Between 1200 and 1410 at least 750 suits advancing allegations of such corsair malfeasance were litigated in various courts throughout the Mediterranean. In these records, individual merchants, or groups of investors, accused an attacker, usually identified by name, of robbing them violently (*violenter*) and *in more* or *in modo piratico* (in a piratical fashion or manner) despite conditions of “friendship”—that is, a preexisting treaty, or alliance. On the basis of these accusations, merchant

plaintiffs introduced an action for *restitution*: return of the stolen cargo, or its value in civil damages.³⁴

The mediation of disputes over restitution particularly conferred political capital in the affirmation of control over ships and individuals and the opportunities these actions afforded to name pirates and define piracy. Restitution proceedings built a juridic bridge between the grievances of individual merchants, their polities, and the polities of those maritime aggressors they accused. However these suits might be resolved, both polities derived benefits from proceedings that affirmed sovereignty over these various agents, either in acting as their advocate or in proceeding as their judge. Restitution, when disbursed, could function as a diplomatic “safety-valve” that prevented hostilities from escalating into full-scale conflicts. The mechanics of judicial process—from the redaction of petitions to their final adjudication—could also contribute revenue to the polity.³⁵

Restitution suits often named the waters in which an attack had taken place by their adjacent territories. Petitions from the archives of the Crown of Aragon referred, for example, to the “seas of Tripoli,” or “the seas of Sardinia.”³⁶ Plaintiffs seldom met with success seeking damages from polities claiming jurisdiction over coastal waters or ports in which a seizure had taken place, however.³⁷ Successful actions, rather, attributed liability from conditions that had territorialized the extraterritorial space of the ship, such as symbols and cartularies that identified and recorded the provenance of vessels and cargo. These symbols were argued to have obliged those at sea to honor laws and agreements forged on land.³⁸ The settlement of an inquest adjudicated by judges for the Crown of Catalonia-Aragon in 1361, for example, was impeded by the disappearance of the cartulary that could have established whether a Crown corsair, Pere Madir of Sassari, had really seized “enemy” cargo aboard the Genoese *panfilo Santa Julia*, or the property of Genoese and Florentine merchants, in violation of Genoa’s truce with the Crown, as the *Santa Julia*’s captain, “Garva of Portovenere,” alleged.³⁹

Merchants who accused corsairs of unjust seizure could occasionally be shown to have been carrying contraband in violation of treaty restrictions on commerce with an ally’s enemies. In some cases, cargo had been shipped under a “false flag,” or misrepresented provenance. Thus, incidents represented by merchant plaintiffs as *piracy* could be interpreted as legitimate *corsairing*, aimed at curtailing enemy trade.⁴⁰ Merchant transgression of the limitations belligerence imposed could be explicit—as, for example, in 1353, when Venetians at war with Genoa attacked a Genoese ship on which Catalan mariners and merchants had been traveling despite the Crown’s concur-

rent alliance with Venice.⁴¹ In other incidents Catalan captains violated the spirit, rather than the letter, of royal treaties with Venice and Genoa, by carrying cargo bearing the marks of both republics during their aforementioned war over Tenedos (1378–1381).⁴²

The evidence of merchant transgression preserved in these records suggests that political and commercial interests could be perceived as distinct in the premodern West. The efforts of aggrieved merchants to obtain rights to retaliatory seizure, or *reprisal*, when restitution was not forthcoming, provides further evidence of this divorce. Actions of reprisal united merchants and corsairs as agents of maritime seizure. Reprisals, moreover, merged land and sea, as grants of reprisal, or *letters of marque*, were valid across maritime and territorial space.

By the mid-1300s those who sought reprisal were nonetheless often subject to rigorous inquiries into the validity of their claims. In 1322, for example, two merchants of Tarragona, Francesc Mir and Bernat Capella, received a letter of marque against subjects of the Crown of Naples for a corsair attack that had occurred nine years earlier. In the interim Crown judicial officers conducted an inquest that solicited testimony from merchants and consuls in Naples and Amalfi.⁴³ Between 1350 and 1500, grants of reprisal were progressively restricted across the Mediterranean. Not only did the number of awards decline; those reprisals that were granted were subject to increasing restrictions upon their exercise.⁴⁴

Restitution proceedings also afforded a means to oversee corsairs. By the late 1200s apprehensions that corsairs would exceed their commissions had given rise to statutory provisions that corsairs departing upon sanctioned voyages *in cursum* should tender a financial deposit—what British admiralty records would term *caution money*—to royal or municipal officials as guarantee that cargo subject to an allied or “friendly” flag would be spared seizure.⁴⁵ While restitution could be disbursed from these funds, errant corsairs sometimes faced additional disciplinary proceedings. In 1327, for example, the Crown of Catalonia-Aragon’s governor in Sardinia investigated charges that the admiral Guillem de Llor had illicitly seized vessels and cargo at Tunis, Sicily, and Sardinia, tortured those aboard, and appropriated supplies for his ships from other Catalan vessels.

Although the records of this investigation do not indicate whether de Llor was punished, other proceedings at Genoa and Venice nonetheless suggest that errant corsairs faced increasingly stringent penalties over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.⁴⁶ The *Diversorum* (transactions) of Genoa’s governing Council of Elders (Anziani) record various decisions in which corsairs were compelled to return illicitly acquired cargo

between 1380 and 1382.⁴⁷ In 1423 a Genoese corsair, Filippo de Vivaldi, was ordered to return goods appropriated from a group of Castilian merchants, even though they had been shipping their cargo as Catalan to avoid trouble with enemy Portuguese.⁴⁸ Other corsairs were subject to similar judgments over the following decade.⁴⁹ By 1425 Genoa's Anziani were issuing lists of commodities that would and would not be considered contraband, explicitly circumscribing the parameters of corsair activity.⁵⁰ In 1426 the Anziani banished Tommaso Grimaldi for attacking the vessel of Venetian Xandro Mauro during peacetime.⁵¹

Venice's Raspe registers indicate that Venetian captains were closely monitored. Corsairs who failed to deliver victory in battle could face suspension or even imprisonment.⁵² Corsairs who overstepped their commissions similarly faced strong sanctions. In 1386 Venetian corsairs Paolo Querini and Francesco Bembo were condemned to fines, imprisonment, and five-year suspensions from command for their attack on a Majorcan vessel.⁵³ Harsher penalties awaited Venetian captains who attacked fellow Venetians. On July 27, 1347, a certain Marcheti and several accomplices were sentenced to death by hanging for exploiting their appointments as customs officials to rob the ship of Giovanni de Lonçano.⁵⁴ By 1415, Venice's Maggior Consiglio decreed banishment for any customs officer who engaged in so much as extortion.⁵⁵

Political capital was located, finally, in the opportunity these proceedings provided to condemn corsairs as pirates, when corsairs had been dispatched to challenge assertions of sovereignty with counterassertions of independent polity. The Crown of Catalonia-Aragon's claims to rule Sardinia, were, for example, opposed by the judges of Arborea and the viscounts of Narbonne, who commissioned maritime commanders to raid Catalan shipping on their behalf. In 1369 Crown authorities implicitly repudiated the legitimacy of these actions as they tortured and executed one such captain, the Provençal Jean Bourguignon, as a pirate.⁵⁶ The maritime republic of Genoa similarly utilized its *Officium Robarie* (Robbery Office) to counter challenges from captains who sailed from the Ligurian port of Savona to oppose Genoese claims of dominion over their town during the 1390s.⁵⁷

In studying contingent definitions of piracy, Alfred Rubin, Janice Thomson, and Anne Pérotin-Dumon have argued that essentialist, or what Rubin calls *naturalist*, characterizations of maritime theft as *piracy* have been applied to campaigns of maritime predation in pragmatic, or what Rubin calls *positivist*, ways, in order to depoliticize the political identity or objectives of those who practiced maritime theft.⁵⁸ The Malay peninsula, from which Rubin draws much of his evidence, offers geopolitical parallels to the medieval Mediterranean, insofar as here, too, organized maritime theft

served to establish a series of fluid, competitive, commercial polities under the varied governance of Muslim sultans and local chieftains before 1500.⁵⁹ During the nineteenth century, British patrol of Indonesian waters about Singapore, at the expense of local autonomy, as well as Dutch and Thai ambitions in the region, was justified by essentializing discourses about the disposition of native Malay and Chinese to practice piracy.⁶⁰ Scholars have begun to explore the ways in which these discourses found antecedents in a rich vocabulary of alterity that had demonized regional, racial, and religious difference during the Middle Ages.⁶¹ No less, however, did the contingent definition of piracy in southeast Asia draw upon the legal and historical experience of western Europeans, who had learned long before they sailed beyond the Mediterranean about the political utility of marking water.

NOTES

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1. For the territorial state, see Marvin Becker, “The Florentine Territorial State and Civic Humanism in the Early Renaissance,” in Nicolai Rubinstein, ed., *Florentine Studies* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968) and Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 3 vols. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 1:56, 65.

2. Note Alfred Rubin, *The Law of Piracy* (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1998), esp. pp. 366–381; Anne Pérotin-Dumon, “The Pirate and the Emperor: Power and the Law on the Seas, 1450–1850,” in James D. Tracy, ed., *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 196–227; Janice E. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extra-Territorial Violence in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Robert C. Ritchie, *Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); J. L. Anderson, “Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective on Maritime Predation,” *Journal of World History* 6 (1995): 175–199; and Barry Hart Dubner, *The Law of International Sea Piracy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980), pp. 11–12.

3. For this research, see E. S. Tai, “Honor Among Thieves: Piracy, Restitution, and Reprisal in Genoa, Venice, and the Crown of Catalonia-Aragon, 1339–1417” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1996).

4. Note Julius Kirshner, “Introduction: The State Is ‘Back In,’” in Julius Kirshner, ed., *The Origins of the State in Italy, 1300–1600* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 1–10.

5. Although medieval concepts of polity lie beyond the scope of this paper, see essays and works cited in Kirshner, *Origins of the State in Italy*; and Diego Quaglioni, "The Legal Definition of Citizenship in the Late Middle Ages," in Anthony Molho, Kurt Raaflaub, and Julia Emlen, eds., *City-States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy: Athens and Rome, Florence and Venice* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), pp. 155–167.

6. Rubin, *Law of Piracy*, pp. 15–18, identifies *hostis humani generis* as a misquotation of Cicero's *De officiis* III, 29, and traces the error back to Blackstone and Sir Edward Coke. The phrase is, nevertheless, found in earlier commentary by the fourteenth-century Bartolus de Sassoferrato (1313–1357) on the forty-ninth book of Justinian's *Digest*. See Bartolus de Sassoferrato, *Lucernae iuris, Tomus Sextus: Commentaria, Digesti In Secundam, Noui Partem* (Venice: Iuntas, 1596), 214v: ". . . Et non quod piratae aequiparantur hostibus fidei et principis et sunt ipso facto diffidati et possunt impune a quolibet derobari . . . hostes humani generis." I am grateful to Dr. Whitney Bagnall for bringing this reference to my attention.

7. For the term *corsair*, derived from the Latin *in cursum*, see Hélène Ahrweiler, "Course et piraterie dans la Méditerranée orientale aux IV^eme–XV^eme siècle (Empire byzantin)," in *Course et piraterie: Études présentées à la Commission internationale d'histoire maritime à l'occasion de son XVe colloque international pendant le XIVe Congrès international des sciences historiques* (San Francisco, août, 1975), 3 vols. (Paris: Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1975), 1:9–11. For medieval statutes relevant to piracy and corsairing, see "Statuti della colonia genovese di Pera," in Vincenzo Promis, ed., *Miscellanea di storia italiana edita per curia della regia deputazione di storia patria per le antiche provincie e la Lombardia* 11 (1870): 513–780, esp. 703–706, c. 144–147; 735–736, c. 206–207; *Leges genuenses*, ed. Cornelius Desimoni, Aloisius Thomas Belgrano, and Victorius Poggi, *Historiae Patriae Monumenta*, 18 (Turin: E regio typographeo apud Fratres Bocca, 1901), col. 109, 519, 943–944; and Jean-Marie Pardessus, ed., *Collection de lois maritimes antérieures au XVIII^e siècle*, 6 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1828–1845), 5:98, 349.

8. Note Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, 2 vols., trans. Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 2:866–867; Michel Mollat, "Guerre de course et piraterie à la fin du moyen-âge: Aspects économiques et sociaux. Position de problèmes," *Hansische Geschichtsbätter* 90 (1972): 1–14; idem, "De la piraterie sauvage à la course réglementée (XIV^e–XV^e siècles)," *Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome* 87 (1975): 7–25; idem, "Essai d'orientation pour d'étude de la guerre de course et la piraterie (XIII^e–XV^e siècles)," *Anuario des Estudios Medievales* 10 (1980): 743–749; and Fred-eric C. Cheyette, "The Sovereign and the Pirates, 1332," *Speculum* 45, no. 1 (1970): 40–68.

9. Braudel, *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*, 1:103–138. For admirals, see Léon Robert Ménager, *Amiratus-Ἀρχηγός: L'émirat et les origines de l'amirauté (XI^e–XIII^e siècles)* (Paris: SEVPEN, 1960).

10. Note sources and bibliography cited in M. Volkov, "La rivalità tra Venezia e Genova nel secolo XIV," *Saggi e documenti* 4 (1983): 143–181; Gherardo Ortalli and Dino Puncuh, eds., *Genova, Venezia, il Levante nei secoli XII–XIV: Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi Genova-Venezia, 10–14 marzo 2000* (Genoa: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 2001); Francesco Surdich, *Genova e Venezia fra Tre e Quattrocento* (Genoa: Fratelli Bozzi, 1970); and Giuseppe Meloni, *Genova e Aragona all'epoca di Pietro il Ceremonioso*, 3 vols. (Padua: CEDAM, 1971–1982).

11. Irene Katele, "Piracy and the Venetian State: The Dilemma of Maritime Defense in the Fourteenth Century," *Speculum* 63, no. 4 (1988): 865–889; and idem, "Captains and Corsairs: Venice and Piracy, 1261–1381" (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-

Champaign, 1986); Alberto Tenenti, "Venezia e la pirateria nel Levante: 1300–1460c," in Agostino Pertusi, ed., *Venezia e il Levante fino al secolo XV*, 2 vols. (Florence: L. S. Olschki, 1973–1974), 1:705–771; Ferruccio Sassi, "La guerra in corsa e il diritto di preda secondo il diritto veneziano," *Rivista di storia del diritto italiano* 11 (1929): 99–128, 261–296; and Frederic C. Lane, "Venetian Merchant Galleys, 1300–1324: Private and Communal Operation," in *Venice and History: The Collected Papers of Frederic C. Lane* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), pp. 193–226. The phrase *nostro culfo* occurs regularly in Venetian Senate deliberations; Archivio di Stato, Venice, (hereafter abbreviated as ASV), Senato, Deliberazioni Misti, Regs. 1–60 (1332–1440). See also Jorjo Tardic, "Venezia e la costa orientale dell'Adriatico fino al secolo XV," in Pertusi, *Venezia e il Levante*, 1:687–704.

12. References to Genoese corsair patrol are given in Archivio di Stato, Genoa, Archivio Segreto (hereafter cited as ASG, AS), *Diversorum*, Reg. 499, fol. 48v, no. 163 (May 14, 1399); fol. 77v/64v, no. 272 (June 30, 1399); and fol. 154v/168v, no. 605 (November 18, 1399). See also Gian Giacomo Musso, *Navigazione e commercio genovese con il Levante nei documenti dell'Archivio di Stato di Genova (secoli XIV–XV)* (Rome: Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali, 1975), esp. pp. 20–22. Pirate executions by Genoese corsairs are recorded by Giorgio and Giovanni Stella, *Annales genuenses*, ed. Giovanna Petti Balbi, *Rerum italicarum scriptores*, vol. 17, pt. 2 (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1975), pp. 146, 225, 236, 274, 281; and Agostino Giustiniani, *Annali della Repubblica di Genova*, 2 vols. (Genoa: G. Ferrando, 1834–1835), 2:198, 209, 235, 239, 245. For medieval stereotypes of Genoese pirates, see Benedetto Cotrugli, *Il Libro dell'Arte di Mercatura*, ed. Ugo Tucci (Venice: Arsenale, 1990), I, 10, 162; and Tai, "Honor Among Thieves," pp. 2–68.

13. For interpretations of medieval piracy as "anti-economic," see Mollat, "Guerre de course," pp. 1–13, esp. 2; Ahrweiler, "Course et piraterie," p. 8; Katele, "Captains and Corsairs," pp. 64–65; idem, "Piracy and the Venetian State," p. 886; Cheyette, "The Sovereign and the Pirates," pp. 56–66; Robert S. Burns, "Piracy as an Islamic-Christian Interface in the Thirteenth Century," *Viator* 11 (1980): 165–178, esp. 168; Frederic C. Lane, "The Economic Meaning of War and Protection," in *Venice and History*, pp. 383–398; and idem, "Economic Consequences of Organized Violence," in *Venice and History*, pp. 412–428.

14. Note Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture, and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), esp. pp. 64, 347–357; and idem, *Historical Capitalism* (London: Verso, 1983), esp. pp. 19, 48–50.

15. For merchant apprehensions concerning piracy, see Robert Brun, "Annales avignonaises de 1382 à 1410: Extraites des archives de Datini," *Mémoires de l'Institut historique de Provence* 11 (1934): 17–104; 12 (1935): 105–142; 13 (1936): 58–105; 14 (1937): 5–57, esp. 14 (1937): 23; and Cotrugli, *Il Libro dell'Arte*, I, 15, 176. ASV, *Duca di Candia* 26, *Sententiarum* (1318–1435), no. 5, fols. 231v–232 (August 23, 1373), records that Venetian Niccolò Rosso was prevented from sailing from Crete to Cyprus by a Genoese blockade in 1373; no. 8, fol. 43r (June 2, 1426), records that Turkish vessels prevented Filippo Querino and Giorgio Mercado from sailing to Salonica from Crete.

16. These two portolan charts are reprinted with permission from the James Ford Bell Library, and may be found at <http://bigbird.lib.umn.edu/jfb/>. Figure 12.1, representing the Mediterranean coasts, was executed by Petrus Roselli, c. 1466; Figure 12.2, representing Mediterranean Europe from the Atlantic to the Black Sea, was executed by Albini de Canepa in 1489. See also David Woodward, "Medieval Mappaemundi," in J. B. Harley and David Woodward, eds., *The History of Cartography*, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1987), 1:286–370; Tony Campbell, “Portolan Charts from the Late Thirteenth Century to 1500,” in Harley and Woodward, *History of Cartography*, 1:371–463; and Daniel L. Smail, *Imaginary Cartographies: Possession and Identity in Late Medieval Marseilles* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), esp. pp. 1–5.

17. Campbell, “Portolan Charts,” p. 378.

18. See Figure 12.2; and Carol Urness, *Portolan Charts* (Minneapolis: James Ford Bell Library, 1999), pp. 9–11.

19. Note Campbell, “Portolan Charts,” pp. 382, 440; Robert S. Lopez, *Genova marinara nel Duecento: Benedetto Zaccaria, ammiraglio e mercante* (Messina: G. Principato, 1933), pp. 202–203, 218, notes 106–107; Antonio de Capmany y de Montpalau, ed., *Ordenanzas de las armadas navales de la Corona de Aragón aprobadas por el Rey D. Pedro IV* (Madrid: En la Imp. Real, 1787), pp. 1–36, 55–71, 77–109, and appendix, p. 2.

20. Merchant investment in corsair expeditions in Genoa, Venice, and Barcelona is documented in “Documenti sul castello di Bonifacio nel secolo XIII,” ed. Vito Vitale, *Atti della Regia deputazione di storia patria per la Liguria*, vol. 1 (Genoa: La Deputazione, 1936); idem, “Nuovi documenti sul castello di Bonifacio nel secolo XIII,” *Atti della Regia deputazione di storia patria per la Liguria*, nuova serie, vol. 4 (68 della raccolta), fasc. 2 (Genoa: La Deputazione, 1940); Raimondo Morozzo della Rocca, ed., *Benvenuto de Brixano, notaio in Candia (1301–1302)* (Venice: Alfieri, 1950), pp. 90–91, nos. 243–245 (July 25, 1301); Antonio de Capmany y de Montpalau, *Memorias históricas sobre la marina, comercio y artes de la antigua ciudad de Barcelona*, 3 vols., reed. E. Giralt y Raventós and C. Batlle y Gallart (Barcelona: Cámara Oficial de Comercio y Navegación de Barcelona, 1961), 2:188–198, docs. 127, 128, 130; Robert S. Lopez, “Dieci documenti sulla guerra di corsa,” *Su e giù per la storia di Genova* (Genoa: Università di Genova, Istituto di Paleografia e Storia Medievale, 1975), pp. 313–327; Laura Balletto, *Mercanti, pirati, e corsari nei mari della Corsica (Sec. XII)* (Genoa: Università di Genova, Istituto di Paleografia e Storia Medievale, 1978); Tenenti, “Venezia e la pirateria,” p. 715; and Katele, “Captains and Corsairs,” pp. 232–237.

21. Note Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, *La pratica della mercatura*, ed. Allen Evans (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1936), pp. 16–19; and John E. Dotson, “Commercial Law in Fourteenth-Century Merchant Manuals,” *Medieval Encounters* 9, nos. 2–3 (2003): 204–213.

22. Cotrugli, *Il Libro dell'Arte*, I, 4, 146–147. See also Emily S. Tai, “Piracy and Law in Medieval Genoa: The *Consilia* of Bartolomeo Bosco,” *Medieval Encounters* 9, nos. 2–3 (2003): 280.

23. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns*, pp. 22–26.

24. Marino Sanudo Torsello, “Istoria del regno di Romania,” in Charles Hopf, ed., *Chroniques gréco-romanes* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1873), pp. 99–174, esp. 146–147.

25. Seven Genoese in the service of the Byzantine Emperor Michael Paleologus are listed in a Venetian document of 1278 published in Georg L. Fr. Tafel and Georg M. Thomas, eds., *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig mit besonderer Beziehung auf Byzanz und die Levante*, 3 vols. (Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1856–1857), 3:159–281. See also Gareth Morgan, “The Byzantine Claims Commission of 1278,” *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 69 (1976): 411–438. Franceschino Grimaldi, exiled from Genoa as pirate and rebel, served King Charles II of Anjou; ASV, *Libri memoriali*, I, fol. 85v (1306), indexed in Riccardo Predelli and P. Bosmin, eds., *I libri memoriali della Repubblica di Venezia: Regesti*, 8 vols. (Venice: A Spese della Società, 1876–1914), 1:67–68, no. 298. Benedetto Zaccaria and Aytone Dona served as admirals for French monarchs; see

Lopez, *Genova marinara nel Duecento*, pp. 95–130, 185–212; and Stella, *Annales genuenses*, p. 128. Conrado and Raffaello Doria served the king of Sicily; ASG, *Notai antichi*, Filze 371, Damiano Torello, filza 9 (December 2, 1337). Muntaner describes Roger de Lauria's service to Peter III of Catalonia-Aragon, and Roger de Flor's service to King Frederick III of Sicily in Ramon Muntaner, *Crònica*, in Ferran Soldevila, ed., *Les quatre grans cròniques* (Barcelona: Selecta, 1971), LXXVI; CXCIV, 728–729, 841; and H. E. Goodenough, trans., *The Chronicle of Ramon Muntaner* (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1920–1921), 1:171; 2:469.

26. ASG, Antico Comune, no. 662 (April 2, 1402).

27. Associations between Genoese and Venetians, and Genoese and Catalans, even during periods of belligerence, may be documented in the ASG; ASV; the Archivo de la Corona de Aragón; and the Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Barcelona (hereafter cited as ACA and AHCB); see Tai, "Honor Among Thieves," pp. 108–123. For Greek and Latin ties in the Levant, see Angeliki Laiou, "Venetians and Byzantines: Investigations of Forms of Contact in the Fourteenth Century," *Thesaurismata* 22 (1992): 29–43, esp. 30–31. For trade between Christians and Muslims, see Eliyahu Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), esp. pp. xix–xx, 9–56, 84–87.

28. Note esp. ASG, *Notai giudiziari*, Reg. 3, filza 24 (November 10, 1394); filza 114 (January 18, 1395); inventoried in Ausilia Roccatagliata, ed., *L'Officium Robarie del Comune di Genova (1394–1397)*, 3 vols. (Genoa: Università di Genova, Istituto de Medievistica, 1989–1994), Case VI (November 10–23, 1394), 1:27–32; XII (January 18–July 20, 1395), 1:67–83; XXXVIII (March 31, 1395–July 12, 1396), 1:315–324; LXII (July 28, 1395–May 4, 1396), 2:452–476.

29. ASV, Avogaria di Comun, Raspe, no. 3642/2 (1341–1361), fol. 30r (October 23–30, 1347).

30. Ibid., no. 3644/4 (1378–1393), fol. 7v (October 12, 1378).

31. A full text of the *Llibre del Consolat de Mar* has been edited and translated by Pardessus, vol. 2; see chap. 231; 2:303–307. See also Stanley S. Jados, *Consulate of the Sea and Related Documents* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1975), pp. 191–192; and *Monumenta Juridica: The Black Book of the Admiralty*, ed. Sir Travers Twiss, 4 vols., *Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores*, no. 55 (London: Longman and Company, 1874–1876), 3:538–547. For the term *contrabannum*, see Ernest Nys, *La guerre maritime: Étude du droit international* (Brussels: C. Muquardt, 1881), pp. 36, 40–41; Sergio Perini, ed., *Susinello Marino, notaio in Chioggia minore (1348–1364)* (Venice: Il Comitato, 2001), p. 21, doc. 11 (June 30, 1349). For neutrality in medieval Europe, see Maurice H. Keen, *The Laws of War in the Middle Ages* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 65, 141–143, 208–212; Sassi, "La guerra in corsa," p. 269; and Pitman B. Potter, *The Freedom of the Seas in History, Law, and Politics* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1934), p. 49.

32. Jacques Heers, *Gènes au XVe siècle: Activité économique et problèmes sociaux* (Paris: SEVPEN, 1961), pp. 138–139.

33. ACA, Real Cancillería, (hereafter cited as Canc.), *Procesos judiciales, Procesos en folio* 102/29 (July 22, 1412), fols. 43r–47v.

34. A survey of this evidentiary base is given in Tai, "Honor Among Thieves"; note esp. p. 621, no. 72. Crucial are the *Regesta marcarum*, or "registers of marque" maintained by the Crown of Catalonia-Aragon, ACA, Canc., Regs. 1485–1488 (1372–1386), 2010–2011 (1387–1396), 2286–2288 (1396–1409). I am grateful to Dr. Maria Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, who first brought these registers to my attention. See also ASV, *Libri commemoriali*, I–X, indexed by Predelli. For published examples of this formula, see Roberto Cessi, "La tregua fra Vene-

zia e Genova nella seconda metà del secolo XIII," *Archivio veneto tridentino* IV (1923): 38, no. V; Georg M. Thomas, ed., *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum, siue acta et diplomata res Venetas Graecas atque Levantis illustrantia*, 2 vols. (Venice: Sumptibus Societatis, 1880–1899), 1:126; Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden* 3:231–232; Antoni Rubió i Lluch, ed., *Diplomatari de l'Orient català, 1301–1409; Col·leció de documents per a la història de l'expedició catalana a Orient i dels ducats d'Atenes i Neopàtria* (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 1947), 6, doc. 5; and Louis de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*, 3 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie impériale, 1852–1861), 3:729.

35. Tai, "Honor Among Thieves," pp. 501–502, 571–573.

36. ACA, Canc., *Procesos judiciales, Procesos en quarto* 1320–1322, fol. 3v; *Procesos en quarto*, 1327D, fol. 3v–4r.

37. Tai, "Honor Among Thieves," pp. 163–169, 360–362, 372–373, 382–384, 559–562, 629–630.

38. Medieval cargo was generally marked by a symbol and/or number series, as described in ASG, Antico Comune, no. 736 (February 28, 1398), fol. 4v; and ASG, AS, *Materie Politiche*, n. 2729, Mazzo 10, *Trattati diversi*, no. 10 (May 15, 1382). See also Laura Balletto, *Genova nel Duecento: Uomini nel porto e uomini sul mare* (Genoa: Università di Genova, Istituto di Medievistica, 1983), pp. 79–80.

39. ACA, Canc., *Procesos judiciales, Procesos en quarto*, no. 1361 (June 26, 1361).

40. Nenad Fejic, "Une lettre de la municipalité de Barcelone au recteur et aux conseillers de la ville de Dubrovnik (Raguse)," in Laura Balletto, ed., *Oriente e Occidente tra medioevo ed età moderna: Studi in onore di Geo Pistarino*, 2 vols. (Genoa: Università di Genova, Istituto di Medievistica, 1997), 1:317–324; Heers, *Gênes au XVe siècle*, pp. 135–139; and Tai, "Honor Among Thieves," pp. 286–288, 355–358, 412, 561–562.

41. ACA, Canc., *Procesos judiciales, procesos en folio* 127/20 (1361), fols. 30v–31r (July 21, 1361), 31r–32r (July 23, 1361), 34r (July 6, 1361), 34v (July 31, 1361), 35v–36r (July 6, 1361), 65v (July 17, 1361), 66rv (July 24, 1361). See also Tai, "Honor Among Thieves," pp. 267–268.

42. Tai, "Honor Among Thieves," pp. 281–309, 350–367.

43. ACA, Canc., *Procesos judiciales, Procesos en quarto*, 1320–1322 (March 17, 1320–November 29, 1322).

44. For this trend to 1417, see Tai, "Honor Among Thieves," pp. 9, 310–318, 442–461, 496–498, 634–636. For 1417–1500, note ASG, AS, *Diversorum* 507, fol. 50rv, no. 125 (April 13, 1425); Reg. 509, fol. 123v, no. 420 (November 8, 1425); and ASV, Avogaria di Comun, Raspe 3649/9, fol. 71rv (August 8, 1447). In the ACA, one may note the declining number of *Regesta marcarum*. Although there are nine for 1372–1409, only three—ACA, Canc., Regs. 2924, 2925, and 3493—are extant for 1416–1478. Reg. 3493 is, moreover, half blank.

45. "Statuti," ed. Promis, 704, c. 164; "Privilèges du Grand Amiral de Sicilie de 1399," in Pardessus, *Collection de lois* 5:258; and Nys, *La guerre maritime*, p. 26.

46. ACA, Canc., *Procesos judiciales, Procesos en quarto* 1327D (August 2, 1327–September 4, 1327).

47. ASG, AS, *Diversorum*, Reg. 496, fol. 144r, no. 317 (September 4, 1380); Reg. 497, fol. 15r, no. 10 (January 13, 1382); and fol. 153rv no. 326 (December 29, 1382). See also Surdich, *Genova e Venezia*, pp. 154–156, doc. 8; and Tai, "Honor Among Thieves," pp. 409–412.

48. ASG, AS, *Diversorum*, Reg. 507, fol. 108r, no. 289 (September 10, 1423); fol. 138r, no. 398 (December 18, 1423); and Tai, "Bosco," pp. 274–276.

49. ASG, AS, *Diversorum*, Reg. 507, fol. 51r, no. 127 (April 13, 1425).

50. Ibid., Reg. 509, fols. 87r–88r, no. 292a, b, c (August 19, 1425).
51. Ibid., Reg. 510, fol. 78rv, no. 236 (June 18, 1426); fols. 118–119v, no. 330 (November 15, 1426).
52. ASV, Avogaria di Comun, Raspe, Reg. 3642/2, fols. 33v (January 14, 1351); 35v (December 9, 1351); 39r (March 29, 1351); 73r–74v (January 3–18, 1353); 77r (March 7, 1353); and Reg. 3644/4, fol. 15v (July 7, 1379). See also Camillo Manfroni, “La disciplina di marinai veneziani nel secolo XIV,” *Rivista marittima* 35 (May, 1902): 237–248; and idem, “Nuove note sulle disciplina dai marinai veneziani,” *Rivista marittima* 43 (June, 1910): 487–502.
53. ASV, Avogaria di Comun, Raspe, Reg. 3644/4 (1378–1393), fol. 3rv (May 29, 1386); and in ASV, *Deliberazione Senato, Miste*, Reg. 40, fol. 34rv (May 29, 1386). ASV, Maggior Consiglio, Deliberazioni, Reg. 21, *Leona*, (1384–1415), fol. 29r (January 20, 1389); and fols. 30v–31r (May 23, 1389) records commutation of these penalties to three-year suspensions. See also Donald E. Queller, *The Venetian Patriciate: Reality vs. Myth* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), pp. 230–231; and Tai, “Honor Among Thieves,” pp. 300–301.
54. ASV, Avogaria di Comun, Raspe 3642/2, fol. 27v (July 27, 1347).
55. ASV, Maggior Consiglio, *Deliberazioni, Ursa*, fol. 1rv (April 18, 1415).
56. ACA, Canc., *Procesos judiciales, Procesos en quarto*, 1369A (April 6–27, 1369), gives the captain’s name as “Johan Burgunyo.” For Crown struggles over Sardinia, see Evandro Putzulu, “Pirati e corsari nei mari della Sardegna durante la prima metà del secolo XV,” *IV Congreso de Historia de la Corona d’Aragón. Actas y comunicaciones* (Palma de Mallorca: Exema. Diputación Provincial de Baleares, 1959–1970), 1:155–179; Luisa d’Arienzo, *Documenti sui Visconti di Narbona e la Sardegna*, 2 vols. (Padua: CEDAM, 1977); and Tai, “Honor Among Thieves,” pp. 339–349, 378–385.
57. Note Roccatagliata, *L’Officium Robarie*, Case VII (November 17, 1394–September 17, 1395), 1:33–47; VIII (November 19, 1394), 1:48–49; XXVIII (March 3–August 7, 1395), 1:242–256; XXXIV (March 18, 1395–May 26, 1396), 1:293–303; XLIX (May 4, 1395–April 11, 1397), 2:392–402; LXIII (July 29–August 11, 1395), 2:477–481; LXXII (August 5, 1395–March 11, 1396), 2:518–525; LXXXV (September 17, 1395–July 20, 1396), 2:604–624; XCIX (November 13, 1395–April 18, 1396), 2:704–712.
58. Rubin, *Law of Piracy*, pp. 28–50, 290–311; Pérotin-Dumon, “Pirate and the Emperor,” pp. 196–227; Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns*, pp. 101–107.
59. Rubin, *Law of Piracy*, pp. 241–290; idem, *Piracy, Paramountcy and Protectorates* (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1974).
60. Note Nicholas Tarling, *Piracy and Politics in the Malay World: A Study of British Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century South-East Asia* (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1963); esp. pp. 1–20, 206–231; Carl A. Trocki, *Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore, 1784–1885* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1979); Rubin, *Piracy, Paramountcy, and Protectorates*, p. 52.
61. Note Bruce W. Holsinger, “Medieval Studies, Postcolonial Studies, and Genealogies of Critique,” *Speculum* 77, no. 4 (2002): 1195–1227; Kathleen Davis, “National Writing in the Ninth Century: A Reminder for Postcolonial Thinking About the Nation,” *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 28, no. 3 (1998): 613–637; Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization, and Cultural Change, 950–1350* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Sharon Kinshita, “Pagans are Wrong and Christians are Right: Alterity, Gender, and Nation in the *Chanson de Roland*,” *The Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 31, no. 1 (2001): 79–111.

With the Sea as Their Domain

Pirates and Maritime Lordship in Medieval Japan

Peter D. Shapinsky

“**T**he greatest pirate in all of Japan . . . is called the Noshima Lord. He is exceedingly powerful. On these coasts and the coasts of other provinces, all are afraid of him and send him tribute every year . . . so our Vice-Provincial [Gaspar Coelho] . . . sought a meeting with him to secure a guarantee of safe passage.”¹ So wrote the prolific Jesuit chronicler, Luis Frois, in 1586 regarding Noshima Murakami² Takeyoshi, lord of a powerful seafaring family. No desperate bandits sailing on the peripheries of society these. In politically decentralized but commercially vibrant fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Japan, ocean-going families often labeled pirates, like the Noshima Murakami, were recognized as authorities over wide swathes of maritime space and populations, even over the waterways that lie at the political, economic, and geographical heart of the archipelago—the region known today as the Seto Inland Sea (see Figure 13.1).³

In the words of the 1420 Korean ambassador to Japan, in Inland Sea regions such as the Kamagari islands, “live hordes of pirates; the writ of the King [shogun] does not extend here. . . . So Sōkin [a merchant accompanying the ambassador] paid seven thousand cash to hire a . . . pirate”⁴ to guard them. To ensure safe passage through the Inland Sea in this period, daimyo (regional hegemonies), merchants, Jesuits, and other travelers willingly paid protection money to the Noshima and other bands, explicitly recognizing “pirate” suzerainty over the waves.

The historical Japanese term that I translate as pirate, *kaizoku*, appears most often in the works of land-based writers referring to seafarers whom they perceived as living outside the confines of land-based institutional frameworks—the Chinese characters literally mean “sea-based outlaws.” However, by the strife-ridden fifteenth century, the term’s usage grew to encompass “pirates” who provided services for land-based powers who could otherwise exert scant influence on the seas.

The Noshima Murakami and other powerful seafaring bands did not




Figure 13.1. Medieval Japan and East Asia with inset of the Central Seto Inland Sea. Modified from Conrad Totman, A History of Japan, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), map 2, and Hayashibara Tatsusaburô ed., Hyôgo Kitanoseki irifune osamechô, 260–261

refer to themselves with this subjective land-based label of *kaizoku*. Instead, many of the leaders of these so-called “pirate bands” considered themselves to be sea lords. While maintaining a distinctly maritime power base, they accepted sponsorship offers from land-based patrons, allowing them to access and appropriate land-based discourses of lordship.⁵ Their nautical mastery provided them autonomy through mobility on the seas and coasts, regions where landed powers often could not exert much direct influence. At the same time sea lords arrayed themselves in the language and panoply characteristic of land-based warrior lordship and took advantage of patrons’ recognition of this status to strengthen their claims of dominion over maritime networks of production and distribution that they had secured through marauding, extortion, and patronage recompense. Sea lords organized their domains so as to maintain and develop their maritime power base, exercising authority in forms of sea tenure.

In contrast to land tenure—rights to hold and use territory, often as measured and allocated by an institution of authority⁶—sea tenure can be usefully understood as control over access to the sea and the tools of maritime production such as ships, salterns, and fishing gear.⁷ Because of the land-based, institutional, and agricentric biases in surviving source material, scholarship on premodern Japan has tended to focus on land tenure as the chief measure of political and economic might. In these historiographical visions—often based on feudal models—the sea is largely an empty, nigh invisible space. However, despite their tenuous influence over the practices of littoral communities in medieval Japan, traditional, land-based authorities still sought to secure access to maritime resources. As a result, the terms of sea tenure were contested. Regional hegemonies, fishing villages, absentee proprietors, and putative sea lords all competed to regulate access to maritime spaces and resources. Modes of sea tenure thus included both the regulations of state-level entities and the customary practices of local littoral inhabitants.⁸

Considering sea-lord power in terms of sea tenure helps explain how “pirates” based on tiny islands like Noshima—less than a kilometer in circumference and thus a meager “land-holding”—succeeded over the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in expanding their holdings from small insular settlements to domains that stretched across the Seto Inland Sea in networks of islands, peninsular fortifications, fishing villages, toll barriers, shipyards, ports, and chokepoints.⁹ Chief among the sea lords’ methods of controlling sea tenure was the establishment of ship-based toll barriers in fortified choke points; from these installations, sea lords charged protection monies and performed protection. This “pirate” suzerainty scared travelers into seeking guarantees of safe passage. By engaging in these practices, the

Noshima Murakami regulated access to many parts of the medieval maritime infrastructure. As such, they and other sea lords became integral elements of the sixteenth-century Japanese political and economic order and came to play a vital role in the functioning of the maritime networks of violence and exchange that connected Japan to the wider East Asian maritime world.

PIRATES, SEA LORDS, AND LATE MEDIEVAL JAPAN

The relatively stable balance of sovereignties that had been shared among warrior governments, the imperial court, and religious institutions in Japan had disintegrated by the mid-fifteenth century. Branches of the imperial house, shogunal contenders, religious leagues, and daimyo all battled for dominion. Purveyors of violence on sea and land¹⁰ sold their services to competing factions. In such an environment, no one power could for long enforce a position as ultimate arbiter of sanctioned violence. Displays of force sufficed to resolve disputes, and the multitude of potential sponsors abetted the hegemony of brute force in this period by applying veneers of legitimacy to conquests.¹¹ In addition, decentralization diminished the ability of land-based powers to extend direct influence over the seas and other regions. Their authority was replaced by that of a wide range of semiautonomous organizations that dealt in violence—leagues of warriors, villagers, merchants, mountain-bandit bands, religious factions, as well as sea lords.¹² This decentralization lasted until the Toyotomi and Tokugawa unification in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

This growing service economy was part of a wider spectrum of commercial development in this period. An economy based predominantly on trade-in-kind, which was characterized by exchange between centrally based proprietors and their remotely administered estate holdings, was evolving into a cash-based commercial economy. Land-based infrastructure was poor, so the sea-lanes were the first choice for long-distance transport, especially of bulk commodities. This commercial revolution sparked an efflorescence of seaborne transport and commerce. Port cities and toll barriers sprang up to handle increased trade and stimulated further development. Sea lords strove to both control and consume this traffic through the administration of ports and toll barriers and the performance of protection. Land-based authorities who sought to secure access to and influence over this maritime trade turned to sponsoring sea lords like the Noshima.

Sea lords performed peaceful and violent nautical services for their patrons that included suppressing those the patron identified as “pirates,” fighting battles, establishing and running blockades, escorting and sailing

trading vessels, managing littoral holdings, and purveying fish, salt, and seaweed products. Warring factions on land had no choice but to sponsor sea lords to ensure safe delivery of troops and materiel by sea. Dealers in archipelagic and overseas trade needed sea lords to protect and manage ships and ports. The securing of maritime products often required negotiating with the sea lords who held de facto authority over sites of maritime production.

As the warfare of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries increased, the need for sea-lord services stimulated competition among warring factions to sponsor seafarers. Many sea-lord bands such as the Noshima exploited these needs to retain their autonomy. Exploiting their nautical mobility and expertise, they entered into and quit patronage agreements and played competing landed factions against each other with impunity. For example, between 1540 and 1582, the Noshima moved their services more than ten times among land-based regional hegemon: the Kōno in Iyo, the Ōuchi and Mōri in western Honshū, the Ōtomo of northern Kyūshū, and Oda Nobunaga based in the capital region.

Well aware of their advantage in the maritime realm, some sea lords dictated that they, not their sponsors, determined how and if they would perform the desired functions, as in this first clause in a 1576 code for a band of seafarers: “When performing duties for patrons on sea and land, they are to be performed according to our bylaws.”¹³ Furthermore, sea lords—not patrons—determined recompense, consistently demanding legitimate title to dominion over further littoral sites. For instance, Noshima Murakami Takeyoshi argued in 1562 that one particular inland territory was insufficient compensation for services requested by their Mōri patrons.¹⁴ Many times, recompense included additional license for protection rackets.¹⁵ However, because sea-lord domains consisted of maritime production and distribution networks, they could not afford to alienate all possible patrons and still hope to have their networks function. Only when ships were sailed, tolls taken, and ports busy could sea lords survive economically.

The patronage opportunities available in this period enabled those labeled “pirates” to gain significant access to written discourse. In premodern Japan, written discourse and lordship were traditionally the tools of land-based powers—the imperial house, the shogunates, regional hegemon, and religious complexes—and these authorities used writing to represent their interests and concerns. After the adoption of Chinese-style institutions in the seventh and eighth centuries, elite institutions considered land-based (especially grain) production to be normative,¹⁶ and these authorities sought to inscribe and incorporate littoral regions within land-based institutional structures such as estates.¹⁷ These agricentric discourses often identified

those people who lived on the coast and performed nautical services for land-based patrons as “sea-people,”¹⁸ reifying the normative nature of landed society. Much of modern scholarship has accepted the terracentric biases of these sources, finding support for feudal paradigms that encase the service relations of *kaizoku* and other members of premodern society in land-centered, lord-vassal binaries.¹⁹ By contrast, a patron-client rubric allows the historian to represent both the autonomy and agency of the sea-lord bands and the land-based patrons’ expectations for loyal service.²⁰

Patrons often recognized those sea lords who accepted sponsorship as warrior lords. And, in the patronage correspondence that dominates surviving source materials, sea lords such as the Noshima Murakami consistently depicted themselves in the trappings of land-based lordship. Use of a surname itself was a claim to elite status. In addition, Noshima Murakami Takeyoshi often signed documents with an honorary title like “governor of Yamato province” (Yamato no kami) or the clan-name Minamoto.²¹ The honorary title represented a clear link to the imperial court as a source of legitimacy. Minamoto was both an imperial clan name and a lineage claimed by successive shogunal and other powerful warrior families, thus resonating in medieval society as a name worthy of command.

To a certain extent, sea lords’ portrayal of themselves in language that land-based peoples accepted and understood as worthy represents discursive conformity. However, examination of sea-lord records reveals that their adoption of landed written forms was an appropriation of land-based discourse. Having landed patrons view them as part of the warrior elite aided sea lords in attracting sponsors, for patrons would recognize in warrior discourse a set of expected behaviors to which they hoped (often in vain) that sea lords would conform. Most of all, sea lords used these once landed discursive forms to administer space and routinize acceptance of their autonomous nautical dominion. Because sea lords kept their power base on the sea while using land-based written forms to deal with maritime concerns in their littoral domains, the records of pirate domains are not agricentric representations. Instead, they detail sea-lord policies for shaping and responding to the exigencies of the maritime environment. For example, the 1576 code cited earlier also contains the following two items:

- Ships entering or leaving the harbor who wish to engage in commerce must receive permission from the Harbor Council.
- Objects that are spotted drifting or washing ashore are to be reported to the Harbor Council.²²

Discursively, sea lords were indistinguishable from warrior elites on land. Ecologically,²³ however, their power base was maritime.

SEA-LORD PROTECTION PRACTICE AND SEA TENURE

The maritime suzerainty of the Noshima Murakami and other sea lords consisted of informal and formal dimensions. Sea lords' reputations—the informal dimension—naturalized public acceptance of their dominion in Japan and abroad. By reputation, I am referring to the degree to which those who lived outside the domain proper still felt fear or safety knowing that pirates ruled a portion of the waves. The reputations of bands like the Noshima Murakami influenced governmental policies and shipping routes beyond the confines of their formal domain.

For example, in the late 1460s Japanese merchants forged the name Murakami when counterfeiting credentials for trade with Korea, demonstrating how the reputation of the Noshima and other Murakami houses as powerful maritime families resonated beyond the archipelago.²⁴ The passage by Luis Frois that opens this essay also illustrates the spread of Noshima Murakami Takeyoshi's name: "all are afraid of him and so . . . send him tribute."²⁵ In addition, sea lords' reputations worked synergistically with patronage opportunities and domains. A band's expanding power enhanced its reputation, enabling them to perform more extensive services for patrons, which in turn brought increased legitimacy for nautical dominion, which further expanded a band's power and reputation. For instance, it was the reputation of the Noshima as port managers and providers of protection in the late sixteenth century that prompted their patron Mōri Terumoto to entrust them with part of the administration of the major entrepôt of Akamagaseki²⁶—a location well outside the Noshima's formal domain.

The formal dimension consisted almost exclusively of littoral spaces, activities, and populations over which sea lords came to enforce claims of dominion based on written titles (some legitimated as recompense from patrons). These included networks of chokepoints, island fastnesses, ports, shipyards, fishing villages, and toll barriers. One chief way that sea lords bounded and regulated access to these spaces—and so defined maritime tenurial rights over them—was by establishing toll barriers in fortified chokepoints from which they intercepted ships, charged protection fees, and performed protection and other forms of violence. In the Inland Sea, shipping lanes threaded paths through the narrow channels between islands and basins (see Figure 13.1). Sea-lord houses like the Noshima Murakami based

themselves in castles on small mountainous islands and peninsulas in choke points in these passages to control access to ports and basins.

Although toll barriers and the performance of protection constituted one of the sea lords' chief methods for demarcating and controlling access to maritime space, it should be noted that toll barriers were by no means limited to sea lords. Toll barriers originally required the sanction of land-based state institutions like the imperial court and shogunate and served purposes on both land and sea ranging from military and police posts to sites for the collection of alms for temple maintenance and construction.²⁷ Proprietors of major ports like Hyōgo were permitted to license officials to charge harbor duties,²⁸ thereby setting precedents for sea-lord practices.

Like instruments of authority more generally, toll barriers had been appropriated by countless local powers by the fifteenth century. However, the protection practices of sea-lord bands indelibly etched an equation of *kai-zoku* with toll barriers in late-medieval Japanese consciousness. An alternate name for "pirates" in sixteenth-century Japan was "barrier erectors."²⁹ In the 1550s a sea lord off the coast of Aki province was known as "the toll barrier captain";³⁰ in the 1603 Japanese-Portuguese dictionary, the definition for toll barrier contains the notation that it is a facility operated by pirates.³¹

At toll barriers, sea lords stopped ships, extorted money under threat of violence, and, as a demonstration of that potential violence, escorted the paying ship the requisite distance. These facilities and practices united the formal and informal dimensions of sea-lord sea tenure. Sea lords often held title to the actual sites of the toll barriers. Performing protection marked their effective operating radius and spread their reputations. Sea lords thus found toll barriers particularly effective tools for regulating maritime boundaries, managing regional and foreign trade, and as bases for operations conducted on behalf of patrons.

Historians have argued that, originally, seafaring bands often began intercepting ships and charging protection money and safe-anchorage fees under the pretext of collecting money and goods for a local religious site.³² Especially in earlier periods, passing travelers may have believed that *kai-zoku* possessed special ties to local maritime deities and could ensure a safe passage with the donation of a "gift" for the pirates to present to that deity. Seafarers thus may have understood the toll as a fee by which they appeased their gods and made a living.³³

However, by the fifteenth century perceptions of protection performance depict a more secular,³⁴ service-based commercial economy. Authorities, travelers, and sea lords all couched the willing payment of protection fees in language that resonated in medieval society as licit behavior. Sea lords

treated toll-collection rights as hereditary parts of the formal domain.³⁵ The money might be called “thank-you cash”³⁶ or “harbor tallies.”³⁷ Escorting ships was known as performing protection,³⁸ and for a sea-lord officer to personally accompany a paying ship was known as “riding along.”³⁹

Use of these euphemisms abounded as sea lords hired their services out to regional hegemony battling for dominion and as the performance of protection developed symbiotically with commercial shipping practices. Like seafarers elsewhere in the world in this period,⁴⁰ assessing fees or seizing cargo while leaving the passengers and crew alive allowed a band to plunder or tax the ship on future occasions and the passengers to spread word of the *kaizoku*, thus increasing their reputation. Charging protection gave sea lords a cut of merchants’ profits and perhaps sent merchants the message that their entire ships and cargo could become merchandise to be disposed of by sea lords. Some Inland-Sea sea lords even rated their barrier fees and protection charges to the amount and types of cargo a ship carried or the number of oars.⁴¹

The Noshima Murakami operated ship-based toll barriers to protect their own shipping and that of sponsors, to keep out interlopers, and to manage commercial shipping organizations based in domainal ports and shipyards like Shiwaku and Kaminoseki.⁴² In doing so, they may have stimulated commerce by reducing protection costs⁴³ and the number of proprietary jurisdictions commerce was required to pass through in the Inland Sea. For the cost of protection, shippers only had to deal with one commercial jurisdictional interest, namely, Noshima’s. Such protections—and thus cheaper protection costs—may have persuaded shipping merchants to remain in Noshima domains and encouraged political authorities and commercial organizations from around the Inland Sea world to accept Noshima control of the seas.

The connections between commerce and protection included foreign trade. The Noshima and other sea lords extended their influence to the searoutes connecting Japan and the wider East Asian maritime world. For example, records of Japan’s tally trade with Ming China contain several instances in which the Muromachi Bakufu and provincial governors arranged for sea lords of the Inland Sea to provide protection for the tally-trade ships. Early in 1434 the Buddhist monk and shogunal advisor Manzai recorded in his diary: “Shikoku pirates [*kaizoku*] . . . and others were to sail out to the region around Azukishima and perform protection [*keigo*] properly and sufficiently so as to prevent [pirates from] Iki and Tsushima from carrying out depredations.”⁴⁴ The inclusion of “Shikoku pirates” here suggests bands like the Noshima, whose island strongholds were located off the coast of Shikoku. Their abilities in performing protection attracted bakufu officials eager to

protect valuable trading vessels on the sea-lanes around Iki and Tsushima—beyond the Inland Sea—as well as the channels of the Inland Sea itself.

By the mid-sixteenth century Noshima control of the Inland Sea enabled them to strangle shipping traveling between entrepôts serving Kyoto and foreign ports. In 1542 the Noshima Murakami accepted an offer from the daimyo Ōuchi Yoshitaka (who sought to control Japan's lucrative foreign trade) to conduct "inspections of cargoes at Itsukushima and other inlets and bays" and to "assess lading tolls on ships involved in trade with the continent."⁴⁵ The Noshima received license to operate toll barriers at strategic points such as the religious-commercial center of Itsukushima, where they intercepted, inspected, and assessed a safe-passage toll upon the overseas trading ships passing through the Inland Sea. The acquisition of these privileges swayed the Noshima Murakami to leave their patrons, the Kōno family, in favor of the Ōuchi, despite the fact that the Kōno and Ōuchi were embroiled in violent conflict with each other at the time.

The influence of these toll barriers extended far beyond the actual reach of the Noshima Murakami. Merchants from the port city of Sakai (near Osaka) brought suit before the Ōuchi lords complaining that the Noshima toll barrier infringed on their rights to levy duties on overseas trade ships. Taking advantage of their warrior-lord status, the Noshima launched a countersuit. In the resulting decision, the Sakai merchants recognized Noshima rights to assess tolls on ships other than those from southern Kyūshū that Sakai merchants claimed as their traditional preserve.⁴⁶ Control of Inland Sea shipping lanes allowed the Noshima Murakami and other sea-lord bands to participate indirectly as both predators and protectors in the maritime trade linking East Asia. In this way, seafarers known as pirates helped to build and manage commercial networks connecting Japan and Eurasia.

Situated in the channels between basins and other choke points, the toll barriers and protection practices of sea lords also demarcated boundaries between different sea-lord domains. For example, the 1420 Korean ambassador Song Hūgyōng recorded that in the Kamagari region of the Inland Sea "live pirates of the east and west. If a ship coming from the east has an eastern pirate on board, then the western pirates will not harm it. If a ship coming from the west has a western pirate on board, then the eastern pirates will not harm it."⁴⁷ Two bands had split the islands between them. To control access to their maritime demesnes, both bands agreed to make passing travelers carry a member of one gang to "ride along" to assure the safe arrival of the ship through the domain of the other, usually for a price. Each band's

claim to dominion legitimized the protection racket of the other, further legitimizing each other's domains.

However, these boundaries were porous, and it was possible for several sea-lord administrative networks to overlap and compete in the same space. The history of Futagami Island in the Kutsuna island-chain epitomizes the administrative situation that might develop as multiple contenders claimed lordship over the same littoral space. From the early 1500s until 1582—when the Noshima Murakami conquered Futagami—the inhabitants of the island fell under the suzerainties of the Noshima Murakami, Kurushima Murakami, and Imaoka sea-lord families.⁴⁸ All extracted allotments of agricultural and marine products such as summer wheat, sea cucumbers, firewood, seaweed, oysters, and clams. And the Futagami family and island inhabitants served as fighters, sailors, and corvée labor in the various sea-lord bands.⁴⁹

In 1582 the Noshima Murakami seized total control of the Kutsuna archipelago, including Futagami Island, after defeating the other sea-lord bands in battle⁵⁰ and driving them from the region. The Noshima Murakami then issued a set of bylaws for those islands that included the following proscriptions:

- The islands' inhabitants are not to perform protection.
- Coming and going by producers in the service of retainers with holdings here is forbidden.⁵¹

Fully aware that these islands contained a population of seafarers formerly under the dominion of competitors, the Noshima Murakami restricted the act of extorting and performing protection to their own house and direct retainers. Nor could the Futagami or other Noshima retainers recruit the producers on Futagami (fisher folk, salt-makers, agriculturalists, etc.) into bands to attack ships or otherwise perform autonomous, unauthorized protection. In issuing these orders, the Noshima restricted producers' movements and access to the deployment of nautical violence, enforcing a claim to sea tenure on Futagami based on Noshima control over protection practices.

Sea lords' mastery in using toll barriers and protection to regulate access to maritime space permitted them to accrue great profit by blockading parts of the Inland Sea for patrons against enemy shipping. In 1579, the daimyo Mōri Terumoto authorized the Noshima and other sea lords to blockade the Inland Sea.⁵² In 1581, Jesuits traveling from Kyūshū to Kyoto fell afoul of the Noshima Murakami's blockade at the port and barrier of

Figure 13.2. Noshima Murakami Takeyoshi Flag-Pass (Murakami Takeyoshi kashobata). Privately owned in the holdings of the Yamaguchi Prefectural Archive (Yamaguchi-ken Monjokan) and used with their permission. This flag is woven from hemp (52.6 cm tall × 42.3 cm wide) and has the Murakami sigil in the center in black ink. The recipient (in this case Shūshi of Itsukushima) is written on the right and the date of issue on the left (9th year of Tenshō [1581], 4.28) followed by the signature of the issuer (Noshima Murakami Takeyoshi). For the Itsukushima flag, see Kanaya Masato, *Kaizokutachi no chūsei* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1998), p. 65.



Shiwaku. The Jesuits managed to escape from Shiwaku and headed for the capital. But Noshima Murakami ships surrounded the Jesuits just outside the port of Sakai and forced them to pay 150 gold coins.⁵³

By the 1560s the Noshima had grown so powerful that it ceased being necessary for them to always send ships or seafarers to personally escort vessels paying for protection at toll barriers. Instead, the Noshima Murakami arrogated to themselves what had previously been a power monopolized by land-based authorities like the imperial court and the shoguns—the issuance of safe-conduct passes (*kasho*),⁵⁴ which rendered the recipient immune from any further toll barriers or piratical interference. In place of members of their band actually performing protection or escorting ships, the Noshima Murakami sold pennants with their family seal emblazoned in the center (see Figure 13.2). The issuance of these safe-passage flags may have contributed an additional aura of legitimacy to the Noshima Murakami's own toll

barriers by equating them in travelers' minds with institutions powerful in ages past such as the imperial court and warrior governments.

Recipients would fly these flag-passes at their mastheads to demonstrate to all that the bearer sailed under the paid protection of the Noshima Murakami and was immune from any toll barrier or other "piratical" interference in what the Noshima considered their domain. It is impossible to determine the prevalence of the passes, but from the few extant examples, recipients of these flags ran the full gamut of maritime livelihoods and hailed from all ends of the Inland Sea. The Noshima bestowed passes upon other maritime lords, such as the Matsura (lords of the northwest Kyūshū port of Hirado), harbor officials from ports like Akamagaseki at the gates of the Inland Sea, the important religious and commercial center of Itsukushima, shipping organizations from Kii province, and travelers seeking safe passage, such as Jesuits.⁵⁵ All of these parties recognized that without the favor of the Noshima, safe passage across the Inland Sea was impossible.

Unlike intercepting ships at toll barriers and extracting payment with threat of force, the Noshima Murakami granted flags at the request of the party seeking safe passage. In the 1560s the Kyūshū daimyo Matsura Takanobu wrote to the Noshima "Lord Murakami": "Regarding the Flag [Pass], I have just received it. Thank you, it realizes my most fervent desires and I am forever in your debt."⁵⁶ In 1585 Noshima Murakami Motoyoshi explained in an order to the harbormaster of Akamagaseki, Sakō Tōtarō: "Regarding the flag pass, we send it according to your petition. It is to be used to ensure that nothing untoward occurs as you travel to and fro on the seas. . . ." ⁵⁷ In issuing these passes, the Noshima expected the sea-lanes in their maritime domain to be free of strife and conflict. These flags demonstrate that the Noshima's dominion extended from bases and harbors to include the interstitial, interconnecting web of shipping lanes. For the Noshima Murakami, these passes were floating signposts that proclaimed their control over access to the seas of their domain.

In 1586, after Toyotomi Hideyoshi had pacified much of Japan en route to his 1590 unification, Luis Frois recounted how Jesuits feared to sail without a Noshima flag-pass to ensure that they could travel unmolested through the Inland Sea. The Jesuits sailed to the island of Noshima and dispatched a Japanese member of their party to appeal to the Noshima lord, Murakami Takeyoshi, to grant them a pass of safe passage. As Frois narrates, "He [Takeyoshi] stated that the Jesuits had already obtained the goodwill of Hideyoshi and so had no need of his favor. Despite that, the messenger appealed again for his protection . . . so Takeyoshi consented to bestow upon

the priests a silk flag bearing his family's crest."⁵⁸ On many of the waterways of the Inland Sea, Noshima Takeyoshi's authority transcended that of the ostensible ruler of Japan, Hideyoshi, because only the Noshima could guarantee the safety of ships at sea. The requesting of a flag-pass represented a perceived need by travelers and land-based authorities for order on the seas and a willingness to accept Noshima Murakami sea lordship. These flags, then, constitute Noshima policies of pacification through control of access.

The flags represent the apogee of the formal and informal dimensions of the Noshima Murakami's dominion. Taking advantage of the sheer punitive force at their disposal, their widespread strongholds, and the networks of seafarers created through the administration of maritime labor and commerce, the Noshima Murakami made the promises of the flags a reality. Potential travelers from across western Japan sought out the Noshima Murakami to ensure safe passage, explicitly recognizing their suzerainty over the Inland Sea. Completion of unification by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and then the Tokugawa shoguns, however, required the eradication of such autonomous sea-based dominion. Sea lords either joined the new early modern state as mariner-retainers and shipping agents, or they faced removal to inland locales if not outright destruction.⁵⁹

CONCLUSION

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, bands of seafaring families took advantage of a decentralized political world filled with vibrant commercial possibilities in purveying violence, commercial services, and commodities to establish themselves as sea lords over littoral spaces and populations. Records of the Noshima Murakami and other families allow the historian to partially relate history from the points of view of seafarers otherwise known to history as "pirates" and to access maritime perspectives from written discourses originally designed to represent land-based values, concerns, and tenurial practices.

Through manipulation of patronage relations, sea lords received status-recognition as warrior elites and so gained access to land-based written discourse. Sea lords used land-based discursive forms to administer their domains, but sea-lord domains were spaces where maritime, not landed, norms defined the customs of everyday life. Sea-lord bands exercised authority through practices of sea tenure—by regulating access to maritime production and distribution networks, chiefly through the performance and extortion of protection at toll barriers. Performance of protection also defined the extent of sea lords' domains and the effective reach of their reputa-

tions, enabling them to blockade the Inland Sea for patrons and to manage foreign and domestic commerce. As a result, the economic contributions of these “pirates” should be understood as productive as well as predatory. The Noshima, most visibly, perhaps best demonstrate this sea-based power through the issuance of safe-passage flags at the request of travelers and land-based authorities. Through the administration of maritime domains and manipulation of patronage networks, sea lords like the Noshima established themselves as integral parts of the political, economic, and social worlds of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Japan and the maritime systems of East Asia.

Employing the concept of sea tenure to explore the perspectives of seafarers allows the historian to situate Japanese “pirates” in a global category of nonstate purveyors of nautical violence whose similarities in ecology—their forging of livelihoods in a maritime environment—transcended land-based cultural or political definitions. The protection practices of the Noshima and other sea lords resemble those of seafaring organizations like the Barbary corsairs who dominated western Mediterranean shipping lanes with a protection racket or the Portuguese forces who forced ships in the Indian Ocean to purchase *cartaz* protection passes—and thus to stop at Portuguese ports.⁶⁰

NOTES

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1. “Luis Frois shokan,” *16–17th c. Iezusukai Nihon hōkokushū*, 3rd period, trans. and ed. Matsuda Kiichi (Tokyo: Dōbōsha Shuppan, 1994), 7:140–141.

2. In the Inland Sea, sea-lord bands tended to be community-based, taking their name from their lord and his putative site of origin, thus the Noshima band. Other sea-lord families known by the surname “Murakami” are thus distinguished from the Noshima by their island bases, Kurushima and Innoshima. Although some marriage alliances and patronage relations in common bound these Murakami bands together, they remained independent houses. Most of the documents for the Noshima and other Murakami houses are collected in, Ehime Kenshi Hensan Inkai, ed., *Ehime kenshi shiryōhen kodai chūsei* (Matsuyama: Ehime Prefecture, 1983). These documents will be cited as EK doc., no., title, date.

3. The name Seto Inland Sea is not extant in premodern sources. I hope this anach-

ronistic usage will be forgiven in the interests of clarity. The significance of this channel in the fifteenth century can be seen in a register of 1,960 ships that passed through Hyōgo port from 1.1445–1.1446. Hayashiya Tatsusaburō, ed., *Hyōgo Kitanoseki irifune osamechō* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Bijutsu Shuppan, 1981).

Japanese “pirates” were not limited to the Inland Sea. For example, the well-known *wakō* (*wokou* in Chinese, *waegu* in Korean) were ethnically heterogeneous bands who ranged from Korea to China and Southeast Asia. For a good overview of the *wakō*, see Jurgis Elisonas, “The Inseparable Trinity: Japan’s Relations with China and Korea,” in J. W. Hall et al., eds., *Cambridge History of Japan*, vol. 4, *Early Modern Japan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 235–300. Other powerful bands dominated traffic on waterways like Lake Biwa and the Kumano coast.

4. Song Hūgyōng, *Nosongdang Ilbon haegnok (Rōshōdō Nihon kōroku: Chōsen shisetsu no mita chūsei Nihon)*, ed. Murai Shōsuke (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1987), no. 162.

5. Amino Yoshihiko has also argued that *kaizoku* should be understood as sea lords (what he calls *umi no ryōshu*), but his argument differs from mine in that he is interested in looking at *kaizoku* as a category of “sea people” who came to dominate littoral populations and modes of production—see Amino Yoshihiko, *Nihon chūsei no hinōgyōmin to tennō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1984), pp. 263–267—whereas I understand the category to be a conscious identity chosen by leaders of seafaring bands. They did not consider themselves to be “sea people.” This term appears only in sources written from the perspective of land-based populations as a generic referent for people who dealt with the maritime environment.

6. See, for example, the classic, John W. Hall, *Government and Local Power in Japan 500–1700* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

7. Arne Kalland, *Fishing Villages in Tokugawa Japan* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1995), pp. 2–3, 146; John Cordell, “Introduction: Sea Tenure,” in John Cordell, ed., *A Sea of Small Boats* (Cambridge, MA: Cultural Survival, Inc., 1989), pp. 5–12.

8. Kalland, *Fishing Villages*, pp. 146–151. Kalland makes this argument for the Edo period, but I believe that his arguments are applicable for much of the premodern era.

9. My use of chokepoints is drawn from John H. Pryor, *Geography, Technology, and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 156–157.

10. My understanding of “pirates” and warriors as all being purveyors of violence is informed by Janice Thomson, *Pirates, Mercenaries, and Sovereigns* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) and Fujiki Hisashi, *Zōhyōtachi no senjō* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1995).

11. Tom Conlan, *State of War* (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan, 2003), chap. 7.

12. For scholarship on these trends, see Hitomi Tonomura, *Community and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); M. E. Berry, *The Culture of Civil War in Kyoto* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

13. EK doc. 2194, “Hokkenotsu Han’en okitegaki,” Tenshō 4 (1576) 11th month, auspicious day.

14. See EK doc. 1900, “Mōri Motonari shōjō,” no date.

15. See, for example, EK doc. 2075, “Usuki Shōsatsu shōjō,” Eiroku 12? (1569) 9.21 and the Ōuchi Yoshitaka episode cited below.

16. Amino, *Hinōgyōmin to tennō*, pp. 30–31; *Ama to Nihon shakai* (Osaka: Shinjinbutsu Ōraisha, 1998), p. 16.

17. Hotate Michihisa, “Chūsei zenki no gyogyō to shōensei: kakai ryōyū to gyomin wo megutte,” *Rekishi hyōron* 376 (1981): 15–43.

18. This construction of “sea people” can be found in Japan’s earliest written records. See for example *Kojiki* [c. 712 CE], Yamaguchi Yoshinori et al., eds., *Shinpen Nihon koten-bungaku zenshū*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Shōgakukan, 1997); Donald Philippi, ed. and trans., *Kojiki* (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1968), bk. 2, chap. 105.

19. For a feudal vision of *kaizoku*, see Udagawa Takehisa, *Setouchi suigun* (Tokyo: Kyōikusha, 1981).

20. Conlan, *State of War*, chap. 5; Tonomura, *Community and Commerce*, pp. 10–12.

21. EK doc. 2102, “Murakami Takeyoshi kishōmon,” Eiroku 13 (1570) 9.20; EK no. 2433, “Murakami Takeyoshi ateokonaijō,” Tenshō 12 (1584) 10.6.

22. EK doc. 2194, “Hokkenotsu Han’en okitegaki,” Tenshō 4 (1576) 11th month, auspicious day.

23. For ecology as a historical tool, see Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).

24. Records for these “imposter embassies” can be found in Shin Sukchu, *Haedong chegukki* (*Kaitō shokokuki: Chōsenjin no mita chūsei no Nihon to Ryūkyū*), ed. Tanaka Takeo (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991), p. 149. Also see, Hashimoto Yū, “Chūsei Nitchō kankei ni okeru ōjō daijinshi no gishi mondai,” *Shigaku Zasshi* 106, no. 2 (1997): 49–78; Kenneth Robinson, “Centering the King of Choson: Aspects of Korean Maritime Diplomacy,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 1 (2000): 116–122.

25. “Luis Frois shokan,” pp. 140–141.

26. See, for example, “Murakami Takemitsu shōjō,” Tenshō 2 (1574) 11.3, quoted in Kishida Hiroshi, *Daimyō ryōkoku no keizai kōzō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001), p. 198.

27. Aida Nirō, *Chūsei no sekisho* (Tokyo: Unebi Shobō, 1943).

28. See, for example, the Hyōgo registry of ships from 1445 cited above.

29. In Japanese, *sekidachi*. Yamauchi Yuzuru, *Kaizoku to umijiro* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1997), p. 169.

30. Bairin Shuryū, *Bairin Shuryū Suō gekō nikki*, in *Yamaguchi kenshi shiryōhen, chūsei* (Yamaguchi: Yamaguchi Prefecture, 1996), 1:471.

31. Sakurai Eiji, “Sanzoku, kaizoku to seki no kigen,” in Amino Yoshihiko, ed., “*Shokunin*” to “*geinō*” (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1994), p. 123.

32. Sakurai, “Sanzoku, kaizoku to seki no kigen,” pp. 116–119.

33. Katsumata Shizuo, *Sengoku jidairon* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), pp. 279–284.

34. For more on *kaizoku* and the transition from a sacred/magical world to a secular world, see Katsumata, *Sengoku jidairon*, pp. 283–284.

35. EK doc. 1519, “[Innoshima] Murakami Yoshimitsu yuzurijō,” Bunmei 15 (1483) 11.15.

36. “*reisen*,” Bairin, p. 471.

37. “*sappo*,” EK doc. 1519, “[Innoshima] Murakami Yoshimitsu yuzurijō,” Bunmei 15 (1483) 11.15.

38. In medieval Japan, the term performing protection (*keigo*) was used not just for sea-lord activities, but also had a much wider usage, including samurai standing watch over the shores of Kyūshū against potential Mongol invaders and vigils held by priests to guard the precincts of temples and shrines.

39. The phrase “riding along” translates two euphemisms: *nakanori* and *uwanori*. For

nakanori, see Udagawa Takehisa, *Nihon no kaizoku* (Tokyo: Seibundō Shinkōsha, 1983), pp. 138–139. For *uwanori*, see EK doc. 1978, “Murakami Michiyasu shōjō,” Eiroku 10? (1567) 6.15; EK doc. 1709, “Kobayakawa Hirohira shōjō,” Tenbun 10? (1541) 9.26.

40. Horden and Purcell, *Corrupting Sea*, p. 157; Anne Pérotin-Dumon, “The Pirate and the Emperor,” in C. R. Pennell, ed., *Bandits at Sea* (New York: New York University Press, 2001), p. 29; Lauren Benton, “Legal Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the Origins of Ocean Regionalism,” *Comparative Studies of Society and History* 47, no. 4 (2005): 713–714.

41. Protection fees assessed by lading were known as *dabetsuryō*. EK doc. 1730, “Ōuchi-shi bugyōnin rensho hōsho,” Tenbun 11? (1542) 5.21. For fees rated by number of oars, see “Ashikaga Takauji migyōsho an,” Ryakuō 3 (1340) 3.14, *Mera monjo* doc. 1048, in *Kumano Nachi Taisha monjo*, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Zokugunshoruijū Kanseikai, 1974).

42. For Noshima control of Shiwaku, see EK doc. 2087, “Ōtomo Sōrin shōjō,” Eiroku 13? (1570) 2.13; for Kaminoseki, see “Murakami Takemitsu shōjō,” quoted in Kishida, *Daimyō ryōkoku*, p. 198.

43. Frederic Lane, “Economic Consequences of Organized Violence,” *The Journal of Economic History* 18, no. 4 (1958): 401–417.

44. *Manzai jugō nikki* (Zokugunshoruijū, hoi 1, 1958), 2:553, Eikyō 6 (1434) 1.30.

45. EK doc. 1730, “Ōuchi-shi bugyōnin rensho hōsho,” Tenbun 11? (1542) 5.21.

46. Ibid.

47. Song, *Nosongdang Ilbon haegnok*, no. 162.

48. EK doc. 1577, “Imaoka Michitada, Murakami Yoshishige rensho andojō,” Bunki 1 (1501) 8.6.; Amino Yoshihiko, “Iyo no kuni Futagamishima wo megutte—Futagami-shi to Futagami monjo,” *Nihon chūsei shiryōgaku no kadai* (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1996), doc. 46.

49. Amino, “Futagamishima,” docs. 40, 41, 46, 48.

50. EK doc. 2440, “Futagami-shi monjo an,” (pts. 3 and 4) Tenshō 10 (1582) 5.19; Tenshō 10 (1582) 6.30.

51. EK doc. 2302, “Murakami Motoyoshi okitegaki.”

52. *Hagi-han batsuetsuroku* (Yamaguchi Pref.: Yamaguchi-ken Monjokan, 1967), 3:135, 840–842, docs. 15, 30.

53. “Luis Frois shokan,” 3:5, pp. 286–287.

54. For *kasho*, see Amino, *hinōgyōmin to tennō*, pp. 96–97; Kobayashi Yasuo, “Nanbokuchō Muromachiki no kasho hakkyū ni tsuite,” in Uejima Tamotsu, ed., *Nihon komonjo gakuronshū*, vol. 8, Chūsei IV, *Muromachi jidai no buke monjo* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1987), pp. 56–94.

55. Takahashi Osamu, “Shinshutsu no ‘Murakami Takeyoshi kashobata,’” *jō*, *ge Wakayama kenritsu hakubutsukan kenkyū kiyō* 4 (3.1999): 41–52; 5 (3.2000): 32–41.

56. *Miyakubō chōshi*, pp. 1073–1074, doc. 13, “Matsura Takanobu shōjō an,” NY 9.26; Kishida, *Daimyō ryōkoku*, p. 348.

57. “Murakami Motoyoshi gechijō,” Tenshō 13 (1585) 3.10, quoted in Kishida, *Daimyō ryōkoku*, p. 198.

58. “Luis Frois shokan,” 3:7, p. 141.

59. Fujiki Hisashi, *Toyotomi heiwarei to sengoku shakai* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1985), pp. 217–238; Yamauchi Yuzuru, *Chūsei Setonaiikai chūikishi no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1998), pp. 183–206; Kishida, *Daimyō ryōkoku*, pp. 365–391. For a useful summary in English, see Elisonas, “Inseparable Trinity,” pp. 262–265; M. E. Berry, *Hideyoshi* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 133–135.

60. See works by Benton and Pryor cited above.

The Pirate and the Gallows

An Atlantic Theater of Terror and Resistance

Marcus Rediker

In the early afternoon of July 12, 1726, William Fly ascended Boston's gallows to be hanged for piracy. His body was nimble in manner like a sailor going aloft; his rope-roughened hands carried a nosegay of flowers; his weather-beaten face had "a Smiling Aspect." He showed no guilt, no shame, no contrition. Indeed, as Cotton Mather, the presiding prelate, noted, he "look'd about him unconcerned." But once he stood upon the gallows, he became concerned, although not in the way anyone might have expected. His demeanor quickened and he took charge of the stage of death. He threw the rope over the beam, making it fast, and carefully inspected the noose that would go around his neck. He turned in disappointment to the hangman and reproached him "for not understanding his Trade." But Fly, who like most sailors knew the art of tying knots, took mercy on the novice. He offered to teach him how to tie a proper noose. Fly then "with his own Hands rectified Matters, to render all things more Convenient and Effectual," retying the knot himself as the multitude who had gathered around the gallows looked on in astonishment. He informed the hangman and the crowd that "he was not afraid to die," that "he had wrong'd no Man." Mather explained that he was determined to die "a brave fellow."¹

When the time came for last words on the awful occasion, Mather wanted Fly and his fellow pirates to become preachers—that is, he wanted them to provide examples and warnings to those who assembled to watch the execution.² They all complied. Samuel Cole, Henry Greenville, and George Condict, perhaps hoping for a last-minute pardon, stood penitently before the crowd and warned all to obey their parents and superiors, and not to curse, drink, whore, or profane the Lord's day. These three pirates acknowledged the justice of the proceedings against them, and they thanked the ministers for their assistance. Fly, on the other hand, did not ask forgiveness, did not praise the authorities, did not affirm the values of Christianity, as he was supposed to do, but he did issue a warning. Addressing the port-city crowd thick with ship captains and sailors, he proclaimed his

final, fondest wish: that “all Masters of Vessels might take Warning by the Fate of the Captain (meaning Captain Green) that he had murder’d, and to pay Sailors their Wages when due, and to treat them better; saying, that their Barbarity to them made so many turn Pyrates.”³ Fly thus used his last breath to protest the conditions of work at sea, what he called “Bad Usage,” and was launched into eternity with the brash threat of mutiny on his lips. Mather took pleasure in detecting what he thought was a slight tremor in the malefactor’s hands and knees, but Fly died on his own terms, defiantly and courageously. In any case, the ministers and magistrates of Boston had reserved for themselves the last lines of the drama. If Fly would not warn people in the ways they deemed proper, they would do it themselves, and in so doing they would answer his threat. After the execution, they hanged Fly’s body in chains at the entrance of Boston harbor “as a Spectacle for the Warning of others, especially Sea faring Men.”⁴

High drama had surrounded Fly and his crew from the moment they were brought into port as captives on June 28, 1726. Fly was a twenty-seven-year-old boatswain, a poor man “of very obscure Parents,” who had signed on in Jamaica in April 1726 to sail with Captain John Green to West Africa in the *Elizabeth*, a snow (two-masted vessel) of Bristol. Green and Fly soon clashed, and the boatswain began to organize a mutiny against his command. Fly and another sailor, Alexander Mitchell, roused Green from his sleep late one night, forced him upon deck, beat him, and attempted to throw him over the side of the ship. When Green caught hold of the main-sheet, one of the sailors picked up the cooper’s broadaxe and chopped off the captain’s hand at the wrist. Poor Green “was swallowed up by the Sea.” The mutineers then turned the axe on the first mate, Thomas Jenkins, and threw him, still alive, after the captain overboard. They debated whether their messmate, the ship’s doctor, should follow them into the blue, but a majority of the crew decided he might prove useful and decided instead to confine him in irons.⁵

Having taken possession of the ship, the mutineers prepared a bowl of punch and ceremoniously installed a new shipboard order of things. These sailors, who routinely sewed canvas sails and were therefore expert with needle and thread, stitched a skull and crossbones onto a black flag, creating the Jolly Roger, the pirates’ traditional symbol and instrument of terror. They renamed their vessel the *Fames’ Revenge*, and sailed away in search of prizes. They captured four vessels. After taking the *John and Hannah* off the coast of North Carolina, Fly punished its captain, John Fulker, tying him up and lashing him before sinking his ship. Fly’s piratical adventures came to an end when a group of men he had forced aboard the pirate ship from

prize vessels rose up and captured him. Fly and his crew were brought into Boston harbor to stand trial for murder and piracy.⁶

Awaiting them in Boston was Mather, the pompous, vain, overbearing, sixty-three-year-old minister of Old North Church, who was probably the most famous cleric, maybe even the most famous person, in the American colonies at the time.⁷ He took a personal interest in the case, vowing to bring Fly to salvation. Mather met with the bos'un, exhorted him to reform and repent, commanded him to go to church. Another leading minister, Benjamin Colman, joined the struggle to save Fly's soul, but it was all to no avail. Boston's most eminent men of the cloth failed miserably with their prisoner, who defied them, mocked them, and raged against them. Colman wrote that Fly "fell at times into the most desperate ragings . . . cursing the very heavens & in effect the God that judged him."⁸ Mather concluded that Fly was "a most uncommon and amazing Instance of Impenitency and Stupidity, and What Spectacles of Obduration the Wicked will be." At one of these meetings Fly had exploded in anger, "I can't Charge myself,—I shan't own myself Guilty of any Murder,—Our Captain and his Mate used us Barbarously. We poor Men can't have Justice done us. There is nothing said to our Commanders, let them never so much abuse us, and use us like Dogs. But the poor sailors—" Mather at this point apparently interrupted; he could bear to hear no more. Two discourses, one Christian and providential, the other maritime and social, came together in a cosmic clash.⁹

The hanging of the "poor man" William Fly was a moment of terror. Indeed, it might be said that the occasion witnessed a clash of two different kinds of terror. One kind was practiced by the likes of Cotton Mather—ministers, royal officials, wealthy men; in short, rulers—as they sought to eliminate piracy as a crime against mercantile property. They consciously used terror to accomplish their aims: to protect property, to punish those who resisted its law, to take vengeance against those they considered to be their enemies, and to instill fear in sailors who might wish to become pirates. This they did in the name of the social order, as suggested by Benjamin Colman, whose execution sermon (which Fly refused to attend) was a meditation on terror, on God as "the king of terrors" and hence creator of social discipline. In truth, the keepers of the state in this era were themselves terrorists of a sort, decades before the word "terrorist" would acquire its modern meaning (as it would do in the "reign of terror" during the French Revolution). And yet we do not think of them in this way, for they have become, over the years, cultural heroes, even founding fathers of sorts. Theirs was a terror of the strong against the weak.¹⁰

The other kind of terror was practiced by common seamen like Wil-

liam Fly who sailed beneath the Jolly Roger, which was designed to terrify the captains of merchant ships and persuade them to surrender their cargo. Pirates also consciously used terror to accomplish their aims—to get money, to punish those who resisted them, to take vengeance against those they considered to be their enemies, and to instill fear in sailors, captains, merchants, and officials who might wish to attack or resist pirates. This they did in the name of a different social order.¹¹ In truth, pirates were terrorists of a sort. And yet we do not think of them in this way, for they have become, over the years, cultural heroes, perhaps antiheroes, at the very least romantic and powerful, if ambiguous, figures in an American and increasingly global popular culture. Theirs was a terror of the weak against the strong. It formed one essential part of a dialectic of terror, which was summarized in the decision of the authorities to raise the Jolly Roger above the gallows when hanging pirates: one terror trumps the other.¹²

This essay continues and amplifies a theme developed by Peter Linebaugh and myself in *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic*: the making of the so-called “Atlantic world” in the early modern era depended profoundly on disciplinary violence and terror of many kinds, enacted from above, and often these were resisted in kind, from below. What I wish to explore in this essay is this dialectic’s theater—in both senses of the word: its geography and dramatic form. The drama took place around the Atlantic, on the hastily constructed scaffolds of port-city gallows as in Boston, and on the heaving decks of deep-sea ships, as on the *Fames’ Revenge*. The stages for this fluid theater were thus transient, in motion, both local and global, as were the subjects who enacted a recurrent Atlantic drama about one of the fundamental issues of the age: not exchange, but rather the transoceanic terror that made exchange possible.¹³

Before we go on, some background. The pirates of the years 1716–1726 were among the greatest ever in the long history of robbery by sea. They stood at the pinnacle of what is called “the golden age of piracy.” These multiethnic freebooters created a major crisis in the Atlantic system by capturing hundreds of merchants ships, many of which they burned or sank. Their numbers, around 4,000 over the decade, were extraordinary, and their plunderings were exceptional in both volume and value. They disrupted trade in strategic zones of capital accumulation—the North America, the West Indies, West Africa—at a time when the recently stabilized and expanding Atlantic economy was the source of enormous profits and renewed imperial power. Sailors joined pirate ships after working on merchant and naval

ships, where they suffered cramped quarters, poor victuals, brutal discipline, low wages, devastating disease, disabling accidents, and premature death. This generation of pirates was perhaps the only one in history that actually embraced the name. Two men cried up "A Pyrate's Life to be the only Life a Man of any Spirit." "A merry Life and a short one," was one of their mottoes.¹⁴

The state, as terrorist, was more than happy to oblige, and indeed the confrontation between William Fly and Cotton Mather in Boston in 1726 was but one scene in a ten-year drama. The governments of the Atlantic powers, led by Britain, organized an international campaign of terror to eradicate piracy, using the gallows as an essential space in the public sphere. Between 1716 and 1726 rulers hanged pirates in London, England; Edinburgh, Scotland; St. Michael's, the Azores; Cape Coast Castle, Africa; Salvador, Brazil; Curaçao; Antigua; St. Kitts; Martinique; Kingston and Port Royal, Jamaica; the Bahama Islands; Bermuda; Charleston, South Carolina; Williamsburg, Virginia; New York, New York; Providence, Rhode Island; and even in Boston itself, where several pirates had already been executed in recent years. In all of these cities authorities staged spectacular executions of those who had committed banditry by sea. Fly's hanging was one of the last of these grisly scenes.

It has long been a commonplace among historians that nearly all pirates managed to escape their crimes with their booty and their lives.¹⁵ While this may have been true for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when England, France, and the Netherlands supported or tolerated piratical attacks against Spain, it is false for the period under study here, when the numbers of pirates hanged were extraordinary by any measure. In a time when royal mercy and pardons in England routinely commuted death penalties to lesser sentences, especially one or another form of bound labor (after the Transportation Act of 1718), pirates rarely had their sentences lessened and were instead hanged in huge numbers and high percentages.¹⁶ Between 1716 and 1726 no fewer than 418 were hanged, and in truth the actual number was probably a third to a half higher. This means that roughly one in every ten pirates came to an end upon the gallows, a greater proportion than many other groups of capital convicts, and vastly greater than what most historians have long believed. When we add the hundreds of pirates who died in battle, in prison, by suicide, disease, or accident, it would seem that at least one in four died or was killed, and the number may have been as high as one in two. Premature death was the pirate's lot; his was most decidedly not a romantic occupation. The campaign of extermination would have been visible to the

eye of any seaman as he sailed into almost any port city during these years: there, in a prominent place, was a gibbeted corpse of one who had sailed under the black flag, flesh rotting, crows picking at the bones.¹⁷

Almost every hanging of pirates around the Atlantic had some of the drama created by Fly, his fellow pirates, and Mather in Boston. The penitents, like Cole, Greenville, and Condick, usually hoping for pardons, said what the authorities wanted them to say, and perhaps they meant it: do not use oaths; do not curse; do not take the Lord's name in vain; do not sing bawdy songs; do not gamble; do not visit the house of the harlot; do not profane the Sabbath; do not give in to uncleanness and lust; do not be greedy. Instead, obey all authorities: respect your parents; "pay the just Deference to the Rulers;" "Stay in your Place & Station Contentedly." A very few pirates did win pardons, but most, even the obedient and remorseful ones, did not.¹⁸

But what stands out about these hangings—what certainly stood out to the authorities at the time—was the amount of disorder and resistance they created. One gang of pirates was rescued from the gallows by an unruly mob in Kingston, Jamaica, in 1717. Royal authorities all around the Atlantic feared the same on other occasions and beefed up their military guard as protection against it. Many pirates, like Fly, refused their prescribed roles and used the occasion for one last act of subversion. An endless train of pirates "Walk'd to the Gallows without a Tear." Facing the steps and the string in the Bahamas in 1718, pirate Thomas Morris expressed a simple wish: that he had been "a greater Plague to these Islands." In Jamestown, Virginia, in 1720, a group of pirates went to their deaths: as one observer explained, "They died as they lived, not showing any Sign of Repentance." Indeed, "When they came to the Place of Execution one of them called for a Bottle of Wine, and taking a glass of it, he drank Damnation to the Governour and Confusion to the Colony, which the rest pledged." When fifty-two were hanged at the slave trading fort, Cape Coast Castle, Africa, in 1722, a group of pirates explained that "They were poor rogues, and so must be hanged while others, no less guilty in another Way, escaped." He referred to the wealthy rogues who bilked sailors of their rightful wages and proper food and thereby turned many toward piracy. On many of these occasions, the authorities displayed the Jolly Roger at the place of execution. Sail under it, they said, and you will die under it. And even the killing was not terror enough: after Virginia governor Alexander Spotswood watched the pirates toast his damnation, he responded in kind, as he wrote to another royal official: "I thought it necessary for the greater Terrour to hang up four

of them in chains.” The corpses of many pirates, like that of William Fly, were turned into a “Profitable and Serviceable Spectacle.”¹⁹

Terror bred counterterror, tit for tat. After Boston’s rulers hanged eight pirates, members of Black Sam Bellamy’s crew, pirates still at sea in 1717, vowed to “kill every body they took belonging to New England.” Edward Teach, also known as Blackbeard, and crew burned a captured ship “because she belonged to Boston alledging the People of Boston had hanged some of the pirates.”²⁰ When Bartholomew Roberts and his crew learned that the governor and council of Nevis had executed some pirates in 1720, they were so outraged that they sailed into Basseterre’s harbor, set several vessels on fire, and offered big money to anyone who would deliver the responsible officials to their clutches so that justice could be served. They made the same threat to avenge pirates hanged in Virginia. They made good on such blusterings when they happened to take a French vessel carrying the governor of Martinique, who had also hanged some members of the fraternity. Roberts responded by hanging the poor governor from his own yard arm in revenge.²¹ Thus did the pirates practice terror against the state terrorists. It was a war of nerves, one hanging for another, a cycle of violence.

But in truth pirates had practiced terror from the beginning, before the authorities had hanged any of them. They had their own reasons, and their own methods. Piracy was predicated on terror, as most all contemporaries of freebooting well understood. Captain Charles Johnson, who knew this generation of pirates (some of them individually) and chronicled their exploits in vivid detail, called them “the Terror of the trading Part of the World.” Cotton Mather called them “Sea-Monsters who have been the Terror of them that haunt the sea.” Pirates practiced terror against those who organized the trade and against those who carried it out. It all began when a pirate ship approached a prospective prize and raised the primary instrument of terror, the Jolly Roger, whose message was unmistakable: surrender or die.²²

Pirates used terror for several reasons: to avoid fighting, to force disclosure of information about where booty was hidden, and to punish ship captains. The primary idea was to intimidate the crew of the ship under attack so that they would not defend their vessel. The tactic worked, as numerous merchant ship captains explained: “up goe the Pirate Colours, at sight whereof our men will defend their ship no longer,” wrote one.²³ On another ship a mostly British crew gathered round the captain and told him that if the approaching ship proved to be Spanish, they “would stand by him as long as they had Life, but if they were pirates they would not fight.”²⁴ They were indeed pirates, and the crew refused to defend the ship. Why? They

knew that if they did resist and were then overpowered, they would likely be tortured, to teach them—and other sailors—a lesson. After all, the pirates would ask: why are you risking your life to protect the property of merchants and ship captains who treat you so poorly?

Pirates also used violence to force prisoners, especially ship captains, to disclose the whereabouts of loot on board the ship. (Pirates were no different in this regard from naval or privateering ships, who did the same thing; indeed no small amount of pirate terror was the standard issue of war-making.) They also practiced violence against the cargo, destroying massive amounts of property in the most furious and wanton ways, as once-captured ship captains never grew tired of recounting. They descended into the holds of ships like “a Parcel of Furies,” slashing boxes and bales of goods with their cutlasses, throwing valuable goods overboard, laughing uproariously as they did so. They also destroyed a large number of ships, cutting away their masts, setting them afire, sinking them, partly because they did not want news of their presence to spread from ship to ship to shore, but also because they wanted to destroy the property of merchants and ship captains they considered to be their enemies. It was indirect terror against the owners of mercantile property.²⁵

Pirates and officials were locked into a reciprocal system of terror based on the underlying principle of class war. But we would be remiss if we stopped our investigation of terror here. We must continue our backward pursuit of the dialectic one more level, which will illuminate the entire progression in necessary ways. For in truth there was not only the terror of the gallows and the terror of the Jolly Roger, there was another more ordinary, more pervasive, more effective, an originary violence and terror that is the key to the whole process. It was the violence of labor discipline as practiced by the ship captain as he moved the commodities that were the lifeblood of the capitalist world economy. This is the deep structure of the dialectic of terror, the maritime chain of violence we have been exploring.²⁶

To understand William Fly and his dispute with the ministers of Boston—and indeed to understand the gallows drama that was repeated in one Atlantic port after another—we must leave Boston and enter the harsh, workaday world of the common sailor in the early eighteenth century. When Fly spoke of “Bad Usage,” of how his captain and mate used and abused him and his brother tars, treating them “barbarously,” as if they were “dogs,” he was talking about the violent disciplinary regime of the deep-sea sailing ship. And even though there is no surviving evidence to show exactly what Captain Green did to Fly and the other sailors aboard the *Elizabeth* to produce the rage, the mutiny, the murder, and the decision to turn pirate, it is

not hard to imagine. The High Court of Admiralty records for this period are replete with bloody accounts of lashings, tortures, and killings for any who might want examples.²⁷

The daily violence of life at sea generated among pirates an oppositional ritual enacted upon seizure of a merchantman, something they called “Distribution of Justice.” Once the prize ship had surrendered, the pirate boarding party would call all sailors and officers on deck for a little drama. The pirate quartermaster would turn to the sailors and ask a simple question: how does your captain treat you? If the report was good—if, that is, the captain proved to be “an honest Fellow that never abused any Sailors”—he would be rewarded by the pirates. He would be modestly plundered, if plundered at all; he would witness none of his cargo destroyed; he would find that his ship would not be damaged or sunk. And sometimes he would be given money or goods as a token of appreciation for his good behavior toward the crew. In one case a well-liked merchant captain was given “a large sum of Money,” so he could go home to London to “bid the Merchants defiance.”²⁸

If, however, the sailors complained against their captain, claiming that he held back their wages, pinched their provisions, or scratched their backs unfairly with the cat-o’-nine-tails—common practices all—then the pirates seized the moment for a symbolic inversion of power. Captains would be punished in the same social space, on their own ship, where they themselves had employed terror: they were tied up, lashed, “sweated” (as a particular kind of torture was called), or “whipp’d and pickled” (salt rubbed into the wounds).²⁹ Bartholomew Roberts’s crew considered the ritual to be so important that they created a place in the shipboard division of labor for it, formally designating one of their men, George Willson, as the “Dispencer of Justice.” Many captured captains were “barbarously used,” and some were summarily executed. Pirate Philip Lyne announced at his execution in Curaçao in 1726 that he “had killed 37 Masters of Vessels.” The search for vengeance was in many ways a fierce, embittered, fatal response to the violent, personal, and arbitrary authority wielded by the merchant captain. This was revenge against the ship captain as terrorist.³⁰

How to conclude this bloody tale? In the end we can say that the encounter between Fly and Mather was unusually combative, but it was not uncommon. Indeed, the tale vividly illustrates the three moments of terror that were critical to the origins, growth, and ultimate repression of Atlantic piracy in the eighteenth century: the disciplinary terror of life at sea, or what Fly called the “barbarity” of ship captains, their pervasive “Bad Usage” of the “poor men” in their employ; the counterterror waged by pirates under the Jolly Roger, the intimidation and violence that was instrumental to the il-

legal capture of ships and the vengeful punishment of ships' officers; and the final terror of the gallows and the gibbet, which were meant to reestablish the original order of things but managed, for a time, to bring forth new measures of counterterror by pirates. The dialectic also had unexpected effects, as when William Fly won the argument with Cotton Mather, convincing the self-righteous minister of one of the primary causes of piracy. During his execution sermon Mather told the assembled ship captains that they must avoid being "too like the Devil in their Barbarous Usage of the Men that are under them and lay them under Temptations to do Desperate Things." Such were the elements of this eighteenth-century morality play.³¹

NOTES

This essay builds upon my previous work, "'Under the Banner of King Death': The Social World of Anglo-American Pirates, 1716 to 1726," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser. (1981); *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700–1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); with Peter Linebaugh, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000); and *Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004).

1. Abel Boyer, ed., *The Political State of Great Britain . . .* (London, 1711–1740), 33:272–273; Cotton Mather, *The Vial Poured Out upon the Sea: A Remarkable Relation of Certain Pirates . . .* (Boston, 1726), pp. 47–48, republished in Daniel E. Williams, ed., *Pillars of Salt: An Anthology of Early American Criminal Narratives* (Madison, WI: Madison House, 1993), pp. 110–117. See also Captain Charles Johnson, *A General History of the Pyrates*, ed. Manuel Schonhorn (London, 1724, 1728; repr., Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972), pp. 606–613.

2. *The Tryals of Sixteen Person for Piracy &c.* (Boston, 1726), p. 14. Mather had written of another crew of pirates who had come to the gallows: "What are these PIRATES now, but so many Preachers of those things, which once they could not bear to hear the Servants of GOD Preach unto them?" See his *Instructions to the Living, From the Condition of the Dead: A Brief Relation of Remarkables in the Shipwreck of above One Hundred Pirates . . .* (Boston, 1717), p. 40.

3. Boyer, ed., *Political State*, 33:272–273. Mather also recorded Fly's threat: "He would advise Masters of Vessels to carry it well to their Men, lest they be put upon doing as he had done." Mather, *Vial Poured Out upon the Sea*, pp. 47–48.

4. Mather, *Vial Poured Out upon the Sea*, p. 112; *Boston News-Letter*, July 7, 1726. Condict, who was considered young, drunk, "stupid and insensible" at the time of his piracy, did indeed get a reprieve. See Benjamin Colman, *It is a Fearful Thing to Fall into the Hands of the Living God . . .* (Boston, 1726), p. 37.

5. Johnson, *General History of the Pyrates*, p. 606.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 606, 608.

7. See the excellent article by Daniel A. Williams, "Puritans and Pirates: A Confrontation between Cotton Mather and William Fly in 1726," *Early American Literature* 22 (1987): 233–251.

8. Colman, *It is a Fearful Thing*, p. 39.

9. Mather, *Vial Poured Out upon the Sea*, pp. 47, 21; Daniel A. Cohen, *Pillars of Salt, Monuments of Grace: New England Crime Literature and the Origins of American Popular Culture, 1674–1860* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

10. Colman, *It is a Fearful Thing*.

11. The alternative, democratic, and egalitarian social order of the pirate ship is discussed in Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea*, chap. 6; and Linebaugh and Rediker, *Many-Headed Hydra*, chap. 5.

12. For the idea of the pirate as modern antihero, see Hans Turley, *Rum, Sodomy, and the Lash: Piracy, Sexuality, and Masculine Identity* (New York: New York University Press, 1999).

13. Linebaugh and Rediker, *Many-Headed Hydra*. See also my follow-up essay, "The Red Atlantic, or, 'A Terrible Blast Swept over the Heaving Sea,'" in Bernhard Klein and Gesa Mackenthun, eds., *Sea Changes: Historicizing the Ocean* (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 111–130.

14. Johnson, *General History of the Pyrates*, pp. 244, 628. See also Robert C. Ritchie, *Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 232–237.

15. See, for example, Hugh F. Rankin, *The Golden Age of Piracy* (New York, 1969), pp. 22–23.

16. J. M. Beattie, *Crime and the Courts in England, 1660–1800* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); A. Roger Ekirch, *Bound for America: The Transportation of British Convicts to the Colonies, 1718–1775* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

17. This theme, and the number and location of the executions, is treated at length in Rediker, *Villains of the Nations of the Earth*, chap. 7.

18. Cotton Mather, *Useful Remarks: An Essay upon Remarkables in the Way of Wicked Men: A Sermon on the Tragical End, unto which the Way of Twenty-Six Pirates Brought Them; At New Port on Rhode-Island, July 19, 1723 . . .* (New London, CT, 1723), pp. 31–44, quotation from p. 33.

19. Archibald Hamilton to Secretary Stanhope, June 12, 1716, in Colonial Office papers (CO) 137/12, f. 19, Public Record Office, London; Johnson, *General History of the Pyrates*, pp. 286, 643, 660; *American Weekly Mercury*, March 17, 1720; R. A. Brock, ed., *The Official Letters of Alexander Spotswood . . .* (Virginia Historical Society, Collections, N.S., II [Richmond, 1882]), 2:338; Mather, *Useful Remarks*, p. 20. See also Stanley Richards, *Black Bart* (Llandybie, Wales: C. Davies, 1966), p. 104.

20. *Trial of Eight Persons Indited for Piracy* (Boston, 1718), pp. 8–19; "Trial of Thomas Davis," October 28, 1717, in John Franklin Jameson, ed., *Privateering and Piracy in the Colonial Period: Illustrative Documents* (New York: Macmillan, 1923), p. 308; *The Tryals of Major Stede Bonnet and Other Pirates* (London, 1719), p. 45.

21. W. Noel Sainsbury et al., eds., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies* (London, 1860–), vol. 32, no. 251; H. R. McIlwaine, ed., *Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia* (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1928), 3:542; Richards, *Black Bart*, p. 56.

22. Johnson, *General History of the Pyrates*, p. 26; Mather, *Useful Remarks*, p. 22.
23. "Anonymous Paper Relating to the Sugar and Tobacco Trade (1724)," CO 388/24, ff. 184–188.
24. *Boston News-Letter*, June 17, 1718.
25. *Ibid.*, August 15, 1720.
26. That violence was essential to the movement of goods and the establishment of the Atlantic economy is one of the more controversial but still unrefuted arguments of *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea*.
27. It was reported that Captain Green had done nothing to deserve his fate, but Mather noted the claim of Fly and other pirates that the murder and piracy were "Revenge, they said, for Bad Usage." See *Vial Poured Out upon the Sea*, p. 112. See also Rediker, "The Seaman as Spirit of Rebellion: Authority, Violence, and Labor Discipline at Sea," in *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea*, chap. 5.
28. *Boston News-Letter*, November 14, 1720; William Snelgrave, *A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave Trade* (London, 1734), p. 241; *Boston News-Letter*, November 14, 1720.
29. "Proceedings of the Court held on the Coast of Africa," High Court of Admiralty papers (HCA) 1/99, f. 101, Public Record Office, London; Johnson, *General History of the Pyrates*, pp. 338, 582; Snelgrave, *New Account*, pp. 212, 225; George Francis Dow and John Henry Edmonds, *The Pirates of the New England Coast, 1630–1730* (Salem, MA: Marine Research Society, 1923), p. 301; Nathaniel Uring, *The Voyages and Travels of Captain Nathaniel Uring*, ed. Alfred Dewar (1726; repr., London: Cassell and Co., 1928), p. xxviii.
30. G. T. Crook, ed., *The Complete Newgate Calendar . . .* (London: Navarre Society, 1926), 3:59; Boyer, ed., *Political State*, 32:272; *Boston Gazette*, October 24–31, 1720; Rankin, *Golden Age of Piracy*, pp. 35, 135, 148; Mather, *Vial Poured Out upon the Sea*, p. 21; quotation from *Boston Gazette*, March 21, 1726.
31. Mather, *Vial Poured Out upon the Sea*, pp. 44–45.

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Transregional Perspectives on World History

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These essays reflect recent widespread interest in reconsidering the political, geographical, and cultural boundaries conventionally observed by area specialists and others. They intentionally range widely through time and space, dealing with diverse issues and contexts, but each highlights the very general theme of cross-cultural interaction. Although they draw heavily on area studies, the contributors seek to put previously separate bodies of scholarship in dialogue with one another by exploring those interactions that have historically linked world regions.

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