ECONOMY, FAMILY, AND SOCIETY FROM ROME TO ISLAM

Bryson's *Management of the Estate* (*Oikonomikos Logos*) offers advice on key private concerns of the Roman elite: getting rich, managing slaves, love and marriage, bringing up children. This estate owner is a farmer and a merchant, making his money through good and effective business. His wife is co-owner of the estate and their love promotes material prosperity. Their child needs 24-hour supervision in 'all his affairs'. Bryson's book was almost certainly written in the mid first century AD, but survives mainly in Arabic. It had a profound effect on Islamic thinking on the economy and on marriage, but is virtually unknown to classicists. This new edition of the text together with the first English translation will appeal to Roman social and economic historians, students of imperial Greek literature, and all those interested in the development of Greco-Roman thought in the Islamic empire of the Middle Ages.

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A Critical Edition, English Translation, and Study of Bryson's Management of the Estate

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Prefatory remarks

The present volume seeks to present Bryson's *Management of the Estate* to a majority of readers who will not be familiar with it, and to offer something new to those who are. The range of skills and the knowledge of different subjects and subdisciplines needed to do justice to the book make its interpretation a task best suited to a team or a committee. For a single author to attempt this is a bold undertaking and readers should bear in mind that their own knowledge and interests in particular areas covered by this study will certainly enable them to improve and further my examination of a work that is important for two reasons: its focus on major social problems of the early Roman empire (money, slaves, marriage, children), and its role as a fascinating and unique bridge between the vastness of the Roman world and the still vaster empire of medieval Islam.

The problems involved in approaching Bryson are of two kinds. First, his treatise survives in Arabic, with a very little in Greek, and this immediately throws up technical issues of editing, translation, and not least the reliability of the Arabic version. Second, relatively few classicists have heard of his work with the exception of scholars working in Greco-Arabic studies (in absolute terms a tiny number, especially from the Classical side) and a handful of economic historians (but not many of them), and this will perhaps lead to suspicions of its value.

With regard to the first of these problems, a mere classicist, and one less interested in and informed about matters philological than he should be, wanders in great danger. The standard edition of the text of Bryson by the eminent German–Jewish Arabist Martin Plessner was a doctoral thesis done in the 1920s. It has been possible to improve on it because Plessner did not have at his disposal a copy of the main surviving manuscript (the Taymūr) but relied rather on an inadequate and hasty transcription by the Jesuit orientalist scholar Louis Cheikho (Shaykhū). The use of the manuscript for the edition in this volume has undoubtedly led to better readings and the remedying of Cheikho's several omissions. This is sufficient justification

for presenting the text. I have also been able to draw on some traditions unknown to Cheikho and Plessner and on a valuable epitome of Bryson held in the library of al-Azhar. An English translation is obviously a requirement in order to communicate the contents of an unknown work to as large an audience as possible, and the preparation of this has been made far easier by the existence of Plessner's German (even if he himself called it 'unreadable' for reasons I shall explain in Chapter 1) and a fluent Italian version by the orientalist and Hebraist Mauro Zonta. There are several ways to present Arabic texts and of the two readers used by Cambridge University Press for this part of the study one wanted it more or less as it is presented, while the other offered constructive but quite different advice. The system of presentation chosen here owes much to that used by Robert Hoyland (now Professor of Islamic History at the Oriental Institute, Oxford) in the volume of collected texts and studies carried out under my editorship on the topic of Greco-Arabic physiognomy (Swain 2007). The main idea in that volume was to allow navigation between the Arabic and the English so that the English-language reader too could be part of the text and understand its variants while classicists with some Arabic could more easily find their way around in the text itself. There is no doubt that more philologically minded scholars and those interested in the intricacies of textual criticism will wish I had done things in different ways. The ever-present possibility that another manuscript of Bryson will come to light will, should it happen, give such scholars the opportunity to make their improvements as they wish. For present purposes it is to be hoped that the text and translation do their job sufficiently, especially as it is clear that the Taymūr represents the tradition of Bryson available to the medieval authors who used him and the business of trying to say something interesting about his book's content is unlikely to be affected too adversely, should further evidence allowing a re-edition come to light. For the present volume is not a philological and literary study but an historical one and its interests and aims are located in the history of thought between two amazing cultures.

I return to issue of the reliability of the Arabic version below.

On the second general problem, more needs to be said, for if a work is largely unknown, can it really be important? A book which dates to the first century AD and offers original thought on the ancient economy (an area which produced little reflection by ancient authors) and in addition contains highly original material on the family is evidently of an importance that does not need to be argued for – so I would say. Nevertheless my fear is that something unfamiliar will meet with scepticism in certain quarters. In his definitive recent edition and translation of the Greek, Arabic, and Latin

survivals of Theophrastus' *On First Principles* Dimitri Gutas, who is one of the most distinguished scholars of the development of ancient Greek thought in Islam, notes 'among scholars of Greek a certain hesitation ... to engage with [the Arabic] translations' of Greek, and he goes on to regret that 'classics departments are not rushing to teach Arabic as the third classical language, at least for students in Greek philosophy and science' (2010: xiv–xv). There are of course perfectly good reasons for not teaching Arabic in Classics departments: classicists have enough to do in a subject area which is more popular and richer than ever. But for anyone prepared to invest the time, the intellectual interest and pleasure in looking at the Arabic translations is very rich. And Gutas' point is that professional classicists *should* be looking at these translations, and not just leaving it to Arabists, if they want to be able to make use of what are typically the earliest witnesses to scientific and philosophical Greek literature, and based on texts often several hundred years older than the available Greek transmission. There are in fact Classics departments, such as my own, where Arabic is studied and taught at postgraduate and postdoctoral level for this very reason. The numbers are small, the intention is big.

Intention is what is important here. Consider what Gutas calls 'hesitation'. This is not a matter of opportunity alone. There are prejudices at work too which are part of a larger picture of centuries of uneasy engagement with the Muslim world. They are exacerbated in some academic circles by strongly held views about the purity of the classical canon. A tiny minority of ancient philosophers with roots in a different era who prefer to think that the world ended with Aristotle are among the worst offenders in this regard. Fortunately the vast majority of classicists are interested in connections and are anything but parochial; and there are not a few who have learnt Arabic or enough of it and/or the major language of transition between antiquity and the middle ages in the east, Syriac. The explosion of work on late antiquity over the past few decades has led more recently to a now firmly established interest in what happened to the Roman world after the Arab conquest during the seventh and eighth centuries, an interest that applies to both historians and scholars of the material culture. This is an impressive development and promises much progress towards making and sustaining connections between Classics and Islamic/Arabic studies.

In this context the parts of the present volume that investigate the transmission of Bryson not as text but as thought will hopefully be welcome. As I have said, it is simply impossible for one person to cover this material successfully or comprehensively: making the attempt is what is important. And just as it is important for classicists to know something of what

happened to classical thought, so I hope those interested in medieval Islam will at least take note of the ancestry of a work which they will most likely know of but perhaps only by name. Herein lies a major difference between the two potential audiences. Bryson is part of the Translation Movement which gathered pace in the eighth century and flourished in the ninth and tenth. We can be fairly sure that his book was translated around 900. Of the several reasons for its translation its first use shows that its contribution to Greek political thought and the incorporation of that thought into Islamic political theory is primary (with political thought meaning social and economic relations rather than political–administrative ones, which had no interest for Bryson). Beyond this theoretical side, which pertains to the introductory part of the text, Bryson was considered useful. If one takes account of the fact that there is a broad continuity in patterns of estate ownership and management from antiquity through to the time of the translation, it will be immediately apparent why this was. Perhaps more surprising than the relevance of Bryson's economic thoughts is his utility in social relations. His work had a profound effect on thinking about the 'Islamic' wife by writers as major and as orthodox as al-Ghazālī, a towering figure who remains of fundamental importance for Muslims to this day. On the regulation of children too Bryson became core reading among medieval Muslims. The Islamic reception ('Islamic' because Bryson was used by authors writing in Persian as well as Arabic) has much in common with the classical production of the text. For on all these levels – economic, conjugal, disciplinary – where Bryson was evidently at the forefront of thinking in his own period in the first century AD his status in Islam reflects a similar appreciation. In both cultures we can see good evidence of Bryson setting trends.

So why is he practically unknown? Part of the reason for his neglect in spite of his central focusses may be that Martin Plessner found himself disappointed by the loose relationship between the two short Greek fragments preserved in Stobaeus' *Anthology* and the corresponding parts of Bryson Arabus and pronounced that it was not possible to get back to the original Greek; and this verdict was repeated by reviewers and then championed for quite dubious reasons unconnected with Bryson by the great Belgian scholar of late antiquity, Joseph Bidez. In some way or other the beginnings of the modern Bryson encouraged neglect and this kept him unknown even to scholars like Rostovtzeff who would have found him most useful. What is the truth of Plessner's belief? Some of Bryson is epitomized for sure. Stobaeus' two fragments come from the introduction to the first section, which was not advice but theory as I have noted, and from the section on

slaves, which is certainly short in Bryson Arabus as we have him. What Plessner did not know is that the argument of Bryson's third section on the relationship between the husband and wife co-owners was summarized by Musonius Rufus at the end of the first century and in places used verbatim by him. Musonius thus offers powerful reassurance about the reliability of the text. The translations done as part of the great Translation Movement naturally vary in quality. But no one has any doubt that the aim of the translators was to render the sense of the base text accurately for their Arabic audience. Given this, any shortening undergone by the text of Bryson Graecus at the disposal of the translator was perhaps already done in the course of his transmission in Greek, though there is evidence of further abbreviation of the prefatory section in Arabic after the translation had been made. The overall length of the treatise – some 10,000 words in English – suggests that what shortening there was has not been extensive. In sum, while we cannot turn Bryson back into Greek, we can be fairly confident that the Arabic translation gives us the argument of the original dependably.

The fact that Bryson covers so many topics and raises so many issues is the excuse for the length of the present study. I start in Part I with a clean translation of the text stripped of all notes to enable readers simply to see what Bryson says. This will be the main point of reference for most. Bryson is broken into 162 numbered sections, which for convenience follow those of Plessner, and I refer to the text by these. The parallel text and translation with annotation are to be found at the end along with other relevant texts and translations in Part V. In between is a series of studies which readers should engage with according to their interests. I begin in Part II with a wide-ranging introduction which offers a summary of the text's main points, gives an account of Bryson's rediscovery at the end of the nineteenth century, and explores the different contexts of the work in antiquity and especially in medieval Islam. The second chapter takes this forward by considering aspects of the history of the text and presents in detail arguments for the reliability of Bryson Arabus as part of the story of his use in antiquity and after. Part III addresses economy and slavery. Chapter 3 investigates Bryson's contribution to our understanding of the ancient economy and places him against what we know of ancient economic thought. Owing to his importance as a witness to the Roman economy, I have made an attempt here, necessarily incomplete and naturally subjective, to look at modern views on what is one of the most contested areas of classical research. Chapter 4 is a much shorter treatment of Bryson on slaves. Since the interpretation of slavery is

far less controversial than interpretation of the economy, I have said virtually nothing about modern debates but have traced Bryson's presentation against other Greco-Roman views. Part IV deals with the Brysonian family. Chapter 5 examines Bryson's discussion of the role of the wife as co-owner of the estate and places him in relation to other key texts of his age in Plutarch and Musonius Rufus. The final study (Chapter 6) on Bryson on children is again briefer. Bryson's interest is not in children – and certainly not in childhood – but in a code of behaviour made up of traditional requirements and applied to 'the boy', who stands for the future heir to the estate. What makes him of interest is the dearth of ancient works about children combined with his repackaging of traditional material with an eye always on the success of the estate.

In each of Chapters 3, 5, and 6 (economy, wives, children) I include a final subsection on the impact of Bryson's ideas in medieval Islam.

Many people and several organizations deserve thanks for their help in making this volume. My first and principal debt is to the Leverhulme Trust, which awarded me a Major Research Fellowship. The work could not have been done without this. The University of Warwick allowed me to hold the fellowship and thus supported me financially throughout. All Souls College gave considerable support both to this project and to a second, concurrent Greco-Arabic project funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council and directed by me on a Neoplatonic Arabic philosophy reader (Wakelnig 2013). Among individuals I would like to mention especially Amr 'Abd al-'Ati Salih, Jim Adams, Ewen Bowie, Keith Bradley (to these I am extremely grateful for various reasons), Kevin Butcher, Angelos Chaniotis, Ahmed Etman, Gregory Hutchinson, David Konstan, Chris Pelling, Bob Penella, Luc van der Stockt (and others who attended the delightful Leuven conference) – all of these and others were generous with time and information. I have always found the Arabist community unfailingly helpful to me as an outsider, and among them I must single out three individuals, Fritz Zimmerman, whose kindness is unsurpassed, Emilie Savage Smith, a source of advice and apposite wisdom at all times and a person of the greatest knowledge and sense, and Yossef Rapoport, a man of extraordinary intelligence and good humour. Geert Jan van Gelder happily answered questions and his pupil Harry Munt undertook the task of making improvements to the text with great enthusiasm and efficiency. Cyril Chilson gave help with the Hebrew text of Bryson. The Warwick Greco-Arabic team during the period of writing (Peter Pormann, Uwe Vagelpohl, Bink Hallum, especially Elvira Wakelnig) gave much direct and indirect help. Help in obtaining the

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PART I

Bryson's *Management of the Estate*: English translation

Note: for ease of reading the translation of Bryson is here given free of footnotes and other information relevant to the edition of the text. The annotated English can be found in Part V parallel to the Arabic.

Paragraph numbers in round brackets refer to those of Martin Plessner's 1928 edition.

Words or phrases in round brackets are additions to help the sense. Square brackets are used to enclose transliterated Arabic words or indicate a lacuna.

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate, Who is My Aid: The Book of Bryson, On the Man's Management of his Estate

(1) He says that the business of the estate comprises four aspects: first, property; second, servants; third, the woman; and fourth, the child.

(2) *PROPERTY*

The Creator – He is Blessed and Sublime! – placed in man the faculties he needs for the sustenance of his body and his well-being. At the same time He made him wanting, mutable, and ceasing; and because of this man stood in need of replacing and restoring what was dissolved from him. (3) I mean by the term 'faculties' (i) the faculty which each one of his body parts uses to derive from food what is similar to it, in the quantity in which it needs it; (ii) the faculty which changes and converts the foodstuff so that it becomes similar to the body part that is to be nourished by it: thus if what is to be nourished by it is flesh, it becomes flesh, if it is bone, it becomes bone, and if it is nerve, it becomes nerve; (4) (iii) the faculty which retains in the body part what has been attracted to (the body part) while it remains fluid and until it becomes solid and is joined to (the body part); (iv) the faculty which expels from each one of the body parts the residue which remains from this nourishment as waste; this is material unrelated to the nature (of the body part) and (the body part) has no power to convert or transform it into its nature; (v) the faculty which causes (his body) to grow and develop until it increases in height, breadth, and volume in correspondence with its parts.

(5) If all of these faculties were placed in man, and many others along with them which he uses for the management of his body, I say that there are two things in him upon which his subsistence depends; but one of them causes the destruction and dissipation of the other. (6) For (man) subsists by heat and moisture, and it is in the nature of heat to dissipate and destroy moisture. For this reason it is impossible for him to remain in a single state. Rather, he undergoes continuous and permanent dissolution. On account

of this he needs to replace what is dissolved from him by movement, and the replacement is the foodstuff which nourishes him. (7) If, in this situation, the body were homogeneous, its need would be for one type of nourishment. But since its constituents are different, it accordingly needs foods of different types and flavours. All (foodstuffs) come from plants or animals because food for each thing comes from what is closest to it, and there is nothing closer to the nature of man's body than animals and plants.

(8) Plants and animals need various types of crafts in order to come into existence and reach completion after they have come to exist. Plants need sowing or planting, then watering and cultivating, and so on, to ensure their usefulness is complete. (9) Animals need feeding, protecting, and sheltering, and similar things which are beneficial (for them). (10) For the collection and preparation of foods and for processing what man and animals subsist on, there is a need of many other different crafts. In man has been placed a faculty for discovering every craft and a faculty for learning it. But owing to the brevity of his life, it is impossible for one person to discover and learn (each of them) because the discovery of one craft and the learning of it will make him too busy to discover the rest of the crafts and learn them. (11) Although he has the potential to learn many of them, he does not have the potential to learn all of them. But for the management of his life a man needs all the crafts.

(12) The crafts, moreover, are connected to each other. For example, the builder who needs the carpenter, the carpenter who needs the craft of the blacksmiths, the blacksmiths' craft which needs the craft of the miners, and this craft (needs the craft of) the builder. (13) So each one of the crafts, even if complete in itself, needs another, in the way the parts of a chain need each other, and if one of the crafts is removed, the rest of the crafts cease to exist as a result of its removal. (14) And since each man needed for managing the affairs (of his life) a variety of things to feed himself with and to cover himself with, and for this purpose was in need of all the crafts; and (since) it was impossible for one man to be expert in all of them, all people needed one another for managing their lives, and for this reason people needed to form cities and live together in them to help each other with the crafts.

(15) People, then, had a need of each other but the occasion of each person's need was usually not the occasion of his associate's need. The amount of what they needed was not equivalent. Nor was it an easy matter for the value [*qīma*] of every item to be known in comparison with every (other) item, nor the level of its price [*thaman*] in comparison with the price (of the other

item), nor the level of recompense [*ujra*] for anything put to use compared with the recompense for every other item. (16) There was therefore a need of something one could use to price all items and know the value of one in relation to another. So, whenever a man needed something that was for sale or something for use, he could pay the value [*qīma*] of this item with this substance, which set a price on things and fixed it. (17) Unless it was set like this, there would be a man with one of the products an associate of his needed – oil, wheat, etc. – while the associate had other products; and it would not happen, when the first needed what the second had, that the second needed what the first had, so barter could take place between them. (18) Even if there were to be agreement between them concerning each one's need of what was in the possession of his associate, it would not happen that there would be agreement between them that the first needed something in the possession of the second for a value [*qīma*] equal in amount to the second's need of what was in the possession of the first. In this case a disagreement would arise between them, and either each one of them would abandon his associate when he could obtain no satisfaction of his need; (19) or they would barter, but then one of them would look for complete satisfaction of his need from another seller. In addition, one would need to know the amount of value [*qīma*] of the part of each one of the products in which people find benefit, e.g. honey, butter, wheat, and of other, different products in accordance with the diversity of the products and the difference between them in value [*qīma*]. (20) Even if one knew this on one occasion, one would need to know it on other occasions, whenever the situation of one of these products changed owing to greater or lesser availability on the market, the level of people's need of it, or their lack of need of it, or of excessive amounts of it at different periods, and people's use of each product at any time.

The above holds true also for the crafts.

(21) For this reason, then, people coined gold, silver, and copper and by this means they set prices for all items. They established this convention so that a man could obtain what he needed at the time of his need. (22) So, someone who possessed something and wanted to replace with it something that had gone out of his possession, or to spend it, and so on, would have no difficulty. Whoever has possession of these substances we have named becomes, as it were, one who has possession of all the products he needs. Hence there was a need for these objects to make life good.

(23) We shall now explain the best way to manage wealth, and we say that the student of this must study three topics: the acquisition of property, its preservation, and its expenditure.

(24) *ACQUISITION*

It is necessary to be aware of three failings: wrongdoing, outrage, baseness. (25) Wrongdoing consists, for example, in giving short weight, not filling the measure, practising deception in the account, evading the truth, alleging untruth, and similar things which consist of grave offences, put a stop to acquisition, interrupt the flow of exchange, and lead to exclusion. (26) This is because the spread of a bad reputation turns people doing business away from a person of such ill repute and leads anyone who has suffered at his hands to inform others about him. The result is that both those who have traded with him and those who have not stay away from him. Consequently, if he renounces such behaviour, his renunciation brings no advantage because of the matter which is being talked about concerning him and for which he is notorious.

(27) Outrage consists of insulting and slapping and things like that, which some people tolerate to get something from persons who practise such (behaviour).

(28) Baseness is when a man abandons the craft his ancestors and relations have been practising, though he is not unable to do it, for a more dishonourable craft – like the man whose ancestors and relations were generals or governors of provinces but gives up pursuing this (way of life), though he is capable of it, and reduces himself to singing and piping and such like. (29) We are not saying that a man whose ancestors were in a dishonourable craft and remains in it is affected by baseness as a result, or that he is doing something that should attract blame. Rather, we say that he is to be praised because he is content with his lot and does not exceed his limitations. (30) Indeed, if every man were obliged to seek a craft superior to the one his father bequeathed him, the consequence would be for all people to aim at one craft, the highest of the crafts. (31) This would have the result of abolishing the other crafts, and the very craft they aimed at would also disappear because it is only completed by means of the other crafts. For all of them are connected to each other, as we have explained above.

This, then, is what one must consider under the heading of acquisition.

(32) *PRESERVATION*

Five considerations are required here. The first is that what a man expends should not be greater than what he acquires. For when he does this, it is not long before his property is consumed. (33) Second, that what he expends

should not equal what he acquires. Rather, he will ensure he has a surplus of possessions against the possibility of an accident, a disaster, or commercial losses. Also, it is right that a portion of his expenditure should go towards his capital. (34) The condition of a man who does this resembles the condition of the body when it is developing and growing. The condition of a man whose expenditure equals his gains resembles the condition of someone whose development is now over and whose growth has stopped. The condition of a man who expends more than he acquires resembles the condition of very old bodies which are constantly in want and are being taken over by decay. (35) For the body that is undergoing development and growth takes in more nourishment than is dissolved from it, while the body that has reached its peak takes in as much nourishment as is dissolved, and the body which has now reached decrepitude takes in less nourishment than is dissipated from it. Just as the body which has reached decrepitude is close to death, in the same way capital will quickly be exhausted when more is taken from it than added to it.

(36) The third consideration required for the preservation of wealth is that a man should not undertake something he is incapable of sustaining. For example, the man who invests his money in a landed estate [*ḍayʿa*] he is unable to develop, or in scattered estates [*ḍiyāʿ*] which it is impossible for him to attend to because there is no one to appoint to maintain them, or who acquires livestock the expenditure on which exceeds the amount of his remaining funds. (37) The condition of one who does this resembles the condition of the greedy man who eats something he cannot digest. Just as someone who eats something he cannot digest does not receive any nourishment from it, but often it passes out of him, and along with it he then expels from his body something that does him harm when it is expelled – in the same way, when someone ventures on the acquisition of something beyond his capacity, there is an immediate risk that not only the profit will be lost, but his capital will also disappear.

(38) The fourth consideration required for the preservation of wealth is that the man should not invest his money in anything that is slow to leave his hands. This is the case with an item that is little in demand on account of the fact that the general population does without it, like the gemstones which nobody needs except kings, or the scholarly books which only scholars demand. (39) The fifth consideration required for the preservation of wealth is that the man should be quick to sell his merchandise but slow to sell his real estate (*ʿaqārāt*), even if his profit from the former is small while his profit from the latter is large.

(40) *EXPENDITURE OF WEALTH*

One must be aware of five failings: sordidness, meanness, profligacy, extravagance, and bad management. (41) Sordidness consists in holding back from spending on the categories of the Good, such as supporting relations, benefiting friends and clients, and charity to the needy, as far as he can and is capable. (42) Meanness consists of restricting essential items such as his family's [*ʿiyāl*] food and things for their welfare. (43) Profligacy consists of being engrossed in lusts and pleasures. (44) Extravagance consists in a man overstepping the expectations of his class in regard to his food or the clothing he might wear due to a desire to show off. (45) Bad management is when the man fails to apportion his expenditure equally among all the things that need it by spending in every area as is justified. For if he does not do this, but is profligate in one and cuts back in another, his affairs will be out of step with each other. (Bad management is also) when he cannot get an item at the moment he needs it.

(46) The sordid man is undone because he does not know the Good and the excellence it contains. (47) The mean man is undone because he does not appreciate (his) obligation and the want caused by his neglect. (48) The profligate is undone because of his preference for pleasure over correct judgement. The sordid and the mean types are detested by people because they represent an aspect of wrongdoing, and the mean man particularly, for he is the more unjust of the two. The profligate man is rebuked and detested: someone people detest and rebuke will get no advantage by associating with them, and if he does not associate with people, he is already numbered among the dead. (49) But the condition of the man of extravagance is worse, because the sordid and mean types, though people detest them both, are at least in the situation of making a profit by preserving their wealth; while the profligate, though rebuked, makes a profit from savouring his pleasures; but the extravagant man has no wealth to preserve and no pleasure to savour. (50) Worst of all is the condition of the man who is a bad manager, for he is in fact undone because he understands neither the amounts of expenditure nor the occasions for it.

(51) Someone who recognizes the categories of the Good and desires them also recognizes the categories of obligatory duty and makes them incumbent upon himself. He is economical in spending on his pleasures and does not transgress the normal behaviour of his class. He knows the amounts justified by each category of his needs, and he spends on it according to the value of its claim. He is not excessive in one category and then obliged to be restrictive in another. (52) He understands the times when each thing is needed.

He does not obtain something early before the time when it is needed so it deteriorates or perishes before it is needed, nor does he delay (obtaining) a thing till the time of its need has passed when obtaining it is now worthless or hard for him and he can only find it at a high price. So long as a man perseveres with what he must do and what he must leave, then he will be associated with noble-mindedness, liberality, affluence, beneficence, moderation, freedom, and excellence in his conduct and manner of life. (53) If someone is like this, his revenue or the profit from his wealth sustain his expenditure on the well-being of his body and on the provisioning of his family [*ʿiyāl*]. Over and above this, he has a surplus which he spends in part on supporting his relations, friends, and clients, in part on his poor and his beggars, (54) and in part he saves so he may call on its aid against the vicissitudes of his destiny. He must not demand more than this, since the demand for more is avarice. Indeed, this is the limit which the free man must not transgress: if he does, he will (certainly) be associated with avarice.

This is the situation with wealth and the management of its acquisition, preservation, and disbursement.

(55) *SLAVES AND SERVANTS*

The need for slaves and servants on estates [*manāzil*] is like the need for a multitude of people in cities; we have already explained the reason why people need to form cities and live together in them. (56) Slaves are of three (sorts): the slave 'by (the institution of) servitude', the slave 'by appetite', and the slave 'by nature'. (i) The slave 'by (the institution of) servitude' is one on whom the law has imposed slavery. (ii) The slave 'by appetite' is one who cannot control himself because he is dominated by his appetites and feelings. One who is like this is a bad slave and a bad person and is good for nothing. (57) (iii) The slave 'by nature' has a strong body and endures toil. He has no discernment in himself (between good and bad), and there is no sign of intelligence in him except to the extent that he is obedient to another, but without getting to the point of being able to manage himself. In his nature he is close to the beasts, which men dispose of as they wish. One who is like this, even if he is free, is still a slave, and the best thing for him is to have a master to manage him.

(58) The slave and the slaves are needed for a variety of things. Some of them are wanted for managing the estate [*manzil*], others are wanted for serving and ministering, while others are wanted for rough labours. So, when a man wants to purchase a servant, he must inspect him. If he already combines slavery 'by (the institution of) servitude' with slavery 'by appetite', one

must not proceed to purchase him nor expect to break him in, even if one is keen to. (59) Whoever buys a slave in this condition has bought a slave who has another for a master, and this being so he is not his slave except in title. For if a person cannot control himself, someone else is even less likely to control him. (60) If the servant is free in nature, strong in spirit and lithe in body, he is someone who may be entrusted with management and custody. If he is free in nature, his mind is gentle and docile, and his body is pure, he is someone who may be entrusted with serving and with ministering. If he is a slave 'by nature', he is entrusted with labours which require force and endurance.

(61) Slaves resemble the limbs of the body, the actions of which the man has in his control. Those entrusted with the custody and the management of the estate fulfil the role of the senses because it is through the senses that one knows what is harmful and removes it, and what is beneficial and attracts it. Those entrusted with serving resemble the hands because it is with them that one succeeds in fetching something useful for the body. Those entrusted with labours resemble the legs because upon them rests the whole of the body and its weight. (62) Therefore the man must protect his servants as he protects his limbs, and this involves thinking about them in two ways: first, the species which unites him with them; second, what they have suffered. If he thinks about their species, he realizes that they are people just like him, and capable of understanding what he understands, of thinking about what he thinks about, of desiring what he desires, and of hating what he hates. (63) When he deals with them in this manner, in addition to the virtue which accrues to him in his heart, he acquires affection from one whose ownership has been assigned to him. When he thinks of what they have suffered, he realizes that if he suffered something like it, he would prefer to be assigned a master who would be gentle to him and treat him with kindness.

(64) If the servant makes mistakes, the master should ignore him the first time and correct him the second time. Correcting him should initially be done with censure, warning, and admonishment; if he does it again, with anger; if he persists, with blows. (65) He should not punish him for an offence he committed in ignorance and unintentionally. But he must not neglect to punish him for an offence he committed out of badness and wickedness. If the servant does wrong, he should only be punished as the (master's) son is punished when he does something similar wrong. For this is the best thing for both the servant and the son.

(66) One must designate periods of rest for the slaves. For if the slave is made to perform task after task and burdened with labour after labour and has no rest, he will become too weary for work, even if he is eager to do it. Rest renews the body and makes work attractive to (the body's) possessor.

(67) In this regard he is like the bow: if it is left strung, it becomes loose; but if it is put aside till the moment when it is needed, its strength endures and it is more suitable for someone to use it. (68) We are really astonished by people we see who care for their riding animals and are keen to rest them and be good to them, but give their servants no part of this. Although the servant should not take as much rest as the animal because (too) much rest makes him insolent and gives him time to do things that harm him, whereas the animal is not like him in this regard, he cannot do without a rest to keep up his strength and revive his energy, though without it reaching the point where one fears it will be harmful for him. (69) Furthermore, since he is of the (same) species as his owner, his owner, in addition to endeavouring to manage him well, must maintain (a feeling of) compassion towards him and a recollection of his weakness. For his animal is more tolerant of negligence than (his servant). (70) Nor should anyone take advantage of his servant when he sees that there is no alternative for him but to accept his orders, like it or not. Rather, he will seek to ensure that (the servant's) work for him is done with affection, zeal, and keenness for the task. Finally, one must be keen to ensure that his servant's submissiveness is due to respect more than fear and to love more than compliance and obedience.

(71) The finest servants are young because they are more capable of obeying and quicker to accept what they are taught. It is they who get used to their masters and retain the habits they follow. A man's best servants do not come from his (own) race, since people are given to despising and envying those related to them, and racial similarity is part of this.

(72) The rights of the servant include having sufficient of what he needs and not being burdened by a task he is incapable of and is illegal for him. Obedience is compulsory for him, and if he does not in consequence obey, punishment is necessary for him according to what we have established for each case incrementally. (73) Servants should stand with their masters in (varying) grades of favour and distinction. If one of them behaves well, he will elevate him from one grade to the next in relation to his merits. For this acts as a spur to the rest to catch him up.

This, then, is what we had to say about servants, following what we said about property.

(74) *THE WOMAN*

The first point of discussion about the woman, which we must start with, is advice concerning the purpose for which she is wanted. We say that there are two sides to this. The first is from the perspective of common sense, the

second from the perspective of Nature. (75) The perspective of common sense relates to the fact that most of the man's business is outside his estate. He is obliged to leave it on its own and go out from it. Given this, there is no alternative for him but to have someone to keep it safe and manage the contents of it for him. It is impossible for someone to give another's affairs the attention he gives his own. (76) Since this is so, the best thing for the man is to have a partner in his estate to possess it as he possesses it, to care for it as he cares, and to manage it as he manages. This is the aspect which common sense indicates and choice suggests.

(77) The second aspect, which Nature requires, relates to the fact that when the Creator – He is Blessed and Sublime! – made people to be mortal and ordained the impermanence of the World, he caused them to procreate, and made procreation from something in which heat and moisture unite. Development, growth, and movement cannot occur without heat. Imprinting and formation in accordance with a variety of sizes and shapes cannot occur without moisture. (78) Moisture in conjunction with heat has no stability or permanence because heat causes its dissolution and destruction. The strength of each of these two in a single body is insufficient for the child to come to be. For this reason the child arises from male and female. For in the male heat is stronger, while in the female moisture is greater. (79) When the male introduces into the female the amount of heat which the Creator has ordained is about right for the child to come to be, and this heat seeks out in the female the amount of moisture through which the created thing will reach completion, then the child is complete.

(80) Moreover, it is part of the perfect disposition of this matter that whereas He gave the man a nature which makes him prefer activity, visibility, and independence, and therefore a need for someone to stand in for him on his estate, He gave the woman a nature which makes her prefer to stay still and keep out of sight. Thus she could compensate for his lack of patience for staying at home, while he could compensate for her lack of action in pursuing a livelihood. (81) Next, He established between them a feeling of love and intimacy, which leads to the removal from each one of them of jealousy, rivalry, and meanness towards his companion with regard to the property which the one permits the other (to use) and over which the one gives the other unrestricted control in respect to its management. Even if this were not so, each one of them would be preoccupied with his companion more than he would be with another owing to their association and partnership and readiness to take (from each other). But He made both of them as if they were one person.

(82) It is the woman's duty to show the man subservience and obedience and to submit herself to his commands, for he has bestowed the estate upon her and made her the owner of it and does not exclude her from any part of it. If she says that he actually does this because it is to his advantage, what she says will not invalidate his good will towards her nor end his authority over her. (83) The reason is that, although the credit for all a person's acts of kindness and his good reputation for them redounds to him and the profit in this regard is greater than it is to the beneficiary, this is not something that stops (a beneficiary's) gratitude towards him or allows (the beneficiary) a way of denying his favour.

(84) When he takes the woman (in marriage), it is necessary that the man should begin by making her understand the reason he wanted her: that he did not want her for children without (also) caring for him and checking on his affairs during his presence, absence, health, and sickness, having custody of all his wealth and aiding him in all his affairs, and (for) her duties in respect of these, on account of the reasons we have explained. (85) The man must not look for rank, for wealth, or for beauty in the woman, because if he looks for any one of these and it is found to exist in her, the woman sees that he has achieved what he desires from her and there is nothing remaining that she needs in order to get close to him. (86) Rather, she thinks that, if she [---] him or is careless of his rights, the fact he has obtained what he needs from her obliges him to put up with this, and that he is readier to obey and submit to her than she is to do so to him. In this situation the management of the estate goes to ruin, since the inferior of the two owners is occupying the rank of the superior. Now either the superior is to follow the inferior, or to quarrel and fight with him when he is in dispute with him. (87) And with quarrelling comes distraction, and with distraction comes negligence. For the business of the estate only prospers if its superior member is the head of the rest of the household [*ahl*], and the rest of the household [*ahl*] listens to him and obeys him.

(88) We have now explained the two purposes for which the woman is sought, i.e. children and the management of the estate. One must consider what is required to pursue these purposes. Rank, wealth, and beauty are of no relevance here. (89) Rather, these attributes are often all detrimental. There are many who gaze and stare at beauty, and frequently this is a cause of corruption in its possessor. As to rank, it leads its possessor to rely on it and to abandon much that adorns him. Wealth makes a man highly pleased with himself and his opinions. How much the more, then, does this apply to a woman with her tendency towards imperfection!

(90) For children, two things are needed in the woman. The first of these concerns the body, the second the soul. What pertains to the body is soundness of build; what pertains to the soul is soundness of mind. For with physical sickness and mental corruption there is no end.

(91) The management of the estate requires many virtues. The first of these is intelligence and acumen. Second is strength of soul and body based on self-control and self-restraint from the appetites. Third is humility of soul, which she is to use in her relationship with her husband. Fourth is tenderness of heart, which she is to use in her relationship with her children. Fifth is fairness of conduct, which she is to use in her relationship with her servants. (92) You will not find any of the virtues the man needs that the woman does not need in the same degree. Rather, the more so because she is weaker and it is she who has a greater need of acquiring virtues. (93) Since not every soul is receptive to the virtues through instruction, the man must make an effort to find someone who will help him assume the virtues naturally so that he is able to build up and increase what he (already) has.

(94) The affairs of the estate will not be straight until the character of the woman corresponds to the character and way of the man. The character and way of a bad woman will not correspond to the character and way of a bad man. (95) The two of them will not be in concord unless both are good – just as straight wood will fit only with straight wood and crooked wood will fit neither with straight nor with crooked wood because straightness constitutes a single way whereas crookedness (goes) in many ways. (96) The man and the woman, then, must jointly be intelligent, chaste, and just. For if they are not like this, there is no accord and the management of their estate goes to ruin.

If anyone doubts what we said about the need for all the virtues to be united in the woman, we can state that (is so), and that she is without any doubt the caretaker and manager of the estate, who calculates what is good for it, and who is charged with ruling the servants and the other persons within it. (97) Can there then be management without someone of intelligence and knowledge? Can there be rule without someone of kindness and consideration, together with severity when severity is in place? Can there be benefit without control and custody? Can there be proper execution without acumen and skill? (98) Can any of this be perfected without preserving the soul and ridding oneself of appetites and pleasures – excepting any considered fine and free from excess? Or, moreover, without patience in the face of suffering, toleration of hardship, giving of oneself freely, and submitting to justice? (99) If not, how can one preserve one's estate if one cannot preserve one's soul? How can one devote oneself to what is good for

it if one is occupied with one's own appetites and pleasures? How can one control those in one's power if one is incapable of self-control? (100) How can one persevere on the road if one has no patience? How can one have the patience to provide for the children's upbringing and for supporting their needs and to serve the husband unless one has tolerance? Will one give them priority over oneself unless one has the strength and the courage in oneself to make this easy? Can one endure wrong unless one has the least fairness and justice? (101) For nobody can say that the woman is concordant in her relationship with her husband and her children unless she prefers their wrongdoing of her to her wrongdoing of them and tolerates their anger and sullen looks and violence at times when they are vexed or afflicted by illness, and, further, shows them that the fault in all of this lies with her and not with them, and, finally, bears them no grudge for it and shows no trace of this in her soul. (102) Rather, when she recalls it sometimes, it renews in her a feeling of tenderness and compassion towards them and makes it an occasion for excusing them for it as she recollects the situations of annoyance, anxiety, or illness which led them to it. And so she is tender to them because of this and is distressed by it. It is her wish that she should not experience such things, as she hates the kind of behaviour they exhibited due to a desire to spare them and from loving care towards them on account of everything that harms them and changes their circumstances. (103) Where is the soul more perfect than the soul in which are united these qualities? For when these qualities are united in the woman, then she is blest in herself, her husband and her children are blest on her account, her family [*ahl*] is held in honour because of her, and she becomes an example to women.

(104) *THE CHILD*

The subject of the child follows that of the woman. The best child is one (born) of a free woman who is sound in body and sound in mind and combines these qualities. This constitutes the primary well-being for the child and the basis upon which his education is built and his way (of life) is directed. (105) His education must begin when he is small, for the small child is readier to obey and quicker at cooperating. He is not yet ruled by habit which prevents him pursuing what one wants of him, and he lacks the determination that diverts him from orders. (106) When he has become accustomed to something and grows up with it, be it good or bad, he cannot readily be turned aside from it. If he becomes accustomed from his youth to fine practices and praiseworthy deeds, he stays with them and supplements them as he comes to understand them. (107) But if he is neglected and let

go until he becomes accustomed to the dominant characteristics to which his nature inclines him, or has become accustomed to base things which are not in his nature, and is then taken to be educated once these things have achieved dominance over him, it will be difficult for whoever is teaching him to turn him aside, and he will not easily be separated from what is (now) normal for him.

(108) Most people come by their bad practices as a result of the habits of boyhood, since there has been no education before (this). I have seen many beyond counting who know their practices are base, and from whom praiseworthy ways are not concealed, but who find it difficult to return to such ways because these practices are dominant in them. If they (ever) set themselves against these (practices) in some contexts owing to a feeling of shame before other people in public, once they are alone they do not fail to return to the other practices which have become dominant in them and ingrained in their natures. (109) I have also seen many children who maintained praiseworthy ways as long as their fathers and others in charge of their education were alive, but turned to the worst and basest of ways when they lost them. (110) There is no reason more powerful for this than habit formed in boyhood. However, when the boy has a natural inclination to bad things and in addition to this follows the course of accustoming himself to them, he is more eager for them, quicker to attain them, and goes into them more deeply with the result that they become well established in him and there is no way for him to separate himself from them. (111) The opposite of this is that the boy is naturally excellent and one takes him along the course of accustoming himself to the Good, and then his nature and his habits each act to correct the other until the Good becomes strong and well established in him. And just as the first boy is not in a position to separate himself from bad things, the second will not separate himself from praiseworthy ones. (112) In intermediate cases, where the boy is excellent by nature, but is then led into bad things, or is abandoned in the company of people who (practise) them, or where he is bad by nature, is then led to praiseworthy things, or happens to see someone who practices them, habit has diverted both of these from (their) nature; but it is possible that after a while they will break with habit and revert to their make-up.

(113) The best sort of boy is the one who is endowed by nature with shame and love of honour, and takes pride. If he is like this, it is easy to educate him. In the case of a boy who has little shame, despises honour, and is far from proud, educating him is difficult. (114) And with this type there is no alternative but to employ fear and terror when he does wrong, then to accomplish (one's aim) with blows if using fear does not work, and finally to

treat him well, if he behaves well. In the case of the boy with pride who has a love of honour, praise and blame following good or wrong behaviour achieve what punishment and gifts cannot achieve in a different boy.

(115) The boy must be examined in every situation involving his eating, drinking, sleeping, posture standing [*qiyām*], posture sitting [*quʿūd*], movement, speech, and all his affairs. He will be taught in all of these to avoid unseemliness and strive for decorum. If he recognizes what is decorous and what is unseemly in these matters, and both concepts are established in his soul, he will heed them and grasp them in all other matters, and for the most part he will not need correction.

I shall (now) set out for you a way to accomplish this.

(116) The first step is the matter of food. The boy must be accustomed not to rush up before it is served, and not to gaze at it greedily. A way must be found to minimize the importance of food in his eyes. (117) If he shows signs of greed, he should be rebuked for it and the disgrace of it should be made plain to him. He should be taught that greed is a characteristic of a pig and that whoever associates himself with (a pig) in this regard cannot be distinguished from one. If he sits down to eat with someone who is older than him, he must not stretch out his hand for food before he does, unless told to. (118) He should only eat what is in front of him. He should not persist in stretching out his hand, now for one thing, now for another. Rather, he should restrict himself in most of his eating to one thing and not desire a great number of dishes. He should not hurry in eating. He should not take big mouthfuls. (119) He should not sully his hands, mouth, or clothes. He should not lick his fingers. He should not be the last to take his hand off the food. He should not stare at any one of his table-companions, especially if they are strangers.

(120) The boy must be made to understand that food is needed in the same way as medicine. Just as it is not intended with medicine that it should be pleasant or plentiful but, rather, useful, in the same way the intention with food lies not in its pleasure or quantity but rather in the degree of its utility. (121) Let the boy be accustomed to present part of what he is eating to someone who requests it. For in this way he gains control of appetite, generosity, and popularity. Let him be accustomed to being content with the frugalest of fare, and to limit himself to bread with nothing on it. For this habit will help him towards continence, self-restraint, and the least wish for money. (122) Desire for money is in itself blameworthy. In addition it often leads to its acquisition by disgraceful means when there is no opportunity to acquire it by fair ones. Being content with the most frugal fare is an excellent thing for rich and poor – except that one who is poor has a greater need to

do this, while in one who is rich it is a sign of greater worth. (123) The boy must not eat his fill at breakfast, but do so (only) at the time of his evening meal. For this is beneficial for his mind and his bodily health because, if he eats his fill during the daytime, he grows heavy, idleness takes hold of him, he needs to sleep, and his mind becomes too gross to receive education. (124) The boy must not be accustomed to laziness and sleeping in the daytime, but should be accustomed to energy, movement, and zeal for education. This regime is also better for the man: if he is accustomed to it from boyhood it will be easier for him and of greater benefit to him. (125) Meats and gross things should not form a majority of what he eats. Putting these aside is more beneficial for (achieving) sharpness of mind and bodily health, and for promoting rapid development because heavy food makes one's nature heavy and prevents it from developing. (126) Let the boy be accustomed to have only a little confectionery and fruit. This is more beneficial for his soul and his body – for his soul because luxury and love of pleasures do not get the better of him; and for his body, because of the speed with which confectionery and fruit are broken down and because of their corruption in hot bodies. (127) Let the boy be accustomed to having his drink after he has finished his food. This is healthier for his body and his soul – for his soul, because it regulates it; and for his body, because it is more helpful for the digestion of his food and more likely to strengthen his body. Anyone with experience already understands this, knowledgeable physicians advise it, and those who take wine know about it. (128) The right time for the boy to have food in the day is when he has already finished the lesson he has been studying and is fairly tired. Whenever you see the boy eat something and he wants to hide the fact he is eating it, forbid him from doing it, since he is only covering his food up because he knows he does not need it and is at fault in eating it.

(129) Let the boy be accustomed not to drink water with his food, especially in summer, because if he drinks, the food becomes heavy, his body becomes languid and lazy, the meal is speedily consumed from his stomach, and he is in need of more. In addition, if it is winter, (the water) cools his body. (130) It is seemly for the boy to restrain himself from drinking water at times when he is busy learning or in the presence of someone who demands his respect. (131) The boy must not go near wine before he is on the verge of manhood because it will damage his body and his soul. In the case of the body, it warms it, though it does not need warming owing to its own heat. In the case of the soul, if wine tends to alter the minds of men of experience in life and lead them to foolishness, irascibility, bad thoughts, insolence, and reckless behaviour, with a boy this is even more likely because the brain of a boy is in addition delicate and the vapour of the alcohol quickly corrupts

it because of its power over it. (132) The boy must not attend symposiums except when people of education and refinement are there. As for the parties of ordinary people, he should also not attend owing to the fact that abusive language is normal and foolishness is apparent among people there.

(133) The amount of sleep the boy has will be assessed according to the extent of his need. He must be prevented from using sleep for his pleasure. Too much sleep is harmful to his body and his soul because it loosens the body and opens it up and makes the mind gross and deadens the heart. (134) The boy must be prevented from sleeping when he has eaten until the food has gone down and settled properly. He is to be roused at dawn to remove from his body the waste and dirt which has accumulated in it so he becomes agile. For there is nothing more helpful for sharpness of mind than this, and nothing more conducive to bodily energy and health. Nor is there a better time for someone to learn than early morning. (135) The man also needs to wake at dawn, and it will be easier if he has been accustomed to this since boyhood. The boy must be prevented from sleeping during the day except when he needs to on account of weakness or disease. (136) Nor should the boy be accustomed to sleeping in people's presence because – leaving aside the disgrace involved – it shows that he is not able to control himself or check himself from pleasure. Soft bedding is bad for the boy because it loosens and opens him up. The boy needs toughening and (he needs) his soul to grow strong.

(137) If the boy is exposed to a degree of cold in winter and heat in summer, it is better for him than being exposed to neither of them. If someone has had no exposure to any of this, his body will be delicate and weak and his soul languid and feeble. For the same reason, walking, running, riding, and movement are better for the boy than quiet, calm, ease, and pampering. (138) Also, the boy must not be accustomed to dressing in soft and fine clothing. He should not think much of (people's) regard for clothes, but understand that this is appropriate for women and effeminates and that it leads to a love of money. We have already explained that love of money is bad in itself and leads to worse. (139) Further, he must not go out without a cloak, nor let his hands hang slack or fold them over his chest. He should not reveal his arm. He should not hurry too much when he walks, nor be very slow, for speed in walking is a sign of recklessness while slowness is a sign of disdain and idleness. Revealing the arm is an act of insolence, and letting the hands hang slack is a sign of contempt for people. (140) His hair must not be allowed to grow long. The boy must not be adorned with women's adornments. Rather, one should make him realize the disgrace of effete behaviour and the aim of someone who practises it. One should make him hate the

idea of looking like women and love the idea of looking like men. (141) He should not wear a ring except when he needs to. He should be prevented from boasting about an item in his possession in front of someone who does not possess such a thing, and should be reproached for this till he stops. He should be allowed to boast of his culture and learning and to compete on the basis of these.

(142) He should be admonished to honour his elders, to stand up from his seat for them, and not to honour the rich except to the degree he honours the poor. He should also be admonished to honour anyone superior to him in culture and knowledge, even if he is younger than him. (143) The boy should be prevented from spitting, blowing his nose, yawning, belching, and so on, in the presence of others because this will show self-control, cleanliness, and a strong sense of shame. Such actions are common only in those who are excessive with their food, drink, sleep, and rest. (144) The boy should not be allowed to place one leg over the other while he is sitting nor to support his head on his arm. For anyone who does this shows that he has gone so far in relaxing and opening up (his body) that he is unable to support his head; and no one does this at a time of vitality, but rather at times of worry, depression, or weakness.

(145) The boy must not swear by God about truth or falseness. This is also proper for the man, except that he is sometimes obliged to (swear). But the boy is not exposed to situations which oblige him (to take) an oath. If someone is accustomed from his youngest years not to swear by God, he will use oaths sparingly when he is adult, guard himself against them, and in most cases not venture them. (146) The boy should be accustomed to being silent and speaking little, and not speaking in the presence of his elders except in reply to something he has been asked. Moreover, when he is present at the assembly of someone older than he is, he must listen to his words because paying attention is beneficial to him for his studies and holding his tongue shows patience and respect. (147) The boy must be prevented from mentioning disgraceful things and be warned against hearing them from someone else. For mentioning them and paying attention to them associates him with them. If he finds referring to them objectionable and regards them as revolting, he will take greater exception to doing them, and strengthens his feeling of disgust as a result. For this reason, the boy must be warned about keeping the company of boys who are bold and forward. (148) The boy must be prevented from abusing and cursing. Let him be accustomed to pleasant speech and a friendly attitude, a cheerful disposition, amiability, and courtesy. Just as it hurts him to do these deeds, so it hurts him to see others doing them. He must not hear blame except from someone who is intending to discipline

him, when he has made a mistake, or to discipline another. (149) One of the most beneficial elements of the boy's education and the finest of the customs he acquires is the practice of telling the truth and avoiding lies. If the boy tells a lie, he must be reprimanded, blamed, rebuked, and beaten if necessary. For telling the truth is the best of virtues, whereas telling lies is the vilest, foulest, and very worst baseness. Whoever is accustomed to telling lies and grows up doing so will not prosper.

(150) The boy must be accustomed to serve himself, his parents, his teacher, and his elders. Boys who are most in need of admonishment in this regard are the children of the rich because the children of the poor are obliged to do this and get used to it. With the children of the rich, on the other hand, there is no reason for them to do it, unless they are admonished. (151) For children who do this, there is an enormous benefit here. It trains the boy and imparts manliness and experience, accustoms him to modesty, earns him affection, and in this way he becomes ready for life's ups and downs.

(152) The boy must not cry, yell, or beg if the teacher hits him. This is a sign of faintheartedness and cowardice and suits the slave, not one who is free. We have already noted that for boys who have no pride success will be difficult. (153) The boy must be disciplined for envious and oppressive behaviour and other things. Let him be made to love being competitive about education and be proud of having no one outstrip him in it. Let the boy be accustomed to being proud that none of his peers does him a favour in some regard without him doing an equivalent or better favour, that he does not take something and give less in return, and that his peer does not love him more than he loves (his peer). (154) It is appropriate for someone noble to show greater favour than he receives and to give more than he takes. And it is appropriate for someone worthy of love to show love more than he receives love. (155) If it is impossible for the boy to show favour in the manner in which his peer favours him, let him find a way of repaying this favour by other means. Otherwise he is not practising justice, and people will attribute to him a love of gain, not a love of honour. (156) The boy must be made to hate gold and silver and be warned against touching them more than one is warned against touching vipers and snakes. The harm done by the viper and the snake enters the body only, whereas the harm done by a love of gold and silver enters the soul and the damage caused by them in the soul is more effective than the damage of the venom in the body. An effort should be made to play down their value in his mind and to disparage anyone who loves them.

(157) The boy must be permitted play at times, but he shall not play a game involving disgrace or suffering. For play should contribute rather to

the boy's relaxation and happiness so that it assists him to achieve what is expected of him later by way of hard work in education and the toleration of its difficulties. Thus, if his play is tiring for him, he will need to relax at the time when he is being educated. The point of it will be lost on him, and only what tires him about it will remain. (158) Among the most excellent things the boy can be accustomed to, and the most effective for achieving success, are obedience to his parents, his teacher, and educated people, looking at them with reverence in the eye, showing respect and veneration for them. Any boy who fails to do this will be slow to achieve success.

(159) A warning must be given to the boy about sexual intercourse or obtaining knowledge of any aspect of sexual intercourse or coming near it before he is married. Apart from the fact that this ensures closeness to God – He is Exalted!, good repute among men, bodily health, proper growth, maintenance of purity and cleanliness, and self-control, if the man does not know a woman apart from his woman and the woman does not know a man apart from her man, the love of each one of them for the other partner is the greatest love there is. His heart enfolds her and her heart enfolds him. This is among the most beneficial of things for the man and the woman jointly. (160) If those who seek a powerful body forbear from sexual intercourse and choose the former over the latter, those who seek virtue in their soul have all the more reason to abstain from it.

(161) Whoever keeps to these (recommendations) and acts in accordance with them will attain to virtue, receive love and honour from God and men, and achieve the greatest happiness to be had. Whoever discards them and thinks that he will not benefit from them and that the benefit they offer is insignificant, and fails to make use of them, receives little by discarding them but incurs much imperfection and vileness. (162) Perhaps he will know their excellence at a time when it is no (longer) possible for him to put himself in order or to rectify what he has lost, and he will come to repent. For a little mistake in the beginnings and foundations of life is not little in the harm it causes. Conversely there is benefit in a little right because it is upon such foundations that life is built.

The end of the treatise of the philosopher Bryson on the management of the estate. Praise be to God alone.

PART II

Background

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1 BRYSON'S BOOK: THEMES AND CONTEXTS

Bryson is an unfamiliar, indeed unusual, author in several respects. Many, perhaps most, classicists will not have heard of him, yet his book on estate management addresses some of the most important interests of social and economic historians working on the early Roman empire, the period to which he very probably belongs. He is also, arguably, of some importance for the development of political thought in the later Roman empire. And he is obviously relevant to students of the Greek literature written under Rome as a prime example of a 'Neopythagorean' text. Since his book survives principally in a medieval Arabic translation and a late medieval Hebrew version of this Arabic, it is unsurprising that Arabists know him fairly well, for the contribution of his work to Islamic economic thinking has been recognized for almost a century and his influence on Islamic social thought has been known for almost as long. Yet even here his contribution to political theory has not been fully appreciated, and nationalistic or religious reasons have sometimes led to an erasure of his authority.

The following pages introduce the main themes and contexts of Bryson's work beginning with Greco-Roman antiquity and passing on to the rediscovery of his text and the identification of its author by modern scholars. This will lead to an extended, but necessarily broad-brush, discussion of Bryson Arabus and his economic and political value to his medieval Islamic audience. Since this material will be less familiar to most readers of this study, I shall say rather more about it here than I do about the classical background. The classical material will be treated fully in the various separate studies of Bryson's contribution to our understanding of the ancient economy, slavery, marriage, and family. This introduction moves quickly through the various issues and I have been sparing in giving references to the later chapters. For biographical matter in particular readers may wish to consult the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (the complete second and new, ongoing

third edition) and *Brill's New Pauly* for the ancient world, both of which are available online.

(a) The oikonomikos logos

Bryson's book is in four main sections. These deal respectively with property and money, slaves and servants, the role of the wife and the community of marriage, and the upbringing and supervision of the couple's sons. In its literary context the work belongs to a relatively well-known, if not very common, genre which deals with the running of landed estates and houses, the organization of the people in them, and the morals and habits of the family members. This is the *oikonomikos logos*. In the present study the spelling 'oeconomic' will be used to refer to this literature and its subject matter while 'economic' will be kept to refer specifically to financial matters, planning, and policy, i.e. the normal modern usages of the word. The content of works belonging to the *oikonomikos logos* varies enormously. In some of them we find practical advice based on real experience of administration and financial management. Yet such advice as is given is mostly frustrating or annoying for the ancient historian who wants to know what the ancients themselves clearly found uninteresting to record, even in quasi-technical literature. Other works present us with philosophical or ethical discourses, ranging from profound, hard-hitting analysis to the superficial and tralaticious. The most famous example of the type is the charming literary work of the philosopher and historian Xenophon. Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* was written around 370 BC and describes a conversation about the choice and education of a landowner's wife, the slave labour used on his estate, and specifically the role of the steward and the day-to-day problems he encounters in his business. Xenophon's older contemporary, Antisthenes, also wrote an *Oikonomikos*, but since this is merely a title to us (though see below), we cannot say if Xenophon wrote in response to it. Plato's stern pupil Xenocrates wrote another *Oikonomikos*, but again nothing is known about its contents. We are on firmer ground with the first book of Aristotle's *Politics*, which focusses on the running of the household and the place of the household in the *polis*, and certainly has to be considered as part of the type. The grounding of the state in the human community and specifically in the household as a unit consisting of family, slaves, and property/productive labour (but with 'more emphasis on people than on the possession of inanimate things', 1259b18–19) is Aristotle's rejoinder to Plato's imagined communities, which is expressed according to his customary division of wholes (the city) into their parts (household and village).

The human parts of the household are analysed according to his theory of the natural superiority of men over women and of Hellenes over barbarians, and since Greeks – whether by biology or culture – continued to hold these views *mutandis mutatis* for the rest of antiquity, *Politics* Book 1 exercised a considerable influence on later literature in this area including Bryson, as we shall see.

The highly condensed style of Aristotle's writing called for further treatments, and from the school of Aristotle come two unconnected and quite different books entitled *Oikonomika*, the first of which (covering wives, slaves, and property) is attributed to Theophrastus by Philodemus of Gadara in his own *On Oikonomia*, which dates to the mid first century BC. The second of the *Oikonomika* attributed to Aristotle is not mentioned by Philodemus or anyone else. It is a short collection of stories of rulers' responses to financial problems or of their peculations in the cities they controlled, preceded by a brief theoretical section on types of economy including public finances (which Moses Finley held to be 'the one Greek attempt at a general statement' of public finances, while rightly condemning its 'crashing banality'). Philodemus himself belonged to the Epicurean school of philosophers and sensibly attached himself to a Roman grandee living in style on the Bay of Naples. His work is a substantial survival of the type, but with a contents and style utterly different from Xenophon. Indeed, Philodemus explicitly rejects the usefulness or applicability for the philosopher of practical economic advice of the Xenophontic kind (and openly attacks Xenophon and 'Theophrastus' for offering such advice as philosophers). When he comes to discuss the subject of money-making he can think of no better way of doing it (for the philosopher) than to ask one's patron or (without a blush) to charge for lecturing on philosophy. Nevertheless, Philodemus' work contains much of interest which has been overlooked, for in giving an account also of the non-philosopher man of business, he makes plain what Finley and his followers doubted, that making money and making it quick were the concerns of the elite Romans Philodemus rubbed shoulders with; and in this respect, he offers some nice parallels for Bryson. Close in time to Philodemus – or perhaps not too much after him – is the work in modern times confusingly known as Ps.-Aristotle, *Oikonomika III*. This is in fact a medieval Latin translation (in various recensions) of a Greek text of uncertain date or authorship which deals exclusively with the husband and wife of the *oikos* and their children and offers a good deal of fairly traditional advice premised on the superiority of the male freeborn landholder. Importantly it also demands mutual respect by the marriage partners and within a private relationship independent of social or civic requirements and rules. When it

was rediscovered in the nineteenth century, it was too tempting to take it as a lost work of Aristotle, as one of the recensions suggested, and to see in it one of the oeconomica ascribed to him by late antique philosophers (Aristotle frr. 182–3 Rose 1886 = 99–101 Gigon 1987). But it is certainly not by Aristotle and its concerns suggest that it is best seen as Neopythagorean or Stoic in influence and therefore from the later Hellenistic or, and more probably, early Roman period in date. All in all *Oikonomika III* offers important parallels to Bryson's third section.

There are two other medieval Latin texts which may be mentioned here. The first, the *Regitiua Domus*, has some similarities with *Oikonomika III*. It is a part-translation by Pedro Gallego (d. *c.* 1267) of a lost Arabic text which was itself most probably a translation of an unknown ancient Greek *oikonomikos logos*. In the minds of its two editors (José Martínez Gázquez and Auguste Pelzer) it also had points of contact with the second Latin text, the so-called *Yconomica Galieni*, which is nothing more than a heavily stripped-down version of Bryson, which was made in Arabic (now lost) before the thirteenth century; but the differences between Bryson and the *Regitiua* are extensive, not least because Bishop Pedro clearly liked adding his own thoughts (such as the long warning to parents of the medical dangers of ejaculation by teenagers, pp. 166–7 Gázquez). I shall say nothing more about the *Regitiua*, but will return briefly to the *Yconomica* in the next chapter.

Beyond these works, there are various extracts of texts and letters by authors bearing – like Bryson himself – 'Pythagorean' names (i.e. names belonging to Pythagoras' family and friends), some written in the fake Doric commonly used in Neopythagorean literature and purporting to be the dialect of the ancient Pythagorean communities of archaic southern Italy, some in the normal Greek literary language of the educated *koinē* or 'common' dialect, some even in the archaizing Ionic dialect. Most of these oeconomic texts probably date to the time of the High Roman Empire and are preserved in various sections of Stobaeus' great fifth-century *Anthology* including Book 4 ch. 28 with the heading *oikonomikos*. Some of them are relevant to the central ethical concerns of the topic and have links to other literature of the early Roman period, for example on the subject of women's make-up and clothes. Among the authors of this material are some bearing female names, and although some moderns have suggested that they are men masquerading as women in order to discuss such topics freely, there is no reason not to accept them as women who were using Pythagorean pseudonyms – since women had a prominent part in Pythagorean legend – in order to claim authority for their deliberations, just as Bryson and

other men did. For whereas there have been many social formations which obliged women to write under men's names, it is difficult to think of ones where men have felt obliged to write as women or wanted to do so. If that is right, the texts are important as rare examples of female authorship surviving from antiquity. Stobaeus' chapter on *oikonomikos* contains two extracts in Doricizing Greek from Bryson himself, on trades and on slavery. He also included under various headings a good number of extracts from the first-century Roman Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus on family and marriage and other oeconomic matters. As we shall be seeing in Chapter 2, Musonius was an attentive reader of Bryson. Other extracts come from Musonius' pupil, the philosopher and politician Dio of Prusa (Dio Chrysostom) and are taken from his own lost *Oikonomikos Logos*, which was probably influenced by Bryson's book. In addition, Stobaeus includes an oeconomic fragment from the second-century author Hierocles 'the Stoic' (so called to distinguish him from his late-antique namesake, Hierocles of Alexandria), who is best known today for his theory of social interaction as a series of concentric circles starting from ego and extending in the outermost circle to the whole human race. The extract from his *Oikonomikos* concerns the tasks of the husband and the wife about the estate, and clearly takes its point of departure from Musonius.

(b) Reliability, date, and name

The *oikonomikos logos*, then, was treated by a number of relatively well-known and important authors. It cannot be said that Bryson is among them, either with regard to antiquity or to the history of classical scholarship. With regard to modern scholarship this is the more surprising because a German translation, together with a slightly unsatisfactory text, by Martin Plessner has existed for over eighty years, even if the translation is not terribly sympathetic to the reader; and an excellent (if not always close) Italian translation by Mauro Zonta has been available for more than a decade. Despite this, the number of entries for Bryson recorded since Plessner in the classical bibliographical database, *L'Année philologique*, is just two, one of which is the Italian translation itself and the other an important study of one of Bryson's readers, Musonius Rufus, which has itself lain unregarded by scholars. (One should add the study by Baloglou and Constantinidis 1996, though it is published in an orientalist journal.) The situation with students of Islamic literature and history is different. This is because of the thoroughness of Plessner's study of the text's influence on Muslim authors writing in Arabic and Persian, and because of Bryson's place in the Translation Movement of

the ninth and tenth centuries AD, which saw the translation into Arabic of a very considerable quantity of Greek science and philosophy.

Except for one very important point, I must leave introducing the translation, transmission, and influence of Bryson in Arabic and Islam for the while and stay with classical antiquity, for although one purpose of this book is to communicate the influence of Bryson's book as a vehicle of cultural transmission and a very good (and indeed less well-known) example of the role ancient Greek thought could play in the world of medieval Islam, Bryson's role in the Greco-Roman culture of the Roman empire must have priority for the moment on account of his virtually complete invisibility to classical scholars. The point to be made here, and one to which I shall return later in this introduction, in Chapter 2, and elsewhere, is that there is every reason to accept the Arabic translation as a fair and intelligent version of the Greek. Among the several specific reasons for Bryson's neglect which I shall be mentioning later is an intemperate and unfounded allegation about the value of Bryson Arabus made, in pure ignorance, by the Belgian historian of late antiquity, Joseph Bidez, just a short while after Plessner's study had appeared. Bidez made this remark in the course of a sustained attack on another Greek text which survived in Arabic, and I shall return to the story and Bidez's further errors later. The fact is that long before this outburst experts on the translation of Greek texts into Arabic were fully aware that the Greco-Arabic translators aimed to be accurate in transmitting the contents of their texts. They and their readers wanted to know what writers in Greek, Middle Persian (Pahlavi), and other languages said and to build upon the legacy of these 'ancients'. They did not set out to distort or modify; that was not their purpose. Even in the case of epitomized versions or the summaries of Greek materials, which are common in the case of some Greek authors like Galen and often sit alongside full translations, we may speak of intellectual honesty. We must always be sensitive to the medieval Islamic background of the translator's world; but interest in 'the ancients' and their thought was part of that world and for this reason we can be reasonably confident in most cases including Bryson that what we read is an acceptable version of what was written in Greek. As with most of the Arabic translations, Bryson Arabus is far from being a 'word for word' version, but rather shows a desire to understand and communicate the text. Thus we cannot turn it back into Greek, as Plessner had toyed with doing; but we may use its contents to investigate Bryson's own time.

In English translation Bryson's work runs to a little over 10,000 words and consequently offers a substantial treatment of the economic and social values of a member of the educated class. Most students of Neopythagorean

literature, to which Bryson belongs by virtue of his name and archaizing dialect, date these texts to the late Hellenistic or early Roman periods. Bryson himself very probably belongs to the first century AD. How can we know this? First, there are a number of circumstantial indications. One of the most important is the insistence on male as well as female virginity before marriage in addition to complete fidelity by the husband and the wife thereafter. The first of these demands is part of an emerging ascesis in the period of the early Roman empire, and Bryson's comparison of such behaviour with the athlete who has total control over his body for the sake of victory both cites the *Laws* of Plato (840a–c) and reveals the difference between the Platonic idea of a legislated abstinence and Bryson's own ideal of personal choice as part of a life focussed on the goal of marriage in the private sphere. The second is demanded by Plato and Aristotle and other earlier thinkers but emerges strongly in the period of the early Roman empire as a phenomenon grounded in a more intense, more emotional engagement between the husband and wife, at least in theory, and this is certainly what we find in Bryson. A second important circumstantial indication is Bryson's assumption of a highly monetized economy with a characteristically Roman tri-metal system. Third, there is a very heavy accent on *paideia* ('education'/'culture'/'cultured and appropriate behaviour and actions'/'politeness', etc.), which is well known as a key trait of the Hellenism of the Roman period. Bryson's book is all about control and takes its place beside many comparable texts from this era, and indeed is perhaps one of the earliest of them.

Apart from circumstantial indicators, there are two specific pieces of evidence. First, Bryson was used by Musonius, who was dead by AD 95 or soon after. I return to this in detail in Chapter 2, pp. 115–21. Second, there is the passage where Bryson points to the example of the man who 'abandons' the role he has been equipped for by his military–political family background (all 'generals or governors of provinces') and who 'reduces himself to singing and piping', which Bryson takes as his prime example of 'baseness' in the use of wealth (§§28–31). It is obviously tempting to think of the epitome of such behaviour, Nero. But we cannot be at all sure of this, for it is clear that the problem of Roman senators and equestrians going on stage was (or seemed) real particularly in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, when there were serious attempts to prohibit such behaviour (Levick 1983, Baltrusch 1989: 145–53). The reference in Bryson does not specify an emperor (Greek *basileus*, Arabic *malik*). This is not necessarily a problem if we want to think of Nero, because the end of this section does envisage kingship; but the passage is better taken as a general remark referring to the type of senator who does this kind of thing and is condemned for it. Since there is no evidence

of comparable prohibitions from the Hellenistic period or of comparable behaviour by the upper classes, a dating to the first century AD on the basis of this remark is reasonably certain. To be sure, in general terms, if we put Bryson further back than this, his views on family and marriage become the more radical and isolated, and make no sense. Bryson's point within the first century is impossible to determine. As we shall see, Plessner was fooled (or fooled himself) into thinking on the basis of misleading evidence that Bryson knew the Neopythagorean sage Apollonius of Tyana, who was active through the second half of the century. That Bryson does not name Nero may suggest he wrote before his notoriety; but the name could have dropped out. Musonius' link with Bryson is more promising. For it may be suggested (to keep things brief at this point) that the reason Musonius used Bryson is that he heard him at Rome. All in all, if we take the 60s of the first century as our assumption of date, we shall not be far wrong.

As I have noted, Bryson establishes his authority to write on the estate and its people by using the 'pseudo-Doric' dialect seen in many Neopythagorean authors. These writers of the Hellenistic or Roman period were claiming to be writing philosophical and ethical texts in the language of the originally Doric-speaking Greek communities of southern Italy where Pythagoras spent most of his life and where his followers had been influential in politics and philosophy in the Archaic and Classical periods. There was genuine Doric Pythagorean material from these times to which the later authors could look for inspiration. They could also use surviving dialect forms to improve their language (Consani 1995, 1996; cf. Abbenes 1997). Nevertheless, the overall effect is artificial. As far as Bryson goes, since Pythagoreans were known above all for their community and for the elaborate social rules communal life involved, the topic of his book fitted very well with an implied Pythagorean background. It is in this general sense that he is Pythagorean. There is virtually no other sign of Pythagorean philosophy in him, which is is true also of the other Neopythagorean ethical texts.

As to the name 'Bryson', the *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names* shows it is not at all common and none of the few entries is of interest. The name is attested in Iamblichus' *On the Pythagorean Life* as that of a companion of Pythagoras, and it seems likely that Iamblichus included it on the basis of a genuine ancient source rather than as a result of reading Bryson's book, for it is embedded in a long list of such associates. In the case of our Bryson, the name is certainly a *nom de plume*. Later readers would not necessarily have known this. Thus it is quite possible that the one reader and user of his book whom we can identify with reasonable certainty in later antiquity, the orator and philosopher Themistius, did actually think of Bryson as one

of the 'ancients'. Stobaeus was presumably under a similar illusion in this regard. It is possible that Bryson's real identity would not come as a surprise, if we knew it.

There is quite a range of Neopythagorean literature. Whereas histories of Greek letters under the Roman empire hardly mention the Neopythagorean writings, histories of philosophy (like John Dillon's *Middle Platonists* or Charles Kahn's recent history of Pythagoreanism) do treat major authors (writing in the 'common' dialect) who identified themselves as 'Pythagorean', such as the philosophers Moderatus and Nicomachus, for later Platonism came to be heavily influenced by Pythagoreanism on account of the antiquity and prestige of Pythagoras and his legendary community. The oeconomic Neopythagorean texts, however, have never received much attention, since their philosophical value is very low and the works we have are largely fragmentary. On the basis of what we do have, none of the other oeconomic texts, which appear to be roughly contemporary with Bryson, came close to Bryson in comprehensiveness; but it is impossible to be sure about this. Bryson, it should be noted, never calls himself a philosopher or labels his text philosophical nor does he urge his readers to solve the problems of their lives by philosophy. Rather, he presents his book as a practical and useful guide to what he calls at the end life's 'foundations'.

(c) Title and contents

These 'foundations', as I have hinted, concern areas of intense interest among students of the ancient world: finance, slavery, the constitution of the household, marriage, and children. Given the limited amount of discussion by ancient authors of economic matters, many readers may feel that Bryson's advice on money and property is the most important part of it. One of the most remarkable aspects of modern research on the ancient economy is the extent to which historians continue to be mesmerized by Moses Finley's denial in *The Ancient Economy* (2nd edn 1985) that the ancients had any notion of an economic sphere, and the feeling among a surprising number that they should apologize for mentioning the possibility that the ancient elites might have been interested in producing wealth as well as consuming it. The vitality of Finley's influence may still be seen, for example, in the introduction to the excellent recent *Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* (2007), even if this state-of-the-art assessment, with its firm grounding in the material culture record and its theoretical sophistication, along with much other recent research, does represent real progress over some of the simplistic pro- or anti-Finley approaches of many earlier treatments.

Finley's problem takes us to the heart of Bryson's book and the question of what its Greek and Arabic titles should mean and how we should translate them. It is Stobaeus who provides us with the Greek title *Oikonomikos*, i.e. *Oikonomikos Logos*. Just as the ancient Greek word for 'city', *polis*, included the city's buildings, people, and territory, so the word *oikos* meant a household establishment complete with buildings, people, land, and property, i.e. an 'estate' within one ownership, and especially in Athenian law where the term *oikos* was used in contrast with *oikia*, the physical 'house'. Thus in the opening remarks of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* Socrates says the *oikos* is a 'house . . . (and) whatever a person possesses outside the house', and Critobulus adds 'even if it is not in the same city . . . everything one possesses is part of the *oikos*' (1.5–6). In the Hellenistic period the word *oikonomia* took on a more general sense of 'management' (Natali 1995b), and *oikonomikos logos* could therefore be taken as 'a treatise concerned with management' or 'the ability to manage'. Yet the focus on the household remains strong in most of the texts of this genre.

If we give Bryson the title 'On Managing the House(-hold)', we might run the risk of ignoring the financial and productive aspects that are important to him because of the limitations of the word house in English. For Bryson is talking of a 'big house', a complex operation, with a large number of personnel, which can only be run by co-owners who are able and adroit. Both husband and wife are concerned with the careful management of their wealth, and the husband in particular is expected to increase this wealth through productive investment – that is what Bryson says – in landed properties and to engage in commerce with the aim of making a 'profit' and topping up his 'capital'. Given all this, it is better to translate *oikonomikos logos* here as 'treatise on managing the estate'. Of course the translation of the text (as opposed to the title) of Bryson in this volume is on the basis of the Arabic, not the Greek. The title in the manuscripts has the Arabic phrase *tadbīr al-rajul li-manzilihi*, where *tadbīr* (with the stress on the second syllable) carries a sense of taking thought for a thing or looking into it as well as (therefore) trying to manage/conduct/organize/regulate it, and *manzil* means 'dwelling place'. Though *manzil* bears no necessary notion of a productive estate (which is properly *ḍayʿa* = *villa*), a member of the property-owning class like Avicenna would (as we shall see) naturally think of the 'dwelling place' as productive of wealth (and does so when alluding to Bryson). *Tadbīr al-manzil* ('management of the household/estate') is in fact the regular Arabic translation of the Greek term *oikonomia*. In the title of Bryson's book the phrase might be literally rendered as 'the man's consideration for (*li-*) his household/estate'. We could take this more idiomatically as

'The Man's Management of his Estate'. In the two entries for Bryson's book in the *Fihrist* (or *Catalogue*) of the Baghdad bookseller and bibliographer Ibn al-Nadīm (see below) the title is the shorter form *Management of the Estate*. Since this accords with Stobaeus' Greek, this form is the one I have chosen to use in this study.

Bryson had not read Finley on the ancient economy and might have been surprised by some of the attitudes he is supposed to hold, for there can be no doubt that he was a member of Finley's consumerist upper classes. There is no way of determining the level of Bryson's personal wealth; but, to judge from what he says, he is comfortable with the enjoyment of a high standard of living and education and lives in a society where control of the ambition to be best is a genuine concern. His pose as a Pythagorean and his ability to write in Doric puts him fairly high up the social scale. And this is what makes his views on the economy important. He begins his work with a sort of preface or introduction which forms a unique account of the origins of trade and money. This genealogy recalls some of the traditional Greek 'anthropologies', which explain the rise of man as a social being and account for the development of civilized life in towns. But Bryson builds his account around the crafts (or trades/professions), almost certainly *technai* in Greek and a term (Arabic sg. *ṣināʿa*, pl. *ṣināʿāt* or *ṣanāʾiʿ*) which for him includes manual, professional, and managerial occupations. It is a sort of 'commercial anthropology', in which (to make his point) the development of the crafts comes before the foundation of cities. Bryson's crafts satisfy 'needs', and in order to function properly money has to be invented, following the foundation of cities, to enable the craftspeople to exchange with each other taking account of the fluctuating 'value' and 'price' of goods and of services. As with Aristotle's discussion of exchange in *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.5, Bryson's exchange has no middlemen, no shopkeepers, and no merchants. He thus differs from Plato's famous 'City of Pigs' at *Republic* 369b–372d where 'needs' are the cause of cities, and the crafts are then established in them. Another key difference is that Plato's humans are unable 'by nature' to carry out more than one *technē*, whereas Bryson emphasizes that man can learn anything given the time. Although he simplifies the picture at this point by excluding retail (unlike Plato), buying and selling come into play after he has moved from the introductory genealogy to his advice on how to acquire, preserve, and spend wealth. The purpose of the introductory developmental account is to underline the absolute importance of the crafts' role in human society and their natural place in the world where they reflect the processes of gain and loss, depletion and replacement that are evidenced in the human biology with which he opens his book. For Bryson all occupations are

interconnected like 'the parts of a chain', and human ability to fulfil any task is somehow part of his conception of interconnectedness. Each craft depends on the support of the others and the removal of one will entail 'abolishing' the rest. No other ancient author puts things this way. If we are looking for Bryson's inspiration here, we can point to the Stoic idea of the interconnection of virtues – where you have all or none.

Evidence from Themistius and from Arabic authors who used Bryson suggests that the introductory part of section one on the genesis of trade and money may have been abbreviated soon after the translation of the text into Arabic, which (it seems) happened around AD 900. But there is no cause to think that the rest of the text has been much shortened or altered structurally (I shall return to this below), and since there are tie-ups between the 'commercial anthropology' and other parts of the work, it is reasonable to hold that the epitomization here has not been severe. What then emerges? The most important thing is that Bryson seems to have had an idea of an economic sphere and that he presents a theory of its workings as part of society, however rudimentary and undeveloped the theory is. Naturally neither he nor other ancient or medieval authors show any sophistication in analysis that is remotely comparable with the modern academic subject of economics. But in his own terms Bryson moved beyond common-sense observation by seeking to describe a circular system with trade of goods and services facilitated by money. In objecting to the possibility that the ancients had a notion of the 'economy', Finley three times invoked Joseph Schumpeter's dictum that simple discussion of, for example, the high price of wheat after a poor harvest never moved beyond the 'prescientific' because it lacked a superstructure of scientific economic consciousness to bring it 'in range of the analytic searchlight' (as Schumpeter remarks of Aristotle; 1954a: 65). Although Finley evaded Schumpeter's brisk deflation of Aristotle himself by flatly denying that Aristotle's discussions of economic matters in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics* were ever intended to offer economic analysis, Schumpeter's dismissal of economics *avant le mot* suited him very well. Schumpeter had raised a real issue, of course. But, like many of the sparkling *aperçus* in his marvellous *History of Economic Analysis*, it is overdone. The dismissive attitude it embodies has much to do with the professional consciousness of economics, which – we should remember – is a very modern academic discipline, the theoretical and mathematical bases of which were established only from the last quarter of the nineteenth century with the work of Alfred Marshall (1879: 2 'best to drop the name "Political Economy," and to speak simply of **Economic Science**, or more shortly, **Economics**'), William Jevons, with his accent on 'quantitative notions'

and focus on utility (consumer satisfaction; 1879: vii–viii), and others. Schumpeter of course was instrumental in developing the new subject and his posthumous *History* was the new history for the new science. But there was never any need to set the bar so high for what constituted economic consciousness in the ancient world. What is lacking is any sustained 'scientific' or quantitative analysis – though the work of Dominic Rathbone and others has shown that ancient accounting procedures (dismissed by Finley) cannot be viewed as having precluded 'rational' economic decision-making or indeed some degree of conscious capitalism.

In his theoretical perspective Bryson has something original to offer. He thinks of the economy as a foundational aspect of human life and sees it as an integrated system upon which everyone depends. This economy is embedded broadly in the sense suggested famously by the anthropologists Bronisław Malinowski and Richard Thurnwald and taken up and defined by Karl Polanyi in *The Great Transformation* and *Trade and Market in the Early Empires*, and consequently influential on the one-time member of Polanyi's research group, Finley himself. But I stress 'broadly', for the socially and ritually embedded economies of the South Sea Islands, as they were perceived by the anthropological voyagers of the earlier twentieth century, are as far from the ancient economy, particularly that of the Roman period, as the Roman world is from the era of the global economy. Social and cultural embeddedness has to be seen in context. There is nothing primitive (in the Polanyian sense) about Bryson's monetized, commercial system where estate ownership and trade go hand in hand. And Bryson's economy is not invisible to the degree presupposed by Polanyi's notion of embeddedness. In the case of Rome, Bryson's theorizing and advice is about right for the job.

Bryson continues the first section after the 'commercial anthropology' by offering advice to his wealthy owner. He is told to regulate himself in three ways in regard to his money. But this is not the standard 'ethical' restraint of the kind, say, that Plutarch presents to his peers. Bryson's advice under the first subheading of 'acquisition' focusses on matters such as 'deception in the account' and the interruption to 'the flow of exchange' that results from a man's bad commercial reputation and leads businessmen to cease trading with him. There is no philosophical musing about injury to the wealthy man's soul. Bryson is also concerned with curtailing upward mobility. People aspire to more socially desirable jobs but they must remain in their hereditary occupations in order to preserve the interlocking system of crafts, or the system will crash. Under the second subheading of 'preservation', the strategy advocated by Bryson is one of increasing 'capital' (Arabic *ra'ṣ māl*), and he explains this by means of a long analogy about bodily growth and

decay. The man of wealth must be careful where he 'invests' his money, and ideally will sell his merchandise quickly and at a high price. Only in the third and last section on spending money does Bryson become a moralist. The morality here is both personal and social. He focusses especially on failure to look after family members and dependents in the community. But the worst failure of all is 'bad management (*sū' al-tadbīr*)', which means, he says, spending the wrong sums at the wrong time. This in itself is a commercial, not a moral, decision; but its effects concern people's lives.

The second major section of the book is on slaves. It looks forwards and backwards within the work: backwards because slaves are of course 'talking property', *instrumentum vocale* as Aristotle and Varro describe them; and forwards because much of this short section is about choice and treatment, themes which structure the third section on the wife and in fact continue into section four on the child. While Bryson's economic ideas are original in several ways, his ideas on slaves will not cause as much surprise (except for the fact that modern students of ancient slavery are unaware of them). He begins by saying that the necessity for slaves in houses is comparable to the necessity for men to congregate in cities – which is to say that slaves are necessary and that is that. Other ancient (and medieval Muslim) authors agreed with this. But Bryson has his own agenda as well. He probably shows the fondness of Neopythagorean writers for division into three in his three types of slaves (Wilhelm 1915). The division is not profound but is interesting nevertheless because it is not found in the rest of classical literature, even if the Stoics had something comparable (Diogenes Laertius 7.121–2). Bryson is more original in the advice he gives about choosing one's slave with an eye on the sort of task he is suited to. He is concerned mainly with ordinary domestics, but he is aware of the bailiff type and (at the other end of the scale) of the man whose body and mentality make him 'by nature' best for hard labour, which of course is an adaptation of Aristotle's notorious statement in the *Politics* (Brunt 1993). If there are still scholars who wish to palliate the unacceptability of ancient slavery by pointing to (some) owners' willingness to be kind to their slaves, Bryson offers little comfort. Being nice to slaves is a good idea, but the reason for not working them too hard is to increase their ability to work, while recognizing their humanity is the basis of knowing how to punish them rationally. We are left with a picture of a master who is constantly vigilant over what types of slaves he buys from where, and who is constantly promoting or demoting individuals to get the best out of all his servants.

The one in charge of the servants in the house, as the third section makes clear, is the wife, and it is in this section that Bryson once again presents us

with highly original and important material. As we have seen, one careful reader of his ideas was Musonius. Even though Musonius' ethical and social discussions are mostly preserved in extracts made by Stobaeus, there is enough to enable us to see that he followed, and indeed quoted from, Bryson's presentation of the role of the wife when he developed his own ideas on women's education (*Discourse III*) and the fellowship of marriage (*Discourse XIII*). In the last three decades much work has been done on the Roman family by quantitative and social historians. There has also been much work by cultural historians, students of later Greek literature including those working on the long prose fiction texts we call the Greek novel, and others interested in the history of thought, on attitudes to marriage and family life in the early Roman imperial era in the wake of arguments about the 'new conjugality' advanced by Paul Veyne and by Michel Foucault in the third volume of *The History of Sexuality*. Veyne's basic argument, accepted by Foucault, is well known. It proposes that under the empire the Roman nobility 'valorized' family relations, specifically marriage, with an intensity that is not evident earlier. The reason suggested for this change in the ethics of sex and marriage was that nobles were now no longer able to be fully active in the public domains of politics and war and hence looked to their private lives more intently. Despite its economy, there are many things wrong with this explanation. It rests upon a too romantic view of the swashbuckling heroes of the Roman Republic, for it is not overly cynical to suppose that most members of the Roman elite in Republican days were every bit as inactive as their imperial counterparts. And it is difficult to sustain an argument that the Republican politicians, except perhaps in the disturbed final years of the regime, had such independence of action in contrast to what Veyne following Ronald Syme called the 'service' aristocracy of the Empire. Unsurprisingly, the Veyne–Foucault thesis has not impressed itself upon the quantitative or the social historians. If they do take notice, they point out that the evidence adduced is partial and inconsistent and (on their view) not worth having. They observe that family values remained unstable throughout the period of the Republic and Empire and that affective relationships were just as likely to be found in the second century BC as in the age of the emperors. The continuously unstable family is, in effect, what Keith Bradley in *Discovering the Roman Family* has called the 'dislocated' family with its multiple divorces and remarriages; and as far as the evidence goes, it is a picture which is true. Even so, one of the leading quantitative historians, Richard Saller, noted that Musonius at least appears to be 'exceptional' in his attitude towards the figure of the wife (Cohen and Saller 1994: 54–5).

Two questions may be raised here. Was there a change in the theory of marriage? Is there historical evidence of changed social practices? Certainly, some of the passages adduced in support of a change are no evidence at all. Thus Pliny the Younger's 'romantic' love for his much, much younger third wife (*Letters* 7.5 'You will not believe how much I am missing you, etc.') cannot be used, as it was by Veyne and Foucault (1986b: 78–9), to demonstrate a shift in practice. If we want to find change in what we might call the ideology of marriage, we need to find some thinkers and opinion-makers. That means Greeks in the main, for most of the literary–philosophical texts pertaining to familial or matrimonial relations in this period are in Greek or inspired by Greek thought (like Seneca's lost *On Marriage*; see Chapter 5, p. 336 n.). These sources can best be located in the continuing life of the Greek city with its sets of local, intermarried elites who were strongly focussed on the reproduction of themselves, their status, and their wealth in an age when urban development and the economy of the empire were at a high point. Musonius Rufus, despite being Roman (or to be exact 'Etruscan') is part of this trend, for not only does he do his moral thinking in Greek, but we now know that some of his key views were influenced by Bryson. There has been important recent debate about the nature of Musonius' 'feminism', and also the relationship between his thought and early Christianity (St Paul). This debate will have to be recast. Musonius is one of several texts by writers of the later first and early second century AD which (a) promote marriage over relations with girlfriends, mistresses, or boys, and (b) present the choice of marriage as natural and personal with a dynamic, emotionally satisfying private relationship between the partners. Some authors (Plutarch, Musonius, Clement) pay careful attention to what Musonius calls 'the act of sexual love' as a way of cementing emotional experiences in the relationship. There is no feminism in any of this – that term is quite inapposite. It is a male ethics, and in its most un-feminist form (the subservience of the wife and the dangers of her sexual power) we find it promoted by the Neopythagorean female writers too. It is certainly right to draw attention to developments in early Christianity, for from this same era comes one of the most revolutionary texts of antiquity which instructs virginity and marriage as the only locus for sex: Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians. The New Testament's pastoral letters from the later first or early second century try to soften Paul's rather negative view of marriage, which however cast a long shadow over Christian thought. In the later second century Clement of Alexandria's *Paedagogus (The Tutor, The Instructor)* combines Musonius for its material on marriage with Paul's austere Christianity and puts God in the bedroom to supervise sexual practices (2.10). But the connections between

pagan and Christian thought are unclear. It is best to think in terms of parallel rather than converging development. By the third century Christian thinking was already making the intellectual running, and the debates of the first and second centuries were not repeated. Of course, for Christians the issue of marriage and sex was never resolved. The bitter attack on Jovinian by the sexually repressed Jerome in the later fourth century shows the problems well enough (Torre 2000).

What of Bryson? The most important element of his ideas on marriage comes in fact in the fourth section where he prescribes correct behaviour for the son of the family and for the adult man he grows into. Bryson commends a strict continence to boys and men and stipulates no sex before marriage and no sex with any woman apart from one's wedded wife. He states what the man needs to do before stating what the woman is to do. Everyone knew the latter: the sexual 'double standard' restrained women not men; but Bryson seems to state the obvious simply to demonstrate the 'symmetry' (to use David Konstan's (1994) term) between the partners in this respect. This is quite unlike anything found in the classical moralists, but is, rather, a product of a private engagement with the marriage and the wife on the part of the husband. For Foucault this symmetry was the key cultural change away from the 'socratizing' culture of the Classical and Hellenistic eras. Pederasty or adult homosexuality ('Greek love') are written out of Bryson because (it seems) they are just non-choices for him. The question whether Bryson is the first author to valorize marriage to this extent (that is, as the sole locus for sexual relations) cannot be answered. It looks as if Plutarch's discussion of married love and sex in his *Dialogue on Love* and Dio of Prusa's extensive comments on social life in his *Euboean Oration* (to take the prominent examples) are a little later. Some of the earliest Greek novels (the new, long prose fiction texts where the hero and heroine are so focussed on their marriage) may be earlier, however; and Paul's thoughts from the 50s, which draw on Jewish and Greek thought (including in this regard Philo), may also be. In any case such changes can hardly be pinned on one or two authors. Yet it would be nice to know who first observes, who first understands, and who first records. Whether Bryson is the first or not, we might at any rate be tempted to draw a connection between his analysis of a vibrant economy, and an elite on their estates engaged in it, and the new views of married life and family reproduction that (in my view) were so closely tied to the civic economy in the eyes of Greek thinkers and in the hard reality of marriage contracts and the notables' concern to keep wealth within their families.

Bryson's third section itself does not begin with any affective view of the man and wife. Rather, two practical reasons are given for the man's need of

the woman. The first is to have someone to help him manage the estate. She is to be the 'partner' enjoying equal possession of the house–estate, with equal responsibility for money permitted to her. The second is attributed to Nature's decision to employ male and female bodies to produce children. 'Love and intimacy' (81) are, however, quickly introduced, but when they are, they are expressed in terms of financial trust. Keeping an eye on these 'two purposes', which Bryson frankly admits are more to 'his advantage' than hers, we are provided with traditional, Stoicizing observations on what one should not look for in choosing a wife, followed by a list of the virtues that she needs 'for the management of the house'. In short, these are the same virtues as the man's (a Stoic idea), for the wife is 'the caretaker and manager of the estate, who calculates what is good for it, and who is charged with ruling the servants and other persons within it'. She is, however, 'the inferior of the two owners', and we should no more speak of feminism in regard to Bryson than we should in regard to Musonius.

But this is not the whole picture. For the third section ends with a highly charged emotional passage which is unlike anything else in classical literature. This is Bryson's description of the wife's tenderness towards her husband and children, her forgiveness of their trespasses against her, and her selfless compassion for their problems, qualities which guarantee the concordance of the marriage (for we have been told that the husband needs the wife in order to acquire *his* virtues properly), and which in the final words of the section bring happiness to her husband and children, honour to her family, and make her a shining example to women at large.

Since it is fairly clear that for the upper classes at least arranged marriage remained the norm, and that doubtless partly as a result of this divorce and remarriage remained common, we may readily believe that Bryson's ideals do not give us a 'true' picture historically. But that is not the point. What is noteworthy is the voicing of the ideal. And this is certainly important for the social historian as well as the student of *mentalités*. Bryson reflects a change in expectations of what is right, and indeed seems to be a leading voice. The affective, ideal elements may not seem so out of order if we bear in mind something important: what he says about the role of the wife in running the upper-class household–estate is doubtless 'real' enough. But of course most of his male readers who agreed with him could have supported his views and behaved contrarily.

The most ideal statement about the wife's and husband's mutual love and fidelity ('his heart enfolds her and her heart enfolds him', etc.) comes in section four on 'the child', showing the interconnections between these two sections. The wife's emotional engagement with her children has featured

prominently at the end of section three. Now in this fourth section we are given explicit prescriptions of the child's (or, rather, the son's) behaviour without affective comment. Most of this material about manners is traditional and well accepted as advice. But the fact that Bryson decided that it needed to be written down shows something new, and the form of the repackaging is significant. Naturally we find bits and pieces of comparable advice in most authors in contexts urging self-control. What we find nowhere else in surviving Greek and Roman literature – with the partial exception of Clement's *Paedagogus* – is this compendious presentation (and Clement is doing something very different from Bryson). Nor in other authors do we find it applied in the first instance, as here, to children rather than to adults. The German *Altphilologe* Paul Wendland and other scholars around the turn of the nineteenth century developed the idea that Stoic and Cynic philosophers in the Hellenistic and early Roman eras were responsible for a large popular–philosophical literature (called by Wendland the 'diatribe'), which transferred the Stoic idea of 'duties' from the realm of the sage to situations of everyday living – the correct manner of eating, sleeping, walking, and so on. There is no very good evidence for this. We are dealing, rather, with cultural 'precepts' learnt, as Seneca says, from one's grandmother, *paedagogus*, or teacher (*Moral Letters* 94.9). We expect such precepts to be widely scattered in our texts. So Bryson is doing something different. Some of what he writes seems to recur in Musonius, though proof of direct use is lacking. And there is one very close passage in Clement, which almost certainly shows Clement read Bryson.

The prevalence of divorce and remarriage in Roman society (at least for the upper classes, for whom we have evidence) must have entailed great uncertainty for children. Bryson does not mention this. His child is not wholly abstract in his own mind, for he claims to base himself on observation ('I have also seen many children who . . . as long as their fathers . . . were alive'). But really speaking it is a type which is used to project the values needed to reinforce upper-class solidarity and keep the elite distinct from lower social groups. There is no sentimentality about childhood. The child is introduced as a product of the wife and her qualities constitute its 'primary well-being . . . and the basis upon which his education (*ta'dīb*) is built'. Education in the sense of socialization is the central idea throughout. It is just possible (Chapter 2, p. 137) that Ibn al-Nadīm lists Bryson – if that is really the correct reading of the name in the entry – as the author of a book 'On Education' (*adab*). The Arabic word, like the Greek *paideia* which it translates, expresses the idea of acculturation as much as education in the narrow sense, of rules and codes of behaviour rather than static learning

and simple comprehension. For this purpose, the inculcation of correct habits was vital and this is why Bryson pays so much attention to habits and customs and the setting of examples. 'I have seen many beyond counting', he says, who can do nothing with their lives because of the bad habits they acquired during childhood. Good and bad natures have a lot to do with success, but habit is most important. And habit is not to be left to chance: the naturally bad boy must have good habits beaten into him (with good treatment to follow 'if he behaves well'). Here there is a parallel between the boy and the slave of section two. In both cases, getting hold of them young is the important thing so they learn and (as Bryson remarks of the slave) 'accept what they are taught'. In both cases physical chastisement is to be used if they fail to learn well. The servant 'should only be punished as the (master's) son is punished when he does something similar wrong. For this is the best thing for both the servant and the son.' The boy 'must not cry, yell, or beg if the teacher hits him', for 'this is a sign of faintheartedness and cowardice and suits the slave, not one who is free'.

Bryson is frank about the power he expects the father/master to exercise. What is of interest particularly is the equivalence he assumes between the son and the slave, and further the assumption of routine physical punishment in the family. Texts about bringing up children are not common. There is some interesting material in the dietetic tradition of Greek medicine, for example in the *Healthy Living* (*Hygiēnē Diaita*) of Athenaeus of Attaleia (first century BC or later) or Galen's six books of *Matters of Health* (*Hygieina*). It has been suggested that the link between *diaita*, essentially one's whole mode of living including diet, and education took on a particular importance in the early Roman imperial era (Grimaudo 2008); and there is probably some truth in this, if one thinks about the rise of a general culture of inspection/supervision and training in this era (e.g. Gleason 1995, Swain 2007a). Various moral treatises, such as Galen's *On Character Types* (preserved in an Arabic abridgement: Mattock 1972), focus on training body and soul in childhood in order to produce the perfect citizen. But the only dedicated work on child education surviving in Greek – for a Greek work preserved in Arabic, see Chapter 6, pp. 377–81 – is the essay included among Plutarch's works under the title *Training of Boys* (often but wrongly known as *On the Education of Children*). It is agreed that this dates to the first century AD. Unlike Bryson, here fathers are instructed *not* to hit their sons, since this would be to treat them as we treat slaves. It is quite clear from other texts that beating or whipping involved not simply corporal punishment but also public dishonour and humiliation, and that it was for this reason that such violence was to be reserved for slaves and was not fitting for free

children in normal circumstances. (Caning by schoolteachers was usually felt to be a different matter, though some authors like Athenaeus and Quintilian denounce it too.) In Bryson there are further parallels between servant and child. The boy 'must be permitted play at times' because this 'assists him to achieve what is expected of him later by way of hard work'; the slave is permitted limited periods of rest for the same reason. And just as the master of slaves is assumed to be constantly watching their behaviour and rewarding and punishing them accordingly, so the teacher and the father must examine the boy 'in every situation involving his eating, drinking, sleeping, posture standing, posture sitting, movement, speech'. *Training of Boys* feels the need to apologize for the fact that the poor will not be able to follow his educational regime. Bryson is also aware of the problem and twice notes differences between the poor and the rich he is writing for: rich children are to get credit for doing things that poor ones have no choice in doing. But other than remarking on the need for the child to honour the poor man as much as he honours the rich one, no further notice is taken of this matter.

The aim of education was to produce good adults, specifically 'properly' male ones. One of the biggest dangers came from men interested in boys. The author of *Training* has an interesting discussion of the problem of older men who pay court to adolescents. When he thinks back to the good old days of Plato and Socrates, this sort of thing looks acceptable; but, since many fathers are set against it today, he ends up by concluding that each parent must make up his own mind. As I have mentioned, Bryson ignores the possibility of sexual relations between adult males. But he does stigmatize effeminacy. His boy 'must realize the disgrace of effete behaviour and the aim of someone who practises it', and must be made to 'hate the idea of looking like women and love the idea of looking like men'. There is a whole range of physiognomical advice about posture and bearing that reinforces the inculcation of male behaviour in the early Roman era and effects the hardening of the proto-male body. In Bryson this is put bluntly: 'the boy needs toughening' (§136). Musonius Rufus may well have drawn on this part of Bryson in his discourses concerning dress and adornment, and of course the whole topic is one which contemporary authors frequently address. As in Bryson, it is effeminate behaviour that attracts the most obloquy. But effeminacy and male–male sexual relations may overlap, as for example in Dio of Prusa's scathing, sarcastic attack on the male population of Tarsus (*Or.* 33) for desiring to become complete and natural androgynes and for filling the city with the 'grunting' sound that Gilbert Highet memorably identified as the 'heavy breathing of men engaged in sexual intercourse' (1983: 95). Polemon of Laodicea is another outrightly polemical commentator in the

dark catalogue of moral failures in his *Physiognomy* (Swain 2007a), as are of course Christian writers beginning with Paul. On the other hand, the balanced attitude of the author of *Training of Boys* is broadly mirrored in discussions of male–male and male–female sexual relations in Plutarch's *Dialogue on Love*, which however makes the right choice clear, comically in Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon*, which nevertheless ultimately valorizes marriage along with the other so-called 'ideal' Greek novels, and scurrilously in the *Loves* attributed to Lucian. Bryson is not at all relaxed on this issue. He takes a hard line on soft beds, long hair, and fancy clothes. We can certainly connect him with the moral dimension of the 'new conjugality' in its political goal of producing real male citizens. But he also sees the issue in terms of politeness and respect for the community of adult males which the child is being readied to join.

A few final words may be said about Clement in this regard, for some passages of his *Paedagogus* list required table manners and other permissible forms of behaviour that are comparable to Bryson but are expressed within an overall framework of moral Christian living that takes readers through from their evening meal to sleeping to morning dressing and bathing. Clement was writing for a new well-off Christian audience (and it should be pointed out that he addresses both men and women; he is obsessed with potential female misbehaviour and its appeal to or imitation by men). These people wanted advice for the new social situation they faced: how to be Christian and still go to their pagan friends' dinners, parade in their finery, and bathe with decorum. Clement repackaged traditional material for his audience's needs and added a heavy dose of Jewish wisdom lore (e.g. Ecclesiasticus/Book of Sirach) and Christian injunction. Naturally his readers were already familiar with the rules about sneezing and belching and knew full well the moral stipulations about gold and silver plates. The totality of the message, not its parts, is what is new for a new situation. We might be tempted to approach Bryson with this in mind and not let the fact that most of what he writes in section four is unoriginal distract us from noticing that he took the trouble to write it down. The total package does present something original. The interplay of good diet and good manners achieves real importance from its final position within a tightly written manual of estate management leaving us with a picture of the next generation.

2 NEGLECT AND REDISCOVERY

Bryson's manual deals with exceptionally important areas of social life and thought in the High Roman Empire; and he has original things to say on

these matters which cut to the heart of current debates. Why, then, are virtually all classicists, ancient historians, and ancient philosophers unaware of him?

The reason for this neglect is not easy to identify. Admittedly Martin Plessner's translation is not 'user-friendly'; but though it might be considered (in his own sorry verdict) to be 'unreadable' (see here below), it is hardly unintelligible. The recent Italian version by Mauro Zonta (1995) is very good and fluent, as I have noted. Nevertheless, it is true that neither of these versions is widely available. Zonta's is in fact part of the appendix of a reprinted translation of the Ps.-Aristotelian *Oikonomika*, and although the editor of the book, Carlo Natali, is a well-known scholar of Aristotle, no one would go looking for Bryson there. Moreover, Zonta as a medievalist specializing in Hebrew and Jewish philosophy naturally had no interest in the significance of Bryson for his own time, and Natali's introduction to the translation is brief and general. Plessner, who dated Bryson to the mid to late first century AD for reasons I shall come to, was an Arabist and, despite translating virtually all the Arabic he edited or cited, did not make it easy for readers who were not orientalists. His work was apparently not reviewed by any student of the ancient world, but there was a review in the German classical journal *Philologische Wochenschrift* in 1929 by the student of Islamic law, Joseph Schacht, who like Plessner was a pupil of the Greco-Arabist scholar and philologist, Gotthelf Bergsträsser (1886–1933). Like other reviewers, Schacht could only express regret at the overly literal and unidiomatic translation for which Plessner had apologized in his preface. He also accepted Plessner's erroneous belief that the whole text, rather than the preface, had been epitomized. Nevertheless, he called on 'die klassischen Philologen' to reward Plessner by undertaking an analysis of the contents of the work. Regrettably no one heeded the call, for if classicists took any notice of Schacht, they might well have been put off by the bad-tempered remarks of Joseph Bidez on the nature of Bryson's text, which were published in the same year as Schacht's review. Bidez (1867–1945) was one of the leading scholars of late antiquity and the expert on Julian the Apostate among other things. He knew of Bryson both from Plessner and from the short summary by the French Jesuit and orientalist, Maurice Bouyges, who was based at the Université Saint-Joseph in Beirut. Bouyges' study had appeared in the history of philosophy journal, *Archives de philosophie*, in 1924. In the same article Bouyges summarized the *Letter* of Themistius (to which I shall return on account of its partial dependence on Bryson). This is a text preserved in Arabic and written by 'Themistius the Vizier of Julian' according to the version known to Bidez through Bouyges, and it was this that Bidez was

interested in. Indeed Bryson was an innocent bystander in his assault on the *Letter*, which he was not prepared to countenance in any way as a genuine product of the fourth-century orator and philosopher. Bidez's inability to read the Arabic himself plainly irritated him in regard to the Themistius text, and he expressed the hope that orientalists would establish that the *Letter* need not concern classicists in just the same way, he said, as Plessner had done for Bryson by showing that Bryson in Arabic was nothing but a degenerate epitome. As I have remarked, Plessner's evidence for the epitomization of the *Management of the Estate* holds true for the prefatory section (the 'commercial anthropology') only, but Plessner hastily concluded from his arguments for this section that the whole text was (therefore) epitomized. Bidez can obviously be forgiven for following him here; but when he writes that the sense itself of the original Greek had been reworked 'avec la fantaisie la plus déconcertante' (1929: 146), he shows that he had not even looked at Plessner's translation and was simply availing himself of any support he could to back up his fierce prejudice against the *Letter* of Themistius.

It would be nice to be able to say that Bidez's petulance with regard to Arabic translations of Greek material was a thing of the past. After all, eighty years on from Bidez we know considerably more about the social context, aims, expectations, and standards of the Greco-Arabic Translation Movement. Regrettably such reactions are still found, though they are uncommon. Whether Bidez's remarks influenced others at the time is not known, but there is a good chance they did (even though the authenticity of the *Letter* was stoutly defended: Croissant 1930). It is at any rate clear that Bryson disappeared from view in the years after Plessner. Thus, when Mikhail Rostovtzeff devoted a few lines to the Neopythagorean texts dealing with domestic matters in *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (1941), he knew only of the fragments of Bryson in Stobaeus on the basis of the 1915 study of Bryson (together with Callicratidas, Perictione, and Phintys) by the German classicist Friedrich Wilhelm, and he readily included Bryson in his statement that all of these texts 'abhor luxury' – which is true – 'and the accumulation of wealth' – which is not true of Bryson, and concluded that 'none of the great economic and social questions affect or interest them' (p. 1133).

Among classicists Bryson received very little attention from the time of Wilhelm to Giuseppe Baldassarre's 1978 study of his influence on Musonius Rufus. Classical encyclopedias usually do not mention him (but cf. Plessner 1968). The two Greek fragments were re-edited by Holger Thesleff in his 1965 edition of *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period*, and more importantly and to his credit Thesleff provided a brief (if not wholly accurate)

summary of the whole work on the basis of Plessner's 'unreadable' German (pp. 57–8). But Thesleff was mainly interested in the linguistic aspects of his texts and had no interest in their possible significance. In the case of Bryson he dated the work to the Hellenistic era on this basis, a dating which has misled the very few scholars who have mentioned Bryson, such as the Roman social historian Susan Treggiari (1991a: 195). Although the 1960s and 1970s continued to see work on the Neopythagorean authors, largely stimulated by the researches of Walter Burkert and others such as Marcel Détienne, the fact that Bryson existed in Greek in two short fragments ensured he was mentioned in passing only. It seems that only one economic historian has mentioned the Arabic translation, Christos Baloglou. He gives a basic overview from Plessner, and makes the serious error of maintaining that Bryson perpetuates the classical 'aristocratic ideology of the ethical superiority of wealth gained by the cultivation of land and of the disrepute attached to commercial activity' (Baloglou and Constantinidis 1996: 51, cf. Baloglou 1995: 455–7, 2004: 63). Thus full marks must be given to Baldassarre for actually sitting down and reading Plessner's translation properly and for arguing on the basis of it that Musonius took some of his principal ideas, indeed some of his very phraseology, from Bryson. This study was published in a Festschrift in honour of a scholar of Hellenistic poetry, Anthos Ardizzoni (who had in fact done some work on echoes of Pythagoreanism in the Hellenistic poets Apollonius Rhodius and Callimachus). But this does not account for the complete absence of interest among those working on Musonius Rufus (including current researchers on Musonius' 'feminism'), for *L'Année philologique* listed the piece – albeit with the author's name spelt wrongly: 'Baldassare' – under both Musonius and Bryson. Carlo Natali's decision to include a translation of Plessner's text was indeed commendable, but he too made no reference to Baldassarre's work, presumably because his own interests are primarily in Aristotle. What is inexplicable is the failure to use Baldassarre in the recent and very serviceable Italian translation of Musonius' fragments by a first-class scholar, Ilaria Ramelli (Ramelli 2001). Baldassarre is present in the bibliography, but in the introductory discussion of Musonius' 'feminism' and of the possible connections between his ideas and the thought of St Paul (reciprocal connections which are optimistically upheld), the relationship between Musonius and Bryson is never mentioned. Just as disappointing in this regard is the recent and useful assemblage of texts and translations of 'sources for the economic theory of Greek antiquity' edited by Gert Audring and Kai Brodersen (2008): they content themselves with the two Greek fragments of Bryson and mention in passing somewhat misleadingly that Plessner offered an 'erweiterte' ('expanded')

version of the Greek in Hebrew and Arabic. The now standard *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques* contents itself with a reference to the studies of Wilhelm, Thesleff, and Plessner (Centrone 1994).

If we broaden our horizon to consider modern work on other Greek authors of this period, the situation is no more encouraging. Most classicists in other fields are probably aware of the current high level of interest in the rich Greek literature and culture of the Roman period, and it may be felt that Bryson would have attracted the attention of at least some scholars in this domain. Work on the Greek literature of the High Roman Empire is, despite its volume, surprisingly uneven in coverage, for by far the biggest part of it is devoted to Plutarch of Chaeroneia. Plutarch is of course a central author for all manner of social, historical, and literary questions, and he dominates the field in terms of the size of his corpus; but he is not altogether well served by the flood of writing on him. Too much of it fails to engage with contemporary writers or society and history, or even with other parts of his own output (Nikolaidis 2008 is a welcome exception in this regard). The neglect of Bryson is a good example of this. Interpretation of Bryson touches on a number of well-known (e.g. *Dialogue on Love*, *Advice on Marriage*, *Love of Money*) and not so well-known (e.g. *Avoid Borrowing*, *Love for Offspring*) writings of Plutarch; and Plutarch's own views, especially on love and marriage, can be enriched from Bryson. Bryson's interest in work and employment, including slavery, as well as his thoughts on marriage, find good parallels in Plutarch's direct contemporary, Dio of Prusa, whose important writings on social topics (notably in the *Euboean Oration*, the first *Tarsian*, and the second essay *On Freedom and Slavery*) have been little studied since Peter Brunt's classic 1973 article, 'Aspects of the Social Thought of Dio Chrysostom'. Fronto tells us that Musonius was Dio's teacher ('magister'); and Dio, as I have mentioned, wrote an *Oikonomikos*, one of the fragments of which (on slavery) appears to show knowledge of Bryson. But of Bryson there is no mention by modern scholars of Dio, even for example in Paolo Desideri's standard account of Dio as an *intellettuale greco* in the Roman empire.

Bryson's advice that 'when the man wants to purchase a servant, he must inspect him' puts us in mind of another contemporary of Dio, Rufus of Ephesus, whose voluminous corpus of theoretical and practical works of medicine included a treatise *On the Purchase of Slaves*. Most of Rufus is lost in Greek, and he is hardly familiar as a result. This particular book is known from Arabic sources which preserve the title and a few fragments. But with a little imagination we can go beyond these and bring forward some interesting, new material. For if we want an idea of what was involved in Bryson's

inspection of the slave, we may turn to the eleventh-century *General Treatise on the Skills Useful for Purchasing and Examining Slaves* (Ghersetti 2001), which was written by the Christian physician Ibn Buṭlān (d. 1066). This is the best known and earliest of several books of advice on the subject (Müller 1980). Ibn Buṭlān says that he depends on 'philosophers and physicians' like Aristotle and 'the ancients' (i.e. Greek writers). He actually names Rufus' acquaintance Crito in his section on the cosmetic improvements used by slave dealers to hoodwink purchasers, referring to Crito's *Kosmētika* (which is known to us from Greek and Arabic fragments). Rufus' book was, it seems, the only dedicated study of how to sell and buy slaves written in Greco-Roman antiquity (though there are plenty of references here and there to the practices of the dealers). Since the Arab physicians were familiar with his works, we can surely get a good idea of what may have been in it – and thus what Bryson as a slave-owner means when he tells us to inspect – by considering the *General Treatise*'s remarkable material on the physical and mental scrutiny to which the slave was subjected for the sake of the new owner's utility and pleasure. And as there is no English translation of this fascinating text, I include a version in Chapter 4 of the first and second sections on 'useful recommendations when purchasing slaves' (part of which is available in Lewis 1974: 243–5) and on the 'examination of slaves' bodies . . . in accordance with the method of the doctors'.

Ethical and social analysis is another area where Bryson has been neglected (e.g. in Mike Trapp's 2007 fine account of 'ethics, politics, and society' in the Roman empire). Carlo Natali forms the exception here in his important and original studies of Stoic economic theory (esp. 1995b). Bryson's views on personal and public morality have a clear Stoic colour, like Dio's. On social and ethical matters the Stoics held that both men and women shared virtues and capabilities and believed that work, including manual work, was acceptable to the wise man, though there is no evidence that they wrote directly about which jobs were suitable for the poor working classes, as Brunt believed. That Dio reflects their opinions (amplified with Cynic material: Brancacci and Brenk in Swain 2000) is well known. But it might be a surprise to those who think in terms of philosophical schools to find comparable ideas in an author who is in some sense a Pythagorean. Certainly, Bryson has strong moral views, though he does not lay down the law about what is good for his readers' souls. That kind of philosophy intrudes neither in the upbringing or education of the child, nor marriage, nor in his thoughts on the humane treatment of slaves, another topic associated with the Stoics and particularly Seneca, where Bryson has again been neglected (e.g. Garnsey 1996). The difference between Seneca and Bryson

in this regard is instructive. Finley rightly took to task those who showered praise on Seneca for telling us about his kindly dealings with his domestics. But Seneca presents this humanity as good for the master rather than the slave (and hence there is no need for anyone to grow misty-eyed about his integrity). Bryson, as we have seen, is more hard-headed and ultimately practical. Nevertheless, he held a strong view of the dignity of work, by free man or slave, and he was for this reason seen as a useful source by the tenth-century Ismāʿīlī philosophical group called the Brethren of Purity when they expressed comparable views on the value of work in a text which I shall consider briefly in Chapters 2 and 3.

It is evident that Bryson continued to be read in the later Roman empire and the early middle ages, and his influence in Arabic gives him great importance in the transmission of Greek thought. Plessner believed that Bryson Arabus had been done by the later tenth century, but we actually find him being used about the 920s by Qudāma ibn Jaʿfar and in the middle of the century by Ibn al-Jazzār (see below), and the translation should therefore be somewhat earlier, say, by 900. (I return to this later.) Whether there was a Syriac version, as was the case with some of the Arabic translations of Greek works, cannot be known. But we can make suggestions that take us back to Bryson's readers in the later Roman period, and this will obviously be of interest to modern students of late antiquity. Stobaeus in the fifth century was evidently one reader. There is a good deal of Neopythagorean material in his *Anthology*, and the reason for this is the importance of Pythagoras and the Pythagorean heritage in the Neoplatonism of Porphyry (*c.* 234–305/10) and Iamblichus (*c.* 240–325). Iamblichus' massive *Collection of Pythagorean Doctrines* had a wide influence. A considerable portion survives including the introductory *On the Pythagorean Life* where (as I have noted) a Bryson is named along with many others as a follower of Pythagoras. The canonization of Pythagoras as the fount of Greek philosophy goes back long before the third to fourth century, but Porphyry and Iamblichus seem to have been responsible for rediscovering Pythagorean literature and for completing the task of building Pythagoreanism into Platonic philosophy (Macris 2002). In an extract of Porphyry's *History of Philosophy* which survives in Arabic, certainly via Syriac, we are given information about the number of genuine and pseudonymous Pythagorean writings. It seems fairly clear, then, that Bryson owes his survival in part to the interests of the Neoplatonists.

But there is another, complementary reason, which is the late antique and Islamic revival of Greek political theory. The translation of Bryson into Arabic must owe much to the importance of *oikonomika* in the philosophical

classification of the 'practical sciences' as the middle stage between control of the self (ethics) and control of fellow-citizens (politics) (O'Meara 2003: 53). Given the comprehensiveness of the *Management of the Estate* in comparison, say, with Ps.-Aristotle *Oikonomika I–II*, it is not surprising that Bryson was the text that emerged to fill this need in Islam. It seems likely that he occupied the role in antiquity too. His suitability was enhanced by the 'commercial anthropology', which belongs to the domain of political theory, and by his inclusion of material that lies within the domain of ethics. Neoplatonist interest in Pythagorean writings would have consolidated his oeconomic standing. One reader in the later Roman period who was probably attracted to Bryson for political–philosophical reasons is Themistius. Themistius (d. *c.* 385) was among the most important intellectual and political figures of the fourth century, a courtier who served the emperors from Constantius to Theodosius and had a professional interest in philosophy as an interpreter of Aristotle. Two of his non-political writings survive in Syriac and it is reasonably certain that others were translated into that language (J. Watt 1995, 2004). Much of his philosophical commentary was available in Arabic (Lyons 1973, Browne 1986, 1998, Brague 1999, cf. Ritter and Walzer 1938 for a possible ethical work). The text which concerns Bryson's readership and his relevance to modern scholarship on late antiquity is the *Letter on Government*, which I have mentioned above. There are in fact two translations of the letter in Arabic. The first dates to the early tenth century and is attributed to al-Dimashqī, a prominent Muslim translator who knew Greek well. The second dates to the later part of the same century and is by the prominent Christian intellectual Ibn Zurʿa. Since it is very close to the first, it appears that Ibn Zurʿa – who did not know Greek – merely undertook a light revision of the Dimashqī, perhaps with an eye on a Syriac version as the manuscript of the work states.

Students of Themistius have been aware of the *Letter* since Bouyges brought it to their attention in his 1924 *Archives de philosophie* article. Although it has sometimes been condemned as a forgery, as we have seen, and is usually passed over quickly, it is certainly genuine since parts of the first section can be shown to have been used directly in Nemesius of Emesa's *On the Nature of Man*, which was written around AD 390. This work is the first comprehensive account of the nature of the human body and soul from a Christian perspective and was based often literally on pagan medical and philosophical sources (Skard 1936–42). It was extremely influential in the Byzantine world and then in the later medieval West thanks to the excellent translation from the Greek by Burgundio of Pisa (Verbeke and Moncho 1975, cf. Burnett 2002: 57–58). The several Arabic translations were also

used widely (Khalil 1986). Certain passages in the first book of the main Arabic version are identical with the *Letter*. It was Nemesius who borrowed them from Themistius because he has clearly amplified the Themistian material *more suo* with additions or interpolations from Christian or pagan authors who came to his mind, and he also took over one key passage which forms an important theme in Themistius but is isolated in *On the Nature of Man*.

It was in the opening 'anthropological' section of the *Letter* concerning the development of human society that Bryson appears to have come in useful. The matter is complex, for we are working through Arabic translations rather than original Greek, and I cannot go into it further at this point except to say that there are both good general similarities between the 'commercial anthropology' of Bryson and the anthropology at the start of the *Letter* (where the crafts also come before the invention of the city, as in Bryson) as well some more specific parallels (see further in Chapter 2, pp. 126–9, Chapter 3, pp. 231, 248–9, and below pp. 97, 102). It is encouraging to note that a leading Arabic writer of the early tenth century, Qudāma ibn Jaʿfar (d. 930s or 940s), had both Bryson and the *Letter* of Themistius before him when he sat down to write his *Book of Government* in the 920s (see above), which formed the last of the 'stages' of his long treatise for administrators on the land tax, the *kharāj*. The *kharāj* was originally a tax on land owned by non-Muslims but by Qudāma's day was *de facto* payable by many Muslims too and was consequently a crucial source of revenue for the imperial government. Hence Qudāma's book could range widely. The *Book of Government* is important because here for the first time in Arabic Qudāma brought Greek political thought into Arabic political philosophy, blending it with Islamic elements and with the already existing political and courtly traditions that had been incorporated from the Persian mirror of princes tradition (Hiyari 1983) in order to offer new solutions to old problems. For Qudāma human politics and the position of God's Deputy (the *khalīfa*) were dependent upon the establishment of a cohesive human community, with laws and towns, trades, specialization of labour, and the invention of money to enable exchange. This is the situation which Bryson outlines in his introductory part, and (with changes) forms the basis of the institution of royal power in the *Letter*. With Qudāma's discovery of Greek theory Bryson came into his own once more.

The story of Bryson's rediscovery by his Islamic readers calls for an introduction to the Greco-Arabic Translation Movement (Section 3), to the work on this which brought Bryson to the attention of modern scholars

(Section 4), and to aspects of the Islamic economic and political background in the age of the translations which can help us understand how the text fitted (Sections 5 and 6). I shall look at all these matters before returning to Bryson's audiences in Sections 7 and 8. Those familiar with the Translation Movement may wish to move now to Section 4.

3 THE GRECO-ARABIC TRANSLATION MOVEMENT

In his *Syriac Chronicle* the patriarch and polymath Barhebraeus (1226–86), who was the last major author to write in Syriac, makes the following remarks at the start of his account of how the Arab kings rose to world domination:

> There arose among (the Arabs) philosophers, mathematicians, and physicians, who surpassed all the ancients in subtlety of understanding. While they built on no foundations other than those of the Greeks, they constructed greater scientific edifices by means of a more elegant style and more studious researches, with the result that, although they had received the wisdom from us through translators, all of whom were Syrians, now we find it necessary to seek wisdom from them (p. 121 trans. J. Watt).

The Arabic text of Bryson is part of the Translation Movement of Persian, Sanskrit, Syriac, and especially Greek books into Arabic during the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries AD, and his rediscovery in modern times is the result of work on this movement. The elite sponsors of the Movement paid large sums of money for translations of the principal scientific and philosophical texts of 'the ancients'. Barhebraeus concentrates on Greek because of his religion. He correctly observes that Arabic authors used (in many cases) Syriac-speaking Christians to translate Greek texts such as the Christian Arab Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq (808–73) and his son Isḥāq, and that the Greek texts were themselves thereafter the basis of intellectual progress by authors writing in Arabic. The Translation Movement represents a very considerable intellectual investment which equipped the Arabic language with various technical vocabularies as well as the possession of the tools of argument and proof. The age of Ḥunayn was crucial in stabilizing the lexicon and clear differences can be observed in the handling of specialist terminologies before and after him. Ḥunayn's *Letter* to his patron ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā, friend and secretary of the effective if irascible caliph al-Mutawakkil (Bergsträsser 1925, 1932), gives a detailed account of the translations of Galen that existed in his time and much information on his own role and that of his colleagues in scouring Syria, Palestine, and Egypt for manuscripts which were then collated and compared with existing translations in order to present the

best possible texts and renditions. A good deal of information on a wide range of texts including Greek ones is given in the *Fihrist* of (Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq) Ibn al-Nadīm (d. *c.* 995; English translation Dodge 1970), and lists of works by Greek sages in Arabic are given in several of the prominent bio-bibliographical works which were so beloved by Arabic literature, such as the *History of the Sages* by al-Qifṭī (d. 1248), *The Sources of Information on the Classes of Physicians* by Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa (d. 1270), Mubashshir Ibn Fātik's *Choicest Maxims and Best Sayings* (written in either 1084 or 1089), and the *Cabinet of Wisdom*, a late tenth- or early eleventh-century collection of discussions and anecdotes about Greek and other sages.

The two recent, substantial elucidations of the Translation Movement by Gerhard Endress (1982–92) and Dimitri Gutas (1998) (for Saliba 2007, see below) identify social and cultural reasons behind this huge effort. It used to be held that politico-religious steers from the court were the main initial cause as rival groups of Muslims came to need sophisticated logics to press their arguments home in the period from 800. But this explanation does not fully account for the variety and extent of the translations. Endress sees the matter in terms of 'Arabization', that is, the prestige of the governing language and the desire of Muslim converts to have their own cultural heritage translated into Arabic as well as the need of Arabic to reach a higher cultural level. This explanation is good at pointing to the causes for the early translations of Persian courtly material like those of the courtier Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (killed *c.* 756), who was responsible *inter alia* for the original translation of the famous mirror of princes *Kalīla wa-Dimna* from Pahlavi (Middle Persian) and for an important book of courtly etiquette and political advice. All of this production needs to be read in terms of a long culture of translation in the Middle Eastern lands of late antiquity, something which has no forebear in classical antiquity. The Syriac translation of Greek materials is a well-known story (Brock 1979, 1983, 1991, 1996, 1999); but it is less well known that there were already translations from Greek into Pahlavi at the end of the Sassanian regime (Gutas 1998: 26), and this transmission undoubtedly played a part in establishing a route from Pahlavi into Arabic (Zakeri 1994). Syriac translations themselves were mostly of religious material; but there are outstanding exceptions to this such as the work of the priest, philosopher, and archiater, Sergius of Reshaina (Theodosiopolis, d. 536; Georr 1948: 17–23), and Ḥunayn's *Letter* has much to say on medical work in Syriac, now virtually all lost (cf. Strohmaier 1991). Again, the establishment of a culture of translation, including habits of moving from Greek into a Semitic language, is extremely important in a zone that had long been used to handing on cultural goods. The expectation that Greek or Pahlavi

civilization had material worth translating was a given in the Arabic intellectual landscape from the outset.

It is usually recognized that there was some antipathy to Greek material in the initial phase of the Islamic empire under the Umayyad regime (661–750). The Umayyads had established themselves in Damascus and, of course, had ejected the Byzantine Romans (*al-Rūm*) from all of Syria and North Africa. For practical purposes they had no choice but to retain Greek in the administration, but within around three-quarters of a century they had changed this to Arabic. Greek was still a major language among some local populations and there are plenty of bilingual papyri from Egypt to prove this. As far as literature goes, the only literary translation of note in the Umayyad period is the fictitious correspondence between Alexander and Aristotle done by Sālim Abū l-ʿAlāʾ (Grignaschi 1975), secretary of the last successful Umayyad caliph in Damascus, Hishām (724–43). Under the new Islamic regime of the ʿAbbasids, which was brought to power by Abū l-Abbās ʿAbdullāh al-Saffāḥ (the 'Blood Shedder') in 750, things were quite different. The circumstances under which the new dynasty came to rule led it to base itself in Iraq and to found Baghdad, officially Madīnat al-Salām (City of Peace) in 762 in a place, at a date, and with a layout determined by Persian astrology. This break with the past allowed an Arabic–Persian Islam (cf. Kennedy 1990) to see Greek culture as a benefit, not a threat. Within a decade or two came the earliest translations of Aristotle (*Topics*, *Physics*) as the regime grappled with religious and political issues demanding sophisticated accounts of theology and cosmology. A civil war in the years 811–13 led to a legitimacy problem for the victor al-Maʾmūn (786–833), who had confronted his own brother. It was now that the Translation Movement made headway. As Gutas has shown, al-Maʾmūn's centralizing policies needed intellectual succour. He presented the Byzantine Romans as philistines and unworthy heirs of ancient Greek culture, which itself had been stolen by Alexander from the ancient Persians according to official propaganda developed in the Sassanian empire and happily adopted by the ʿAbbasids. This encouraged the beginning of large-scale translation work in medicine, astrology, and other sciences, and philosophy. Intellectual philhellenism sat perfectly well with military attacks on the Byzantine empire.

The main factor behind the Movement was money and the emergence of patrons and sponsors who were prepared to invest in the translation of texts to boost their own credibility. The result is a documentable rise in the quality of translations as scholars reached higher standards and cooperated in developing uniform techniques. Endress (1997) in particular has pointed to the role of the philosopher al-Kindī (*c.* 801–73) in promoting translation

terminologies in philosophy which was presented as an aid to attaining the wisdom inherent in the revealed religion of the Koran. It was al-Kindī (who knew no Greek himself) who promoted the idea that the ancient Greeks (*al-Yūnān*) were descended from Yūnān, whom he made out to be a brother of Qaḥtān, the ancestor of all the south Arabian peoples, while a later source noted that the Byzantine Romans had an ancestor different from the ancient Greeks' own. There was naturally some reaction against Hellenic influence by traditionalist Muslims, but the meshing of Greek philosophy with rationalist theology ensured its place.

In his book on the history of Islamic astronomy and the debts, acknowledged or unacknowledged, of the early modern European astronomers to the Islamic tradition, George Saliba (2007: chs. 1–2) has criticized the idea that the translations were useful to the religious policies of al-Ma'mūn and therefore encouraged by him, and rejects the suggestion of a Persian ideology as a 'racial construction' of the ʿAbbasid regime that is fundamentally flawed (p. 58). Two of the points he makes concern the implied evidence for early translation work in the bureaux, where Greek and Pahlavi had been the original languages, and the continuing strength of the Translation Movement after al-Ma'mūn's reign. In this later period, with an eye on Ḥunayn's troubles under al-Mutawakkil (cited from his autobiography by the medical historian Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa), Saliba remarks on the 'deadly competitive environment' of the ʿAbbasid bureaucrats and their associates as a cause of the continuing development of translation literature. Undoubtedly there are worthwhile observations here. If we are thinking about translations already happening in the Umayyad period, we can cite the comprehensive study of Sprengling (1939–40: esp. 191–6) on bureau translation (focussing on Pahlavi to Arabic) in the late seventh and early eighth centuries. But this is not a 'translation movement'; and much of what Saliba wishes to write off as the 'classical [= orientalist] narrative' remains an important element in the genesis and extension of Greco-Arabic translation.

The work of Ḥunayn, his son Isḥāq, and his nephew Ḥubaysh ibn al-Ḥasan known as al-Aʿsam ('The Withered') and of others like Abū ʿUthmān Saʿīd ibn Yaʿqūb al-Dimashqī (d. after 914; see. p. 65) and Qusṭā ibn Lūqā (d. 912–13) in the middle and later ninth and early tenth century achieved the translation of a large amount of Greek technical material from the Hellenistic and Roman period and completed the main phase of the movement. The tenth century remained important especially for the revival of Aristotelian studies through translations now made from Syriac, not Greek, by the Baghdad Aristotelians like the Nestorian Abū Bishr Mattā b. Yūnus (d. 940). With him studied al-Fārābī (*c.* 870–950) himself and the

Monophysite Christian philosopher Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī (d. 974), who passed his teaching to the next generation of both Christian (Ibn Zurʿa, d. 1008; Ibn Suwār, 942–1017) and Muslim philosophers, such as Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī 'The Logician' (d. *c.* 985). Among those who frequented Sijistānī was Abū ʿAlī Miskawayh. I shall have occasion to mention several of these figures again. It is interesting to note the awareness of the value of the Translation Movement in the later period as attested by Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī's report of the dream of al-Maʾmūn, in which the caliph reported having seen Aristotle. Gutas has analysed the original context of the dream as the politico-religious situation of al-Maʾmūn's regime, where rational argument was needed to assert the caliph's favoured views. But in the tenth century, as he notes, things could be presented differently. The version of the dream recorded by Ibn al-Nadīm and later by Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa stresses the value of the *intellectual* inheritance of Aristotelian philosophy.

The *Cabinet of Wisdom*, which probably originates from the school of the philosopher al-ʿĀmirī (d. 992) rather than from circles more directly associated with al-Sijistānī (Qāḍī 1981), is an excellent example of the fascination for the ancient Greeks among the wider Muslim elite. This mixture of doctrine, anecdote, and real or fictional biographical details of Greek and Muslim sages reveals the cultural expectations of men participating in the salons which are abundantly described in this period and not least in the entertaining *belles-lettres* of Tanūkhī (b. 941) and Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (b. 920s). Al-Tawḥīdī's *al-Muqābasāt* (*Conversations*) sketches 106 discussions on philosophical topics often led by al-Sijistānī, while the thirty seven vignettes of the brilliant salon of the vizier Ibn Saʿdān assembled in his *al-Imtāʿ wa-l-Muʾānasa* (*Delight and Conviviality*) provide an entertaining account of learned table-talk mixed with court gossip at the highest level of good literature. Such works are examples of what in Arabic is called *adab* (pl. *ādāb*), which is 'education' or 'culture', as we have seen, and signals the possession of the social conventions and knowledge which allowed a man to function in the public domain. Literature was one of the principal vehicles of *adab* (for example, the great collection of Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih in the early tenth century, which classifies the culture expected of a gentleman). However, like Greek *paideia*, which it translates, *adab* was not restricted to literary matters, but (in Michael Chamberlain's definition, 1994: 107) refers to 'the whole complex of manners, moral conduct, deportment, and scripted forms of self-presentation' that are the cultural capital of any advanced society. There is, it seems, no *paideia* literature from antiquity in the sense of works entitled 'the *paideia* of this or that class' (leaving aside the odd work on the '*paideia* of the king'), whereas in Arabic there is a very extensive literature of the *adab*

of all sorts of groups, especially those who had to do with court, including the prince (e.g. the *Great Ādāb*, *The Comprehensive Book of Rules of Conduct* of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ), but also the senior administrators (the Secretaries, *al-kuttāb*, cf. Ibn Qutayba's *Adab al-Kātib* with its admired introduction on principles of conduct), or the figure of the judge (the genre of *adab al-qāḍī*), and so on. In political terms *adab* literature included mirrors, and the *Great Ādāb* is one of the earliest examples of these, reflecting Pahlavi court literature to a large extent but also containing a fair share of Greek aphorisms (Richter 1932: 4–22, Marlow 2007: 39).

What about the quality of the translations? One immediate point to make is that the translators used Greek materials at a far earlier stage of the transmission process. The manuscript tradition which culminated in printed editions of Greek texts depends in many cases on copies made long after the ninth or tenth century, and of course we may assume that the translators were often using copies which were not themselves recent. Thus they often had 'better' texts. The care taken over collation is impressive. Two examples will help to impress this. Let me take first of all Galen's commentaries on Hippocrates. These constitute one of the most important examples of ancient scientific exegesis. The Greek manuscript tradition of the commentaries is poor. Ḥunayn's translation captured the text in the middle of the ninth century and is frequently cited in the Corpus Medicorum Graecorum edition where the Greek is extant (and of course where it is not). But it is not only the text of Galen's own words where the Arabic is important. In the Western manuscript tradition the Hippocratic lemmas which Galen comments on were replaced by the text of Hippocrates drawn from the textual tradition of the Hippocratic corpus; whereas Ḥunayn's translation preserved the text of Hippocrates which Galen himself wrote out from his own collation of copies at his disposal and then used for his lemmas. The editing of the Arabic text of the commentaries on Hippocrates' *Epidemics* 1–2 is currently under way at Warwick as the first phase of an ambitious plan to edit the 'Arabic Galen' where the Greek survives and where it does not, and these two volumes will be forthcoming with the Corpus Medicorum Graecorum in Berlin. The second example concerns the great manuscript ar. 2346 held at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris which contains the logical writings (the *Organon*) of Aristotle (Hugonnard-Roche 1993). This is a compilation of various translated texts assembled by Ibn Suwār, the pupil of Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī. The translators were among the best of the previous century: Isḥāq b. Ḥunayn for the *Categories* and the *On Interpretation*, al-Dimashqī for the *Topics* and Porphyry's *Introduction* (which was read as an introduction to the *Categories* and heads the collection), Mattā b. Yūnus for the *Posterior*

Analytics and the *Poetics*, the *Prior Analytics* by a translator called Tadhārī who was possibly the brother of one of Ḥunayn's assistants, no fewer than three translations of the *Sophistical Refutations* (by Ibn Zurʿa, his teacher Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī, and one of al-Kindī's translators, Ibn Nāʿima al-Ḥimṣī), and the *Rhetoric* by an unnamed translator probably from the circle of al-Kindī (Vagelpohl 2008). In the margin to the *Sophistical Refutations* Ibn Suwār tells us of his aims in including three versions of the work: 'as we wished to understand the virtues of each one of them, we have written out all the translations which came into our possession so that it will be possible to consider each one and use one to help interpret the other in order that we may grasp the meaning' (Georr 1948: 198–9).

As I have remarked, there is no doubt that the aim of the translators was to make a good translation. The generally high standards meant that much hard work went into turning Greek into a reasonably natural Arabic. In his *Book of Animals*, in which he draws heavily on the Aristotelian tradition (through the translations of his contemporary, al-Biṭrīq; Najim 1979), the ninth-century *littérateur* and humorist ʿAmr ibn Baḥr known as al-Jāḥiẓ ('Pop Eyes') (776–868/9) brings his usual irony and perceptiveness to bear on the difficulties ranging from defective manuscripts to the underlying problem of moving between cultures:

> How can the translator render (the inner meanings and subtleties of the source text) and convey the meanings and messages faithfully and correctly unless he possesses the knowledge of the author and writer concerning their senses, the ways in which the terms are variously employed, and the interpretations of odd usages? . . . (He) needs to possess just as much eloquence as he does knowledge. He must be highly familiar with the original language and the language of the translation, and have a perfect command of them both. But when we find someone able to speak two languages, we can be sure that he harms both of them, for they are bound to influence each other, borrow from each other, and distort each other. Besides, how is it possible for him to have the mastery of two languages together that he has when he applies himself to one? . . . For the narrower and more difficult of access the door to a subject is, and the fewer scholars there are in it, the harder is the translator's task and the greater the risk of making mistakes – for you will never find a translator who is the match of one of (the original authors) (Cairo edn, vol. 1, 38–40; cf. Salama-Carr 1990: 91–101).

Al-Jāḥiẓ, ever impugning the motives and abilities of his fellows, did not know Greek himself but took advantage of the thriving atmosphere of al-Maʾmūn's Baghdad and the vigorous theological and intellectual debates which were fuelled, in part, by the growing number of translations. He was writing just before the establishment of the standards laid down by

the Ḥunayn school. Both he and Ḥunayn were known for their care over language and the pure quality of their Arabic (*al-arabīya al-fuṣḥā*) and both represent ʿAbbasid civilization at the apogee of its political–cultural power.

The approach to the quality and reliability of the translations has often suffered in the past from a false distinction between 'literal' and 'free', which became enshrined in the modern literature as a result of remarks by the fourteenth-century polygraph, philologist, and critic Khalīl ibn Aybak al-Ṣafadī (d. 1363), to the effect that the Greco-Arabic translations moved from a literal, word-for-word basis to a determined translation of the sense in the school of Ḥunayn and his followers (translated in F. Rosenthal 1975: 17). It is now realized that there is not much evidence for this neat progression, and that indeed the establishment of terminologies and lexicons in the ninth century produced (on one level) a translation closer to the original but without sacrificing clarity for literalness. Anyone who has compared the Arabic and Greek of Ḥunayn (say for Galen) or his son Isḥāq (say for his – or his father's– translation of Nemesius) is aware of the translator's desire to write Arabic, not translationese, which still of course means omissions and additions to make the sense clearer or to cover misunderstanding, with common strategies like the use of two words where the Greek has one in order to make the sense explicit, or interjections and alterations to accommodate the text within Islamic culture, with a result that is not always elegant. But given that they lived centuries later, were confused by references to political and social institutions specific to the ancient world, and were operating between languages with nothing in common, the best translators did a very good job for their new Arabic readership (Vagelpohl 2010).

To get a flavour of the effort, the ability, and the conceit of the most famous of the translators, some extracts may be cited from Ḥunayn's autobiography, as recorded by Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, and from Ḥunayn's own *Letter* on the translations. According to Ḥunayn his enemies

> could see that I was above and beyond them in my learning, my work, and my translation for them of the glorious sciences from languages they had no command of and no idea of and no knowledge of whatsoever, employing an absolute facility of expression and good style, and without any omissions or errors, with no bias towards any of the faiths, with no obscurity and committing no solecism according to the Arabic professors of rhetoric. These men have a knowledge of the rules of syntax and of the outlandish word and stumble against no blemish or inflexion or meaning (in my work), but find only the most pleasing vocabulary guaranteeing immediate comprehension . . . (Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa p. 265 ed. Riḍā = 191 Müller).

Ḥunayn's *Letter* is full of reflections on the quality of his work. Take his comments on Galen's *Method of Healing*:

> Sergius translated this book into Syriac, the first six parts when he was yet weak and inexperienced in translation work. He translated the remaining eight parts when he had acquired experience so that he did this version better than that of the first six parts. Salmawayh (ibn Bunān) [physician to the caliph al-Muʿtaṣim] urged me to correct the second half for him believing that this would be easier than making a new version. So he collated with me a part of the seventh section, he holding in his hand the Syriac version while I held the Greek text, he reading the Syriac and I telling him of any variations from the Greek text and suggesting corrections. At last the work became troublesome to him . . . So he asked me to translate these parts, and I translated them completely (*Letter* 20, pp. 692–3 trans. Meyerhof).

Compare this with what he says in his comments concerning *On Sects*:

> I translated it when I was a young man . . . from a very defective Greek manuscript. Later on, when I was about forty years old, my pupil Ḥubaysh asked me to correct it after having collected a certain number of Greek manuscripts. Thereupon I collated these so as to produce one correct manuscript, and I compared this manuscript with the Syriac text [made by Ibn S(h)ahdā] and corrected it. I am in the habit of proceeding thus in all my translation work. Some years later I translated it into Arabic for Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn Mūsā [prominent courtier, bankroller of translators, co-author of a book of ingenious machines, d. 873] (*Letter* 3, pp. 690–1 trans. Meyerhof).

Ḥunayn's connections with the ʿAbbasid intellectual and political elite were important for the diffusion and acceptance of the standards he set. Obviously, not all translators were as thorough or as able. But we have several statements by the bookseller Ibn al-Nadīm about the competence of the numerous translators he names, and occasional other remarks, such as for example what Miskawayh says about al-Dimashqī. Al-Dimashqī translated the *Letter* of Themistius, and Miskawayh includes the following comment in his *Refinement of Character* about an ethical work attributed to Aristotle that Dimashqī had translated : '(These words) come from the translation of Abū ʿUthmān al-Dimashqī, who was a man well versed in both languages, namely Greek and Arabic, and whose translation has won the approval of all those who have studied these two languages. At the same time, he has tried hard to reproduce the Greek words and their meanings in Arabic words and meanings without any difference in expression or substance' (p. 81 trans. Zurayk).

It used to be thought that Syriac translations underlay many of our Arabic versions of Greek works. But although a considerable quantity of Greek

medical texts was in Syriac, a certain amount of Aristotle (the logical works), and examples of ethics (Plutarch, Themistius), it is now accepted that in the heyday of the Greco-Arabic Translation Movement the translators mostly worked directly from Greek. Of course the fact that they were largely drawn from Christian communities speaking Syriac or another Aramaic dialect means that 'Syriacisms' are likely in their Arabic. These would not, then, be a sign of a genuine Syriac intermediary. In the case of Bryson there is no evidence of a Syriac translation. In general, even where a Syriac existed, it might not be very useful except for the purpose of collation. Ḥunayn's *Letter* contains some trenchant criticism of the abilities of the Syriac scholars. His own Syriac translations, done for the benefit of Christian colleagues or as a stepping stone to an Arabic version, mean he had considerable experience to go on, though we should always bear in mind his overestimation of his own abilities in relation to others. The already mentioned Paris *Organon* manuscript contains an interesting note in this regard. Its copy of the *Rhetoric* was taken from a copy made by another pupil of Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī called Ibn al-Samḥ in the year of his death, 1027. Ibn al-Samḥ says that he had found it difficult to obtain the Arabic *Rhetoric*. He eventually located a 'defective' copy, and then found a much better one. He goes on:

> I relied upon this second copy in my transcription of this (present) version, and where I found a mistake in the second copy I had recourse to that (other) version. If I found it given correctly there, I would copy down what I found in that version in its correct form, but if I found that it was defective there too, I would check back on the point to a Syriac manuscript. If I found the (Syriac) manuscript's reading to be sound, I would produce an Arabic version to match it, but if it was defective, I would enter it, defective as it was, and mark the line in which it occurred with the sign [ع]. I have checked over this (present) copy and done my best to see that there has been no carelessness (pp. 1, ii–iii trans. Lyons, adapted).

Here, then, a Syriac translation of the *Rhetoric* was used for comparison or emendation of defective Arabic passages only (Vagelpohl 2008: ch. 2).

Unlike Syriac, Arabic was a language of power and was in addition validated by religion. The Koran several times specifies that it is 'an Arabic Koran' written in 'a clear Arabic tongue' (16: 103, 26: 195, 39: 28, *et al.*). As the effective foundation of the language, the rhymed prose of the Koran continues to be the spiritual and linguistic reference point of Muslims. Thus there was very little reason for the Arabic-speaker to speak another language, while Muslim speakers of other languages have always had to master Arabic to some extent. As with ancient Greek, other peoples' speech was often deemed inferior and ridiculed in Arabic literature. Thus it is probably right to

think of an absence of bilingualism and biculturalism on the part of most of the patrons and consumers of the Translation Movement as part of a more general absence in medieval Islam. Of course, on the ground bilingual interchange and routine contacts always took place and were always necessary; but that is a different matter. And there were certainly bicultural contacts between the caliphate and the Byzantines, both diplomatic (Kennedy 1992) and intellectual/scientific (Strohmaier 1983). Some scholars have indeed wondered about the influence of ʿAbbasid culture on the Byzantine humanist revival of the ninth century (e.g. Speck 1987, 1998 inspired by Strohmaier). But we have to be careful in our reading of these contacts and must not generalize or exaggerate along the lines of Bertrand Hemmerdinger's thesis that Photius had had to journey to Baghdad to find the books he needed to write his *Bibliotheca*. Such stories do not stand up to scrutiny (Magdalino 1998). Arabists themselves have traditionally been disinclined to see influence from Byzantium on the ʿAbbasid regime, though new voices are being heard, some measured, some not. For example, the Moroccan historian Abdesselam Cheddadi (2004) has challenged the received idea of a complete rupture between early Islamic historiography and the traditions of late antiquity, a rupture he not unreasonably sees as a literary analogue of the 'Pirenne Thesis' (for which see below, p. 79). In the important domain of law the provocative study by Jokisch (2007) argues forcefully that Shaybānī's collection of case law under Hārūn al-Rashīd in his monumental *Kitāb al-Aṣl* (or *al-Mabsūṭ*) was in one area at least influenced by an early Byzantine summary of Roman law and by Muslims who knew it. But it seems that this is going far too far. The fact that there is not a hint of acknowledgement of this influence in the text accords well with the caliph's military and political warfare against Constantinople. And though Jokisch presents textual evidence in one area of law, his erudition does not make his attempt to trace virtually everything else to Byzantine developments persuasive or likely. Bernard Lewis' *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (1982) undoubtedly had its prejudices, but its basic thesis, that Muslim civilizations were largely uninterested in contemporary cultures to the west and the north until the Ottomans felt obliged to be in the eighteenth century, had it about right (notwithstanding day-to-day economic and political contacts of the type charted by Nabil Matar (e.g. 1999, 2009) on the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). Which is not to say that Europeans in general had any greater or more honourable interest in the Arab world. European hostility and aggression (the Crusades) and later on 'orientalism' are facts; but in the later middle ages and at least until the onset of the colonial era recognition of the intellectual superiority of Arabic culture is amply attested in the industry of translation from Arabic

to Latin (e.g. Burnett 1997, 2009) and by a wider set of borrowings and interests now forgotten or denied (e.g. Makdisi 1981: 288–91, W. Watt 1972, generally Goody 2010).

Muslim interest in the civilization of the ancient Greeks was assisted by the fact that Greek literature had died. The glory of Greece was sealed in the past, as it is for us, and the 'wisdom' of the Greeks could therefore be deemed authoritative and translated without worry. In the course of a withering attack on Byzantine Christianity and ignorance written to ingratiate himself at court, Jāḥiẓ distinguished the modern from the ancient Greeks by saying that, 'those (prestigious authors) came from a nation who have perished. But the traces of their minds live on: it is they who were *al-Yūnān*' (*Against the Christians*, ed. Hārūn, *Letters*, vol. III, 315).

4 EDITING THE TEXT AND IDENTIFYING THE AUTHOR

Three samples of Greek economic thought were translated into Arabic. First is the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle's thoughts on exchange and justice at *NE* 5.5 do not seem to be cited in discussions of (o)economic matters by Islamic authors; that the passage is used, perhaps at second hand, by Miskawayh in his discussion of justice in Book 4 of his *Refinement of Character* serves to confirm its non-economic role. On the other hand, Aristotle's 'brief and dispersed words' on the subject in the Arabic *Ethics* are noted by Barhebraeus in the oeconomic section of his Syriac encyclopedia, the *Cream of Wisdom* (Chapter 2, p. 142). Second is a summary version of Ps.-Aristotle *Oikonomika I* by one of the Christian Aristotelian philosophers of Baghdad, Abū l-Faraj ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. 1043) under the title *Fruits of Aristotle's Treatise on Tadbīr al-manzil* (Maʿlūf 1920–3, 1921). The attribution to Ibn al-Ṭayyib has been questioned (see Jackson 1982–3: 155–6), but there is no good reason to do so, for this author wrote *inter alia* a number of summaries of Greek works in this form. The term 'fruits' signalled that they contained 'what he considered the most important points made in them' (F. Rosenthal 1977: 274). *Fruits of Aristotle* is sometimes very close to the original, sometimes not. It is worth studying in relation to the Greek, since it antedates the Greek manuscripts of *Oikonomika I* by two centuries or so, and in particular looks as if it represents an alternative recension (Victor 1983: 66–73 with a German translation of the Arabic by Z. Shunnar). However, the summary appears to have had no influence on Arabic philosophical writing or other discussions of economic affairs (cf. Peters 1968: 62–3; Zonta 1996b for a possible reference in the translator Qalonymos ben

Qalonymos, and the Hebrew tradition which was based partly on Leonardi Bruni's Latin of *Oikonomika 1* and partly on the 'Translatio Durandi', for which see Chapter 5, p. 320). Ibn al-Ṭayyib is likely to have known Bryson Arabus, since he was well versed in the Greek heritage and is recorded as having been fluent in the spoken (*rūmīya*) and the classical (*yūnānīya*) Greek language. The fact that Bryson was considered the standard work on the topic of family and estate management may have encouraged him to bring the Aristotelian piece to the attention of Arabic readers. But it is hard to find any direct influence from Bryson in his text.

The third example is Bryson. Martin Plessner drew his text from that published for the first time by the Jesuit scholar Louis Cheikho (Lūwīs Shaykhū) (1859–1927; Dagher 1956–83: II 515–24, Hechaïmé 1967, 1978). Cheikho was one of the pioneers and proponents of the Arabic Christian heritage and an intellectual giant of the renaissance of Arabic language and literature in the nineteenth and twentieth century movement called al-Nahḍa ('the Arising'). He was to all intents and purposes the founder and namer of the Bibliothèque Orientale of the Catholic Université Saint-Joseph at Beirut. He directed the library from 1880 onwards and was responsible for amassing its collection of manuscripts. As a boy he had studied Latin and Greek at the Jesuit school then located at the small town of Ghazir to the north of Beirut, and this explains his abiding interest in Greek philosophical texts translated into Arabic. For Bryson, he relied on one of two manuscripts available at the time.

(1) He transcribed his printed text from a manuscript now housed in the National Library and Archives of Egypt (*Dār al-Kutub*) at Cairo in the Taymūr collection. This appears to date to the fourteenth century AD. Bryson is one of twenty treatises – half of them mere extracts – contained in this *majmūʿa* ('anthology', 'collection') of philosophical and ethical texts, several of which are in origin translations from Greek (Kraus 1937: introduction). The *Letter* of Themistius in the version ascribed to Ibn Zurʿa follows the Bryson. Among the most important treatises contained in the manuscript are Galen's *On Character Types* (which is lost in Greek) and Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī's *Reformation of Morals* (Griffith 2002). The manuscript was in the possession of a prominent Beirut advocate (Ṣafā 1913) when it was first described by Cheikho at the Eleventh International Congress of Orientalists held at Paris 1897. He published the Bryson some years later in the journal he himself founded, *al-Machriq* (*The East*) (vol. 19, 1921; reprinted in *Anciens traités arabes*, 1923). Since the name of Bryson was distorted by the scribe, and Bryson was completely unknown, he did not manage to make any sense of who the author might be.

A separate copy of the Bryson was made from the same Taymūr manuscript in 1942 as part of a programme of copying by the National Library; its scribe was not always attentive to his work and it has no independent value.

(2) The second version of Bryson extant in Cheikho's day was a copy now lost which was in the possession of the intellectual and reformist Ibrāhīm al-Yāzijī (1847–1906; Dagher 1956–83: II 759–63). Yāzijī published it in his literary and cultural magazine, *al-Ḍiyā'* (*The Light*) (vol. 2, 1899–1900). He was also unsure of the author's name and made no attempt to guess his identity. His text, which Plessner knew of but had not seen, contained only the first two parts of Bryson's treatise (money and slaves), and he published it in answer to a reader's question as to whether there had been any medieval Arabic study of 'political economy' (*al-iqtiṣād al-siyāsī*). The date of the copy owned by Yāzijī is unknown; it may well be modern since he speaks of possessing 'a copy of an ancient treatise', not an ancient copy. It is extremely close to the Taymūr recension but presents several alternative readings, some of which cannot be due to its copyist or to Yāzijī himself, for they accord with the other medieval manuscript known to us now (see **(4)** below). Cheikho apparently did not assign Yāzijī's text any value since he chose to ignore it when he published his own in *al-Machriq*. But in a note attached to a follow-up article by ʿĪsa Iskandar al-Maʿlūf (Maʿlūf 1920–3) on Ps.-Aristotle, *Oikonomika I*, he claims that he was unaware of it. Maʿlūf (1869–1956) was another important literary figure at this time, a poet, historian, and journalist (Dagher 1956–83: III. ii 1246–55), who, typically, founded his own literary and historical journal (*Majallat al-Āthār*) and attracted contributions from many of the leading lights of the period. His sons, who were poets of the *Mahjar* (the Arab Diaspora), were the last distinguished representatives of a family that had produced renowned intellectuals for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (*Enc. Isl.*, 2nd edn, 1991: IV 303–8). Like so many of the participants in the modern Arab renaissance, philology for Maʿlūf was a tool of political and social renewal as much as an intellectual pastime. Amongst his numerous publications is a two-volume study of the Yāzijī family (1944–5). In the article in *al-Machriq* he suggests that the Yāzijī text was actually 'older and more accurate' than Cheikho's. Yāzijī himself was a man of strong views about the direction of the Arab renaissance and, though Cheikho had also been a contributor to *al-Ḍiyā'*, his failure to mention Yāzijī's edition may reveal irritation rather than unawareness. On the other hand, the magazines and journals of the Nahḍa era are weighty tomes covering a vast range of material, and ignorance by so prolific an author as Cheikho can be forgiven (see below on Jurjī Zaydān).

Two other manuscripts may be mentioned here before returning to Cheikho and the modern rediscovery of Bryson. (**3**) A few years after the publication of Cheikho's Bryson, a late-nineteenth-century copy of the complete *majmūʿa* came into his possession at the Bibliothèque Orientale. Unfortunately this is now marked in the definitive version of the catalogue as 'disparu' and its whereabouts are unknown. (**4**) Far more important is a second medieval *majmūʿa* containing Bryson, and probably dating to the twelfth or thirteenth century, which is now kept in the library of al-Azhar university in Cairo. This was unknown to Cheikho and Plessner and was first noted by Fuat Sezgin (1971: 91). It is an interesting text in many ways. Scribal practices indicate it was produced in the Yemen. Large stretches of it are a reworking of the Taymūr tradition, in which the author has used many synonyms while keeping for the most part close to the sense and order of the Taymūr recension. Thus the text is useful for defending or rejecting readings in the Taymūr, and in some parts, including much of the fourth section on the child and the final part of the first section, the Azhar stays very close to it. There is no reason to accept the claim of its author that Bryson was translated by Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq, for Ḥunayn's name was often attached to translations to dignify and legitimize them (and the Azhar text was clearly in need of legitimization). Early modern readers of the copy made notes on it which show that they knew the Taymūr Bryson tradition and were not entirely happy with the level of rewriting.

As we shall see shortly, two medieval texts, the mirror of princes by Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ (mid thirteenth century) and the theoretical, part of a traders' manual by a certain al-Dimashqī (probably mid eleventh century), both quote parts of Bryson verbatim and demonstrate that the Taymūr recension was authoritative and stable. Another author, Miskawayh, closely paraphrases part of section four of this recension. The Hebrew translation edited by Plessner, though a little reworked, also confirms the status of the Taymūr tradition. Thus in terms of producing the text in this volume, the Taymūr continues to have priority.

Louis Cheikho's enormous number of publications sometimes led him to work too fast: 'il n'a pas le temps de s'attarder, de se relire, de fignoler ("faff around")' (Hechaïmé 1978: 19). He was not always accurate in making transcriptions and one may find harsh verdicts by Western scholars about his standards (e.g. F. Rosenthal 1941: 383). His text of Bryson shows a fair number of misreadings or typographical errors in respect of the Taymūr manuscript, some very careless, and even the omission of whole phrases. It is also unclear from the transcription when Cheikho is emending or suggesting an emendation. Many of his errors were already correct in the text published

by Yāzijī (perhaps prompting Maʿlūf's remarks about the superiority of that text). It is unfortunate that this latter edition was unavailable to Plessner, who had Cheikho alone to rely on. Martin Plessner himself (1900–73; Sellheim 1975) undertook the edition and study of Bryson at the suggestion of Carl Brockelmann (author of the *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*) and under the guidance of Gotthelf Bergsträsser. It is a testament to the brilliance of Bergsträsser and Plessner that so many of Cheikho's mistakes were corrected without sight of Yāzijī or of the Taymūr and Azhar manuscripts themselves.

The events of history played a decisive role in Plessner's edition. For on hearing that another young orientalist, Willi Heffening, was already working on Bryson with a view to producing a study of Islamic economic thought, Plessner originally decided to undertake a study from the classical side, to find parallels in Greco-Roman literature, and to evaluate the possibility of reconstructing the Greek text. But in the events following the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhrgebiet in 1923 and the international political jockeying over the region, Heffening found himself unable to get books sent to him due to a boycott of the area by the Berlin library lending service, and in this situation, as Plessner tells us in the preface to his edition, Heffening ceded the project to Plessner. Plessner was then able to turn his full attention to the Islamic reception of Bryson and to forget his earlier plan. He nevertheless determined to make his translation a literal one in order to provide classicists with as close a picture of the Arabic as he could. Such a translation was, he argued, anyway less idiosyncratic because it was a product of sustained 'self-criticism'. But when he came to revise the proofs of his book, he saw that it 'would be unreadable (*unlesbar*) without a fundamental revision'. Since this was not possible, he 'eliminated the worst offences against the German language'. Even so, the translation still did not have the 'complete approval of Herr Professor Bergsträsser', and he dearly wished he could redo it from scratch (1928: v–vi).

Plessner acknowledges that he particularly owed his interest in Bryson to the important study by Hellmut Ritter (1892–1971; see Plessner 1972) on the probably mid-eleventh-century Abū l-Faḍl Jaʿfar b. ʿAlī l-Dimashqī. Ritter had written his doctoral study of al-Dimashqī's *Book of Advice on the Advantages of Commerce, the Knowledge of Good and Bad Merchandise, and the Deceptions of Fraudulent Traders* with Carl Becker, who saw to its publication while Ritter was on military service as a translator and spy in the Middle East (Ritter 1917). It was Ritter who first identified Bryson. He did this by detecting extensive parallels between Brysonian passages in al-Dimashqī, the mirror of princes by Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ (*Conduct of the*

Ruler in the Management of Kingdoms), and the oeconomic portion of the *Nasirean Ethics* by the thirteenth-century. Persian philosopher, astronomer, and politician, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (1201–74), who is the only one of the three to name Bryson. It is no wonder that the quality of the 22-year-old's thesis impressed Brockelmann and that Brockelmann saw the scope for further work on the topic.

It was Ritter's genius not only to connect the similar passages of Dimashqī, Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ, and Ṭūsī but also to link these with the late medieval Hebrew translation of Bryson. The manuscript copy of this had been described not long before in the catalogue of the Hebrew manuscripts at Munich by Moritz Steinschneider. Steinschneider suggested the author name of *Brāsōn* was more likely to be Greek than Arabic but went no further (1893: 228). Ritter correctly linked the various forms of the name with the Neopythagorean author whose Greek fragments had been commented on so 'carefully', as he says, by Friedrich Wilhelm in his 1915 study of the Greek oeconomica.

At the beginning of the oeconomic section of the *Nasirean Ethics* Ṭūsī tells us that he knows of an Arabic translation of an ancient Greek work on this subject by 'Abrūsun' (Wickens 1964: 303–4). Persian, like Arabic, does not normally tolerate two initial consonants. The solution in these languages is to add an initial vowel (*Aflāṭūn* for Πλάτων) or insert a vowel (*Buruqlus* for Πρόκλος). 'Βρύσων' presented the same problem. When the name appears in Arabic with two initial consonants, we may assume a vowel would have been pronounced between them. The form of what is probably the first occurrence of Bryson's name in Arabic literature in the physician Ibn al-Jazzār in the mid ninth century shows the initial vowel. The next earliest occurrences in the great *Fihrist* show the form *B-r-* in our best manuscript. Ibn al-Nadīm finished his catalogue in 987/8 not long before his death. I shall go into its evidence in detail in Chapter 2, since on the basis of the standard edition by Gustav Flügel (published posthumously in 1871–2), Plessner mistakenly held that the *Fihrist* recorded that Bryson had dedicated his book to Apollonius, i.e. the Neopythagorean 'holyman' Apollonius of Tyana, and on this basis he dated it to the mid or later first century AD (see above). The *Fihrist* is a remarkable work and its translation into English by the American orientalist Bayard Dodge was itself an extraordinary undertaking. The first six of its ten 'discourses' deal with Islamic topics and are bibliographical in a fairly strict sense. The last four deal with non-Islamic topics – philosophy, legends and magic, beliefs of non-monotheistic religions, alchemy – and for this material Ibn al-Nadīm included far more general information and biography about his authors and the translations of their works into Arabic. This material was perhaps issued also as a separate edition; if that is right (but cf. Zimmermann

1976: 269–70), it shows the direction of Ibn al-Nadīm's cultural interests and his judgement about those of his readers. Bryson's book is mentioned twice, once in Discourse Seven on Greek philosophy and its Islamic revisers, and once in Discourse Eight in a section on 'sermons, morals, and wisdom'. In the second instance Bryson comes in a section of books on the education of children ending with the *Testament of Ardashir*, which was one of the most widely disseminated mirrors and translated from Pahlavi into Arabic. Bryson is the only Greek work in this category. In the first instance Bryson's book appears with just one other, a well-known occult treatise which went under the name of Apollonius.

The work of editing the *Fihrist* was undertaken in the period when Flügel was a librarian at Vienna. It is difficult now to imagine how exciting it must have been to track down the manuscripts and plan the edition of this famous book. Unfortunately Flügel did not know of the two best manuscripts, originally one but split in modern times, which seem to date from the final years of Ibn al-Nadīm's life and indeed to come from his own workshop. In the case of the text containing the first reference to Bryson Flügel depended on two recent copies and in these the name of Apollonius (garbled and not clear to Flügel himself) had been misplaced so as to suggest that Apollonius wrote a work called 'Bryson on Estate Management' or – as Plessner took it, straining the Arabic – that Bryson dedicated his *Management of the Estate* 'to Apollonius'. A dedication to Apollonius would be of exceptional interest for all sorts of reasons. In support of the Flügel text Plessner was able to cite the late medieval Latin epitome of the *Management of the Estate* called the *Yconomica Galieni* (see above). This is a very brief work, itself a translation of a lost Arabic text, and is of minor interest to the study of Bryson. It is distinctive because it is attributed to Galen. Although Arabic did use a transliterated form of the name Apollonius (*Bulūnyūs*, *vel sim.*), the usual form was *Balīnūs* or *Balīnās*, which appears to represent oral development of the name of a figure who was widely associated with magic in the later Roman period and the middle ages and indeed later (a large number of Latin and vernacular texts is ascribed to *Belenus*, etc.). Plessner suggested that the *Balīnūs* of the dedication had somehow become the author and had been read as *Jālīnūs* – which would be perfectly possible. But there is in fact no real evidence for the name of Apollonius in the title (either as author or as dedicatee). The solution to the puzzle of 'Galen's Oeconomics' is probably either the medical material in the introductory section of Bryson (but this does not survive in the Latin epitome) or the need of an author more distinguished than Bryson to head the text for whatever readership the epitomizer had in mind (see Chapter 2, pp. 134–6, 141).

In the first reference to Bryson in the *Fihrist* it is not only Apollonius' name which is garbled. Flügel printed an unjustified transliteration 'Rufus' in place of the ambiguous forms which his two manuscripts presented for Bryson. But in the second passage he followed one of his manuscripts in printing the correct name, *B-r-w-s-n*. It was from here that the Lebanese–Egyptian novelist, journalist, and historian Jurjī Zaydān (1861–1914; Dagher 1956–83: II 442–48, Philipp 1979, Dupont 2006) had the name of Bryson in its correct form when he mentioned the genre of the *oikonomikos logos* in his standard history of Arabic literature (1911–14: II 233), for Zaydān was not aware that any part of the work had been published (see above on Cheikho's amnesia about Yāzijī's text). In fact he noted that Bryson was 'lost'.

In the story of the uncovering of Bryson one must also pay full tribute to the French orientalist Maurice Bouyges, for without knowing Ritter's article Bouyges himself established the connection between the texts of estate management published by Cheikho and by the 'célèbre lettré syrien' Yāzijī and the Greek author Bryson in his 1924 article on Bryson and the *Letter* of Themistius. Bouyges aimed to make these lost Greek works known beyond an orientalist readership and to remedy what (he says) the archaeologist Salomon Reinach had called the 'crime' of '*infanticide scientifique*', which was committed by those who published new material in an obscure language without summarizing their results 'in Latin or French'. Bouyges' detective work is every bit as impressive as Ritter's. He too knew of the Hebrew translation and its author *Brāsōn*, of Avicenna's citation of the name in the form *Arūns* (in the printed text available then and still retained in the current edition by Ḥasan ʿĀṣī, but preserved as *Brūshun* in the unpublished manuscript consulted by Bouyges), and in addition had tracked down the references in the *Fihrist*, demolishing Flügel's imaginary 'Rufus', and making the connection with Wilhelm's Neopythagorean. With some justification he complained, in his 1931 review of Plessner, that Plessner had not taken proper notice of his article – 'ce dont témoignent quelques notes inutiles ou mal placées' – making bare mentions of it (1931: 257). It was his ill luck to make his discovery after the event.

5 POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

Why was it considered useful to translate a textbook of oeconomics? The ancient division of practical philosophy into the three areas of ethics (*ēthē*, *akhlāq*), estate and family management (*oikonomika*, *tadbīr al-manzil*), and politics or 'government' (*ta politika*, *siyāsa*) was taken over by Islamic

intellectuals not simply because it was an inherited set within the philosophical tradition, but also because it accorded with the world-view they shared with the Greco-Roman elites. Which is to say that they continued to believe they could and should moderate themselves, they continued to need to control their unruly families and extravagant expenditure, and they naturally desired to rule over each other. The theocratic monarchy of the caliphate changed nothing in these regards, and Bryson's practicality and comprehensiveness recommended itself as much as the fact that it was the only full example of a textbook of *oikonomia* available from ancient times. But this does not tell us about the specific intellectual context of the translation and the political–economic situation in which it was made, and it is appropriate to venture some remarks about these at this point. I have already hinted that social and economic conditions in the first century AD help to explain the original composition of the book (and I expand on this in Chapter 3). Some comparable, if brief, reflections on the background to the Arabic translation are in order at this point. I shall take this under two main headings, (*a*) the progress of the ʿAbbasid regime, (*b*) aspects of the Islamic attitude towards wealth and the idea of the 'economy'. In addition (*c*) I shall briefly mention again Bryson's place in the political–theoretical landscape of late ninth- and early tenth-century Islam, and finally, and equally briefly, (*d*) and (*e*) raise issues to do with Bryson's 'social context', marriage and slavery in Islam. I pursue some of these matters in greater detail in later chapters with regard to authors who inherit and develop Bryson's ideas.

(a) The ʿAbbasid empire: expansion, decline, economy

The establishment of the ʿAbbasid dynasty brought great changes and opportunities to the economy of the lands under its control. Under the Umayyad dynasty Islam was not a proselytizing religion. Rather, Umayyad policy aimed to keep Arabs as military rulers of their vast territory funded by the taxes of their subject races, *ahl al-dhimma* ('the people of the covenant'), who paid the land tax (the *kharāj*) and the capital tax, the *jizya*. The attractions of 'submission (to God)' (*islām*) among the subject populations, not least for reasons of lessening these burdens, undermined this vision and the converts, usually styled as 'clients', *mawālī*, of various sorts and backgrounds soon came to have genuine social, economic, and ethnic grievances against the ruling clique. This story is part of the long gestation of the ʿAbbasid revolution in the first half of the eighth century in al-ʿIrāq and al-Īrān (Wellhausen 1927, Shaban 1970). The onset of the ʿAbbasid regime, with its army recruited from the East and its bureaucracy drawn

from Iraq/Iran, marked the end of privileges still held by Arabs. Now all Muslims could, in theory, rise to the top in all areas of state including the court. As I have remarked, this cultural and political cosmopolitanism was a major factor in the rise of the Translation Movement and the ruling elite's support of it. The ideology of political unity led to the physical inauguration of a gigantic economic space which generated extensive trade and exchange inside and outside the empire. The idea of a single Islamic people or 'nation' (the *umma*) begins with the Koran and remains a very powerful force today, not least because of its revitalization by the various reformist and modernizing movements which arose during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in response to European invasion, colonization, and technological/economic power. But it was the ʿAbbasid caliphate which first put the idea into action.

The political–military unity of the ʿAbbasids was increasingly in decline from the middle of the ninth century and the empire which had stretched from the Atlantic to the marches of China broke up relatively quickly into a series of often short-lived regimes, some important, of differing theological and political complexions. There are interesting differences and comparanda between the unity of the *umma* and the political unity of the Mediterranean basin during the Roman period. The modern consensus (beyond Finley) of a moderate growth in the Roman economy of the late Republic and early Empire views growth as a product of strong political cohesion, notwithstanding the several civil wars of the period, and a strong fiscal unity (the Hopkins 'taxes and trade' model, modified as necessary; Chapter 3, pp. 176–9), joined by a healthy commercial sector which was reasonably independent. The serious plague of the later second century AD was a major jolt to this happy story, but not the end of it. The comparative political–fiscal stability of the later Roman world in the East is again important in the current view of the success of the late antique economy (e.g. Ward-Perkins 2000, esp. Wickham 2005), at least until the natural crises and warfare with Persia after the mid sixth century. With regard to the ʿAbbasid economy, for well over a century the regime did maintain its power in most of the empire, with the notable exception of Spain, where the Umayyads hung on and created one of the most flourishing of the Islamic states. This is the economic heyday of the regime (Ashtor 1976b). But in the later ninth century things started to go wrong. In the years 869–83 southern Iraq and Khūzistān went up in flames in the revolt of the Zanj (or Zinj). These were African slaves employed in vast numbers by the landowners of Baṣra as 'sweepers' (*kassāḥūn*) to remove the nitric deposits which obscured the otherwise fertile soil of the extensive marshy area stretching up from

the Shaṭṭ al-ʿArab. None of the several Roman slave revolts of the late Republican era offered comparable challenges to the central power. Under the charismatic leadership of the 'Master of the Zanj', ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Mahdī ('the Guided One'), who was in fact a free man himself, the slaves overran large tracts of land and several cities, and established their own polity, all just a few hundred kilometres south of Baghdad (Clarence-Smith 2006: 63–4). Many of the Iranian provinces seized the opportunity to break away, and Egypt too asserted *de facto* independence in 877 under the leadership of the capable Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn, who had been allowed to amass his own army of Turkish and Sudanese slaves. Ibn Ṭūlūn mastered Syria the following year (Bianquis 1998). A couple of decades later the Caliphate's decline was further hastened by serious unrest caused by the revolutionary Ismāʿīlī sect known as the Qarmaṭians, which again brought trouble to the central provinces of the empire and indirectly paved the way for the full independence of Egypt under the mainstream Ismāʿīlī dynasty of the Fatimids in a series of attempts from the 910s onwards (Walker 1998).

The political and military woes of the caliphate interfered with prosperity in certain regions, but the contraction of the empire did not have a result comparable to the fall of the Roman empire. With Rome, in late antiquity, fiscal demands, as I have mentioned, are viewed as important drivers of long-distance trade and this trade is seen at least in part as the product of the unity offered by the state system. The experience of the late Hellenistic and early Roman eras, however, shows political, legal, and fiscal interconnectedness was far less relevant to economic success then; and for late antiquity Banaji (2007a, 2007b) and others are certainly right to observe in the evidence a genuine 'commercialization'. No one is in doubt that neither imperial requirements nor any other sort of model will explain actual distribution patterns of potteries and amphorae (e.g. Panella 1993, Reynolds 1995), which point to a rather vibrant commerce independent of state apparatuses. That said, it is a fact that the end of the Roman system in the West meant the end of so many regional linkages that had been maintained through the period of political, cultural, and linguistic integration. By contrast, in the Islamic world there developed from the eighth century onwards a codified notion of a common Islamic law (the *fiqh*) for the whole Islamic *umma* under whatever political dynasty it dwelled. Although there arose various 'schools' of law, the similarities between them are very great, and that includes their attitude towards commercial activity. Thus the gradual break-up of the empire did not have the same effect as the fall of Rome, and the caliph continued to act as a unifier, at least for Sunni Muslims. Although the central provinces of the empire never regained the fortune they had enjoyed in the

period of Baghdad's own prosperity, other regions, like Egypt, were very much better off when they no longer had to remit taxes to the caliph. In the case of Egypt, indeed, the era of the Fatimids not only marked its greatest prosperity in the medieval period but also, from the eleventh century, inaugurated a new age of commercial contacts between the northern and southern Mediterranean galvanized by demand for Egyptian textiles and trade from India passing through Alexandria (Goitein 1967, Udovitch 1999, Jacoby 2000, Rapoport 2011).

The first one and a half centuries of the ʿAbbasid regime saw a continuation of warfare against the Romans (Byzantines) and in this respect represent a continuation of the policies of the Umayyads. It was in this context that Henri Pirenne advanced the thesis named after him in his posthumous monograph *Mohammed and Charlemagne* (1937), that trade between the north and south of the Mediterranean more or less ceased with the advent of Islam (though he allowed for some continuing activity in the eastern Mediterranean). This situation, he noted, 'was to continue even to our day'. Pirenne, writing in the Mandate era, makes somewhat strange reading now ('Although in our days the European has subjected the Asiatic, he has not assimilated him', and so on). His thesis, which was based largely on what he believed was the disappearance of trade in luxuries and papyrus, has been disputed and badly holed. Riising's well-thumbed 1952 survey of the immediate responses, methodological and other, is still required reading because it identifies the essence of the problem as one of compounding too many grand claims, for the cessation of Mediterranean trade in the West led in Pirenne's eyes to the decline of the Merovingian dynasty, the rise of the Carolingians, and the entrenched power of the medieval papacy itself. Archaeological finds will continue to challenge the validity of Pirenne's ideas (e.g. Oked 1996 on the late seventh-century church turned ?storehouse at Ostrakine on the coast of Sinai, where pottery remains reveal a continuing east Mediterranean trade). Nevertheless, it is clear that large-scale commerce did disappear and was not to pick up till the decline of the ʿAbbasid empire after the mid tenth century.

As I have mentioned, there is a consensus among historians of late antiquity of a sharp decline in supra-regional trade even in the East after the mid sixth century. But there is also agreement that the East remained a far more commercialized and urbanized area in comparison with the West. Ward-Perkins (1996) and others are surely right to suggest that the rapid growth of the early Islamic economy was facilitated by the prior existence of robust economic structures in Syria, initially guaranteeing 'considerable cultural and economic continuity' (Haldon 2010, cf. Foss 1997), in Egypt, and in the

Sassanian realm (Morony 2001–2). Greco-Roman and Sassanian economic historians focus on the monetization of these economies in the late antique era. Sassanian Iran had a particularly strong agricultural base with an extensive irrigated agriculture based on large estates run by bailiffs (Morony 1981), as well as large-scale mining activity, and a well-established long-distance trade with India and China, with the creation of 'merchant diasporas' to service it (Morony 2004). In these respects it is a precursor of the ʿAbbasid economy, which, like ʿAbbasid political ideology, must owe a good deal to Sassanian models. The Brysonian landed estate – the *ḍayʿa* – managed by a steward for a rentier landlord continued to be important in the Islamic lands, as it had been in late antiquity (Banaji 2007a, Decker 2009b) through into Byzantium (Teall 1971), and was perhaps the norm (Watson 1983, but cf. Cahen 1986). This remained true at least until the eleventh-century decline of agricultural production and the problems arising from what is called 'Bedouinization' and the development of the fief system of land assignments (the *iqṭāʿ*) following the establishment of Buwayhid power in the central provinces (Donohue 2003: ch. 5). For as the ninth-century intellectual Qusṭā ibn Lūqā remarks, sensible people knew that the best place to put their wealth was in 'landed estates and high value properties, which produce money day after day', if they took care to 'develop and improve' them (Sbath 1941: 137/165).

From the reign of the fifth Umayyad caliph, ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 685–705), the Arab empire secured plentiful and reliable sources of gold from western Sudan and West Africa. There were equally plentiful sources of silver from the eastern provinces of the empire. This paved the way for a widespread bimetallic monetization (copper standardization having been tried briefly), and at the end of his reign ʿAbd al-Malik took the decisive step of abolishing Byzantine- and Sassanian-influenced figural schemes and imposed a uniform gold and silver coinage identifiable by its use of Koranic verses, which was to remain the standard for centuries after (Treadwell 2009). From the late eighth century until the period of decline the gold and silver coinage of the ʿAbbasid state shows an impressive stability: 'l'âge du dînar et de la suprématie économique du monde musulman' (Lombard 1947, cf. 1971: chs. 5–6). The gold dinars are known for their high gold content, which was due both to technological refinements and to the unprecedented ease of supply. The quantity of gold in circulation has been linked with a progressive increase in prices, with wages also rising, as its value became diminished (Ashtor 1964, 1969). But prices also rose as a result of a steady increase in demand on the back of an increasing population and other occasional or local factors (insurrections, epidemics). Estimating human population and its increase in this

economic system is far more difficult than assembling the evidence for basic prices and wages, as Ashtor has done. Baghdad in its early ninth-century prime had well over half a million inhabitants, if we may rely on its topography (Lassner 1970). It is a fact that many cities were founded, but accurate figures of inhabitants are virtually non-existent (for informed speculation, see Issawi 1981). There are similar problems in estimating population in the ancient world, even for Rome (Morley 1996). As with the city of Rome itself, population increase had much to do with extensive immigration, which was a factor in the central provinces of the empire (Arabs, Turks) and certainly also in Egypt (Arabs).

For the Roman economy the evidence of shipwrecks allows us to point to large-scale transit of certain foodstuffs like wine and fish sauce (*garum*) – but not in the main subsistence products – and of ceramic tablewares and lamps. Making patterns out of such movements of goods is another matter. Another very important area of the economy for which we do not have much archaeological evidence is textile production; that the product is not durable means a reliance on literary or epigraphical/papyrological sources or monuments, and from these it is clear that medium- to high-quality materials and clothes were traded over large distances (Jones 1960, Drinkwater 1982, 2001). In contrast, much more is known about textile production and distribution in the Islamic middle ages, for it is one of the most dynamic and visible of the 'global' industries of the caliphate (Lombard 1978 on Islam as 'une civilisation du textile', Ashtor 1976a; Serjeant 1942–51 for a comprehensive regional survey). Wools, linens, cottons, and above all silks travelled across the lands of the *umma* from renowned centres of production making garments, curtains, and the ever-useful carpet. State production was important, involving extensive ownership by members of the caliphal dynasty and the various petty princedoms, with production housed in the large factory unit known as the *ṭirāz* or *dār al-ṭirāz*.

So crucial was textile manufacture that it came to occupy a central place in legal discussion of the *salam*, the 'contrat d'investissement' (El-Gamal 2006: ch. 5, Johansen 2006). In the *salam* contract the investor made a purchase on the basis of a description of goods to be supplied, with the goods to be produced at an agreed date. The investment is specifically called 'capital' (*ra's al-māl*) and the investor naturally wanted to see a healthy 'profit' (*ribḥ*) from it. Among other important things, something familiar to us today is revealed by these discussions, which start in the ninth century and are at their most sophisticated in the golden period of Islamic law in the tenth to twelfth centuries: the phenomenon of the French stick made in London or the cheddar cheese made anywhere but Cheddar. In such products the

adjectives 'French' or 'cheddar' refer to a technique of production rather than to ethnic localities. In the modern world such 'ktetic' descriptors are often copyrighted, but medieval Islamic commercial law was happy with the idea that a Herāt carpet could be made elsewhere. (There is some evidence for this in Greco-Roman textile production: Drexhage 2004.) The jurists, in Johansen's observations, therefore both reflected and facilitated the spread of local techniques of production across the lands of the *umma*. Both the entrepreneurs behind the investment and the producers were free men (as indeed were workers, even in the royal factories). The *salam* contract made sale a matter of personal obligation or *dayn* ('debt', always implying something due for settlement at an appointed time). In this sense, it was a barrier to the formation of a truly capitalist organization of labour and production. Yet in medieval and modern times the *salam* contract has been a major stimulus to economic development and a cause of enrichment for the investor class (Doumani 1995 on Ottoman Palestine). Along with other financial instruments like the credit note (*suftaja*), it exemplifies the commercial mentality of medieval Islam. This was a world which understood Bryson's call to increase capital and profit from trade every bit as well as his own but 'was sufficiently different from the [Greco-Roman] past to represent a significant advance' (Banaji 2010).

What has been said about textiles can be applied to other areas of the Islamic manufacturing sector (soap; glass; paper; sugar, Ashtor 1981). Naturally, agriculture remained the most important area of the economy overall and, as in all pre-industrial societies, most agricultural production was for a local market. But it is important to note the arguments advanced by Andrew Watson (1983) for progress and innovation in the agricultural scene in relation to Greco-Roman late antiquity and Sassanian Iran. The coming of Islam meant that many new crops were grown and diffused and that new techniques were harnessed, at least more widely, to supply increasing demand on the back of demographic expansion in what Watson dubbed the 'Arab agricultural revolution' (1974). Although Watson was unaware of the extent to which the vectors of his revolution were already cultivated before the days of the Islamic empire (Decker 2009a), 'there is no doubt that the movement [of species] was amplified and accelerated during the early centuries of Islam' (Cahen 1986).

(b) Islam, wealth, and the idea of the 'economy'

The necessarily impressionistic sketch given above allows a glimpse into the general economic context which made a translation of ancient oeconomic

thought desirable. We may take this further by considering some attitudes towards commerce at the time when Bryson was turned into Arabic.

In his *Treatise on the Divisions of the Intellectual Sciences* Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā; 980–1037), the 'Chief Shaykh', specifies the 'divisions of practical wisdom' as the three areas relevant to the '*tadbīr* (= regulation/management) of humans' as individuals, households, or cities in accordance with the familiar schema inherited from antiquity. The first of the three sciences regulates a person's private morals and actions with the aim of producing the 'happy life', and Avicenna gives as his chosen example of a book on the topic 'Aristotle's *Ethics*'. The third science deals with 'types of politics and government, and good and bad civic communities'. The Shaykh refers the reader to 'Plato's and Aristotle's *Politics* and *Laws*' (though no translation of Aristotle's *Politics* had been made, and perhaps no more than epitomes of Plato were available; see below). The second science concerns knowledge of how a man is to 'manage his house which is shared by him, his spouse, his child, and his servant in order that its state should be properly ordered and productive of the capacity to achieve prosperity. The topic,' he continues, 'is treated in Bryson's *Management of the Estate* (*tadbīr al-manzil*), and in books on this subject by other people' (p. 85 ed. 'Āṣī; on the form of Bryson's name here, see above). When Avicenna sums up the aim of reading Bryson as that of making one's house–estate 'productive of the capacity to achieve prosperity (*saʿāda*)', he pairs economic life with the spiritual life based on revealed teaching and practice, since *saʿāda* means prosperity, good fortune, happiness, and felicity both 'with respect to religion and with respect to worldly things' (as Lane's lexicon defines it, *s.v.* p. 1362). In other words, for Avicenna and his audience the educational–moral side of Bryson and the practical, economic advice he gives about money and slaves – 'worldly things' – fitted together as easily as they did for Bryson's Greek readers. The additional factor is religion. For Islam regulated pursuit of wealth is enshrined in the Koran and the sayings of and about the Prophet. In the Koran the believer hears that, 'God has made selling lawful and usury unlawful . . . O ye who believe! Fear God, and remit the balance of usury . . . if ye repent, your capital is yours. Ye shall not wrong, nor shall ye be wronged' (2: 275–9 trans. Palmer). The first chapter of the anthropologist and Islamicist Maxime Rodinson's study of *Islam and Capitalism* (1974) remains the single best account of an attitude which combines wealth creation with the responsible use of one's wealth. If we bear in mind Bryson's positive view of making and spending money, and his wish to see money spent socially and responsibly, the Islamic accommodation of this secular text from antiquity will occasion no astonishment.

This combination of aims cuts again to the heart of the 'Finley problem' in the economic history of antiquity. For one of Finley's central contentions in *The Ancient Economy* was that the moral attitudes of the Greco-Roman elite set them against productive capital. Since they were unable to conceptualize the economy, risk was alien to them and they looked to security not profit to further their way of life. I have suggested above that this is a non-problem, or a misconceived one, for the historian of the ancient world. And in terms of the economically vibrant world of the Islamic high middle ages it is also a non-problem. Islam requires the people of the *umma* to earn a decent living if they can. As Michael Bonner (2001) has it, 'people then had and made representations of what we call economic matters, [even if] they did not carry in their heads a separate and distinct economic sphere'. The *Book of Acquisition* by the Iraqi jurist al-Shaybānī (d. 805), which is the subject of the study in which Bonner makes this observation, begins precisely with the religious duty of generating wealth (*iktisāb*, a term important in Bryson Arabus too); but it also contains much discussion of poverty and charity. This key text was reworked later in the ninth century and then again by the Ḥanafī commentator al-Sarakhsī (d. probably 1090). In each version 'we have a kind of representation of what we now call the economic sphere, dramatically unlike ours . . . a discourse on economy inextricably bound up with and part of discourse on the norms of religious law, on the founding and sustaining narratives of the Muslim community' (Bonner 2001: 412). Thus Shaybānī prefers to argue on the basis of the sayings of the Prophet and Koranic prooftexts such as Koran 2: 267 on charity, 'spend of the good things you have earned, etc.'. It is this same set of values that makes the contractual obligation to provide goods one has been paid for into the personal obligation of *dayn*.

Shaybānī died not long before the ʿAbbasid empire reached its economic height. His book is one of several works which chart the rise of what Shelomo Goitein called the 'middle-eastern bourgeoisie' (1966). Few today would be happy to use the term 'bourgeoisie' in studying the medieval period (because of its too close association with European capitalism and the bourgeoisie as an economic 'class', the owners of the means of production in Marxist discourse). Some Islamic economic historians, like their classicist counterparts, prefer to speak of 'entrepreneurs', though this is a necessarily limited term. Terminology aside, we need to realize the diffusion of this economically active group in the upper echelons of the *umma*. Naturally there was prejudice against those involved in 'trade'. But the attention paid to the concerns of merchants in religious writing may be seen as part of the justification of this group found memorably in the colourful essay of Jāḥiẓ, *Praise of the*

Merchants and Condemnation of the Secretaries (pp. 11, 187–209 ed. Hārūn, *Rasāʾil al-Jāḥiẓ;* cf. O. Rescher 1931: 186–8), where the merchant's piety and integrity is contrasted with the servility of the courtier, or in (Ps.-)Jāḥiẓ's *Kitāb al-tabaṣṣur bi l-tijāra*, 'A Clear Look at Trade' (Pellat 1954), where the values of numerous ordinary and luxury goods from all over the Islamic empire are presented in a wholly positive manner. This merchant class is not easy to quantify; but it looks as if it was far bigger in number, consciousness, and influence than comparable groups in the Roman period. This was truly the era of business 'partnership and profit' complete with the requisite legal and contractual underpinnings (Udovitch 1970).

(c) Political theory

Turning away from economics, another important context for the translation of Bryson's book that may be mentioned here is political theory. Qudāma b. Jaʿfar's *Book of Government* has been referred to already for the new evidence it provides for the date of Bryson's translation and for its author's double use of Bryson and the *Letter* of Themistius. Qudāma's desire to incorporate Greek political thought (by which I mean in Bryson's case the 'commercial anthropology' of the introductory section) should be stressed again. Since this earliest attested reader of Bryson used him for this political–theoretical purpose, it might just be that the unknown translator or his patron was also attracted by this side of Bryson's book in a period when the regime's serious political problems were in need of new solutions.

(d) Marriage

As we have seen, Bryson prescribes a conjugal, affectionate, and property-sharing relationship between man and wife. Yet the social reality of medieval Islamic society was not like this: divorce was common, polygamy and concubinage were allowed, and the separation of property between husband and wife was strictly observed (Rapoport 2005). Reality and theory do not have to go together, of course, and Bryson's original readers may themselves have been made to ponder by some of his ideas about marriage. But the variance between what Bryson says and what was done seems even greater in Islam than at Rome. And this is not just a matter of social history: Ṭūsī begins the third part of the oeconomic section of the *Nasirean Ethics* by saying with Bryson that 'a good wife is the man's partner in property' (p. 161 trans. Wickens), but his specific advice about 'ruling a wife' departs from him and includes for example the recommendation that the husband 'should

keep hidden from her the amount of his property and his capital (*māya*)' (p. 164). This departure suits the late medieval Islamic world view perfectly. (See Chapter 2, p. 142 for a very un-Brysonian view of the wife ascribed to Bryson by Barhebraeus in a passage actually drawn from Ṭūsī.) Typically it is Miskawayh who clearly alludes to Bryson's manager–spouse when he discusses the friendship of marriage. Such Greek ideas must have appealed to some, for Koran and Hadith know nothing of this wife. Yet the possibility of Brysonian influence and of its acceptability is ignored in the burgeoning literature on gender in Islam, which tends to focus almost exclusively on the Islamic law of the family in accordance with received opinion that the Islamic family is an institution owing nothing to external influences. In her influential *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate* (1992), Leila Ahmed speculates about Hellenistic–Christian 'misogynist' influence on the pre-Islamic Middle East (which was entrenched by a patriarchal ʿAbbasid society against the true intentions of Islam); but she is unaware of Bryson or his readers. Nor is Bryson mentioned in surveys of women in philosophical and popular literature (e.g. Malti-Douglas 1991). Above all the relationship of Bryson's ideal with al-Ghazālī's ethics of marriage and comments on the role of the wife in Book 12 of the *Revival of the Religious Sciences* (Farah 1984, Holland 1998) demands examination in this regard.

(e) Slavery

Since medieval Islam was a slave-owning society, Bryson's handy advice on the treatment of servants was likely to down well. Indeed it is clear that he had some influence on the development of the Islamic conception of slavery. Franz Rosenthal (1960: 91) noted that his threefold distinction between legal, natural, and moral slaves becomes commonplace in Islamic ethical literature. Patricia Crone (2004) suggests that Bryson helped to pave the way for the association of 'natural slaves' with certain ethnic groups in slavers' manuals – though this has more to do with the physiognomical tradition, which was perhaps embedded in Rufus of Ephesus' *On the Purchase of Slaves* (and is explicit for the first time in Ibn Buṭlān; see above). Nevertheless, given the centrality of slave-based households in the civic–political organization of high medieval Islamic society, Bryson's formulation of the relationship between the head of household and his servants is important, even if Greek ideas have little input into Islamic discussions of the justification of slave ownership.

6 'ISLAMIC ECONOMICS'

When Avicenna says that for *tadbīr al-manzil* one reads Bryson and 'books on this subject by other people', to whom is he referring? For the fact is that, when the topic is addressed by later encyclopedists such as Barhebraeus, Ibn al-Akfānī (d. 1348), or Ṭashköprüzāde in his sixteenth-century summation of knowledge, *The Key to Happiness and the Lamp of Leadership*, all of these authors cite Bryson. It would be right to assume that in late antiquity itself Bryson was a known work, and probably the set text in this branch of philosophy. For the ancients, however, other works were available: Ps.-Aristotle *Oikonomika I–II*, the *Oikonomika III*, Philodemus, and other now lost material including a much fuller Neopythagorean literature. Avicenna may have been referring to the Arabic base text behind parts of Pedro's *Regitiua Domus* (see p. 30), or he may have had in mind various discussions included in works such as his own short treatise known as the *Kitāb al-siyāsa*. But for self-standing material it seems there was Bryson alone. It is Bryson who is at least partly the basis of the oeconomic section of the great ethical treatise by Ṭūsī, and Bryson who is summarized closely (again in Persian) by the exegete and theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (1149–1209; see below, p. 101). When the eleventh-century jurist al-Sarakhsī updated Shaybānī's *Book of Acquisition*, what other economic source was there to inspire him (Bonner 2001: 421–2)? Avicenna's remark may have more to do with his desire to bolster the category of *oikonomia* within the classification of the philosophical sciences. Ṭashköprüzāde, following him closely and emphasizing with him Bryson's role in the moral scheme of individual, household, and city, again says there are 'lots of other books' on this topic, but he adds that Bryson is 'the most famous', either stating the obvious or following the words of the widely used reference work of Ibn al-Akfānī (p. 64 ed. Witkam: 'Brūshun').

Ṭashköprüzāde's *Key to Happiness* remained a used work into recent times. The definition of household management it took over from Avicenna was singled out by Jurjī Zaydān (1911–14) in his literary history of Arabic but shifted in a revealing direction. For Zaydān *tadbīr al-manzil* was 'around a thousand years' older than anything like it to be found among 'the people of today's civilization (*tamaddun*)'. Since he could find no book to cite other than Bryson (which was 'lost'), he instead proceeded to treat the modern category of 'political economy' (*al-iqtiṣād al-siyāsī*) under which he specified yet another medieval work, the 'precious book' of al-Dimashqī (whose partial dependence on Bryson was unknown to him). *Iqtiṣād* is the modern Arabic for 'economy', but its meaning till the ninteenth century

was 'moderation', 'being economical', 'tending to the mid course' in one's aim. The classical dictionaries include in their examples the sense of finding the mean between the opposites of *isrāf* ('profligacy', 'extravagance') and *taqtīr* ('meanness', 'miserliness'). The adjective *muqtaṣid* continues to bear the meaning 'economical' (= 'frugal'), while the sense of 'economic' is expressed through the new formation *iqtiṣādī* (cf. *al-iqtiṣādī*, 'economist'). These concepts of parsimony and extravagance are found in the Koran, but obviously go back much further. One of the most concise expressions of this 'Aristotelian' mean comes in Bryson, for whom the man of wealth 'is economical (*iqtaṣada*) in spending on his pleasures' (51) and must avoid both meanness and profligacy (40). I have noted already that Ibrāhīm al-Yāzijī published the economic part of Bryson in order to prove that the topic of 'political economy' had existed in the Arabic literature of the middle ages. Zaydān in turn waxes lyrical about Dimashqī's book on trade and pronounces that 'the art of political economy' was already well known long before Dimashqī, in fact in the second ʿAbbasid century. The agenda behind this is worth remarking. For like many Christian Arab intellectuals in this period of the Nahḍa, Zaydān espoused the idea of Pan-Arabism (not yet expressed in strongly nationalistic terms), which would include the Arab Christian community, encourage it to abandon its minority mentality, and end the periodic pogroms by Muslims against their Christians neighbours. This necessitated the adoption of a measured secularism, which drew strong criticism from Christians themselves (including Louis Cheikho; see Dupont 2006: 642–50). But the real venom came from Muslim intellectuals who upbraided Zaydān for downplaying the role of the Rightly Guided caliphs (the immediate successors of the Prophet) and the Umayyads in his historical work and therefore diminishing the Islamic polity which had been spread by their conquests. Zaydān's presentation of the usurper ʿAbbasids as the real representatives of the golden age of Islam is easy to understand, for the culturally eclectic ʿAbbasids provided a model for an identity based on culture rather than religion. Not that he or other intellectuals actually looked to the medieval past: it is important to remember that this was an Arising (Nahḍa), not a Renaissance (and while Arabic does use the word *nahḍa* to describe the European Renaissance, the underlying idea is the same, i.e. that borrowing from Islamic civilization, more than the rediscovery of the classics, started the European ascent). For Zaydān the ʿAbbasids' acquaintance with the crucial modern discipline of economics contributed to the Pan-Arabist dream by serving to root economics securely in ancient culture. Unfortunately his Muslim critics were not tolerant of a 'Syrian' and a Christian and were powerful enough to prevent him taking up his

appointment to a chair at the new University of Cairo in 1910. In any case, his views were largely without influence because he lived and died before the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate and did not witness the rise of the Arabist and Islamic nationalist independence movements which were the inevitable response to the British and French 'mandates' after the Great War (Philipp 1979, esp. Dupont 2006).

The idea that Islam had invented 'political economy' was both rash and unnecessary. For the Arabic *iqtiṣād* is, as we have seen, an Islamic idea of economic relationships that embraced Islamic and Greek ideas and ideals. A brief sketch is needed at this point of what is known as 'Islamic economics', for the related modern historiography of Islamic economic thought sometimes acknowledges Bryson's impact on medieval writers and sometimes deliberately excludes him. Guidance on economic matters begins, of course, as we have seen with the Koran and the Hadith, the extensive body of material concerning the doings and sayings of the Prophet, which together constitute the *sunna*. The obligation to avoid usury, the regulation of fair practice in the market place (through the supervisory institution known as the *ḥisba*), the debate about whether 'prices are in God's hands' (Sabra 2003), bequests, alms-giving (*ṣadaqa*) and the obligation of charity (*zakāt*, the third of the five Pillars of Islam, and effectively used nowadays to mean income tax in some Islamic polities): all of these are central topics and concerns of Islamic society from the beginning. In the twentieth century the challenge of Western capitalism has called forth a number of specific studies on such areas as Islam and insurance, banking, or enterprise within the parameters of Islamic Law (see e.g. Siddiqi 1981, 1983, 1985a, 1985b, Nyazee 1995, Iqbal 2001, which could easily be amplified; and with a progressivist agenda, El-Gamal 2006); and in addition a literature of 'Islamic sociology' among the many ideologues and intellectuals who have contributed to the reform and modernizing movements, such as the influential Iranian intellectual ʿAlī Sharīʿatī (1933–77) (e.g. Shariʿati 1980 debunking the radical credentials of Marxism). Islamic law means essentially the jurisprudential activity of the middle ages and the activities of the theologians and commentators on these texts, which remain canonical. The Islamic conception of the economy, in the middle ages and the present day, is of a domain embedded in the social, moral, and religious framework of society. It is far closer to Bryson's idea of the economy than to the modern Western view of an independent sphere where 'the triumph of market-oriented economics' demonstrates, in the sublimely confident words of a current very well-known textbook, that 'income- and wealth-creating activities are usually best accomplished through the efforts of private citizens operating in largely unregulated markets' (Lipsey and Chrystal 2007: xiv).

Islam strongly upholds individual property rights and the integrity of capital, but these rights are always tempered by a sense of community. This is why it was so easy to absorb Bryson. In certain circumstances, indeed, the community's needs override the individual's rights. A merchant may be obliged to sell food at a justly determined price (the procedure called *tasʿīr*), if the community is in danger, rather than the price he hopes for from hoarding. Imposing a price, when necessary, is what Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) calls finding the 'equivalent price/value' (*al-qīma al-mithl*) in his *Public Duties in Islam* (*al-Ḥisba fī l-Islām*), which is the best-known and most sophisticated of the medieval treatises dealing with the *muḥtasib* (the inspector of goods, weights and measures, and so on) and the institution of the *ḥisba*. Bryson's economic message was: make money, spend it, do something responsible with it for the good of your family and your community. If God is added to this, we have something familiar to a Muslim audience. There is no proof that Ibn Taymiyya himself read Bryson; but given the status of Bryson's book, it is likely that he had at least heard of it. *Public Duties in Islam*, and especially the first part (as arranged in the 1982 English translation; see Cook 2000: 151 n. 48 for the independence of the two parts), is an intelligent and sensitive discussion of business ethics and the enforcement of the Islamic moral code in civic life by the *muḥtasib*, whose 'market' (*sūq*) is not simply the physical space of trade, the souk with its gates closed at night, but the abstract realm of exchange throughout the Islamic city. The *ḥisba* as an institution has often been seen by Western scholars as a descendant of the office of the ancient Greco-Roman *agoranomos* (Foster 1970), and there may be some truth in this in some localities. But in addition to regulating exchange relations, the *muḥtasib* was responsible for ensuring the community's religious devotion and for the upkeep of the congregational mosque in the heart of the city, since, as Ibn Taymiyya constantly reminds us, his role was determined by the Islamic injunction 'to command what is right and forbid what is wrong' (Cook 2000). Bryson broadly follows the Aristotelian conception of the *oikos* as the fundamental building-block of the city (but without then taking notice of the city's institutions), and superimposes on this, indeed makes a priority of, the idea of exchange and production (the interlinking of the crafts) as the mechanisms which effect community. His household–estate is fundamental to the cohesiveness of the community as people, but remains an essentially private matter within the social world of the local elite. In Islam the house is again a private space where the authorities in the form of the *muḥtasib* had no remit; indeed, the house could be read as operating along the lines of the *ḥārāt*, *maḥallāt*, and *akhṭāṭ*, the 'quarters', 'neighbourhoods', and 'streets' of Ira Lapidus' *Muslim*

Cities as the elements which constitute a tendency towards fragmentation. On another level, and this applies to Bryson too, moral and religious laws obviously governed the interactions of the individuals in the household with the civic and religious authorities. Bryson Graecus and Bryson Arabus were speaking the same language.

Ibn Taymiyya (along with al-Ghazālī, see below, and the mystic Ibn al-ʿArabī) is acknowledged to have been one of the main influences on modern Islam including Islamic fundamentalist movements. Other *ḥisba* treatises are fairly practical in nature and serve to highlight his own reflectiveness. But Ibn Taymiyya was not writing economic analysis. If we want penetrating sociological insight into the role of the economy in the development of Islamic society and the movement from the desert to the city, only one medieval author comes into consideration: Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406). Ibn Khaldūn's invention (in his own words) of the 'new science' of human civilization has been justly praised (e.g. E. Rosenthal 1958: ch. 4, Lambton 1981: 152–77, Cheddadi 2006: 191–200, cf. Toynbee 1934: 321–7, Fromherz 2010 on his pyschology). And, unsurprisingly, one of the best studies of medieval Islamic economic thought is an examination of the economic ideas in the famous *Introduction* (*Muqaddima*) to his universal history (*The Book of Lessons*). This is the article by the American economist Joseph J. Spengler (1964), which has much of interest to say about the (indirect) influence of Bryson on Ibn Khaldūn's central views. Ibn Khaldūn does not himself mention Bryson, but he must have known what he said.

Other medieval thinkers certainly 'made representations of what we call economic matters' (to recall Michael Bonner's phrase); but trying to make academic economists out of them, as some moderns do, detracts from what is most valuable about Islamic economics. The Islamicist apologetic school which takes this line does, however, have one justified target in its sights, and that is Joseph Schumpeter's notorious 'Great Gap'. Schumpeter's *History of Economic Analysis* (1954a) was published after his death, but it seems unlikely that he would have changed his mind about what he saw as a complete absence of economic thinking from Aristotle to Aquinas. This is what he called the Great Gap. The Roman period itself hardly fares better than the Islamic middle ages when it comes to Schumpeter's fondness for sweeping dismissals. The material comforts of Rome's elite and their cultivation of leisure meant '[t]here was little steam left for serious work in any scientific field', an *aperçu* which reveals the memory of a Latin teacher droning on about the cultivation of *otium* in the Late Republic. The Byzantines, Schumpeter remarks more sensibly, must have dealt with a 'host of legal, monetary, commercial, agrarian, and fiscal problems', but no economic analysis had been

preserved from them (1954a: 67, 73–74). On Islamic writers he includes a passing reference to 'Semite mediation' (p. 87), and no more.

Since ancient and medieval authors show nothing approaching modern economic theory, it is obvious that one must be very careful before imputing modern terminology to them. Yet some of those who have tried to 'fill' Schumpeter's Great Gap – a reasonable aim in itself – have been tempted to do just that. The essays reprinted in Ghazanfar (2003) offer a convenient conspectus of the problem. Ghazanfar himself is aware of the objections to the contention that medieval Islamic writers practically invented modern economics, since he includes in his volume a response by Paul Oslington (a scholar who works at the interface between religion and economics) to an article written by himself and A. Azim Islahi in 1990 (and also includes his and Islahi's 'rejoinder' to Oslington). Ghazanfar and Islahi's piece is a study of the 'economic thought' of al-Ghazālī, the chief theologian of Islam (1058–1111). In it Ghazālī's ideas are treated under the four headings of 'voluntary exchange and the evolution of markets', 'production', 'barter and the evolution of money', and 'the role of the state and public finances'. There is no reason to take an unduly Finley-ist line with Ghazālī. He was fully aware of economic life and perfectly sure the economy was and should be integrated into and governed by the religious fabric of Islam. He duly displays Bonner's 'kind of representation'. But the desire to present Ghazālī 'almost as if he were a late twentieth-century professor of economics at an American university' (Oslington) does no one any favours. As Oslington notes, assertions about Ghazālī's 'modern economic thought' are supported in the article by quotations from his works which offer no support. Thus, although Ghazālī was aware of economic concepts, he did not think in the analytical phraseology of the 'upward-sloping supply curve' or of 'price elasticity of demand'. He was more than aware that people are 'acquisitive', but to say he views them 'as "maximizers"' probably takes things too far. An article by Hamid Hosseini (1995) included in the Ghazanfar collection presents Ghazālī 'grasp[ing] the market failures leading to the Coasian discussions of the role of the firm' (referring to the Nobel Prize-winning British–American economist, Ronald Coase). One could multiply these examples. Hosseini's 1996's attack on the Great Gap might also be mentioned, since he is here conscious of improving on Ghazanfar and Islahi by pointing to the Persian origin of Ghazālī and other intellectuals who can be rounded up to prove the medieval invention of economics. *This* Islam is very consciously not Arab.

Islamic historical economics is right to criticize Schumpeter and other economic historians (see the infamous roll call in Ghazanfar 1995) who have failed to mention not just major works relating to economic matters but

also the practical literature of the *ḥisba* and of the taxation and administrative treatises, such as the *kharāj* books of Abū Yūsuf (teacher of Shaybānī, courtier and senior judge of Harūn al-Rashīd; d. 798) and Qudāma b. Jaʿfar, which have been studied by Aharon Ben Shemesh (1958, 1965, 1969). But these authors did not do 'economics'. It is disappointing to see the Islamicist approach in the promisingly named *Islamic Economics: A Short History* edited by A. A. E. El-Ashker and R. Wilson (2006). The book, despite its many editorial failings, has some use for its coverage of a large range of authors from the start of Islam to the modern age. Most of these texts are only partially (o)economic. For example, the long *Book of Revenues* by Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām (770–838), written at the height of ʿAbbasid power and distilling the oral wisdom of learned society at this time (Görke 2003), is actually a jurisprudential work concerned mostly with *fayʾ*, 'booty', its divisions and the entitlements to it, and with alms and *zakāt*. It is essentially an extended collection of Hadith. Now at this period, warfare as a means of spreading Islam was a very real matter: the anti-Byzantine campaigns of al-Maʾmūn and others have been alluded to above. But there is nothing here on economic policy, personal finances, state revenues and expenditures, etc. It is 'Islamic economics'; but the book *Islamic Economics* tends to analyse such texts as if they dealt in the abstract Westernized discipline of economic science. There is no mention of Greek influences, possibly from an apologetic tendency (cf. Hosseini's criticism of Spengler for 'overemphasizing the Greek element in Islamic economic thought and more', 2001: 31–2, referring to Bryson), or more likely out of ignorance. This is a problem in treatments of other texts by El-Ashker and Wilson. For example, the important ethical treatise by Raghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. early–mid eleventh century), the *Means to the Excellences of the Law*, clearly shows the absorption of Greek ideas in Arabic literature over the preceeding centuries and how they can be presented in a strongly Islamic framework. When Raghib discusses the interdependence of the trades, he is obviously harking back to Bryson's work, either through Islamic readings of it (for example by the Brethren of Purity or Miskawayh's *Roaming Questions and Comprehensive Answers*, which contains a Brysonian discussion of the origin of money as Question 161), or through awareness of the text from oral discussions in the literary salons, or through direct acquaintance. Pointing this out does not diminish the work's contribution to economic thinking in the middle ages, but rather sets it in the long history of ideas upon which the economic thought of Islam is founded.

This historical perspective is the basis of Yassine Essid's *A Critique of the Origins of Islamic Economic Thought* (1995). Here, importantly,

the *ḥisba* literature is set alongside the ethical and economic thinking of *tadbīr al-manzil*. Essid, a Tunisian Muslim with an awareness of current issues in Islam and globalization, rightly takes Bryson as the central text in the historical domain, and emphasizes that medieval Islamic writers developed their own economic theses on the basis of the Brysonian legacy. 'Contrary to the opinion professed by a literature arising out of a renewed "Islamic consciousness", the most outstanding accomplishments of Arab–Muslim thought,' he writes in his conclusion, 'reveal it to be faithful to its Greek inheritance.' To ignore this inheritance is to compromise historical enquiry about the development of economic ideas in the Islamic world of the middle ages. For '[i]n confining Islamic economic thought within the limits of religious precepts, "Islamicist" economic literature raises it to the status of revealed truth, reducing all research to simple exegesis' (p. 232). A flagrant example of this may be seen in a number of recent publications by Islahi (e.g. 2008a, 2008b), well distributed on the internet, which deny that Bryson existed. The attack on the 'myth of Bryson' goes hand in hand with an attack on scholars like Essid and Hosseini who are said to have accepted the myth in order 'to imitate Western style'. Unsurprisingly some of this secondary literature – even Essid – shows confusion about Bryson's name or mistakes him for his namesake from the fourth century BC, the philosopher Bryson of Heraclea Pontica (see Muller 1994) – which indeed makes him the more mysterious and mythical.

7 THE STABILITY OF THE TEXT

In those authors who quote Bryson closely, from Miskawayh to al-Dimashqī (Abu l-Faḍl Jaʿfar b. ʿAlī) to Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ, the text of Bryson in the four core sections of his work appears to be very stable. So far as we can tell, the work these authors read is more or less identical to that which is transcribed in the fourteenth-century copy held in the Taymūr collection of the Egyptian National Library. The other medieval manuscript kept at al-Azhar university is in part abbreviated or rewritten, but both it and its readers' notes confirm the status of the Taymūr. Essentially, the same redaction was used for the medieval Hebrew translation and (apparently) lies behind the short *Yconomica Galieni*. Naturally there are variants between the passages of quotation and paraphrase from Bryson that we find in our sources and what we have in the manuscripts, but these variants are minor. Such variations as we have may be due to casual changes by copyists, or in some cases they may reflect the original translation better and make better sense. What we cannot do on the basis of Dimashqī and the others who use Bryson is

to draw up a *stemma* along the lines of the one Plessner put forward, hesitantly enough it is true, at the conclusion to his introduction. Indeed, the peculiarities of the transmission of texts in Arabic, where copyists often imported significant variations, makes the whole business of the *stemma* far more problematic than would usually be assumed by those familiar with the transmission of classical works (cf. de Callataÿ and Halflants 2011: 72–4). Apart from anything else, variant versions may often be seen as having their own validity and integrity, and not as deformations of an authorial original (see James Montgomery's introduction to Schoeler 2006). This is obviously the case with the Azhar text of Bryson, where the author has made an effort to rewrite much of the text in his own words.

Although Bryson's subject matter might be thought a likely one for additions reflecting authors' own experiences (a possibility raised by Bouyges is his *Archives de philosophie* article), the evidence points the other way. In his acclaimed studies of how texts were transmitted in early Islam, Gregor Schoeler has pointed to the oral origin of many of our written texts into a period as late as the third century of Islam. The consequence of this is variation in the content and structure of these works. The pattern is that mentioned above in respect to Shaybānī's *Book of Acquisition*. Schoeler cites comparable evidence from the ancient world – with due attention to differences – in the form of Hans von Arnim's exhaustive examination of the transmision of speeches of Dio of Prusa which show doublets or alternative endings (Schoeler 2006: ch. 2 von Arnim 1898, cf. Amato 1999). But he does not consider translation literature, where a *Grundtext* exists which was produced by the translator from a written work in the source language. Arguably the Translation Movement helped to consolidate the idea of the written book with an author's name – often a prestige author – attached to it. Even this did not guarantee invariability. Texts could fall victim to the production of handier summaries and epitomes; but this is a different phenomenon within an established written transmision, albeit one where oral instruction and guidance were usually considered indispensable. The surviving Latin epitome of Bryson rests on one such Arabic summary. All in all, it seems to be the case that the text of Bryson was treated in medieval Islam as one for others to build on, but which itself retained – in respect to its core sections on property, slaves, the wife, and the child – a fundamental integrity reflecting its position as 'the most famous' book on the topic.

This stability of Bryson's text is a strong argument against Plessner's suggestion that the Bryson surviving to us has been epitomized in comparison with the original Arabic translation. Leaving aside the introductory portion, where the evidence of shortening of some kind is clear, the text we have of

the four main sections is very likely to reflect – certainly with changes here and there – what the translator had before him in Greek around the turn of the tenth century. Musonius Rufus serves to corroborate that our text of section three is similar to what was in the Greek, for the order of Musonius' arguments about the community of marriage (Discourse XIII) and the philosophical education of women (Discourse III) corresponds well with the order and arguments of the extant Arabic of Bryson on the wife's role in managing the estate. Importantly, Musonius appears to include three citations of Bryson's Greek in passages which correspond closely with the Arabic. Of the two Greek fragments anthologized by Stobaeus, the second (from the third section on slaves) shows the tenor of the translation well: there has been rewriting but the translator has been careful to preserve the sense of Bryson's unique division between the three types of slave. The first quotation (from the introduction, on the origin of the crafts) has been abbreviated; but, as we shall see when I look at this passage in detail, there is nothing to suggest that the sense has been deformed. In terms of the overall organization of the text, Bryson's section on slaves retains its order in second place, thereby relating slaves to property (as Aristotle would have wanted), whereas in much of the Islamic tradition based on Bryson the slave comes last and is treated as part of the people of the household, which is an innovation.

It is as well to consider here the remark made by al-Ṭūsī about Bryson which influenced Plessner. The *Nasirean Ethics* (*Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī*) was by far the most influential book of its kind in Islamic literature, even though it was written in Persian (as Ṭashköprüzāde complains). Despite what is sometimes said, Ṭūsī was not in fact very dependent on Bryson. Leaving that aside, he reports of him (in G. M. Wickens' translation) that the '*mukhtaṣar* of the observations of Bryson' is 'extant in the hands of the Moderns', whereas other Greek texts on this topic have not been translated (p. 155). The word *mukhtaṣar* is a borrowing from Arabic and in both Arabic and Persian it may mean 'abridgement' in the sense of something cut down from a larger work (like an abridgement of a novel: Gutas 1993), or alternatively 'compendium' in the sense of a handy statement of the facts of a particular field of knowledge, i.e. a summary or handbook. Plessner (pp. 10, 18, 41) took Ṭūsī to mean that he had 'ein Kompendium der Abhandlung' of Bryson in the sense of a 'Verkürzung'. But only a sentence later Ṭūsī uses a similarly ambiguous loanword synonym – *ījāz* – about Avicenna's *Book of Government*, which developed the theme of *tadbīr al-manzil* within the wider system of politics and ethics. Ṭūsī says it is a distinct improvement on Bryson and that he is therefore basing his section on estate management on Avicenna, who is to be praised both for his eloquence and his 'conciseness'

(*ījāz*). This word *may* also mean 'epitome' in the sense of 'abridgement', but it cannot do so with reference to this short work: Avicenna's treatise is simply concise and to the point. It is a compendium of the topic, not an abridgement of a longer treatment, and Avicenna is explicit about this at the end of his text. What Ṭūsī means when he calls Bryson's 'observations' a *mukhtaṣar* is that the *Management of the Estate* is also a compendium, not that it is a shortened version of an originally longer book. There were epitomes of the *Management of the Estate* in circulation (Chapter 2, Sections 5 and 6), but there is no reason to think Ṭūsī did not have the full text nor (for this was in Plessner's mind) that he supposed the Bryson Arabus before him was just an epitome.

The aim of the following paragraphs is to show, briefly, the extent of Bryson's influence and to introduce or reintroduce the Islamic authors who used him. Martin Plessner's survey of Bryson in Arabic and Persian literature will naturally be the basis of what I say here, though not all of the works he mentions are of interest or relevance, and he was unaware of some important ones. Of his two groups of authors, the first comprises those who may stand as witnesses to the text because of their incorporation of extracts from Bryson into their own books. The second group shows knowledge of Bryson or used his ideas and structure. Naturally, as Plessner was well aware, the distinction between the two groups does not always apply and this should be borne in mind.

The earliest Arabic author to make use of Bryson, Qudāma Ibn Jaʿfar, has been mentioned above several times. Qudāma was a leading figure in the political and intellectual landscape of the early tenth century. He does not actually name Bryson and he is of very little use as a textual witness. As we have seen, he also made use of the *Letter* of Themistius in his *Book of Government*, and was perhaps aware that Themistius had used Bryson's introductory section. He himself turned to Bryson on topics which Themistius did not include, such as the invention of coinage. The economic historian of medieval Islam, Claude Cahen, was the first to draw attention to Qudāma's knowledge of Bryson (though he strangely missed his use of Themistius: Cahen 1962), but this is ignored in the recent study of Qudāma's political philosophy by Paul Heck (2002), and also by the editor of the *Book of Government*, Mustafa Hiyari (1981, 1983).

The next reader of Bryson, and indeed probably the earliest to cite him by name, is the physician Ibn al-Jazzār of Kairouan, the author of numerous works including an influential pocketbook of medical advice for travellers, the *Zād al-musāfir wa-qūt al-ḥāḍir* (Ullmann 1970: 147–8). Bryson is mentioned in his *Treatment and Regimen of Children*, which is the

first surviving comprehensive treatise of paediatrics. There is some confusion about the date of Ibn al-Jazzār's death, but the editor of the book, Muhammed al-Ḥabīb al-Hayla, presents valid arguments for taking it as 979/80 rather than 1004, which is often used by Western scholars (1984: 23–4). If that is right, the report that he lived to about eighty surely means that the attributed quotation in *Treatment and Regimen* is the earliest we have by name. Most of this work concerns child/infant health and disease but with an eye on his educated audience Ibn al-Jazzār finishes with a chapter on good and bad habits and here he turned to Bryson on the boy. The extant manuscripts are full of misspellings and Bryson's name is corruptly given as 'the philosopher Abū Wās'. A few lines of direct quotation assure the identity of an author who perhaps needed the label of *faylasūf* in case Ibn al-Jazzār's readers were unaware of him.

Not much after this Bryson was used in two of the philosophical *Letters* of the Brethren of Purity, which were composed around the 970s at approximately the same time as Ibn al-Nadīm was creating his two entries for Bryson in the *Fihrist*. The *Letters* are an encyclopedia of current knowledge ranging from mathematics and metaphysics to moral fables. The identity of the Brethren is fairly clear from near-contemporary reports, and all that needs to be said here is that they were (as one would expect) well-connected figures who seem to have constructed their anonymous personae to avoid questions about heterodox views (G. de Callataÿ 2006). Plessner dealt with the Brethren only in regard to the history of Bryson's text, not the history of ideas. The *Eighth Letter* is an extremely interesting account of trades, crafts, and arts set in a Neoplatonist hierarchy in which ultimate knowledge of a trade comes from the divine and is transmitted through a series of apprenticeships to actual practitioners (Lewis 1943). It is well known that the Brethren had Ismāʿīlī leanings, i.e. that they sympathized with the (nowadays minority) Shīʿite sect which parted company with mainstream Shīʿism in the eighth century and in the tenth century enjoyed both considerable power in the form of the Fatimids based in Cairo and considerable notoriety in the shape of the renegade Qarmaṭians. The Ismāʿīlīs were allegedly sympathetic to the lower classes and this may be behind the Brethren's insistence on the dignity of work, including physical labour, and their stress on the utility of work for the community. As we shall see (Chapter 2, pp. 128–30, Chapter 3, pp. 251–2), the letter is the most detailed account of different sorts of labour in this period. There are a number of elements and phrases that come from Bryson. Like Qudāma, it is the economic–political Bryson which is the focus, and though the Brethren do not employ Brysonian anthropology, they do place economic development and cooperation at

the heart of human society and political community. When we remember the extensive influence on the Brethren of Pythagoras (i.e. the Islamic Pythagoras), which was their weak point according to al-Ghazālī (G. de Callataÿ 2006: 107), it is tempting to speculate that they knew of Bryson's Pythagorean credentials. But although they also use Bryson in Letter 2 on the geometry of bodies, which sounds promising, the citation of Bryson §10 is in fact an '*excursus*' (Bausani 1978: 39, unaware of the source) which calls on the Brethren to cooperate. It does at least reveal that parts of Bryson were by now sufficiently well known to be used in what is a literary flourish.

The Brysonian–Themistian association of economics and politics recurs in Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ. But before turning to him, we must consider tenth- to twelfth-century developments by Avicenna, Miskawayh, and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Avicenna's *Book of Government* is one of several ethical writings by the Chief Shaykh. It is accepted as genuine by most Western and Eastern (Shams al-Dīn 1988) scholars of Avicenna, but not by Hishām Nashshāba in his book on the *Pedagogical Tradition in Islam* (1988). Interestingly Nashshāba's doubt arises from Plessner's contention that the *Book of Government* was based on Bryson, and he goes as far as saying that it is 'no more than an abridgement' (*talkhīṣ*) of Bryson (p. 8). Clearly Nashshāba had read Plessner but not Bryson. The fact is that Avicenna marks an important advance on Bryson and is really quite different. Although he takes over the basic elements of *tadbīr al-manzil*, he reorders them and subsumes them within an Islamic framework that reminds us how Greek Bryson Arabus actually is. Bryson's introductory anthropology of trade is wholly replaced in favour of a celebration of God's own *tadbīr* (which will remind students of the ancient world of the Christian concept of *oikonomia*) and His hierarchization of human beings. The divinely planned political order fits a man's duty 'to govern himself' and then the rest of mankind. Only now, after politics and ethics, do we get oeconomic material and here we find that the Brysonian order of property, slaves, wife, child has been changed to property, wife, child, and slave. For Avicenna, slaves must be treated as the Hadith prescribes, and we find in him the repeated call to use physiognomical techniques for purchasing slaves that appears in the medical literature of this period (e.g. Rhazes, *Ad Almansorem* Book 2 with Ghersetti 2007: 294–6; Ibn Buṭlān, see above).

Miskawayh was an older but very long-lived contemporary of Avicenna who died in 1030 just a few years before Avicenna himself. His fine ethical treatise, *Tahdhīb al-akhlāq* (*The Refinement of Character* in Constantine Zurayk's English version), is an important restatement of classical ethics. Indeed, the 'science of character' (*ʿilm al-akhlāq*) means the Greek legacy

and principally the *Nicomachean Ethics* (until it was replaced by the works of Avicenna and Miskawayh himself; contrast the continuing need of Bryson). Miskawayh's older Christian contemporary, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī, wrote a work with the same title as Miskawayh's, which has been translated by Sidney Griffith under the English title *Reformation of Morals*. Even though Richard Walzer was probably wrong to regard this simply as a translation of 'a lost Greek treatise' (1962: 165 n. 1), his verdict shows how closely the 'science of character' reprised Greek thinking. In Miskawayh's own *Refinement of Character* there is little use of Islamic sources. There are a number of commonplace references to the sayings of the Prophet and to ʿAlī and to the 'law' (the Sharīʿa), but it is Aristotle who dominates the intellectual stage. Given this use of Greek thought, the long extract from Bryson's fourth section, which is credited to him (as is Miskawayh's way with his sources), will not cause surprise. The style of the rewording and reordering of Bryson reminds us a little of the Azhar manuscript of Bryson and the attention to the text demonstrates the deep respect of Miskawayh for his Greek predecessor. I have already mentioned use of the 'commercial anthropology' in Miskawayh's *Roaming Questions* and his allusion also to the Brysonian wife in the *Refinement*. This shows that he knew the whole manual well.

Miskawayh leads us directly to al-Ghazālī, who has been mentioned above in the context of 'Islamic economics'. In his most important work, *Revival of the Religious Sciences* (*Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*), he bases himself for a couple of pages of Book 22 on Miskawayh's section on the training of the child. He must have known that Miskawayh was rephrasing Bryson, as Miskawayh states this clearly. Although Ghazālī is cited in traditional histories of Islamic philosophy for delimiting the influence of Greek philosophy in works like *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, his knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy was profound and his 'restricted' (*maḍnūn*) corpus of esoteric philosophy for reading by pupils and close associates, which is only now coming to be fully understood (al-Akiti 2007), reveals the complex interrelation between the philosophical and scientific tradition (which Ghazālī did not stifle) and its expression through an intensely traditional religious terminology. It is on this basis that Ghazālī can use a work so steeped in Greek thought – Miskawayh's *Refinement* – in his great exoteric statement of faith concerning man's and society's place in the divine order. The *Iḥyāʾ* also contains an ethics of marriage, as mentioned above, and it may well be that here too there is some reflection of the Brysonian ideal, possibly mediated by Miskawayh, for the wife's activity in the household (Book 12; trans. Farah 1984: esp. pp. 66–7) is in itself a Greco-Roman, not an Islamic, notion, even if Ghazālī develops it through the sayings of the saints.

The distinguished theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Persian summary of Bryson (in his short encyclopedia, the *Jāmiʿ al-ʿUlūm*) has also been mentioned. The *Jāmiʿ* was original in the range of its coverage and the success of this can be measured in the large number of surviving manuscripts (Vesel 1986: 35). Like Ghazālī, Fakhr al-Dīn was fully adept at integrating the Greek and the Islamic sciences (see Mourad 1939 on his *Book of Physiognomy*, where a quintessentially Greek discipline is grounded in the oldest Arabic traditions). Four sections of this encyclopedia deal with moral–political life: 54 character, 55 politics, 56 *tadbīr al-manzil*, 59 kings. Although the material is familiar, the compendious presentation appears 'pour la première fois dans les écrits en persan' (de Fouchécour 1986: 426). Moreover Fakhr al-Dīn has ignored tradition and chosen to place his oeconomic section after politics thus emphasizing its civic–political connections. What is interesting about section 56 is that Fakhr al-Dīn retains Bryson's ordering (property, slaves, wife, child), unlike those authors who took the slave along with the personnel of the house. There may be some influence from Ghazālī and certainly from Qudāma in the remarks about God's incorporation in men and women of stimuli to encourage reproduction (at least this is not in Bryson Arabus as we have it); but essentially what we have is pure Bryson, though experts on the work (de Fouchécour 1986: 425–9, Vesel 1986: 35–8, 2009) are apparently unaware of this.

The other response to Bryson in Persian, the second part of Ṭūsī's *Nasirean Ethics*, is on a different scale from Fakhr al-Dīn, and that difference is central to the huge success of his work, which spawned rewritings and summaries in Persian (esp. the more Islamicized version by al-Dawwānī/Davānī, the *Akhlāq-i Jalālī*; E. Rosenthal 1958: Ch. 10) and Arabic and Syriac (in the oeconomic section of Barhebraeus' *Cream of Wisdom*, Chapter 2, p. 142, and al-Shahrazūrī, Chapter 6, p. 410). Ṭūsī concentrates at length on ethics, oeconomy, and politics–kingship. He projected a grand conception of the spaces where man operates and of the rights and obligations given to him. At the individual ethical level he drew extensively on Miskawayh but pictured man as so much the more responsible for himself to God. On the oeconomic level Bryson is present, but the influence of Avicenna is paramount and property (*māl*, *amwāl*) is thus a criterion of ethics rather than a conjunction of ethics and economics (as in Bryson). On the political–civic level Ṭūsī's individual is part of an organic whole with interdependencies, hierarchies, and classes descending from the king, all held together in the ideal world by what he grandly calls 'the connector of societies', Love (*maḥabbat*).

The 'science of ethics and types of behaviour' is the description Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ gives to his mirror of princes, the *Conduct of the Ruler in the*

Management of Kingdoms. Although the 1869 lithograph edition of the text has him celebrate the happy times of the 'Commander of the Faithful al-Muʿtaṣim' (r. 833–42), perhaps a deliberate attempt to date this sophisticated work as early as possible, the whole conception of the ethical and political framework and other factors such as the author's name make it absolutely certain that the reading of the Paris manuscript is correct and that this introductory notice was in fact addressed to the caliph al-Mustaʿṣim (r. 1242–58). Morality, conduct, the divisions of government – these are the author's concerns, and he sets them out in a tabular form which was pioneered, as he notes without naming names, by the Christian intellectual and physician Ibn Buṭlān (d. 1066) in his influential manual of hygiene, the *Taqwīm al-Ṣiḥḥa* (*Tabulation of Health*, the *Tacuinum Sanitatis* in its popular Latin translation), using a presentation drawn ultimately from astrological tables (Elkhadem 1990). Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ claims to have read an inordinate number of works to make his book. Among them evidently was Bryson (unnamed), who is used for several pages, and almost verbatim, in the third chapter on 'the intellectual way of life' in the section on practical aspects of living. The Cairene classicist M. S. Sālim was the first to point out the extensive use Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ made also of the *Letter* of Themistius (Sālim 1970), a fact unfortunately ignored in the best-known edition of the *Conduct of the Ruler* by the Cambridge graduate Nājī l-Takrītī (and also in his separate study of the work, 1980). In this regard Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ recalls Qudāma, though he does not seem to use both texts simultaneously. Rather, Themistius is a major source for the fascinating fourth chapter on government, the dynamics of kingship and the ministers of the king, and the parameters (*shurūṭ*) which make city and civic life itself possible. As with Qudāma, the invocations of the deity and the quotations of scripture might seem designed to obscure the use of foreign sources. But, of course, that would be an entirely wrong way of looking at it. Bryson and Themistius were used because their ethical–political values were compatible with Islamic thought, completely domesticated, and of genuine assistance to theorists like Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ in developing their ideas of Islamic government.

Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 950), known as the 'Second Teacher' (that is, after Aristotle), must also be mentioned here because one might expect to find traces of Bryson or Brysonian ideas in his works on ethics and government (cf. Dieterici 1904, German translation of *On Political Government*, *Kitāb al-siyāsa l-madanīya*; Dunlop 1961, *Aphorisms of the Statesman*; Walzer 1985, *On the Perfect State*, on which see below). However, it cannot be proved that he used either Bryson or the *Letter* of Themistius. The household–estate is

not in fact a concern of his. In his *Aphorisms of the Statesman* there *may* be an echo of Bryson/Themistius in what he says about one craft for one man; but this is thin pickings, and is probably Platonic. Certainly he must have known of our authors; apart from anything else, he was well acquainted with Abū Bishr Mattā b. Yūnus, who translated Themistius' philosophical commentaries. Perhaps the reason for the neglect is Fārābī's focus on Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* in his political writings (whether he knew the Greek texts directly or not: Harvey 2003). The absence of a translation of Aristotle's *Politics* (with its attention to the *oikos* in Book 1) is relevant in this regard. This is closely connected with the absence of any Greek commentary on the work in antiquity. Fārābī 'follows Plato's authority in political theory without reservation but sides with Aristotle in all other branches of philosophy' (Walzer 1985: 428). The trend to unify the thought of the two philosophers goes back beyond Porphyry's (lost) essay on the subject, and it strongly influenced the Second Teacher (Mahdi 2001: 50 'they intended to offer one and the same philosophy'). But the lack of an Arabic *Politics* left Fārābī with no choice but to use Plato. In his major work, *Principles of the Views of the Citizens of the Perfect State*, he does this with a fair originality. Of Themistius and Bryson there is no sign. When he speaks here of the necessary 'union' of people at the start of the discussion of good and bad associations in ch. 15, he states clearly that anything below the level of the *madīna* ('state') is 'imperfect', including the smallest of such unions, which is the *manzil*.

The short Fārābian *Treatise on Government* (Cheikho 1911a, translation G. Graf 1902; cf. N. Rescher 1962: 47) is a little more promising. Like many such treatises, the work develops the idea of a hierarchical relationship in society beginning with the king. In the section on 'governing oneself' the message is that one should preserve one's *jāh* ('rank', 'station', 'dignity') over one's *māl*. But there may be something Brysonian in the accompanying call to avoid disreputable sources of income and in the stress on balancing the books.

Later than al-Fārābī but some while earlier than Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ comes the last writer I shall mention here. This is al-Dimashqī, author of the *Book of Advice on the Advantages of Commerce*, much of which was translated into German by Ritter (1917). It is one thing for the author of a mirror of princes to find ancient books applicable to his subject matter – for by their very nature such treatises can only ever be contemporary to a limited degree – and quite another for a practising merchant. All indications suggest that Dimashqī lived in the eleventh century, and quite possibly wrote in

the period before the Fatimids lost control of Damascus in 1076. From the internal evidence of the text he operated as a wealthy purveyor of fabrics and cloths. In essence Dimashqī was an educated merchant with pretensions to literature. His text is a remarkable and unique example of the merchant's view which may be compared (and most certainly contrasted) with the detailed notebooks and handbooks that were produced by Italian merchants and company agents from the late thirteenth to the early fifteenth century (such as the *Book of Descriptions of Countries and of Measures of Merchandise* by Francesco Pegolotti: Evans 1936, Spufford 2002: ch. 1). Most of his treatise does not, however, directly represent economic or social realities. Thus his neat division of merchants into three categories (the stockist, the traveller, the supplier–exporter) finds little real evidence to support it (though it is repeated as an historical fact in much of the modern literature, such as the Brill handbook of *Islamic Economics*). That said, Dimashqī is recognized as having written on the basis of real experience; but he hides this behind extensive moralizing and belletristic verbiage. What is important for us is that someone who was neither a philosopher nor an intellectual uses a Greek writer and quotes him more or less literally in his theoretical section on the use of money. This testifies in general to the wide acceptance of the wisdom of the 'ancients' among the Muslim elite, and specifically to the influence Bryson enjoyed in the realm of economics (*not* oeconomics) and to the utility of his first core section for anyone who wanted to write about money and property from a moral–economic perspective, which, as we have seen, suited Muslim authors so well. Bryson Arabus is entirely free of Hadith and scripture, but this was hardly felt to be a problem. Indeed Dimashqī's 'mechanical' (Cahen 1962) use of Islamic signatures shows how 'secular' his own thought is, despite some vestiges of piety. A key difference from Bryson is that Dimashqī does not mention the household–estate as the economic unit of production. He is not at all interested in base-level manufacture or estate management, but rather in shipping and wholesale distribution and in what Cahen called 'le commerce au gain spéculatif' (p. 168). His Bryson is not an author of a *tadbīr al-manzil*, but of a *tadbīr al-māl*, the management of money and capital. In this domain the aim of the merchant is to secure advantage through the knowledge he has over others' knowledge. He has to identify which goods sell for what prices in different markets so he can buy cheap and sell for profit. The classification of the three types of merchant is perhaps best seen as a projection of this strategy: What types of knowledge and experience does one need to succeed? How much risk should one take? How does one deal with the ever present danger of tricksters who abuse one's trust?

8 BRYSON AND CLASSICS

Bryson's role in Arabic and Persian is not restricted to the authors mentioned above, and one can expect to find conscious or unconscious allusions to his ideas, and perhaps even further direct quotations, scattered around, and not just in discussions of money. He thus enjoyed a role in Islamic oeconomic literature that is (it seems) vast in comparison with his role in classical antiquity. In this regard, then, the question arises finally as to what the 'rediscovery' of Bryson brings to classics? The three most important ways of thinking about this are the ancient economy and the household, the Greek literature and culture of the imperial Roman age, and (on a quite different level) the common inheritance of Greek thought, that is, its reception, in Islam and the implications of this reception for Western and Arab–Islamic civilization.

With regard to the ancient economy and the household–estate, Finley got things wrong in asking the ancients for a consciousness of 'the economy' as a separate sphere with its own characteristics and values. This demand was unhistorical. But Finley's views are still influential and still implicit in many modern treatments of ancient economics; and my own discussion in Chapter 3 of Bryson and the ancient evidence for economic thinking will necessarily have much to say about him, for his articles and monographs remain among the most brilliant and enjoyable on the topic. Ancient historians, economists, and numismatists have accumulated a large amount of data demonstrating economic activity. While it is not always interesting to know of another olive press in Tripolitania (and Finley would have said of one more fact like this: So what?), it is undeniable that the evidence has become overwhelming and justifies the assumption that trade for profit and capital investment were normal activities all over the Roman world. What has not been done much – and this is where Bryson makes a worthwhile contribution in an area of poor or at best implicit evidence – is to re-evaluate Finley's presentation of elite views, for it is this alleged resistance to the values of the market among the educated elite and their risk-averse mentality concerning capital investment which, for him, hobbled economic development by refusing to identify an economic realm and pursue its goals. Finley used Cicero and other authors to attempt to lay bare the indifference and antipathy of the Greco-Roman elites towards profit and productivity. Bryson almost certainly wrote after Cicero and was not writing his kind of philosophy. The very nature of his treatise is workaday. (The use of pseudo-Doric, we should remind ourselves, is a claim to authority, and not literary pretension.) This allows us to argue plausibly that *Management of the Estate* is more likely to

have reflected widely held attitudes than, say, Cicero's *On Duties*. Of course we must be careful about comparing things that are dissimilar. Bryson was not a member of the senatorial elite and there is no reason to think he was a very big landowner (though his assumption of 'scattered estates' means he was wealthy enough). Although he has original things to say to us, it is probably right to hold that many, if not all, of these things were at least concordant with the views of his readers. He presents his views on the economy and other social matters in a prescriptive form, but we cannot conclude that he is saying much that was not in the air when he wrote. His importance lies in the fact that he appears to be the first to set some of these things down. Some of his beliefs may have caused surprise, others none. Thus his opinions on the naturalness of profit, investment, and productive capital surely took no reader aback. They too were men busy making and spending money as they ran their properties and businesses. On the other hand his advocacy of virginity before marriage for men as well as women may well have made people stop and think, though others were saying the same thing or beginning to. Bryson put commerce at the heart of human society and saw occupations (the 'crafts') as interlinked and operating in an economic domain where what we think of as the defining part of Greek culture – the *polis* – hardly intruded. In this he offers a valuable and different perspective on his age.

The second area where Bryson is important is Greek literature. He was a capable writer. The text is well organized, and there are even literary touches. In this respect he represents an important addition to the range of genres and dialects of the Greek letters of the Second Sophistic (which is the term used to describe the Greek literary culture, or even the wider Hellenic culture, of the first to the third centuries AD; see e.g the classic study of Reardon 1971, Schmitz 1997, Whitmarsh 2002). As I have pointed out above, Neopythagorean literature does not feature in standard literary histories. Bryson offers an opportunity to rectify this failing, though I cannot comment on this here.

With regard to the common inheritance of Greek thought in 'East' and 'West' and Bryson as an example of the reception of ancient Greek thought, there are important things to say. It is true that Greco-Arabic research has little reference beyond the scholarly Western community, and even within Islamic or (and particularly) classical studies occupies a very small space. Nevertheless it may be suggested, if boldly, that it may have some role to play in the current atmosphere of suspicion between Islamic and Western societies. There is certainly common ground. Most classicists will be unaware that one of the largest departments of classics in the world is at the University of Cairo, from where the Egyptian Society of Greek and Roman Studies

publishes a substantial annual review with articles in Arabic and European languages (www.esgrs-escl.com/). The legacy of antiquity has enjoyed a special place in Egypt – where there are a number of university departments of classics – and in the Lebanon, though to a lesser extent. This is due to the interest in classical literature among some of the leading figures of the Nahḍa and a genuine feeling for the long history of these lands before Islam. Some of the most distinguished students of the Greek legacy in Islam have in fact come originally from the Middle East, especially from these areas. Elsewhere in the Arabic world, however, interest in classical antiquity is patchy. This is true specifically of Greco-Arabic research as an academic subject concerning the development of ancient Greek thought in the Islamic civilization of the middle ages (a term which is, by the way, a standard chronological marker in Arabic too).

There may be more to this than a simple lack of interest. Thus we have seen that 'Islamic economics' (in its historical focus) and Islamic scholarship tend to ignore Bryson's importance for medieval thinkers (with the laudable exception of Yassine Essid). Important light on contemporary disengagement can be found in the current series of UNESCO human development reports on the Arab world (e.g. United Nations Development Programme 2003), written entirely by Arabs, which show the chronic intellectual, social, and economic underdevelopment of the Arab world, disguised by petrodollars in some countries, and an unreceptiveness to foreign cultures. The authors rightly remark that this has nothing to do with Islam as a religion (and anyone who is tempted to say it does should read the head-on discussion of this claim in Rodinson's *Islam and Capitalism*). Rather, they trace such problems to the unsympathetic political complexion of many regimes in modern Arab countries. But there is more to be said. George Saliba's *Islamic Science and the Making of the Modern European Renaissance* (see above p. 60) blames the West's irresistible 'dynamic cycle' of economic and technological advances, which (in the final words of his book) suck in the resources of the 'non-western world' and make it 'even harder to win' for Muslims today. There is much truth in this. Although Arabs cannot blame the West for problems of their own making, the fault does lie in part in the continuing determination by some countries and commentators to demonize Islam and to show their own ignorance of Islam's historically based consciousness. On the academic plane in the history of economic thought there are many heirs of Schumpeter's Great Gap (see for example Jack Goody's *Capitalism and Modernity* (2004) on the proponents of the 'European Miracle'), and they are quite as bad as any *salafī* who seeks to make Bryson into a myth. In this charged atmosphere historical work on

the acceptance and development of ancient Greek thought in the medieval era can make a contribution, however small and however academic, by communicating to Muslims and Westerners alike that the legacy of the ancient Greek world in East and West is a shared one. The present study of Bryson's *Management of the Estate* and aspects of the social–economic thought of antiquity and its inheritance will, it is hoped, signal this clearly.

CHAPTER 2

Text and transmission

INTRODUCTORY

Bryson survives in an Arabic translation dating to around AD 900. But two short extracts of the original have been preserved in Stobaeus' late-antique *Anthology*, and there are traces of his influence in the later first and second centuries in Dio of Prusa, Clement of Alexandria, and particularly in the *Discourses* of Musonius Rufus. At issue is the reliability of the Arabic. I have commented in Chapter 1 on the general intentions of the Arabic translators in wishing to remain faithful to the sense of the original works. The problem with Bryson is the lack of clear controlling evidence. The Greek fragments are very short, and realistically speaking, not too much can be based on them. If we compare the Arabic, we find that the section corresponding to Greek fr. 1, which is part of the 'commercial anthropology', has been abbreviated. There is some evidence to suggest that this may have happened after the translation was made. The sense, however, has been preserved, and the important idea of a circuit of interconnected trades or occupations has been retained. The second Greek fragment comes from the start of section two on slaves. Here the Arabic also shows some abbreviation but clearly presents Bryson's argument about the three types of slaves. Section two is by far the shortest part of the book, and it may be – but proof is lacking – that it has undergone a reduction of some kind, quite possibly in Greek before the period of the translation. The 'commercial anthropology' is not strictly part of Bryson's advice on money, and was therefore a candidate for abbreviation or omission (as for example in the epitome known as the *Yconomica Galieni*). With section three of Bryson we are in a far better position. In two of his discourses Musonius Rufus follows the main argument of Bryson Arabus §§85–96 and 96–103, and cites §§95, 96, and 103 very closely. This provides reasonable proof of continuity between the Greek and the Arabic here; indeed, Musonius' use of these sections is the best indication of the Arabic's integrity. Beyond this we must rely on our general knowledge of the relation

between Greek texts and their Arabic translations. Bryson Arabus is fairly long as it stands and most readers will feel that the sections on wealth, the wife, and the child have not been reduced to any great extent and that there is no cause to extend the specific evidence for epitomization to the whole text, as Plessner believed.

The purpose of the first and longest section of this chapter is to look at the relation between the Greek and the Arabic in depth and consider what we know of the original. I shall then comment on various aspects of the transmission. In the second section I consider possible pathways and evidence for Bryson in late antiquity including the *Letter* of Themistius. The intellectual, political, and socio-economic background to the transmission at the time of the caliphs has been sketched in Chapter 1. In Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 I shall focus on matters relating to the shape of the text in this period, and begin by looking in more detail at Plessner's suggestion of 'omissions' throughout the Arabic text. After examining the first mentions of the title and author in the later ninth century (including the alleged dedication to Apollonius of Tyana and the possibility that Bryson wrote an *On Paideia*), I shall look at the evidence of other recensions including the Azhar manuscript and the Hebrew and Latin versions of the text.

1 THE GREEK VERSION

I begin this first section with the Stobaean fragments and then turn to Musonius and the evidence for the Greek of Bryson in Dio of Prusa and Clement of Alexandria.

(a) Stobaeus' fragments

Two extracts of *Management of the Estate* were included in Stobaeus' *Anthology* at 4.28.15 (pp. 680–1 Hense) under the headword *Oikonomikos*. A lemma is given for the first only and no division is indicated between them. I take the text from Thesleff (1965) 56–7. The first extract contains no significant variant readings.

> Ἐκ τοῦ Βρύσωνος Οἰκονομικοῦ.
>
> (i) Οὕτως ἔχει ποτ' ἄλλαλα τἀνθρώπινα πράγματα καθάπερ καὶ τᾶς ἁλύσιος τοὶ κρίκοι. (ii) τῆνοί τε γὰρ ἐξ ἀλλάλων ἄρτηνται ἀλλάλους τ' ἀκολουθίοντι, καὶ ἑνὸς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἑλκυσθέντος ὁποίου δή ποκα τό τε ὅλον καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀρχᾶς ἀκολουθεῖ· (iii) καὶ τῶν τοῦ βίου δὲ πραγμάτων ὁποῖα ἂν βούλῃ ἑλέσθαι εὑρήσεις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκας κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ἀλλάλοις ἑπόμενα. (iv) αὐτίκα γὰρ εἰ <τὰ> κατὰ γεωργίαν τις ἐπιτηδεύοι, ἆρ' οὐ

πρᾶτον εἶμεν δεῖ τεκτονικάν; (v) εἰ τεκτονικάν, δεῖ δὴ χαλκευτικάν· <εἰ> χαλκευτικάν, δεῖ δὴ μεταλλευτικάν. (vi) ἀλλ' ἵνα ἀγραυλεῖν δυνατοὶ ὦντι, δεῖ σκέπαν ἦμεν τὰν περὶ τὸ σῶμα· (vii) τοιγαρῶν ὑφαντικᾶς καὶ οἰκοδομικᾶς ἐστι χρεία. καὶ τἄλλα δὲ πάντα μαστευόμενος καὶ ἀνερευνῶν οὕτως εὑρήσεις ἔχοντα ποτ' ἄλλαλα.

We may translate as follows:[1]

From Bryson's *Oikonomikos*.

(i) Men's occupations relate to each other like the links of a chain. (ii) These are fastened to one another and follow one another. If any one of them should ever be removed, all of them follow along with it from the end. (iii) Whichever of the means of livelihood you wish to take, you will find that (it and) the others of necessity succeed each another in turn. (iv) For example, if someone practises farming, must not the art of the carpenter exist first? (v) If the art of the carpenter, the art of the blacksmith must of course exist. If the art of the blacksmith, the art of the miner must of course exist. (vi) But so (people) can live outside, there must be some covering for the body. (vii) Thus there is a need of the art of weaving and the art of building. If you search and investigate all the other occupations, you will find they relate to one another in the same fashion.

The text of the second extract runs:

(i) Δοῦλος δὴ πᾶς ὀνυμαίνεται[2] τριχῶς. (ii) ὁ μὲν γάρ τις δοῦλος κατὰ νόμον γίγνεται· (iii) ὁ δὲ καττὸν τρόπον τᾶς ψυχᾶς ὁ κρατούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων παθημάτων τᾶς ψυχᾶς· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐχ ἁπλῶς δοῦλος οὐδὲ τᾷ φύσει δοῦλος, ἀλλὰ τῶν παθῶν δοῦλος καὶ ἐν καταχράσει δοῦλος, καὶ μᾶλλον μοχθηρὸς ἄνθρωπος ἢ δοῦλος κατὰ φύσιν. (iv) κατὰ φύσιν δὲ δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος αὐτάρκως τὰς διὰ τῶ σώματος ὑπηρεσίας παρέχεσθαι τοῖς δεσπόταις καὶ ἐν τῷ ὁδοὺς πορευθῆναι καὶ φορτία βαστάξαι καὶ κακοπαθείας καὶ διακονίας ὑπομένεν, μήτε δὲ ἀρετὰν μήτε κακίαν ἐπιδεχόμενος ψυχικάν.

Translation:[3]

(i) Every slave may be designated in (one of) three ways. (ii) First, there is the slave 'by law'. (iii) Next there is the one 'by type of soul'; he is dominated by particular disorders (*pathēmata*) in (his) soul. This kind is not simply a slave nor a slave in his nature, but a slave of appetites (*pathē*) and a slave in the metaphorical sense.[4] He is a bad person rather than a slave 'by nature'.

[1] Cf. Bouyges 1924: 2–3, Laurenti 1968: 139, Audring and Brodersen 2008: 213.

[2] δοῦλος δὴ πᾶς ὀνυμαίνεται: Gaisford for the various corrupt readings of the MSS. Cf. the Arabic, 'slaves are of three sorts' (lit. 'slaves are three').

[3] Bouyges 1924, Audring and Brodersen 2008.

[4] Cf. Audring and Brodersen 2008: 213 'im übertragenen Gebrauch (dieses Worts)'. Not 'per abusum vocabuli' (Bouyges 1924).

> (iv) The slave 'by nature' is in fact one who is well capable of providing services to his masters by means of his body, by travelling the roads, carrying burdens, or tolerating hardships and duties, and he possesses no virtue or vice in his soul.

Let us take the second passage first. This is translated well enough in the Arabic at §§56–7. (Arabic numerals in square brackets are the Plessner paragraphs which are retained in my translation and text; Roman numerals in round brackets indicate the correspondences with the Greek and the English translation of the Greek above):

> [56] (i) Slaves are (of) three (sorts): the slave 'by (the institution of) servitude', the slave 'by appetite', and the slave 'by nature'. (ii) The slave 'by (the institution of) servitude'[5] is one on whom the law has imposed slavery. (iii) The slave 'by appetite' is one who cannot control himself because he is dominated by his appetites (*shahawāt*) and feelings (*khawāṭir*). One who is like this is a bad slave and a bad person and is good for nothing. [57] (iv) The slave 'by nature' has a strong body and endures toil. He has no discernment in himself (between good and bad), and there is no sign of intelligence in him . . .

The Arabic translation is not literal, but (as is usual) represents an attempt to understand and interpret the passage while trying to write an idiomatic Arabic. None of the changes the translator introduces make his version problematic. He glosses the threefold division in sentence (i) of the Greek (where the transmission of the text is difficult) by summarizing. In sentence (ii) he calls the first type of slave by a different name from the Greek's '"by law"', but explains that he is a slave as a result of 'the law'. The second type of slave (sentence (iii)) shows his translation technique well, for here the translator starts with his own summarizing phrase ('slave "by appetite"'), ignores the Greek's '"by type of soul"', but then renders ὁ κρατούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων παθημάτων τᾶς ψυχᾶς fairly closely. He ignores οὐχ ἁπλῶς . . . δοῦλος, but appears to take παθῶν as his 'feelings'. He expands the Greek's 'bad person' and ignores the lead ('"by nature"') into the third category of slave. The final sentence (iv) in the Greek has undergone abbreviation. He renders κατὰ φύσιν to παρέχεσθαι well enough, but ignores τοῖς δεσπόταις to ὑπομένεν, and renders the final part 'but he receives no virtue or vice in his soul' with the idiomatic *tamyīz*, which refers specifically to the ability to distinguish or discern good from evil.[6] His 'no sign of intelligence in him'

[5] One might expect a phrase in Greek like οἱ δουλεύοντες δοῦλοι (Dio, *On Slavery and Freedom* II = *Or*. 15.13, retaining the MS reading).

[6] Cf. Koran 8: 37 'That Allah may distinguish (*li-yamīza*) the evil from the good.' In Islamic law the 'age of *tamyīz*' means the age when one distinguishes what is advantageous from what is harmful; cf. Lane 1863–93: 2747, Motzki 1986: 421–3.

may represent an expansion of this, but more likely translates phrases in the Greek original that follow on and are not in Stobaeus.

The translation of the first Greek passage shows a comparable approach, but here there is greater evidence of epitomization. The corresponding parts of the Arabic version according to Plessner are §§12–13 but I give here also the end of §11 and the start of §14, since these are also relevant. Arabic numbers in square brackets again indicate Plessner paragraphs, while Roman numerals in round brackets are suggested correspondences with the sentences of the Greek.

> [11] . . . for the management of his life a man needs all the crafts. [12] The crafts, moreover, are connected to each other. For example, the builder who needs the carpenter, the carpenter who needs the craft of the blacksmiths, the blacksmiths' craft which needs the craft of the miners, and this craft (needs the craft of) the builder. [13] (i) So each one of the crafts, even if complete in itself, needs another, in the way the parts of a chain need each other, (ii) and if one of the crafts is removed, the rest of the crafts cease to exist as a result of its removal. [14] (iii–vii) And since each man needed for managing the affairs (of his life) a variety of things to feed himself with and to cover himself with, and for this purpose was in need of all the crafts . . .

Plessner suggested that the Arabic not only epitomizes but also reorders the Greek text, thereby changing the meaning.[7] The suggestion is due to a misreading of which parts of the Arabic map onto the Greek in Stobaeus. For Plessner, fr. 1 was translated by §§13 and 12 *in that order*. In §12 Bryson Arabus outlines the association of the crafts, a topic he returns to at §31 ('all of them are connected to each other, as we have explained above'). Here the builder's craft is linked to that of the carpenter, which is linked to that of the blacksmith, which in turn depends on mining, which itself needs the builder. In Greek fr. 1(iv–v) we have farming, carpentry, blacksmithing, mining, and then separately (vi–vii) weaving and building. This led Plessner to see §12 as a translation of the second half of fr. 1(iv–vii).

The reality is almost certainly different. Bryson Arabus §13 (the image of the links of the chain) obviously translates fr. 1(i–ii). But Bryson §12 has nothing about building or weaving (fr. 1(vi–vii)). And the point about the necessary *priority* of one craft in relation to another in fr. 1(iv–v) (πρᾶτον εἶμεν δεῖ) is related to, but different from, the point made in §12 about the *circular* relationship of the crafts. A more natural way of looking at the matter

[7] Plessner 1928: 10 'Viel schlimmer noch [i.e. than the epitomization] ist jedoch der Umstand, daß, wie wir bereits aus den kurzen auf uns gekommenen Fragmenten ersehen können, A [the Taymūr MS] auch mit dem Sinn nach Belieben verfahren ist.' It was this statement that gave Bidez his idea that the Arabic showed 'la fantaisie la plus déconcertante' (1929: 146) in its treatment of the Greek.

would be to suggest that §12 on the circular relationship of the crafts contains material *from before* the start of the extant Greek text. On this argument the comparison with the chain in §13 is the first part of the Arabic which corresponds to the Greek in Stobaeus (fr. 1(i–ii)). The Greek then makes a further related but different point about the crafts, beginning with farming and the necessary priority of carpentry, etc. (fr. 1(iv–vi)). For Plessner, the Greek presentation of the crafts here as forming 'eine Linie' in opposition to the 'Kreis' of the Arabic was the 'most important' alteration of sense. But the assumption that each craft presupposes another does not have to contradict the circular arrangement. Consider Bryson Arabus §31: if, Bryson says, men were to aspire to practise only one craft ('the highest'), the other crafts would perish and 'the very craft they aimed at would also disappear because it is only completed by means of the other crafts. For all of them are connected to each other, as we have explained above.' Here, in a different train of thought about inappropriate ambition, there is a highest craft (a linear arrangement relating to the hierarchy of statuses), but *all* of the crafts are mutually linked, which – as the text notes – has already been stated in §12.

Bryson Arabus §12 argues, then, for a circular relationship, next in §13 comes the analogy with the chain. What of the rest of Greek fr. 1? I suggest that it is strongly epitomized in the following paragraph of the Arabic (§14). Here 'affairs' will pick up fr. 1(iii) τῶν τοῦ βίου δὲ πραγμάτων. Qudāma Ibn Jaʿfar's rewriting of Bryson, which was perhaps based on a slightly more complete text of this part than has been transmitted to us, speaks of 'running his *life* and securing advantage for his *affairs*'.[8] Sentences (iv–v) of the Greek were, it may be suggested, omitted by the epitomizer, the reason being that they make a point not greatly different from that made just before (in §12 of the Arabic text). Sentence (vi) σκέπαν is picked up in Arabic §14 'cover himself with'. Greek sentence (vii) on weaving and building and (again) the relationship of the crafts has been omitted.

The rest of Bryson Arabus §14 on the need to form cities is plainly much abbreviated also, if we may judge from the use made of Bryson in Themistius (below, pp. 126–9). The start of §15 ('People, then, had a need of each other but the occasion of each person's need was usually not the occasion of his associate's need') looks like an attempt to bridge a gap. The material about cities (in its full form) would certainly follow on appropriately from what we have in the last part of Greek fr. 1.

If all this is right, there is *no* drastic alteration of sense between the Greek and the Arabic, even though the Arabic as we have it here is quite clearly an

[8] See n. 43 to the text/translation. Contrast Plessner 1928: 10 'Der Satz über τὰ τοῦ βίου πράγματα hat bei A [the Taymūr] überhaupt kein Äquivalent.'

epitome. This may have preceded the translation in some degree. The *Letter* of Themistius, Qudāma, and perhaps the Brethren of Purity (below, p. 128) seem to have had a slightly longer version of Bryson's introductory section on economic and social relations. The Brethren in their long recasting of Bryson on the crafts confirm, in their own way, the theme of interrelatedness (Letter 8 'On the Ranks of the Crafts': 'the craft of building in addition requires the craft of carpentry and smithing, and both of these need another craft which assists and completes each one'; see below, p. 130). The point is important because Bryson's observation of the interconnectedness of the economic system is unique in Greco-Roman literature.

(b) Musonius

Important light on the Greek text of Bryson is shed by extracts from the discourses of Musonius Rufus assembled by his disciple Lucius and preserved in Stobaeus' *Anthology*. There is no absolute certainty that Musonius said what his disciple wrote. We may compare the *Discourses* of Epictetus, which were written up by Arrian. Most scholars are happy to speak simply of Epictetus or Musonius as the author and for present purposes I shall do the same.[9] Aspects of the intellectual relationship between Musonius and Bryson with regard to expectations of the wife and the upbringing of the child (social behaviour) will be treated in Chapters 5 and 6. Here I am concerned with evidence for the Greek text of Bryson's third section and with the question of Bryson's priority.[10]

The relationship between the two authors is indisputable and consists of general similarities and particular passages. The correspondences were first pointed out, as I have mentioned in Chapter 1, in a neglected article by an Italian scholar, Giuseppe Baldassarre (1978a), who knew Bryson only through Plessner's translation. Baldassarre identified Musonius' use of Bryson section three in *Discourse* III ('That Women Also Should Study Philosophy') and XIIIa–b ('What Is the Main Purpose of Marriage?').[11] His arguments for the priority of Bryson were (1) chronological, (2) the

[9] Hense 1905 has a full but inconsequential discussion of Lucius, of whom nothing is known. Cf. Baldassarre 1978b.

[10] Musonius is cited from Hense 1905. See also Lutz 1947, whose text is practically identical to Hense's and is used by the *TLG* (but without Lutz's page numbers). Hense is reproduced in Ramelli 2001 (but without the apparatus criticus or *Similienapparat*).

[11] XIIIa–b are often assumed to represent one continuous original, and that is very likely. Stobaeus, however, splits them by putting the latter in his section 'On Wooing' (4.22d.104), while XIIIa is filed in the previous subsection on the advantages and disadvantages of marriage (4.22c.90). The change in subject from XIIIa to XIIIb suggests that something in between has been lost, even if we retain Hense's ordering. See the translation in Chapter 5, pp. 337–8.

improbability that a handbook would mine a collection of diatribes, (3a) the 'carattere esclusivamente economico' of the relationship between the spouses in Bryson as opposed to the 'concezione molto alta della donna e dei rapporti fra i coniugi' in Musonius, and (3b) the more profound conception of the institution of marriage in Musonius.

The first argument begs the question, of course. Baldassarre was relying on the view of Thesleff that Bryson belonged to the third century BC (see Chapter 1, p. 51), which has no particular weight.

The second and third arguments are, however, important and merit treatment. We are concerned with two longish sections of Bryson's text, §§85–96 and 96–103.

Bryson Arabus §§85–96 contains arguments and phraseology that occur in Musonius XIIIb (pp. 69.4–70.7 Hense). Bryson begins (*a*) by recalling the traditional theme that a man who is choosing a wife should not look for rank, wealth, or beauty. The focus then turns (*b*) to the problems which arise for 'the management of the estate', if the wife is aware that she possesses the aforementioned qualities (§§85–7). This is followed (*c*) by a discussion of how to achieve the 'two purposes' of marriage, 'children and the management of the estate' (the themes which in fact structure the whole section on the woman, §§74–103); here Bryson returns to rank, wealth, and beauty and outlines the problems they cause (§§88–9). Then (*d*) we learn that there are the two things needed in the woman in order to have children: a sound mind (soul) and a sound body (§90). Next (*e*) is a section on virtues required for 'the management of the estate' (§§91–3). Finally (*f*) comes the image of the straight and crooked pieces of wood (§§94–6), where Bryson concludes by saying that without concord 'the management of their estate goes to ruin'. Musonius XIIIb begins (α) with rank, riches, and beauty (pp. 69.4–9 Hense), and observes the problems they cause for *koinōnia* and *homonoia*, the partnership and concord of marriage. Next (β) (p. 69.9–17 Hense) he notes the types of bodies good for producing children and the minds (souls) good for virtue and *koinōnia*. Finally (γ) (pp. 69.17–70.7 Hense) he remarks on the impossibility of concord between good and bad and uses the image of the straight and crooked pieces of wood.

Overall these passages are close. Musonius has the same order of topics but is far more condensed, dispenses with Bryson's (*b*), most of his (*c*), and covers (*e*) rapidly. He displays no interest in the financial and managerial aspects of the *oikos*. His treatment of (*e*) is significant because the five (sets of) virtues in Bryson §91 constitute one of the few authentically Pythagorean touches in *Management of the Estate* (see Chapter 5, p. 329); Musonius' 'minds . . . disposed . . . to *sōphrosunē*, *dikaiosunē*, and <u>to virtue in general</u>' shows clear

abbreviation; and this means Bryson has priority. The image of the straight/crooked pieces of wood is very similar in both (see below, p. 120).

The second set of overlaps is in Musonius III (pp. 8.15–13.3 Hense), where there are parallels between pp. 10.2–12.5 Hense and Bryson §§96–103. Bryson begins in the second half of §96 (*a*) by picking up from his statement in the first half of the paragraph that husband and wife must be intelligent and just and adds that, 'if anyone doubts what we said . . . we can state' that the woman is the 'manager of the estate', who calculates its benefits and rules its personnel. Next (*b*) is a list of virtues, expressed through a series of rhetorical questions, which are useful for the wife's management of the estate (§§97–100), leading to (*c*) important comments on her affective relationship with her husband and children (§§101–2), and finally (*d*) as the coda of the whole section on the wife the statement that the 'soul in which are united these qualities' is a blessing to her husband and children, an honour for her family, and 'an example to women' (§103). Bryson's comments are, again, set firmly within his argument about how the estate will be successfully managed. Musonius III is on a different and far wider topic, 'That Women Also Should Study Philosophy'. But one of the reasons she should do so is precisely her traditional role within the household as its competent manager. Musonius begins (to take matters from the actual start of the *Discourse*) (α) by outlining the basic physical and mental-cum-attitudinal similarities between man and woman (pp. 8.15–9.17 Hense). He develops this (β) by remarking that 'it appears' that virtue in the woman will come from philosophy. 'For a start' (p. 10.2 Hense, the beginning of the overlap with Bryson), she will be *oikonomikē*, *eklogistikē*, and *archikē*, for 'it is these abilities, I say, that a woman practising philosophy must have in particular', because the role of philosophy is to distinguish what is good and bad within the house (pp. 9.17–10.9 Hense, with an apt quotation of Homer). Next (γ) he says that the woman must be able to control her appetites through *sōphrosunē* – philosophy teaches both man and woman to be *kosmiōtatos* (p. 10.10–19 Hense). Then in (δ) (pp. 10.19–12.2 Hense) he argues that the philosophically educated woman will be a good wife and mother, considering that 'doing wrong is worse than suffering it', loving 'her children more than her life', being 'more courageous', ready to oppose tyrannical, powerful, and rich men, tolerant of hard work, breast-feeding her bairns, serving her husband herself, and not shrinking from tasks others consider servile. Next (ε) is the tricolon coda which marks the end of the overlap with Bryson: such a woman is a blessing (*ophelos*) to her husband, an adornment (*kosmos*) to her family, and a 'fine example' to other women (p. 12.2–5 Hense). Finally (ζ) Musonius changes tack and answers those who say ('"But by Zeus," some people may say, "it is inevitable . . . "') that women

who philosophize spend their days chatting arrogantly about syllogisms with men and neglect to stay at home (*to oikourein*). He counters by asserting that philosophy enjoins action, and that a philosophic woman will be moral and hard-working (pp. 12.5–13.3 Hense).

Bryson and Musonius go in ways appropriate to their overall concerns (management of the estate *vs.* the philosophical education of women). Yet there are striking similarities of content and progression. Musonius (β) on the woman who is *oikonomikē*, *eklogistikē*, and *archikē* is very close in language to Bryson (*a*) (see below, pp. 120–1). Musonius (γ) has a general correspondence (but not in details) with Bryson (*b*). Musonius (δ) has some overlaps with Bryson (*c*) (cf. e.g. §100 'priority over oneself . . . strength and courage in oneself', §101 'prefers their wrongdoing of her to her wrongdoing of them'), and in style recalls the rhetorical questions of Bryson (*b*). Finally the tricolon coda (ε) matches Bryson's (*d*) very closely (see below, p. 121).

Baldassarre was right to bring up (as his third argument) the 'carattere esclusivamente economico' of Bryson (so long as we remember that 'economico' for Bryson includes the people of the estate); perhaps we should actually speak of his book's 'managerial' character. It is quite true that Musonius' emphasis in III and XIIIb (see also XIIIa, and XIV 'Is Marriage an Impediment to Philosophy?') on *koinōnia* and *homonoia* in marriage goes beyond Bryson's 'two purposes for which the woman is sought' at §88, 'i.e. children and the management of the estate' (which are reversed in the fuller treatment at §§74–9 concerning the double-purpose of the wife: 'the perspective of common sense', which is managing the estate, and 'the perspective of Nature', which is having children). These purposes are stressed throughout the section on the woman: in §§74–103 'manag-' occurs ten times, 'child-' eleven times. That is to say, the material where there are overlaps (§§85–96, 96–103) is part of a continuing dual theme in Bryson's book. The strong emphasis from start to finish of the dependency of the estate's fortunes on the success of this managerial marriage builds straightforwardly to the tricolon coda at §103 on the model wife. And of course management and control are the abiding themes of all sections in Bryson's work, while the child, which is introduced as a theme in section three, is then developed fully and at length in section four. Though Musonius does not perhaps reach the affective height of Bryson's all-forgiving wife and mother at §§101–2, his sensitive endorsement of *koinōnia* in XIIIa especially,[12] including the

[12] For overlaps, cf. p. 67.9–10 Hense on shared property with Bryson §81; and p. 68.6–7 on caring for one another 'in health, in sickness, etc.' with Bryson §84.

koinōnia of bringing up children together (contrast Bryson's 'perspective of Nature . . . which Nature requires'), is more subtle and more intelligent than anything Bryson's focus allows him. As to the question Musonius asks in III (Should women practise philosophy?): while it is true, as I have observed, that Musonius' wife is the more *oikonomikē* as a result of her philosophical training, serves her husband in person, and is taught by philosophy not only 'shame', 'modesty', and 'self-control' but also to see 'that the capability for managing (the house)[13] is a virtue' (pp. 12.19–13.1 Hense), her training also makes her fearless in the face of death and unwilling to kowtow to the powerful, the rich, or to tyrants – that is, it makes her into a genuine philosopher. The whole approach and conception of Musonius in this discourse, that women should be educated to the same standard as men, is beyond the mindset of Bryson, who does not once mention the education of daughters or wives and envisages his wife as staying within the *oikos* – whereas Musonius does not bother to rebut the criticism that his philosophical woman fails to stay at home but spends her time in discussion with men, p. 12.7–10 Hense.

As we have seen, the material shared by Bryson and Musonius is split in Musonius across two diatribes on different topics, with XIIIb taking the first tranche culminating in the image of the straight and crooked wood (§§85–96), and III taking the second culminating in the exemplary wife (§§96–103). In both cases Musonius has produced something more reflective from material which chimes with themes spread throughout Bryson's section. The conclusion is inescapable that 'it was Musonius who borrowed from the economic treatise' (Baldassarre). The clear evidence of him abbreviating Bryson's 'Pythagorean' quintet of virtues makes the case certain. To suggest otherwise, we would have to imagine that Bryson's eye was caught by the reference to the wife as *oikonomikē* at III (p. 10.2 Hense) and by the opportunity of using III (p. 12.2–5 Hense) on the model wife as the climax of his section on the woman, but then disregarded Musonius' main theme of philosophical education; and was attracted to XIII for the striking image of the straight and twisted wood, but ignored Musonius' definition of marriage as 'a partnership for life and procreation' in favour of his own 'children and the management of the estate', where having children is Nature's requirement (§77), and then grafted all this Musonian material onto his own §§74–84. This did not happen. Bryson was quite capable of generating imagery (cf. the chain of the crafts at §13, the bow and the slave at §67) and more than capable of independent thought. Moreover it is worth remarking

[13] *hē oikonomikē.*

that, had he borrowed from Musonius, we would need to picture him using Lucius' edition of Musonius' talks, and, even if we place Lucius early in the second century, this would make Bryson uncomfortably late. As to Musonius, we should not say that he had copied Bryson. He was inspired by some of the phraseology and the general movement of thought, shared the usual view that running the estate was the woman's role, but reduced Bryson's obsessive idea of management to a minimum. In contrast to Bryson he elevated the discussion of the woman to the enlightening themes of education and the idealized *koinōnia* of marriage and child-rearing.[14]

Turning now to particular parallels which give a clue to the Greek text of Bryson, three passages in Musonius are very close to what we have in Bryson Arabus. Musonius writes at the end of XIIIb, 'How could people who are bad be in concord with one another? How could a good person be in concord with a bad one? No more than crooked wood could fit with upright wood, or two pieces of crooked wood with each other. For a crooked piece cannot be made to fit an equally crooked piece, still less a straight piece different to it. In a word, a bad person cannot be a friend with a bad person nor in concord with him, and far less with a good person.'[15] The passage, as I noted, is particularly similar to the thought of Bryson §§94–5 and to the words of §95: '[94] The affairs of the estate will not be straight until the character of the woman corresponds to the character and way of the man. The character and way of a bad woman will not correspond to the character and way of a bad man. [95] The two of them will not be in concord unless both are good – just as straight wood will fit only with straight wood and crooked wood will fit neither with straight nor with crooked wood because straightness constitutes a single way while crookedness (goes) in many ways.' The image of the crooked and the straight wood is not found elsewhere,[16] and is apparently original to Bryson.

Discourse III contains two passages which are close to the Arabic. Shortly after the start Musonius announces discussion of the qualities a woman needs to live 'virtuously' (*kalōs*). 'For a start the woman must be capable of managing the household (*oikonomikē*), capable of calculating (*eklogistikē*)

[14] Cf. XIIIa, p. 67.6–7 Hense βίου καὶ γενέσεως παίδων κοινωνίαν κεφάλαιον εἶναι γάμου.

[15] 69.17–70.7: πῶς δ' ἂν ὁμονοήσειαν ἄνθρωποι πονηροὶ ὄντες ἀλλήλοις; ἢ πῶς ἀγαθὸς πονηρῷ ὁμονοήσειεν; οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον ἢ ὀρθῷ ξύλῳ στρεβλὸν συναρμόσειεν ἄν, ἢ στρεβλὰ ἄμφω ὄντα ἀλλήλοιν. τὸ γὰρ δὴ στρεβλὸν τῷ τε ὁμοίῳ τῷ στρεβλῷ ἀνάρμοστον, καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τῷ εὐθεῖ ἔτι μᾶλλον. ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὁ πονηρὸς τῷ τε πονηρῷ οὐ φίλος οὐδ' ὁμονοεῖ καὶ πολὺ ἧττον τῷ χρηστῷ.

[16] Chapter 5, p. 330.

what is good for the estate, and capable of governing (*archikē*) the servants.'[17] The woman who studies philosophy, says Musonius, has exactly these attributes. Compare Bryson Arabus §96: 'we can state . . . that she is without any doubt the caretaker (*qayyima*) and manager (*mudabbira*) of the estate, who calculates (*mufakkira*) what is good for it, and who is charged with ruling (*mutawalliya li-siyāsa*) the servants and the other persons within it'. The string of participles in the Arabic may be an attempt to catch the flavour of the Greek adjectival formations *oikonomikē*, *eklogistikē*, *archikē*.

As we have seen, in the following lines Musonius continues to draw on Brysonian material about the qualities of the wife. At the end of this section, and before comments of his own about possible dangers of philosophy for women, he concludes by asking, 'Would not such a woman be a blessing to her husband, an adornment to her family, and a fine example to women who know her?'[18] Cf. Bryson §103 ('for when these qualities are united in the woman, then she is blest in herself, her husband and her children are blest on her account, her family is held in honour because of her, and she becomes an example to women').

(c) Other evidence for the Greek text

(i) There are a number of instances where Musonius uses material which has parallels in the fourth section of Bryson on the upbringing of the child. As I shall be saying in Chapter 6, this material is largely in the common domain and most of it is not original to Bryson. In this regard it is hardly surprising if Musonius on the subject of clothes has correspondences with Bryson. But, since Musonius read Bryson, and since Bryson is one of only two compendious treatments of correct codes of behaviour for children (and adults) that we know of (the other being Clement's *Paedagogus* in the late second century), the likelihood is that Musonius did draw on him. Two passages may be mentioned. In *Discourse* XIX 'On Shelter' Musonius remarks that 'it is not good to be entirely without experience of cold and heat, but one ought in some degree to feel chill in winter and be exposed to sun in summer . . .' (p. 107.3–5 Hense). Compare Bryson §137 'if the boy is exposed to a degree of cold in winter and heat in summer, it is better for him than being exposed to neither of them'. In fr. XXVI Musonius says

[17] 10.2–4: αὐτίκα δεῖ οἰκονομικὴν εἶναι τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ ἐκλογιστικὴν τῶν οἴκῳ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀρχικὴν τῶν οἰκετῶν. For τῶν οἴκῳ συμφερόντων as the job of the *oikonomos*, cf. Arius Didymus *ap*. Stobaeus 2.7.11d, cited in Chapter 3, pp. 203–4.

[18] 12.2–4: ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν ἡ τοιαύτη γυνὴ μέγα μὲν ὄφελος εἴη τῷ γεγαμηκότι, κόσμος δὲ τοῖς προσήκουσι γένει, παράδειγμα δὲ χρηστὸν ταῖς ἐπισταμέναις αὐτήν;

that, 'not hesitating to do disgraceful things begins with not hesitating to say disgraceful things' (p. 120.9–10 Hense). Compare Bryson §147, 'the boy must be prevented from mentioning disgraceful things and be warned against hearing them from someone else. For mentioning them and paying attention to them associates him with them. If he finds referring to them objectionable and regards them as revolting, he will take greater exception to doing them, etc.' If Clement is anything to go by, the reference in Musonius's *ta aschēmona legein* is to lewd talk, cf. *Paedagogus* 2. 6.

(ii) Dio Chrysostom, as part of his very wide range of literary and social interests, wrote a lost *Oikonomikos logos*, which is excerpted by Stobaeus. The brief fragments in Stobaeus show us that Dio's book treated the relationship between husband and wife, the rearing of children, self-presentation and control, and slavery. Dio was acquainted with Musonius and wrote a lost *Πρὸς Μουσώνιον* to him. Synesius' report of this work mentions it in the same breath as another lost book, *Κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων*, but there is no reason to follow Synesius in taking the *To Musonius* as an attack (as *Against the Philosophers* must have been).[19] Given Musonius' use of Bryson's *Oikonomikos*, we might expect Dio to know Bryson too. Dio fr. v may show influence. It is included by Stobaeus in a section on slaves and masters: 'one must act fairly as a master and allow those (slaves) that want it to relax sometimes. Periods of rest prepare one for hard work: bow, lyre, and man flourish as a result of relaxation.'[20] Compare Bryson §§66–7 where he argues that a slave must be given 'periods of rest' because a slave 'too weary for work' is no good to the master. 'Rest renews the body and makes work attractive to (the body's) possessor', and 'in this regard (the slave) is like the bow: if it is left strung, it becomes loose; but if it is put aside till the moment when it is needed, its strength endures and it is more suitable for someone to use it'. The image of the bow/lyre (and other similar examples) is part of the Stoic topos of 'work and play' (περὶ σπουδῆς καὶ παιδίας).[21] It is applied e.g. in this period by Ps.-Plutarch, *Training of Boys* 9c to the parent–child relationship, and while an application to masters and slaves is not a difficult move, so far as is known, Bryson and Dio are the only authors where we find it. Given the title of Dio's book and the intellectual community between Dio

[19] Synesius, *Dio*, 1.75 ed. Terz. = Loeb Dio, vol. v, 372–3. Many Dio scholars have believed that the unnamed high-ranking Roman philosopher who annoyed the Romans, and is praised for it, at *Or.* 31.122 is Musonius.

[20] Χρὴ οὖν δεσπόζειν ἐπιεικῶς καὶ ἀνεθῆναί ποτε βουλομένοις ἐπιτρέπειν. αἱ γὰρ ἀνέσεις παρασκευαστικαὶ πόνων εἰσί, καὶ τόξον καὶ λύρα καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἀκμάζει δι' ἀναπαύσεως.

[21] Praechter 1912 citing Dyroff 1899: 269 (Quintilian 1.3.8, Seneca, *De tranq. an.* 17.5).

and Bryson on work and the treatment of slaves, we probably have further evidence for the readership of Bryson.

(iii) Clement of Alexandria's *Paedagogus* was written towards the end of the second century. It is a moral treatise designed to make its wealthy Christian readers control their desires and appetites and conduct themselves in a way appropriate to their class and especially their religion. I shall say more about it in Chapter 6. It contains a number of passages which reflect the kind of guidance on manners that we see in Bryson section four. Obviously much of what Clement says needed no written source. Nevertheless he certainly used Musonius (verbatim but anonymously). Use of Bryson would not be surprising. At 2.7.54.3–55.3 Clement lists the table manners expected of 'young men'. Among other things, he says that, 'If they should be sitting, they must not have their feet crossed or place one leg over the other or use their arm to support their chin. For it is vulgar not to carry oneself properly, and a bad sign in a young man' (54.3).[22] In Bryson §144 'the boy should not be allowed to place one leg over the other while he is sitting nor to support his head on his arm. For anyone who does this shows that he has gone so far in relaxing . . .' The combination of the two habits – crossing the legs and resting the head on the chin – is not apparently attested elsewhere. But it is possible that Clement read it in a lost part of Musonius drawn from Bryson. For other, general parallels between Clement 2.7.55 and Bryson on eating habits, see Chapter 6, pp. 391–2. Beyond this it is worth mentioning the parallels between Bryson's demand for a total supervision of the boy at §115 ('in every situation involving his eating, drinking, sleeping, posture standing, posture sitting, movement, speech, and all his affairs') and Clement's calls at 3.11.59.1 ('posture standing, movement, walk, clothes, and quite simply our whole way of life'[23]) and 3.11.68.1 ('appearances, looks, walks, and voices'[24]).

2 THE PYTHAGOREAN REVIVAL AND LATE ANTIQUITY

(a) Pythagoreans

Bryson might not have survived had he chosen to write his handbook outside the Pythagorean tradition (and especially that part of it which

[22] εἰ δὲ καὶ καθέζοιντο, μὴ ἐναλλάξ τὼ πόδε ἐχόντων μήδε μὴν θάτερον τοῖν μηροῖν θατέρῳ ἐπιφερόντων ἢ τὴν χεῖρα τῷ γενείῳ ὑπερειδόντων· ἀγεννὲς γὰρ μὴ φέρειν αὑτόν, καὶ τοῦτο κατηγόρημα τοῦ νέου. The wider passage is translated at Chapter 6, p. 391.

[23] καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ βάδισμα καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς τὸν πάντα βίον.

[24] τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ βλέμματα καὶ τὰ βαδίσματα καὶ τὰς φωνάς.

he wrote in pseudo-Doric). For the authority of Pythagoras was a serious matter in the Roman period. It was he who had invented philosophy, which was the Greeks' claim to fame according to Diogenes Laertius in the preface to his *Lives of the Philosophers*. There are a number of excellent studies which focus (in part at least) on the renewed interest in Pythagoras and Pythagorean philosophy from the time of the Roman Late Republic and the ways in which Pythagoreanism was built into Platonism, especially after Plotinus.[25] From the second and third centuries Christianity motivated pagans to prove the antiquity of their wisdom by deploying detailed chronologies to demonstrate the vintage of the Jewish scriptures and prophecy which guaranteed Christian truth. In response pagan philosophers made their beliefs more exclusive and emphasized their own roots. As I have mentioned in Chapter 1, Porphyry (d. *c.* 305–10) and Iamblichus (d. *c.* 325) were the key figures in building up the importance of Pythagoras. Both wrote on his life. Porphyry's biography (which was the first book in his *History of Philosophy*) was an important transmitter of information about Pythagoras to the medieval East (see Cottrell 2008). But Iamblichus' Pythagoreanism went far beyond that of his older contemporary. There is an important and well-referenced study of his contribution in Macris (2002), cf. also Staab (2002). Iamblichus' *Collection of Pythagorean Doctrines*, which began with *On the Pythagorean Life*, was a vast undertaking. Four books survive from the original ten. He or a pupil authored a commentary on the *Golden Verses*, which is available in Arabic (Daiber 1995); and throughout his writings there is systematic evidence of the availability to him of a large Pythagorean library. It is the pseudo-Doric works that interested Iamblichus. He showers praise on Pythagorean Doric in *On the Pythagorean Life* 241–3 (cf. 157). He shares this interest in the Doric pseudopythagorica with Stobaeus. Since it is clear that Stobaeus had good access to the writings of Iamblichus, who is the most cited of all the modern philosophers in the *Anthology*, it is likely that Stobaeus' own interest was based on the availability of a similar collection and one which of course included Bryson. It is almost as if Iamblichus gave Stobaeus the authority to include these works (cf. Harder 1926: xvii, Macris 2002: 97, 108–9). If oeconomic material was

[25] Among these I have benefited especially from John Dillon's *The Middle Platonists* (1996), Dominic O'Meara's *Pythagoras Revived* (1990), Polymnia Athanassiadi's *La lutte pour l'orthodoxie* (2006), and Charles Kahn's *Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans* (2001), articles and studies by Burkert (Burkert 1961, 1971, 1972, 2001), Thesleff (1961, 1965, 1971), van den Waerden (1965), and Moraux (1984 pt 4), and editions of individual Neopythagorica by Harder (1926), Szlezák (1972), Tobin (1985), Giani 1993, and Thom (1995, cf. Linley 1984, Daiber 1995). For scholarly debates on the dating and classification of the pseudopythagorica, the summary in Giani 1993: 8–18 is esp. helpful.

discussed by Iamblichus himself, it could have been in the lost sixth book of the *Collection* on ethics.

Although Bryson was written in pseudo-Doric, it is possible that the work of his Arabic translator was made easier by the existence of a recension in ordinary literary Greek (*koinē*). This is completely unknown; but is not unlikely both because we do not know of a translation into Arabic of a Doric text, and because two of our Neopythagorean philosophical treatises that were written in Doric, probably in the late Hellenistic period, were re-edited in *koinē* versions. *On the Nature of the Universe*, by the fictitious Ocellus of Lucania (Harder), and *On the Categories* (*Περὶ τοῦ καθόλου λόγου*: Szlezák 1972: 13–19), ascribed to the historical Pythagorean Archytas, have been transmitted only as *koinē* texts, but some passages of Ocellus are preserved by Stobaeus in Doric and larger parts of Archytas are quoted in Doric by the Neoplatonist philosopher Simplicius. It is clear from Doricisms in the *koinē* recensions, which are fairly mechanical rewritings without alteration or shortening, that the originals were Doric. Richard Harder suggested that Ocellus was changed at a very late stage, possibly as late as the great Byzantine recopying of manuscripts into minuscule (Harder 1926: xx–xxii; cf. Szlezák 1972: 19 n. 100 in support). The argument was based on the fact that the Neoplatonists wanted to keep their Pythagorean documents in antique Doric. But it seems that not everyone would have agreed. Porphyry held that Doric was 'obscure' and an impediment to knowledge of Pythagorean doctrine (*Life of Pythagoras* 53). Works like those of Ocellus and Ps.-Archytas were important because they were taken as sources for Aristotelian philosophy at least by some,[26] and there is no reason why they could not have been rewritten in *koinē* much earlier, perhaps in the first or second century, to make them accessible within Peripatetic circles. If Bryson was indeed re-edited in *koinē*, the same conditions might have applied. He had no special value for Platonists looking to their Pythagorean origins, so there was no reason for him to remain as a hallowed text among Pythagoreanizing Platonic philosophers alone. In terms of economic and family matters he is closest to Stoic traditions in content (and was certainly read by authors interested in these: Musonius, Dio), but in terms of form – as a treatise on the *oikos* – he is naturally part of a tradition looking to Aristotle's *Politics* and *Oikonomika I–II*. If that is right, a *koinē* version would have been helpful to readers wanting to fill in the gap between the *Ethics* and the *Politics* according to the standard classification of the sciences. What Aristotelians would have made of him cannot be known. Themistius at any rate rejected

[26] See. Chapter 6, p. 410 n. on the Islamic tradition.

Ps.-Archytas as an impostor.[27] Since Themistius declared in this report (which is not preserved in the original) that Ps.-Archytas claimed authenticity 'vetustate nominis', not by his use of Doric, it looks as if he read his *On the Categories* in the *koinē* recension. As to Bryson, he is so different from *Politics* and even from *Oikonomika 1* that the Peripatetic texts could hardly have been felt to derive from him, even in part; but his comprehensiveness made him a valuable complement to them.

(b) Themistius, Letter on Government

It may have been Bryson's presence among Aristotelians (if that is right) that appealed to Themistius. Basic information about his *Letter on Government* has been given in Chapter 1. Although it survives only in Arabic translation, its authenticity can be proved, as I have pointed out, because of its reuse in Nemesius of Emesa's *On the Nature of Man*. The translator of the Themistius, al-Dimashqī, clearly had sight of the Nemesius when he did the Themistius, for the wording used in the passages they share in common is very similar; and he was acquainted with its translator (either Ḥunayn or his son Isḥāq). It is possible that the translation of the *Letter* played a part in the translation of Bryson inasmuch as the translation of a Greek work of political advice (coming on top of the translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* by Isḥāq b. Ḥunayn) must have sent informed readers looking for Greek *oikonomika* to accompany it.

Since the *Letter* is the subject of a separate edition, translation, and study, I shall keep my remarks brief and focus solely on the use of Bryson. I refer to the paragraphs of my translation (Swain 2013) and also to the Latin translation in the third volume of the Teubner Themistius.[28]

The section of interest is §§1–11 where Themistius embarks on an anthropology. The general similarities with Bryson are striking, though there are many divergences in detail. Themistius starts by charting how the divine gave mankind faculties to help them live and take in nourishment to counter the constant flux from him and change in the qualities (§§1–7). His 'permanent dissolution owing to movement' corresponds to Bryson's 'continuous and permanent dissolution . . . dissolved from him

[27] Thesleff 1965: 21–2, citing Boethius' commentary on the *Categories: In Cat. Arist.* 162A ed. Migne *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 64: Themistius 'did not agree with (Iamblichus) and would not allow that it was Archytas the Pythagorean from Tarentum . . . but some Peripatetic Archytas who used an ancient name to bestow authority on a brand new work'.

[28] Bouyges 1924: 20–3 provides a summary in French, and there is also Norman's Latin in the Teubner Themistius (Shahid 1974), misleading though it is in places.

<by movement>' (6).[29] Bryson §§6–9 is close in sense. Themistius next recounts how man's softness led to the need for protection and defence (§§8–10) and hence to 'the crafts'. Since an individual man could not undertake (or perhaps: learn) all of the crafts, 'people had a need of other people . . . and joined together in a single location . . . Thus they formed cities so that people could enjoy advantages of proximity' (§§11–12). This is close in thought and language to Bryson §§10–11 and §14. In Bryson the crafts also come before the foundation of cities. If all this is right, Themistius' greater attention to the role of the city in §§12–14 (90.5–92.2 Shahid) may suggest that Bryson originally had more on the topic, as we should expect.

One item may be examined in more detail, since Themistius appears to confirm the existence of a passage in Bryson which is not in our manuscripts but was (it seems) in the copy used by Dimashqī for his manual of trade (Chapter 1, pp. 103–4, Chapter 3, pp. 252–4). In the scheme of things this is a minor matter; but it shows Bryson's adaptation of a theme and the way in which his use of it appealed to others. In *Letter* 8 Themistius says that God 'made (man's) skin – with which he was able to sense things he came into contact with on the exterior – thin, delicate, and lacking any covering of thick hair, wool, feathers, fur, scales, or shells, which are found on animals'. Dimashqī (pp. 21–2 ed. al-Shūrbajī; p. 48 in Ritter's translation) has a very similar passage embedded in a larger section where he is following Bryson closely. Man, he says, needs various crafts to carry out various processes, but an individual cannot take up all the crafts 'due to the brevity of his life'; and because the crafts are interlinked, a need for cities arose to provide mutual aid, since need applied to all (pp. 20.13–21.4). Now he makes the additional point: 'as for the rest of the animals, they had no need of one another . . .[30] for they were dressed as they were in natural coverings such as hair or wool or fur or feathers or scales or shells', and also enjoyed natural provision of food and dwelling places (p. 21.5–8). He follows this by noting that domesticated animals in contrast needed people to feed them (p. 21.9–10; cf. Bryson §9 and see below), and then resumes Bryson as we have him in the Taymūr manuscript in §§15–22: 'people, then, were in need of each other . . . but the occasion of each person's need was not the occasion of another's need, etc.', so they came to require a means of exchange and money was invented

[29] The insertion is guaranteed by its inclusion in the verbatim citation of this passage by Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ; see text and translation *ad loc*.

[30] The missing words *baʿda quwwat al-sharr*, lit. 'after/aside from the power/faculty of evil/harm' are difficult to make sense of. Ritter 1917: 48 took the meaning as 'die übrigen Lebewesen aber bedürfen nicht einer des anderen bei der Einwirkung schädlicher Gewalten'. If, by an easy change, one read *surr* rather than *sharr*, one might suggest 'aside from the faculty of pleasure' (cf. Lane 1863–93: 1337): i.e. the animals only needed one another for procreation. Translationese may be behind the problem.

(p. 21.11 ff. ed. al-Shūrbajī; pp. 48–9 in Ritter's translation). There is no trace of Themistius in Dimashqī, nor of Nemesius who took the passage over as part of the material he used from Themistius.[31] In other words, Dimashqī seems to confirm that we are dealing with a lost sentence of Bryson.

As the exact position of the sentence is not clear (because Dimashqī p. 21.9–10 harks back to Bryson §9), I have not inserted it in the text of Bryson but noted it only. Further confirmation that it was there comes from the eighth letter of the Brethren of Purity in the section entitled 'On the Ranks of the Crafts' (ed. al-Ziriklī, pp. 1, 216–17; cf. below, p. 130). The argument of this section is the crafts' dependence on one another in a hierarchy. It seems extremely likely that Bryson has been an influence here, as Plessner noted. He is used for sure in the second of the Brethren's letters, where there is a citation of §10 in the Brethren's section on the need for men to cooperate (p. 1, 62 ed. al-Ziriklī).[32] At §13 Bryson says, 'each one of the crafts, even if complete in itself, needs another': this is the idea developed at length in the Brethren's eighth letter (e.g. 'weaving is only completed by the craft of spinning, and the craft of spinning is only completed by the craft of carding, etc.', 'each one of these crafts [milling, pressing, baking, cooking] needs another craft which completes it'). Thus when they write, 'since man was created with a thin skin naked of hair, wool, fur, shell, and feathers and the things other animals have, want gave rise to the making of clothes by the craft of weaving', it is likely in this context that they are citing Bryson (rather than suddenly turning to Themistius or Nemesius for one sentence).

The passage about the natural coverings of the animals occurs in extant classical literature in this form only in Nemesius, though Origen, *Against Celsus* 4.76 offers similarities and may have reinforced what Nemesius read in Themistius. The determination of earlier generations to identify Nemesius' sources, coupled with a desire to uncover as much as possible of the lost works of the Stoic philosopher Posidonius, led Willy Theiler to classify the Nemesius as a fragment of Posidonius (fr. 309a, pp. 1, 112ff. Theiler). Even without knowledge of the Themistius, Dimashqī, and Brethren

[31] Nemesius Graecus 1.7–8 (p. 43.13–21 trans. Sharples and van der Eijk) 'not merely for comeliness, but also on account of sensitivity of touch, in which man surpasses all other animals, He did not clothe us in a thick skin, like oxen and the other thick-skinned animals, nor in long thick hair like goats, sheep and hares, nor in scales like snakes and fish, nor in shells like tortoises and oysters, nor in a pliable shell like beetles, nor in wings like birds. As a result, we inevitably needed clothing, as a supplement to us of what nature gave to other species. For these reasons we need food and clothing, and we need housing both for these reasons and especially as refuges from wild beasts.' Nemesius Arabus is very similar here.

[32] 'It is impossible for an individual man to acquire all of (the crafts) because life is short and the crafts are many. On account of this, many people have gathered together, etc.' Cf. Bryson 'owing to the brevity of his life, it is impossible for one person to discover and learn (each of them) . . .'

versions, this was optimistic. In fact the Brysonian passage develops a theme concerned with the difference between humans and wild animals which can be seen clearly at the start of Book 7 of Pliny the Elder's *Natural History*, where he waxes lyrical about the wonders of Mother Nature: 'man alone of all living things she clothes in borrowed resources. On all the rest in various ways she bestows coverings of shells, bark, spines, hides, fur, bristles, hair, down, feathers, scales, fleeces; even the trunks of trees by bark . . .'[33] Ultimately this goes back to Plato, *Protagoras* 321a–c, and in all cases the stress is on animals' natural protection.[34] It is original of Bryson to adapt it to the theme of work and need for the crafts, a change which fits very well with the overall thrust of the 'commercial anthropology' (see esp. Chapter 3, pp. 228–36), where he takes a number of ideas common to accounts of human development (e.g. in the *Protagoras*) and fashions them to his own managerial agenda. The run of thought in the passage of Origen (God made man to lack, hence crafts for food and protection, hence 'sailing and navigation', whereas animals were given natural protections) may well be inspired by Bryson, for Origen knew Musonius and his teacher Clement may cite Bryson, as I have mentioned above.

(c) Aristotle in late antiquity: Oikonomikos *and texts on marriage*

There are late-antique reports of a work by Aristotle with the title *Oikonomikos* (*vel sim.*) which has the same topics as Bryson's *Management of the Estate*. Diogenes Laertius lists an *Oikonomia* (5.22; see Gigon (1987) fr. 99 = Rose fr. 182). The reports are very similar: the work dealt with the three relationships father–children, slave–master, wife–husband (the order differs) and with the need for income and expenditure to match. Most likely the reference is to what we call *Oikonomika I*. Of the *Περὶ συμβιώσεως ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός*, which one of our reports links to these topics, nothing can be said. The same goes for the *Νόμοι ἀνδρὸς καὶ γαμετῆς*, which Rose (fr. 184) believed was the real title of *Oikonomika III*, a work that has nothing to do with Aristotle.[35] Gigon fr. 100 = Rose fr. 183 from Clement, *Paedagogus* 3.12.84.1 on the behaviour of wives in front of slaves is not worth consideration as evidence of a specific oeconomical text by Aristotle.

[33] Pliny, *NH* 7.2: 'unum animantium cunctorum alienis uelat opibus, ceteris <sua> uarie tegimenta tribuit, testas, cortices, spinas, coria, uillos, saetas, pilos, plumam, pinnas, squamas, uellera, truncos etiam arboresque cortice . . .'

[34] See A. S. Pease's commentary on Cicero, *De natura deorum*, vol. 2 (1958), p. 855 *ad* 2.121.

[35] *Περὶ συμβίωσεως* and *Νόμοι* are listed in the late life of Aristotle attributed to Hesychius Illustrius (ed. Düring 1957).

3 BRYSON ARABUS AND PLESSNER'S 'OMISSIONS'

Martin Plessner attempted to bolster his suggestion that Bryson Arabus not only shortened but also distorted Bryson Graecus fr. 1 by citing the evidence of the Brethren of Purity's eighth letter on the crafts (1928: 16–17). In reality the support he was seeking was not there. The passage in question is on p. 217 of the Cairo edition by Ziriklī, and may be quoted to show their style and their focusses. The key terms are in italics:

> And again since man was created needing foodstuffs and nourishment, and foodstuffs and nourishment come only from the seeds of plants and the produce of trees, want gave rise to the craft of *farming and planting*. And since the craft of *ploughing* requires the breaking of earth and the digging of streams and this is only completed by means of shovels and yokes and such like, and shovels and yokes are nothing without the *craft of carpentry and smithing*, want gave rise to the use of these, and the craft of the *smith* requires the craft of the *miner* and other crafts. Thus all of these are subordinate and ancillary to the craft of *farming and planting*...
>
> And again, since man is in need of something to shelter him from heat and cold, protection from beasts, and secure storage for foodstuffs, want called him to the craft of *building*. The craft of *building* in addition requires the craft of *carpentry* and *smithing*. And both of these need another craft which assists and completes each one.

In Bryson Graecus fr. 1 the order of the crafts is: farming, carpentry, smithing, mining, weaving, and building. The Brethren have in this passage: farming/planting, ploughing, carpentry, smithing, mining, farming/planting; and then: building, carpentry, smithing; and a little before (see p. 128) weaving and crafts related to it. Bryson Arabus §12 has building, carpentry, smithing, mining, building. I have suggested above that the list of interrelated crafts in Bryson Arabus comes from a section of the Greek immediately before the Stobaean fragment. With regard to the Brethren, their recasting of Bryson to suit their own theme makes it impossible to attempt to use their text to comment on the *order* of Bryson's crafts in Greek or Arabic, as Plessner wanted. Their argument centres on the subordination of the crafts, which is not in Bryson. Their insistence that the crafts are dependent on each other is at least close to Bryson's concern with interrelatedness.

It was not only on the basis of the Brethren that Plessner claimed that 'we have several clear signs that Bryson had once existed more completely' (pp. 14–15). He cites five further passages, of which three are worth commenting on. First is the end of §32 'it is not long before his property is consumed'. Dimashqī adds 'and nothing remains of it at all (*al-battata*)'; the

short Latin *Yconomica Galieni* (which rests on an Arabic epitome used by the Jewish philosopher Ibn Falaquera: see below, p. 141) reads, 'in the end his wealth is completely (*omnino*) consumed' (Plessner p. 205). The additional *al-battata* or *omnino* are so bland that no conclusion can be drawn, especially given the general unreliability of the Latin (Plessner p. 24 'little sense and many words'). It is (of course) *possible* that *al-battata* and the other words of Dimashqī stood in Bryson Arabus and have dropped out of the Taymūr; but proof is lacking.[36] More promising is the fourth example of the evidence of Dimashqī and the *Yconomica* on §44, which reads in the Taymūr 'extravagance (*badhakh*) consists in a man overstepping the expectations of his class due to a desire to show off'. Dimashqī adds 'in regard to his food or the clothing he might wear'. The *Yconomica* defines *prodigalitas* as 'when someone goes beyond what his peers do or should do in regard to eating, clothes, or the use of horses to ride on' (Plessner p. 206). It seems justifiable to add Dimashqī's addition to the text of Bryson here in order to provide some examples of 'extravagance'.[37] There is, however, no reason to build an overall relationship of superiority between the two, for the Taymūr scribe may simply have omitted words that were before him out of carelessness. We have, however, already seen that the *Letter* of Themistius, Dimashqī, and the Brethren of Purity strongly suggest that Bryson Graecus and Arabus contained material additional to what we have in the Taymūr on natural protection in animals see (pp. 127–9). If that is right, Dimashqī's copy may well have been a slightly fuller version of the recension.

Plessner's final example is weak in itself but brings us on to more interesting matters. It concerns additional material in Miskawayh's *Refinement of Character* and the *Yconomica*. The *Refinement* uses Bryson, with acknowledgement, in the section of Book 2 'on the education of the young, and of boys in particular' (p. 50 trans. Zurayk). Anyone who reads the section will see that Miskawayh keeps fairly close to Bryson, but adapts the phrases and vocabulary of the Taymūr recension as he wishes. This makes it difficult to use him to improve the tradition or sustain a *stemma*. Bryson §120 is the passage Plessner focussed on. It is a fairly brief comparison between the purposes of food and medicine. Miskawayh reads as follows:

> The boy should first be made to understand that eating is meant only for health and not for pleasure and that all the kinds of food have been created and prepared for us solely to make our bodies healthy and to sustain

[36] The Azhar recension shows no trace of it (fol. 103a: *matā fa'ala dhālika naqaṣa l-māl ḥattā yafnā*). For what it is worth, neither does Ibn Falquera's *Moral Treatise* in the equivalent passage: Zonta 1992: 108 fr. 2.

[37] Ibn Falaquera has 'clothes' at this point: Zonta 1992: 109 fr. 6.

> our life. They should be considered as medicines with which we remedy hunger and the pain resulting from it. Just as we do not seek medicine for pleasure and are not driven by greed to take more and more of it, so it is also with food: we should only take as much of it as would preserve the health of the body, remove the pain of hunger, and guard against disease (pp. 52–3 trans. Zurayk).[38]

The *Yconomica Galieni* (p. 210 Plessner), which shows the particular interest in Bryson section four of its lost Arabic original, also has an expanded version of Bryson §120:

> One should also know that the boy needs food as he needs medicine. It is not intended that medicine should be generous or plentiful nor that its taste should be pleasant but, rather, that it should be useful and beneficial to the body. In the same way there is no intention for food to be generous in quantity or pleasant in taste, but, rather, to have its benefit and utility, since it is solely to defeat the natural feeling of hunger, which only comes about from the emptying of the parts (of the body).

The point is that both Miskawayh and the *Yconomica* (or its source) have rewritten Bryson as they wished. *Perhaps* a reference to hunger has dropped out of Bryson §120 (there is however none at the corresponding point of the Azhar, which stays very close to Bryson in section four); but the *Yconomica*'s 'natural feeling of hunger' is rather different from Miskawayh's 'pain of hunger'. Plessner's conclusion that such passages give us 'an even better picture of the numerous omissions' in the Taymūr is puzzling. The reason for the assertion has something to do with one of his aims in adducing these snippets, which was to prove that the tenth-century Christian intellectual Ibn Zurʿa was *not* the author of the translation of Bryson from Greek, as Cheikho had tentatively suggested in the introduction to his edition.[39] And it has much to do with a blind faith in the fruits of *Quellenforschung*.

There is no cause to say much in this context specifically about Dimashqī or Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ. I have already noted that Dimashqī incorporates substantial passages of Bryson more or less verbatim and perhaps had a better text. Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ uses Bryson's phrases for large parts of his mirror of princes. His tabulated, reference-style of presentation entailed alteration and abbreviation of what he found (cf. Plessner pp. 31–4). Nevertheless Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ and Dimashqī in particular, as well as Miskawayh, attest to the stability of the Taymūr recension in both content and language. This is

[38] The Arabic text is Zurayq 1966: 58.11–17.

[39] Plessner wanted to establish that the Brethren had access to an *ur*-edition dating from before the lifetime of Ibn Zurʿa (943–1008), which was also available to Miskawayh and the author of the epitome.

extremely important and for this reason I have given the main parallels from these authors in the notes to the text and translation. There are words or phrases or the odd sentence where they have genuine material additional to the Taymūr, but these are rare. We must always bear in mind that these authors were perfectly capable of introducing the odd term or phrase in their Brysonian material. By approaching the matter through a rather narrow filter Plessner convinced himself that they allowed the establishment of a text that was more authentic than the Taymūr (or, to be exact, in Louis Cheikho's edition of it). The two *stemmata* on pp. 140–1 of his edition are the summation of his approaches. In fact they are largely groundless. This may seem like a harsh criticism of a young scholar's work, and a scholar whose study of Bryson already showed the very high standards of his later studies (for example of the *Picatrix* and the *Turba Philosophorum*). But *in the main* there is no reason to give the versions of these users of Bryson priority. Each case of difference must be judged on its merits.

In sum what we have in the Taymūr recension is a translation that is certainly not literal but which aimed to convey the sense and content of the Greek original as far as it could, and which remained in use as the standard Bryson among Arabic authors.

4 THE *FIHRIST*, APOLLONIUS OF TYANA, AND THE *ON PAIDEIA*

According to Plessner, Ibn al-Nadīm's *Fihrist* also demonstrated the existence of 'quite divergent recensions' because the title it gave for Bryson's book differed in the two passages where it was mentioned (ch. 7 section 1, ch. 8 section 3) from the title in the Taymūr and in one of these passages contained a dedication (Plessner 1928: 14). We know (of course) of actually different recensions: the Azhar tradition shows this well, as we shall see, and the *Yconomica Galieni* reflects the existence of an Arabic epitome of exactly the sort we should expect to find in the case of a popular and useful text. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Persian summary shows how a major known author handled the abridgement of Bryson. But the evidence of the *Fihrist* itself proves nothing beyond the fact that Ibn al-Nadīm had two copies where the wording of the title differed a little from the Taymūr. The matter is of moment because this is the earliest mention of Bryson's book by author and title apart from Ibn al-Jazzār, who names Bryson and attests the start and end of the fourth section on the boy. I have already noted that Plessner was reliant on Gustav Flügel's famous first edition of the *Fihrist*. This was made from inferior, later manuscripts or modern copies and without the benefit

of what we now know are by far and away the two best manuscripts, Dublin Chester Beatty 3315, which runs from the beginning to *Fihrist* ch. 5 section 1, and Istanbul Süleymaniye, Şehîd Âli Paşa 1934, which contains the rest of the book. These were one to begin with and probably date to the end of Ibn al-Nadīm's life. Both state that the handwriting is 'an imitation of the hand of the author' (Dodge 1970: xxiv–xxx).

In Flügel's text the relevant readings are: Rufus' Book on *tadbīr al-manzil li-ʿlwsws* (Flügel 1871–2: 263), and: Bryson's Book on *tadbīr al-manzil* (p. 315).[40] As Plessner pointed out, Flügel's printing of 'Rufus' was without justification: none of his own manuscripts read it. He realized that the name behind *ʿlwsws* was Apollonius, i.e. Apollonius of Tyana, the Neopythagorean holyman of the first century AD. Apollonius was made famous in the biography, or hagiography, of Flavius Philostratus, which was written at the request of the empress Julia Domna in the 220s (Flinterman 1995, Boter and Flinterman 2005). Philostratus' work reflects Apollonius' emergence into mainstream Greek religion as a figure of magical powers. In fact he enjoyed a healthy pseudo-life in later Greek and Arabic hermetic literature. As the *Fihrist* states later on (ch. 8 section 2), Apollonius' book on 'the talismans he made in his own city and in the kingdoms of the kings'[41] was 'well known and famous'. He was called 'the Master of Talismans' in Arabic and under his name passed a good number of magical and alchemical texts, some of which have Greek forebears (Sezgin 1971: 77–91, Ullmann 1972: 378–81). In the *Fihrist* passage Plessner somewhat wilfully took the preposition *li-* as bearing the meaning 'to' rather than the usual sense it has in relation to books, 'by' (i.e. signalling the author), and translated it as: '*To Apollonius*'. He then ingeniously used the 'ambiguity' of the preposition to explain how the *Yconomica Galieni* had come to be attached to Galen rather than Bryson: someone had taken the title to mean, not "Bryson's Book on *tadbīr al-manzil* **to** Apollonius" but "The Brysonian Book on *tadbīr al-manzil* **by** Apollonius". The Arabic form of Apollonius (*Balīnūs*) was, he observed, sufficiently close to Galen (*Jālīnūs*) to explain the mistake.[42]

One of the most important of Apollonius' Arabic works is the *Book of the Secret of Creation* (Weisser 1980), which explains the nature of the cosmos, the planets, and life on earth. The legend of its discovery by Apollonius in a vault beneath a statue of Hermes Trismegistos reworks an old topos (e.g. Speyer 1974: 50–2). It was Paul Kraus (1942: 273–4 n. 3) who pointed out

[40] كتاب روفس في تدبير المنزل لعلوسوس in the first, كتاب بروسن في تدبير المنزل in the second entry.
[41] Not 'which he wrote in his own city . . .' (Dodge 1970).
[42] بلينوس and جالينوس; see below.

that in Flügel's text the other entry in this subsection of ch. 7 section 1 is the *Book of the Darkened Vault on the Secret of Creation*.[43] In other words, Apollonius' name had been transposed in a copying error (apparently in modern times[44]) and had nothing to do with Bryson but, so he surmised, belonged with the title *Secret of Creation*. The matter was obvious once it was pointed out. Yet Sezgin (1971: 91) could still propose "Das Bryson'sche Ökonomik-Buch von Apollonius". The entries were first printed in the correct order by the first editor to use the Chester Beatty and Süleymaniye manuscripts, Reza Tajaddud, in his 1971 edition of the *Fihrist*. It is worrying that Dodge, who based himself on these manuscripts, still followed Plessner and wrote in his translation, '*Bryson* on the Management of the Home, by *Apollonius*', and footnoted that 'In the manuscripts . . . Rūfus is the first name . . . probably intended to be Bryson' (1970: 630; the italics indicate an unsure reading). For the Süleymaniye manuscript is crystal-clear on fol. 97b: *b-r-w-s-n*.[45] It also clearly marks the *Secret* as belonging to a name which is a corrupted form of Apollonius.[46] As to Tajaddud, although he had the right order, his reading of Bryson's name is odd. In his 1971 edition he put بروخس (p. 322); in his 1987 translation into Persian (which retains the Arabic book titles and names) he dotted the *bā'* and printed بروخس, *B-r-w-kh-s*, though there is no sign of a *khā'* at all (p. 474).

What of the 'author' of the *Yconomica*? Plessner's suggestion was certainly clever (and plausible, since confusion between the Arabic forms of Apollonius and Galen is indeed found: Plessner (1928: 5) citing Steinschneider on the corruption of the name of the celebrated writer on conics, Apollonius of Perge); but it was too imaginative. One very strange thing needs to be acknowledged, however. The *Fihrist* subsection which includes Bryson and Apollonius is entitled, 'Individual Books by a Group of Individuals'. Ibn al-Nadīm left room in his text to add items under the various headings and the Süleymaniye shows this well on fol. 97b where there is plenty of space. Tantalizingly the word 'book' is written next as the start of a third entry here – the heading is a plural not a dual – but no work or author is given. All we have is Bryson and Apollonius. The oddity for us lies in the conjunction in a discrete paragraph of the *Fihrist* of two works by

[43] Not 'The Obscure Way (Mind) about the secret of the Creator' (Dodge 1970).

[44] Of Flügel's manuscripts only two have the dedication: C and H. C is a Paris manuscript (Dodge's '*Manuscript 4458*') that was copied in Istanbul in 1846. As Dodge says, 'the headings are not separated as distinctly as they are in the Flügel text and there seem to be numerous clerical errors' (p. xxxiii). His Dodge's '*Vienna Manuscript No. 34*' and to Flügel appeared to be closely related to his C. It seems that both are copies of the Süleymaniye.

[45] بروسن; only the *bā'* is dotted.

[46] للوسوس, contrast ch. 8 section 2 بلنياس الحكيم 'Balinīyās (*vel sim.*) the Sage' (fol. 147b, Dodge 733).

Greek authors who lived around the same time (Apollonius died at the end of the first century AD) and were both Neopythagoreans (in broad terms). But there is probably nothing more to this than that two Greek (or, in the case of the *Secret*, pseudo-Greek) books came to hand and were filed together awaiting additions to fill out the section. There can be no suggestion on the basis of Arabic literature that Bryson and Apollonius were identified as Pythagorean, even if the citation of Bryson in the second letter of the Brethren of Purity (on geometry) places him in a typically Pythagorean context.[47] As to the ascription of the *Yconomica*, I have suggested in the Introduction (p. 74) that Bryson's quasi-medical focus on the faculties at the start (though omitted in the epitome as transmitted to us in Latin) or the need for a more famous author, and one with an interest in philosophy and ethics, led to the work being attributed to Galen. We may also note that the translation of the Azhar recension (see below) was ascribed to Ḥunayn, probably because he was the most famous of the translators, but also perhaps on account of the medical material. In addition, the medieval scribal habit of omitting dots on dotted letters is a recipe for confusion with foreign names. Bryson was well known in his field, but surely not very well known in general. There is little evidence of him entering the gnomological or biographical tradition. Plessner (1931: 544) noted two appropriate sayings attributed to him in an anonymous Istanbul collection of *sententiae* of Greek philosophers; Dunlop wondered without much foundation about reading the name in the heading of a couple of paragraphs of the *Ṣiwān al-ḥikma* (1979: 87 §145, 94 §177); and it is possible that garbled names in well-known collections like Mubashshir's (Rosenthal 1960–1) hide 'Bryson'.[48] Thus, although Ibn al-Nadīm himself surely knew he was writing 'Bryson', there is no reason for copyists to have known this. The same goes for the name as it is found in the Taymūr. If readers did not already know it, without dots and with incorrect letters it would have been completely unintelligible. This invited a substitute.[49]

To finish this subsection, I must briefly consider the second entry on Bryson in the *Fihrist*. In a division on moral works, Ibn al-Nadīm included (in Dodge's translation), 'of *Bryson*, about moral training; of Bryson, about

[47] Of the Neopythagoreans only Nicomachus of Gerasa was identified as a Pythagorean. This is how he is styled in the manuscript tradition in Greek and Arabic (ed. Kutsch 1959 *min shīʿat Fūthāghūrus*); in terms of the date he was probably confused with Nicomachus the father of Aristotle, who consequently became a 'Pythagorean' in the Arabic biographical machine: Ibn al-Qifṭī, *History of the Sages*, pp. 15, 258–9, 336–7 ed. Lippert 1903.

[48] E.g. among the entries in the penultimate 'composite' chapter of sayings of sages whose material is too slight for an individual section: وقيل لاثاروبوس (Badawi 1980: 304), وقيل لابرونيقس (*Ibid.*: 322).

[49] Cf. the corrupted form in Ibn al-Jazzār: Abū Wās. See further p. 98.

home management' (1970: 739). The first work is on *adab*, *paideia*. It would be no surprise to learn that Bryson had written such a book. Flügel (1871–2: 315) read for this author *B-f-r-w-s*; Tajaddud (1971: 377) has (?) *B-y-r-w-s* (سروس) while in his 1987 translation/revision he has *s–y–r–w–s* (1987: 559). The 1971 reading is an accurate transcription of the Süleymaniye (fol. 151a). It would not be too difficult to change the manuscript's سروس to بروسن, but we cannot be sure this is right and Bryson's authorship of a book on *paideia* must regrettably remain in doubt. The entry following this to the left is clearly Bryson and the *Management of the Estate*: though here the *bāʾ* is undotted (بروسن), the title puts the interpretation beyond doubt. Tajaddud saw this in his 1971 text (*ibid.*), but in his 1987 translation/revision imported *B-r-w-kh-s* from the first entry (1987: 559; cf. above).

5 THE AL-AZHAR RECENSION

In this section I note some of the differences between the Azhar recension (which was unknown to Plessner) and the Taymūr tradition. In Part V there is a sample of text and translation corresponding to the interesting passage at the end of Bryson section three.

The existence of the Azhar text was first pointed out by Fuat Sezgin in his article on Apollonius in his *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums* (1971: 91). He dates the manuscript to the 6th century AH (corresponding to 1106–1202 AD). The fact that the paper is not lined confirms this dating. If anything, the writing suggests 1150–1250. Dots under undotted letters like *ṭāʾ* and *dāl* (distinguishing them from *ẓāʾ* and *dhāl*) are a sign that the Azhar copyist was a Yemeni. The habit of summarizing, which is the main distinguishing feature of the recension, is also known to be Yemenite. The manuscript presents a 'study' note at the start of the text and apparently at the end (though it is difficult to read here). The hand at the start (distinguished by the use of a thin steel nib) is that of a known Yemeni scribe of the seventeenth century called 'Īsā ibn Luṭf Allāh ibn al-Muẓaffar. He dates his activity of 'studying . . . collating . . . correcting' to 1028 AH (1619) and makes a number of suggestions to the text. It is not easy to say what this reader/editor was collating against: the Taymūr Bryson tradition (cf. fol. 108a) or another copy of the Azhar recension? But there are indications from his corrections that he had the Taymūr tradition to hand or knew it, for he includes phrases present in this tradition which are missing from the Azhar recension. I return to this below. As to the question of whether the author of the abridgement made it for himself, this cannot be answered. But as far as the scribe of the main text is concerned (and we should remember that he

himself could have been the author), the relative clarity of the hand suggests that he was writing with others in mind.

The author of the Azhar Bryson both reduces and rewrites the text. The length is around 70–90% of the Taymūr for most of the first three sections including the 'commercial anthropology', and this does not always make the sense clearer, nor indeed is it helpful for the several cases of doubtful readings in the Taymūr. Section four evidently appealed to the author, as it did to the epitomizer behind the *Yconomica Galieni*, since he follows the Taymūr version more faithfully, at least from §115 onwards (see below). Overall he follows the order of Taymūr very closely but occasionally omits paragraphs. The text bears the signs of being read by several people and these have left various corrections or comments.

The most interesting improvement on the Taymūr copy concerns the name of Bryson in the title. Many writers and copyists preserved this in a fairly accurate form, while the Taymūr manuscript does not (unless one knows the name). In the Azhar the name appears as is *b-r-w-n-s*,[50] probably to be read *Burūnus*; but above the last two letters the scribe has written the letters *shīn* and *nūn* meaning that he wanted to read *Burūshun*.

That the main corrector of the text (the one with the steel nib) was not altogether happy with the version he was reading is shown by the fact that he occasionally quotes the Taymūr. Some examples may be given. At §125 Bryson Taymūr reads 'heavy food makes one's nature heavy and prevents it from developing'.[51] Al-Azhar has 'heavy food hobbles one's nature and prevents it from developing'.[52] Above the word 'hobbles' the corrector has written 'makes heavy'. There are several short corrections of this kind. One of the best longer examples is found at §129. Bryson Taymūr reads, 'let the boy be accustomed not to drink water with his food, especially in summer, because if he drinks, the food becomes heavy, his body becomes languid and lazy, the meal is speedily consumed from his stomach, and he is in need of more. In addition, if it is winter, (the water) cools his body.'[53] Al-Azhar reads, 'let the boy be accustomed not to drink too much water after his food, especially in winter, for it will cause heaviness in his belly, and make his body languid and lazy'.[54] The alteration was too much for the corrector, who evidently valued the full remarks about the dangers of water. Over 'to drink

50 برونس.

51 الغذاء الثقيل يثقل الطبيعة ويمنعها من النشوء.

52 الغذاء الثقيل يعقل الطبيعة ويمنعها من النشوء.

53 ويعوّد الصبي ان لا يشرب الماء على غذائه ولا سيّما في الصيف فانه اذا شرب ثقل الغذاء وفتر بدنه به وكسل ونفد الطعام ايضًا عن معدته سريعًا واحتاج الى غيره وان كان الشتاء فهو مع ذلك يبرّد البدن.

54 ويعوّد الصبي لا يُكثر بعد غذائه من شرب الماء ولا سيّما في الشتاء فانه يثقل في جوفه ويفتر بدنه ويكسله.

too much' he wrote 'drinks', and over the last two clauses in my English translation he wrote 'if he drinks, it becomes heavy . . . becomes languid . . . becomes lazy, the meal is consumed from his stomach'; and in the margin he continued, 'and he is in need of more. And if is winter, it . . .' The phrases used in the correction are drawn from the Taymūr.

A different sort of correction occurs in the passage quoted in Part V. Here another reader did not like the shortening of the comparison between the harmonious couple and two straight-edged pieces of wood (§95) and he added some text in the margin. Unlike the corrector with the steel-nibbed pen, the words used do not correspond exactly to the phraseology of the Taymūr recension, but they clearly reflect its argument that two pieces of crooked wood can fit together no better than a straight and a crooked piece can.

What these correctors show again is the stability and authority of the Taymūr recension as *the* text of Bryson in Arabic. It is interesting to note the late date at which the text was being studied. The corrector with the thin steel nib was, as we have seen, writing in the early seventeenth century and had both versions of Bryson. Another collator has left a note at the start of the treatise which is dated 1167 (1753–54). Of course Bryson was being invoked as late as the start of the *twentieth* century as evidence of the invention of political economy in medieval Islam (pp. 70, 88).

Many passages of the Azhar version are in fact very similar to the Taymūr. For example, the end of section one on money (§§51–4), which is Bryson's endorsement and summary of the right approaches to wealth, is transcribed more or less completely. In the fourth section on the child the author is often very close to the words and content of the Taymūr tradition and is therefore of use to us in confirming readings, though even here there are omissions, some surprising (for example §158 on obedience to parents and teachers and educated people). The sort of rewriting we see in the Azhar text is easy to parallel. Miskawayh's alterations to Bryson section four in his *Refinement of Character* offer a good comparison, since he rewords, inverts phrases, or makes additions and deletions in accordance with his statement that 'most of' his chapter on the upbringing of the child has been 'copied from the work of Bryson' (trans. Zurayk 1965: 50). Often, as for example in Rhazes' notes from Galen in the *Continens*, one cannot tell whether an author is rewriting deliberately or doing so as a result of writing from memory.[55] Bryson was the best-known book in its field. It seems that the author of the Azhar text wanted to put his own stamp on this tradition, and that he wanted *his*

[55] On Rhazes' *Continens* (*al-Ḥāwī*), see Jennifer Bryson 2000.

Bryson to be used. Unlike Miskawayh he was anxious to authenticate his changes by passing his text off as the work of someone more famous: his title page ascribes the translation to none other than 'Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq the Physician' (fol. 100b), as I have mentioned. In the present state of our knowledge of the lexicography of the Translation Movement and the lack of enough thorough studies of Ḥunayn's techniques, this claim cannot be substantiated. Ḥunayn's fame as a translator made it easy to foist translations upon him, especially ones beginning with material on the 'faculties'. The Azhar author evidently wanted his version to be read as genuine, which was going to be difficult given the diffusion of the Taymūr text. 'Discovering' the translator's identity was therefore a useful prop.

How far the sense of Bryson has been changed by the reworking is difficult to say. The passage offered in Part V is Bryson's highly affective portrait of the wife's engagement with her husband and children. The reshaping of the text in the Azhar may place more emphasis on the wife's subservience than the Taymūr. But, if it does, the re-emphasis is weak, and, despite the many changes in wording, what we have is essentially a still recognizable version of the standard Bryson Arabus.

6 THE HEBREW TRANSLATION, THE *YCONOMICA GALIENI,* AND BARHEBRAEUS' *BOOK OF ECONOMY*

The medieval Hebrew translation of Bryson survives in a single manuscript in Munich. It was first reported by Steinschneider (1893: 228–9) and edited by Plessner (1928). For convenience Plessner's text is reprinted in Part V. I rely here on the comments by Plessner and Mauro Zonta.

The work was clearly translated from a text very similar to the Taymūr and has a similar title ('"The Disposition of the Man's Management in his House", which Bryson the Philosopher Composed...', cf. the Taymūr's "The Man's Management of his Household/Estate"), but like any translation has been rewritten in part. It was done from Arabic by David ben Shelomoh ibn Yaʿish of Seville, as the title states. A man of this name was active about AD 1375 and the identification first proposed by Steinschneider has been generally accepted (see Zonta 1996a: 172). It is characterized by pleonasm and explicitation, translationese (imitation of Arabic constructions, not always well understood), and lengthiness resulting from its liking for Biblical stylistic features. In his translation Plessner methodically lists divergences from the Taymūr Bryson. Occasionally these indicate material which should perhaps be in the text, and I have noted them in the text and translation.

The genesis of the *Yconomica Galieni* merits a few more words. This short Latin version – which is reprinted from Plessner (1928) for the reader's convenience in Part V – was translated by a well-known physician and university professor of the Montpellier medical school,[56] Armengaud Blaise (Blasi), who died, it seems, in 1312.[57] Plessner (1928: 25–9) was concerned to disprove the possibility that the epitome was made on the basis of a Hebrew version. After sifting the evidence offered by the translation of Ibn Yaʿish, he expressed his confidence that it was done directly from Arabic, as the title states. Much more is now known about Blaise's techniques and it is clear he worked with Jewish colleagues on his various translations. It seems that his usual technique was to ask the intermediary to translate into Romance vernacular, while he then made a Latin version. Michael McVaugh (1997) has studied the peculiarities of Blaise's Latin in the *Yconomica* and in another cut-down Latin translation, or, put better, paraphrase, that Blaise made from the Arabic version of Galen's *Affections and Errors of the Soul*, and which is transmitted alongside the *Yconomica*. He argues from a comparison of the two that the shaping of the *Yconomica* as a rewritten epitome was due to Blaise himself.[58] But the proof that the epitome of Bryson was in fact already existent in Arabic had been provided a few years previously by Mauro Zonta, who demonstrated that this lost Arabic was used by the thirteenth-century Jewish philosopher Shem Tob ibn Falaquera about half a century before Blaise's effort. Ibn Falaquera (1225–after 1300) included much of this text within his short, belletristic *Moral Treatise* in Hebrew.[59] The content of the *Treatise* and the *Yconomica* agree fairly well in this regard, and not least in the dominance of Bryson's fourth section on the upbringing of the child, which we know was popular (cf. Miskawayh, Ghazālī, and of course the Azhar), and which suited Ibn Falaquera's maxim-laden work on the wanderings of a youth in search of wisdom. The *Moral Treatise* presupposes the translation of the epitome into a lost Hebrew version by around 1200; but it seems that Blaise himself relied on the Arabic (with the help of his Jewish associates). The Arabic epitome could have been done at any time before this.[60]

[56] On Montpellier and 'Euro-humanist' myths note Goody 2010: ch. 3.

[57] McVaugh and Ferre 2000: 1–4, 10–11, Hasselhoff 2006: 343–6.

[58] McVaugh also calls attention to the second manuscript of the *Yconomica Galieni* (*sic*; McVaugh gives the title as *Yconomia*) at Paris, which is closely related to the Dresden copy used by Plessner (and which suffered serious wartime damage): *Cat. gén. des manuscr. des bibl. publ. de France: Paris* (1909) vol. 1, p. 367.

[59] Zonta 1992: 107–15, 1996a: 172, 204–12; cf. Jospe 1988: 34, and see already Plessner 1956: 176–9 on Bryson section one in the *Yconomica* and the *Treatise*.

[60] For a lost fifteenth-century Hebrew version of Bryson by the philosopher Yosef ibn Shem Tob, see Zonta 1996a: 261–2; cf. Steinschneider 1893: 228 for another lost Hebrew oeconomic tract.

The great Syriac intellectual Barhebraeus has been mentioned in Chapter 1 for his observations on the Translation Movement. Amongst his writings is the gigantic encyclopedia called *The Cream of Wisdom* (Zonta 1992, Joosse 2004). For his oeconomic section Barhebraeus leant heavily on the *Nasirean Ethics* of his contemporary, Ṭūsī (see Chapter 1, p. 101, Chapter 5, pp. 360–1, Chapter 6, pp. 407–9). In the introduction Barhebraeus says that Aristotle had treated economy in the *Ethics* and adds, 'We have also found a short tractate by Bryson on this subject' (trans. Joosse 2004: 99). He then claims to have based himself on Aristotle. His treatment seems in fact to have nothing in common with Bryson directly and the name may simply be drawn from his source. But in the section detailing relations with the wife Barhebraeus' fifth piece of advice is attributed to Bryson. I quote from Joosse's translation (p. 109):

> Bryson, who learned much from his experience with women, and revealed himself as a very wise man, said: whoever is ensnared in the nets of an unworthy woman is allowed to escape from her and to rescue himself from her hands by means of one of the four (following) stratagems. First, one may redeem oneself from her through the (expenditure) of wealth . . . Secondly, a separation of sleeping-quarters . . . Thirdly, one should encourage sly old women to make him detestable in her eyes . . . Fourthly, if these methods are not advantageous, one may go on a journey to a far country . . .

Under the influence of Plessner's suggestion of epitomization throughout the text, Peter Joosse airs the possibility that the passage is genuine, since Bryson's book 'is not by far a complete translation of the Greek original' (p. 237). It will be clear to anyone who has read Bryson section three that the whole idea of a wife one wishes to be rid of is completely foreign to him (and to the whole oeconomic tradition in Greek). The passage is actually based on the relevant section of the *Nasirean Ethics* (165–6 trans. Wickens; cf. Plessner 1928: 74–5), and shows both Ṭūsī's and Barhebraeus' misogynism and at some level the influence of Islamic divorce law on Ṭūsī.[61] It evidently appealed to Barhebraeus to such an extent that he wished to accord it a Greek pedigree, as he does with other Ṭūsian material he likes. It is significant that when he wanted to name a classical source on the wife, only one came to mind.

[61] Plessner 1928: 75 n. 1, cf. Zonta 1992: 17.

PART III

Economy

CHAPTER 3

Property

INTRODUCTORY

Bryson's book is a manual of estate management. The estate – the *oikos* – comprises money and properties, and Bryson presents us with an owner who is responsible for its financial security and welfare. He is a landowner: he is in possession of 'scattered estates' in which he 'invests' his wealth; he makes his money by selling the right kind of goods at the right time. His economy is firmly grounded in a social system. This owner has much in common with the Roman *pater familiae* of Columella's *On Agriculture*, for Columella's estate-owner is also focussed on increasing his *res familiaris/patrimonium* through investment. And Columella's thoughts on economic activity are part of social, not economic, practice. 'The secret is out,' wrote Martin Frederiksen in his review of *The Ancient Economy*: 'like Rostovtzeff, but to very different effect, Finley thinks Cato and Columella were talking *economics*. But that was not their aim at all' (1975: 169). Yet Cato and Columella do offer economic thoughts, which they express within the limitations of the ancient world's view of these things. If we are looking for attitudes towards the creation of wealth and an understanding of how to go about it, they have plenty to say to us. Bryson's world is not so different from theirs, but in important respects he goes beyond them. He appears to have a rudimentary grasp of a system of economic activity, which he envisages as a circuit of trades or crafts, and in which he locates the commercial and family life of the estate.

In this chapter I shall be examining a variety of evidence to help us situate Bryson's first section on the estate-owner's attitude towards wealth and property, and in the first part of the study I shall consider voices on the possibilities of economic life in agriculture and the running of estates, and in other areas, bearing in mind (as Columella does) that farming is one side of the wealthy man's activities. I shall be paying attention to modern views as well as ancient ones. Although Bryson is a Greek text and stands in various traditions of Greek thought, he can hardly be understood apart from the

Roman world for which he wrote. He cannot be treated as representing a local or regional approach; his culture was, as it were, international. Thus comparisons with Columella and Pliny (both of whom were in any case versed in Greek traditions) and others are valid. The problem of comparability is one faced by all students of the ancient economy. The legal and fiscal unity of the Roman empire goes a long way to providing a structural basis for allowing consideration of the wool merchants of Gallia Belgica alongside the Appianus estate in Egypt. And in any case, it is a fact that the evidence, whether textual or material, is too thin for us to ignore what ancient sources there are in seeking for economic mentalities. In the first section I shall look at examples prominent in the modern literature. My aim is simply to present cases which can reasonably be interpreted as showing an economic attitude which accords with what Bryson says. The scholarly literature on the ancient economy is naturally very large and I shall refer to what I have found interesting and relevant.

Some of the major modern theories will occupy the second section of the chapter. Again, I discuss what I find interesting and important: Hopkins, the Stanford economists, Finley (and the influence of Polanyi and Weber upon him) have their place here. The last three were themselves all drawn at times to the greatest theorist of all, Aristotle, and in Section 3 I shall look at Aristotle afresh both to present again the sophistication of his account, which has been depreciated too often, and the assumptions underlying it, and also to lay the ground for what follows. In the fourth section I pass to some other classical or late classical/early Hellenistic authors (Xenophon; Ps.-Aristotle, *Oikonomika*). I shall not attempt to cover all manner of references to economic activity from Homer onwards, an approach of too many modern (but not many current) scholars, and one which gets nowhere. In Sections 5 and 6 I look in detail at the Stoic and Epicurean ideas of the Hellenistic period. Aristotle disapproved – though not as strongly as is sometimes said – of making money out of exchange. The Stoics took the opposite view. Their position is not well known, and interpretation is hampered by the fragmentary remains of their thought; but what they had to say will, I think, be seen to be important. Philodemus represents the Epicureans and (of course) he is important for being in the thick of the Roman elite of the late Republic. His *On Oikonomia* has been disregarded by historians because much of it concerns the Epicurean wise man's attitudes to wealth and his limited sources of acquiring it rightly in a philosophically acceptable manner. But, in presenting the philosopher, Philodemus has much to say about the businessman, whom he expects to make plenty of money in as short a time as possible. That makes him interesting.

The usefulness of Aristotle, the Stoics, and Philodemus for considering ancient economic thought is coloured by their identity as philosophers. Bryson, to whom I turn in the seventh and eighth sections of the chapter, is at times moralistic and highly prescriptive. He has things in common with the philosophers, but does not choose to present himself as one. He is also descriptive and realist, though focussed and unwilling to waste words. He makes it plain that his owner is someone who stays within what he calls the 'limits' of his class. That is, he is presented as a normal representative of his social group. The owner's awareness of status and obligations is crucial; these are paid for by commercial successes. This commerce is placed by Bryson within a view of economic life where the productive parts – the crafts (jobs or occupations) – are connected to one another like the links of a chain. There is no cause to make grand claims about the conception of connectivity in this image. It is expressed very simply and it must be seen in the thought world of ancient society to which it belongs, and particularly Stoic ideas. Bryson also employs common metaphors of bodily growth and nutrition to recommend that the owner should have income that is greater than his expenditure. This is how he speaks of capital. What he lacks in Aristotelian brilliance, he makes up for by having stood back and imagined how to present private economic activity as part of the family life of the *oikos*. His estate is assumed to be independent of the city in the sense of the city's civic–political structures. The city is invented simply to provide a space for commerce and is otherwise of no interest to him.

I finish the chapter with brief remarks on Bryson's reception in several key Islamic authors.

1 ROMANS ON THE ECONOMY: ATTITUDES AND OPPORTUNITIES

I start with one of the principal passages Finley used as a basis for his contention that the Roman economy was governed by an antipathy towards active investment, strategic risk-taking, and rational management: Cicero's famous discussion of 'liberal' and 'sordid' occupations at *On Duties* (*De officiis*) 1.150–1. 'I shall treat the Cicero passage as the foundation for a hypothesis', Finley stated. Some of the key assumptions expressed in Chapter 2 of *The Ancient Economy* on the back of this and related passages have not been reconsidered to any great extent because economic historians have been concerned to challenge Finley and move on from him on the basis of the material evidence now available. But it is timely to revisit the Cicero to begin this study.

The snobbish attitude of the ancient elites is well known: thus we are not going to find much trace in their writings of a positive attitude towards commerce and the pursuit of profit through commercial activity, and consequently no sign of 'economic thinking'. Or so it has been said. But as Frederiksen noted, the ideological attachment of the Roman senatorial elite to the land and the ideologically driven legal constraints on senators embarking on commercial activity tell us no more than we want to hear: that is, we can accept these views and amplify them with Finleyan readings if we like. In fact, if we pay proper attention, the evidence for commercial involvement by the senatorial elite, directly or through agents, is very good (John D'Arms' *Commerce and Social Standing* (1981), esp. chs. 2 and 7, sets it out suggestively), and there is no *a priori* reason to assume aversion from commerce among the rich or super-rich. There is a great deal of contempt for the lower orders and their economic doings; but that is a different matter.

The passage of *On Duties* runs as follows:[1]

> (150) Now as for crafts (*artificia*) and other means of making money (*quaestus*), the following is roughly what we have been told (*haec fere accepimus*) as to which should be thought fit for a free man (*qui liberales*), and which demeaning (*qui sordidi*). First those means of livelihood that incur the dislike of other men are not approved, for example collecting harbour dues, or usury. Again, all those workers who are paid for their labour and not for their skill have servile and demeaning employment, for in their case the very wage is a contract to servitude. Those who buy from merchants (*mercatores*) and sell again immediately should also be thought of as demeaning themselves. For they would make no profit unless they told sufficient lies, and nothing is more dishonourable than falsehood. All handcraftsmen (*opifices*) are engaged in a demeaning craft (*ars*); for there can be nothing well bred about the workshop. The crafts (*artes*) that are least worthy of approval are those that minister to the pleasures . . .
>
> (151) Other crafts (*artes*) either require greater good sense or else procure substantial benefit, for example medicine, architecture or teaching things that are honourable. They are honourable for those who belong to the class they benefit. Trade (*mercatura*), if it is on a small scale, should be considered demeaning (*sordida*). If, however, men trade on a large and expansive scale (*sin magna et copiosa*), importing many things from all over, and distributing them to many people without misrepresentation, that is not to be criticized greatly (*non est admodum vituperanda*). Indeed, if ever such men are satiated, or rather satisfied, with what they have gained, and just as they have often left the high seas for the harbour, now leave the harbour itself for land and estates in the country (*in agros possessionesque*), it seems that we are perfectly entitled

[1] Slightly adapted from Griffin and Atkins 1991: 57–8.

> to praise their occupation as merchants. However, there is no kind of gainful employment that is better, more fruitful, more pleasant and more worthy of a free man than agriculture. As I have said plenty about this in my book *The Elder Cato*,[2] you may find there everything relevant to the subject.

On Duties is a work of Stoic philosophy, adapted to Cicero's requirements and interspersed with his own experiences and views. It is generally accepted that much of it draws on the second-century Stoic Panaetius of Rhodes (d. *c.* 109 BC), who wrote a similarly titled work that has not survived, and whose influence Cicero acknowledges as a particular authority for his book.[3] The later Stoics' interest in ethics and their presentation of the quest for virtue as a social matter were profoundly influential on Roman intellectuals, and this is the case in *On Duties*. Cicero's remark that 'trade on a large and expansive scale' is praiseworthy in fact accords well with attested Stoic views about the validity of making money (see Section 5), and this offers a clue to Cicero's position. In pursuing his belief that the Cicero passage was a 'foundation' for his theories, Finley ignored these remarks on big trading except to footnote that 'foreign trade is evaluated positively because it provides goods to consumers'. There is abundant snobbism in the *On Duties* passage, but it is not directed against making the right sort of money. Cicero did not praise those who run corner shops, but he did admire those who made themselves very rich. And when he states plainly that large-scale commerce is fine (and this includes the *mercatores* who sell to the shopkeepers in §150), it is difficult to see what 'foundation' the passage actually offered to Finley's general hypothesis.

Panaetius' pupil, Posidonius of Apamea (d. *c.* 51 BC), was a principal mediator of Stoic views to Rome. He offers broadly similar opinions about good and bad occupations when he is quoted by the younger Seneca as part of a discussion of virtue:

> (21) Posidonius says there are four kinds of crafts (*artes*): (i) common and demeaning, (ii) promoting amusement, (iii) educating boys, (iv) fitting for a free man (*liberales*). (i) Common ones belong to handcraftsmen, depend on handwork and are practised to support one living. There is nothing proper or honourable about them. (22) (ii) Crafts promoting amusement aim to please our eyes and ears . . . The eyes of the innocent are struck with amazement and they marvel at all those unexpected tricks because they don't know what causes them. (23) (iii) Crafts to do with boys, not dissimilar to the crafts fitting for a free man, are those the Greeks call 'curricular' and we 'fitting for

[2] *Cato Major* (*On Old Age*) 51–60.
[3] Griffin and Atkins 1991: xvi–xxi, Dyck 1996: 17–28. Cf. below, pp. 199, 202–3.

> a free man'. (iv) The only crafts that are really fitting for a free man, or are to speak more truly free (*liberae*), are those in which virtue is concerned (*quibus curae uirtus est*). (*Moral Letters* 88.21–3)

Seneca, who was a man of prodigious wealth and saw himself as a practising Stoic, begins this 'moral letter' with the fictitious question, 'You are wanting to know my view about which studies are fitting for a free man. Well, I respect no study, and number none among the good, which results in money (*ad aes exit*)' (88.1). It is easy to take the whole thing as representative of an all-embracing attitude towards commerce; and so it is used, for example in a standard modern sourcebook on the economy of the Roman empire (Drexhage, Konen, Ruffing 2002: 301–2). But, as I have said, in the case of the Stoics making money (*chrēmatistikē*) was viewed positively, and the reason is that wealth potentially assisted the acquisition of virtue by the wise man rather than being a hindrance to it (below, p. 202). There is no evidence that the Stoics were sympathetic to lower-status trades or crafts, as has occasionally been argued: big earning is what they approved of, not ordinary working, and the Senecan passage rests on this attitude. What is fitting for a 'free' man and his virtue depends on how one looks at the world and how that wealth arises. Later in *On Duties* Cicero himself, as we shall see, repeated the essence of a grand Stoic debate of the late second century BC about the ethics of maritime trade and the extent to which sharp business practices could be justified, as one major Stoic thinker thought they could be, without undermining one's moral standing (pp. 199, 206). A writer in overtly intellectual mode, as Seneca is here, might seem exacting, exclusive, and utterly uneconomic in thought because of the word 'virtue'; but it needs to be realized that moral and material practices cohabited easily in the mind of the Stoic sage and his Roman imitators.

Romans did not of course need Greek philosophers to take a moral–political view of the undesirability of trade. The ideology of the land was so powerful among the aristocracy that the matter of being seen to avoid trade had become enshrined in law through the plebiscite of Q. Claudius (tribune of the people 218 BC), which made it illegal for senators to indulge in maritime trading with ships carrying over 300 amphorae. The story is reported by Livy (21.63.3–4), who explains that this size of ship was suitable for transporting the produce of landed estates, and he notes that 'all means of making money (*quaestus omnis*) were considered improper for the Fathers'. The reasons for the law – political (as Livy suggests), economic, social, or some combination – cannot be known (D'Arms 1981: 31–3). The fact that it does not seem to have been challenged or overturned shows that it corresponded to the mentality of the super-elite in their public image as men dependent

on land for their wealth. But image and practice do not have to go together. The power of the image is such that we should not expect many references in literature to making money except through land. But there are some.

Cato the Elder's economic views are relevant in this regard. In his biography of this stalwart Roman of the second century BC Plutarch writes as follows:

> (5) As he came to focus more energetically on making money (*porismos*), he began to view agriculture as a pastime rather than a source of income, and made his investments (*aphormai*) in businesses that were secure and safe. He bought lakes, spas, districts given over to fullers, pitch factories, and areas with natural pasture and woodland, from which a great deal of money came to him and which (in his own words) 'could not be harmed by Jupiter'. (6) He engaged in the most disreputable type of loans, those underwriting ships, in the following manner. He obliged men taking out loans to form a large company (*koinōnia*), and when there were fifty partners and as many ships he retained one share through his freedman Quintiōn, who would sail with those taking the loans and join them in doing business. In this way he did not risk everything, but only a small part – and for huge profits. (7) He also provided money to any of his slaves who wanted it. They would buy boys, train and teach them at Cato's expense, and sell them after one year. Cato took charge of many of them, reckoning up in his accounts the maximum price offered by a purchaser. (8) He encouraged his son to follow his methods and said that diminishing one's patrimony (*ta huparchonta*) was the sign of a widow woman, not a man. But he surely went too far when he ventured to say that the man who is really admirable and godlike in reputation is the one who has added more to his accounts (*logoi*) than he has taken out. (*Cato the Elder* 21.5–8)

Cato's greed is a theme of Plutarch's biography and these remarks are part of that theme along with Cato's hypocrisy for his condemnation of usury at the beginning of his *On Agriculture* (see below, p. 157), which Plutarch knew. But there is no need to discard what Plutarch reports. We can assume that Cato conducted all his business operations by using freedmen, as is said. In this way he did not break the law or harm his image as a senator. Probably the law on senatorial commerce was not always adhered to anyway. Cicero suggests that Verres' barrister Hortensius had been going to use the defence that it was by now obsolete (*Verrines* 2.5.45 '"those ancient, dead laws", as you are accustomed to call them'). Two decades later, however, Julius Caesar reinforced the provision by including it in his *Lex Julia de repetundis* of 59 BC. The ban on trade by senators is still attested as being in force in the later second century and Paulus (*c.* 200; to be exact, the later *Sententiae Pauli*) noted that it was aimed at voyages *in quaestum* ('to make money'; Pavis

d'Escurac 1977: 340–1). In these circumstances Cato's strategy must have been the typical one.

Senators were so important in Roman society that what they did or did not do was closely watched. But they had brothers and cousins and friends and freedmen and slaves who could act for them. In some parts of their lives reality was more important than image, and then it was not simply a matter of deriving income from lands and rents. At the start of *Letter* 119 Seneca asks his imaginary correspondent Lucilius how he 'can become rich as quickly as possible'. The answer is that he will need a creditor: 'to be able to go into business (*negotiari*), you must take out a loan'. Selling agricultural produce at the right time was certainly a way of getting rich from the land; but this depended on Jupiter, as Cato had remarked; and surely a more usual way was a smart investment funded by borrowed money. Business depends on credit, and moneylending itself was acceptable to senators in most situations and consequently to other members of the elite. When Apuleius wants to define 'riches', he specifies 'estates and moneylending' (*Apology* 20.3). Horace's friend Fufidius is 'rich in land, rich in money put out to loan' (*Satires* 1.2.12 = *Art of Poetry* 421). Seneca's rich man 'has a magnificent staff, a beautiful house, he plants much land, he lends much money: none of this comes from him, but goes on around him' (*Letters* 41.7). And so on. Some of this lending would have been for purely consumerist activity; but (as we shall see) there is no reason to hold that this was its only use and that a good deal of lending was not, as Seneca says, for business purposes. Nor should we hold that agriculture itself – estates – was non-commercial in aim.

Banks played a part in the credit scene.[4] It is well known that Roman society lacked an effective, independent banking system to which entrepreneurs could turn to secure finance for major commercial ventures. There were banks, but it seems there was nothing comparable to the kind of operation, limited in its way, that existed in fourth-century Athens in the bank of Pasion.[5] At Rome serious credit came from patrons and patrons' patrons. Yet it is probably right to argue that banks were both more widespread than is generally thought and that they could be involved in commercial investment; and moreover that, however many banks there were, credit was available through them in some measure. We have hints (that is all) of how this might work from the Murecine Tablets (Tabulae Pompeianae

[4] The best short account is Rathbone and Temin 2008: 391–407; see also Andreau 1999, and pertinent remarks in Harris 2006: 12–17. For comprehensive detail, Andreau 1987.

[5] Bogaert 1968, Cohen 1992. Cf. p. 184 below.

Sulpiciorum = TPSulp.), a cache of 127 wax tablets discovered outside Pompeii in 1959 and published in 1999.[6] These reveal the financial activity of a group of professional freedman credit-brokers, the Sulpicii, in the years AD 26 to 61, with a concentration of documentation for the period 35 to 55. The Sulpicii's business was to manage loans made by individuals as well as lending from their own reserves. Some of these loans were for small-scale commercial purposes and relate to financing those buying and selling at auction or to short-term speculations in the grain trade that passed through Puteoli, where the business was based. There is some evidence that the firm of the Sulpicii was also involved in larger deals, but perhaps in terms of facilitating rather than financing. Thus the bilingual document TPSulp. 78 of AD 38 appears to show them acting as agents for a known importer of *garum* from Spain to Italy, P. Attius Severus, who is represented by his slave, Primus, in drawing up a contract for chartering local freighters to take his goods up the coast to Rome.[7] A number of other freedmen or slave agents of the wealthy including the imperial household appear in the records. Unfortunately there is no sign of large loans or speculative investment. Nor do we know if the profits from the Sulpicii firm stayed with the immediate persons known from the tablets or whether patrons had shares and had supplied capital for the venture. What we may assume is that firms like this were common throughout Italy. However, there is no evidence for a widely spread system of branches allowing easy transfer of payments without the need to transfer coin and bullion physically; and this must have limited the potential of banks considerably, leaving distant or transmarine operations dependent on networks guaranteed by the super-rich (cf. Howgego 1992: 28–9) or coalitions of wealthy merchants (see p. 237).

The jurist Ulpian shows what might be expected of banks when he discusses priorities in the event of bank failure and distinguishes between moneys deposited with the bankers (here called *nummularii*[8]) and not earning interest – these must be repaid first – and 'funds which (depositors) have invested at interest with the bankers or in conjunction with the bankers or through them' (*Digest* 16.3.7.2).[9] A glimpse into the world of deposit bankers (*argentarii*) comes in a note from the jurist Scaevola on the closure of a client's account with a banker (*mensularius*). The withdrawal of the sizeable sum of HS386,000 is instant, and this perhaps shows that deposit bankers had to be cautious before indulging in financing; but it is

[6] Camodeca 1999: 11–43, Verboven 2008: 219–24.
[7] Camodeca 1999: 177–80, 605–8 (ill.), Jones 2006: ch. 6.
[8] With a general sense, rather than the specific 'money changers'.
[9] *pecunias . . . quas faenore apud nummularios uel cum nummulariis uel per ipsos exercebant.*

difficult to believe that some of these funds did not go out on loan 'through' the banks for various purposes. When the wealthy did want to make money out of money, the use of bankers as intermediaries was a convenient way of taking a share of profits and protecting oneself from losses (cf. Bryson §33). One would have to be extremely sceptical to deny the existence of what was in effect 'an institutionalized credit market'. Wealthy Romans 'lent (and borrowed) on an enormous scale; crudely, between a quarter and a third of their wealth was in loans as opposed to property'.[10] This market could not have been limited to consumerist lending.

Trimalchio's description in the *Satyricon* of how he got to be rich and what he does now he is rich is designed to show the attitude of the upper classes in someone who had once been a slave but had come to possess the 'capital of a senator' (*patrimonium laticlavium*, *Satyricon* 76). This is what makes him a figure of fun. Armed with money from his former master, he declares, 'I wanted to go into business,' and he explains how he began to make and lose money by shipping wine and other products, including slaves, to Rome. Having made enough to buy his old master's *fundi*, he then invested in more slaves and in livestock. Finally, 'I removed myself from the business world (*de negotiatione*) and began to make money by lending through my freedmen (*coepi <per> libertos faenerare*)' (76.2–9). Here, perhaps in the early decades of the second century rather than in the age of Nero (Martin 2000), the comedy of the super-rich freedman is based on his imitation of the mentality of the senator: demonstrating status by showing off the productivity of one's estates and by supplying credit on a vast scale 'through freedmen'. Verboven (2008) neatly cites the picture drawn in one of the 'minor declamations' that are by the orator Quintilian or from his time about the turn of the second century: 'you rich men lend money through your agents, you control your slaves through stewards, most of your possessions you never visit' (345.10, p. 323 ed. Shackleton Bailey). This shows the governing mentality including the distancing that was important for preservation of image. Other well-known cases of lending relate to Romans (Italians) making loans to provincials in the late Republican era: the equestrian P. Sittius who 'owed at Rome so that he might be owed the greatest sums of money in the provinces and kingdoms', as Cicero put it (*For Sulla* 58); and the middlemen M. Scaptius and P. Matinius, who had made a loan at the unacceptable rate of 48% to the city of Salamis on Cyprus and were revealed by Brutus to be his own agents when he asked Cicero to pressurize the Salaminians into paying up (*To Atticus* 5.21.10–13 Brutus' 'acquaintances'; 6.1.3–8 'I never heard

[10] Rathbone and Temin 2008: 419, Verboven 2008: 215.

from Brutus himself that the money was his'; 2.7–9, 3.5–6 Brutus' 'friends' are 'illusions'). This sort of thing continued in the empire. Plutarch's short essay *Avoid Borrowing* is a savage attack on western *tokistai* and *pragmateutai* (*faeneratores* and *negotiatores*) who operate from the Roman colonies of Patras and Corinth and at Athens and are likened to the Persian invaders of the early fifth century owing to the fact that they 'bring jarfuls of bonds and contracts like fetters against Greece' (829a). Their extortionate and 'illegal' loans are both for the agricultural sector and matters of status – 'estates, slaves, mules, dining rooms, tables . . . public displays (*philotimiai*)' (830e). They show a wide culture of credit and borrowing that is not restricted to Rome (Howgego 1992: 14), and the source of the credit is likely to be the super-rich of Italy operating through their intermediaries. Plutarch's advice was to lend within the family; the one family we know a great deal about, that of Marcus and Quintus Cicero, shows extensive credit dealings with those outside the family circle (Pittia 2004).

Those who lent money through agents also engaged in commerce through agents. The Roman law of the Principate contains extensive deliberations about commercial activity, and the use of agents is assumed to be normal.[11] They not only offered protection for the social image of the high elite – not having to get one's hands dirty, as it were. Both in the case of freedmen and directly owned slaves the law also offered the attractive possibility of limiting financial liability in business operations. In a warning about the manumission of slaves, which as a result of prior or impending insolvency defrauds one's *creditores*, the jurist Gaius notes that 'men often expect their wealth is greater than it actually is: this is something that frequently happens to those engaging in business overseas (*transmarinas negotiationes . . . exercent*), or in regions where they do not themselves dwell, by means of slaves and freedmen. Often these deals incur losses (*attritis istis negotiationibus*) over a long period, but they are unaware of this and manumit without fraudulent intent' (*Digest* 40.9.10). The ways in which the overseas entrepreneur (*exercitor*) could distance himself from trouble by using slave agents is outlined by the jurist Ulpian in his *de exercitoria actione*, that is, the legal procedure relating to the business of maritime trade. The point at issue is whether the immediate manager of a trading vessel (the slave captain – *magister*) was operating in his business dealings 'with the consent' of his owner (*dominus*). If he operated 'with the consent', his master was responsible at law. Ulpian then gives an example of how the ultimate owner of the capital might evade

[11] See Kirschenbaum 1987 and esp. Johnston 1999: ch. 5 for a full survey of *peculium* and agency relations in the law relating to commerce.

responsibility. The matter hinges on who has control over the person who is manager. If someone was a slave or a son with a father still alive, Roman law figured him *in potestate*, 'in the power', of his master or father. Such a slave or son is *peculiaris* – he will have property of his own (the *peculium*) by permission of his master or father. This property could have been substantial and include money or stock such as a vessel. In general those having *potestas* were liable, but there was an important limitation. 'If a ship is managed by a *servus peculiaris* with the consent of the son to whose *peculium* he belongs, or by an under-slave (with the consent of the slave to whose *peculium* he belongs), the son will be liable in full, but the *pater* (i.e. *paterfamilias*) or *dominus*, who has not given his consent, will only be held liable to the amount of the *peculium*. Of course, if they are managing (the ship) with the consent of the *pater* or *dominus*, (these latter) will be liable in full, and moreover so will the son be responsible in full, if he gave his consent' (*Digest* 14.1.1.22).

The *paterfamilias* was the ultimate owner of all the *peculium* of his family and slaves and hence stood to profit from their business dealings. If he left it up to them, the costs of any failures on their part would be limited to the value of the personal *peculium* he had allowed to them. If he wanted to be more directly involved, however, he ran the risk of becoming liable in person. In another type of action, the *tributoria actio* ('action for distribution'), the *paterfamilias* was deemed to know what his dependent had done and therefore considered responsible (see Andreau 2004b on the risks and choices here). In a third type, the *actio de peculio*, his liability was again limited to the amount of the slave's or son's *peculium*. Where a slave had been appointed to manage a particular job (*Digest* 14.3.3,5 pr. 'whatever kind of business'), he was known in legal language as an *institor* ('business manager'; see Aubert 1994), and the appropriate action (*actio institoria*) made his owner responsible for damages on the basis that '*commoda* derive from the acts of business managers' (*Digest* 14.3.1). In this case the law recognized a direct line between the business and the owner of the person carrying it out. The employment of freedmen, rather than slave, agents put matters on a more secure level in terms of capability. They were of course independent in one way but continued to have social and financial obligations to their *patronus*, for the law held that they remained within his *familia* (*Digest* 50.16.195.1).

The legal restraints on senators, then, were concerned to protect an image, and did not reflect actual attitudes to making money commercially. There is enough evidence to show commercial dealings were normal. Credit was easily available for this purpose. Banks had a role in providing money, but patrons were the lubricators of Roman business. The law worked with them by providing sophisticated mechanisms to protect investors. Snobbish

attitudes were widespread, but at least in part were concerned with small-scale trade rather than with commerce *per se*, which was perfectly compatible with pretensions to philosophy. Trimalchio's decision to get out of *negotiatio* and go into lending surely represents a common attitude. As he puts it, 'No-one ever has enough.' And risk in business was not a deterrent: shrugging off the loss of all his ships early in his career, he boasts, 'Do you think I gave up? The loss didn't mean a thing to me; it was as if nothing had happened' (*Satyricon* 76.5). Cato the Elder understood this entrepreneurial spirit well. He begins his *On Agriculture* by comparing farming with commerce. 'It is sometimes possible to be very successful by making money from trade – were it not so risky, and likewise by making money from lending (*fenerari*) – if this were at all honourable'; and after briefly noting the contempt in which moneylending had been held at Rome in contrast to the praiseworthiness of the farmer, he drives home his point by observing that, 'I consider the merchant to be energetic and dedicated to making money, but, as I have just said, exposed to risk and ruin. From farmers, however . . . come profits that are highly respectable, extremely secure, and totally unobjectionable' (Preface 1–4). In a work on farming we might expect trade and loans to be talked down. Plutarch's account of how Cato happily managed his risks and his image gives a more independent view and squares well with the strategies of the jurists. Even with the 'extremely secure' business of agriculture, 'profit' (*quaestus*) is the reason for Cato's commendation. That its profitability was respectable (*maxime pius*), secure (*stabilissimus*), and socially acceptable (*minime inuidiosus*), reflected the sound thinking of its practitioners (*minimeque male cogitantes*) who, like Cato, saw gain from whatever quarter as good.

The Roman elite farmer and his attitude to investment and profit takes us to Pliny *Letters* 3.19, one of the most frequently examined texts in the search for signs of 'economic thinking' as opposed to traditional conservatism and the desire to preserve one's patrimony. The letter corroborated Finley's presentation of the attitudes of the ancient elites. For Pliny and other ancient writers failed to 'describe land as the best investment in maximization of income language' (Finley 1985a: 122). Letter 3.19 was examined specifically for any sign of awareness by Pliny that the purchase of an adjoining estate – the topic of the letter – could bring about economies of scale (pp. 113–16); and it was found wanting. Moreover, Pliny showed no concept of investing with the thought of creating capital: he and others demonstrated that 'the prevailing mentality was acquisition but not production'. To Finley, then, Pliny looked like Cicero, whose *On Duties* was trumpeted as 'a prevailing social judgement'. If anyone cited or interpreted a text in disagreement with

this reading, they and their sources were held to show 'the prevalence of argument by exception' (e.g. p. 52).

Pliny's letter on the question of whether he should buy next to his beloved villa at Tifernum Tiberinum (cf. the description of the *regio* at *Letters* 5.6) is a work of belles-lettres designed for readers' delight and the goodness of their Latin. Nevertheless, it has important things to say to us and has been the subject of discussion by many economic historians, notably Dennis Kehoe, P. W. de Neeve, and Elio Lo Cascio. Since it is a fundamental text in the matter of evaluating attitudes to estate ownership by the educated upper classes, I give a translation.[12]

> Pliny, To Calvisius Rufus
>
> (1) As usual, I am calling upon your advice in a property matter. The estate next to my land and running into it is up for sale. There are many attractions tempting me to buy but also some no less important reasons putting me off. (2) The primary attraction is the beauty of joining them. Then there are things which are no less practical than pleasurable: being able to visit both estates together on one journey, to run them with the same steward and practically the same foremen, to maintain and furnish one villa and only keep an eye on the other one. (3) In this account I include the cost of the outfittings, of household staff, gardeners, workmen, and also the hunting gear. For it makes a considerable difference whether you keep them in one place or distribute them between several. (4) On the other hand I am afraid it may be rash to expose a property of such a size to the same uncertainties of weather and general risks, and it might be safer to meet the hazards of fortune by having one's properties in different localities. Change of place and air is very enjoyable, and so is the actual travelling between one's places. (5) But the chief point for consideration is this. The land is fertile, rich, and well-watered, and the whole made up of fields, vineyards, and woods which produce enough to yield a fixed income if not a very large one. (6) But this natural fertility is being exhausted by poor cultivation. The last owner on more than one occasion sold the items pledged for rent, so that he temporarily reduced their arrears but weakened their resources for the future, and consequently their debts mounted up again. (7) They will have to be set up again with slaves, and good ones, which will increase the expense. For nowhere do I employ chained slaves myself, and no one uses them there.
>
> It remains for you to know the purchase price: three million sesterces. It used to be five million but this current scarcity of tenants and the general bad times have reduced the income from the land and reduced its value. (8) You will want to know if I can easily raise this three million. It is true that I am nearly all in estates, but I also make some money through lending, and it will

[12] Text: Mynors 1966; translation: adapted from Radice 1963.

not be difficult to borrow. I can always get it from my mother-in-law, whose money-chest I use as if it were my own. (9) So don't let this worry you, if the other matters (to which I'd like you to give your full attention) don't defeat you. For as regards the management of large sums of money, as in everything else, you have abundant experience and wisdom. Goodbye.[13]

The letter is designed to show Pliny in a good light sensibly weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of extending his land through the purchase of the estate, which he can now acquire at a far cheaper price than it had originally been marketed for. He does in fact identify some economies to be had from possessing adjoining properties: farm labour and housing/domestic staff costs. It is difficult to see why Finley flatly denied this. But what about the overall attitude? Was he uninterested in productivity? Was his eye solely on the *pulchritudo iungendi* taken aesthetically? It was Cato's advice to keep an eye on the neighbours at the outset: 'notice how well the neighbours are prospering; in a good district they should be quite prosperous' (*On Agriculture* 1.2). In his article on the reasons behind the lack of 'economic rationalism' on the part of the ancient elites, from Cato to the Appianus estate, Gunnar Mickwitz noted that we 'find in these words no indication of the idea, so familiar to us, that lack of prosperity in a certain region might simply be the result of bad farming, and that an energetic farmer might be able to make money by buying a cheap farm in just such a district'.[14] Rather, Cato's advice was purely 'empirical' because of his inability to compute profits and losses scientifically and the resulting need

[13] Adsumo te in consilium rei familiaris, ut soleo. Praedia agris meis uicina atque etiam inserta uenalia sunt. In his me multa sollicitant, aliqua nec minora deterrent. (2) Sollicitat primum ipsa pulchritudo iungendi; deinde, quod non minus utile quam uoluptuosum, posse utraque eadem opera eodem uiatico inuisere, sub eodem procuratore ac paene isdem actoribus habere, unam uillam colere et ornare, alteram tantum tueri. (3) Inest huic computationi sumptus supellectilis, sumptus atriensium topiariorum fabrorum atque etiam uenatorii instrumenti; quae plurimum refert unum in locum conferas an in diuersa dispergas. (4) Contra uereor ne sit incautum, rem tam magnam isdem tempestatibus isdem casibus subdere; tutius uidetur incerta fortunae possessionum uarietatibus experiri. Habet etiam multum iucunditatis soli caelique mutatio, ipsaque illa peregrinatio inter sua. (5) Iam, quod deliberationis nostrae caput est, agri sunt fertiles pingues aquosi; constant campis uineis siluis, quae materiam et ex ea reditum sicut modicum ita statum praestant. (6) Sed haec felicitas terrae imbecillis cultoribus fatigatur. Nam possessor prior saepius uendidit pignora, et dum reliqua colonorum minuit ad tempus, uires in posterum exhausit, quarum defectione rursus reliqua creuerunt. (7) Sunt ergo instruendi, eo pluris quod frugi, mancipiis; nam nec ipse usquam uinctos habeo nec ibi quisquam. Superest ut scias quanti uideantur posse emi. Sestertio triciens, non quia non aliquando quinquagiens fuerint, uerum et hac penuria colonorum et communi temporis iniquitate ut reditus agrorum sic etiam pretium retro abiit. (8) Quaeris an hoc ipsum triciens facile colligere possimus. Sum quidem prope totus in praediis, aliquid tamen fenero, nec molestum erit mutuari; accipiam a socru, cuius arca non secus ac mea utor. (9) Proinde hoc te non moueat, si cetera non refragantur, quae uelim quam diligentissime examines. Nam cum in omnibus rebus tum in disponendis facultatibus plurimum tibi et usus et prouidentiae superest. Vale.

[14] Mickwitz 1937: 584.

to rely on anecdote and impression. Pliny knew the estate that was for sale well. It had a fixed income that is 'not very large', which is likely to mean large given his habit of referring to his modest wealth and little fields, etc. The fact that none of the ancients considered costs of depreciation, amortization, and so on, is not actually relevant here: we do not have 'economic rationalism' of the kind demanded by Mickwitz (followed by Finley), but we certainly have an intelligent sizing up of income. Moreover, Pliny's next-door estate *was* underperforming because of bad management (§§6–7). This is Mickwitz's 'bad farming'. As he noted, a good farmer could make money by buying a depreciated farm at a cheap price, and Pliny is letting the world know that this is what he was planning to do. There is some debate about whether he did in fact buy the estate. But since the letter was published, it is a fair bet he did and that he consequently felt pleased with himself. A comparable case is outlined at *Letters* 6.3, where he brings in one of his tenants to run the *agellus* (and here it probably is a small farm) that he had bestowed on his old nurse for a pension. This farm was also underproducing and the agent is installed to bring about the proper management needed to save it. From 3.19.7 we see that Pliny knew perfectly well that he had to invest to make the neighbouring estate function properly. The *coloni* (or just possibly the *agri*) needed to be restocked with slaves. In order to get his income, he would have to put money in. This is production for profit to increase *patrimonium*.

Naturally some owners took things more seriously than others. The kind who is envisaged by Pliny at *Letters* 1.24, which concerns the purchase of a 'little estate' (*agellus*) for the future biographer Suetonius, is not interested. He is a *scholasticus dominus* and his aim is to 'stroll around his grounds' and 'get to know each of his precious vines'. There is no commercial sense here. Pliny's aim in writing this letter is to advertise his role as a literary patron supporting an up-and-coming star already identifiable as a show orator (*scholasticus*), and who was still under Pliny's wing some years later (10.94). Pliny too had many concerns beyond income. His analysis of his own wealth often amounts to sentimentality and boasting, as when he lets a relative know in detail that his kindness allows her to inherit her father's estate although it owed Pliny a considerable sum: 'my resources are altogether rather modest, my social position is expensive, my income is dependent on the condition of my little fields and thus small or precarious. But what I lack in income is made up for by cheap living, and this is the spring from which my generosity flows' (2.4).[15]

[15] Sunt quidem omnino nobis modicae facultates, dignitas sumptuosa, reditus propter condicionem agellorum nescio minor an incertior; sed quod cessat ex reditu, frugalitate suppletur, ex qua uelut fonte liberalitas nostra decurrit.

But his money was not all landed. In 3.19.8 he notes that, 'It is true that I am nearly all in estates (*praedia*), but I also make some money through lending (*fenero*), and it will not be difficult to borrow (*mutuari*). I can always get it from my mother-in-law, whose money-chest I use as if it were my own.'[16] There is no telling exactly what he means when he lists the second of his sources of income as 'some money through lending'. It should be a sizeable amount: Rathbone and Temin suggest one-quarter of a fortune they reasonably estimate at HS20 million, a large but perhaps not a massive sum.[17] Pliny needs HS3 million, which is around three-eighths of the expected capital of a basic senatorial fortune. He does not think there will be a problem in getting hold of this (or paying it back). He exemplifies his access to credit by citing his easy arrangements with his mother-in-law.[18] Keeping money in the family was obviously attractive. What of getting back one's own money out on loan? And what was this money doing? The bank of the Sulpicii shows a number of very short-term loans – for example, of one month. That still does not exclude loans being used for commercial purposes. It is unfounded to think that Pliny's *faeneratio* was simply for consumption, and not also destined to fund production. Seneca's advice to look for a loan, if one wanted to *negotiari*, meant going to someone like himself or Pliny who had money to spare and wanted to profit by it. To speak of Pliny's own loan from his mother-in-law as a consumer loan 'coincidentally applied to the purchase of agricultural land' seems to be a misreading both of the letter and of the general attitude towards credit and its range of purposes.[19]

We know that Pliny made loans and gifts for non-commercial purposes, as we should expect of a man of his standing. Dennis Kehoe has cited, for example, a disadvantageous property deal he let happen in the interests of an old family friend, Corellia.[20] The story is told at *Letters* 7.11. Corellia had been after some property on Lake Como and Pliny had promised to sell her some at a price of her own naming. Having notified her that he was selling a part-inheritance he had just come into there, she had contacted his freedman

[16] Duncan-Jones 1982: ch. 1 remains the best account of Pliny's lands, his likely wealth in relation to others, and his generous disbursements. De Neeve 1990 is the most intelligent discussion.

[17] Rathbone and Temin 2008: 382. Galen indicates that the category of 'a rich man or a grandee (*monarchos*)' started at 5 million dr. (i.e. HS20 million), and tells the story of a man of great wealth who demanded recipes for extremely expensive drugs to match it (*De compos. medic. per genera* 13.636–37 Kühn); but this passage should not be taken as a dictionary definition of *plousios* in the later second century.

[18] Pompeia Celerina, 'mother of his first or second wife': Sherwin-White 1966: 259.

[19] Kehoe 1997: 47 n. 31.

[20] Kehoe 1993. For the family of Corellia and references to them in Pliny, see Sherwin-White 1966: 213 on *Letters* 3.3.

agent and the agent had sold the property for HS700,000 rather than the HS900,000 that it was worth. Pliny defends his action to his outspoken grandfather-in-law, Calpurnius Fabatus (cf. 6.12.3–5), whose objection was no doubt that Pliny was wasting the patrimony of his future children by Calpurnia. Pliny presents himself as being duty-bound to honour Corellia, and also as standing nobly by his freedman, which it obviously suited him to do. Romans were fully aware of the price of land; this has been doubted, but De Neeve (1985) is conclusive on the matter. There is no need to question the figures Pliny gives; but the price of land fluctuated, and for all we know Pliny was actually making a good deal in the end, not an unfavourable one. That he was also prepared to court the irritation of his fellow-heirs (§2 'I am anxious to have . . . my fellow-heirs' forgiveness') may indicate that he profited. For Kehoe the letter shows how blithely he disregards economic sense. Even if we read it straightforwardly – that is, that Pliny has made a loss and does not mind – it is clear that textbook economics is not on Pliny's mind in the way he presents himself; but we must ask, why on earth should it have been? The presentation in a published letter lets people know what kind of man Pliny is. For Bryson, public reputation is the basis of making money (§26, cf. in general §83). A letter like 7.11 builds up an image with potentially realizable pay-offs in the business and social worlds.

Was Pliny seeking more than a reliable 'fixed income' from a resource when he thought of purchasing the new estate? Did he think of adding to his capital? Might commercial opportunities have been in his mind? Columella, as Fredriksen remarked, was not doing economics, but in his agricultural treatise he displays a strong sense, like Cato before him, of what farming was for in financial terms. It was not simply about 'income' (*reditus*) or 'profit' (*quaestus*) in the sense of something temporary. Rather it is 'the one way of increasing family wealth that is suitable for a free and well-born man' (*On Agriculture* 1 pref. 10 *unum genus liberale et ingenuum rei familiaris augendae*), and he laments that such a *genus amplificandi relinquendique patrimonii* ('a way of enlarging and passing on one's patrimony') should nowadays be despised by his peers (1 pref. 7). Shortly after this he remarks that, if the *pater familiae* is sympathetic to his workforce, his 'justice and consideration . . . will contribute greatly to an increase in his patrimony' (1.8.19 'multum confert augendo patrimonio'). Columella's advice with figures about viticulture, the most valuable and the most frustrating part of his work for economic historians, leaves us no doubt as to the reason to plant. This type of farming, he remarks with an eye as ever on the moral decline of the Roman race, is now deeply unpopular, and for this reason he proposes to enquire first whether it can 'enrich the *pater familiae*'. One must invest

properly, he counsels, and be patient, and then one will 'easily outdo (those farming other crops) in the increase of one's patrimony'. The *diligens ratiocinator* will see how viticulture 'is extremely good for one's family wealth' (3.3). Columella now goes on to give his figures for production and income which are almost certainly at the high end of what was possible for someone with access to a ready market like Rome, and not an average that could be obtained anywhere. That in itself is significant: he is stressing that one can make a lot of money out of this business. Indeed, all the way through *On Agriculture* Columella's farmer is presented as intelligent, reasoning, sensible, and aware. The word *ratio* occurs no less than 190 times. And although most of the treatise is relentlessly agricultural, the farmer's mentality is expected to be one of increasing patrimony while he undertakes the pleasures of *pastinatio*.

Given how little we know about the actual workings of the ancient economy, the demonstration of a commercial sector in ancient agriculture aside from the remarks of the agricultural writers is not easy. But it has been possible to do this clearly with olive oil production from the estates of Roman Tripolitania: David Mattingly's studies of surplus production here, and also in Roman Tunisia and Spain, make it certain that these elites did not farm olives because the environment encouraged them to do so in preference to other crops. They were in olive oil for its export potential, and the surviving evidence of production facilities shows that this was a serious market. The political benefits of the increasing wealth of the Lepcitanian aristocracy culminate in the rise of Septimius Severus to become emperor.[21] Of course there are many factors that make for a focus on export. Quality of product is part of it; aggressive commercial sense is more important. As ever, social status (with all its obligations) is wrapped up with economic wealth and dependent on producing it, as Bryson states plainly (§§51–4). The tangible results of the oil magnates' riches are evident in the magnificent remains of Lepcis itself and other towns.[22] We might imagine that some of these owners were like the great *conductores* of the famous Tunisian imperial estate inscriptions, extremely rich tenant farmers who contracted with the government to work the land through their own sub-tenants.[23] In any case, the money they were making recalls what we know of the wine market in Italy, which Pliny himself was very much involved with.[24]

[21] Mattingly 1988a, 1988b. Cf. Hitchner 1993.
[22] For Lepcis especially, see recently Wilson 2007: 295–307.
[23] Kehoe 1988a.
[24] Purcell 1985 for the social and economic aspects; de Neeve 1990: 375–9 for the important Plinian letters 8. 2, 8. 15, 9. 16, 9. 20, 9. 28 on the directly managed part of the estate and Pliny's arrangements for the vintage. Cf. Chaniotis 1988 on the substantial exports of Cretan wine to Rome.

We have to be as open-minded as we can in trying to understand attitudes toward wealth. The evidence is so incomplete that limiting oneself strictly to it is likely to mislead rather than inform. Thus it is not impossible that Pliny himself could have been a tenant on some estates for commercial reasons. In such a circumstance the leased farmland would provide income, and not be a drain on capital. Holding lands in different areas – spreading the risks from 'Jupiter' – was sensible (cf. 3.19.4), and we know of wealthy owners in Egypt who were happy to own and also happy to rent and to sublet.[25] In addition, in a society governed by rank and status, one would not be surprised to find tenancies being held by some for reasons that were not strictly economic. It has been well argued that Pliny's own *coloni* were in fact 'capitalist' farmers, not peasants, who were leasing land because they saw an opportunity to profit from it by producing for the market.[26] They might also have benefited from their relationship with Pliny. Landlords and tenants often have problems with one another and it is difficult to for us to determine at any one time who was in the driving seat owing to the variety of factors in play. At *Letters* 3.19.7 Pliny complains of 'this current scarcity of tenants (*coloni*) and the general bad times'.[27] At 7.30.3 he complains about having to give time to his farming and the difficulty of leasing land on account of the rarity of finding 'suitable lessees (*conductores*)'. These remarks could be no more than a farmer grumbling. Like any owner, he wanted the right sort of tenants, and 'suitable' here means well-off ones. In his only letter to a tenant, 6.3, he thanks a certain Verus for taking over his 'little gift', the failing farm run by his old nurse, and asks him to make it *fructuosissimus*. If we take Pliny at his word, he thought tenants were in a strong position. This is the view Kehoe (1997: ch. 4) has taken from him, while also noting (from Finley's study of tenant indebtedness, 1976: 112–17) that tenants' debts gave landlords the upper hand, tying them *de facto* to the master's land. The term *colonus* in Pliny 3.19 is difficult to pin down, and could be no more than a farm manager of some kind, of the sort we see Pliny advising his grandfather-in-law about at 6.30.[28] A big *conductor* would be in a different position. Either sort could present managerial headaches, which is why Columella recommends the use of tenants only for far-flung properties growing grain (1.7.6–7).[29] Bryson too thought in terms of managers, and worried about getting hold of good

[25] Bagnall 1993: 130–1.
[26] De Neeve 1990.
[27] But note Lo Cascio 2003: 285–8 arguing, perhaps rightly, for 'hac penuria colonorum' to mean 'the tenants' own lack of resources'.
[28] De Neeve 1984 for an exhaustive exploration of the term.
[29] Capogrossi Colognesi 1996: 246–7, 290–2.

ones (§36). Personal inspection was better, but in most cases more inconvenient. Given the likelihood of *diffusa late praedia* (*Digest* 29.5.1.30), mixed management, taking into account both local economic conditions, including the availability of labour, and reflecting local and family habits (cf. Finley 1976: 118), was surely the norm. The effort that could be involved is voiced clearly by Pliny at *Letters* 9.37, where he apologizes to Valerius Paulinus for having to miss his inauguration as consul (in September 107) owing to having to deal with the rental arrears on his *praedia*. These were now so great that he was going to institute the 'new system' – new for Pliny, that is – of sharecropping. To make his apology stick, he stresses that this will 'require a great amount of trust, sharp eyes, and many pairs of hands' (9.37.4).

The balancing act for Pliny probably meant no very active commercialism. As he remarks, 'other men visit their estates to come back richer (*locupletiores*): in my case it's to come back poorer' (*Letters* 8.2.1). Yet the presentation of a lack of success should make us suspicious. On this letter, and with reference to 3.19 also, Elio Lo Cascio hits it right when he remarks that for Pliny 'motivazioni extra-economiche . . . e motivazioni rigorosamente economiche si mescolano' (2003: 288–9). Pliny was not and could not be the freedman entrepreneur Remmius Palaemon who made a fabulous amount from the improved productivity of vineyards bought in a state of 'neglect' (cf. above on Mickwitz) and in need of repastination (Pliny the Elder, *Natural History* 14.48–52), or the Augustan ex-soldier and consul Tarius Rufus who lost HS100 million through investing in agriculture (presumably vines) and failing to get a return. Pliny the Elder, who tells the tale to exemplify a dictum of 'the ancients', remarks sententiously that 'farming well is what is needed: farming too well is ruinous' (*Natural History* 18.37–8). But if we had letters from these men, our view of Roman estate management would be radically different. For Kehoe these stories are the Finleyan exceptions to the rule: 'other Roman landowners could not have viewed their estates as investments whose value would grow; nor did they tend to acquire them to improve them and sell them for a profit' (1997: 72). But why not? The remark comes in Kehoe's valuable and original study of the jurists' rulings concerning matters relevant to the agrarian economy, *Investment, Profit, and Tenancy*. The rulings focus on tutorship, that is to say, on the administration of estates left to minors. The problem with this evidence, as Kehoe acknowledges, is that the aim of tutorship is to protect the ward's inheritance. Commercial risk-taking is not going to feature in necessarily conservative and cautious advice. Although the jurists' consideration of tutorship offers an important perspective and one that many landowners would have been comfortable with, in the end it cannot offer proof of a risk-averse

mentality because its purposes are so circumscribed. Comparable evidence from endowments examined in ch. 3 of Kehoe's book unsurprisingly also shows long-term, low-risk investment to realize a stable income. This is not going to tell us anything of a Remmius Palaemon; but neither will it tell much about a Pliny.

Kehoe's determination to see ancient owners as displaying an attitude of maximum caution in an economic environment offering limited choices comes out strongly in his 1992 book on the organization of private or semi-private estates in Roman Egypt. The methodological and evidential problems of the study have been well discussed in the review article by Roger Bagnall (1993). It is instructive to compare Kehoe on the best known of these estates, the Appianus domain, with the detailed study by Dominic Rathbone, which appeared a year before his book.[30] The Appianus estate was massive – perhaps 4,000 hectares or more – and our evidence for it consists of detailed records of income and expenditure relating principally to one division (or *phrontis*) out of some thirty and for the period from roughly AD 249 to 268. The documents are mostly written to the manager or *phrontistēs*, Heroninos, and the collection is known by his name. We do not have the records of the central administration of this carefully managed enterprise. For Kehoe, the evidence is approached from the premiss that Appianus' aim was security and his major objective in order to ensure this was to maximize the crop, irrespective of the market for it, since he had no means of being able to respond to market forces given the limited choices available to him about what he should cultivate. Thus, although the estate gives the impression of an 'intensely cultivated enterprise, aimed at organizing large amounts of labor . . . [to produce] above all wine as a cash crop', in fact Appianus was subject to the same 'general constraints' facing all other landowners. Size actually is irrelevant to aims (Kehoe 1992: 106–7, 118), and the Appianus domain was in essence no different from a smallholding. The only relevant factors were those applying to all landowners: 'a chronic shortage of capital, labor and managerial expertise' (p. 59). In establishing this picture his interpretation of the evidence of Pliny is important (cf. pp. 168 ff.). It is indeed interesting how the literary evidence (cf. Kehoe 1988b, 1989) provides the foundation for many of his conclusions, as it did for Finley.

That the Heroninos material relates to a largely rural division of Appianus' property should not be taken to suggest (as Rathbone well remarks) that most of his wealth was in agriculture. There is enough information to

[30] Rathbone 1991; cf. further thoughts and bibliography of responses in Rathbone 2005 and the other essays in the same volume incl. esp. Andreau.

indicate wider business interests including property, fishing rights, and transportation. Within the rural estate there existed an advanced, centrally directed transport system. Rathbone's study puts it beyond doubt that this system produced efficiency savings by allowing a 'rapid circulation of instructions, produce, labour and other resources among the units of the estate'. This was not simply an internal matter aimed at enhancing self-sufficiency. The proof of the pudding is the sophistication of the accounts. Relying on Mickwitz's 1937 study of 'economic rationalism', which was written at a time when the Heroninos archive was not properly known,[31] and on de Ste. Croix's 1956 study of Greco-Roman accounting, when historians had yet to get to grips with the material, Finley identified accounting practices in the ancient world as a prominent factor in the absence of a capitalist mentality. And it is true that ancient accounting in the main looks primitive to us. As is well known, there was no double-entry booking (that is to say, no practice of recording individual transactions in two different places according to their debit or credit value, thereby guaranteeing, by the ability to check both the debit and credit balances, the accuracy of the transactions). More than this, outgoings and income are often listed in order of time in the same column, and related entries are not grouped together. The result was 'individual records of debts and of receipts and payments, and miscellaneous inventories', and the purpose of accounts was essentially 'to expose losses due to fraud or inefficiency on the part of the proprietor's servants and others' (de Ste. Croix 1956: 14–15, 34). There is no proper distinction between capital and income or the process of writing off the upfront costs of an asset such as (to give the standard example) Columella's expensive vine-dresser slave (*On Agriculture* 3.3). Detailed study of the Heroninos accounts, however, reveals a much more integrated picture, even if other evidence is not so promising. On the Appianus estates different accounts were drawn up by different officials for different purposes, which were designed to be part of an interlocking whole. The main purpose was to ascertain the cost-effectiveness of the enterprise. This was done by separating entries for disbursements and receipts and by grouping entries by relevance, not time, and on a monthly basis. On their own these accounts would not have shown profit because only the central administration of the estate would have known of the income from surplus produce. The local accounts certainly enabled checking. But the central accounts had the information to

[31] I hesitate to use the word 'archive', given Finley's amusing comparison of the Zenon 'archive' (which relates to lands farmed for Ptolemy II Philadelphus' finance officer, Apollonius) to the contents of his 'desk drawers' (1985b: 34–6). But the Appianus/Heroninos archive is a rather different matter.

draw up a profit account, if they wanted, and Rathbone speculates wisely on the process by which this might have been done (pp. 375–8).

Fundamental to the question of whether sophisticated accounting actually matters to doing business and making money is the reconsideration of de Ste. Croix from an historiographical perspective by Richard Macve (1985), emeritus professor of accounting at the London School of Economics. Macve and others have argued that accounts in themselves do not necessarily assist the development of a profit mentality and that it is perfectly possible for far simpler accounting procedures to give sufficient information to estimate profitability 'rationally'. The grand thesis of Werner Sombart in his still untranslated *magnum opus*, *Der moderne Kapitalismus* (1902), had it that double-entry booking was a precondition for the rise of capitalist economic thinking. This is clearly open to challenge: entrepreneurs leave accounts to their accountants. On the other hand, while there were proto-capitalist elements in the ancient economy, no widespread capitalism emerged. Double-entry may or may not be a precondition of such a development; what it does show is organization and minute control of information and the ability to guarantee that information, hence to provide trust and business confidence. The handbooks and notebooks of the Italian merchants and company agents which date from the late thirteenth to the early fifteenth centuries show what antiquity lacked in terms of paperwork. These multi-branched companies, where the partners for the first time attracted investment from shareholders to whom they were answerable, had educated and well-travelled employees, some of whom put their own capital into the enterprise. Market confidence in the companies led to the development of bills of exchange, first among traders and then more widely, at least in some parts of Europe, and this greatly increased the need of money as a result of the ability to defer payment and hence transact more business. The result was a great 'dethaurization' of previously accumulated coin as, for example, church wealth was put to use in productive investment (Spufford 1988: 251–63, 2002: 22–5, 34–8; cf. Banaji 2007b: 55–7).

The 'paper trail' of the late medieval Italian companies is truly impressive; but more basic information combined with the assurance of a good reputation could guarantee confidence (cf. above on Pliny and Bryson and below, pp. 237–8, for Greif's work on the medieval Maghribi merchants). With regard to accounting techniques, the Appianus documentation is at least suggestive. There was an internal credit system within the estate. Local workers had accounts where their wages were credited and debits were made for purchases, taxes, and payments in cash. The documents show that the estate worked in money completely but without the need for cash in

all situations, and the older view that wine was the 'currency' is just wrong (Howgego 1992: 16). As Rathbone notes, the use of an expanded monetary economy helped to support the use of money throughout the rural Fayyum. The level of activity was itself a vital constituent of the reputation that was needed for business success and avoiding exclusion from the market (Bryson §§25–6). It is obviously right to hold that 'credit-money added very significantly to the Roman Empire's money supply' (Harris 2006: 24).

The so-called 'Muziris' papyrus, which gives us the only figure we have for the value of the mid-second-century trade between Alexandria and Muziris (? modern Murachi-Pattanam) in south-west India, shows the sort of opportunity an Appianus could have taken to invest some of his wealth in other directions, for a cargo of such a very high value must have had a very wealthy man behind it – the text indicates a single investor – with ready cash to advance on credit and a network of agents to ensure his advantage. The after-tax value of the cargo on board the ship Hermapollon (the tax being set at one-quarter) was nearly HS7 million, which is the equivalent of almost 1% of the net product in wheat of the arable land of Egypt (Rathbone 2000). The papyrus contains both the actual figure and also part of a template contract for such ventures (and perhaps for this shipment itself), which indicates the regularity of the procedure. We may assume that the financier had originally loaned around a quarter of the after-tax value, which value is, it seems, the sum he then paid the merchant for the cargo. He 'used third-party contractors [the merchant/shipper] to spread some . . . of the risk . . . , but above all to secure management which was expert, and had a personal incentive (legal liability for loss, profit motive) in running the venture efficiently'. The contract part of the papyrus indicates that he, rather than the merchant, would be likely to buy the goods and sell them himself at Alexandria. Though it is not stated, it must be the case that the financier paid via his bank (see van Minnen 2008: 236–8). We cannot say what the mark-up would have been at Alexandria, or Rome, and Rathbone speculates on the basis of some ancient figures.[32] This fabulously rich load offers us a glimpse into the eastern trade and is comparable to a cargo like that of the ninth-century Belitung wreck (Flecker 2001).

Another example of an opportunity for an Appianus is provided by evidence for the Egyptian textile trade in the form of Peter van Minnen's reinterpretation of a papyrus (P. Oxy. Hels. 40) which was once held to be a simple laundry list (van Minnen 1986). In fact it is a customs log showing

[32] Such as those in Pliny's *Natural History*, around which '[a]ncient historians will continue to flutter fatally . . . like moths drawn to a candle'.

textiles taken out of Oxyrhynchus by merchant 'exporters' over a period of one week (or perhaps five days) in the month of Hathyr (early November) in an unknown year of the second or third century. The 'absolute minimum' number of *chitōnes* is 1,956 including 1,079 for children. This implies an annual production of around 100,000 items or some 15,000–20,000 pieces of cloth, figures which easily stand comparison with cloth production in late medieval England or Flanders. It competes with the evidence of mass transit-trade in textiles of the kind we see in the ʿAbbasid empire; and there is every reason to assume a vigorous local trade in many parts of the empire of this *oikos*-based craft and its essential, everyday product (Jones 1960). The evidence from Egypt, though far more extensive than for other regions (cf. Wipszycka 1965), is otherwise lacking at this level of detail and it is difficult to confirm a picture of a market-oriented 'industry'. Even so, the production for a town the size of Oxyrhynchus is significant. A domestic sphere of production is usually viewed as pre-industrial by economic historians who tend to see 'capitalist' enterprises as related to industrialization where workers work exclusively on a product in a venue exclusively devoted to the making of that product. In an important recent article Jairus Banaji has reminded us, with regard to comments made by Marx in the *Grundrisse* about put-out textile manufacture, that 'the *dispersal* of production [is] no indication that these forms of domestic industry were not part of a network of *capitalist* enterprises' (2007b: 69). At the start of the twenty-first century it may be time, as Banaji suggests, to rethink some of the nineteenth-century periodizations which instinctively prevent us from being able to discern capitalist enterprise in pre-industrial societies.

With regard to the opportunities for investment in textiles, the recent study of the facilities for textile production at Timgad (Thamugadi) by Andrew Wilson (2001) is highly suggestive. One whole quarter of this town was colonized by fullers (cf. Cato's investments), pointing to a production way beyond the needs of a small city and therefore for export. All in all the evidence for the African provinces is not very extensive (Wilson 2004), so interpretation of economic realities is as usual very difficult. The Egyptian potters' leases published in 1981 by Helen Cockle are indicative of the kind of organization this business might have had. The leases show that rich Egyptians from the landowning class established and let out facilities to master-potters for the production of a considerable quantity of wine amphorae. Such arrangements are not attested elsewhere, but naturally enough have been proposed in connection with the organization of the pottery workshops of southern Gaul, and particularly the site at La Graufesenque, which was the dominant producer and made hundreds of thousands of

pieces of high-quality slipware throughout most of the first and into the beginning of the second century AD. Unfortunately nothing at all is known about who supplied the land and kit needed by the Gallic potters and it is not possible simply to assume that the Egyptian *locatio–conductio* arrangements applied. The large firings at La Graufesenque – typically above 25,000 pieces – and the wide distribution of the ware indicate the commercial success of the enterprise and show careful management. It has been doubted that local landowners had any involvement with marketing: this was surely in the hands of *mercatores* (Marichal 1988, Polak 2000, Dannell 2002); but it is quite possible that landowners did provide some of the finance needed for distribution, as must have happened in the case of the 'Muziris' shipment and as has been argued in detail for Arretine ware by Allard Mees (2002: 301–16). Finley's warning about the difficulties of recovering the socio-economic background to the movement of utilitarian goods still makes good reading (1985b: 23–6); but there is no cause to be in thrall to it.

Options other than agriculture certainly existed, then. Take-up of these options depended on the mentality and traditions of the local elites; no black-and-white picture can be drawn. Columella bemoans one reason for neglecting profitable agriculture: *civilis ambitio*, he says, detained the upper classes in the forum, and the only solution he can think of is for politically active people to have an estate near town (*suburbanum praedium*) so they can go home and run it *post negotia fori* (1.1.19). He is thinking of Rome, of course; but socially and politically busy men throughout the empire are a focus of socio-medical texts in the first two centuries (Celsus, Plutarch, Galen) which describe or prescribe for the poor health that results from perennially running around and never having time to look to one's well-being.[33] Such people did not perhaps 'think' business or have time to do so – but they had others to do it for them. Moreover the politically active elite was a small part of the landowning notables. Bryson's estate-owner has no involvement in civic ambition and honours: for him the city provides commercial, not political, space. There must have been very many with the same outlook. Like Bryson's owner they had 'scattered estates' which they invested in (§36), and at the same time benefited from the fruits of commerce. One such group of provincial landowners who clearly did think business are the Secundinii brothers of modern Igel near Trier, and it worth spending time examining their attitudes. Commerce, not politics, moved the Secundinii to self-display. The lively scenes of their commercial activity are portrayed on the socle, frieze, and attic of the uniquely surviving 23-metre-high tomb – die

[33] Romano 1991, 2000, Grimaudo 2008. Cf. Chapter 6, pp. 396–7.

Igeler Säule – which was presumably erected on one of their estates probably in the first half of the third century. The Column has long been studied. The best historical analysis, by Drinkwater (1982), considers the nature of the business of the Secundinii against the background of a well-attested wool textile production in Gallia Belgica. What we see are scenes concerned to show 'the large-scale marketing of finished cloth in very large quantities' (p. 115). This cloth is for the wholesale market: it requires several people to manipulate the pieces depicted. Drinkwater suggests comparisons with the medieval drapers or clothiers who oversaw everything in the wool industry of their time from the provision of raw materials to the presentation of the final product to the buyer. The Secundinii, on this argument, were concerned primarily with the fine wool of the region, that is, with specialist production and not with homespun cloth, and the panels portraying land and river transportation of their wares demonstrate full commitment to export. The distance of this market can only be guessed at: a regional operation seems a better idea than farther provinces like Italy. The comparison with the medieval period is entirely speculative, of course, as Drinkwater acknowledges in full; but it is not fanciful or unhelpful. The Column shows large quantities of woollen cloth on the move over mountains and up rivers. It shows the presentation of the cloth to onlookers in a market hall.

One can hear what Finley would have said in response by recalling his comments on Walter Moeller's *The Wool Trade of Ancient Pompeii* (1976): a 'spectacular effort . . . to create a great woollen industry in Pompeii, based in the first instance on local sheep-raising for which there is no evidence': so *The Ancient Economy* p. 194. The reaction Finley implicitly called for came in Jongman's 1988 study of the economy and society of Pompeii, a scholarly and learned work, but one which presents an essentially static economy where agricultural production, especially wine, was aimed almost exclusively at a local market. Jongman's conclusion came from a painstaking entry into the cul-de-sac of hypothetical statistics, which for the ancient world are likely to be especially misleading, joined to a Finleyan insistence on Pompeii as a 'consumer city' (an idea that was 'a nightmare of sociological simplicity', as Banaji averred).[34] Drinkwater's imagination is more appealing. Jérôme France (2004), in the important collection of papers edited by him with Andreau and Pittia (*Mentalités et choix économiques*), rejects the comparison with the clothiers, as does Jonathan Wild,[35] but he cautiously and sensibly

[34] Banaji 1989: 230; cf. Frier 1991. See also Wilson 2002b: 234–6 for a wider view of Pompeian production.

[35] Wild 1999: 34, 2002: 28, locating the Secundinii in a more rural framework of production by landowners, with (in this case) markets in the garrisons of Upper and Lower Germany.

outlines the ethos of the Secundinii by invoking the Weberian idea of *Beruf* ('vocation' and 'profession'), which is so important in *Der protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* and encapsulated for Weber the dedicated pursuit of profit for its own sake. Weber exemplified the call to profit by quoting the capitalist *sententiae* of the frugal Benjamin Franklin with their moral and religious demand to make money. The Igel Column strongly suggests that the Secundinii were driven by a similar consciousness of their own worth as producers and businessmen.

The difficult question is whether citing the Column is another instance of 'the anecdotal technique of dredging up an example or two as if that constituted proof' (Finley)? There are numerous representations of jobs and employments on Roman graves (Zimmer 1982; NB restricted to Italy), and other representations of the wool industry survive from Gallia Belgica (details in Schwinden 1989); but the business of the Secundinii appears to have been at a far higher social and commercial level than these. Their interest in recording their *Beruf* in quality art is a cultural claim to high status, especially in the visual association they made in the four dominant main panels between themselves and the mythological heroes Perseus, Achilles, and Hercules (Kleiner 1992: 345–9). It is dreadfully ignorant to say 'they gained no great advantage from involving themselves in [trade]' (Samuel 1997: 218). But can we really be sure that the Column is not a one-off? One of the most sensible set of comments on the state of our knowledge about the ancient economy and what we may say about it comes in William Harris' introductory chapter and postscript to *The Inscribed Economy* (1993a, 1993b). Here he carefully, but assuredly, concludes that the evidence for production and distribution 'does lead in a particular direction', that is, the direction of integration and the 'market economy' with features of capitalism (we might call these 'proto-capitalist' or 'proto-industrial'[36]) and organization that show an ability to manage resources for profit. The Igel Column also leads in a particular direction: a sense of the ability to organize production, a feeling of pride in the product, the awareness of the power of distribution, of divine protection and immortality. But we cannot extrapolate from the particular conditions that made the Secundinii. Drinkwater himself, in re-examining the evidence, does not shrink from concluding (with due acknowledgement of Finley) that 'socio-political ideology' limited the cases of such activity (2001). And it is certainly right to be cautious about turning the Secundinii into medieval clothiers given the technological advances which supported

[36] Cf. Dark 2001 on the latter term.

the production of that period (Cardon 1999). Nevertheless, the fact there was no general capitalism in antiquity does not mean there was no capitalist mentality.

2 'THE INSTITUTED PROCESS': MODELS AND POLITICS

Richard Saller's instructive essay, 'Framing the Debate over Growth in the Ancient Economy' (2002), aims to take interpretation onward in two ways. To start (pp. 224–9), he explores the creation in the scholarly literature of the opposing camps of 'modernizers' (associated with Rostovtzeff) and 'primitivists' (with Finley).[37] His remarks can teach us much about how debates come to be structured and how patterns of selective quotation and the attribution of implacable positions arise all too easily. In fact, if we ignore some unguarded statements, Rostovtzeff and Finley are much closer about the performance of the ancient economy than might be imagined; this is Saller's conclusion, and he is right. He then takes up the challenge of putting this sterile clash behind us (pp. 231–7). A way forward is allowed by the broad consensus that the period from the second century BC to the end of the first century AD saw a steady, if modest, overall growth and improvement in standards of living. This is the general position taken by the contributors to *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* (Scheidel, Morris, Saller 2007), of which Saller is a co-editor. It is the position adopted by Keith Hopkins against what he called (1995–6) the 'static minimalism' of Finley, and the 'local and economically self-contained pockets' (without empire-wide, integrated trade) of Richard Duncan-Jones (notably in his *Structure and Scale* (1990)). It is certainly a world with which Bryson would be happy.

Agreeing on a mildly progressive economy is one thing; interpreting it in action is another. The *Cambridge History* advocates a broad sweep of approaches from related socio-economic fields which quietly reimport, or at least do not question, the application of neo-classical economics to the ancient world. There are of course problems in utilizing potentially complex social science/economics models in one's footnotes without too much thought about their application. For example, Yujiro Hayami's *Development Economics* is cited.[38] This standard book sets itself the task of exploring

[37] Of the many treatments of the debate in the period before Rostovtzeff, Millett 1991: 1–23, esp. 9–19, is especially clear. On Rostovtzeff in particular, D'Arms 1981: 11–17. See also Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 3–8, and Lo Cascio 1991.

[38] In its second edition; I have used the third edition, co-authored with Yoshihisa Godo (Hayami and Godo 2005).

'the possibility of emancipation from poverty for developing countries'. It consequently focusses strongly on the possibilities of technology and the institutions appropriate to enhancing the use of technology within a capitalist market system. Major overall concerns include the explosive growth in world population and the shortage of resources that have occurred since the Second World War, our dependency on scientific agriculture to feed the world's burgeoning numbers, problems of environmental destruction, and so on. There are many useful things here for the student of past societies: thus throughout the book the 'cultural–institutional subsystem' and the 'economic subsystem' (sub-systems, that is, of the social system on a Parsonian vision of the world) are taken as mutually interacting. But in the main, in the detail which is based on very rich quantitative data, *Development Economics* is not going to be of much use to Roman historians. We are on more productive ground with the various approaches which may come under the title of 'the new institutional economics', a broad approach which spreads neo-classical analysis into the 'institutional' bases of the economy, with talk of 'maximizers' and 'the free rider', the obedient but greedy actor who is only constrained by particular historical political and legal circumstances. This has been proclaimed by a number of scholars, especially by the *Cambridge History*'s co-editor Ian Morris, as *the* way forward (Morris 2002). It necessarily entails a strongly modernizing approach – though its proponents see themselves as sidestepping the old modernist–primitivist anithesis.[39] The introduction to the *Cambridge History* begins with a quotation from an economist closely associated with the focusses of New Institutional Economics (NIE), Douglass C. North.[40] Some of the technical aspects of NIE are, naturally, not easily applicable to the ancient world,[41] and the language used by some of those NIE economists writing on historical topics is foreign enough, if one reads it, or banal.[42] Its common-sense aspects are, however, transferable: the institutions which shape the 'performance' of an economic system and determine costs of coordination (within, say, a firm) and transaction costs (on the market). 'Institutions' (the market, the firm, the franchise, property rights, etc.) affect

[39] On this illusion, Meikle 2005.

[40] As does Scheidel's and von Reden's introduction to their reader of key papers, *The Ancient Economy* (2002).

[41] Cf. Chapter 1, p. 92 on the 'Coasian discussions of the role of the firm' attributed to one prominent medieval thinker. For Coase and his claim to have invented NIE with his 1937 paper 'The Nature of the Firm', see The Ronald Coase Institute website.

[42] See essays in Drobak and Nye 1997; banal: North's often admired *Structure and Change* (1981). Quite different is the work of Avner Greif on the medieval economy, which might have been mentioned in the *Cambridge History*; see pp. 237–8.

costs of producing and distributing some good or service. 'Transactions' are not simply buying and selling: they may also be informal exchanges such as gifts. The positive results of using this theory are shown in the opening part of the *Cambridge History*, 'Determinants of Economic Performance', with chapters on ecology, demography, household and gender, law and economic institutions, technology. 'Performance' signals measurable data of production and consumption (cf. North 1981: 3), however crude and uncertain these are for ancient times. If we combine the structural interests of *The Ancient Economy* with the vast amount of material culture data now available (which is the focus of the distinctively quantitative approach of Bowman and Wilson 2009), we can begin to make progress – so long as the limitations of our knowledge are not ignored.

These limitations of evidence lead to a need of models. 'The objective, in the final analysis, is the paradoxical one of achieving a more complex picture by the employment of simplifying models'. These are Finley's last words in *Ancient History: Evidence and Models*, which are repeated in the supplementary chapter written for the second edition of *The Ancient Economy*, and published in the same year.[43] Models are tricky things, honest and dishonest. The master of all the virtues and vices of modelling the ancient economy is, of course, Keith Hopkins and his 1980 'taxes and trade' model, which seeks to account for trade by making it a response of the periphery (the provinces) to a centre (Rome and Italy) which sucked in provincial wealth in the form of taxes and (in Hopkins' 1995–6 revision of the model and his 2000 revision of the revision) also rents. The provinces were obliged to pay their way by producing goods for the centre to buy. The centre could afford to do this on the basis of tax and rental income. In addition to paying for goods, the centre transferred funds to the provinces through the major form of public spending in the Roman world, the army. In his 1995–6 revision of the model, and commentary on some of its critics, Hopkins is by turns assertive and arrogant, or modest and reflective, about his proposition. Particularly audacious, though amusing, is the reappearance of the Wigwam of Truth (1995–6: 42), the idea that a number of potentially or actually weak arguments support one another mutually in the form of a wigwam.[44] Yet Hopkins has to yield somewhat because key parts of the model do not wash: the work of Duncan-Jones had shown that coinage did not circulate much out of provinces, and though Hopkins seeks solace in Howgego's

[43] Finley 1985a: 182, 1985b: 108, referring to R. J. Chorley and P. Haggett (eds.), *Socio-Economic Models in Geography* (London, 1968), 22.

[44] The idea goes back to *Conquerors and Slaves* (1978) 20, and the original 'Taxes and Trade' article, 1980: 116.

reconsideration of the problem of coin circulation (1994), it is not enough to sustain him. Egypt in particular operated a closed monetary system, as several scholars have pointed out.[45] More importantly (and this is something Hopkins chose to ignore), there is an imperfect overlap between the heyday of Mediterranean seaborne commerce (i.e. in the western Mediterranean, where the 'delights of summer beaches' have concentrated most of the research into wrecks[46]) from the second century BC to the first century AD and the period, beginning with Augustus, of the 'sharp distinction between "tax-producing" and "tax-consuming regions"'. In addition the model (obviously) fails to explain Italian exports and their 'astonishing (first century) boom'.[47] And since it is held by every major ancient economic historian that the tax take was small – some 10% – the ability of tax to drive the economy by itself is certainly open to question. The wigwam is shaky. But the model is still important; and Hopkins alerts us to the limitations by stating with an appealing frankness that, 'basically, to choose between static minimalism [Finley] and local and economically self-contained pockets on the one hand [Duncan-Jones], and on the other mild development plus a thin veneer of economic and monetary integration [Hopkins], as basic characteristics of the Roman economy, is not so much a problem of fact and evidence, but rather a problem of preference, of a general sense of how the Roman world worked, and of the balance of probabilities and plausibilities' (Hopkins 1995–6: 60). Those ancient historians who claim to 'subject themselves to the evidence' only will clearly not be impressed by this avowal. But it is a statement of strength rather than an admission of weakness: Hopkins was saying that what was needed was a feeling, a conception, of how things worked in combination with a dynamic model of the possible processes. The resulting model can only be defeated 'by showing that its assumptive frame is wrongly conceived, or even better by showing that an alternative model will cover more evidence, more elegantly, with fewer moving parts, and more persuasively' (pp. 43–4).

The large increase in the production of coins from the late Republic to the early empire, the unification of political and legal frameworks, the apparently aggregate increase in elite wealth, Rome as an 'accelerator' developing the economy of the whole empire: these are the attractive aspects of the Hopkins thesis. These fit broadly with the evidence of shipwrecks, with the fascinating record of air pollution revealed by ice-core analysis from

[45] E.g. Rathbone 2007: 419.
[46] MacMullen 1988: 9. For the evidence and literature, see recently F. de Callataÿ 2005: 369–70.
[47] Lo Cascio 2007: 646 for both points. 'Boom': Wallace-Hadrill 2008: 406 on Campanian bronze ware.

the Greenland ice-cap,[48] and more. That this evidence does not map well onto a fiscally driven economy does not undermine the heuristic attraction of the 'taxes and trade' model, which is '[t]he only comprehensive attempt to explain the dynamics of the Roman imperial economy' (Scheidel, in Scheidel and von Reden 2002: 191; cf. e.g. Pleket 1990: 31–56, esp. 43–6). One of its main appeals has been the possibility of explaining the economic decline of Italy after the first century, and here Hans-Ulrich von Freyberg's *Kapitalverkehr* ('movement' or 'flow of capital')(1988) has been influential in developing Hopkins by taking as its point of comparison the feared potential effects on the economies of the Western powers of the German war reparations stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. It was Keynes himself who warned of the negative consequences for the economy of Great Britain from the flood of goods which Germany (like the Roman provinces for von Freyberg) was to be required to pay.[49] In the case of the Roman world the provincial economies were the beneficiaries of the need to pay up, since Italy was too costly and lacking in motivation to compete with them. Though the economic history of the decline of Italy is well known, the mismatch between the situation after the Great War and the High Roman Empire is perhaps too great to be helpful.[50] A better way forward is to deploy detailed demographic and other quantitative data, such as it exists, within the broad approach opened up by Hopkins, as is done in Scheidel's densely argued 2007 paper offering a new 'model' for the growth and decline of the Italian peninsula. Models are needed because the proxy evidence, from shipwrecks to watermills, may never answer the big questions (Scheidel 2009).

One thing missing from Keith Hopkins' model in its various forms is people: the Hopkins market is an abstraction determined by fiscal flows. This is infinitely less messy than factoring in the kind of work done by John D'Arms in *Commerce and Social Standing* (1981). Moreover, economic development is not a topic often addressed by ancient authors writing literary treatises, for, as Wim Jongman has put it fairly and squarely, these 'abound

[48] Hong *et al.* 1994 show that lead–silver smelting in the late Republic/early empire produced lead pollution at 'approximately the rate [reached] at the time of the Industrial Revolution', with a production peak of around 80,000 metric tonnes at the start of the first century BC. See also Hong *et al.* 1996 for the peak in copper production in the same era, Scheidel 2009: 47–50 for discussion and interpretation of the literature.

[49] Cf. Keynes, 1919. Book 4 of *The Wealth of Nations* issues comparable warnings about the commercial losses empires inflict on their own homelands as a result of their (initial) domination of provincial markets.

[50] For an extended commentary on von Freyberg, see Andreau 1994, who both admires him and condemns him for being unduly influenced by Anglo-American modelling and theorizing (and for not citing Andreau).

in litanies of decline, and are rather useless' (2007: 612). But there are plenty of examples in the literary evidence where rich authors, if we read them carefully and in conjunction with the material record, speak more positively of economic gain and express optimism for the present and the future. Thus in Columella there is much talk of 'decline'; but this has to do not with economic opportunity, but with the idleness of the elite. The manipulability of authorial statements is always a problem: to support one's chosen interpretation by the 'cherry-picking of congruent quotes – whilst standard practice in ancient history – makes for poor economic history', as Scheidel remarks (2007: 340), with reference to the use of literary texts to provide confirmation of quantitative data. Scheidel's impressive work on Roman population necessarily treats people as facts and figures.[51] Such approaches provide further historical background for Bryson, but are not in accord with his holistic conception of the economy as part of people's lives, where the estate's business is wrapped up with the owner's obligations to its people and to his family.

Paradoxically (perhaps) the models that lie behind Finley's approaches in *The Ancient Economy* are more congenial to this Brysonian conception, based as they are on the humanistic social sciences. Finley was one of the first ancient historians to incorporate Max Weber's thoughts on the ancient world and on general sociology. In particular, as Ian Morris brings out in his excellent foreword to the 1999 reissue of *The Ancient Economy*, Finley took on board the Weberian ideas of 'status' (*ständische Lage*) and of the community denoted by status (the 'status group' or *Stand*, as opposed to the nineteenth-century development of economic 'class'). 'Where stratification by status permeates a community as strongly as was the case in all political communities of Antiquity and the Middle Ages,' Weber had written in *Economy and Society*, 'one can never speak of a genuinely free market competition as we understand it today.'[52] Other key ideas of Weber about classical antiquity were, however, discarded by Finley. For Weber was intrigued by the question of whether capitalism had existed in the ancient world, partly because he regarded capitalism in the modern world as the most advanced stage of human socio-economic relations. In *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilisations* (2nd edition 1909; translated and introduced by R. I. Frank, 1976), and especially in the introductory essay, 'Zur ökonomischen Theorie des antiken Staatenwelt' ('Economic Theory and Ancient Society', pp. 37–79 trans. Frank), he claimed that 'whole periods

[51] Scheidel's most recent papers are easily accessible through Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics (PSWPC) at www.princeton.edu/~pswpc.

[52] Weber 1978: 937 cited by Morris (p. XVI of his introduction to Finley 1985a). See the whole section ch. IX.6 (pp. 926–39) of *Economy and Society* and Weber's schematic summary in ch. IV (pp. 302–7).

of Antiquity were shaped by capitalism, and indeed precisely those periods we call "golden ages"' (p. 51). This 'capitalism' for Weber was a mixture of public and private entrepreneurship. The private companies who collected tax in the late Republic showed a clear determination to make a profit for themselves, hence were 'capitalist'. The use of slaves in agriculture and other industries was also capitalist. But at the same time, there was no structural coordination of this labour, which resulted rather from individual possession. Moreover, Weber went on to say that distinctive features of modern capitalism were lacking; mass markets, organization of labour, technological innovation harnessed to profit. In ancient societies the owners of capital were generally content with income from rents. 'Capitalist entrepreneurs' were held in contempt (p. 66).

In his later works, *General Economic History* (which was reconstituted posthumously from notes taken at lectures) and above all in *Economy and Society*, Weber advanced a somewhat different and certainly more persuasive set of ideas. In *Economy and Society* (partially revised before his death and published posthumously in 1922; translated by G. Roth and C. Wittich, 1978), he distinguishes between two forms of capitalism: peaceful, rationally focussed, planned 'market capitalism', which is exemplified in the modern 'organization of labor' with its 'fixed capital, free labor, the rational specialization and combination of functions . . . bound together in a market economy' (p. 165 trans. Roth and Wittich); and, on the other hand, what he called 'political capitalism', which existed 'wherever there has been tax farming, the profitable provisions of the state's political needs, war, piracy, large-scale usury, and colonization' (p. 480). 'Political capitalism' depended for its profits on activity by the state. These two forms of capitalism were mutually antagonistic: a 'state which collects money taxes by tax farming . . . does not encourage the orientation of profit-making activity to market . . . [rather it proceeds] by creating vested interests in the maintenance of existing sources of fees and contributions' (p. 199). He went on to say that this form of capitalism makes (in John Love's paraphrase) 'rational calculations and systematic planning . . . extremely difficult, if not impossible',[53] hence severely retarding the development of the market capitalism characteristic of the modern business firm. In late antiquity the 'liturgical organization of public finance' was '[t]he most important case in history of the obstruction of capitalistic development' (p. 201). In these comments, from the section entitled 'Repercussions of Public Financing on Private Economic Activity', Weber is speaking at a structural level and aiming to distinguish ancient (not just

[53] Love 1991: 53.

Greco-Roman) economic activity from modern capitalism. In a different register he also notes that Rome at least was from the time of the Gracchi 'in possession of a rational capitalistic class', who are the late Republican *publicani*, and that such a class was necessarily at odds with the 'official nobility' (the regime of the 'notables', e.g. pp. 290–2). This account is complementary to the factors behind the primitiveness of the ancient economy identified in the earlier *Agrarian Sociology*. There transport, technology, political attitudes, and so on were brakes on development. In both this work and in *Economy and Society* the trend of the emperors towards bureaucratic rule even brought an end to political capitalism, and owing to the state's reliance on 'status-liturgy' and 'public want satisfaction', the end of antiquity itself was nigh (1976: 364–5, 1978: 351).

Directly or indirectly, these ideas have been hugely influential.[54] The lack of know-how (especially of modern accounting: *Economy and Society* pp. 107–9, 161–4[55]), the wrong attitudes and/or overriding concern with status, the negative effects of dependence on taxes and rents and slavery, are after all the main planks of the Finley approach, even if he discarded Weber's belief in capitalist activity among the Romans. Less influential but still important for Finley was Karl Polanyi's sociology ('in our own day', *The Ancient Economy*, p. 26) of the ancient world as one where the economy was essentially a system of redistribution far removed from the modern world of price-fixing autonomous markets. Polanyi did not mention Weber much in his works, partly because he places some of his ideas (like 'status') in a long history of nineteenth-century philosophy and social analysis, thereby downgrading their originality in Weber, perhaps deliberately. In his most famous work, the evangelical *The Great Transformation* (1944), he had undertaken to expose the modern market economy as a system divorced from society and to propose in its place a genuinely socialist and Christian alternative to an economy 'based on self-interest' (p. 249). The capitalist market, then, was unnatural; Polanyi's task was to point this out. That 'the behavior of man' in the past had been 'almost the opposite' to what we consider right led Polanyi to set up a research group to look at past societies, which eventually produced the publication of *Trade and Market in the Early Empires* (Polanyi, Arensberg, Pearson 1957). Although Polanyi's ideas are undergoing something of a revival today and in any case have always had some popularity with historians, he may reasonably be considered an

[54] Weber and classics is well addressed in Love 1991, with an emphasis on Rome, and Nafissi 2005: 57–123, with an emphasis on Athens.

[55] Interestingly Mickwitz, who knew his Weber, does not cite him on this central point.

intruder into ancient history – even more than Weber – with little to say to us now. His consideration of pre-modern economies is designed to buttress the political agenda of *The Great Transformation*. But he also goes much further in *Trade and Market* by developing the contrast between ancient and modern as one of an antithesis between a 'formal' and a 'substantive' economy. By formal Polanyi meant 'a set of rules referring to choice between the alternative uses of insufficient means' (the 'scarcity postulate'). This was a means–end rationality, and its rules were economic theory, which applied only to a market system where all goods, including labour, have a price and price is the 'economic fact par excellence' (p. 247). The idea of the substantive 'derives from man's dependence for his living upon nature and his fellows. It refers to the interchange with his natural and social environment, in so far as this results in supplying him with the means of material want satisfaction' (p. 243). The economy was an 'instituted process', by which he meant that it was 'embedded' in an array of non-economic institutions such as kinship or bodies of rules, and was thus invisible. Although Polanyi does not use Marxian language, he meant that goods were used for the ends intrinsic in them (their 'use value') and not made to satisfy consumer utility, and that economic activities served not one another (their 'exchange value'), but human needs and communal welfare. The important result of this is that in Polanyi's pre-modern society one could not conceive of the economy as a separate sphere or, therefore, formulate an economic theory; it existed but it was pointless to look for it.

Polanyi's idea of embeddedness is attractive, even though it is perhaps rather simple or even simplistic.[56] Pre-modern societies were quite aware of scarcity. And if they do not express a desire to achieve surplus in monetary terms, there is no need to assume that surplus is not important. There are other ways of expressing this – through luxury, culture; and other ways of achieving it – piracy, war, and such manifestations of Weberian 'political capitalism'. In his determination to enforce a sharp distinction between ancient and modern, Polanyi – writing at a time when economics as an autonomous science was barely a century old and with the shocking experiences of the Great Depression and the War fully in view – could only see economic consciousness in terms of the disastrous ideals of modern economics. Most of us nowadays would not hail as 'outstanding' the 'discovery of recent

[56] See Bresson 2005 for some penetrating criticism of Polanyi's over-schematization and the problems of trying to straitjacket ancient society into it, and de Ste. Croix's 1960 review of *Trade and Market* (a book of 'outstanding interest', but on Aristotle and the discovery of the economy Polanyi was 'hag-ridden by his general theory'). Further, Smelser 1959, the wide-ranging discussion by Humphreys 1969, Booth 1993: 76–80, Temin 2001, Nafissi 2005: 127–88.

historical and anthropological research . . . that man's economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships'; we would accept it, notwithstanding the views of a few economists of the Lipsey and Chrystal type (see Chapter 1, p. 89). At the same time, many would not understand the claim that man 'does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest in the possession of material goods; he acts so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, his social assets', and 'values material goods only in so far as they serve this end' (Polanyi 1994: 46). Polanyi had come to this conclusion, as he acknowledges, by immersing himself in the works of Malinowski and Thurnwald (cf. Thurnwald 1932) on Oceania and other 'primitive' societies.[57] One of the effects of reading these anthropologists was the projection of an almost permanent, timeless pre-modernity on early societies, even if these were not primitive 'savages'. This static conception of the past was something that Polanyi bequeathed to Finley, whose weakest assumption in *The Ancient Economy* is the unchanging nature of the ancient economy from early Greece to the later Roman empire.

3 FROM POLANYI AND FINLEY TO ARISTOTLE

Just as North's *Structure and Change* goes some way to admitting that ancient economies cannot be explained through neo-classical economic theory alone, so for Polanyi some aspects of the pre-modern economy itself were not 'substantive'. It is important to remember that the Polanyian schema was not chronological or teleological, and that Polanyi differed from Weber or Marx in this respect. For this reason he was able and prepared to find what he called 'subordinates' of the market economy in periods before the nineteenth century, and likewise was entirely comfortable with the idea that systems of reciprocity (for example, gift exchange) and redistribution (e.g. council housing) – the major alternatives to the market[58] – existed as subordinates within market capitalism. Capitalism itself was after all a temporary and transitory phase, the flaws inherent in which required thoughts about its future replacement. One of the earlier societies which showed signs of the market was fourth-century BC Athens. Polanyi begins

[57] Malinowski studied for a while with Karl Bücher, an economist with clear views on the 'geschlossene Hauswirtschaft' of the ancient world (in his *Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft*, translated as *Industrial Evolution* by S. M. Wickett, London, 1901). This and other texts relevant to his battle with the 'modernist' Eduard Meyer are collected in Finley 1979.

[58] To which in *The Great Transformation* he added 'householding', with reference to Aristotle (53–4); the concept (derived from Bücher, of course) is developed in *Dahomey and the Slave Trade: An Analysis of an Archaic Economy* (1966). Cf. Humphreys 1969: 204, Gregory 2009.

his engagingly entitled study of 'Aristotle Discovers the Economy' with a wide-ranging restatement of his values backed up with the extensive use of material from Malinowski, Thurnwald, and Margaret Mead. Ancient societies lacked any notion of 'the economy' because they were based on 'status' and 'community' rather than 'contractus' and 'society' (drawing here on the ideas of Ferdinand Tönnies and Sir Henry Maine's celebrated book, *Ancient Law*). Aristotle had 'thought on economic questions', but offered no 'economic analysis'. That is the extent of Polanyi's claim, and it is a reasonable one to the casual reader. Leaving aside Aristotle for one moment (his thoughts in the *Politics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* will be examined below), it is worth recalling that scholars on the modernist wing of the debate (i.e. the majority of those writing today) would reject Polanyi's view of ancient Athenian economic activity as far too limited, and would see Finley as its heir when he argues that large landowners (in Greece and Rome) 'had a "peasant-like" passion for self-sufficiency on their estates' and did nothing else.[59] Historians have been busy bringing out many exceptions to disprove Finley's dismissively minimalist view of classical Athens. The issue of interest now is not the demonstration that individual landowners needed for their public and private lives a great deal of money and probably had a large agricultural surplus to dispose of in the city's markets in order to raise it (see Osborne 1991 on the "maximiser" mentality' of Phainippos and others), or the existence of the quasi-industrialized landscape of the silver-producing area of Laureion in Attica (Rihll 2001), or the importance of banks and credit within the Athenian economic system (Cohen 1992, Shipton 2008). From different angles, such studies make big inroads into Finley's contentions – though the extent of market production and the degree of complexity and interconnectedness between markets was hardly at the level implied by Morris' review of Cohen (1994).[60] For Finley, the lack of economic analysis was the key indicator: had there been massive economic activity, it would have been noticed. In this regard, Aristotle's failure to comment on 'the economy' served to corroborate him. Indeed, for Finley in his 1970 study of 'Aristotle and Economic Analysis', Polanyi almost seems to have exaggerated.

In Polanyi's eyes Aristotle had been a witness to something happening: 'the oncoming of market trade'. Given the great transformation of economy and society 'in our own day', Aristotle's 'significant formulations

[59] Finely 1985a: 108, cited by Osborne 1991: 136.

[60] There is a good deal of truth in Millett's picture of friends and family being more responsible for the provision of credit than banks (1991).

on economic matters' had much to teach us. What were these formulations? After several pages on the idyllic society of the Arapesh of New Guinea, it is not surprising to find Polanyi picking out *koinōnia*, *philia*, *autarkeia*, communal justice, natural trade, equivalence of exchange, and the shrine of the Graces 'that accompanied the idea of reciprocity' (as he puts it) in Aristotle's economy. For Aristotle, then, economy was submerged within traditional structures, and the more so given his actual awareness of changes to this happening around him. And that is it: Polanyi's promise of an acute observer in the end offers us no more than an aristocratically minded philosopher who is bent on defending the last vestiges of archaic gift-giving reciprocity in a rearguard action fighting the inevitable growth of the market. But scholars today would say that the structural changes in the Athenian economy had happened long before Aristotle. Finley of course found Polanyi's reading of the Athenian economy as embedded and substantive a very useful one. In 'Aristotle and Economic Analysis' he suggested that Aristotle's remarks on economic matters are merely incidental in both *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, that the latter is a purely ethical discussion without relevance to economic thinking at all (which let Aristotle off the hook: '*no* economic analysis rather than poor or inadequate economic analysis' (p. 15)), and that likewise in the former 'of economic analysis there is not a trace' (p. 18).

What Finley says is correct, if one comes at the matter wanting Jevons, Marshall, and Walras. But Aristotle's analysis, especially in *Politics*, is actually a sensitive and acute account of the relationship between economic activity and social needs. The fact that he does not advance a theory of value or discuss price-fixing markets does not make his analysis irrelevant to economics. Moreover, he is being prescriptive and attempting to instil a view of economic activity which he knows and states is not shared by others, and so he reveals general assumptions; in the end, both works concern politics rather than academic analysis – and all economic analysis is political at some level. Most importantly, 'Aristotle is the author of the fundamental distinction between the two patterns in the use of money, as a means and as an end' (Meikle 2005: 24). To express this in the familiar Marxian formulae used by Meikle, Aristotle distinguished between the use of money as a means of exchange between things we need, which Marx called the circuit C–M–C ('the transformation of commodities into money, and the change of the money back again into commodities'), and the subordination of commodities to the end of enrichment, which he called M–C–M ('[m]oney that circulates in the latter manner is thereby transformed into, becomes capital') or more exactly M–C–M^1 (where M^1 = 'the original sum advanced, plus an

increment', which 'I call "surplus-value"').[61] Aristotle's analysis should not be deprecated, then. Yet there is a widely held view that he has nothing to say on economics, and even Schumpeter, who took him seriously, refused any analytic intention.[62] Meikle is undoubtedly right to utter the suspicion that this view has 'something to do with the fact that, though [his analysis] has impressive intellectual qualities of explanatory power and insight, it is not in the end favourable towards trade, commerce, and money relationships' (2005: 27–8). Aristotle had read his Polanyi too well – and Polanyi's sociological constructions were never in favour with economists.[63]

For our purposes, Aristotle's account of money at *Politics* Book 1.8–10 (1256a1–1258b8) will be taken first, and I shall then come on to the account of exchange in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (henceforth *Ethics*). Bryson certainly knew *Politics* and his overall conception of money and trade as intrinsic parts of the society of the estate owes much to it. Nevertheless, he rejected a good deal of what is said and has a different way of imposing limits on unbridled wealth creation, being influenced in part by Aristotle's own discussion of generosity in *Ethics* Book 4 and by the views of the Stoics.[64]

Aristotle begins the discussion in *Politics* (1.8) by saying that the slave – the topic he has just been discussing – leads to an examination of 'property in general and the art of making money (*chrēmatistikē*)'. The question will be whether *chrēmatistikē* is the same as, part of, or ancillary (*hupēretikē*) to *oikonomikē* (which is the *technē* of estate management, and is of course the principal subject of *Politics* Book 1). The first option is immediately dismissed in a decisive analytical and political move, for *oikonomikē* is concerned with use, whereas *chrēmatistikē*, in what will soon emerge as its 'good' manifestation, is concerned with provision. The enquiry will be whether *chrēmatistikē* is a part, or 'a different sort' (i.e. ancillary). Since there are many parts of property (*ktēsis*), Aristotle then asks if, for example, farming is a part of *chrēmatistikē*, or something different. Various methods of procuring food are then considered, the reason being that food provision is the basic activity of all. This discussion gives the general conclusion that

[61] *Capital* (1887) vol. 1, ch. 4 (cited from www.marxists.org). In the original German Marx used W(are)–G(eld)–W, etc. See Meikle 1995: 52 n. 7

[62] 'But in itself this [distinction of use and exchange value] is not only common sense but also commonplace' (Schumpeter 1954a: 60).

[63] Which is not to say that economists have ignored Aristotle. See e.g. the collection of papers assembled by Mark Blaug (1991).

[64] There is a large amount of literature on Aristotle and the economy, and much of it I naturally have not read. By far and away the best account of the *Politics* (and *Ethics*) passages is Meikle 1995, which is based on various earlier studies of his. Some of the argument is reprised in Meikle 1996 and 2005, but the 2005 chapter goes further and contains perceptive comments on Finley and *après* Finley.

there is a sort of acquisition (*ktētikē*) that is natural because *oikonomikē* must 'either have things at hand or provide them', and these things should be useful for 'the community of the city or the family (*oikia*)' (1256b29–30). The amount of property which is needed 'for a good life is not unlimited', and Aristotle notes that Solon was wrong to suggest otherwise.[65] Wealth is simply a tool (*organon*), and in any *technē* the number of tools is finite. Thus 'there is a natural art of *ktētikē* for managers of estates (*oikonomikoi*) or those involved in public life (*politikoi*)'.

So far so good. Aristotle now goes on to identify 'a second type of *ktētikē*, which people specify, and rightly so, as *chrēmatistikē*'. It is similar to the first sort but, whereas the first is natural, the second is not but is won 'through experience and skill' (1.9, 1257a4–5). Here *chrēmatistikē* = making money in the capitalist sense, not simply creating wealth to satisfy family and communal needs. It is now that Aristotle proceeds to distinguish between the Marxian formulae, C–M–C and M–C–M. Originally, he says, there was 'an art of sharing (*metablētikē*[66]) everything', which equalized the possession of necessities. Thus 'we may infer that retailing (*kapēlikē*) is not a natural part of *chrēmatistikē*'. This original *metablētikē* is not contrary to nature nor is it any part of (the second kind of) *chrēmatistikē*, but it is needed 'to fulfil man's requirements according to nature' (*hē kata phusin autarkeia*)'.[67] As communities grew and became dependent on other communities, money was invented to facilitate exchange (*allagē*). This marked the inauguration of 'the other sort of *chrēmatistikē*', i.e. *to kapēlikon* (1257b2). 'It was probably straightforward to begin with, but as a result of practical experience it became rather sophisticated.' Its aim was to secure the 'greatest profit (*kerdos*)'. Retail trading 'produces wealth (*chrēmata*) specifically through exchange of wealth' (1257b20–2). Aristotle again notes the difference from the true *chrēmatistikē*, the purpose of which is to support the *oikos*. The problem is that the two types have much in common: in the case of licit *chrēmatistikē* (wealth-making), there is another 'end' in sight (i.e. the welfare and needs of the *oikos*); whereas in the case of the other kind (money-making), the end is simply 'increase' (*auxēsis*). 'Hence some people are led to believe that this latter is the object of *oikonomikē*, and they go through

[65] Solon fr. 13. 71 ed. West, *Iambi et elegi graeci*, vol. II (1972).

[66] Cf. Polanyi 1957a: 93–4. But 'exchange' is not a misleading translation, as Polanyi contends, providing one understands what it means, and at some points is required, e.g. 1258b1, where it refers to exchange value in the capitalist sense.

[67] For *autarkeia* see Meikle 1995: 44 'the main meaning Aristotle gives it is "having enough"', citing *Ethics* 1097b14–15 τὸ δ'αὔταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ, 'makes life worthy of choice and lacking in nothing'.

their lives thinking that they have to preserve or increase their money to an unlimited degree' (1257b38–40). The result is a corrupt view of what things are for. Thus, although the aim of being a general is to secure victory and the aim of being a doctor is to promote health, some people will turn all such arts into 'money-making ones'.

At this point Aristotle feels able to draw his arguments together to reach a conclusion to the question, Is *chrēmatistikē* (in its acceptable guise) the province of the *oikonomikos* or *politikos*? (1.10, 1258a19–b9). His answer is that the *oikonomos* manages and does not produce. So, the art of money-making is like the art of medicine: on one level, medicine concerns the estate-owner and the magistrate, on the other, it does not because it properly belongs to the physician. So, wealth is really the concern not of *oikonomikē* but of the art (i.e. *chrēmatistikē*) 'ancillary' to it. Having come to this conclusion, and reminding us again that one form of *chrēmatistikē* is *oikonomikē* (meaning that it has 'to do with estate management') while the other is *kapēlikē*, he is finally in a position to condemn in the strongest language the practice of making money through 'petty usury' (*obolostatikē*; i.e. M–M, 'money which begets money', in Marx's words, *Capital* vol. 1, ch. 4). Here all interest payment – *tokos* – becomes identified with the proceeds of moneylending. Such is his moral fervour at this point, Aristotle never stops to ask whether an interest-bearing loan might be good for the borrower by advancing him credit, for he sees no further than the formula M–M.

In this tendentious account – as Aristotle is fully aware – we have a combination of an historical and a logical development of the institution of money and of the rise of people whose intention is to use money to make more money, set within a framework of the proper purpose of money/wealth as a tool to serve the aim of the *oikos*. To Schumpeter's mind, this represented a typical confusion of the 'unsophisticated analyst'; yet even so he was prepared to allow that in Aristotle the combination had an 'expository' purpose. The developmental schema has the effect of highlighting Aristotle's belief that the use of money for its exchange value only was an inevitable thing; and one thinks not only of Plato's ready coupling of the words *oikonomia* and *chrēmatismos* (*Apology* 36b, *Republic* 498a, cf. *Phaedrus* 248d), which he would have known of, but also of his own remark, in a quite different train of thought, at the start of the *Ethics* to the effect that the aim of the *oikonomikē technē* is 'wealth' (*ploutos*) (1094a9, cf. *Politics* 1338a16). But we know that Aristotle enacts a strong separation of the two sorts of *chrēmatistikē*. Is there then a problem in his logic, as Meikle (1995: ch. 2) suggests? Meikle points to the dual-purpose 'Delphian knife' which is cited by Aristotle *en passant* at *Politics* 1252b in a discussion of the distinction

between masters and slaves: the dual-purpose knife is an example of what nature herself tries not to do, to use one tool or instrument for two ends. The knife-makers are accordingly condemned for acting *penichrōs*, 'cheaply'; and the meaning of this is made clearer by the passage at *Parts of Animals* 4.6, 683a24–5, where in the course of discussing insects Aristotle observes that nature much prefers to use separate organs for separate aims 'instead of making a "spit-cum-lampholder" like coppersmiths do in order to produce a bargain (*pros euteleian*)'. He adds, however, that nature will also do this, if she has to. With regard to trade, he also knows that production of goods for their commercial value, not their intrinsic natural-use value, was historically and logically determined. And as we have seen, it is not just goods but *technai* too (specifically that of being a general or a doctor), that may be pursued primarily, if illegitimately, for gain. So, why does Aristotle not just say that money has exchange value as its *telos* from the start? The answer is both that he has an agenda for reform – since *Politics* is an idealist work – and that money does not have to be like this: it can be used in the circuit C–M–C; but in the real world its use as exchange value between commodities will take over and produce the circuit M–C–M *kata logon* ('regularly', 1257a31). Elsewhere (1263b15–29), in the course of his anti-Platonic discussion of the disadvantages of banning private property, he notes that, although people blame private wealth for public evils, the cause of these evils is actually their own 'wickedness' (*mochthēria*), not the existence of private wealth itself. In the *Ethics* he famously says that the 'the money-maker (lives) under compulsion' (1096a5).[68]

Politics 1.8–10 is as far from archaic gift-giving as it could be. Where does it get us to? Aristotle is not in any way concerned with describing the *economy*; yet he does give some clues as to what he thought this entailed. He offers the opinion that *to kapēlikon* (that unnecessary *chrēmatistikē*, i.e. the economy beyond the *oikos*) was now 'as a result of practical experience' something 'rather sophisticated' (*technikōteron*) (1257b3–4). This tells us nothing concrete about the extent or nature of economic activity in fourth-century Athens; but it does show that in Aristotle's eyes there was plenty of exchange and profit-driven economic work, which involved planning (for he later explains that the 'most sophisticated' (*technikōtatai*) types of *ergasiai* are those 'where the element of chance is the smallest', 1258b36). He does not condemn this growth on moral grounds. Throughout his account

[68] If that is what the passage means: ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστιν. The Arabic (Akasoy and Fidora [Dunlop] 2005: 123 ll. 12–13; NB Ullmann 2011–12 on the 'catastrophic' failings of this edition) apparently read βίος (cf. *sīra mā*), but the manuscript is not fully legible at this point.

there is an emphasis on money for use both in 'necessary' trading connected with the *oikos* and 'the other sort' beyond the *oikos* (including interest and usury), which indirectly supports the modern view of advanced banking and credit arrangements in Athens against the static and underdeveloped financial system envisaged by Finley and Polanyi. He does not and cannot tell us what he thinks the limits of 'necessary' *chrēmatistikē* are for the *oikos* (in other words, for the morally good life, as he sees it); but this certainly involves trading. Clearly, though, it does not involve the buying and selling of goods for profit, as is envisaged by Bryson for his own estate-owner. Although Aristotle does not condemn trade in the way Plato does, and does not seek to ban it, it is not something he approves of. This comes out strongly in *Politics* 1.11, which is the practical appendix to the 'theory' of the previous sections (1258b9–11). Here the divisions of 'the most relevant *chrēmatistikē*' (i.e. germane to the *oikos*) are entirely agricultural and look very traditional. Of 'the sort to do with exchange the most important is merchant trading (*emporia*) . . . , the second is *tokismos*, the third is hired labour' (1258b20–6). Confusingly, he introduces here a third kind of *chrēmatistikē* which has elements of the 'natural' sort and the 'exchange' sort. There is now no strong condemnation of exchange, since he is in a practical vein.[69] Aristotle also tells us that there are various divisions of *ergasiai*, but refuses to go into these out of intellectual snobbery or inability: 'a detailed account would be useful for these *ergasiai*, but to pursue the topic is vulgar' (1258b35). Instead, he provides two examples of 'cleverness' (*sophia*) in forming 'monopolies', remarking that a collection of stories about this topic would be 'helpful for those who value *chrēmatistikē*', and advising *hoi politikoi* to study them (1259a36).

So his account ends. The message on trade beyond the needs of the *oikos* is mixed: trade for profit is unnatural, but it is also a regular (*kata logon*) development of natural trade. And it has its uses: it is good for a city to be involved in merchant trading (*emporikē*) through its port. If the scale of this trade is too great, it will be due to 'greed' (*pleonexia*); but there is advantage to be had from having a port, and the city's laws will be able to prevent harmful contacts (7.6, 1327a26–40).[70]

[69] Beware of Jowett's translation of 1258b11 τὴν δ'ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν in the Oxford Aristotle (vol. x, 1921), 'but to be engaged in them practically is illiberal and irksome'. There is no 'illiberal and irksome' here. Ross offers as an alternative Bernays' 'but in practice we are limited by circumstances'.

[70] The passage is an attack on Plato, *Laws* 705a. On exports, cf. Bresson 1987 citing *inter alia* Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1360a12–17. For what it is worth, in the defective passage at *Ethics* 1133b9–10 the Arabic translator did not have an equivalent of ἐξαγωγήν ('export') here; Akasoy and Fidora [Dunlop] 2005: 314 n. 148.

The attempt by some earlier scholars to read neo-classical economics into Aristotle is part of the reason for Finley's scepticism about the value of Aristotle's investigations into money and trade.[71] Such approaches apply particularly to the other main passage where there is 'economic' material, *Ethics* 5.5, 1132b21–1133b28, and to which I now turn. There is in fact no economic context here – no estate, no trade, no *ergasiai*, no agriculture, no monopolies; and Finley's reading of the passage as ethics might seem right, initially at any rate. But that is not the whole story. The context is 'reciprocal justice' (*to antipeponthos*), and Aristotle stresses the importance of this type of 'reciprocity of proportion' in 'associations concerned with exchanges' (*hai koinōniai hai allaktikai*) for the very existence of the *polis*.[72] He is interested in two main issues: the distinction between the natural or use-value of a good and its conventional or exchange value; and the identification of the element and the measure that allows 'commensurability' (*summetria*) between goods. The passage has no bearing on neo-classical economics, where use-value serves to explain exchange value,[73] for Aristotle keeps these apart; and for this reason it has everything to do with ancient approaches to the social foundations of economic activity.

He begins by outlining the need for proportional reciprocity as a form of justice or fairness. To ensure this, 'all things which may be exchanged must somehow (*pōs*) be commensurable (*sumblēta*), and for this purpose money was introduced and somehow (*pōs*) served as a middle. For it measures all things' (1133a5–22, 1164a1–2). His thought in what follows is generally acknowledged to be unclear; and it is not my intention to go into the difficulties in detail, but to pick out the main issues. Essentially, he tries two solutions to the problem of how things are commensurable and how this commensurability may be measured, but they are set out separately and it is not until we get to the end of the discussion that we find out that the first – money – cannot be the answer to the problem because exchange had been happening 'before money' (1133b26–7). The invention and function of money is an economic enquiry on any level (so also in Bryson); and while commensurability in Aristotle's treatment is clearly philosophical, it would be foolish to deny its relevance to economic thought. For like *Politics*, *Ethics* 5.5 makes the basic assumptions of a monetized economy and sets exchange relations at the heart of civic life.

[71] Especially Josef Soudek 1952.

[72] τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις. Cf. *Politics* 1261a30–1 'preserves cities, as I have remarked in the *Ethics*'.

[73] Cf. Schumpeter 1954a: 911–12.

Money, then, does not function as the unit by which commodities are measured. It is purely conventional, Aristotle says, and because the metals used to make it have a use-value of their own, which is independent of their function as media of exchange, its worth fluctuates (1133a28–31, 1133b13–14, *Politics* 1257a35–8). Thus it soon turns out that money stands for something else, and this second thing is 'need'. 'Everything has to be measured by one thing, and in truth this is need (*chreia*), which holds everything together' (1133a25–7, cf. 1133b6–7). 'Need has come to be conventionally represented by money' (1133a29). But now there is a stumbling block: *chreia* lacks a unit, and the unit of money, as Aristotle eventually states, cannot be the key to commensurability (because exchange was happening before it was introduced), and in any case (as we have just seen) money may not keep the same value (1133b13–14). Nevertheless, for the minute, he takes his possible solution a little further before stating that 'in truth it is impossible for things so different to be commensurate; but in respect of *chreia* they admit of being (commensurate) sufficiently (*hikanōs*)' (11133b18–20). This 'must be construed as an attempt to salvage what he can from the chapter' (Meikle 1995: 39). In other words, for the philosopher the chapter is a failure. But for the historian in Aristotle the 'sufficiently' allows 'need' something practical which, though it has no bearing on the essence of commensurability, does leave it with a crucial role: it 'holds everything together'.

We should not try to make Aristotle's 'need' into a neo-classical 'demand', as if it referred to consumer satisfaction. This has been a persistent failing with translators and commentators. Aristotle's *chreia* does not relate to consumers (whereas we shall see that Bryson's does); in fact the whole chapter focusses on commodities, not users. Nor must we import other modern conceptions, such a theory of labour, which has been postulated to explain the notorious analogy 'what a builder is to a shoemaker, so must shoes be to a house' (1133a22–3, cf. 1133a7–10, 1133a32–b6).[74] To explain fairness in exchange, Aristotle assumes in this comparison no more than that builder and shoemaker are equal in point of view of exchange relations. Their statuses are taken as the same. And he adds, 'if it is not like this, there is no exchange (*allagē*) and no community (*koinōnia*)' (1133a24, cf. 1133b5–6, 15–18). Exchange, then, is the basis of civic life, so long as there is fairness and equality on both sides. Aristotle is fully aware of profiteering and can even find something good to say about it (*Politics* 1.11 on Solon). But in his

[74] Schumpeter 1954a: 60–2, Gordon 1964. For the real meaning of δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν [ἢ τροφήν], see Meikle 1995: chs. 7 and 9. NB editors sometimes omit τροφήν, which does seem intrusive; but it was in the text translated into Arabic: Akasoy and Fidora [Dunlop] 2005: 313 ll. 11–13.

discussion of fair and just relations between people in *Ethics*, it is hardly behaviour he is going to commend in regard to the security of the city.

Should these two great explorations of 'the social matrix of exchange relations' (Baeck 1994: 91) be integrated, as several commentators have wanted? It is certainly tempting. For example, *Politics* 2.2, 1261a30–1 refers to the role of reciprocal justice in preserving the city and cites the like remark at *Ethics* 1132b32. And of course the whole discussion in the *Ethics* was incorporated word for word in the *Eudemian Ethics*, which appears to be Aristotle's mature statement of ethical relations.[75] Finley's view, that the discussions arise incidentally, is not in any way correct: they are secure and relevant in their contexts. But for this reason we can see that they are not related other than being the product of one mind. They say comparable things, but in different language and for different purposes. What they have in common is to stress as strongly as possible that making money should always be at the service of the community. To this end Aristotle presents the shoemaker and the builder as entitled to equal treatment. Without such ethics there is no community and, crucially, no business. For Bryson too business ethics, especially fair dealing, are fundamental. But Bryson is practical: he has no difficulty with profit; and his community is one of household–estates, not the *polis* which forms Aristotle's horizon.

4 BEFORE AND AFTER ARISTOTLE: PLATO, XENOPHON, PS.-ARISTOTLE

There are authors before Aristotle – Plato and Xenophon – and after him – Ps.-Aristotle, the Stoics, Philodemus – who need to be considered at this point. The depth of Aristotle's analysis is not repeated in them. Nevertheless, their views of estate management and other economic relations are extremely important – particularly those of the Stoics and Philodemus – and will take us on to Bryson in Section 7. Here I consider Plato, Xenophon, *Oikonomika I–II*. In the following two sections I treat the Stoics and Philodemus.

Plato and Xenophon will not take long for present purposes. 'One can quote Plato to "disprove" almost any general statement one tries to make about Greek society, but that is a stultifying and fundamentally wrong historical method' – so Finley, *The Ancient Economy*, p. 38; and he went on to distinguish representatives of 'a particular social environment', like Cicero, from '"[u]nrepresentative" moralists', like Plato, who 'cannot be

[75] Kenny 1978.

read straight' (p. 43). Finley knew full well that he was on a sticky wicket in making this distinction and moved swiftly on to a discussion of Weberian status, where Cicero could at least represent a social class. With regard to Plato, however, many would agree with his verdict. Relevant to Bryson's introductory 'commercial anthropology' is Plato's imaginary historical outline of the development of trade in what one of Socrates' interlocutors, Glaucon, calls 'a city of pigs' at *Republic* Book 2, 369b–372e. I shall take this famous passage in Section 7 below. Otherwise, Plato's thought is not very relevant. He advances well-known views against trading and *chrēmatismos* and condemns human greed in his imaginary city of Magnesia (*Laws*, e.g. 741e, 847d, 918d), and states that it would have to be 'a metic or a foreigner who would go in for trading' there (920a), a good example of the elitist view that citizens should not dirty themselves with trade. Moreover, *oikos* and personal property are lacking in Plato, in the *Republic* at any rate, as Aristotle remarks at length in *Politics* 2.2–5. Sensible consideration of the purposes of wealth and the possibilities of creating it are also lacking.

Xenophon merits a somewhat longer treatment. Much of the *Oeconomicus* (the *Discourse on the Skill of the Estate Manager*[76]) is concerned with the role of the wife, the supervision of slaves, and above all the tidiness of the house and the successful farming of the estate. All of this is the *epistēmē*, the 'science', of *oikonomia*; and it had a great impact on Bryson's social chapters. Here I confine myself to money and business, though it should be stressed that the wife is intrinsic to this side of the *oikos* and Xenophon's recognition of the value of her labour has rightly been described as radical in relation to the expectations of his contemporaries. In the opening conversation between Socrates and the rich Athenian Critobulus, stress is laid on Critobulus' need of money to pay for his various public obligations, and the source of that money is said to be the 'surplus' (*periousia*) that comes from his estate (ch. 2). The usual assumption of the need to acquire wealth is on display here, and this means, of course, making money; but there is nothing of interest about the economy beyond agriculture (note the condemnation of crafts in ch. 6), and nothing much about the economics of agriculture, even in the paean to the *technē* of farming at *Oeconomicus* 15–20. Since Bryson on money does not follow Xenophon, I shall say nothing more about this side of the *Oeconomicus*.[77]

[76] Cf. Pomeroy 1994: 105, who translates 'Discourse on the Skill of Estate Management', with her commentary 213–15.

[77] Those interested should see Pomeroy 1994. All modern treatments of ancient economics have something (or a lot) to say about the *Oeconomicus*.

Xenophon did think about money and the revenues of the city as well as of estates (*Memorabilia* 3.6.5). His plan in the short political pamphlet called *Ways and Means* (*Poroi*) for all the citizens of Athens to live off the labour of slaves in the silver mines and by improving the facilities available to the metics is well known and discussed, and gave Finley good ammunition in support of the view that the ancient elites did not want to work. Xenophon is also, notoriously, the author of the one passage in ancient literature that has from time to time been taken to show awareness of the 'division of labour', *Cyropaedia* 8.2.5. Here he observes that 'in small towns' one and the same man makes 'couches, beds, ploughs, tables, and often even builds houses'. Although this craftsman is not fully proficient at all of these, he is grateful if he can get enough work as a result of being able to do them all. By contrast, says Xenophon, 'in big towns' a single *technē* will provide enough work for a individual because there is so much call for it. Thus the different tasks of the shoemaker's craft will fall to different workers. And he concludes, 'this shows that someone whose work is specialized will of necessity do this work in the best way (*arista . . . touto poiein*)'. In a paper that heralded the themes of *The Ancient Economy* ('Technical Innovation and Economic Progress in the Ancient World'), Finley rightly remarked that this passage of Xenophon is speaking of the specialization of quality, not division of labour as a means of increasing productivity per worker along the lines of Adam Smith's pin-making concern which could produce 48,00 pins a day by the 'proper division and combination of [the workers'] different operations'.[78] Naturally, it is clear that division of labour to ensure a high level of production was known in the ancient world, even if no one wrote about it: one only has to think of the potteries of southern Gaul.[79] And Finley's theme of the lack of 'technical innovation and economic progress' looks sorry when one considers the hard evidence of steady progress in the design and implementation of machines like watermills or of the spectacular engineering and technological breakthroughs in antiquity that are now well known.[80]

The period from the late fourth century down to Rome's annexation of Egypt in 31 BC constitutes the Hellenistic age. The conquests of Alexander produced a new cultural era in which Greek culture was widely disseminated

[78] Finley 1965a: 38; cf. 1985a: 135; Smith, 1993: 12–13.

[79] So Greene 2000: 45, criticizing Finley's use of the Xenophon passage 'to generalize . . . across a period of nearly 1,000 years'. Cf. Wilson 2008.

[80] See the recent review article by Tracey Rihll 2008. Further literature and discussion: (e.g.) Greene 2000, Wilson 2002a on water power *et alia*, Bowman and Wilson 2009: 33–8. But note the reservations of Scheidel 2009: 69 about the extent of innovation once Hellenistic inventions had been assimilated.

over what we nowadays call the Middle East including Egypt. There were also many cultural and political changes in response to the establishment of the successor kingdoms that divided Alexander's territories after his death in 323. Cities now had to deal with princes, while intellectuals and literati naturally gravitated towards royal patrons and their courts in foundations like Alexandria in Egypt. This was the era of the Hellenistic philosophical schools – Stoics, Epicureans, Cynics. In cultural terms 31 BC marks no immediate cut-off. Roman domination of the Greek-speaking world did produce cultural, political, and economic changes that begin to be noticeable from the first century AD onwards. But the different Hellenistic schools of thought continued to be influential; and many of Bryson's views on economic matters – not to mention social ones – owe a good deal to the Hellenistic thinkers.

The Ps.-Aristotelian oeconomic material very probably dates to early in the Hellenistic period, and I now turn to this. Those parts that concern the wife (i.e. much of *Oikonomika I*) or the slave (part of *Oikonomika I*) will not be discussed here. (*Oikonomika III* is a work of the late Hellenistic period or more probably the early Roman empire and will be taken in Chapter 5.) *Oikonomika I* takes its cue from *Politics* and begins by defining the relationship between *oikonomikē* and *politikē* (1). It then deals with the 'parts of the house', starting (in conformity to Aristotle) with the people, then addressing 'property' (2). This, however, concerns no more than what is 'natural', which is farming, and the comments on this are brief and even less interesting than Xenophon. After discussing the wife and the slave the author takes a more promising turn with talk of the four 'aspects' the *oikonomos* must attend to in relation to wealth (acquisition, preservation, arrangement, and use). The categorization had an influence on later texts, as I shall mention. But the material is brief and trivial.[81] I shall have a little more to say about *Oikonomika I* when I come to Philodemus, since he takes it to task (along with Xenophon).

Oikonomika II is a more important text for the matter at hand, if only because some scholars have taken its ideas seriously. 'The one Greek attempt at a general statement [of the management of public revenues] is the opening of the second book of the pseudo-Aristotelian *Oikonomikos*,' wrote Finley (*The Ancient Economy*, pp. 20–1, often quoted), and he added, 'what is noteworthy about these half a dozen paragraphs is not only their crashing banality but also their isolation in the whole of surviving ancient writing'.

[81] The author's reference to the 'Attic' system of *oikonomia* (1344b31–33) usually brings forth a comparison with the practices of Pericles as recorded by Plutarch, *Pericles* 13. But, as Zoepffel (2006: 508–11) observes, the remark applies to 'the smaller economies' (1344b33). It is optimistic to read 'die chrematistischen Aspekte' into this 'Attic' system on the basis of the passing reference to 'selling and buying'.

Oikonomika II consists for the most part of a series of eighty-two examples (in forty-one sections) of how Greek cities and their leaders down to Alexander dealt with various kinds of financial crisis.[82] But its first section is theoretical, if that is not too grand a word, and offers brief definitions of four types of *oikonomiai*, which here must mean 'types of economy'. These are royal, satrapic, civic, and personal. Clearly this is designed to fill in what *Politics* omitted. The examples in section 2 do not answer to the material Aristotle suggested collecting at *Politics* 1259a36 (cf. *Rhetoric* 1359b31–2), as many have thought, since this concerns money-making by individuals; but that is beside the point. Aristotle omitted much that could be of interest, and both *Oikonomika I–II* try to compensate.[83] *Oikonomika II* says just a little about personal economics: estate revenue is from land, ?property,[84] and interest (1346a12–13); and it is particularly important to ensure that expenditure does not exceed income. The lack of attention to the *oikos* entails complete exclusion of the wife (women are mentioned a few times in the second part) and of slaves, whereas both are of course important in *Oikonomika I*. The author of *Oikonomika II* is far more interested in the other branches (and so personal management of wealth is not mentioned in section 2). Royal economy is divided into four (coinage, exports, imports, expenditure); satrapic economy comprises six kinds of revenue; while civic revenues stem from local products, ports (?merchandise), dues, and ordinary taxes (?).[85]

Finley, then, was right. But there are other ways of looking at the matter. Rostovtzeff came to quite the opposite view and made *Oikonomika II* into a focal point of his chapter on the Seleucids' 'economic and financial policy' (1941: 440–6). 'It was in all probability . . . a kind of guide or manual for those who were confronted with problems of an economic and financial kind, whether in the cities or in the monarchies of the time . . . a vade-mecum . . . for the use of contemporaries . . . [and] in his preface [the author] certainly had in view not the past only, the structure of the Persian kingdom and of Alexander's empire, but also the present, the economic and financial organization which he himself observed in the world in which he lived' (441). Noting that Ptolemaic Egypt and Antigonid Macedonia did

[82] Zoepffel 2006: 568–635 provides a detailed commentary for those in need.

[83] On the late antique reports of an *Oikonomikos* by Aristotle, see Chapter 2, p. 129.

[84] Reading κτημάτων with Spengel for the MSS *hapax* ἐγκληματάων. Rostovtzeff 1941: 446 suggested (from C. B. Welles) a connection with ἔγκτησις ('the right to own property in land or houses'). Wartelle and van Groningen 1968: 53 n. 1 adopt the old proposal ἐγκυκλημάτων in the sense 'activités périodiques' (whatever that is supposed to mean); Zoepffel 2006: 561 proposes 'Erwerbstätigkeiten'.

[85] εἶτα ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμπορίων (*v.l.* ἐμποριῶν) καὶ διαγωγῶν (cf. Polybius 4.52.5), εἶτα ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐγκυκλίων.

not fit the categories of the text, he deduced that the subject of the author's observations was the Seleucid empire and proceeded to analyse this in line with the divisions of the text (446–72). This was making *Oikonomika II* bear a great weight;[86] on the other hand, a text often transmitted with *Oikonomika I* alongside *Politics* and *Ethics* in the manuscript tradition was undoubtedly taken seriously by ancient readers.[87] And Rostovtzeff made one important suggestion, which has been taken up by the ancient philosopher Carlo Natali (1995b: 127). To show how such readers might have read *Oikonomika II*, the 'banality' of which he was evidently aware of, he drew a comparison with the Hellenistic *peri basileias* literature, which made its appearance with treatises under that title by Aristotle, Xenocrates, and Theophrastus (Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 5.22; 4.14; 5.42, 47, 49).[88] The Hellenistic 'On Kingships' were presumably no more 'practical' than the Neopythagorean texts (i.e. they did not offer practical advice how to rule), but aimed at two things: to legitimate monarchy by discussing it openly and positively, and to set limits to kings' behaviour which they and their subjects could agree on and which the monarchs wanted to be known for. On this argument *Oikonomika II* instructed by way of some very general precepts backed up by an array of suggestive examples.

All in all the Ps.-Aristotelian *Oikonomika* contain nothing of the powerful analysis Aristotle brings to the question of exchange and its ability to satisfy the needs which bind communities together. And where they do touch on property, they restrict their focus to 'use- value'; they do not emphasize the importance of making money (indeed, the term *chrēmatistikē* is not used). To make progress towards Bryson's rather different views, I now turn to the Stoics and Epicureans.

5 STOIC ECONOMIC THOUGHT

Stoic economic thought has not received much attention from scholars other than Carlo Natali, who has written three important studies on the topic: (1995b) on general developments and theories among the Hellenistic

[86] The recent study by Aperghis (2004) takes Rostovtzeff's approach even further: ch. 7 (with a translation of the first part of *Oikonomika II*), ch. 8, *et al.*; cf. p. 7 on the 'fundamental' value of this source.

[87] Gigon 1960: xvii–xix. Cf. Natali 1995a: 37. The transmission reflects the Hellenistic category of 'practical' philosophy; see Chapter 1, pp. 55, 83.

[88] The treatises which survive to us from the main part of antiquity are those of Neopythagorean authors, perhaps of the Roman period, and the elaborate discourses of Dio of Prusa (Dio Chrysostom) from the turn of the second century (Moles 1990). On works by early Stoics, Rostovtzeff 1941: 1594 n. 34, 1346–7 n. 24.

schools of thought including the Stoics; (2003) on Stoic interpretation specifically; and (1995a) his introduction to his reprint of Renato Laurenti's translation of the Ps.–Aristotelian *Oikonomika*. These are the basis of much of what I say here, especially on technical aspects of Stoic philosophy.

The ideas of the Stoics are known mostly from fragments, which are often quotations in hostile sources, or from doxographical accounts. There is no doubt that they considered economic matters carefully; but given the total loss of the original treatises, we are not in a position to say how fully and whether discussion was self-standing or part of other works. I begin with the Stoic treatment of business ethics – a major focus of Aristotle's discussions, of course – as reported by Cicero in the form of a debate between Diogenes of Babylon (d. *c.* 150 BC), the pupil of Chrysippus, and Diogenes' own pupil, Antipater of Tarsus (d. *c.* 130 BC), at *On Duties* 3.50–55. As has been noted above, *On Duties* owed a great deal to Stoicism, especially to Panaetius. This particular passage is usually believed to go back to his student, Hecaton, but is of course written by Cicero and we should therefore bear in mind that it is not 'a precise representation of the doctrines of the historical Diogenes and Antipater' (Dyck 1996: 557). The argument about business ethics turned on the balance between virtuous behaviour and pragmatic self-interest, and focussed on the problem of full disclosure of the facts of a sale of goods, including the likely future state of the market, which the vendor, but not the purchaser, had knowledge of versus partial disclosure which acted only in the interests of the vendor. For example, should one sell at a high price in a time of scarcity when one is aware that more supplies are on the way? Antipater's position was 'never'; Diogenes took the contrary view and argued that the whole truth was unnecessary, with the expectation that he would profit highly from selling. Neither Antipater nor Diogenes has any problem in principle with making money by trading.

The position taken by Diogenes appears to be comparable with remarks reported from Antipater, Diogenes, and others unnamed by Arius Didymus, the author of an important summary of mainly Stoic and Peripatetic thought that survives for the most part in Stobaeus' *Anthology* (2.7).[89]

[89] For Arius, see Göransson 1995: 201–26 *inter alia* questioning the traditional identification (Diels 1879) with Augustus' court philosopher, Arius of Alexandria, on the ground that the latter is nowhere called Arius Didymus (as the doxographer sometimes is), and denying that the first part of 2.7 (pp. 37–57 in Wachsmuth's edition of Stobaeus) has anything to do with him. It is quite true that this first part is in a style very different from the summaries of Stoicism and Peripateticism which follow; but Göransson's scepticism about Arius/Arius Didymus is less persuasive than the traditional identification (so Brad Inwood, *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 95.12.08). See also Long 1983, who suggests that 'we may be reading a good deal of Chrysippus in Arius Didymus, or whoever he is' (p. 56), Giusta 1964–7: 1 39–44, 58–62, 140–7.

At Stobaeus 2.7.7f Arius reports Stoic views about 'value' and 'valuation' applied to commerce. Potentially this shows a sophisticated approach which addresses the relationship between hierarchies of valued objects and systems of moral values. In this passage we seem to have a recognition of the power of the market and an acknowledgement that the consumer makes the decision to buy at a certain price. The investigation is part of the enquiry into why we choose some things over others. Choice is made between things which are classified in Stoic philosophy as 'indifferent', that is, it is possible to achieve moral happiness with them or without them. Wealth and health are prime examples of this. Value (*axia*) explains why some of the 'indifferents' will be preferred to others.[90]

Arius reports that, 'everything in accordance with Nature has a value (*axia*) and everything contrary to Nature has a disvalue (*apaxia*). They take value in three ways: (1) the "contribution" (*dosis*) and "price (*timē*)[91] in itself", (2) the "recompense for the thing that has been assessed" (*amoibē tou dokimastou*), (3) and thirdly what Antipater terms "selective (value)", on the basis of which we choose this instead of that when things allow it – for example health instead of disease, life instead of death, wealth instead of poverty.' Noting that 'disvalue' is to be analysed by a comparable scheme, Arius continues, 'Diogenes says that (i) the "contribution" is a judgment about how far (something) is in accordance with Nature and how far it provides utility (*chreia*) to Nature. (He says that) (ii) the "thing that has been assessed (*to dokimaston*)" does not refer to items (*pragmata*) being received "assessed (*dokimasta*)", but to the fact that we call the man who assesses items an "assessor (*dokimastēs*[92])". Thus he says that such a man is "an assessor of the recompense" (*tēs amoibēs dokimastēs*).'

This is indeed a 'cryptic' passage, as Natali says, and translation is fraught with difficulties; but the sense seems to be as follows. Stoic value applied generally, as Arius' (3) makes plain; but the theory has room for commercial transactions, and (1) and (2) of Arius' first report from unknown Stoics, and the whole of his second report from Diogenes of Babylon, appear to relate to this area specifically. Diogenes is quoted to help interpret (1) and (2). In Diogenes' view items themselves do not have an independent value but, rather, value is the assessment made of them by the 'assessor'. If that is right, value as the *amoibē tou dokimastou* (Arius' phrase in (2)) meant to Diogenes

[90] On Stoic concepts of value and indifference, see the incisive remarks of Long and Sedley 1987: 1 357–9.

[91] Not 'esteem' (A. Pomeroy 1999: 49).

[92] δοκιμαστὴν: Heeren's necessary correction of MSS δοκιμαστὸν.

not 'recompense for the thing that has been assessed' (as Arius presents it in (2): when he introduces Diogenes' view he clearly signals that *tou dokimastou* is the neuter singular *to dokimaston*, 'thing that has been assessed'); it meant rather the assessment of value made by the *dokimastēs*. According to Diogenes, then, *tou dokimastou* was the genitive of the masculine agent noun *dokimastēs*, not of a neuter singular. For him an assessor fixes the rate of the recompense.

Some help is at hand from a parallel report which the doxographer Diogenes Laertius makes about Stoic doctrine in the long doxography of Stoic philosophy he includes in his life of Zeno. 'Value they say is (*a*) a contribution (*sumblēsis*) to the harmonious life, such as attaches to every (morally) good thing; (*b*) some intermediate faculty or utility contributing to the life in accordance with Nature, as if one were to say, "(value) which wealth or health brings to the life in accordance with Nature"; (*c*) value is the *amoibē dokimastou*, such as someone with experience in the items may determine, as if we were to say, "wheat is exchanged (*ameibesthai*) for one and a half times the amount of barley[93]"' (7.105). In (*c*) the phrase *amoibē dokimastou* is again ambiguous: it could be 'recompense for a thing that has been assessed' (cf. Arius (2) above); or *dokimastou* could be the genitive of the agent noun *dokimastēs*, as Diogenes of Babylon took it in (ii) above. The second alternative is favoured by Hicks' English,[94] but the first seems better,[95] given the following gloss of *empeiros*, 'someone with experience', for this *empeiros* seems here to be the equivalent of Diogenes of Babylon's 'assessor'. An example follows of wheat being rated at one and a half times the value of barley. Presumably both of these points were drawn from Diogenes of Babylon or a tradition close to him.

'When there is no notion of value, there is no economic phenomenon' – so Marcel Mauss (2007: 98). What Mauss meant was that economic goods and services only exist in a value system; and without taking account of values, economic analysis is simply redundant. How far this claim is valid beyond ethnography is a matter for debate. But in the case of the Stoics at any rate, and so far as we can interpret the remains of their theories, their

[93] I follow Marcovich's Teubner (1999): ἀμείβεσθαι πυροὺς πρὸς τὰς ἐν ἡμιολίῳ (μέρει) [σὺν ἡμιόνῳ PFD et Suda, συνημιονων B] κριθάς. Hicks' Loeb (1925) keeps the MSS reading and translates 'wheat exchanges for so much barley with a mule thrown in', which is obviously wrong; cf. Gigante's Italian translation (1976).

[94] Hicks 1925: 'thirdly, value is the full equivalent of an appraiser, as fixed by an expert acquainted with the facts'.

[95] Gigante's Italian (1976)seems to take it this way: 'un ulteriore significato del termine "valore" essi traggono dallo scambio di merci quale è stabilito dall'esperto intenditore'.

conception of economic exchange fits well with Mauss's dictum. Who, though, is the 'assessor'? The gloss in Diogenes Laertius speaks of someone with experience in the commodity in question. This could refer either to the buyer or the seller. The latter is perhaps more likely – the person who sets the rate of recompense for an item because he has experience in it (*empeiros*).[96] Whether we are dealing with buyer or seller, the Stoics were presumably acknowledging the power of exchange value and the market's ability to price a good. Natali notes that Aristotle had mentioned the idea of *axia* at *Ethics* 1119b26–7 in his discussion of generous spending of wealth (*chrēmata*): 'and we mean by "wealth" all things, the *axia* of which can be measured by money'); but the idea does not form part of his theoretical enquiry into money and exchange (though cf. 1133b25, 1163b35), even if modern, economically minded interpreters of Aristotle try to talk it up.[97] The fragments of Stoic thought suggest they took things much further.

The Stoics were untrammelled by Aristotle's prescription that wealth was an instrument needed for the good life and was therefore *qua* instrument needed in a limited degree. A large amount of wealth was perfectly acceptable to them, just as no wealth was. But wealth was no simple 'indifferent': it was in fact a 'preferable' indifferent. It was something that could be 'generative' of an impulse towards other preferables (Stobaeus 2.7.7e). That is, it was something that could assist the virtuous actions of the wise man.[98] The idea of wealth as a 'material' (*hulē*) of action made it especially preferable. This elaborate philosophical construction was how Stoics justified the wise man being filthy rich.

When Posidonius, according to the report of Seneca, defined *artes* (crafts, *technai*) 'fitting for a free man' as those 'the concern of which is virtue', it is likely that he was thinking of occupations which generated the wealth that assisted virtue. According to Cicero's *On Duties*, the wise man had a definite duty to attend to his patrimony: *res enim familiaris quaeri debet*. This must be done by means 'that involved no disgrace'. He must 'preserve' his wealth through good management and care in spending (*diligentia et parsimonia*), and 'increase' it by the same means (2.87). This advice is on one of two areas (the other being health) about which Antipater of Tarsus rebuked Panaetius because he had failed to treat them in his book (2.86).

[96] ἀμοιβὴν δοκιμαστοῦ, ἣν ἂν ὁ ἔμπειρος τῶν πραγμάτων τάξῃ.

[97] Gordon 1964: many of the passages cited here are not really to do with economic matters. On the other hand, Gordon does not actually say that Aristotle anticipated the nineteenth-century Austrian value theorists (Meikle 1995: 111), though he certainly stands in a tradition of modernizers ambitious to detect neo-classical tools in Aristotle's work.

[98] Natali 2003: 83–4 citing in addition Plutarch, *De comm. Not.* 1069f, 1071b, and Cicero, *De fin.* 3.18.61.

So there is a reasonable chance that we see Antipater's own view behind the thought that making money without *turpitudo* is a requirement for the sage. This would square with his stance in the debate with Diogenes of Babylon, as reported (probably) from Hecaton. Cicero at this point proceeds to connect the advice with the precepts of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, 'which we translated from Greek into Latin'.[99] Means that involve *turpitudo* are presumably those quoted at *On Duties* 1.150. As we have seen, at *On Duties* 1.151 Cicero without demur praises big trading, and earlier in the same book he had declared that *rei familiaris amplificatio*, if it harmed no one, was not to be disparaged (1.25). Thus Natali is probably be right to connect Cicero's *mercatura magna et copiosa* with the Stoics' acceptance of wealth and wealth made from trade (he is obviously right to connect the praise of farming which follows at 1.151 with the influence of Xenophon). Peter Brunt (1973: 26–34) also argued strongly for a Stoic basis (Panaetius) to 1.150–1.[100] Of course, rich Romans did not discover from Greek philosophers that money was good (and Cicero actually makes this point at 2.87: you can learn more about money from Rome's bankers than 'from any philosophers in any school'). Nevertheless, a principal role of the philosopher in ancient society was legitimating elite activity (and offering ethical sticking plasters to go with it). In this sense the Stoic theory of wealth as a 'preferred indifferent' was convenient and desirable.

Another report in Arius – Stobaeus 2.7.11d – concerning the Stoic view of the relation between making money and managing one's patrimony offers firmer ground than the difficult material on value. Since the text contains a number of problems, and the whole passage is of great importance, I give both the Greek and a translation (section divisions are mine):

> (i) Οἰκονομικὸν δ' εἶναι μόνον λέγουσι τὸν σπουδαῖον καὶ ἀγαθὸν οἰκονόμον, ἔτι δὲ χρηματιστικόν. (ii) τὴν μὲν γὰρ οἰκονομικὴν εἶναι θεωρητικὴν ἕξιν καὶ πρακτικὴν τῶν οἴκῳ συμφερόντων· (iii) τὴν δ' οἰκονομίαν διάταξιν περὶ ἀναλωμάτων καὶ ἔργων καὶ κτήσεως ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν[101] ἐργαζομένων. (iv) τὴν δὲ χρηματιστικήν ἐμπειρίαν περιποιήσεως χρημάτων ἀφ' ὧν δέον,[102] καὶ ἕξιν ὁμολογουμένως[103] ἀναστρέφεσθαι ποιοῦσαν ἐν συναγωγῇ

[99] For Cicero's translation and its influence on Latin citations of the *Oeconomicus* (e.g. in Columella), see Pomeroy 1994: 70–3.

[100] Dyck 1996: 331–2 denies it apparently on the ground that the 'account . . . is moralizing . . . but can hardly be called philosophical'; see further below.

[101] αὐτὸν FP; ἀγρὸν Heeren, Meineke, Wachsmuth.

[102] Meineke; ἀφ' ὧν δέος FP; ἀφειδῶς Mullach.

[103] Heeren; ὁμολογοῦμεν ὡς FP.

χρημάτων καὶ τηρήσει καὶ ἀναλώσει πρὸς εὐπορίαν.[104] (v) τὸ δὲ χρηματίζεσθαί τινες μὲν μέσον εἶπον εἶναι, τινὲς δὲ ἀστεῖον. (vi) φαῦλον δὲ μηδένα προστάτην ἀγαθὸν οἴκου γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ δύνασθαι οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκονουμένην[105] παρασχεῖν. (vii) Μόνον δὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄνδρα χρηματιστικὸν εἶναι, γινώσκοντα[106] ἀφ' ὧν χρηματιστέον, καὶ πότε, καὶ πῶς, καὶ μέχρι πότε.

Three problems in the text should be mentioned before we proceed. In section (iii) editors have preferred Heeren's change of τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν ἐργαζομένων to τῶν κατ' ἀγρὸν ἐργαζομένων, making the phrase refer to 'those workers on the land'.[107] I suggest retaining the manuscript reading and taking it as 'those working on it (i.e. the estate)', i.e. slaves or free workers in general, and with no specification of location. In (iv) ἀφ'ὧν δέον ('from appropriate sources') is an important and correct emendation with resonances in Aristotle, Bryson, and Philodemus; Mullach's ἀφειδῶς, 'lavishly'/'freely' destroys the sense.[108] The word εὐπορίαν, 'wealth'/'affluence' in (iv) is preferable to F.'s ἐμπορίαν, 'trade'.

We may translate as follows:

(i) Only the excellent and good manager is described as 'capable of managing an estate', and, in addition, 'capable of making money'.

(ii) The art of managing an estate is a theoretical and practical disposition concerning what is good for the estate.

(iii) 'Management of the estate' means organization of expenditures and tasks, and care of property and of those working on it.

(iv) The art of making money is (α) the experience of procuring wealth from appropriate sources, and (β) a disposition making one behave consistently when accumulating, preserving, and spending money in the pursuit of affluence.

(v) Some (Stoics) say that making money is 'intermediate', others 'fine'.

(vi) No worthless man makes a good head of an estate, nor is he capable of presenting a house that is well run.

(vii) Only the excellent man is capable of making money, for he knows from which sources money should be made, and when, how, and for how long.

104 P; ἐμπορίαν F.

105 Heeren; οἰκουμένην FP, Meineke.

106 γιγνώσκοντα Meineke.

107 Meineke 1860–4: II. clxxciii. Cf. Natali 1995b: 115 'those who work in the fields', 2003: 77 advocating a connection with Xenophon's agricultural interests. A. Pomeroy 1999: 66–7 does not record the MSS reading and translates 'the produce from the fields'.

108 Mullach 1867: 76 col. 2.20.

The Stoic wise man was known by the value term *spoudaios*, implying seriousness, action, quality, and general excellence. Arius tells us more about this 'excellent man' a little after our passage. He displayed physical characteristics of strength, stature, and good build as well as moral qualities. He was rich, happy, and dear to the gods (indeed, for Chrysippus he was the equal of god: Plutarch, *Mor.* 1038c, 1041f = *SVF III*.526, 545). In particular, he had 'the qualities of the king, the commander, the statesman, the *oikonomos*, and the *chrēmatistēs*'. His opposite was the man who was *phaulos*, 'mean', 'bad', 'low', 'worthless', etc., a word which is often employed in Greek as the antonym of *spoudaios* and in the Stoic division of the world into 'two types of men' came to signal the 'stupid' man. 'Stupid people have qualities entirely the opposite of those of the wise man' (Stobaeus 2.7.11g). This unattractive aspect of older Stoic thought was gradually dropped, if not entirely (cf. Chapter 4, p. 266).

Running one's estates and making money go together closely for the Stoic wise man, and it is on these two capabilities that Arius dwells at 2.7.11d. We are told (ii) that knowing how to manage one's *oikos* is a *hexis*, an internally habituated disposition to act in a certain way, with practical results (iii). Aristotle had been well aware of others' views that estate management and money-making were close associates. But he preferred to see *oikonomia* primarily in terms of management and hence links it with the supreme management of *politikē* (e.g. *Ethics* 1141b32, 1142a9–10, *Eudemian Ethics* 1218b13). Since *politikē* is a *hexis*, he presumably viewed *oikonomikē* in the same way. But the Stoics did not take *oikonomikē* primarily in terms of management. Arius' summary reveals 'signs of deep reflection' on the issue of wealth as a personal attitude and experience, with contrary viewpoints recorded (Natali 1995b: 115–17). As to making money, it was (iv β) both a *hexis*, and one different from the *hexis* of *oikonomikē*, and (iv α) an experience or expertise lacking a theoretical basis. The debate about the status of it in (v) reflects this. Some Stoics were not prepared to accept money making as a 'fine' thing.[109] The verdict of 'intermediate' probably signals a duty incumbent on us (cf. Stobaeus 2.7.8a, Diogenes Laertius 7.105, 110, Cicero, *De finibus* 3.58), and so in this case too money-making was viewed as useful. Other Stoics, says Arius, accorded it the highest status of 'fine'; and it appears that the wise man's disposition to 'behave consistently when accumulating, preserving, and spending', and his knowledge of the sources from which money may be made, 'and when, how, and for how long', are broadly equivalent to Aristotle's notion of the good *chrēmatistikē*, which provides wealth as a tool appropriate to the ends of the *oikos* – but without the limitation that

[109] On the value word *asteios* as a Stoic technical term, note Schofield 1999: 136–40.

Aristotle put upon it (iv, vii). The wise man's disposition also somehow reflects Aristotle's discussion of appropriate means and circumstances for the *hexis* of generosity at the start of *Ethics* Book 4, where the 'liberal' man makes gains only from the right sources (4.1.15, 24) and gives 'to the right people, the right amounts, on the right occasions' (4.1.12, 24).

The Stoics' view amounts to a complex justification of what was surely a normal viewpoint among the ancient elites, that making plenty of money was a good thing. It would be strange to hold that this was simply a drive to acquisition divorced from any readiness to take risks and invest within an appropriate moral framework, or that they had no thought at all of increasing their capital. The debate between Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater of Tarsus, which Cicero records at *On Duties* 3.50–5, presents two cases of the problem about full or partial disclosure in the interests of vendor or purchaser (see above). The second of these is a house sale. But the first is long-distance mercantile trade. A cargo of corn is shipped from Alexandria to Rhodes ahead of other shipments: should the merchant let the Rhodians know that the other ships are on their way, or should he sell now at the highest possible price? Such trade was inherently risky, and it was dependent on investment credit. Its normality and familiarity allowed it to be used as a ready example in a discussion of business ethics.

At the end of his 2003 study Carlo Natali semi-humorously suggests that the Stoics' theoretical position (and, on the basis of Diogenes' comments in Cicero, their actual practice) of 'the pursuit of affluence' put them in the same category as Milton Friedman, Margaret Thatcher, and the 'neoliberisti'. Their foil was Aristotle the good Catholic Social Democrat, the ancient world's answer to Ignacio Ramonet.[110] Humour aside, before I leave the Stoics, it would be appropriate to mention a possible strand in their economic thought – at least, one that has been ascribed to them – which might run counter to this suggestion. This is their alleged sympathetic consideration of the occupations of the lower classes. If it is right, it would put society firmly back into their beliefs. Such a viewpoint was argued for by Peter Brunt in his paper on the 'Social Thought of Dio Chrysostom and of the Stoics' (1973). On the basis of Dio's *Euboean Oration*, second *Tarsian Oration*, and second essay *On Freedom and Slavery*, Brunt suggested that Dio's sympathy with the poor, his view of the dignity of ordinary occupations, and his exploration of the legitimacy of slavery owed much to later Stoic authors, especially Panaetius. I shall return to this more fully when I come on to Bryson,

[110] I.e. the Spanish-born French journalist and activist associated with the anti-globalization pressure group ATTAC.

since Bryson shares at least some of these perspectives with Dio. To be sure, the cost of economic activity to its workers, or the sort of jobs ordinary people should or had to do, are topics hardly mentioned by ancient pagan authors. I suspect, however, that Dio's attitudes, which led Brunt to surmise, with some imagination indeed, that he might have been favourably inclined to 'hired builders, dockers, porters', and even 'seamen' (1973: 15–16), have more to do with Dio than the Stoic theorists,[111] and just possibly something to do also (so I shall suggest) with Bryson himself.

There is at least no evidence for the suggestion that Stoic *peri biōn* literature ('on types of lives/livelihoods') actually treated in any comprehensive way 'methods of earning money consistent with a particular *bios*, called by the name *Oikonomikos*' (Natali 1995b: 120), for both Arius and Diogenes Laertius concur on the 'ridiculous' list of money-making occupations that the Stoics allowed themselves (Stobaeus 2.7.11m, Diogenes Laertius 7.188–9).[112] Seneca, *Moral Letters* 94, was brought forward by Brunt as evidence for the existence of Stoic writings on 'moneylenders, traders, farmers, and advisers of kings' (1973: 24). In this epistle Seneca presents arguments in favour of philosophy giving precepts (*praecepta*, *admonitiones*) to individuals, the issue being whether general principles are enough for the wise man or whether principles should be tailored for ordinary folk and ordinary situations. Seneca initially sets up contrasting opinions on this issue by Ariston of Chios (anti) and Cleanthes (pro), whose position he develops into his own by arguing that 'general precepts' will do because they may easily be applied across situations which in fact entail only 'slight distinctions' (94.35). At 94.14–16 Ariston suggests that the task of issuing dedicated precepts to all and sundry would be enormous because the Stoic philosopher would have to give 'one set of rules to the moneylender, another to the farmer, another to the businessman, another to those who pursue friendships with kings, another to those who want to be friends with equals, another to those who want friendships with inferiors, and on on'. But the whole passage is a *reductio* ('we cannot include every type!'; cf. 94.17 on the absurdity of 'precepts for the madman') rather than evidence of a genuine early Stoic literature. Beyond this, the (early) Stoics' definition of freedom, and their offensive description of most of the world as *phauloi*, is against an interest in ordinary work. Diogenes Laertius 7.121–2 cites the Stoics as stating that freedom is the 'power of acting autonomously (*autopragia*)', while slavery is the

[111] In the back of Brunt's mind was perhaps Dio, *Or*. 45.12–13 on his desire to equip Prusa with 'harbours and dockyards' and to look after the economic well-being of the *dēmos* in general.

[112] See Natali 2003: 84–8 (quoting these passages amongst others).

deprivation of this power, and in two senses: both 'subjection (*hupotaxis*)' combined with 'possession (by another)', and 'subjection' on its own. Hired workers, political subjects, wives/children, and any kind of dependent could come into the category of being 'under subjection'. This does not encourage a positive view of the free poor who had to work to support themselves. If, then, we are obliged to discard the Seneca letter as a promising example of Stoic social work, it may be that the Stoics were Natali's neoliberals after all (*mutatis mutandis*, and there are plenty of *mutata* to be made).

This means two things. First, the Stoics share with Bryson a rejection of the restrictions put on wealth by Aristotle. The relevance of this to elite attitudes to wealth creation, especially at Rome where Stoic thought was so prevalent, is obvious. Second, note that Bryson's ordering in his manual of wealth, slaves, wife, and child departs from Aristotle's idea of *oikonomikē* in *Politics* Book 1. For Aristotle wealth and property are subordinate to the personnel of the estate (*Politics* 1.13, 1259b18–20). Chapters 1–7 of *Politics* concern people not property and wealth comes in with ch. 8. Bryson on the contrary puts wealth first, and that is significant. In the same way, for the Stoics, if we can rely on Arius, management of the estate meant first 'organization of expenditures and tasks', and then 'care of property and of those working on (the estate)'. This accords with their strong legitimation of the importance of making money.

6. *PHILODEMUS*, ON OIKONOMIA

On Vices and the Virtues Opposed to Them, the People in Whom They are Found, and their Fields of Application (Περὶ κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν οἷς εἰσι καὶ περὶ ἃ, *De vitiis et virtutibus oppositis*) is a collection of ethical discussions by the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus (*c.* 100 to after 40 BC), which were recovered from the famous Villa dei Pisoni (Villa dei Papiri) at Herculaneum.[113] It begins with an essay *On Flattery* and included as the tenth book an *On Arrogance*. A study of greed (*philarguria*) may also have formed part of it.[114] Philodemus' general method is to individuate the vice in question, reveal its complexity, and contrast it with its opposing virtue or virtues. No title for the *On Oikonomia* survives in

[113] General orientation: D'Arms 1970: 173–4, Gigante 1995, Mattusch 2005.

[114] Monet 2001 argues that the title of the whole work was simply *On Vices*. For the *Flattery* and *Arrogance* and Philodemus' techniques in *On Vices* see Tsouna 2007: chs. 6–7, and ch. 8 for the *On Oikonomia* ('On Property Management' in her translation – see below in text; on her assumptions and approaches, cf. n. 173). For editions of the surviving parts of *On Vices*, see the website of the Friends of Herculaneum Society, www.herculaneum.ox.ac.uk/books.html.

the papyrus (PHerc. 1424) which contains it. It simply identifies itself as *On Vices Book 9* (Θ); but in col. xxvii of the text Philodemus answers potential criticism 'for writing on *oikonomia*', and the contents of the book strongly suggest that Περὶ οἰκονομίας should be its name. Little work has been done on the *Peri Oikonomias* since Renato Laurenti's detailed 1973 study of Philodemus' arguments and sources. Laurenti accepted the ordering of the papyrus established in Jensen's 1906 Teubner edition, and this is maintained in the recent German translation by Audring and Brodersen (2008: 176–203), and by other modern commentators including Voula Tsouna, who has written a valuable study of the work alongside other aspects of Philodemus' ethical thought. Her translation of the title, *On Property Management*, is a proper one, but I shall use *On Estate Management* here, since Philodemus does discuss matters other than money, and this suggests a slightly wider compass than just 'property'. References to columns and lines in what follows refer to Jensen's text.[115]

As far as we can tell, *On Estate Management* appears to differ from the other books of *On Vices*. For here Philodemus does not treat a particular vice, but is instead interested in exploring the good and bad qualities required by those who have property/wealth and need to look after it and wish to increase it. He does criticize the failing of 'love of property/money' (*philochrēmatia*),[116] and in general excessive devotion to wealth is reproved, as we should expect of a philosopher. The position Philodemus takes is in line with that of a kept Epicurean, as he was, without financial worries or responsibilities, but who is ready to face money troubles if necessary inasmuch as (he makes clear) his own needs are small. If this is the usual eyewash from the ancient philosophical elite, the views on the acceptability of wealth, and (within limits) the goal of increasing it, are not, or at least not what we might expect.

In the first, less well-preserved half of the text Philodemus comments on treatments of oeconomics by Xenophon in his *Oeconomicus* and by Theophrastus, whom he takes as the author of the work we call Ps.-Aristotle, *Oikonomika 1* (cf. Jackson 1982–3: 148–9). Philodemus says

[115] There is no *TLG* or other online edition. Jensen is available again as a paperback by Kessinger. *On Estate Management* is partially available in Italian translation in Laurenti (1973; the translation is interspersed by discussion). I have not seen Delattre's and Tsouna's French version in Delattre and Pigeaud 2010: 595–616. In quoting Greek I have normalized the spelling and for the most part removed indications of doubtful letter forms and the other technical apparatus used by papyrologists except to show if a word is wholly or mostly an editorial suggestion/restoration. NB Users of Audring's and Brodersen's (2008) excellent translation should be aware of the typesetting error affecting cols. xiv and xvi: ll. 1–10 of text on p. 190 should be placed at the top of p. 192 and ll. 1–11 of text on p. 192 should be placed at the top of p. 190 (and thus continued by ll. 11ff. of this page).

[116] The word occurs in the text only in the adjective φιλοχρήματος, cols. xi.3, xvii.13.

that 'everyone' writing on this topic depends on Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, which is *huperechon*, 'pre-eminent' (meaning that it is the major work in the field).[117] Since Xenophon's Socratic discussion of the *oikos* comes in for a good deal of criticism, both for its impractical content and for its long-windedness, this dependency is not necessarily a good thing, though at the end of *On Estate Management* Philodemus does acknowledge that his own presentation of what is good for a philosopher draws on both Xenophon and Theophrastus (col. xxvii. 15). That Bryson (who owes little to Xenophon) is not mentioned here does not in itself, of course, indicate that Philodemus wrote before him, for Philodemus' 'everyone' is merely assertive and (for example) ignores treatments of *oikonomika* before Xenophon (specifically Antisthenes, cf. also *Protagoras* 318e). But it is interesting to observe that Philodemus is bored by the agricultural aspects of estate management and does not think that philosophers should have to engage with farming as a way of making money (except through other people's labour, that is). Bryson does mention agricultural business, but he is far more interested in the commercial side of the estate's economy (crafts and exchange between them, business practices, investment in land and livestock for profit, the right time to sell merchandise), and we might just expect Philodemus to have taken note of a perspective that is rather different from Xenophon's (cf. the encomiums of farming at *Oec.* 4–6 and 15, and the strong condemnation of the crafts/trades, *technai*, and their workers in ch. 6 and elsewhere; and Ps.-Aristotle's idealization of farming at 2.2). Philodemus has an urban outlook, even if the city as an institution is not of relevance to him; much the same may be said of Bryson.

Philodemus' critique of Xenophon and Theophrastus is our only example of how oeconomic texts might be presented and commented and is therefore valuable. But his own views in the second half of the treatise, which is by far the better preserved portion of the papyrus, are more important for our purposes. Here the stress on what a philosopher should not have to worry about in the world of money-making and management is backed up by observation of a very healthy interest in increasing wealth as quickly as possible on the part of his non-philosopher peers.

The following discussion represents a run-through of the contents of the work. I avoid any too fragmentary parts of the papyrus, and begin with the comments on Xenophon and Theophrastus (Ps.-Aristotle), both because of the intrinsic interest of this part and because it helps position Philodemus' own contribution, and I then pass to Philodemus' own ideas.

[117] Col. vii.42–3. This is Jensen's suggestion for the remaining letters ὑπερ[.

Laurenti brings out well Philodemus' practical reaction to what he calls the 'stranezza' of Xenophon's Socrates. Socrates says he does not need money, so Philodemus feels entitled to ask, How on earth he can advise on *oikonomika* (col. v)? The particular problem for Philodemus in these opening sections of the work appears to be the nature of Xenophon's 'good' management (*to eu oikein*), as Socrates attempts to define it at *Oec.* 1.2–3. In col. i the position no one 'could agree with' is to 'suppose' that management means management without 'gaining a good deal of wealth, as well as safeguarding gains and already existing moneys, and *in this sense* managing one's own estate well and ensuring good management for another's – assuming usual practice (*to sunēthes*) was the same then as it is now'. The usual acceptation of language, rather than Socrates' annoying irony and verbal excavation, is what suits Philodemus' Epicureanism and his concern with tangible wealth.[118] So, looking forward to the second half, the accumulation of wealth is clearly part of good management. The whole topic of *oikonomia*, says Philodemus, is in fact more complex than Xenophon lets on: it cannot be taught 'in a single lecture', as Socrates is made to pretend. Indeed, Socrates' 'lack of clarity' about what *oikonomia* is and how one should do it shows that he had 'apparently never once set (the subject) out' (col. vi.16–17); whereas, even if someone 'lacked any really deep theoretical perspective' (col. ii.1–2),[119] he could see what would be needed. 'I think,' says Philodemus speaking in col. vii for the first time in his own person and showing his irritation with farmer Socrates, 'that only an idiot would suppose there is no need of others. I have to ask just who (Socrates') words [at *Oec.* 12–13 advocating the use of slaves] were educating, if not someone who knew this already? Further, what he says about ruling and educating, using the analogy of animals undergoing training, is both long-winded and well observed and practised by farmers. How is it acceptable that the steward should appear to do things required by a philosopher and carried out by him? I think the same goes for [Ischomachus'] instructions about keeping one's hands off the master's property and not stealing . . . If he's really claiming to teach the steward to be capable of making (the other slaves)[120] just [*Oec.* 13–14], I consider his statement resembles the fantasies we have when we are asleep. But there is actually no cause to spend time on the rest of Xenophon's thoughts on managing estates, for they go through the craft of farming point by point, something which is best left to personal experience, not to philosophy. Nor

[118] Cf. Sedley 1973: 21–3 for Epicurus' advice on this matter in his *On Nature*.

[119] NB Jensen's ordering of the papyrus fragments at this point is col. vi, col. iiib, 'col. perdita', col. ii, col. vii.

[120] Cf. Laurenti 1973: 47ff.

is it necessary for philosophers to become acquainted with it nor are its tasks suited to being carried out by them. It is clear why we engaged with most of what Theophrastus says, which is summarized from there [*Oeconomicus*] in its salient points, and that is even truer of what others say. For everyone has mined it as the pre-eminent source, including Theophrastus. We shall be seeing on which points he differs. He actually begins with irrelevant material, for the distinction [of *oikonomia*] from the art of politics tells us nothing about the art of estate management . . . (cols. vii.1–viii.1).

Having begun with Theophrastus at this point, Philodemus does not let up.[121] In col. viii he both questions the statements made at the start of *Oikonomika 1* about the relationship between the house-cum-estate and the city, and condemns them as 'pretty obvious', and then, looking ahead, attacks Theophrastus for going into too much detail about the constituent parts of his topic. 'We are also right to ask how there is a connection between these and the following statement,

> "This is why it's necessary as Hesiod says to have,
> 'an estate first of all and a woman',[122]
> for the former is the first part of sustenance, while the latter (is the first) of the free people (of the house)"?

Unless the wife is in fact property (*ktēsis*) just like the sustenance (*trophē*), even if she does help to run the estate (*sunoikonomousa*).' Philodemus takes the text in a quite different sense (and with a different wording) than we have it in order to complain about Ps.-Aristotle's idea of the wife, for Epicureans had no time for marriage.[123] 'How is the estate "the first part of sustenance", and why is the woman the first of "the free people (of the house)", and how can we assume that Hesiod meant the woman was "married", when many people assert that he wrote (next) "bought, not married"?[124] Why does he say agriculture is "in accordance with Nature", why that our "first care" is for this,[125] and why does he suppose that mining and such like are proper for excellent men (*spoudaioi*)? Why with regard to people, (does he suppose)

[121] Cf. Tsouna 2007: 172–6.

[122] *Works and Days* 405. Philodemus only quotes half the line (see next note).

[123] Ps.-Arist. *Oik. 1* 2.1 'this is why it's necessary as Hesiod says to have "an estate first of all, a woman, an ox, and a plough", for the topic of sustenance is first, that of the free people (of the house) <second>' (τὸ μὲν γάρ τῆς τροφῆς πρῶτον, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐλευθέρων <δεύτερον>, Wartelle and van Groningen); cf. Wartelle's translation, 'en effect, le premier point à traiter concerne la nourriture, et le second les hommes libres'. See Tsouna 2007: 173 n. 25. Audring's and Brodersen's 'descendants' ('das eine ist das wichtigste für den Lebensunterhalt, das andere für freigeborene (Nachkommen)') is not right. For Epicurus on marriage, see Chapter 5, pp. 305–6.

[124] Cf. West on *Works and Days* 405–6.

[125] Ps.-Arist. *Oik. 1* 2.2.

that our "first (care)" is for the wife [col. ix.1], when it is perfectly possible to live a happy life without one,[126] and how (does he suppose) that the manner of the wife's engagement with the rules of estate management, as it is usually conceived, fits in, and why consequently is it absolutely necessary to marry a virgin?[127] Why does he say that "the most important and most indispensable of possessions for managing the estate is the best and most capable of estate management",[128] i.e. a person? How does he think slaves should be "procured" before those Hesiod advises are first?[129] How can he speak of the steward and the worker as "two types" of slave, when it is quite possible for both of them to be free men? Why does he tell you to "procure and raise" and educate children in the case of (slaves) who "are to be assigned tasks worthy of free men", rather than ones who have been already educated and brought up by others?' (col. ix.26).

After this rhetorical blast, Philodemus continues by commending Theophrastus for differentiating the treatment of slaves on the basis of their behaviour, but then berates him for his policy about slaves and wine, and damns him by observing that, '(the recommendations) about work, food, and punishment are commonplace and are not specific to a philosopher, and are practised by fairly moderate people' (cols. ix.44–x.2). Though he approves of differentiating workloads, Theophrastus is ticked off for being too exacting. His advice about not buying too many slaves from one race is also 'unnecessary'.[130] His policy on rearing slaves – τὸ ἐξομηρεύειν ('keeping them hostage', *Oik. 1* 5.6) – is 'worse' than Xenophon's, who specifies breeding from good slaves only (*Oec.* 10.9.5), while the idea that festivals are more for the benefit of slaves than free men is 'fairly hard to believe' (βιαιότερον ἅμα τῇ πίστει). The division of the topic into four at *Oikonomika 1* 6.1 ('acquire . . . preserve . . . be capable of arranging . . . and using') is also dubious: the categories of acquisition (*ktētikon*), preservation (*phulaktikon*), and usage (*chrēstikon*)[131] are fine, but Philodemus adds (with an indirect swipe at Xenophon's paean to household order at *Oec.* ch. 8) that, 'there is no category of arrangement (*kosmētikon*)', even if he does at least 'distinguish (*antidiairein*) it from the most important tasks', i.e. 'acquisition and

[126] Ps.-Arist. *Oik. 1* 3.1, where, however, *gunē* 'woman'/'wife' is used, not *gametē* 'wedded (woman)'/'wife' as Philodemus has it to make his point more telling.

[127] Ps.-Arist. *Oik. 1* 4.2.

[128] For Philodemus' reading of Ps.-Arist *Oik. 1* 5.1 as οἰκονομικώτατον, 'most capable of estate management', the transmitted text of *Oik. 1* presents ἡγεμονικώτατον, 'most capable of leadership'.

[129] Ps.-Arist. *Oik. 1* 5.1.

[130] Because (once again) it was standard: Laurenti 1973: 77ff.

[131] A secure conjecture of Jensen at col. x.34.

preservation' (cols. x.39–xi.3). Finally, Theophrastus' advice about money (col. xi) is reprehensible because it shows the vice which is (apparently) the opposite of good *oikonomia*: 'it is a money-loving (*philochrēmatos*) man who advises that "the productive parts" (*karpima*)[132] of one's property should be "greater than the non-productive ones" (*akarpa*), if this in fact means "profitable" and "unprofitable" parts. For if it meant "useful" and "useless", really speaking he should have said that everything is to be useful and nothing useless.' That tasks should be allotted so as to prevent harm to the overall concern is fine for the 'ordinary man' but obviously does not apply to a philosopher, for if a philosopher works at all, 'it does not seem likely that he will endanger everything'. As to preservation, Philodemus does not think much of what *Oikonomika 1* calls the Athenian system, that is, sell all at once and buy what you need on the proceeds. 'This is difficult, perhaps unprofitable.' Ps.-Aristotle's advice about the need to guard the house is fine, but is once again inapplicable to philosophers. They do not want to get up earlier than the slaves, nor rise during darkness: this is bad 'for health and for philosophy'.[133] At least the philosopher can agree on Ps.-Aristotle's call for a door-keeper and on the fact that he '"should not be used for other work"' (cols. xi.46–xii.1; *Oik. 1* 6.8).[134]

So ends the first half of the text. Philodemus has rattled through his predecessors' works, scoring points freely and effectively and commending little. He quotes as he wishes (cf. above on the Hesiod quotation), and introduces errors (partly no doubt as a result of slips of memory): thus where Ps.-Aristotle says the householder on a small estate should make inspections 'rarely' (*oligakis*), Philodemus writes this at col. xi.27 as 'all the time' (*aei*).[135] What he seems to like least is the spectacle of philosophers advising on estate management. He feels neither of them defined their subject well nor understood that a large part of business was the result of experience, not lectures on philosophy. And he is plainly not taken by country pursuits – which is significant for his view of how and where money can be made.

These attitudes remain important in the second half of the work, to which I now turn. Philodemus introduces his task at the start of col. xii. 'Sufficient points have been made in relation to these (authors), and we must now give

[132] Cf. Wartelle 'les terrains fertiles, etc.' (Wartelle and van Groningen 1968: 6).

[133] *Oik. 1* 6.5 'good for health, estate management, and philosophy'.

[134] Cf. Foraboschi 1984 on the discrepancy between this advice and the household practices of Philodemus' patron, Piso, in Cicero's speech against him ('idem coquus, idem atriensis', *In Pisonem* 67).

[135] Cf. Laurenti 1973: 91 'difficile spieghare l'origine di tale cambiamento'. Philodemus is not in fact greatly bothered about the result.

a concise outline of our own views.' Recalling his criticism of Xenophon's Socrates, he starts by restating that he is not interested in morally good living (*kalōs bioun*), but in the question of 'how one must approach the acquisition and preservation of wealth, the topics to which estate management and the estate manager must give particular thought'. The 'estate manager' (*oikonomos*) here, as in Xenophon and Theophrastus, is the owner, not the owner's representative (as the term may signal). Philodemus will focus on the level of 'acquisition which is right for a philosopher, not just anyone, for in the case of a philosopher there is a limit (*metron*) to wealth. We have set this out in our book *On Wealth* in accordance with the (teachings of the) Masters[136] in order to set out the science of managing (*hē oikonomikē*) the acquisition and preservation (of wealth) for this man' (col. xii.15–25). Philodemus' philosopher is not an ascetic like the Cynics.[137] He brings to his aid Metrodorus' own attack on the Cynics, and Laurenti and others (e.g. Asmis 2004) have followed Sudhaus (1906) and Jensen in seeing everything from col. xii.45 to col. xxi.35 as a more or less direct quotation from Metrodorus' *On Wealth* ('il pensiero di Metrodoro–Filodemo'). Sudhaus argued on the ground that this section broke Philodemus' strict stylistic aversion from 'hiatus'; but there is plenty of room for disagreement on this point and, as Tsouna has observed convincingly (1996: 702–3), it is far better to assume that we have the words of Philodemus rather than an extract from an unattested work of Metrodorus on *oikonomia*, which is (of course) the topic at hand rather than a moral disquisition on the use of wealth.[138] For Philodemus' purposes Metrodorus had established that wealth is good, so long as it entailed minimal worry to the Epicurean sage – that was the key thing. But his own interest, and his contribution to the debate here, is in the administration and preservation of wealth, not the possession of wealth itself, which he did not need to argue for. Of particular interest for our present discussion is that he determines the attitude of the philosopher–sage partly by distinguishing him from the 'good' and law-abiding businessman, who is not a sage because he makes too much money too quickly and has to worry about his wealth, which is easy to get and easy to lose (col. xx).

Starting with Metrodorus (and his comments on the Epicureans' Cynic enemies), Philodemus affirms that the sage requires enough income 'for his daily needs' (*to kath' hēmeran*, col. xii.38–43), a versatile definition. But, he

[136] I.e. the major students of Epicureanism, Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyaenus. For *On Wealth* (PHerc 163), see below.

[137] See Laurenti 1973: 99ff. *ad loc.* for an exploration of what may have been in the *Oikonomikos* of Antisthenes, the father of Cynicism in the eyes of the ancients.

[138] Foraboschi 1984: 537–8. For the underlying polemic against Cynics, see in general Gigante (1992).

says, one must take a long view and see wealth as something 'for your whole life' and 'for the highest way of life' (cols. xiii–xiv).[139] We need to avoid excessive devotion to money and must not create the 'opportunities (*exousia*)[140] which wealth provides' by 'giving ourselves trouble over the preservation of property or its ceaseless accumulation' (col. xiv.42–6). The wise man needs his friends (a standard Epicurean theme) and, if he has these, he will not worry if he loses what he has, providing there is enough for his 'daily property' (*ktēsis ephēmeros*, col. xv.23). He is better off than those 'vigorous men'[141] because his wealth is preserved 'no less' than theirs 'or, if not, (is) not destroyed as quickly nor perhaps (is) as risky' (col. xv.28–31).[142] For Philodemus those men who serve to contrast with the calm money-making of the sage are people for whom risk and worry is normal, and he makes no comment on this. Instead he reiterates that the sage cannot bear hard work (*megalous hupomenein ponous*). 'For wise men, the acquisition of wealth must not be accompanied by unpleasant worries concerning the way to preserve it.' If this condition can be fulfilled, having a profit (literally 'more', *to pleion*) is 'acceptable,' he repeats, 'so long as it causes no harm and is easy to obtain'[143] (cols. xv.31–xvi.46).

Treatises on wealth were common in the ancient world. They focus on excessive love of wealth and display of wealth, on consumption and luxury. Plutarch's essay *Love of Wealth* (*Peri Philoploutias*) is a good example surviving from the late first century. The idea of *philoploutia* is something Plutarch is particularly keen to criticize in his biographies and it is no surprise to find a separate essay on the topic. In it he takes an almost comic turn, with a liberal scattering of anecdotes and quotations from comic writers, Euripides, and so on. The theme of the first two-thirds of the work is the suffering of the money-grabber (a standard comic figure) who is condemned through his uncontrollable meanness to spend all his time on the 'interrogation of servants, the inspection of account books, the auditing of stewards and debtors, in occupation and worry . . .' (526f). The last third ridicules wealthy display as a sign of a lack of *sōphrosunē*. Both in his *Estate Management* and his own *On Wealth* Philodemus certainly makes use of the first, proverbial bundle of ideas, but he leaves out the comic element. The *On Wealth* is preserved in a very fragmentary condition, and then only for the first book.[144] At least

[139] For a translation of this section (cols. xii.43–xiv.23), see Tsouna 2007: 178.

[140] Note Tsouna 2007: 181: 'resources'.

[141] Col. xv.28 [ἐν]τό[νων]; perhaps read [εὐ]τό[νων], 'well-toned', 'tough', 'masculine', often used of the active members of the elite. Cf. Vooys, 1934–41: 137 *s.v.*

[142] οὐσίας . . . οὐχ οὕτω ταχέως φθειρομένας οὐδ' ἴσως ἀκροσφαλεῖς οὔσας.

[143] ἄν ἀβλαβῶς [not 'blameless', Tsouna 2007: 182] καὶ εὐπόρως γίνηται.

[144] Tepedino Guerra 1978.

we can see in it themes shared with the *Estate Management*: the worries, the torments, the fears of losing it all, and following from this the question of whether being reduced to poverty is actually bad, and in addition the need not to despise others if one is rich nor to become too worried by *oikonomia* (col. lviii). Although the work taps into themes taken from the Masters, the style is sober and in accord with *Estate Management*. Philodemus does not condemn having wealth, as a Plutarch might, for he has a quite different purpose. Although the *Estate Management* is limited by the focus on what can be expected of philosophers, Philodemus' concern is nevertheless with the acquisition (*ktēsis*), preservation (*phulakē*), and – to a lesser extent – the use (*to chrēstikon*) of money. These three are the 'most important tasks' of col. xi.1, but the first two are the special concern of the estate-owner and of the topic of *oikonomia* at the start of col. xii (ll. 8–12) where Philodemus begins his own thoughts.

Our interest is in the behaviour Philodemus presents as typical in non-philosophers. It is no surprise to find him occasionally displaying the snobbism we expect of a member of the upper class (whether he styles himself a philosopher or not). After remarking at the end of col. xvi that *to pleion* ('profit') is good, providing one does not have to work too hard to get it, he continues in the next column by observing that, 'the wise man should *perhaps* not be called a *technitēs*-cum-*ergatēs* of property (*ktēsis*) that is large and quickly assembled. For money-making (*chrēmatismos*) has its own skills (*empeiria*) and ability (*dunamis*), which the excellent man (*spoudaios*) does not share in, nor does he go looking for the circumstances (*kairoi*) in conjunction with which such ability would come in useful; for all these things are the province of the money-loving (*philochrēmatos*) man' (col. xvii.2–14). The context rules out standard meanings of *technitēs* such as 'skilled craftsman' and *ergatēs* as 'workman': Philodemus is indicating a far more elevated group of people, perhaps a 'specialist trader', with stress on his intelligence,[145] and 'producer'. Such expertise, he goes on, is to be found in any branch of activity where there are 'craftsmen' (*dēmiourgoi*) and 'technical knowledge' (*empeiria entechnos*), including *ktēsis* and *phulakē*. The *spoudaios* who does not share in these empirical skills is the Epicurean sage, who does not want to be bothered with the hard work of making money, but like someone who can make his own bread, yet does not possess the technical knowledge, i.e. to run a bread-making enterprise, the sage has enough skill to make money for himself (col. xvii.14–30).

[145] Cf. Pollux, *Onomasticon* 4.7 (fields of knowledge and the *technai* arising from them) ἐπιστήμων, ἐπιστημονικός, γνωστικός, γνωμονικός, θεωρητικός, διαγνωστικός, ἔμπειρος, τεχνίτης, τεχνικός, and 4.21 where τεχνίτης is one of a long list of terms praising a top orator.

The term 'money-loving' is obviously a criticism; but as we shall see shortly, making a large amount of money quickly is something even the sage can aspire to, providing certain conditions are met; and even here in col. xvii, the wise man should only '*perhaps* not be called a specialist-cum-producer'. 'We,' Philodemus continues, 'may not be specialists (*technitai*), like some who are obsessed with the accumulation and preservation (of wealth) in a determined and assiduous way', but we make enough 'for our needs' (col. xvii.30–40). He is keen to stress the competence of his Epicurean's attitudes against other advice (presumably the Stoic demand that the *spoudaios* must be an *agathos oikonomos* and a *chrēmatistēs*). Taking away the pain or stress (*to baros*) of getting money for the Epicurean definitely does not, he states, mean 'taking away being rich' (*to ploutein*) (col. xviii.7–11).[146]

The businessmen, with whom the sage is contrasted, are clearly involved in the normal civic life of the upper classes. 'As for the kind of person the many call a "great worker" and a "guardian of wealth",[147] they do not consider public giving and generosity are more than ignorance of anything devoid of figures' (i.e. the rich pore over their accounts) – that is the only way such a man could have made money and kept hold of it (col. xviii.31–9).[148] The sage on the other hand 'measures', so he is aware of the enjoyment to be had from money. 'He cannot acquire the most money in the shortest time and consider properly where his profit (*to pleion*) is going to increase most, if he does not measure this against his true aim but only in relation to gains and losses and the continuous, vigorous defence of his existing wealth' (col. xix.4–11). If one regards moderate means (*penia*[149]) as the major problem, one will end up with a lot of trouble. The sage takes his cue from Nature. 'It's no bad thing for such a man sometimes to have another person

[146] μὴ δὴ λέγωμεν, ὡς, εἰ περιαιρήσομεν τὸ βάρος αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν κτῆσιν, ἀφελούμεθα καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν.

[147] The language may be intended to reflect that of the public acclamations that are a well-attested part of city life: e.g. Dio, *Or.* 48.10 on the *dēmos* 'praising us throughout the day, calling some of us war-heroes, some Olympians, others saviours, others feeders (of the people)'. Cf. Robert 1949, 1960, and Roueché 1989 on the civic rivalries involved, and the fine picture of the benefactor (*philotimos*), the acclaim for him 'the whole day long', and his fate in John Chrysostom, *On Vainglory* 4–11 with the notes of Malingrey 1972.

[148] οἷον μὲν γὰρ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐργάτην καὶ φύλακα κτήσεως οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, οὐδὲ τὸ φιλάνθρωπον <ἀποδέχονται> καὶ μεταδοτικὸν πρὸς τῷ ταῦτ' ἀγνοεῖν ὧν οὔκ εἰσιν ἀριθμοί τινες. Cf. Audring and Brodersen (2008) 'Wen aber die Menge als guten Arbeiter und Wächter des Besitzes bezeichnet, (dem) billigt sie nicht Menschenfreundlichkeit und Gebefreudigkeit zu, außerdem daß er das nicht kennt, was nicht in gewissen Zahlen auftritt'. To suggest that this implies the sage himself is *philanthrōpos* and *metadotikos* (Tepedino Guerra 1978: 57, cf. Laurenti 1973: 136) seems to miss the point.

[149] Not 'poverty': *penia* means having to live carefully and by working for a living (Aristophanes, *Plutus* 552–4, where Penia draws a firm line between herself and *ptōcheia* or 'poverty').

like a servant, for example one with excellent skills in bread production.'[150] It is not proper to do this kind of job yourself. If you take the right attitude, wealth will bring you many benefits: *ktēsis* combined with *to sumpheron*. 'It will *perhaps* make no difference to (the sage) to be called a good businessman (*chrēmatistēs*), since it is in accordance with his best interests that he acquires, uses, and looks after his wealth' (cols. xix.42–xx.1). The implication is that the Epicurean sage, like the Stoic, very much wants to be called this.

The whole of the next column and most of the following (cols. xx.1–xxi.35) are worth quoting to show Philodemus' positive attitude to the creation of wealth. He begins:

> For sure we cannot stupidly force this (point) using the familiar means of expression, let alone make pronouncements about the wise man's acquisition and use (of wealth), as the sophists[151] do. Rather, with reference to our existing Preconception (*prolēpsis*)[152] of the good businessman (*agathos chrēmatistēs*), let us examine wherein the Preconception lies, to what kind of businessman it may be applied, and in which case it confirms the predicate 'good businessman'. If, within the terms of our Preconception, we wish to describe the good businessman as the man who acquires and looks after his wealth in accordance with his best interests (*kata to sumpheron*), we can state that the wise man (*sophos*) is precisely this man. But if, within the terms of our Preconception, we take the good businessman to be the man who [l. 25] earns much money through ability and skill, without disgrace and in accordance with the law, even if acquisition causes him much more harm than pleasure, we must speak of people other than the wise. Such a predicate does not take away the usual sense of 'wise man'[153] [------[154]] arises in accordance with his best interests in acquiring and managing wealth. Because we (humans) do not see how 'in accordance with best interests' applies to those who stand out for their wealth, we envy those who acquire much quickly, for we imagine that their way of making money is profitable for their life. Although it is possible for us to state on what grounds the wise man will acquire [col. xxi.1] and be in control of wealth for his benefit, and in general to specify the kind of administration (*dioikēsis*) that is best, those who claim to look at things

[150] τὸν ἄκρον περὶ τὴν τοῦ σίτου κατεργασίαν, perhaps referring to commercial, not domestic, activity. Cf. p. 222.

[151] Rivals from the Epicurean school: Laurenti 1973: 141–2; or, better, Stoics.

[152] The technical term signals an habitually recognized concept which is based on perception through experience; cf. Cicero, *De nat. deor.* 1.43 '*prolēpsis* . . . a kind of mental outline, preconceived in the mind, of a thing, without which there is no possibility of comprehending, examining, or discussing anything'. See Manuwald 1972: 103, esp. Glidden 1985.

[153] οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένη τοῦ σόφου ἡ τοιαύτη κατηγο[ρία συνήθ]ειαν: I follow Sudhaus' suggestion from Jensen's apparatus.

[154] One and a half lines are garbled.

> 'philosophically'[155] do not do this but merely seek to fit the predicate to the wise man, without referring to the Preconception which we have of the good businessman, and trying to force the accepted usages of words. For all in all, neither do they generally appear willing to always apply words, in the case of things they are ignorant of, in accordance with the above stated method (*to proeirēmenon*), nor (are they willing to) in the case of the subject before us now. But they are good at letting themselves be diverted [l. 20] by the general usage of words into making pronouncements about matters and then instructing us how they can prove the ordinary population wrong where it differs with these people over the predication of the same terms, and they offer instruction about things they are ignorant of. This is what happened to Aristotle in his *On Wealth*[156] with his notion that the good man is a good businessman while the bad man is a bad businessman. Metrodorus has demonstrated this.

Building on these forthright conclusions, Philodemus goes on to say that we Epicureans can proceed to determine the size of the property we need to look after, what kind of management is required, and in what way we can describe the wise man as a 'manager' (*oikonomos*), and in what way we cannot. 'The same goes for the businessman, and what (type of) estate management is an art (*technē*) and what is not, it being possible for this to be practised by the wise man just as much as by many (others). For such management is beneficial and profitable and leads to the highest prosperity, whereas the other sort is unprofitable and wearisome' (cols. xxi.42–xxii.4). We Epicureans need to avoid continuous strain in order to achieve the 'best way of life'. Yet if we do not become *politikoi* or *praktikoi* but have high principles, people say we achieve nothing and make incompetent leaders of cities or armies. Philodemus exemplifies the gulf between the sage and the active and engaged type of man by naming four figures from the distant past (Gellias of Sicily, Scopas the Thessalian, and Cimon and Nicias of Athens) who had misused wealth.

He next (col. xxxiii) passes to some more practical remarks about the wise man's sources of wealth. 'It is laughable to imagine that making money from knowing about horses (*hippikē*) is good,[157] and making money from mining with slave labour is unfortunate,[158] while making it "by both (hands), doing the work oneself" is mad.' Farming with one's own labour is 'wretched', but 'using others and owning the land' is fine. The reason is that you don't have to deal with people if you do it that way, and you leave yourself free to consort

[155] Perhaps renegade Epicureans: Laurenti 1973: 142; but note the reference to Aristotle below, and of course the Stoic position ('only the *spoudaios* is *chrēmatistikos*').

[156] Cf. Diogenes Laertius 5.22.

[157] Cf. Xenophon, *Oec.* 3.8.

[158] Referring back to his own remarks about Ps.-Arist. *Oik. I* 2.2 at col. viii. 42.

with your friends and meet 'upright men' (*hoi sōphrones*). The second and third best ways of making money are from renting property (*sunoikia*)[159] or owning slaves with expertise or who practise 'trades (*technai*) which are not in any way dishonourable'. The best way is, of course to earn 'gratitude and honour' from philosophical discourses undertaken with men able to understand them.

The easiest way to lose money, says Philodemus pursuing his subject (cols. xxiii–xxiv), is through vice and depravity and (in true Epicurean vein) as a result of baseless fears. Just behaviour is the best way to make and keep your wealth. In addition, friends (again) are necessary to ensure a 'decent income and good security' (col. xxiv.24–6). Meanness (*aphilanthrōpia*, *anhēmerotēs*) will lead to you being without helpers and 'often' to your property being 'taken away completely'. Indeed, 'every *kakia* is a hindrance to pleasurable accumulation and the care of existing property'. Some men consider gifts to 'friends and well-placed persons' to be a waste, but Hermarchus (col. s.1) did well to advise cultivating such men. In addition, one must look to the future. One should often spend of one's wealth (i.e. invest) to secure a 'multiple return' (*pollaplasia karpizesthai*, col. xxv.20–1).[160] You have to spend in accordance with what you have and in accordance with need at any one time rather than 'laying down rules about buying for much or little' (presumably something businessmen might do, and which we shall see Bryson doing). Criticizing Xenophon's ideas about monthly spending (*Oec.* 7.36), Philodemus advises 'with your income (*prosginomena*), you could do what some Romans do, and divide it into expenses, furnishings, repairs, and savings'.[161] This will stop you being obliged to spend as a result of eventualities or politeness (*kalokagathia*; cf. p. 245). If you hit hard times (col. xxvi), retrenchment is aided by attending greetings, waiting upon people, and 'exchanging advice'. Above all, 'don't let it seem as if you are giving up philosophy' (col. xxvi.4–14).

As Philodemus nears the end of his treatise, his counsel becomes multifarious:

> With regard to choosing suitable stewards (*epitropoi*), subordinates, properties (*ktēmata*), contracts (*sunallagmata*), and everything relevant to managing

[159] Cf. Dio, *Euboean* 104.

[160] Tsouna 2007: 184 takes this as spending on friends, as at the start of this column; but at this point in it Philodemus specifies *pragmata*, 'affairs', 'business', explaining 'for we have discussed people' (19–20).

[161] τὸ μὲν εἰς δαπάνην, τὸ δ'εἰς κατασκευήν, τὸ δ'εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν, τὸ δ'εἰς θησαυρισμόν μερίζειν. He is perhaps referring to the system of domestic accounting (the *tabulae* or *codex accepti et expensi*) that is known from Cicero's speech *Pro Roscio*: de Ste. Croix 1956.

> the estate, do not be self-willed but seek advice from friends who are most appropriate or knowledgeable about particular aspects. With regard to the purchase of servants and employment of them conducive to revenue and its maintenance, one can take information from our comments about servants (above),[162] and there is no need to pursue the topic here. A variety of possessions seems to entail fewer disappointments, and in different ways, than possessions of one kind, since the latter can lead to a total loss, while the proverbial 'flow of wealth[163]' from property seems to be no worse (in this case), but is sometimes more secure and gives one extra confidence.[164]

After further brief remarks concerning friends, Philodemus finishes (col. xxvii) his book by acknowledging his borrowings from Xenophon and Theophrastus, and addresses potential criticisms for writing 'on *oikonomia*'. He should perhaps have written more, but he sees that the subject is not in need of further 'hairsplitting' and that 'the superiority of wealth over poverty is small'.[165] Additional aspects have been treated 'in other expositions . . . especially in the book *On Wealth and Moderate Means*,[166] in the treatise on the luxurious and the simple life,[167] the book *On Choices and Avoidances*,[168] and if there are any others of this kind'.

Through his benefactor, the politician L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, consul in 58, son-in-law of Julius Caesar, and celebrated enemy of Cicero (*In Pisonem*), Philodemus must have come into contact with many members of the Roman governing class. He would have been used to wealth and luxury. It is not impossible, despite received opinion today, that the grand villa, in which his books were discovered (the Villa dei Pisoni), in fact belonged to him, not his patron.[169] His remarks on money-makers surely reflect his experience of the Roman elite and of their – and his – wealth and management of wealth. Philodemus' philosopher is allowed to top up his capital by farming, by renting, or by employing skilled slaves who have trades (*technai*) (col. xxiii.20–1). Freedmen are presumably included among these slaves. The production (*katergasia*) of bread is given as an example of the type of thing

[162] Referring (probably) to what has been said about Theophrastus: Laurenti 1973: 177–8.
[163] Jensen compares Eur. *Medea* 1229 ὄλβου δ' ἐπιρρυέντος. Cf. commentators *ad loc.*
[164] Cf. Laurenti 1973: 179.
[165] Cf. *On Wealth* col. li.27–30.
[166] Περῖ πλούτου καὶ πενίας; Tepedino Guerra 1978.
[167] Unknown.
[168] Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan 1995.
[169] Philodemus' description of the house to which he invites Piso for the birthday celebration of Epicurus (*Greek Anthology* 11.44) as 'his humble cottage' is 'not to be taken at its face-value', as Gow and Page drily remark (*The Garland of Philip*; 1968: II, 393 *ad loc.*).

one can do for oneself at home but which depends on technical knowledge in order to function as a business (col. xvii.27, cf. xx.24 for the technical knowledge of the good businessman).[170] In cols. xviii–xx he speculates on the nature of the 'good businessman', partly no doubt in response to Stoic and Peripatetic ideas, as well as Aristotle (cf. col. xxi.28–30). For Philodemus even the sage is interested in making 'the most money in the shortest time' and in 'considering properly where his profit (*to pleion*) is going to increase most' (col. xix.4–7). No surprise, then, that he might (*isōs*) want to be called a 'good businessman' (col. xix.42–5) and might (*isōs*) want to be hailed as a 'specialist'/'producer' (col. xvii.5) and aims at the management that delivers 'the highest prosperity' (*euetēria*, col. xxii.2–3). There is a stress on making money quickly (cols. xix.5–6, xx.42) – and losing it in the same way (col. xv.29). The criticism of the 'money-loving' man who amasses too much too soon and is always 'looking for opportunities' is muted by the fact that he uses genuine skills and is a 'specialist' (col. xvii). What is important here is that quick gains are taken as usual. Philodemus is surely referring to commercial activity when he pictures money being made fast as a normal activity. The actors in this game are the 'vigorous' men of col. xv.28 whose acquisitions are subject to risk. But the sage is not so different: if he keeps an eye on his true Epicurean pleasure and freedom from bother, he too, as we have just seen, will make his money quickly and look to increase it (col. xix.4–7). In all this there is some conception and even admiration, not of the dignity of work as we find it in Bryson or Dio of Prusa, but at least of the professionalism, skill, and dangers involved. The good businessman is 'the man who earns much money through ability and skill, without disgrace and in accordance with the law' (col. xx.22–6). The whole idea of the *technitēs*, the expert, sends out the same message. People who pursue money, Philodemus says, need to be smart. They take risks, they can make a lot quickly, and they have to work extremely hard (note the stress on *ponos*)[171] in order to maintain their position. They are presented as regular members of the upper class (col. xviii.31–9).

What we see in Philodemus are not the economic values ascribed to the risk-averse ancient elite by Finley, who limit themselves to renting and usury and never dare to imperil their real estate, and – most of all – display a negative attitude towards wealth creation. It is indeed something of a surprise that it should be a work like this, written primarily to advise

[170] Cf. Aristotle, *Politics* 1. 9 1257b4 τὸ καπηλικόν . . . δι' ἐμπειρίας ἤδη τεχνικώτερον . . . πλεῖστον ποιήσει κέρδος.

[171] Cols xiv.30–1 ὁ κατὰ τὴν κτῆσιν πόνος, cf. xviii.45–6; xv.36–7 μεγάλους ὑπομένειν πόνους καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν πλῆθος ἀλλακτούς, xvi.27 πόνος παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον.

the Epicurean philosopher, that reveals views that square so well with the picture made plain by the rich material evidence. Relevant to this is the fact that there is less of a moral dimension to Philodemus' unpacking of *oikonomia* than we would expect – in the sense that there is no condemnation of wealth in itself. Naturally there is much reflection on the good life for the philosopher and condemnation of ambition and money-grabbing. But to say that Philodemus is mainly interested in how the philosopher 'should provide for his rudimentary needs on a day-to-day basis' is a little naïve. Daily needs for inhabitants of the most lavish villas on the Bay of Naples were not rudimentary.[172] Philodemus' philosopher must, to be sure, confront or abstain from immoral practices (at least as prescribed by Epicureans: cols. xxiii.36–xxiv. 6). But there is actually far less interest in achieving self-control here than in Bryson, and less stress on the noble life than there is, say, in Xenophon.

Nor is there any conception of the Aristotelian subordination of wealth-getting to the ideal aims of the household. Aristotle, as we saw, deliberately dismisses the sense of *oikonomia* which is uppermost (as he admits) in the minds of 'others' – i.e. money-making – and allots even the good *chrēmatistikē* an 'ancillary' (*huperetikē*) function (*Politics* 1253b–1256a). For him the major parts of *oikonomia* are the three key relationships: master and slave, husband and wife, and father and son – the people, not the property. In other words, social and economic are separated and wealth is purely instrumental to the social good of the house (1259b18–21). When he comes to discuss the practical matter of business at 1258b9–1259a36, farming is first and foremost, and while he does not hold an overtly 'aristocratic' view of the moral superiority of farming (as Xenophon does) or against the 'trades' (Xenophon again), he does say he will refrain from a detailed consideration of business on the ground that to embark on it would be *phortikon*, 'vulgar' (1258b35). Philodemus does not share these prejudices: he can allude to bread-making without asides, and he can speak at length

[172] Tsouna 2007: 177. Tsouna's interpretation is from the position of ancient philosophy, which is entirely proper and productive. But she overemphasizes the ethics of the treatise repeatedly. For example, if for Philodemus 'the traditional manager is affected by arrogance and stupidity (*De oec.* VII. 2), presumption (VII. 21–6), harshness (IX. 32) and inhumanity (X. 15–21), possibly imprudence (XI. 11–16), and certainly folly' (p. 186), the overall interpretation I suggest would be difficult to sustain. But all of these passages are criticism of Xenophon and Theophrastus and their ideas, as rival philosophers, of what constitutes the good manager. Again (p. 187), the advice not to be friendless (col. xxiv.19–29) if you want an income 'worth talking about' does not mean 'that the traditional manager tends to live a friendless life': Philodemus is advising how the philosopher should not proceed, but there is no blanket stigmatization of the rest of the world. The attack shortly before this on 'injustice' (*adikia*) which 'is believed' to help one make and keep wealth clearly does not apply to the good businessman of col. xx.

about the 'good businessman' and explore in what ways the wise man has things in common with him. It is no wonder he spends time attacking the Stoic conception of the *spoudaios* as a good *chrēmatistēs*, for this is an idea he in fact shared.

7 BRYSON: EXCHANGE AND MONEY

If we had only the third or fourth section of Bryson's book on the wife and the child, or even just the second on the slave, we should have no hesitation in labelling it a work of moral reflection and advice and not much more. This would still be of interest, for Bryson has new things to say, or new ways of saying old things, concerning marriage, children, and slaves. But without the introduction and first section we should miss his overall conception of how the people of the *oikos* fit into the total scheme of nature and the divine plan, and we should miss his greatest achievement, which is the incorporation into his scheme of an 'economic point of view'. Hard facts and figures are completely outside Bryson's interest and abilities, and since no ancient author thought it necessary to provide such information systematically or at all, there is no possibility of discovering in him (or others) economic analysis in anything even approaching the modern sense of the phrase. But Bryson's first section and introductory 'commercial anthropology' go beyond the layman's observation of simple economic processes, of Schumpeter's 'pre-scientific' observations, and within the norms of ancient discourse amount to a theoretical vision of how the world works socially and economically. His presentation of how economic needs and activity made human society takes its place besides the other authors we have considered; and the general context in which he places his scheme – the management of the private estate, its property, and its people – certainly makes him comparable with Columella, Cato, and Pliny on the one hand and with texts like those of the Appianus estate on the other. Bryson of course drew on earlier oeconomic literature and it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to gauge his originality. Aristotle and Ps.-Aristotle are certainly of importance to some of what he says, as are the Stoics. There are some interesting parallels too with Philodemus. The introduction and first section seem, however, to owe hardly anything to Neopythagorean literature, such as we have it (whereas there are parallels between Bryson and these texts for the last two parts of his treatise). From the Aristotelian tradition, and also from accounts of the origins of human society, he borrowed the idea of 'need' as a driver of economic relations, for 'need' comes up constantly in the introduction as a motive of human relations and activities. Once human needs had set in motion such relations, the

system ran by itself in a perpetual, chain-like circuit. The 'creator' and nature play a part in the establishment of the system, but not dominant parts. There is no idea of a directive providence. Bryson's idea of progress stops after the invention of the city. Once people have instituted this mode of living, an end point has been reached. If this is teleology, it is a weak teleology. The creator reappears in section three in the context of the biological processes that require male and female to make a child, God's approval of the young man's continence is mentioned in the fourth section, and similarly for adhering to Bryson's recommendations in the coda. But there is something mechanical about these references, for Bryson is hardly religious. Instead of a teleology we might speak of a 'finalism' whereby society, having attained its present state, is fixed and now unchanging. In this sense Bryson's manual is both an explanation of a homeostatically preserved system and, for the most part, a maintenance guide which, if followed correctly, will he says ensure 'love and honour from God and men' (§161).

One of the ghosts that haunted Schumpeter's great *History of Economic Analysis* was the comparative newness of total scientific analysis in 'our science'. The road to Schumpeter's hero in this regard, the nineteenth-century French academic Léon Walras ('the greatest of all economists', 1954a: 827), was a long one in which we frequently read of the fumbling and tentative steps of economic thinkers to grasp the fundamentals of the subject from the seventeenth century onwards and of the science's 'gradual emergence into the light of consciousness' (p. 242). Walras is known for his general theory of the equilibrium of all markets and, given Schumpeter's admiration for him, decisive steps towards the understanding of this crucial realization were bound to attract his enthusiasm. The earliest self-conscious grouping of economists, the Économistes or Physiocrats of mid and later eighteenth-century France, were the first to convey the idea. It was they 'who made the great breach, through which lay all further progress in the field of analysis, by the discovery and intellectual formulation of the circular flow of economic life' (1954b: 43, 1954a: 242–3). It would be the destruction of any academic reputation to suggest that Bryson's short presentation of 'economic thought' was in any sense comparable with the work of these Physiocrats. There are many and vast differences – in the quality and scope of the Physiocrats' work, their interest in all fields of agricultural and mercantile economy and the government's role in it, their use of facts and figures. Nevertheless, in the words of one of their leading members, the Elder Mirabeau, who with others developed the 'tableau économique' of François Quesnay, the 'table is no more than a map of

circulation'.[173] The Physiocrats viewed everything as being in accordance with natural law (hence their name), but did not let this blind them to analytical argument. In that respect, Bryson has *something* in common with them. They took agriculture as the basis of the nation's interconnected economy, which for the mid eighteenth century, as in antiquity, was true enough, and they saw industry as ultimately unproductive of the aim of the whole system, which was the surplus or *produit net*. Bryson, as I have mentioned several times, is not interested in farming according to the usual landowner's prejudices; but he does base his system on the interrelation of the *technai* which include agricultural *technai*, even if he does not privilege these. The seventeenth-century discourses on trade, by such figures as William Petty and Josiah Child, had marked the start of progress towards modern analysis and shown awareness of the fundamental issue of interdependence, yet took it for granted, and failed to arrive at an explicit formulation or understanding of the need to focus on the 'map of circulation'. This was the difference the Physiocrats made. But, seventeen centuries before them, Bryson was far more aware of an interdependent system than any previous thinker, and he explained how it worked – albeit in the very briefest of terms – in his idea of the interlinked chain of the *technai*. In reality his contribution amounts to no more than the merest inkling of what was going on, a Schumpeterian fumbling towards the golden light of analysis; but it is something. Moreover, we must remember that the strength of Bryson's social and economic thought is precisely that people are part of the system, not in an abstract way, but in a very involved one. He does not mention basic areas of economic life (including some very basic ones), but he does integrate economic life into the life of the people of the *oikos*. Some might even consider his approach fundamentally more intelligent than that of the 'neoliberisti' and the Physiocrats thrown together.

Before moving to the text, we should remind ourselves that we are dealing with a translation, not (for the most part) an original Greek work; and it is worth while repeating the conclusion reached in Chapter 2 about the reliability of Bryson Arabus in terms of reflecting the content of the Greek. Essentially, there is every reason to accept the Bryson translation as a credible effort to present to an Arabic-speaking audience the arguments of the original. Within this overall context, interpretation of individual phrases

[173] Mirabeau 1766: 202 (English translation of his *L'ami des hommes*, which was heavily influenced by Quesnay in its later editions – hence it is often filed under Quesnay's name in bibliographies, and its English title – *The Oeconomical Table* – reflects this). For Quesnay's own work, see Kuczynksi and Meek 1972.

and words from a Greek perspective is not easy and not always possible. Some words do map onto each other closely (*sināʿa* and *technē*, *adab* and *paideia*, *ribḥ* and *kerdos*, *qīma* and *axia*, *thaman* and *timē*, *ḥāja* and *chreia*). In other cases, for example when the owner 'invests' (literally 'keeps busy') his money at §36, it is very difficult to know, just when we want to know, what the Greek was; in other cases, e.g. 'potential' (*iḥtimāl*; see below), we can make guesses but it does not matter too much what the Greek was. The present state of Arabic lexicography, especially in the field of translation literature, certainly does not allow us to be sure in many cases, and this needs to be borne in mind.[174] In what follows in this chapter and in subsequent chapters, where I quote, I am quoting my English version of the Arabic. For the sake of continuity, I shall do this even in the few cases where the Greek is extant (i.e. frr. 1–2 and the quasi-citations in Musonius/Clement), and shall footnote the Greek or a reference to it, as appropriate.

I start with §§1–23, the section I have many times referred to as the 'commercial anthropology'. Anthropology as a technical term within Classics refers to ancient accounts of the genesis of human civilization. Broadly, these accounts divide into three brands. Widespread in poetry is the myth of the Golden Age, when men and gods communicated happily on earth and were uncontaminated by civilizational or technological developments such as seafaring or agriculture. The Golden Age myth figures the present day as a decline from this blessed state of affairs, and reflects a strong reactionary cultural trend in ancient thought.[175] The two other varieties stress progress – up to a point – rather than decline. One, made famous by the sophist Protagoras in Plato's dialogue of that name (320c–323a), presents the origin of human civilization as a response to the harshness of nature and the need to form communities for protection. The result is a sort of social contract in which men recognize the mutual benefits to be had from cooperation, for the gods have given all of them a share of civic virtue which enables this to happen. The related alternative theory traced the development of civilization to man's discovery of cultivation, shelter, fire, metalworking, weaving, and so on. It is this popular model which Bryson used.

[174] Ullmann's lexicons (2002, 2006, 2007, 2011) are the best tools available, but are necessarily based on limited corpuses; the excellent *GaLex* of Endress and Gutas (1997) is only comprehensive to date for the Greek of Arabic words beginning with *alif*. Greco-Arabists are aware of the numerous editions of individual texts which have good word-lists and there is no need to record them here. The overall situation is about to change radically with the advent of the possibility of scanning Arabic accurately and the computer analysis of large corpuses which this will allow.

[175] See Lovejoy and Boas 1935, who include relevant texts.

The standard English-language study of this theory (Thomas Cole, *Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology*, 1990 [1967], cf. also Edelstein 1967: ch. 2) outlines the several elements that are part of it as they are attested in various ancient or later authors (principally Lucretius, Diodorus Siculus, Vitruvius, Tzetzes, Posidonius (i.e. Seneca, *Moral Letters* 90)); and by assembling their myths according to his own ordering Cole was able to demonstrate that the accounts all go back to a single narrative by the Atomist philosopher and social theorist, Democritus of Abdera. Many have felt that the methodology used by Cole is dubious, that his conclusion is foregone, and that, while there is no doubt that the set of ideas goes back to the classical period, the case for Democritus is not proven. It is in fact more likely that we are dealing with ideas which arose among the sophists and were adapted right from the beginning (as for example by Plato). But that is not a concern here, for Cole does a good service in setting out and discussing the various accounts, which do after all display considerable general similarity (alongside idiosyncratic factors such as Vitruvius on the primary role of the architect or Posidonius' attribution of all civilization to philosophers). In these accounts the development of crafts (*technai*, *artes*) sometimes precedes, sometimes follows, the establishment of towns. Thus in Book 5 of Lucretius' great poem *On the Nature of Things*, written at the end of the Republic in celebration of Epicureanism, cities are founded by kings for their security and gradually the arts develop and reach a culmination (5.1108–10 'urbis arcemque', 1113 'posterius res inventast aurumque repertum', 1456–7 'cacumen'). In Book 1 of the universal history of Diodorus Siculus cities are established in a quite different manner – through the bounty of the god Osiris in Egypt. Diodorus' sketch of early civilization at 1.8. 5–9 is worth quoting to show what Bryson does with this subgenre.

> (5) Now the first men led a very hard existence because none of the things that are useful for life had been discovered. They were naked and without clothes, unfamiliar with housing and fire, and had absolutely no conception of prepared food. (6) Since they knew nothing of harvesting wild food, they did not even store fruits against their needs. As a result, many of them perished in the winter due to the cold and lack of food. (7) Gradually they learnt to take refuge in caves in wintertime and to put aside those fruits which were suitable for preserving. (8) After becoming acquainted with fire and other useful things, little by little they discovered the crafts and the other things which are able to help people live communally. (9) For in general it was real need that became people's teacher in everything, guiding them in learning each subject in a way that was appropriate for a creature of natural talent who possessed as his assistants in all matters hands, reason, and acumen.

Bryson does not have anything in common with the detail of this scheme; yet though his version of the movement towards civilization (and work and money) is quite different, he shares some of the basic features of the classic 'anthropology'. He begins his introduction to the section on wealth by discussing the Creator's provision in man of a number of 'faculties' (or 'powers'; *quwwāt*, *dunameis*). In ancient medicine these faculties are envisaged as the specific abilities of the organs (spleen, stomach, etc.) and other parts to do their work, and they were a particular feature of Galenic physiology. Galen elaborates his theory in a number of works, particularly *On the Natural Faculties* and *On the Use of the Parts*.[176] At *On Mixtures* 3.1 (1.654. 4–12 Kühn, cf. *Differences of Fevers* 7.381. 7–12 Kühn) he says he has demonstrated in *On the Natural Faculties* that 'there are four faculties of the body as a whole: one concerned with the attraction (*helktikē*) of substances which belong (to a given organ), another concerned with the retention (*kathektikē*) of these, a third with their transformation (*alloiōtikē*), and a fourth additional to these is concerned with the expulsion (*apokritikē*) of substances that do not belong (to a given organ)'. These faculties and others like them were a sort of shorthand for Galen for what he did not know: 'so long as we are ignorant of the true essence of the cause which is operating, we call it a faculty' (*Natural Faculties* 1.4 = 2.9 Kühn). They are an intrinsic part of the living animal: 'the Creator has bestowed on (each part) certain divine faculties' (*On the Use of the Parts* 3.268.19–20 Kühn). In the words of Margaret May, 'the multiplication of faculties verges on the ridiculous'.[177]

Overall the body possessed a 'nutritive' (*threptikē*) faculty and the feeding and growth of the body parts is the most important part of the system (Books 4 and 5 of *On the Use of the Parts*). This system is a 'vital' one and Galen contrasts it in *On the Natural Faculties* with the mechanical explanations of earlier, Hellenistic physicians like Erasistratus and Asclepiades. The shadow cast by Galen resulted in the loss of most of the work of his predecessors and contemporaries, and it is therefore difficult to know how much of the theory was present in his late Hellenistic and early Roman forerunners.[178] The terminology Galen uses did exist before him, but our scant evidence does not allow us to know if there was any comprehensive formulation of the faculties in the manner of Galen himself writing in the later second and early third centuries (though we should remember that the basic ideas are not exclusively medical

[176] Translations: Brock 1916 May 1968.

[177] May 1968:1: 49–50 citing *Nat. Fac.* 1.4.

[178] The evidence emerging from fragments of medical texts on papyri is now beginning to show just how much has been lost: Andorlini 2001–2009, Leith 2009.

and can be found elsewhere[179]). Nevertheless, since Bryson knows the faculties of attraction, transformation, retention, expulsion, and nutrition (§§3–4), one might hypothetically ask if that means he knew the Galenic system. The answer must be 'no'. For even if we were unaware of the evidence for his date provided by Musonius Rufus (see Chapter 2), it is problematic to think of placing a Neopythagorean work written in Doric as late as the third century AD. This being so, it seems that Bryson is of considerable importance in medical history as being perhaps the earliest surviving attestation of the scheme of the major bodily faculties working in tandem. Of course, one could argue that the introductory section – which has been epitomized in some way – was rewritten later with knowledge of the Galenic scheme. I think that most unlikely, however. One thing against it is the probable influence of this part of Bryson on the so-called *Letter* of Themistius (see Chapter 1, pp. 55–6, Chapter 2, pp. 126–9, and below, pp. 248–9). As I have remarked, this text, which is in Arabic only, was used by Nemesius of Emesa around 400 and therefore existed in some form in the fourth century, and there is thus no cause to doubt that it is a genuine work of Themistius. It begins with the provision by God of faculties in man. The details are different from Bryson ('God . . . created Man the most complete and most perfect of living beings, and placed in him three faculties: the nutritive faculty, which some call the appetitive and others the vegetative, the vital faculty, and the rational, discriminative faculty'), but the development of thought in the following sections on the depletion and replenishment of the body and the consequent invention of crafts has much in common with him. The *Letter* offers confirmation that the provision of faculties was in Bryson's Greek. Second, in Bryson himself the interaction of the faculties with the two dominant 'qualities' of heat and moisture in §§5–6 reappears in §§77–9 in a way that has no particular connection with Galen.

All in all, then, there is every reason to assume that Bryson's presentation of the faculties is Brysonian. What has it got to do with the *oikos* and the economy? Basic medical theory was widely known among the ancient elites. If Bryson was up with current ideas (as knowledge of the 'classic' scheme suggests), he was certainly advertising his knowledge to his readers (note the explanation of the theory to them in §3, 'I mean by the term "faculties". . .'). As an opening statement in an *oikonomikos logos*, it makes quite an impact. It also set a dominant theme for his section on wealth. For the faculties' job is 'management' (*tadbīr*, *oikonomia*) of the body and this means constant regulation of the influx and efflux in and out of the body

[179] Cf. e.g. Plutarch, fr. 69 on when the system goes wrong.

which is caused by the continuous battle between the two 'qualities' of heat and moisture. Here Bryson does not employ the 'classic' scheme of four fundamental 'active qualities' (hot, cold, dry, wet), which Galen worked up into nine combinations determining bodily and mental health and claiming, as ever, a Hippocratic precedent.[180] Bryson's focus on heat and moisture looks forward to the discussion of procreation in section three, where their mutual antagonism and cooperation make the embryo according to a fairly standard theory. Here in section one the operation of the organism involves 'continuous and permanent dissolution' which is caused by 'movement' (*ḥaraka*, *kinēsis*), an important idea in *On the Natural Faculties* and generally of physiological processes.[181] It is this 'movement', and man's need of constant input, that necessitates the development of the *technai*. It is certain that Bryson also had in mind at this point the metaphor of bodily growth and decay which he applies to the financial health of the estate and its capital at §§33–5.

For now he pursues the themes of ancient anthropology. Constant influx and efflux put the body in need of nourishment and cause man to develop 'various crafts' (§8) in order to undertake plant and animal farming, and 'many other different crafts' to make foods from them. 'In man has been placed a faculty for discovering every craft and a faculty for learning it.' The brevity of life makes it impossible to learn more than one of these properly, despite man's 'potential to learn many of them'. He nevertheless needs many crafts 'for the management of his life' (§11). Somewhere in Bryson's mind here is Plato's account of the origin of production and trade at *Republic* 369b–372d, and the differences are instructive. Socrates outlines his first ideas of the development of human communities as part of his attempt to discover the origin of 'justice and injustice' (372e). One of his hearers, Glaucon, calls the imaginary community a 'city of pigs' when at the end of his description Socrates pictures the inhabitants happily feasting, and demands another account (372d–374e). The beginning of the city is 'need' of others (369c). The basic requirements are food, housing, clothing, 'and the like' (369d), hence the farmer, builder, weaver, cobbler, and 'some other to look after the needs of the body'. Each individual is fitted 'by nature' for just one task, and is able to practise one 'craft'. This has the positive result 'that more

[180] See *On Mixtures*; cf. Nutton 2004: 234. The 'active qualities': e.g. *De const. artis med. ad Patrophilum* 1. 252.5–15 Kiihn. (heat and cold are the most powerful), *De sympt. causis* 7.254.17–255.1 Kühn (heat the strongest).

[181] For Bryson's text here, see Part V, p. 433, n. 15.

things are produced more finely (*kallion*) and more easily when one man performs one task in accordance with nature, at the right moment, and at leisure from other occupations' (370b–c).[182] Many other crafts are required to make the community a success. Moreover (370e–371a) the city needs exports, imports, and merchants (*emporoi*), and the 'sharing' of products leads to buying and selling, a market, and coinage as a 'symbol of exchange' (371b). '"And if the farmer or any other craftsman takes his produce to the market and does not arrive at the same time as those who need to exchange with him, will he sit idly in the market and lose time from his own craft?" "By no means," he said, "but there are men who see this and appoint themselves for the service. In well-run cities they are generally those who are weakest in body and useless for any other task. They must wait there in the market and exchange money for goods with those who need to sell, and goods for money with as many as need to buy anything." "This need, then," said I, "creates the class of shopkeepers (*kapēloi*) in our city"' (371c–d). Another subclass ('not entirely worthy of community') is also needed, hired workers who call the 'price' (*timē*) of their bodily strength a 'wage'.

Bryson's approach is different. Man has the 'potential' (*iḥtimāl*) to learn many crafts, but does not do this in practice because life is short. Plato, like Xenophon in the famous *Cyropaedia* passage discussed above, is primarily interested in quality of work (*kallion*) by craftsmen who are clearly envisaged as working on their own. For Bryson the key point is circularity and cooperation: 'the crafts . . . are connected to each other' (§12). He repeats this at §31 ('for all of them are connected to each other, as we have explained above'). The introductory section leads to the specific discussions of acquiring, preserving, and expending the wealth of the estate at §§23–54. There is a strong implication that the wealth of the owner depends on the process of exchange detailed at §§12–20, which, importantly, applies to both goods and to services (§20 end). The specific link between §31 and §§12–13 confirms this dependence. Bryson's economic activity exists in a private sphere: the city, fundamental for Plato and Aristotle, is a bystander, not the primary aim of human society at Bryson §14. This economic space reaches completion after the crafts, exchange, and money (§§21–2) have been instituted. The system once set up is stable, but not without weaknesses. 'Each one of the crafts, even if complete in itself, needs another, in the way the parts of a chain need

[182] ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾷον, ὅταν εἷς ἓν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ. Cf. Aristophanes, *Wasps* 1431 for the traditional thought here.

each other, and if one of the crafts is removed, the rest of the crafts cease to exist as a result of its removal' (§13).[183] The chain of crafts is thought of in personal terms. To make this point, Bryson exemplifies it with socially equal occupations (builder, carpenter, blacksmith, miner, and back to builder), which may recall Aristotle's famous builder and shoemaker (above, pp. 192-3). But the list is *exempli gratia*: at §§28–31 Bryson comments on and disallows claims of personal ambition to get a better job, according respect to lower status occupations and reminding those in higher status ones that the interconnectedness of the crafts means that everyone depends on everyone else. The 'potential' of the individual to learn and practise any craft reinforces the sense of a continuous and cohesive system, in which differences of status are, however, still important. The formation of the city is treated so briefly (§14) that it seems likely there was a longer account in the original Greek. Whether that is the case or not, it is noteworthy that the purpose of the city is 'to help each other with the crafts', and in Bryson's overall conception it plays no other role. There is nothing of the common analogy between *oikos* and *polis* that we find in other Neopythagorean oeconomica.[184]

The next subsection (§§15–22) deals with exchange, barter, and the need for coined money. As in Aristotle's *Ethics*, the presentation of exchange is simplified by excluding consideration of middlemen. Bryson specifies 'value' (*qīma*), 'price' (*thaman*), and 'recompense' (*ujra*) as relative matters (§15 'in comparison with'), i.e. dependent on what people think goods and services are worth. The last term *ujra* comes from a root which is used to translate Greek *misthos*, etc. (Ullmann 2007: 695), but does not here seem to mean a 'wage' or 'fee' for work done by one person for another, as it often does. It may simply refer to hiring a thing – 'whenever a man needed something that was for sale or something for use', as Bryson says in §16. A means of determining relative value was required, a substance to 'set a price on things'. This could resolve the double coincidence of wants problem: how can two people identify commensurate (§18 'equal in amount to') value in two unlike goods? The problem involves the 'value' both of wholes and of parts of goods, taking into account 'the diversity of the products and the difference between them in value'. Bryson explains what he means by adding that the 'situation' of products changes owing to various factors: 'greater or lesser availability on

[183] Cf. Greek fr. 1 (i)–(ii) (Chapter 2, p. 111): 'Men's occupations relate to each other like the links of a chain. These are fastened to one another and follow one another. If any one of them should ever be removed, all of them follow along with it from the end'; Chapter 2, pp. 00–0.

[184] Callicratidas 105.20–4 Thesleff (Stobaeus 4.28.17, p. 685 Hense) ὅ τε οἶκος καὶ ἁ πόλις συνήρμοσται, Phintys 153.23–5 Thesleff (Stobaeus 4.23.61a, p. 592 Hense), *et al.* (cf. Chapter 5, p. 319).

the market', how much people need them (or do not need them, or need them to an excessive degree), and their 'use of each product at any time'. Here he hints at information asymmetry, but evidently does not consider it a problem. There is nothing startling about these comments; the remarks are 'commonsensical', but that is precisely the point: the attitude is one of ease with the idea of trade and the relevance of buying and selling to the owner of the estate. In effect Bryson presents a *model* of economic activity. As Finley noted (see n. 43 above), 'achieving a more complex picture' may be brought about 'by the employment of simplifying models': Walras' equations are not the only way of presenting economic thought or of discussing economic behaviour.

Before he addresses the invention of coinage (§§21–2), Bryson adds something important to his account of exchange: 'the above holds true also for the crafts'. So, services too have a value and a price which fluctuate according to people's needs and by season. The crafts underpin society, but the way they function is not static. Like any good model, Bryson's builds in responsiveness. Thus, however simply he envisages things, he clearly envisages the operation of a market. Although he has been influenced by Aristotle's discussions (especially the question of commensurability), he does not have a moral problem with exchange value. As we have seen, Aristotle's *chreia* does not relate to consumers and attempts to make it do so by translating it as 'demand' are wrong. Bryson's 'need' (*ḥāja*) is not demand (Arabic root *t-l-b*), which he does use later, as we shall see. That said, the consumer plays an important part in the presentation. The purchaser, if he cannot obtain 'satisfaction of his need', will look for this 'from another seller'. The 'level of people's need' determines the value of a product. As we shall see later, he also identifies in his commonsensical way the operation of confidence as a decisive factor in 'exchange' (§25). Vendors must be trustworthy. The same attitude lies behind his view of coinage (§§21–2). As in Aristotle, it is conventional and convenient. But Bryson goes beyond Aristotle in his very strong view of the power of coined money: 'whoever has possession of [coins] becomes, as it were, one who has possession of all the products he needs'. His world is fully monetized (the specification of 'copper' alongside gold and silver reflects the system of the Principate[185]); and if you are a consumer with money in your pocket, you can get anything you want. This scenario suits the Roman empire well. He concludes with a powerfully simple statement: 'there was a need (of coins) to make life good' (§22). The Aristotelian flavour of this

[185] Thus when Dimashqī rewrites Bryson here (Part V, p. 441, n. 68), he omits copper, which did not form an established part of the monetary system of the Islamic empire.

phrase (in transliteration: *fī maṣlaḥat al-maʿāsh*) suggests a Greek original of *pros to eu zēn* (*cf. Ethics* 1140a28, *Politics* 1326b9, *Oikonomika I* 1343a11), *vel sim*. But Bryson's morality was not Aristotle's. In her massive commentary on the Ps.-Aristotelian *Oikonomika*, Renate Zoepffel notes that Bryson (whom she summarizes after Plessner) concerns himself with *chrēmatistikē* more than any other Greek oeconomic treatise, and that this makes it difficult to classify him with the Neopythagorica transmitted by Stobaeus. Her conclusion is that Bryson's translator 'was taking account of the facts of his own society' (2006: 269–70). Actually, it was Bryson taking account of the facts of *his* own society. There are indeed few real overlaps with the Ps.-Aristotelian texts, and not many with *Politics* Book 1. We shall see that the Peripatetic school on slaves and wives offered more to our author. For the purposes of money, if we are looking for influences, we miss (I think) the Stoic literature, the remains of which were examined above. It may well be that there was no treatise like Bryson's. But the Stoics had shown the way in liberating wealth from Aristotle's restrictive view of it as a tool to achieve the virtuous good life. And if we wish to find inspiration for Bryson's 'chain', we might recall the Stoic concept of the interconnectedness (*antakolouthia*) of the virtues (Diogenes Laertius 7.125); the idea is not quite identical, since for the Stoics the wise man's possession of one virtue entailed possession of all, but correspondingly to lack one meant to have none, a position that would appeal to Christian writers (Horn 1970). For Bryson, 'if one of the crafts is removed, the rest of the crafts cease to exist as a result of its removal' (§13). The Stoics used a similar argument about the sequence of causes and, if we believe their critic Alexander of Aphrodisias, proposed that 'all the things that are become causes of some of the things after them, and in this way things are connected to one another by the later being attached to the earlier in the manner of a chain (*halusis*)' (*On Fate*, p. 193. 5–7 Bruns, trans. Sharples). The same term *halusis* is used in Bryson's first Greek fragment (καθάπερ καὶ τᾶς ἁλύσιος τοὶ κρίκοι).

8. BRYSON: WEALTH AND SOCIETY

We now leave the 'commercial anthropology' and come to the advice part of the first section (§§23–54). There is evidence to suggest that the 'anthropology' underwent shortening. From §23 onward there is every reason to assume that the translation reflects the extent of the Greek and the arguments of the Greek reasonably faithfully. In this section management is much on Bryson's mind. Three topics present themselves to the 'student' of wealth: acquisition, preservation, expenditure. I take these in order.

Bryson does not feel the need to argue for the acquisition of wealth any more than Philodemus. Nor does he give advice how to get it. There are some thoughts on this aspect in the next subsection on 'preservation'. For the moment his focus is on three ways in which one should *not* go about it. The first is the avoidance of *jawr*, which is regularly used for Greek *adikia*, 'unjust behaviour', 'wrongdoing'. Bryson's owner is Philodemus' 'good businessman'. The examples of behaviour he should not be party to are familiar in any period, but Bryson has his own point to make. Cheating and misrepresentation put a stop to making money and 'lead to exclusion' owing to a lack of confidence in the fraudster among 'those who have traded with him'. The specification of confidence as a key element of successful business relations and the necessity of having a good reputation chime with themes developed in Bryson section four on the correct social behaviour to which the child must be accustomed. The Aristotelian idea of habit made for the assumption of more or less fixed character after childhood. The corresponding idea in Bryson is that one's public persona is fixed by one's behaviour in the marketplace, hence 'renunciation' of malpractice will do no good.

In this regard it is interesting to consider Avner Greif's model of the workings of reputation and trust in the dealings of the medieval Jewish Maghribi merchants (1989). Relying on the evidence of the famous letters and documents of the Cairo *geniza* (Goitein 1999), he argues that these merchants dealt with their agents, who would be other merchants, in a manner which was based not on social controls or 'the internalization of norms of behavior (although these factors play a role in any economic system)' (1989: 881), but on the basis of trust working as an optimized economic institution which offered both parties the benefit of reduced transaction costs. Agents saw it was in their interest not to cheat because, as Greif says with reference to game theory and economics literature on reputation, they were assured a 'premium' if they were honest. By placing all 'agency relations . . . within an economic institution that may be referred to as a "coalition"' (867), in other words a stable grouping of merchants (and here one with a strong ethnic and regional identity), costs for the merchants would be further reduced. In his 2006 *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy* Greif revisits and expands his earlier work, stressing the merchants' ability to impose 'collective punishment', including the destruction of reputation, as a way of enforcing their rights (cf. Greif 1993), making interesting use of game-theory analysis to explore the interplay of knowledge and rules, and stressing the absence of a centralizing state from the development of such institutions. This modelling could easily be applied to the ancient world where similar problems of long-distance trade existed and 'coalitions' based on various

identities must have been common. Whether one should be so beholden to New Institutional Economics as to call such arrangements 'institutions' is another matter. But if they are tight enough, they could have functioned in a quasi-institutional mode. There is no doubt that Bryson's specification of 'reputation' (*thanā'*) is *economic in consequence*, and that it is grounded in a moral–social framework (*adikia*) which entails multilateral punishment in terms very similar to those outlined by Greif (who does not mention Bryson). There is also no doubt that these economic consequences depend on the operation of a clearly identifiable institution – the *oikos* – which in Bryson section one is closely connected with the market.[186]

The second bad habit Bryson condemns is the use of physical violence. The term *ʿār* ('outrage') is regularly used to convey Greek *hubris*. The definition is highly compressed, but seems to refer to the use of physical violence to get items one wants. If that is right, the 'some people' who tolerate violence will be businessmen, and the people who practice it their henchmen.

Third is 'baseness' (*danā'a*), corresponding to something like Greek *tapeinotēs* or *aischunē*. It is defined as making oneself *déclassé*, despite the fact that one is capable of remaining in a higher status profession. The example given is the man whose family 'were generals or governors of provinces' but who 'reduces himself to singing and piping'. The implications of the passage for the first-century dating of Bryson have been discussed in Chapter 1 (p. 33). Bryson's demand that men should stay in the occupation of their ancestor is a stipulation associated with the late empire after 395 and then only in the West as part of an attempt to maintain urban services. There is no evidence of such legislation in the early Roman period. But at any time crafts tended to be passed from father to son or mother to daughter (though the social obligation was to teach children *something*[187]). Bryson's point, then, is prescriptive; and he makes two important statements as part of it. First, undertaking a lower-status occupation ('a dishonourable[188] craft') is not something that 'should attract blame' (§29). Rather, a man who remains in such a position is praiseworthy for staying within 'his limitations' (*ṭawr*,

[186] Cf. Bang 2008: 268, 296, placing the *oikos* at the heart of merchant operations but suggesting the consequences of the institution are fragmentation and 'compartmentalised circuits of distribution' owing to a tendency to exclude those outside the (extended) family. This is not at any rate how Bryson sees things.

[187] So at *Satyricon* 46 Echion the rag-merchant says about the son who is being made to learn poetry, 'if he objects, I've decided to teach him a trade (*artificium*) – barber, auctioneer, or at least a pleader – something only Orcus can take away from him'.

[188] *khasīs*, with sense of 'mean', 'base', 'low', 'shabby', 'contemptible', etc., is used to translate (e.g.) *agennēs* (Ullmann); one might also think of *aprepēs*, *atopos*, etc.

in the sense of a state, condition, measure which one should keep to). This is an idea that recurs at the end of section one where Bryson summarizes the correct attitude towards expenditure of money with some general remarks about the expectations of peers,[189] and of course it is a principal underlying theme of section four on correct conduct including control of ambition and not overreaching oneself. Bryson's second point concerns the economic system as a whole. An extraordinary situation is envisaged: if people constantly aimed higher and left their ancestral employments, they would end up seeking 'one craft, the highest of the crafts'. This craft is not specified but is surely political – i.e. kingship – even if everyone is aiming at it, rather than (e.g.) referring to the 'aristocracy of the craftsmen . . . the goldsmiths, silversmiths, and jewellers', as A. H. M. Jones put it (1964: 863). The idea is anyway intentionally absurd, and Bryson pursues it by saying that this craft 'is only completed' (the Arabic root here *t–m–m* represents Greek *telos*, *vel sim.*) by the other crafts. The conclusion (*idh*, 'for') is the Stoicizing claim that 'all of them are connected to each other, as we have explained above'.

Bryson's attempt to forbid social mobility rests on the imposition of limits which are not neutral givens. For he has already said men can *learn* any craft, and here he is saying that they *should* not. He is determined to maintain the system, keeping the lower orders in their crafts and the upper classes in theirs, presumably with their respective abilities to acquire wealth (since we are still under the heading of 'acquisition'). In part he is recalling attacks on 'sordid' occupations going back to Plato and well exemplified in Cicero's *On Duties* or the oft-cited list at Pollux, *Onomasticon* 6.128.[190] There are things one does not have to to do (such as singing and piping) in order to make a living. But there are surely other crafts Bryson would take under the heading 'dishonourable', which are in a different category. 'Dishonourable' is a value-judgement made by those of a higher status because Bryson himself categorically denies ('we are not saying . . .') that men should be condemned for undertaking such crafts. If the first point is traditional, the second is not.

I have already mentioned (above, p. 207) that Diogenes Laertius calls the money-making ideas of the Stoics 'ridiculous', when he notes Chrysippus'

[189] The word there is *ḥadd*, which refers to limits or borders.

[190] βίοι ἐφ' οἷς ἄν τις ὀνειδισθείη, πορνοβοσκός, κάπηλος, ὀπωρώνης ὀπωροπώλης, τελώνης δεκατώνης, δεκατηλόγος εἰκοστολόγος πεντηκοστολόγος ἐλλιμενιστής, κῆρυξ, ναύτης, πανδοκεύς, πορθμεύς, μαστροπός, ὑπηρέτης, βυρσοδέψης σκυτοδέψης, ἀλλαντοπώλης. εἰ δὲ καὶ μὴ διὰ πασῶν ἀνέλθοι τεχνῶν τὸ ὀνείδισμα τοῖς βελτίω βίον αἱρουμένοις, ἀλλ' οἵ γε τοιοῦτοι βίοι τὸ ἐπονείδιστον ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἔχουσιν, εἰ καί τις ἐπιμένει τῇ τύχῃ. Pollux appears to be saying at the end that one does not have to keep to one's fortune.

advice to get money from a king, friends, or by teaching (7.189),[191] and that there is no evidence of Stoic interest in ordinary jobs for ordinary people (and this is despite the fact that the second head of the Stoic school, Cleanthes, allegedly had to support himself through manual labour: Diogenes Laertius 7.168–70). I have also mentioned that there is no good evidence to support Peter Brunt's belief (1973) that Dio of Prusa, the only ancient author to show sympathy with *penētai* (the poor who have to work for a living), was influenced by the Stoics in this, and that it is better to see Dio's attitudes as related to his domestic politicking at Prusa where he expresses support for the people before the popular assembly and in the council (*Or.* 43.5–7; 45. 13–14 his plans to bring economic benefits to the city; 50. 3). Since Dio associated himself with whatever interest group he needed at any time, his support for the *dēmos* should be treated with some scepticism. Nevertheless, he apparently had a deep distrust of his own class which at times reaches the heights of Polemon's offensive descriptions of his peers in the *Physiognomy*, an important source for political attitudes and language in the second-century Greek world (Swain 2007b). Dio's *Euboean Oration* (*Or.* 7) is where his distrust, even contempt, of the upper class is expressed and this is the work where his sympathy with poor workers is particularly evident. Bryson's own sympathies may be illuminated by comparison.

The *Euboean* is a complex, and in parts brilliant, piece of writing. In the first half Dio recounts his chance meeting with a family of hunters who live in the Euboean countryside and take him in after shipwreck. Among other events, the father describes a debate in the assembly of the city to which he was once taken on a charge of avoiding taxes. The tone of the debate has much in common with what we read in(to) Dio's own Prusan speeches. There is a strong implicit or explicit attack throughout the *Euboean* on the urban elite and the lives of the rich in contrast with the happy life of the rural poor encountered by Dio, whose material wants do not prevent them from being well nourished.[192] Literary scholars have often admired the first half of the work and drawn parallels with idyllic poetry or the Greek novel. From this perspective the quite different second half of the work is a puzzle, since from §81 to §102 Dio makes explicit his unfavourable comparison between the rich and the poor and then announces (§103) that he must investigate the life and occupations of urban workers. After §133 till the end (§152) he

[191] Natali 2003: 85–6; Diogenes Laertius is corroborated by Plutarch, *De Stoic. repugn.* 1043e, Stobaeus 2.7.11m. The Stoic advice is not dissimilar to the advice issued to the Epicurean wise man by Philodemus.

[192] See Ma 2000 on Dio's suspicions of 'poliadic' discourse and the evidence of the *Euboean* for the vitality of politics around the turn of the second century.

changes tack again and condemns prostitution and pederasty. In between he concentrates on jobs. Frustratingly he says there are too many occupations to list and it would be inappropriate to do so (§110, 114). But the sympathy expressed for what he calls the 'respectable poor' (§107) is remarkable. They have to pay rent, they have to buy everything from their clothes to their fuel (§105–6), thus they should pay no attention to those who 'throw insults' (*loidoroumenoi*) at their trades or those of their parents when such jobs 'have nothing disgraceful about them' (cf. Bryson §29).[193] '(We tell them) to get on with it without being ashamed (*aischunomenoi*) of any such thing' (§114). He then launches into a description of some of the jobs that should not be done by 'our poor' (§118), apparently presenting the 'respectable poor' as 'our' in the sense of his own clients.[194] This unusual phrase recalls Bryson §53 on 'his poor and his beggars'.

'Not having to practise any banausic craft,' says Aristotle, is proof that one is free, 'for a sign of a free man is that he lives without being dependent on another man' (*Rhetoric* 1367a32–3). It was this ingrained attitude that Dio 'turns on its head' (Brunt 1973: 13–14) with his remarks about appropriate employment for the urban poor. Brunt rightly connects Dio's idealization of working the land by oneself earlier in the *Euboicus* with some of Musonius' thoughts in his Discourse XI on the means of support proper for philosophers, for Musonius was at some stage a teacher of Dio according to Fronto (p. 135 van den Hout 1999). He notes, however, that '[e]ven Musonius is plainly thinking of the independent farmer who is his own master'. Bryson is not interested in agriculture (except inasmuch as the owner of an estate necessarily has farms). It is his conception of the interconnectedness of the crafts that explains his remarks on the blamelessness of ordinary work. It may be that the idea was treated by Musonius, who passed it on to Dio. But it is time to recall again that Dio himself wrote an *Oikonomikos* (fragments IV–IX, from Stobaeus, who attests the title). From the fragments we can see that the work covered masters and slaves, husbands and wives, children, behaviour in public (laughing). In the period of the High Roman Empire there are only three works with this title (Bryson, Dio, Hierocles the Stoic),[195] and there is

[193] As Russell notes (1992: 142–3), the actual occupations given are taken over from Demosthenes; that does not mean Dio himself is not commending them.

[194] τῶν ἡμετέρων πενήτων: Dio uses the first person plural of himself throughout the second half of the *Euboicus*.

[195] For Hierocles see Chapter 5, pp. 343–4. The short extract (preserved by Stobaeus) deals with the work roles of husband and wife. We might add to the list Callicratidas' *On the Happiness of the Oikos* and the *Yconomica Aristotelis*, i.e. the Latin text known nowadays as Ps.-Aristotle, *Oikonomika III*. On these see Chapter 5, pp. 336–9, 320–4.

every reason to suppose that Dio had read Bryson's. If that is right, it does not detract from his independence of thought and expression. But it does help us to see where Dio was coming from when he expressed his radical views on the decency of the 'respectable poor'.

So to the topic of 'preservation'. This is a standard part of oeconomic thought (Ps.-Aristotle, *Oikonomika I* 1344b24 *phulattein*), which may be associated specifically with the role of the wife who 'keeps' the house (*Politics* 1277b24–5). Bryson's wife has a comparable role, as we shall see. But in section one, preservation is a male game. It is not the chore that Philodemus and Aristotle (1257b39–40) make it, and the strategy is to increase wealth, not to preserve it in the sense of maintaining the status quo. Bryson's presentation is important and original. The first consideration, however, is the traditional one that, as *Oikonomika II* has it, 'expenditure must not exceed revenue' (1346a16). Second, he recommends that expenditure should not equal acquisition, but that the owner should run a surplus in order to be able to cope with accidents or 'commercial losses'. Moreover, 'it is right that a portion of his expenditure should go towards his capital (*ra's al-māl*)' (§33). He explains what he means by using an analogy of bodily growth, which recalls the 'commercial anthropology'. The man who is adding to his capital is, he says, like a body which is 'developing and growing'. Spending at the level of income is like a body 'whose growth has stopped'. Spending beyond income is like an ancient body which is in decay. He so likes the analogy that he immediately rephrases it and concludes by emphasizing that, just as the ancient body is 'close to death, in the same way capital (*al-māl*) will quickly be exhausted when more is taken from it than added to it' (§35).

Bryson intends us to understand by this commercial outlays which bring in money through the profits made (cf. explicitly the need to avoid 'commercial losses', *waḍīʿa*). It must be stressed again that his 'preservation' is *not* static, and the following specific pieces of advice (§§36–9) make this plain. First, do not bite off more than you can chew. Here Bryson addresses the risks of 'the man who invests his money' (*yashghal mālahu*, literally 'busies' or 'occupies' his money) in a 'landed estate' (*ḍayʿa*, Greek *chōrion*, *agros*, 'farm'). The potential problems are (i) inability to develop it,[196] (ii) the difficulty of finding staff to run it, and (iii) overexpenditure on its livestock. Bryson again uses an analogy with the body to explain what he means. Food which the 'greedy' man has eaten but which his body cannot

[196] Cf. Qusṭā ibn Lūqā at Chapter 1, p. 80.

use will be expelled, but (he warns) the process of elimination often results in the inadvertent expulsion of useful substances. The risk is both a loss of 'profit' (*ribḥ*) and a loss of capital, a common enough situation. Thus at 11.28 of *On Agriculture* Columella notes that the most important characteristic of the slave farm manager (*vilicus*) is awareness of what he does not know: 'although knowledge is of great benefit, it must be said that ignorance and negligence do more harm, particularly in agriculture . . . For though the ignorance and negligence behind a failure can sometimes be put right, the master's property has already been consumed and will not immediately yield a surplus sufficient to make good the damage of the lost capital (*caput*) or repair the profits (*quaestus*).'

Next (§38), do not invest (same word as above) in products that are slow to move owing to poor 'demand' (*ṭilāb*). Here consumer satisfaction governs the market, and the word used for 'demand' is a strong term mapping onto something like Greek *zētein*. As examples Bryson uses jewels for royals and academic books. His estate-owner should not go in for niche markets, however much they are worth (for the high cost of books, cf. e.g. Bagnall 2009 ch. 3). Finally, he should sell his 'merchandise' quickly but be slow to sell his real estate 'even if his profit from the former is small while his profit from the latter is large' (§39). The word for 'merchandise' (*tijāra*) corresponds to Greek *emporia*, Latin *mercatura* (cf. Ullmann 2006 *s.v.* ἔμπορος).

The final part of section one concerns expenditure (§§40–54). As with acquisition, Bryson concentrates on things one should not do; at the same time, social obligations are emphasized. He begins with a list of five 'failings' concerning money including finally, and most importantly, 'bad management' – we might say, incompetence. There is none of the overt moralism of a work like Plutarch's *Love of Wealth*. Plutarch's *philoploutia*, *philarguria*, *pleonexia*, etc., are private and public issues, and men are driven on by 'ambition, boastfulness, vainglory' (525d), but are also stingy enough to keep their sons on a tight rein financially 'and close them up and sew them together like a purse' (526d), and in general they indulge their need of luxuries by misusing their wealth which they are ever obliged to flaunt (527b–528b). 'Such is the happiness wealth possesses.' This moral watchdog decks out his outrage with copious quotations from the poets and the philosophers and plays to all his audience's prejudices. Plutarch owes little in vocabulary to Aristotle's dissection of the virtues and vices of money-getting and spending at *Ethics* 4.1–2 (cf. 2.7.4–6). With Bryson, it is difficult to be sure about sources of influence, given that we lack the Greek. 'Sordidness, meanness, profligacy,

extravagance, and bad management' are appropriate English translations of the Arabic terms. 'Bad management' (?κακῶς οἰκονομεῖν) is not an Aristotelian concept.[197] But Bryson does owe something to Aristotle's stress on the concern of the 'liberal' (or 'generous'; *eleutherios*[198]) man to give and take appropriately. He 'will give because of the Good (*to kalon*), and (he will give) correctly: to the right people, the right amounts, on the right occasions; and other criteria in accordance with correct giving' (1120a24–6). Although Bryson's owner is perhaps not *eleutherios* (which is properly Arabic *sakhīy*, as for example in the translation of the *Ethics*), he is 'free' (*ḥurr*, *eleutheros*) at the end of this section (§54), and he is distinguished for his *sakhā'* in §52.[199] Crucially Bryson's owner must know 'the Good' (§§41, 46, 51). Armed with this knowledge, he will be responsible for the welfare of the many people in his 'big house',[200] and it is his responsibilities that Bryson highlights more than his pleasures. (His productive spending has been dealt with under 'preservation'.) Relatives, friends, clients,[201] the needy, the welfare of his family, 'his poor and his beggars' – these are not private in the modern sense of the word, but represent a 'private' outlook in their attachment to the estate's owner and his wealth; and though there is a reference to life outside the home in the injunction to the owner not to overstep 'the expectations

[197] But cf. 'good management' (*tadbīr* = *oikonomein*) as a subdivision of *'iffa* (*sōphrosūnē*) in a late-antique Peripatetic handbook of ethics surviving in Arabic, Lyons 1960–1: 51. Cf. Chapter 6, p. 393.

[198] I follow Ross (reprinted in the *World's Classics* series 2009) in preferring the translation 'liberal' in order to keep the link with *eleutheros*, 'free'.

[199] In the book of commentary (Ullman 2011–12: 67–71), which was transmitted into Arabic as Book 7 of the *Ethics* (leaving the remaining Greek books as 8–11), the liberal man is in fact 'the man of *ḥurrīya* (freedom)'; cf. Lyons 1960–61: 38 for the same translation in the treatise mentioned in n. 197.

[200] I refer to Ariès' idea of "la grande maison" in early modern France (1960: 441–51) with its extended family, children, servants, friends, and acquaintances, the house 'where nobody could be alone'. The concept (Wallace-Hadrill 1994: 91) is important in the Neopythagorean oeconomica, cf. Wilhelm (1915) 171 on Callicratidas' *On the Happiness of the Estate* 104.13–24 Thesleff (Stobaeus 4.28. 16, p. 683 Hense), where the people of the *oikos* are the master's blood relatives, in-laws, and a 'host of friends', Perictione 144.25–145.2 Thesleff (Stobaeus 4.28.19, p. 693 Hense) 'children, relatives, slaves, and the whole house containing possessions, friends, fellow-citizens, and strangers'. See Chapter 5, pp. 300, 344, 354 on the Neopythagorean material in the *Book of Happiness*.

[201] Literally: 'those who enjoy protection/veneration (*hurma*)'. It is difficult to be sure exactly what this phrase (also in §53 'relations, friends, and clients') may mean otherwise. The normal word for 'clients' is *mawālī* (a word with particular political–religious senses in Islam). Lane 1 1863–93: 555 *s.v. hurma* lists senses equivalent to *dhimma*, 'covenant', meaning '*such as renders one responsible for the safety, or safe-keeping of a person or thing*', hence 'wives', 'family', and those a man 'protects, or defends'. In Bryson people who enjoy *hurma* with the lord of the estate are clearly a class of dependents but apparently different from those within the *familia* (the *'iyāl*, those supported or provided for, translated as 'family' at §§42 and 53), and in the Roman context 'client' is probably right.

of his class in regard to his food or the clothing he might wear due to a desire to show off' through his extravagance (§44, cf. §51),[202] this notable is not concerned with the public world of benefactions for public buildings and festivals such as we see commemorated by so many statues and inscriptions detailing honorands' accomplishments. This is quite different from Plutarch's big spenders in *Love of Wealth* or Aristotle's *megaloprepēs*, the 'magnificent' or 'munificent' man, whose 'big' public spending (*mega* being the operative word, Aristotle says) is what earns him public glory, leaving the 'liberal' man to an essentially private world of generosity.[203] Bryson's fourth section focusses on the private world of the son's upbringing too – and not just for the reason that he is speaking of a young man, for he makes it clear that the advice is for adults as well. We are so trained to think of civic display as the defining characteristic of the elites of the High Roman Empire that we sometimes forget the world of the notable consulting with himself 'in his counting house', as Clement of Alexandria puts it. Clement understood all this well and informs us of the private life of the urban rich better than many of our authors because Christianity was necessarily wary of the public gaze. This is evident in the *Paedagogus*, where the advice on conduct concerns the world of family and neighbours, not the civic–political structures of the *polis*. In the *Stromateis* Clement advises the wealthy man who is reflecting in his *tameion* that 'your management (*oikonomia*) should not focus only on your estate, but on your soul too. What should you apportion to it? How? How much? What should you reserve and put away in its treasury? When should you get it out, and for whom? For people do not become gentlemen (*kaloi kagathoi*[204]) naturally: they do so by studying, just like doctors and pilots' (1.6.34.1). The financial imagery applied to the soul is striking, and convenient. This was Bryson's owner, reflecting on managing himself and his dependents. If he got it wrong and was a bad manager, like 'the old rich familes' of Tacitus who were 'ruined *studio magnificentiae*' (*Annals* 3.55.1), he would be 'undone because he understands neither the amounts of expenditure nor the occasions for it' (§50).

[202] 'show off': the word *mubāhāh* carries a strong sense of competing over status or personal finery; *badhakh*, 'extravagance', which is the cause of this *mubāhāh*, has connotations of arrogance and boasting. For 'in regard . . . wear', see Chapter 2, p. 131.

[203] *Ethics* 4.2; Aristotle starts by telling us that the man does it all for the Good, but soon gets carried away with the heights of the man's ambition and honour, clearly enjoying his description and emphasizing that anyone who is *penēs* need not apply (4.2.13).

[204] The traditional translation of a highly charged term, grounded in Athenocentric ideology, that appealed to Clement. Pollux indicates a strong association with intelligence and learning (4.10,11), which it carried from the start (Bourriot 1995) and which suited Clement well.

At §§51–4 Bryson summarizes: balanced apportioning of expenditure, correct timing, the positive qualities of the man who knows all of this and responds to the Good. For Aristotle the *eleutherios* loses out because he gives too much away (*Ethics* 4.1.18). Unsurprisingly Bryson's owner is careful to support both himself and his family (§53). He 'saves' (in the sense of 'stores away') for a rainy day. This is not the circuit M–C–M of §33, for Bryson is now in a quite different register, stressing limits, transgression, and a list of desirable qualities which are private–public: 'noble-mindedness, liberality, affluence, beneficence, moderation, freedom, and excellence in his conduct and manner of life'. There is, however, no sign of the world of the city. This whole section concerning wealth, which runs on uninterruptedly from the 'commercial anthropology', connects the *oikos* with the external facts of trade, money, and commercial gain; but there is nothing on civic life or economy. Throughout there runs the theme of constant natural inflow and outflow affecting the human body, whose growth is a metaphor for the expansion or loss of capital. Bryson's owner is aware of the 'ravenous hunger for acquisition' that bedevilled the lives of Finley's 'upper strata' inhibited by their landed wealth (*The Ancient Economy* 56). He too has his farms but, contrary to Finley, expects to invest in them in a way (it is implied) that might damage his capital if he gets his investment wrong (§§36–7). He is also a merchant. With his merchant hat on he depends heavily on the trust of his fellows and on those in other lines of work. He respects the interconnectedness of all economic activity. He makes his money by observing what people want and selling his goods at the right time. He knows what he can handle, and is prepared for loss. His duties and obligations are fulfilled by timeliness, appropriate spending, and managerial efficiency. We should not think of this owner as too moral or philosophical. His concern is not to transgress the social rules. He is presented as normal in relation to his peers. This normality does not encompass civic–political society as we understand it, for the city is a place of trade, not politics. Politically, the Roman empire has passed Bryson's owner by. But his commercial instincts depend on its trading space and monetization of exchange.

9 ECONOMICS AND POLITICS: BRYSON'S INFLUENCE ON ISLAMIC AUTHORS

Hellenistic philosophy divided into dialectic/logic, and practical and theoretical philosophy. The last comprised physics, geometry, mathematics. 'Of practical philosophy, one part is concerned with the care of morals, another with the management of the *oikos*, another with the *polis* and its

preservation. Of these the first is called ethics, the second *oikonomikon*, and the third politics' (Alcinous, *Handbook of Platonism* 3.3, trans. Dillon, adapted). As Dillon points out in his commentary on this textbook of the first or second century AD, 'management' here is *prostasia* in the meaning it bore in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. I suspect that its classical sense of 'leadership' is still present, and that a combination of 'strategy' (if one may use such a modern term) and managerial competence is envisaged for *oikonomikon*; this at any rate is what we see in Bryson. But we need to stand back from scholastic divisions of knowledge. I have already noted that Bryson elides the city. Only a philosopher would say that this is due to his being constrained by the schools' understanding of what was entailed by the 'practical' management of the household. By writing in Doric Bryson put himself in the Pythagorean tradition, but he never mentions philosophy and does not present himself as a philosopher. (Contrast Alcinous, who begins with a rousing laudation of philosophy and philosophers, preaching to the converted.) If the *polis* is elided, that is Bryson's choice, not intellectual constraint. In 'anthropologies' humans foregather for various reasons but, when they do, they select a leader, a monarch, to give them laws with the help of the deity. Bryson chooses to 'commercialize' the tradition, as we have seen, and to limit the city's role. Yet the use of the anthropology subgenre sets readers on the lookout for government. And Bryson does not disappoint: he assumes the *oikos* is a place of authority (§82 *ri'āsa*, *archē*) and political rule (§§96, 97 *siyāsa*, *politikē* or some such term), and the idea of leadership in combination with administrative competence is implicit or explicit throughout his book. In the oeconomic tradition one sort of *oikonomia* is after all defined as 'political' (Ps.-Aristotle, *Oikonomika 1*, 1346a5). As we have seen, both Philodemus and Xenophon assume that money made on the estate may be used for civic–political purposes, i.e. for the good of the community and the advantage of the donor.

It is no surprise, then, that later authors who used Bryson could include his material either in an economic or in a political framework. In this section I am not going to embark on a comprehensive reception history of Bryson, which is beyond me. Plessner did much of the groundwork for such a history but in a somewhat schematic manner; and he did not have space for more than essentially philological comparisons. My aim is the more modest one of looking at a handful of texts which will help us see how Bryson, and specifically his first section on money, was interpreted by his ancient and medieval readers, including some important ones unknown to Plessner. There is no doubt that a full investigation would show many further readers.

I have already mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2 and in Section 7 of the present chapter that Bryson's commercial anthropology was very probably used in Themistius' *Letter on Government*. The *Letter* is a mirror of princes, and it seems that Themistius built on a revival of the genre in the fourth century.[205] Naturally he set his work within a theoretical framework, and it is in this regard that he was inspired by Bryson, for, as we have seen, he starts with the idea of natural faculties in the body and the body's need of regular replenishment to make up for the continual breakdown and dissolution caused by the effects of the qualities (see above, p. 231). The similarities in the opening sections of Bryson and Themistius' letter were recognized by the first author I wish to consider here, Qudāma Ibn Jaʿfar. Qudāma is the first person we know of to use Bryson in Arabic translation and he did it in a most interesting way. He came from a family of high administrators in the ʿAbbasid regime. Unfortunately there is confusion about the details of his life in the biographical sources; Hiyari (1983) simplifies a complex picture, but Bonebakker (1986) makes it too complex. What is clear is that he was a commentator on Aristotle and an accomplished scholar of literature and wrote not only the great *Book of Taxation*, which I am concerned with now, but also the extant *Criticism of Poetry*. The Secretaries of the caliphs were technocrats and intellectuals; both sorts of knowledge went together as naturally as they could do in antiquity, but the production of books of *adab* (*paideia*) specifically for the secretary class entrenched the expectations of cultural achievement and mannered performance. In 320/932 (or four years earlier) it is attested that Qudāma showed the 'Good Vizier' Alī ibn ʿĪsā that part of the *Book of Taxation* dealing with poetry, and the Vizier's comments are preserved by the belletrist, Tawḥīdī. The *Book of Taxation and the Craft of the Secretaries* is a comprehensive work, of which virtually all of the second half survives while the first is known from various references. It was clearly very different from previous treatments of the *kharāj* tax (cf. Chapter 1, p. 56). Qudāma did something original: he put literature, historiography, and social thought into the package, and the eighth and final book, *On Government*, is a broadly conceived mirror (cf. Rosenthal 1968: 115–17). He was able to innovate by taking advantage of two recent translations from Greek which allowed him to amplify the traditional Persian material on courtly behaviour (such as the standard work of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ). These were Themistius and Bryson.

The Greek theoretical material forms a block at the start of *On Government* after a first chapter concerning God's creation of the world and the provision

[205] O'Meara and Schamp 2006.

in men of a share of the angels' *tamyīz*, the power of discrimination and an idiomatic way in Arabic, with Koranic backing, of expressing Greek *logos* (cf. Chapter 2, p. 112). The Greek material in chs. 2–7 uses Themistius and Bryson in tandem, with clear attempts to mediate between their different accents. Thus in ch. 2 Qudāma has both the Themistian four elements and Bryson's heat and moisture at work as the agents which necessitate constant replenishment in the body; the Bryson comes from both the 'commercial anthropology' and the passage in section three on the formation of the child through the input of the hot male and the moist female. The requirements for clothing, for procreation, and social living follow (chs. 3, 4, and 5). In ch. 5 we find the Brysonian material on the craftsmen's need of one another. Qudāma develops the argument by considering in detail the case of the farmer who has to spend so much time on his own work that he could not possibly learn medicine. In ch. 6 the material is from Bryson alone on the innovation of coinage and exchange. The argumentation is very similar, but, if anything, there is more of a stress on the exchange value of services. This chapter is pivotal because here, immediately before Qudāma begins his treatment of the figure of the monarch, his Islamic society reaches its full development in *economic* association according to the model set out by Bryson. The *Book of Government* is 'the earliest known version of an Islamic theory of state adapted from the Greco-Hellenistic tradition' (Heck 2002: 201). Hellenistic elements in later chapters include gnomological traditions, the Ps.-Aristotle *Secret of Secrets* (*Book of Government on the Management of Leading*), and letters to Alexander, which have a long history in Arabic and other literatures.[206] Political advice in Greek mode was not totally new; but the economic framework of Bryson (who is not mentioned in Heck's study of Qudāma) and Themistius' advice (itself influenced partly by Bryson) most certainly was. One important thing remains to be said. We are not dealing in the *Book of Government* with 'philosophy' or 'moral' thought: Qudāma was an influential figure and what he wrote about how to conduct politics was serious stuff for serious people.

Before turning to the final two works I shall consider, the manual of trade of Dimashqī and the *Muqaddima* of Ibn Khaldūn, I want to examine three shorter texts. First is an interesting discussion of money and labour

[206] See the amazing study of Manzalaoui 1974, also Grignaschi 1982. The citation of the *Secret of Secrets* (*Sirr al-asrār*) is of importance because it is still being suggested that the first author to use it was the physician-biographer Ibn Juljul in the later tenth century (R. Forster 2006: 31–2). As Forster rightly remarks, shared material is no guarantee that the *Sirr* is the source of a passage (whereas Ibn Juljul gives the title); but Qudāma pp. 84–5 Ḥiyārī takes a whole page from the Long Form of the *Sirr* (pp. 75–76 in the edition of Badawī; cf. Manzalaoui 1974: 212–13) almost verbatim.

in the philosopher–historian Miskawayh (*c.* 932–1030[207]), a passage which, like the Qudāma, was unknown to Plessner. Second is the pseudo-Fārābian *Treatise on Government*, which was also not used by Plessner. Thirdly I shall look at Bryson in two of the letters of the Brethren of Purity.

Question 161 of Miskawayh's belletristic *Roaming Questions and Comprehensive Answers*, which was written with Tawḥīdī, is a discussion of the origin of coined money.[208] Miskawayh of course knew his Bryson well, since he lightly rewrites a large chunk of the fourth section on the child in his *Refinement of Morals* and was influenced also by Bryson's wife (Chapter 5, Section 7). He was aware of Aristotle's account of exchange in the *Ethics*, which he mentions in Book 4 of the *Refinement* in the context of his own discussion of justice. And it seems he know his Qudāma too. Question 161 focusses on the reasons for gold and silver coinage (cf. p. 235 n. 185, Essid 1995: 197) and goes through the Brysonian scheme of man's need to live communally, to develop means of feeding and clothing himself, and to found cities, all of which is introductory to the workings of exchange and the problem of simultaneous need by those exchanging. A 'regulator' (*qayyim*) was invented, i.e. coined money. But instead of a stress on its use in equating quantities of oil and wheat and such products, as in Bryson, Qudāma, and others, Miskawayh emphasizes work (*ʿamal*),[209] labour (*kadd*), and jobs (*mihan*). Coinage had to be made of material people could have faith in – a familiar point – and with appropriate symbols on it in order to prevent fraud, which took the form of 'making a profit from someone's work and not profiting him'. The consequence of fraud is the cessation of 'mutual assistance. . .and the failure of society and communal living', in other words the end of Aristotelian *koinōnia* which is upheld by fair exchange (*Ethics* 1133a24, above p. 192). Miskawayh's point may be 'pre-scientific' and not economic; but that does not detract from its importance both in developing Bryson and Aristotle and foregrounding the labour behind exchange value, and by upholding fair practice as a basis of community.

The Ps.-Fārābian *Treatise on Government* (ed. Cheikho 1911a) deserves a mention, for its ideas of pursuing gain by just means and from just sources have something Brysonian about them. The treatise is interesting for its advice on dealing with different groups within society – 'leaders', 'peers', 'inferiors' – all of whom are dependent on the king and upon knowledge of the Creator and his prophets (chs 1–4). In the fifth section on governing

[207] Arkoun 1982, Fakhry 1991: ch. 6, Kraemer 1993: ch. 3.
[208] Text in Amīn and Saqr 1951: 346–9.
[209] Cf. already Qudāma cited at p. 439, n.56.

oneself comes advice on balancing income and outgoings. The context of such control is the preservation of one's rank and one's *murūʾa*, 'personal honour and dignity'. This is suitably general and obviously ethical. But the remarks about avoiding 'vile sorts of commerce' (*al-tijārāt al-khasīsa*) and keeping to the 'balance/mean appropriate to one's class (*ṭabaqa*)' (pp. 19–20 Cheikho) may just show acquaintance with Bryson (cf. §§ 44 'expectations of his class', 51 'the normal behaviour of his class').

The *Letters* of the Brethren of Purity are 51 (or 52) treatises which form a famous encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences with a strong emphasis on mathematics. These authors are identified in contemporary sources as a group of wealthy men who met in secret in the Iraqi cities of Basra and Baghdad around the 970s AD. Perhaps the best known epistle is the didactic fable of the animals *versus* man in the court of the Jinn (no. 22).[210] Most interpreters consider the Brethren to be Ismāʿīlī sympathizers who were active at a time when the Ismāʿīlī Fatimid dynasty was in the ascendant but was not in control of the areas where the Brethren lived (hence their desire for anonymity).[211] I must say no more on the background here except to note that there is a strong Pythagorean element in the *Letters*. In fact citations of Pythagoras and Pythagoreans by name are matched only by citations of Hermes Trismegistus (Baffioni 1994: 37). Sectarianism in medieval Islam is deeply political, since it is wrapped up with questions about the nature and powers of God's 'successor' (the *khalīfa*). The Shīʿite Fatimids held views on this that were radically different from the ʿAbbasids. Although the Brethren themselves were not 'sectarian' and are hardly political in any overt sense, they did touch on political matters (Crone 2004: 205, 327–8), and it was thus a good idea to publish their thoughts as a group. It has been argued that their Ismāʿīlī sympathies led them to be more sympathetic to ordinary folk. This attitude is ascribed to Ismāʿīlīs by their opponents, and may be simple abuse. Nevertheless, one of the two contexts in which Bryson is used is indeed a sympathetic and comprehensive account of the trades of Medieval Islam which constitutes a 'pioneer statement of the nobility of labour' (Lewis 1943: 151). This is the eighth epistle on the 'practical crafts', and Bernard Lewis' study of it presents the main argument in a convenient tabular form. The third main division on the 'ranks (*marātib*) of the crafts' (pp. 1: 216–18 ed. Ziriklī) clearly owes much to Bryson §§7–8, 12–13, but is expressed in a Neoplatonic hierarchical form. Here the crafts are linked

[210] Goodman and McGregor (2010). For general guidance see the summaries in Bausani (1978), G. de Callataÿ's helpful introduction (2006), and the essays collected in El-Bizri (2008).

[211] Netton 2002 in contrast emphasizes the Neoplatonic aspects of their thought.

vertically, with three primary areas (farming, weaving, building) which have successive 'ancillary' crafts attached to them in order to 'complete' them. The fourth main division, on the 'nobility' of the crafts and the need of even the lowliest is of great interest to any social historian, and in spirit chimes with Bryson. Also from the 'commercial anthropology' comes the second reference to Bryson in the Brethren. This is the second letter on 'geometry'. After treating lines, surfaces, and bodies, the authors comment on the practical application of geometry and the problems encountered by those who lack knowledge of it. This leads to an excursus on the desirability of social cooperation (p. 1: 62 ed. Ziriklī). An individual cannot acquire all of the crafts 'because life is short and the crafts are many'. Humans found towns and villages and 'establish conventions for measuring, weighing, and pricing'. There are verbal parallels here with Bryson §§10, 14, and 21. I have already noted (Chapter 2, p. 136) that the Pythagorean context (geometry) is not a reason for the use of Bryson since there is no indication that he was known to have been part of what the Brethren and others call the 'Pythagorean sect'.

The eleventh century marked the height of Fatimid power and the economic historian Claude Cahen suggested plausibly that this was the context for Abū l-Faḍl Jaʿfar b. ʿAlī l–Dimashqī's *Book of Advice on the Advantages of Commerce, the Knowledge of Good and Bad Merchandise, and the Deceptions of Fraudulent Traders*.[212] The *mudallisūn*, people who trick buyers with goods which do not live up to their descriptions, greatly exercised the medieval Muslim mind. A thirteenth-century Syrian author named Jawbarī wrote a lengthy catalogue of all types of fraudsters from religion to science to businessmen, doctors, pederasts, and others (Lewis 1977: 13–14, Höglmeier 2006). The *mudallisūn* are not Dimashqī's only problem. His merchant faces shoddy goods or goods that break in transit or unpredicted changes in price or taxes or tyrannical actions by the authorities, all of which cause him stress as he goes about his business making money and increasing his 'capital'. Dimashqī's book is not in fact a practical record of his or others' trading activities. For the most part it operates at the general level of advice, useful but non-specific, addressing various common factors in the merchant's life. The centrepiece is a long list of products, stuffs, minerals, foods, property, slaves, and livestock under the rubric of investigating their

[212] Cahen 1962. Ritter (1917) was the first to bring the work to western attention. His idiomatic, sometimes free, translation is based on the Cairo edition of 1900. Wiedemann (1911–22) translated parts of the long description of wares which Ritter left out: see Ritter 1917: 16 III– 26. There is a Beirut edition of 1983 edited by F. Saʿd; and a Cairo edition of 1977 edited by al-Bishrī al-Shurbajī, which I cite in the notes to the text and translation of Bryson (Part V). A French translation of Dimashqī has apparently been published in Tunisia: Essid and Seddik 2009 (*non vidi*).

good and bad qualities. This recalls a ninth-century work included in the corpus of Jāḥiẓ entitled *A Clear Look at Trade* (Pellat 1954), which focusses on precious stones and jewels, essences, materials, and imports from around the world. But *Advantages of Commerce* is much longer and quite different in tone. Dimashqī flexes his literary muscles where he can, adding poetry and prose (the famous mirror *Kalīla wa-Dimna*), *sententiae*, and of course the views of 'the ancients' (*al-awā'il*). Thus Bryson's analogy of the growing body and the successful estate (§34) is used in the most belletristic part of the work, the last section (p. 89 trans. Ritter). Here the author condemns waste by constructing a literary anthology to illustrate good practice and good fortune. It is this section, together with the occasional remark in flattery of the great, that shows Dimashqī's aspiration to be taken seriously.

For the most part Dimashqī's use of Bryson stays close to Bryson Arabus as we have it and to such an extent that Plessner felt free to use him to correct Cheikho's hastily copied text. Dimashqī uses Bryson more or less verbatim in his third chapter (pp. 47–50 trans. Ritter) 'on man's need of *māl*', which takes over much of §§8–22 from the 'commercial anthropology'.[213] He did not find anything in Bryson on 'acquisition', for Bryson of course tells his owner how not to go about making money. But he follows him reasonably closely on 'preservation' ('the preservation of property requires five considerations'; pp. 75–7 Ritter) and 'expenditure' ('regarding expenditure of wealth one must be aware of five aspects'; pp. 77–9 Ritter). When he refers to 'the ancients', on both occasions (pp. 49, 89 Ritter) he means Bryson. Since Bryson was the standard book of *oikonomika* in the Islamic middle ages, at least some of Dimashqī's readers will have known who he was drawing on. His use confirms the status of Bryson, but does not detract from his own originality. Anyone who reads *Advantages of Commerce* will see the elevation of the *tājir*, the grand merchant, to the world of high culture,[214] supported by a naturalized Greek source, Arabic poetry, prose, and Islamic reflexes, the latter being not simply 'une habitude mécanique de citations tirée de son éducation', but also (as Cahen puts it) 'peut-être le souci . . . d'être en accord avec Dieu'. Ultimately in any society the making of a large amount of money, especially in combination with *adab–paideia*, leads to acceptance, and if piety can be added to the equation, so much the better. Consideration of advice to traders in a genuinely religious context, such as Ghazālī's *Revival of the Religious Sciences* (Book 13) or *Chemistry of Happiness*, shows us the

[213] To which he certainly added a dash of Qudāma when Bryson was not forthcoming: cf. Dimashqī p. 23.18–19 quoting Qudāma p. 46.12–13 on the purpose of symbols and designs on coins.

[214] Cahen compares Goitein's study of the 'rise' of the 'bourgeoisie'; on this cf. Chapter 1, p. 84.

restriction of religion in Dimashqī (pp. 31–44 Ritter).[215] This secular text is one that thinks big: Dimashqī has no interest in the *oikos* or its people. His focus is on wholesale trading and in this regard he shows us Bryson's adaptability. Bryson's elision of the city suited him as well as it had Themistius.

The *Muqaddima* or *Introduction* of Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406) is a vast work of the highest intellectual quality and the few words I propose to say about it here are hardly adequate. Nevertheless, in terms of social–economic history which stands in the tradition of Bryson, however distantly, the *Muqaddima* must be mentioned. There are no verbal links with Bryson's book, and for this reason it fell outside Plessner's interests. But the legacy of Bryson's 'commercial anthropology' and his insistence on the interconnectedness of economic activity can be seen in Ibn Khaldūn's presentation, which is admittedly far beyond Bryson's scope or ability. Ibn Khaldūn was interested in structures. 'I comment on civilization, urbanization, and on the essential characteristics of human social organization' (1 Foreword = vol. 1, 11).[216] He justly claimed he had invented a new 'science' with 'its own peculiar object – that is, human civilization and social organization . . . [and] its own peculiar problems –that is, explaining the conditions that attach themselves to the essence of civilization' (1 Preliminary Remarks = vol. 1, 77). Economic structures are an integral part of his explanation alongside other factors. His theory of the rise and fall of 'dynasties' (*duwal*, sg. *dawla*, which is not far from its modern sense of 'state', 'regime') postulates an economic–moral cycle in which prosperity inevitably leads to excessive luxury and where the governing class quickly loses energy and resorts to increasing taxation (*jibāya*). This in turn depresses the economy – for his taxes and trade model is the opposite of Hopkins' – and stifles 'enterprise' (*iʿtimār*[217]) (3.36, 40 = vol. 11, 89–91, 102–3). Ibn Khaldūn sees the state as the 'greatest market' and theorizes that, following a fall in public expenditure, 'business slumps and commercial profits decline', and tax revenue then falls too 'because the land tax and taxation (in general) depend on enterprise, commercial activities, business prosperity, and people's demand for gain and profit'. The constant movement of money between state and subject is what keeps the system going (3.40 = vol. 11, 103), and, when this slows, 'the incen-

[215] Lambton 1962: 123–6.

[216] Translations (adapted as necessary) are taken from F. Rosenthal (1958), to which book–section and volume–page references refer. His translation is available online at www.muslimphilosophy.com/ik/Muqaddimah/. NB the online version does not preserve Rosenthal's page numbering. For the Arabic I have used the text at www.muslimphilosophy.com/#people (scroll down to Ibn Khaldūn).

[217] Rosenthal takes this technical term as 'cultural activity', but this does not seem correct. Cf. dictionary definitions of 'proposing business' (on the basis of the Arabic lexicons: Lane 1863–93: *s.v.* اعتمر, Freytag 1830–9: *s.v.* معتمر).

tive for enterprise is gone. It is the dynasty that suffers from this situation, because profits from enterprise return to it' (3.36 = vol. II, 91). The downward cycle becomes worse and worse 'until (the dynasty) disintegrates' (3.37 = vol. II, 92). Any attempt by the central power to monopolize markets and shore up prices with big players is itself doomed to failure: the only remedy is to aim at exemption from taxes and dues (3.38 = vol. II, 93–6).

Ibn Khaldūn also focusses on the relationship between the health of the regime and the costs of goods, labour/crafts (meaning as ever manual, professional, and intellectual occupations), and land, and he lays stress on the key role of 'capitalists' (*al-mutamawwilūn*; 4.12–16 = vol. II, 276–86). Much of the fifth book is in fact devoted to crafts and production. Here he emphasizes that 'gains and profits, in their entirety or for the most part, are value realized from human labour'. The Brysonian idea of interlinked crafts appears in a reduced form: 'in some cases crafts are associated with other (crafts). Carpentry and weaving, for instance, are associated with wood and yarn (production). However, in the (first) two crafts the labour is greater and value of it is greater' (5.1 = vol. II, 313–14). Ibn Khaldūn focusses on the human work behind all production and profit (like Miskawayh, p. 250; cf. Banaji 2007b: 58) rather than the interconnectedness of the parts of the economy; but there is no doubt that he thinks in terms of a single system. His idea that people master one craft only also recalls Bryson for us, but is presented in a quite different manner. Bryson puts this down to a lack of time. Ibn Khaldūn's reason is that one gets into a certain frame (or 'colouring') of mind and it is then difficult to learn something else (5.21 = vol. II, 354).

In his 'Economic Thought of Islam: Ibn Khaldūn' (1964) Joseph Spengler observed the 'very considerable pool of economic knowledge or wisdom' which someone like Ibn Khaldūn was able to draw on including of course his own political and administrative experiences (for which see e.g. F. Rosenthal 1958: I, xxix–lxvii, Fromherz 2010: ch. 1). His presentation is empirical and wholly positivistic (with a particular emphasis on getting to the facts). There is no economic analysis in modern terms. But, then again, he is far from simply descriptive. Rather he is the first author to give economic factors an explanatory role in the state's political and social life. When he denies there were predecessors in his new science, we may believe him. But nothing comes from nothing. As Spengler noted sensibly, Bryson's legacy has some (limited) input in the development of the science. Ibn Khaldūn states that he is not writing politics or oeconomics (*tadbīr al-manzil*) (1 Preliminary Remarks = vol. I, 78). But he does praise the contribution of *tadbīr al-manzil* at the end of Book 5 (5.32 = vol. II, 406) in a passage which concerns the evolution of the intelligent society. The section is entitled 'the

crafts, especially writing and calculation, give intelligence to the person who practices them'. Ibn Khaldūn says here that, 'perfect sedentary culture (*al-ḥaḍāra*[218]) provides intelligence because it is a conglomerate of crafts associated with estate management,[219] contact with one's fellow men, and the attainment of education and culture[220] through mixing with them . . .' When he writes 'associated with *tadbīr al-manzil*', he refers to personal and familial finances, dealings, and prosperity (as Avicenna defines it in connection with Bryson (p. 83). These various aspects of civilization (to which he adds 'performance of religious matters') act as 'norms' which guarantee individual and collective intelligence. Ibn Khaldūn did not need anyone to tell him this: the presentation is his own in preparation for the very long final statement of the power and prestige of the intellectual 'crafts' which occupies Book 6. But if we are looking for influences, Bryson's identification of the crafts as the key to human society is surely one among them.

I shall not say anything here about the sophisticated mirror of princes by Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ, the *Conduct of the Ruler in the Management of Kingdoms*, which drew on Bryson verbatim in a number of passages (cf. Chapter 1, pp. 101–2), or the pre-eminent book of advice literature, Ṭūsī's *Nasirean Ethics*, both of the thirteenth century. This period saw a plethora of dynasties and an abundance of intellectuals to service their moral needs and respond to the final destruction of the ʿAbbasid caliphate by the Mongols in 1258 (cf. Lambton 1981: 138–51). Both texts use Bryson's economic thought, but they do so in an ethical–political mode where it sits alongside his advice on wives, children, and slaves. Ṭūsī will be considered at the end of Chapter 6 along with Avicenna's *Book of Government* and related material.

[218] The modern word for 'civilization'.
[219] مجتمعة من صنائع في شأن تدبير المنزل.
[220] Education and culture: *ādāb*.

CHAPTER 4

Slaves

1 BRYSON ON SLAVES

Bryson's second section on slaves (§§55–73) brings additional material to our knowledge of slave-owners' views of the use and treatment of slaves. He has things in common with Aristotle and with the Stoics (so far as their thought on slavery can be recovered), but his views must be considered his own and, though this section is fairly short, there are original perspectives. It is not my intention to begin this chapter with an introduction to the 'state of the question' regarding ancient slavery and modern approaches to it. The nature of ancient slavery is reasonably well known; whereas there is far less agreement, or rather plenty of disagreement, about the nature of the Roman economy. Given that Bryson is one of the very few authors of antiquity to have commented on economic matters, an introduction to modern approaches was justified. With regard to slavery there is no such controversy that needs responding to in the context of what Bryson offers. He extends our knowledge of what we already know, and that is worth having.[1] Nor shall I say anything in this chapter about the reception of Bryson's ideas in Medieval Islam, where slavery was extensive. Bryson on economics, the wife, and the child/son has important resonances in Islamic texts, and these are explored in Chapters 3, 5, and 6. His threefold division of slaves was repeated (Rosenthal 1960: 91 n.), and his forceful statement of the necessity of slavery no doubt indirectly assisted the case for it in Islamic authors, whose justifications were inevitably full of contradictions and based on 'foundations . . . so flimsy as to pose a constant threat to the viability' of the practice (Clarence-Smith 2006:

[1] For some of the political–ideological battles that have been fought in the past on the terrain of ancient slavery, see Finley 1980: ch. 1 on *inter alios* the Nazi sympathizer Joseph Vogt (to whom many of the volumes of *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* were later dedicated) and his battles with East German classicists after the War. I regret that I have been unable to take account of Bradley and Cartledge 2011.

47). Greek ideas do not seem to have been especially important to their arguments (*id*. ch. 2) or much needed.[2]

Among the oeconomic texts of antiquity it is Aristotle, Ps.-Aristotle, and Xenophon who discuss the slave within the household–estate. The Neopythagorean oeconomica, as excerpted by Stobaeus, have hardly anything to say on the subject. At the start of *Politics* 1.8 Aristotle states that the preceding discussion of slaves, who form part of the master's property (1.4), has led him to a discussion of money-making and its function within *oikonomikē*. Ps.-Aristotle *Oikonomika I* also puts the slave firmly within the estate's property (ch. 5). Bryson makes the same connection, but he puts property first. At the end of the section on the slave he describes what he has written as 'following what we said about property', just as at the beginning of section four on the child he says that 'the subject . . . follows that of the woman' (§104). The ordering is logical, not just sequential: the child has been prefigured all the way through section three, and the slave as property is implicit in the discussion of wealth in section one. This, then, is how slavery 'follows' money. But Bryson also differs from the Aristotelian tradition. There is good evidence for the Stoics' view that all humans shared in rationality and that slaves (at least in the positions taken by Seneca and Hierocles) deserved proper treatment as a result of this common humanity. Bryson mentions the idea of common species as clearly as Seneca, and he probably reflects similar discussions (though he also thought that some were born to be natural slaves). As with St Paul (1 Cor. 7:21, Col. 3:11, 22–5, Gal. 3:28, Philemon) and the authors of the Pastoral Letters,[3] it is quite possible to hold such a view as a theoretical perspective and at the same time to uphold the institution of slavery in the real world. With his stress on management (the Arabic root *d-b-r* occurs six times in this section, three of which will certainly correspond to Greek *oikonom-*[4]), Bryson lacks the romanticism of Seneca on the treatment of slaves, and what he says is the more palatable for it. As I have mentioned in the introduction, his material on good treatment is clearly connected with the owner's need to get good service out of his properly fed and rested slave workers.

[2] Lewis 1990 for attitudes, albeit somewhat one-sided. Bryson's influence can be discerned (without the three categories) in Avicenna's *Book of Government* (p. 256 ed. Shams al-Dīn) and in Ṭūsī's *Nasirean Ethics* (181–4 trans. Wickens). I say more about the general character of these books in relation to Bryson in Chapter 6. Ṭūsī does include the Brysonian categories, but follows Avicenna in thanking God for providing slave labour to assist us.

[3] See esp. Garnsey 1996: 173–88.

[4] §§58, 60, 61 on the estate; one might look for a different Greek term for the personal management of the slave (§57 *bis*, §69), but the idea is similar.

Section two starts with the reason for having slaves: just as cities need many people, estates need servants (§55). A cross-reference ('we have already explained') is given to §14 on the role of the city in the Brysonian economy. There is a strong implication that slaves are essential to the very concept of the estate – without them, it could not exist, as a city does not exist without a population. In saying this Bryson was recognizing a social fact which he had no intention of disturbing. What of economic need? The allusion to the origin of the city must recall the city's role as the space of exchange and craft work (for the city's political aspects are outside Bryson's interests, as I have noted). Given this, it looks as if the economic function of the estate is in his mind also; indeed, it could hardly not be.

Bryson starts the slavery section, like his others, with theoretical remarks. These concern types of slaves (§§55–60), for which the second Greek fragment from Stobaeus corresponds to §§56–7. There are three sorts:[5] (i) the slave 'by law' (Greek *nomos*)/'by (the institution of) servitude[6] . . . on whom the law has imposed slavery' (Arabic *riqq . . . sharīʿa . . . ʿubūdīya*); (ii) 'by the habits of (his) soul' (Greek *tropos tās psuchās*)/'by appetite' (Arabic *shahwa*); and (iii) 'by nature' (Greek *kata phusin*)/'by nature' (Arabic *ṭabʿ*). Friedrich Wilhelm found the origin of this threefold division in the Neopythagorean 'fondness for dividing by three' (1915: 165).[7] It is certainly true that the threefold division is not found elsewhere applying to slaves themselves. (Aristotle was clear about a twofold division, *Politics* 1255a4 *dichōs.*[8]) There is however a report at Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 7.121–2, that the Stoics identified three types of slavery. First was deprivation of the 'power to act autonomously (*autopragia*)', second the state of being 'in subjection to' another, third being 'in subjection to' and 'in the ownership of'. As I have pointed out above (Chapter 3, pp. 207–8), the second category does not apply to legal slavery, but reflects the usual disparagement of those who have to work for a living (and, for all we know, could have applied to any other subject status/relationship). The first category presumably also applies to some restriction of the 'power' of autonomous action, which this passage makes plain was the prerogative of the Stoic superman who was not subject to another *and* was able to demonstrate this by free action. This is very different from Bryson; but it might have influenced his thinking.

[5] Here I give the Greek, then the Arabic version.
[6] Ritter 1917: 13 suggests 'Der Sklave im eigentlichen Sinn des Wortes.'
[7] Cf. e.g. Ocellus 2.3 Harder = 20 Thesleff, Callicratidas 105.7 Thesleff (Stobaeus 4.28.16, p. 684 Hense), Phintys 152.26–153.3 (Stobaeus 4.23.61, p. 590 Hense).
[8] Cf. Ps.-Aristotle, *Oikonomika I* 1344a26 in a quite different sense: 'two sorts: foreman and worker'.

Bryson's categories are plain. The first is legal. The second and third appear to be subordinate to it logically (though the categories are presented paratactically), since he is speaking of actual slaves in all three cases. Within this the second refers specifically to moral slavery. This concept was developed by the Stoics, and was alive and kicking in Bryson's time – Philo's essay, *Every Excellent Man Is Free*, from the early to mid first century, is a classic restatement of it.[9] One of its principal, if unspoken, effects was to uphold the institution of slavery: for if the juridically enslaved person could still be 'free' (in the sense that s/he was morally good and not dominated by vice), juridical status did not matter; and it was only to be expected that the slave might be a morally bad person. The manoeuvre is well known and appealed to Early Christianity.[10] But Bryson does not deploy it to discuss the moral failings of his peers (as moral 'slaves'), as the Stoics did: his morally vicious person *is* a slave, and (as he goes on to say) he is the kind of slave one does not want to own when one finds him for sale.[11] Third is the Aristotelian category of the slave 'by nature', who 'possesses no virtue or vice in his soul' (Greek fragment)/'has no discernment in himself (between good and bad)' (Bryson Arabus).[12] His role is completely menial. He may be 'free'. Even so, it is best for him to have a master. Stoicism was always a broad church and it is clear that many Stoic thinkers had moved beyond the fairly automatic association between juridical slavery and natural inferiority (the Aristotelian position). But not all had. Notoriously, the leading second-century BC Stoic Posidonius reached back to Aristotle to describe the historical subjection of the tribe of the Mariandyni to the Greek city of Heraclea Pontica when it was founded in the mid sixth century. Posidonius introduced his account by saying that, 'many persons who are unable to govern themselves owing to the weakness of their intellect place themselves in the service of more intelligent people. They depend on them to take care of their basic necessities and in return render to them whatever services they are able to provide' (Athenaeus 263c = fr. 60 Edelstein-Kidd, fr. 147 Theiler). 'Weakness of intellect' is a Stoic slur and one which appealed to Posidonius.[13] Posidonius does not actually call the Mariandyni natural slaves, but he comes close to it. Bryson

[9] The first part of this work, *That Every Stupid Man Is a Slave*, is lost.

[10] Milani 1972: 185 rightly calls it 'una gigantesca opera di mimetizzazione di una voluntà sostanzialmente conservatrice, realizzata attraverso un'abile manovra dialettica di svuotamento e di «anetesia».' Cf. Garnsey 1996: 131–3.

[11] Cf. the Neopythagorean letter of 'Theano to Euboule' p. 166 Städele (p. 196 Thesleff) ἵνα μὴ τῶν παθῶν ᾖ δοῦλα.

[12] See Chapter 2, p. 112.

[13] Garnsey 1996: 147, 1997: 169 on the stupid man's *atonia*, 'flabbiness'.

(following Aristotle, *Politics* 1254b19–20, 1255a1–2) is quite happy to associate deficient intelligence with the need to be a slave.

The remains of Stoicism do not tell us how to identify the wise and the stupid. But Bryson knows exactly what to do in the case of the slave: one must 'inspect' before purchase. Buying and selling slaves had long been recognized as a complex matter. In the *Laws* (916a–c) Plato ordains penalties for slave-dealers (*dēmiourgoi*) who sell slaves suffering from mental or physical disorders which ordinary people would fail to notice. Purchasers were to have recourse to restitution before a panel of doctors. However, if the purchaser were a trainer (*gumnastēs*) or a doctor himself, he would have no cause to complain. In other words, those who dealt with bodies in a professional capacity could be expected to spot problems. Surprisingly there is no evidence from the Hellenistic period for books by doctors or trainers on how professionals or laypersons might avoid mistakes. The only attested work on this subject from antiquity is Rufus of Ephesus' *On the Purchase of Slaves*, which is lost in Greek. Rufus was active in the reign of Trajan and amongst his many works, mostly all lost, are treatises addressed to non-professionals on a variety of topics (Ilberg 1930, Sideras 1994, Swain 2008 for his date). *On the Purchase of Slaves* was one of these. There are just a few citations of the book by Arabic physicians (Ullmann 1970: 74; translation in Rosenthal 1975: 204). But it is very likely that a good deal of what Rufus wrote is to be found in the most famous and earliest of the several treatises on this topic written in Arabic. This is the *General Treatise on the Skills Useful for Purchasing and Examining Slaves* by Ibn Buṭlān, the eleventh-century Christian physician and theologian (Schacht 1979, Ghersetti 2001).[14] In his introduction Ibn Buṭlān says he has taken his material from 'the teacher of Alexander and other scientists[15] and philosophers' (p. 383 Hārūn), and at the start of ch. 1 he names his sources as 'physicians[16] and philosophers' (p. 385). These terms undoubtedly refer to Greek authors. Since Rufus is the only specialist treatment known to us from the ancient world, and since his work had been translated, he was surely a principal source in ch. 1 and also, but perhaps to a lesser degree, in ch. 2 where Ibn Buṭlān says he is following 'the method of the doctors' (p. 390). There is no doubt that the material has been entirely rewritten on the basis of Ibn Buṭlān's own experience and knowledge of the dealers (as he insists). Nevertheless, although there are many allusions to the

[14] *Risāla jāmiʿa li-funūn nāfiʿa fī shirā l-raqīq wa-taqlīb al-ʿabīd*. The term *shirā* might refer to buying or selling, but the contents of Ibn Buṭlān's book make it clear that the normal sense of purchase is the right translation (so also in Rufus' *Fī shirā l-mamālīk*).

[15] *ʿulamāʾ* – literally 'learned men', 'experts'.

[16] *ḥukamāʾ* – literally 'wise men', but often used to signify doctors and/or philosophers.

practices of the dealers (*andrapodokapēloi*, *mangones*, etc.) in ancient sources (Wallon 1879, 2: 51–66 remains the best account), it seems a good idea to offer a translation of the first two chapters of the *General Treatise* to make up for the loss of Rufus' own book and to offer an illustration of what Bryson means, and this can be found in the Appendix to this chapter.

I have suggested elsewhere (2008: 120–3) that there was probably a physiognomical aspect to Rufus' work on slaves (as there certainly was, for example, to his *On Melancholy*) – i.e. he explored the relationship between the slave's appearance and his all-important character. This was evidently on Bryson's mind: 'if [on inspection] he already combines slavery "by (the institution of) servitude" with slavery "by appetite", one must not proceed to purchase him nor expect to break him in, even if one is keen to' (§58), and he then associates the particular sorts of work for which one wants the slave with the particular mental and physical characteristics he will need to have (§60; cf. Columella 1.9.1 'quibus operibus quemque habitum corporis aut animi'). It was not long after Rufus that Antonius Polemon wrote the most important and most interesting manual of physiognomy known from antiquity (Swain 2007a). This also came into Arabic; but it was the tradition of the Ps.-Aristotelian *Physiognomy* in its Arabic version by Ḥunayn (Ghersetti 1999, Vogt 1999) that inspired the great physician Rhazes' medical–physiognomical appraisal of slaves in Book 2 of the *Liber ad Almansorem*, and it was this book that Ibn Buṭlān copied for ch. 3 of his own treatise (Ghersetti 2001: 28–9). Physiognomy in this domain was a tool for increasing the economic value of one's purchase. There is another aspect to it as well: race. Bryson advises on not buying slaves of one's own race (§71 *jins* < Greek *genos*). The association between race and physical/mental traits is an old one and is clearly articulated by Ps.-Aristotle and Polemon. Ibn Buṭlān devotes a separate chapter to slaves according to race, and it is already a factor in Avicenna's *Book of Government*.[17] When Bryson's estate-owner is told to 'inspect', all these aspects of the purchase would be of interest to him.

With inspection fresh in his mind, the comparison between the slaves and the limbs of the master's body was easy. The bailiff, who is to be mentally and physically fit like Columella's *vilicus* (*On Agriculture* 11.1), is the key figure: he gives the owner the information he needs (§61, cf. §58). The owner is concerned to protect his slaves as he protects his own limbs.[18] This is a matter of utility, then, and the master is enjoined to understand the slave's position

[17] See Ṭūsī's version in Wickens' English (1964: 184).

[18] Cf. Hierocles at Stobaeus 4.27.20 (p. 663 Hense, pp. 88–9 Ramelli) on brothers as the equivalent of one's own eyes, legs, and hands. On the diffusion of the image (cf. e.g. above on Diodorus, Chapter 3, p. 229), and its origin in Xenophon, see Praechter 1901: 55–6.

both as a fellow human being (cf. §69),[19] and one who has suffered much. If the owner were to stand in his shoes, 'he would prefer to be assigned a master who would be gentle to him and treat him with kindness' (§63). The attitude here is Keith Bradley's 'self-interested lenience' (2008: 344). Thus punishment (§§64–5) is to be 'incremental' (cf. §72), from simple rebuke through the display of anger to the use of violence. The interesting point is that punishment should be the same as punishment inflicted on the master's son. 'For this is the best thing for both the servant and the son.'

Outside Bryson's incremental regime, violence against slaves, whether they had done wrong or made a mistake or been in the wrong place at the wrong time, was routine, as Bryson would have known full well. Galen's father 'frequently berated friends who had bruised their hands in the act of hitting servants in the teeth'. Galen knew men 'to use not only their fists but even their feet on their servants, or to stab them with a pencil' (*Affections and Errors of the Soul* Book 1 ch. 4 trans. Singer), and he noted that biting and kicking domestics was routine (*ibid.* ch. 2). Among modern commentators, it is Bradley who has brought out the unpleasantness of the average slave's lot in classical antiquity better than anyone else. Fear and abuse, beatings, floggings, sexual violence: these were all common (1987: 113–37). As Propertius put it, 'a fearful slave has a greater reliability' (3.6.6). Bradley studies the regime particularly through Columella's carrots and sticks and his presentation of 'the owner's view of slaves as intransigent property' that is given to negligence, lies, idleness, fraud, and theft *inter alia* (1987: 21–45, cf. 1994: ch. 6). Everywhere one looks, one can find the assumption that slaves will do bad deeds if they can. The chapter on the 'servus corruptus' in the *Digest* (11.3) is a good example of a trend which is countered by just a few passages with special agendas (such as Seneca's discussion of slave loyalty in *De Beneficiis*, to which I shall come shortly). The 'torture and execution service' offered by a firm of undertakers at Puteoli for private and public clients is only the remarkable tip of the iceberg (Bradley 1994: 165–6; the text is AE 1971, no. 88; translation in Gardner and Wiedemann 1991: no. 22).

Given Greeks' and Romans' obsession with status, much of the behaviour towards slaves was about putting them in their place. In this regard, it has been said that 'Romans did not assimilate children and slaves in their reflections on the nature of authority' (Saller 1994: 133). Saller quotes Cicero on this: at *Republic* 3.37, in a discussion of different sorts of chastisement and the severe punishment the mind must deal out to vice, Cicero says that sons

[19] On the theme of 'common race' (humanity), see below on the treatment of slaves. I have translated Arabic *jins* as 'species' in §§62 and 69, and as 'race' in §71.

know how to obey and do not need to be coerced and broken like slaves. Bryson alludes to the owner's possible desire to prove himself by doing just that with bad slaves (§58 'if one is keen to'). But what of sons? When it comes to physical violence, Saller notes the symbolic purpose that goes in tandem with the infliction of physical pain. The whip was the favoured weapon and Seneca states that only a *pessimus pater* will use it on a son 'constantly' (*On Mercy* 1.16.3). The good father, however, will sometimes chide, sometimes threaten, and sometimes use the lash in an incremental progression (*On Mercy* 1.14.1). Clearly practice varied from family to family and occasion to occasion. Overall Seneca recommends that children should never be subjected to servile treatment (*On Anger* 2.21.4); but it seems that Romans and Greeks were sometimes prepared to exercise the same authority over sons and slaves. The author of the Ps.-Plutarchan *Training of Boys*, which was probably written in the first or second century AD (Chapter 6, p. 373), is set against beating sons on the ground that this is what one does to slaves (ch. 12 = Plutarch, *Moralia* 8f). He explicitly points to the degradation involved in being struck (*hubreis*). His stance reveals differences of opinion; and Bryson is on the other side. At the other end of antiquity, in the world of Augustine sons might be punished 'even by the father's slaves' (Shaw 1987: 11). In section four Bryson's son may be beaten for telling lies (§149). The difference between the son and the slave is that the son is not to scream if he is hit (§152, here by his teacher[20]).

Another overlap in Bryson between slave and free concerns relaxation and rest. Boys need rest and play in order to concentrate on their schoolwork (§157). Similarly the owner of slaves must allow them rest. 'Rest renews the body and makes work attractive' (§67). Here Bryson uses the (not very apposite) image of the bow which is kept unstrung till it is needed. There is a Stoic theme behind this idea of work versus play (Praechter 1912, cf. Victor 1983: 206). Praechter traces the image of the bow, now tense for action, now loose, to a work by a Stoic of the first century BC, Athenodorus of Tarsus.[21] As he notes, ultimately it goes back to Herodotus 2.173 where Amasis uses it to rebuke those who criticize him for taking time to relax. Given its literary provenance, not to mention its very ordinariness, parallels in other authors might be without meaning. But it is interesting to note that the author of *Training of Boys* applies it to children's need of rest (ch. 13, 9c): like bows and lyres, the soul needs *anesis*, 'relaxation', before *ponos*, 'work'. It may be that

[20] On discipline in class (a zone notorious for regular violence), see Quintilian 1.3.13–16; Quintilian himself is against corporal punishment.

[21] I.e. Athenodorus Calvus, son of Sandon, rather than his homonym of the same time and place, Athenodorus Kordylion.

these ideas (and this image) had been elaborated by Chrysippus in his 'advice on the education of children' (Quintilian 1.11.17, *SVF* 737).[22] But it seems that only two authors apply the image to slaves: Bryson and Dio of Prusa. In his *Oikonomikos* Dio writes (fr. V = Stobaeus 4.19, 46, p. 430 Hense) that, 'masters should behave reasonably and allow those (slaves) who want it to relax: periods of relaxation prepare us for periods of work. Bows, lyres, and people are in the best condition after resting.'

Bryson's concern not to overwork the slave is designed to ensure that his 'work . . . is done with affection, zeal, and keenness for the task' (§70). He includes what he says in the context of his personal observation of masters who treat their riding animals better than their servants ('we are really astonished . . .'). The master must be compassionate and understanding (§§68–9). The theme of the good owner naturally makes us think of two famous passages in Seneca's *De Beneficiis* and *Moral Letters*. Perhaps these deserve no fuller treatment than they get in Milani's *La schiavitù*, 220–1, who simply remarks that Seneca's 'humanism' never challenges slavery and that he is kind 'almeno a parole'. The literature on slavery is vast and the literature on Seneca's views of slavery is large, and I make no pretence to have read it deeply. It seems (as far as I am aware) that one of the first modern writers to denounce Seneca comprehensively was Finley in ch. 3 of his *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology* (1980). Finley quotes the Elder Seneca – both of them liked a *bon mot* – on the literal position of the slave: '(being socratized) is a crime for the freeborn, a necessity for a slave, and a duty for the freedman' (*Controversiae* 4 pref. 10). Admittedly this provoked laughter ('in iocos abiit') according to Seneca, but the power of the master over the body of slaves and former slaves was total, and that is Finley's point. Thus one had to distinguish between 'more or less humane treatment of individual slaves by individual masters and the inhumanity of slavery as an institution' (p. 190). In overall terms Seneca's humanism 'served to reinforce the institution itself, not to weaken it' (p. 189). Moreover, defenders of Seneca are excoriated: Will Richter's 'standard essay' (*Gymnasium* 1959), Miriam Griffin's casual remark that 'Seneca's pronouncements on slavery are justly admired' (1976: 279). Richter was certainly complacent and unthinking (p. 214 on 'Jeder unvoreingenommene, etc.': every impartial person will applaud what Seneca says); but Griffin was well aware that Seneca's remarks were (a) not new but had been mouthed by many a self-interested slave-owner, and (b) were to be seen alongside the many traditional disparaging remarks Seneca makes about slaves' failings (pp. 266–8, cf. Bradley 2008: 346–7).

[22] On the relationship between *Training* and Chrysippus, see Chapter 6, p. 376.

The nature of the 'reinforcement' Seneca offered the institution was the comfort he gave owners. Thus he suggested in *De Beneficiis* 3.18–28 that slaves were really quite decent, if one offered them the chance to be, and could perform a benefit just like any other human being. He backs this up with several examples of slaves who saved the life of their master, and so on. *Moral Letters* 47 has the same effect, but it deserves a few more words, for it is more complicated and is not to be despised automatically. Seneca states that slaves are our comrades (*contubernales*) and that we should sup with them. They can be our friends and we should behave amiably (13 *clementer, comiter quoque*, 17 *hilarem te praestes*) towards them. The suggestion of inviting them to table gives him the opportunity to condemn the gluttony of the upper classes and their creation of enemies among their slaves through ill treatment. Indeed Seneca is forthright about the cruel conduct of Roman masters (47.5, 11) which leads slaves to be treated like *iumenta*, animals used for riding or drawing vehicles and the Latin equivalent of Bryson Arabus' *dawābb* (§68), which I have translated as 'riding animals' (cf. Freytag 1830–5: *s.v.*). Slaves are 'from the same stock' (10, cf. *De Beneficiis* 3.28.2 *unus omnium parens mundus est*) – the idea of common race. It is not clear how deeply the Stoics adhered to this old idea, which in any case had always sat quite happily with inequality and hierarchy (Milani 1972: 161–79). Some later Stoics dropped the division of humankind into *spoudaioi* and *phauloi* and developed the concept of the *oikeiōsis* ('affinity', 'belonging') that one has first with oneself and which is then extended outwards to others.[23] Hierocles the Stoic's presentation of human relationships in terms of ever-widening circles around ego is the best-known example (Ramelli 2009: 90–3; Stobaeus 4.27.23, pp. 671–2 Hense) of this more positive view, which has much to do with Panaetius' development of a theory of social 'duties' (*kathēkonta*). In the Hierocles passage there is no talk of servants, though they must be included in the outer circle of 'the whole human race (*genos*)'. In another extract, on siblings, Hierocles advises that in any relationship we should see ourselves as the other person involved to assess the closeness of 'the role' (*to prosōpon*): 'for, in fact, a person would treat a slave well, if he considered how he would think the other should behave toward himself, if the other were the master and he himself the slave' (trans. Ramelli 2009: 87; Stobaeus 4.27.20, p. 661 Hense). The force of the conditional is that people do *not* see slaves this way. In spirit Hierocles' advice is, however, close to Bryson §63 ('he realizes that . . . he would prefer . . .').

[23] This doctrine in fact goes back originally to Chrysippus and Zeno: Radice 2000, Ramelli 2009: xxxiii–xlvii. The orthodox division continued to be voiced in some contexts: Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 9.1.3 τοὺς μὲν φαύλους ἐν ἡδοναῖς εἶναι . . . τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πόνῳ.

When it comes to real race or ethnicity, Hierocles' draws a distinction between those 'of similar ethnicity (*homoethneis*)' and 'the whole human race', and Bryson at any rate does not have a problem in advising that slaves must come from a different 'race' (cf. above p. 262). Seneca's 'same stock' and 'same world' have similar limitations. For, after all, at the end of the letter he says that his aim is simply to get slaves to 'respect (*colant*) their master rather than fear' him (47.18). This is exactly what Bryson wants (§§63, 70 'respect more than fear').

Bryson is a manual of estate management. Seneca is a belletrist and a philosopher. The point of comparison is slim. The language of humanity towards slaves had been voiced long before them and for the same reasons (e.g. Xenophon, *Oec.* 12.5–7, Plato, *Laws* 776d, with Garnsey 1996: 89–97). That said, and despite the differences in these texts, at least these two authors do bother to voice it. Thus I think in the end that Garnsey is on the right lines when he says that 'the nature of [Seneca's] arguments, and the energy with which they are presented, do perhaps provide an opening for the suggestion that he felt a twinge of conscience at the inhumanity and injustice of slavery' (pp. 68–9). But I am not sure we need a 'twinge of conscience'. All people in a position of authority may be nice or nasty to their colleagues, employees, charges, or pupils, and at the same time must also command them and set them work. Whether they are good or bad bosses, the system does not change; but the one way is much more pleasant for the underling; and if Seneca's or Bryson's or Hierocles' attitude was sympathetic, 'almeno a parole', that is something.

Bryson finishes off his section on slaves with advice on the best sort of slaves to have (§71): young ones. It is a fact that children were often sold as slaves. Thus, to give a well-known example, the sale contract P. Turner 22 from 142 AD deals with the sale of a ten-year-old Galatian girl at Side for transport to Egypt (Hagedorn 1981, with the extended comments of Bradley 1986a).[24] The connection in Bryson's mind with §70 ('respect more than fear . . . love more than compliance and obedience') is that the young 'are more capable of obeying' and 'retain' their master's habits. Ps.-Aristotle, *Oikonomika I* 1344a27 makes much the same point. For Bryson there are good parallels in section four on the child which begins with comments on the importance of habit formation during early years, 'for the small child is readier to obey and quicker at cooperating' (§105). He next moves (almost

[24] Cf. Bieżuńska-Małowist 1977: 21–30 on child slaves in Egypt (most in origin having been babies rescued from exposure (*expositio*) according to a well-rehearsed social practice; cf. Chapter 6, p. 367), 32–42 on imports. On cosmetic distortion of such children, Clement, *Paedagogus* 3.21.1.

before he forgets) to the servant's 'rights': 'what he needs' (i.e. food, shelter, etc., but nothing is specified) and not being 'burdened by a task he is incapable of and is illegal' (cf. *Training of Boys* ch. 13), reminding us that the slave has no choice and is subject to discipline. This puts him in mind, finally, of 'grades of favour and distinction' (§73). Good slaves will be elevated as a 'spur to the rest'. Columella, who had a fairly low opinion of slaves, in much the same way recommends instilling a sense of 'competition' among rural slave gangs, but he adds chillingly that this enables 'shirkers' to be punished 'without any dispute' (1.9.8; for reward and punishment cf. Xenophon, *Oec.* 12.19, 13.6, 13.10–11, 14.7–10, Ps.-Aristotle, *Oikonomika I* 1344b3–11, 15–17). Just before this Columella comments on the need to assign specific tasks to specific slaves, and we know from other evidence that demarcation was both an important tool of control and (as Columella states) an important means of ensuring good productivity.[25]

For Bryson slaves are an essential part of the social and economic system. His advice to the owner is brief, but covers the main traditional and (as it appears) some contemporary points of discussion. He does not attempt to do what Dio does in his second essay *On Freedom and Slavery* (*Or.* 15) where the argument is cautiously advanced that the institution of slavery depends in all cases on illegitimate enslavement in war, that all other forms of slavery take their origin from this, and that there is consequently no *kat' alētheian doulos* (15.28), no slave 'according to truth', since all those who serve as slaves (*hoi douleuontes*) are (on this argument) freeborn. But even though Dio here went 'further than any writer of Roman times . . . in subverting the legal institution of slavery', we 'must not suppose that alone of ancient moralists he advocated the abolition of slavery' (Brunt 1973: 18). Bryson, as we have seen, was entirely comfortable with the idea of natural slaves. In his schematic treatment there are areas he does not cover which we would like him to have done, notably manumission and the role of freedmen. And he does not remedy Bradley's desideratum of a 'handbook of regulations for the management of a Roman urban household', which would be comparable with Columella's instructions for the supervision of rural slaves (1987: 24) – or at least not entirely. For Bryson seems to want to cover all types of slaves: the bailiff-cum-supervisor-cum-manager, domestic service and ministering, and slaves who undertake 'rough labours'. Agricultural slaves must come under the last named: the estate-owner is after all the owner of farms. But he is also the owner of a house in which his wife has charge over the

[25] Bradley 1994: 58–64 drawing on amongst other things the *Digest* and Susan Treggiari's discussion of slave tasks allotted in the establishment of the empress Livia (1975).

servants (§§91, 96, both using the word *khadam*, which signifies domestic attendants[26]). The wife too must act properly in her management of servants and treat the domestics fairly. This is part of the idealization of the spouse, as we shall see; but is also part of the theme of the good treatment of slaves within the general Brysonian concern for good management of the property and the personnel who form the *oikos*.

[26] Freytag 1830–5 translates as *famuli*. The Greek behind *khadam* in §96 may have been *oiketai*, if we may judge from Musonius Rufus. See above Chapter 2, p. 121 n. 17.

APPENDIX: IBN BUṬLĀN, GENERAL TREATISE ON THE SKILLS USEFUL FOR PURCHASING AND EXAMINING SLAVES

As I have remarked above, Ibn Buṭlān's *General Treatise* very likely contains material derived from Rufus of Ephesus' lost *On the Purchase of Slaves*, especially in chs. 1 ('Useful Recommendations when Purchasing Slaves') and 2 ('Examination of Slaves' Bodies'). The translation of these chapters is offered here for general interest so readers can see the kind of thing Rufus might have said to the prospective purchaser and that was in Bryson's mind when he advises his owner to 'inspect' (§58).

The other chapters of the *General Treatise* concern: (3) physiognomical indications of slaves' behaviour and character (taken over from Rhazes' *Liber ad Almansorem*, cf. above, p. 262), (4) races from which slaves are taken, (5) tricks (recipes) used by dealers to improve slaves' appearances, (6) suitability of slaves for certain tasks, especially slaves with musical talents.

The translation is based on the text edited by Hārūn (1991: 383–420) and numbers in square brackets refer to his pages. Versions by Ghersetti (2001; note her comments on Hārūn's text, p. 39), Müller (1980), and (in part) Lewis (1974: 243–5) have been consulted and I have benefited from suggestions made by Harry Munt. The meaning of a few of the technical terms is unclear, but I have not commented on these in the main.

[385]

[Chapter 1]

Useful Recommendations when Purchasing Slaves. In Accordance with the Statements of the Physicians and the Philosophers. Ten Recommendations.

Four recommendations of general application to male and female slaves.

Exposition:

1. Instructions (of the Physicians and the Philosophers) to the man looking (for slaves) when making an examination before purchase. Prohibition against making a decision on first impressions.

They say: A man who is looking for a product should not do so in state of need. For a hungry man will think that any food that satisfies him is good, and a naked man will think any rag that keeps him warm and covered is suitable. For this reason they say: a lecherous man should not go looking for [386] a slave girl. For a man who is sexually excited has no reason, as he will decide on first impressions. First impressions occasion fascination, while novel and exotic things occasion wonder. If this (state) coincides with pressing need, he will decide on something that his senses will reject once he can dispense with it. This gives us the saying, 'repeated looking ages all novelty, constant re-examination reveals all artifice and drives out all bogus selling'.

2. Precautions before purchase according to the ancients. Be careful not to purchase slaves at fairs, for at such markets the slave-dealers perfect their deceptions.[1] How many scrawny girls have been sold as 'plump'? How many greying brunettes have been sold as 'golden blondes'? Or a man with a worn backside as 'full buttocked'? Or a man with a paunch as 'trim round the waist'? Or a man with halitosis as 'sweet breathed'? How often have (the dealers) stained yellow the white discharge from ulcers in the eye, from leprosy or vitiligo on the skin, or have made blue eyes black? How often have they reddened up pallid cheeks, made hollow faces fat, enlarged small anuses[2] and removed beard hair from cheeks, or made red hair jet black, curled lank hair, lightened brown faces, rounded out skinny legs, combed over thinning hair, and removed traces of smallpox, tattoos, freckles, and scabies?

For each of these there are methods which doctors know about and which we have cited in our treatise on the *ḥisba*.[3] We shall quote from this in our fifth section as necessary.

How many ill (slaves) have been sold as healthy ones! How many slave boys as slave girls! Add this to the (dealers') instructions [387] to the girls to flirt and fool around with young men passing through who regard carrion as lawful food, or in the same way adorn themselves with dyes, henna, and soft

[1] Cf. beauty treatments and body modification for women: Alexis fr. 98, Ovid, *Art of Love* 3.101–250 and the fragmentary *Cosmetics for Women*; Rosati 1985. On the seller's guarantee that the slave is free of infirmities or legal claims, cf. the sale contracts in Rāġib 2002.

[2] The word *faqḥa* (pl. *fiqāḥ*) means 'anus' (the only sense in the modern literary language) and less commonly 'palm of the hand'. Ghersetti (2001: 47) prefers the latter meaning, Müller (1980: 52) the former ('kleine Öffnungen', i.e. 'orifices').

[3] Not preserved or cited elsewhere.

coloured clothing.[4] We have heard one of the dealers declare, 'A quarter of a dirham of henna increases the price of the slave girl by a hundred dirhams of silver!' You will not get protection against this from (experiencing it on) a single occasion. Accordingly there is a saying: 'distrust your vision in the case of something you appreciate till you find your appreciation lasts for a picture that is undiminished by repeated viewing'. This only comes about from several occasions and a variety of descriptions.

3. Prohibition against deciding as soon as one hears slave boys or girls.[5] They say: Do not decide on the basis of a slave boy's or a slave girl's first utterance. For sometimes their (words) are concordant and meet with your approval, but afterwards there will be nothing similar; through this hidden faults are concealed from you. Sometimes the matter turns out rather differently. But be more inclined to doubt in this business than to trust. Stick to a negative thought and be safe.

4. Special precautions for leading citizens. They say: Leading citizens – anyone with an enemy from whom he fears treason, or whom he fears will come across his secrets – should be wary of purchasing a eunuch[6] or a slave girl, especially if she can write and comes from the sultan's palace – unless he has had direct experience of her. Also, of purchasing a half-breed from a merchant or an importer, for this is a trick that has been the undoing of many kings and leaders.

Next, three pieces of advice concerning the purchase of (male) slaves in particular.

Exposition:

1. Prevention of the purchaser from buying a slave used to being beaten [388] and shouted at. They say: Do not purchase a male slave whose master has frequently beaten him, and do not fail to find out about the slave's owner and the reason why he is selling him. Ensure you learn this before buying him, both from the slave and others. Much advantage is to be gained from such an investigation, whether you keep him or discard him and let him go.

[4] On the theme of adornment, cf. above n. 1 and Chapter 5, pp. 287–8.
[5] The reference is to the use of slaves for musical performances.
[6] For *khādim*, 'servant' in this sense, see Ayalon 1979.

2. Was (the desire to sell) based on the slave being bold enough to criticize his master and disparage him? Or his resentment at his (master's) criticisms and lack of care for him? Also, is the reason for his sale down to him or his master?

3. Recommendation before you put him into service. They say: The slave responds to how he sees you behave the first time he enters your house. If you encourage him, he will be (too) bold. If you discipline him, he will be subdued. If he mixes with a corrupt slave or some other corrupt person, he will be corrupt.

Next, two recommendations relating particularly to the purchase of slave girls.

Exposition:

1. How to discover before purchase that slave girls are free from pregnancy. They say: Pay attention to ensuring that slave girls are not pregnant before you become their owner. Be aware of a discharge for effect[7] and of making false claims. Very often they will insert into their vaginas rags (soaked) with other girls' blood. The one who should examine them is a woman who is opposed to them foisting someone else's child on you. Order her to palpate their breasts and feel for a pregnant belly.

You can learn this from the (girl's) paleness of complexion and her appetite for salty foods. For this is a sign that she has a craving. Undertake the examination by measuring her belly and by using fumigations (which will be mentioned at the end in accordance with our promise).[8]

2. How to be on the alert after the purchase for deceptions with the aim of (her) becoming pregnant against the master's wishes. They say: Be alert for two things. [389] When you have purchased a slave girl yet to reach puberty, she will probably reach it under your ownership and without you knowing. She conceals this from you because she wants a child. Be aware of slave girls who make you believe they are sterile and hate the idea of pregnancy, for they will often dupe you.

[7] واحذر بهرجتهن بالسداد. For this translation, which is quite insecure, cf. Lewis 1974: 245.

[8] In ch. 5, p. 414 Hārūn: 'knowledge of this is attained by placing under the woman a fumigant such as ambergris etc., and preventing it come out of her sleeves or openings in her clothes. If the smoke comes out of her mouth, she is not carrying, and *vice versa*.'

Next, something that applies to the seller and not the purchaser.

Recommendation.

They said: Do not take a slave girl from your ownership to a dealer unless she is menstruating because she may then become pregnant in the cells and assert that it is yours. For my part I have witnessed in my days a woman menstruating throughout her term; but this is rare.

[390]

[Chapter 2]

Examination of Slaves' Bodies with Respect to Each of the Parts. In Accordance with the Method of the Doctors. Thirty-eight sections.

Three aspects which apply generally to the body.

Details:

1. Colour. This should not change to yellow, which is the sign of a weak liver and the dominance of yellow bile; nor to black, which is a sign of black bile and a weak spleen. If it is white, it should be suffused with red. If it is brown, the brown should be a pure brown.

2. Skin. It should be smooth, clean, free of vitiligo, leprosy, tattoos, rashes,[9] cauterization, pigmentation, warts, moles, or scarring, especially if from the bite of a rabid dog.

3. Proportion of the limbs. They should be well proportioned in respect of one another whether they are long or short, large or small. Long limbs which are out of proportion with their broadness are good for undertaking heavy work, despite their weakness in power. Short ones are the opposite of this.

Next, thirty paragraphs relating to each part.

Of these, four items relating to the head.

[9] *qūbā'*, 'dartre' (Kazimirski 1860).

1. Shape. It should not be basket-shaped [391] nor deformed. Rather, it should be like a ball of wax that has been squeezed at the sides so it bulges at the back and the front.

2. Hair. It should not be thin or unkempt. There should be no alopecia or scaliness, nor should it have patches of white like piebald cattle.

3. Skin. It should not be dry. It should not have pustules (on the head)[10] or pimples. There should be no scar from a wound (that was) deep enough to reveal the bone.

4. Visible excretions. He should not have abundant mucus or saliva. Much sleep dulls the eyes and the reactions. This is in fact one of the indications of epilepsy, especially if some of the limbs are trembling.

Five items relating to the eye.

1. Movement. They should not be disturbed, for this is one of the signs of madness, especially if the speech is incoherent. An expert in the slave's language should consider this.

2. Colour. There should be no bluish grey in the pupil, unless it was there already, for this is one of the signs of cataract. The white of the eye should not be cloudy or yellowy or show veins, for this is one of early manifestations of scleritis.

3. Shape. It should not be round, especially if the face is marked by folds, for this is one of the signs of leprosy.[11] The pupils should be a uniform blackness. One should not be larger than the other nor as if split along its length. This is determined by having (the slave) close each one of the eyes and seeing [392] if they have different shapes.

4. Inner corner of the eye. There should be no pterygium in the corner of the eye, no excrescence, and no fistula. The sign of this is that when you press in the corner, pus comes out.

[10] *saʿfa*.

[11] *judhām*; Ghersetti 2001: 55 'elefantiasi'. But, although elephantiasis (*dāʾ al-fīl*; used in the section on the legs below) is often confused with leprosy in its symptoms and is sometimes called *judhām*, it tends to affect the lower limbs. Leprosy was probably not common in the ancient Mediterranean world.

5. Eyelids. The lashes should not have fallen out nor be inverted. The lids should not be too thick.

One item relating to smell and hearing.

1. Inspect them both in a good light to ensure there is no excrescence in them. Expose (the slave) to speech and smells after blocking one of their two orifices.[12]

One item relating to the tongue.

1. Let him speak in case he has an impediment. This can be a result of the smallness or largeness of the tongue, or the loss of part of it, or damage to its sinews, or the loss of some teeth, or because it is attached from birth or as a result of a wound. Enquire about all this. If it is none of these things, harbour suspicions of him, for it may well be that he has bitten his tongue owing to an epileptic fit. Fumigate him with goat's horn, give him roasted billy goat's liver to eat, and if he is epileptic, he will have a fit.

Two items relating to the teeth.

1. If they are missing as a result of being broken, they will not come back. If they are there, examine their colour, hardness, and freedom from cavities. Next, examine whether they are set on edge[13] by testing their tolerance of acid.

2. Having them joined together is better than having gaps – though giving the teeth a serrated appearance is a practice in favour among the Arabs.

One item relating to the gums.

1. They should not have boils. Check his breath in case he has halitosis. This could be due to putridity in the gums, caries in his molars, or phlegm which has turned putrid in his stomach.

[393] One item relating to the uvula.

[12] I.e. test alternate nostrils/ears.
[13] *ḍaras*: severe discomfort in the teeth due to acidic food or drink.

1. It should not be hanging loose, for this causes a persistent cough. It should not descend too low, for this is followed by glanders. Observe this in a good light.

One item relating to the throat[14] and the wings[15] of the nose.

1. There should be no sign of scrofula.

One item relating to the chest.

1. It should not be narrow or crooked or lacking in flesh. For this can be a cause of (inflammation of) the lung, coughing, and colds, especially if the shoulder blades are winged.

One item relating to the hands.

1. When you measure them, one of them should not come out shorter than the other nor should both of them be short. For this is bad for work.

One item relating to the forearms.

1. The elbow should bend easily without getting crooked and without swelling or without contractions resulting from a trauma or from 'Medina vein'.[16] Examine him to see if he can grasp your hands firmly.

Five items in all relating to the guts.

One item applies generally to (the area of) the guts as a whole.

1. They should not be enlarged in whole or in part. To see this, order him to lie down on his back and palpate his guts from the mouth of the stomach to the pubes. If you see that it is enlarged or painful, make your decision accordingly, especially if this is accompanied by an unhealthy colour or there is

[14] Literally 'pharynx' (البغانغ). Müller 1980: 57: 'die inneren Ohrwände' is obscure.

[15] This is printed by Hārūn as the non-existent *azbatayn*: Ghersetti redots to *arnabatayn*, the dual of *arnaba* 'end of the nose', which is clearly Müller's interpretation also. Scrofula can appear anywhere on the neck or face.

[16] I.e. the parasitic infection caused by the nematode *Dracunculus medinensis* (Guinea worm). The cause was not known to ancient or medieval medicine, though the peculiarities of the disease were recognized (Ullmann 1978: 81–3).

inflammation in the sockets of his eyes. Confirmation is provided by shortness of breath when he is asked to come over to you or shouts.

[394] Four items relate to each individual part.

Details:

1. Stomach. It should not be hard, nor have a poor digestion owing to a poor constitution, hot or cold. It should not contain a humour which induces it to eat clay or charcoal.

2. Kidneys and bladder. They should not have ulcers, stones, or looseness. These are manifested by the fact that there is sand or pus in the urine. He should be observed for several nights to see he does not wet the bed.

3. Testicles. They should not contain varicoceles, nor should there be an intestinal hernia in one of them.

4. Penis. The opening of the glans should not be misshapen. This can be observed during urination.

Four items relate to the legs.

One item applies generally to them as a whole.

1. They should not show any distortion or spasms or sciatica or luxation of the hips, which are manifested when you order him to come over to you or when you measure them: one should not be shorter than the other.

Three items relate to the individual parts.

Details:

1. The knee joint should not show any hard swelling or spur.

2. The lower legs should not show curvature, twisting, or in-toeing. They should have no varicose veins on the inner sides.

3. The foot and the ankle should not show elephantiasis.

Two items relating to the womb. These are:

1. The body. The area between the navel and the pubes should not be enlarged or hard, for this is the sign of a tumour.

2. The period of [395] menstruation. They should not suffer a loss of consciousness similar to a stroke, for this is the sign of inflammation in the womb which is followed by sudden death.

Next, five items regarding the limbs which should be observed during the hours of sleep.

Exposition. He should not be one of those who:

1. defecates in the bed

2. babbles in his sleep

3. walks without being aware of it

4. grinds his teeth

5. sleeps face-down.

These are things that physicians, once they have learnt them, find useful in seeking the health of the sick.

PART IV

Family

CHAPTER 5

The wife

1 MARRIAGE

Bryson's third section is on 'the woman', *al-mar'a* (the word for 'spouse', *zawj*, is not employed except to mean 'husband'). His Greek term, then, was γυνή, but the sense is at all times the normal one of 'wife'. This is what I shall mostly use in this chapter, but in the translation I have kept 'woman' to make clear the basic sense of the term being used. I shall not attempt here a general sketch of the background issues which lie behind recent interpretations of the family in the period of the early Roman empire, though I shall naturally be referring to many of these matters and to key modern views as needed. The polarization that has affected the debate on the ancient economy is largely absent from analysis. With Bryson's sections on the wife and the child we enter the complex realm of manners, customs, and emotions. The quantifiable side of Roman family life has attracted the attention of some of the best modern scholars in recent decades; but it has no bearing on what Bryson says. Some, perhaps most, of the quantitative family historians ignore qualitative approaches on 'the role of the wife' – Bryson's focus – as unproductive or even invalid. Fortunately there are a good many social historians who seek to interpret the texts with the help of documentary information in order to produce a sensible synthesis, and these have influenced and informed my approaches. How, then, to proceed?

For many literary–cultural scholars modern interpretation starts with Michel Foucault's *Le souci de soi* (*The Care of the Self*), the third volume of the *History of Sexuality*. This book has certainly done some harm because of the grandness of its theory of a changed attitude to marriage (*gamos*) and of the emergence of 'conjugality' and 'reciprocity', even 'symmetry', in the married relationship during the first century AD. It is easy to find this overly fluent and confident and too all-encompassing despite Foucault's careful warnings about the absence of quantitative information to confirm his suggestions. I am unable to engage with the literature produced by pro- or anti-Foucault

academics on the question of 'sexuality'. But it can safely be said that few of those who attack him on the history of sexuality in antiquity have ever written anything as original or elegant as *Le souci de soi*; indeed, for present purposes we should pay tribute to Foucault for entering Classics from the outside and saying something new and important which has made people think.[1] Yet it can also be said that many of his critics have serious objections. Among these I may single out two thoughtful essays by Amy Richlin (1991, 1998) in which she points to something that only a man could miss: the male sexual ethics of the ancient world received from Foucault a very sympathetic hearing and this in effect encouraged an interpretation of 'sexuality' where women's sexual and emotional experiences were written out. Foucault held that the 'new' ethics of the Roman period were 'addressed to men' (1986b: 22) without stopping to enquire what this meant for women. Thus Richlin was right to observe that *The History of Sexuality* 'is not a useful theory or history for women' (1998: 167). Whether our sources enable us to establish any kind of female ethics or a female response to male thinking is something I shall consider in due course.

Is Foucault useful for the interpretation of Bryson and his presentation of 'the woman'? There are, I believe, enough texts available from this period to demonstrate a Foucauldian 'valorization' of marriage and (to a lesser extent) of monogamous sexual relations, incumbent on both partners, within marriage, and a concomitant displacement from mainstream intellectual respectability (but certainly not an abandonment) of Platonic–Socratizing homoerotic/pederastic relationships (which were also, it is worth noting, a marked feature of Stoic thought on the ideally virtuous and loving community: Schofield 1999: ch. 2). Some authors build up the relationship between man and wife very strongly and intelligently in a way that is new: Bryson, Musonius, Hierocles, Plutarch, Ps.-Aristotle *Oikonomika III* (henceforth *Oikonomika III*, since it has nothing to do with Aristotle and is clearly late Hellenistic or, and in my view, early Roman in date). There are quite a few other (non-Christian) texts,[2] mostly known from quotations in Stobaeus'

[1] *The Care of the Self* is a far more original contribution than its companion, *The Use of Pleasure*, which treated the more worked over period of classical Greece. For a lengthy denunciation of Foucault's ideas, see Davidson 2008.

[2] Early Christian texts (beginning with St Paul and the Pastoral Letters of the New Testament and apocrypha such as Barnabas) are regrettably outside the scope of this chapter. Christian vociferousness undoubtedly distorts the influence of these works on their own time, for there is no reason to think Christians numbered more than 10,000 souls when Pliny wrote his famous letter about them in the early second century, or that there was more than 'a tiny group of [literate] specialists' among them (Hopkins 1998, with the indignant comments of Stark 1998). On Christian texts in relation to Neopythagorean and Stoic authors, note Lührmann 1980–1, Balch 1992.

Anthology, which address marriage and/or seek to regulate aspects of family life and sexual behaviour – Nicostratus, Naumachius, Dio of Prusa, the Neopythagoreans Theano, Myia, Melissa, Callicratidas, Phintys, Perictione, and the 'Pythagorean' female philosopher whose work is preserved in the Ps.-ʿĀmirī *Book of Happiness* (which I treat in the final section of this chapter on the reception of Bryson's ideas in the Islamic empire). Nor should we forget the so-called ideal Greek novels or romances, which in the main were written in the first or second/third centuries: these emphasize marriage as a primary aim of their young heroes and build into it a pervasive 'romantic' love combined with a theoretical or actual fidelity by both partners (Konstan 1994, translations and basic introductions in Reardon 2008, studies in Schmeling 1996, Swain 1999a). In all these texts we see in broad terms a stress on the importance and the validity of marriage and, to a lesser extent, the foregrounding of a dynamic (and at times also an emotionally/sexually satisfying) relationship between the married couple. To speak of reciprocity in the context of conjugality so defined, as Foucault does (1986b: 163 'a certain form of'), is, however, problematic because women's roles within marriage remained bounded in all authors and the reciprocity always seems lop-sided. Nevertheless, though some of our texts clearly take to heart the Aristotelian idea of women's natural inferiority, others do not at all; and Richlin's blanket description of 'misogynist' is far too harsh for most. The ancient male elite did not say they hated the wives they wanted to love and to be loved and served by. The ideal of Penelope and Odysseus long endured in these works; but Odysseus was in charge.

The new evidence of Bryson offers a good opportunity to revisit and re-evaluate material which is, to be sure, difficult to handle and easy to misinterpret. Bryson's specific interest in marriage lies in the wife's skills in helping to organize and administer the estate's people and property, a theme that comes out in other works (beginning with Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*), but not as obsessively. At the same time he offers a unique picture of the wife's affective engagement with her husband, and (as we shall see) insists on the localization of sex within marriage for both men and women. His book, then, brings its own viewpoints into a domain where there is much interesting material for comparison in broad terms, including legal (Evans Grubbs 1994) and documentary (see below, pp. 333–4) sources, but where it is the literary works that offer the possibility of establishing a system of thought. In what follows I shall make some general observations on where Foucault was right and wrong, illustrating his 'new erotics' by paying particular attention to Plutarch's *Dialogue on Love* and *Advice on Marriage*. I then want to go back to the beginning of oeconomic literature and look briefly at

Xenophon's wife in the *Oeconomicus* (and also Columella's imitation and Philodemus' response), Ps.-Aristotle *Oikonomika I*, the Stoics (in the form of Antipater of Tarsus), and the Neopythagoreans. I shall then examine *Oikonomika III*, which is really very different in tone from the preceding texts and merits its own section. I shall next consider Bryson himself. This will lead naturally to Musonius, Dio, and Hierocles. The focus throughout will be on the history of ideas in relation to the concerns of Bryson and Bryson section three in its first-century AD context. Inevitably there is much that I shall have to omit from consideration.

Three general points may be made to begin with. The texts I have just mentioned offer a strong view of the institution of marriage combined with traditional assumptions about what women should or should not do. For example, in Bryson the wife is very much the co-owner of the estate, but she should also stay put there. The effect is to simultaneously empower and disempower her for her husband's convenience. There is a traditional 'complementarity' of roles. So what is new? In the first place there is the quantity of writing dealing with marriage. The level of attention is striking. If the sample of texts that survive to us represents no more than a part of what was written, which is a wholly reasonable supposition, we must imagine a very large literature came into existence around the first century AD to satisfy the demand for guidance on contracting and living a marriage. Many of our surviving texts and parts of texts are Neopythagorean and it would be right also to imagine that a much larger group of these writings was produced. Second, as part of this attention we may observe in several of our texts the presentation of an affective engagement with the wife or even between the couple, and some degree of analysis of this. Such attention to the dynamics of marriage entailed, I think, some movement towards a breaking of moulds – for example, Musonius' rebuke of masters for copulating with slaves (which was one of the only legal outlets for sex outside marriage according to Roman law) on the grounds that the master/husband would not like his own wife to sleep with a slave boy; or Epictetus' recommended ('as pure as you can', cf. Plato, *Laws* 840e; below p. 346), and Bryson's absolute, ban on sexual contact before marriage for both partners. Much of this thinking is encapsulated in Musonius' presentation of *koinōnia* ('partnership') in his Discourse XIII, which I shall be looking at later and not least because the second part of it was influenced by Bryson. The word *koinōnia* is frequent, of course, in the context of marriage and often simply meant marriage; but the art of saying something new is often expressed in the re-presentation of what is familiar. Familiar concepts make good slogans that do not have to be explained, and this is what we have in Musonius' idea of the partner. Bryson also uses the

term (§81 'association and partnership'[3]). He does not make much of it but, interestingly, he alone is frank about what partnership meant: 'if she says that he actually does this because it is *to his* advantage, what she says will not invalidate his good will towards her nor end his authority over her' (§82).

The third point is the direction taken by analysis of the workings of marriage. For if the enhancement of marriage as an institution trapped women as unequal partners, it could also serve to control, or at least to dispose, men within its rules, and this is something new. We may be sure such controls did not work very well. But the point is the establishment of expected behaviour relating to the duties and obligations of being married. This may apply to both partners, but is addressed especially to men and for the purpose of ordering their lives both with and away from their spouses before male friends, relations, and colleagues. In this regard Foucault was right about the addressees, in that men are primary. But there is more to say, as Richlin noted, since women are addressed directly in some texts (the short Neopythagorean letters, and the treatises of Phintys and Perictione, with their restrictive view of the wife's role; and especially Plutarch's advice on marriage to Pollianus and Eurydice), and indirectly in most of the others, including Bryson.

The Neopythagorean treatises of Perictione and Phintys, which probably date to the first century BC or the first to second century AD, give us women's voices on family and domestic (but not economic) matters, though perhaps they are not what moderns would wish to hear. There is no reason to deny – as has often been done – that women are behind the pseudonyms. Perictione bears the name of Plato's mother. Plato was of course closely associated with Pythagoreanism and the semi-divine legend of his birth (Diogenes Laertius 3.2) has often been seen as inspired by fourth-century Pythagorean interests. Phintys bears an authentic-sounding Doric name.[4] The function of these names is exactly the same as it is for Bryson's own name. It offers the authority to discuss such material and the expectation of being taken seriously by men and women. Unquestionably women wrote on subjects covered by their work. One of the chief concerns, as it often is in texts by male authors, is *philokosmia*, a negative term meaning 'addiction to making up' that is not really used before the first century AD when it was evidently identified as a problem serious enough to be named or (since objections to make-up are ancient) to be renamed, and was thereafter under this name a fundamental

[3] *muqārana wa-shirka*. For *shirka* as κοινωνία, see Ullmann 2007: *s.v.* παράδοξος and Arabic index p. 849.

[4] Cf. the Philtys of Iamblichus, *On the Pythagorean Life* 267. She is given a different parentage from Phintys and there is no reason to amalgamate them.

tool of Christian discourse against women. The 'addiction to making up' – it should not be translated neutrally as 'love of adornment' – is what Plutarch's wife Timoxena wrote about in a work 'to Aristylla', which Plutarch tells the newly-wed Eurydice to keep to at *Advice on Marriage* 145a.[5] Thus there is no cause to entertain doubts about Phintys and Perictione. The Neopythagorean female letter-writers (Melissa, Myia, Theano) are more difficult to deal with, since men did write fictitious letters between women – for example, some of Alciphron's letters of courtesans. But these fall into a different category altogether and in my view the Neopythagorean writers should be taken as real women using the Pythagoreans' concern for family matters to offer literary, traditional advice on avoiding make-up, on nurses, children, jealousy, and servants.[6]

What we see in these texts is something well known: those in a particular system work hard to uphold that system even though alternatives might be better and freer, and they create values within it which they are proud of and celebrate. But upper-class women like Perictione and Phintys were hardly 'chained to the sink'. The Bagnall and Cribiore collection of the private letters of Greek-speaking women from Egypt (2006) gives us extremely interesting information on attitudes to wealth and property and the running of estates (among other things) in the Hellenistic and Roman eras. These well-heeled women show significant independence of action and attitude including the assumption of responsibility comparable to what Bryson expects in his wife when the husband is absent or sick (§84). I return to them later. Somehow these expressions of real-life engagement with finance and business are reflected in the debate over 'female' and 'male' occupations that can be seen in several of our thinkers, notably Musonius and Hierocles, and which is implicit in many other texts (like Plutarch's *Virtues of Women* or *Dialogue on Love*). If women are running the *oikos* as required, as opposed to limiting themselves or being limited to spinning, cooking, and feeding, it is no surprise to find serious discussion of their capabilities and no surprise to find these capabilities discussed alongside their relationship with husbands and children.

Foucault's explanation (1986b: pt 3, ch. 2 'The Political Game') of why men were addressing texts about marriage to themselves (I would add: and

[5] The work is listed as item 113 in the ancient library catalogue of Plutarch's works, the Lamprias Catalogue, so it was presumably published (and filed along with Plutarch's own writings). For Timoxena's strict views, cf. *Consolation to his Wife* 609a. On the history of misogynist comments against make-up from Hesiod and Semonides to Gregory Nazianzene, see the survey in Knecht 1972: 39–56.

[6] I call attention again to the Pythagorean woman philosopher whose advice was included in the Ps.-ʿĀmirī *Book of Happiness*, below (Section 7).

to women) is, in my view, wrong, as I have noted in Chapter 1 (pp. 41–2; cf. Swain 2007b: 132–4). The idea that the monopolization of public power by the imperial court led the nobility to turn inward and pay greater attention to their family lives (the source being a famous article by Paul Veyne, 1978[7]) is far-fetched and the examples given to support it are no support, as Richard Saller has pointed out as decisively as anyone: Cohen and Saller 1994, cf. Garnsey and Saller 1987: 133–4. But one may critique Veyne and Foucault without also ignoring change in attitudes among intellectuals. Foucault cautiously referred to these intellectuals as forming a 'few limited milieus' (1986b: 163), which is right given the tiny number of the educated elite. Within that elite, however, these authors were influential. We are dealing in the main with texts in Greek, though of course read also by Romans in a period when many rich Romans learnt literary Greek very well (Musonius being a good example of this).[8] These texts do not have to reflect social practice, even among their upper-class readers. Codification of manners does not have to impact on behaviour. Thus marriage failure (which is never mentioned by our authors, though marriage difficulties are) was undoubtedly high. It cannot be quantified, but Bradley's study of marriage and remarriage among the Roman upper class (1991) is suggestive, and the marriage contracts of this period (see below) presuppose the fact of widespread breakdown (cf. Treggiari 1991b on the limits of the evidence). What we can say is that readers were receptive to (the desirability of) this codification – otherwise the texts advocating such behaviour would not have been written. A similar issue arises with the manners stipulated by Bryson section four, which are put forward as part of a total control of the child. But the elements of most of that material were thoroughly traditional, and its applicability belongs to a large extent in a different, practical, non-affective domain.

The effort towards signalling the importance of marriage as the means of effecting a permanent union concerned not only the couple but also their respective families and peers, all of whom made up the 'big house' (above, Chapter 3, p. 244). My modest explanation for this effort takes its departure from the healthy economic situation of the Greek elites and the political security they lived in, which had been established by the spread of Roman imperial control throughout the East. The signs of this are everywhere in the material evidence which allows us to say that the first and second centuries AD were the greatest period of urban development in the ancient world. We are dealing with a landholding aristocracy of diverse backgrounds and

[7] Note also the influence of Syme's 'service aristocracy': Foucault 1986b: 84.
[8] On Seneca's *On Marriage*, see below, n. 60.

lineages who had two important things in common among others: by the time of the mid first century AD they had been busy acquiring property and land for some 300 years from the conquests of Alexander and the establishment of the great Hellenistic successor kingdoms, which marked the inauguration of what we call the Greek East; and, whatever their backgrounds or ethnicities, they had learnt to express themselves in all public domains in the language of the dominant culture, Greek. Roman imperial peace allowed these notables to exploit and display their resources further. Although the position of the upper classes may well mislead us about the actual levels of prosperity across other social groups, the enormous circulation of wealth at the top of society is abundantly clear. It is this that made marriage 'dynastic'. The existence of wealth and the cultural imperative to show it off meant that there was too much at stake not to invest in the success of the one institution which promised the most and risked the most for the future. It is hardly surprising that marriage became integrated within 'the whole complex of manners, moral conduct, deportment, and scripted forms of self-presentation' that constituted the key social signifier of *paideia* (education/culture/manners/politeness),[9] and why the social, cultural, and sexual aspects of marriage became topics of analysis. Marriage joined the other areas of life that became subject to surveillance.

Marriage is linked to the problem of sexuality. This was a period when there were particularly strong social and moral pressures to be what Hierocles in his *Oikonomikos* calls 'a real man' and not one of those 'dirty little men' who sit by the fireside knitting 'in their eagerness for femininity' (below, p. 358). The primary typology in Polemon's *Physiognomy* is that of the manly versus the effeminate. A whole system of private and public abuse was established on the basis of this (see especially Gleason 1995, Swain 2007b). Successful marriage and successful procreation guaranteed that a man was in compliance with the prevailing norms. As Libanius puts it in answer to the question 'Should One Marry?', 'a man who claims the persona of a free man should go forth from his wife to public business and return from public business to his wife'. He is entrusted to represent the community because 'the man who is bringing up children is thought to fear the gods, respect men, desire glory, and honour justice'. The 'worse reputation follows the man who is unwilling to marry'. By contrast the married man can weather accusations because having a wife places him under an 'obligation to be self-controlled' (below, p. 326). Successful marriage demonstrated reliability.

[9] I borrow the quotation (cf. Chapter 1, p. 61) from Michael Chamberlain's study of social power and culture in thirteenth-century Damascus (1994: 107).

People will have married for many reasons, whatever their families or intellectuals advised. But in most cases partners were chosen and marriage carefully arranged (Treggiari 1991a: ch. 4). The operation of parental choice is seen in the fact that marriage with cousins or at least collaterals was very common 'at least among those who had property to leave'.[10] Approval for those who were Roman citizens was intrinsic not just to the provision of dowries (which were usually not large) but also, and more importantly, to the situation whereby the wife's personal property remained part of her own family's wealth while her father was living. In the first and second centuries even among the Greek elites Roman citizenship was not so very common, and Roman *mores* (subject of course to repressive Augustan marriage legislation; Treggiari 1991a: 277 ff.) are not directly relevant to the situation in the Greek cultural sphere. Nevertheless, family approval was fundamental for Greeks too. Naturally there was some freedom of action by the young man or woman at the centre of the marriage. The evidence of marriage contracts from Egypt in the later Hellenistic and Roman periods shows a greatly enhanced role for individual choice in marriage and consequently in divorce.[11] In some of these contracts we find the idea of 'partnership for life' (πρὸς βίου κοινωνίαν), which helps us connect Musonius and other thinkers with common parlance.[12] Bryson and other family texts talk up the personal choice on the man's side in order to emphasize the moral approach to partnership (§76). But all private wishes were ultimately limited by an elaborate social process, the complexities of which afforded opportunity for considerable tension.

The sequence of thought in Pollux's late-second-century thesaurus of Greek is indicative of what was involved: (3.31–6) match-makers (προμνήστριαι), potential in-laws (γαμβροί, πενθεροί, etc.), the heiress (ἐπίκληρος), courtship (μνηστεία), the formal 'undertaking' concerning the daughter's suitability (ἐγγύη) and the procedure of 'giving away' (ἔκδοσις), the dowry (προίξ, φερνή), sureties (ἀποτιμήματα), gifts (δῶρα, etc.), (3.37–45) details of the wedding, venue, presents, food, sacrifices, and so on. Pollux's terminology reflects his reading in the classical sources and

[10] Evans Grubbs 2005: 108. Evans Grubbs' analysis of the legal sources confirms Corbier 2005: 268–79 (with references to other studies of hers) against what Corbier calls the 'rather hasty conclusion' of Shaw and Saller 1984, who argue that cousin-marriage was uncommon because it was not needed to retain consolidated estates (which Roman notables lacked); but the issue is preservation of wealth, not contiguity of lands.

[11] Modrzejewski 1981: 61, 66–7. For a complete list with texts and pointers to translations where available, see David Instone-Brewer's collection at www.tyndalearchive.com/Brewer/MarriagePapyri/Index html with further links to texts, bibliography, etc.

[12] *BGU* IV 1052 (13 BC), PYadin 18 (AD 128) πρὸς γάμου κοινωνίαν. For these and other documents, see Katzoff 1995, Brashear 1996. Translation and some discussion in Evans Grubbs 2002: 122–35.

some elements may not have been current in some regions (Modrzejewski 1981, with literature). The reality behind such a list is brought out in Dio of Prusa's contrast between a simple, rural wedding on Euboea and 'the marriages of the rich, with their match-makers, investigations into wealth and lineage, dowries, wedding gifts, promises and deceits, agreements and contracts, and ultimately the wrangling and feuds that often occur at the weddings themselves' (*Or.* 7.80).[13] The stress of arranging a good match features in Plutarch's essay on the social and political pressures people faced and the awkwardness and difficulty of standing up for themselves against bullies and importunate dependents (the problem he calls *dusōpia* or 'being discountenanced', effectively 'embarrassment', 'being trapped'). 'Embarrassment has locked many a man into an unprofitable agreement for a daughter's or a sister's marriage, and afterwards obliges him to change his mind and break his word' (*On Embarrassment* 532e). The pressure to wed is illustrated nicely by Philostratus' account of the marriage of the rich, patrician sophist Hermocrates to the daughter of the powerful imperial secretary Antipater of Hierapolis in the late 190s at *Lives of the Sophists* 611 (= p. 111.1–16 Kayser). Antipater wanted the match for social reasons, the 'match-maker' spoke of his 'power' and of the 'large dowry' on offer, Hermocrates' relatives clamoured rudely about Antipater as 'Corinthus son of Zeus',[14] and Hermocrates yielded only when the emperor himself came and 'gave the girl away' on Antipater's behalf. These political and social issues are brought out well in Tullia Ritti's study of Antipater (1988: 104–7). Unsurprisingly this marriage soon ended in divorce. Two centuries later John Chrysostom's congregation knew all of this just as well, as he reminds them: 'fathers and mothers talking it over, visits to other people's houses, flattering this father, complimenting that one, a multitude of match-makers and negotiators, promises of money, father and mother keen to conduct the discussions themselves, not ashamed, not blushing . . .' (*In Psalmum XLVIII*, 55.509 Migne).

The social ideal was for 'all of us to know the families each of us has come from, and the *paideia*, property, attitudes, and way of life we enjoy'.[15] This was possible in a city like Pergamum, Galen says, because it was *oliganthrōpos*.

[13] κἀγὼ προσέμεινα οὐκ ἀηδῶς, ἐνθυμούμενος ἅμα τῶν πλουσίων ὁποῖά ἐστι τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς γάμους, προμνηστριῶν τε πέρι καὶ ἐξετάσεων οὐσιῶν τε καὶ γένους, προικῶν τε καὶ ἕδνων καὶ ὑποσχέσεων καὶ ἀπατῶν, ὁμολογιῶν τε καὶ συγγραφῶν, καὶ τελευταῖον πολλάκις ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς γάμοις λοιδοριῶν καὶ ἀπεχθειῶν.

[14] The phrase was often used to denote empty boasting: Civiletti 2002: 629.

[15] Galen, *On Precognition* 14.624.6–10 Kühn: ἀπαλλάξομαι τῆς μεγάλης τῆσδε καὶ πολυανθρώπου πόλεως (Rome) εἰς τὴν ὀλιγάνθρωπόν τε καὶ σμικρὰν (Pergamum), ἐν ᾗ πάντες ἴσμεν ἀλλήλους ἐκ τίνων τε γεγόναμεν ὅπως τε παιδείας ἔχομεν καὶ κτήσεως καὶ τρόπου καὶ βίου. The work was written about 178: Nutton 1979: 49–51.

By calling it a place with 'a few people', Galen did not mean that Pergamum was small, for by ancient standards it was large (?150,000; Galen's own estimate is 120,000, *Affections and Errors of the Soul* 5.49 Kühn). He meant that, in comparison with Rome (where he says he was attracting notoriety), it was a place where there were just a few families one had to get to know in order to count. Smaller cities or towns must have suffered badly from the problem of not being able to escape the eyes and ears of one's fellow-notables. Weddings in these small towns, as Dio had observed, were likely to be difficult moments. At the end of his *Physiognomy* (ch. 69 of the Leiden version; Swain 2007a: 456–9), Polemon reports his observations of two occasions that went badly wrong. In pagan society the state rarely had any direct involvement in marriage: the ceremony was a purely private arrangement. In the first example Polemon says he had accompanied a procession escorting the bride to the groom's house. He noticed a man in the crowd smiling, breathing deeply, and sweating. Like him, the bride's eyes were watering, and she was evidently waiting for something to happen. Suddenly armed men rushed the procession, killing people, and seizing the girl. The second occasion was in Smyrna. Again Polemon was in the bride's train and when they reached the house of the groom, the bride slipped out and was whisked away by a young man who had been seen by him in the company of the husband and whose face, to Polemon's expert eye, had betrayed his anger with the groom. All the careful preparations by the 'multitude of match-makers and negotiators' ended in confusion and failure and we are left to imagine the crowd of guests standing empty-handed at the remains of the reception. Such 'banquets,' says Plutarch, 'not only involve friends but also relatives', and the two sets of families 'make the reception twice as big'. The fact that 'most of the work is done by wives' meant that the 'husbands are necessarily dragged along' (*Table Talks* 4.3, 667a–b), and were all too ready for Dio's 'wrangling and feuds'.

The idea of kidnap at a wedding provides the dramatic background to the discussion about loving women rather than boys in Plutarch's celebrated *Dialogue on Love*, to which I now turn to illustrate some of the issues I have been considering. There is clearly a literary topos involved in the kidnap, but the scenario is supposed to be a real event that happened soon after Plutarch himself had been married some time around AD 70 (assuming he was born about 45). It is meant to be plausible, and there is no reason to think the characters are imagined (see below). The dialogue is about love and the experience of a higher form of love. Thus philosophical interpretations are valid and important (Brenk 1988). But the issues behind the abduction, indeed behind the whole work, are social; and, apart from Plutarch's *Advice*

on Marriage (which I shall discuss shortly), there is no better illustration of the importance accorded to marriage in the later first or early second century.[16] The conversation takes place at the Festival of Eros near Thespiae, where Plutarch has brought his new wife and several friends to sacrifice on account of the 'difference and dispute' that had arisen between their parents as a result of the marriage. Soon they are joined by two men, Pisias and Anthemion, who are described as relatives of 'Bacchon the famous "beauty"'. They are at odds over the young widow Ismenodora, who has fallen in love with Bacchon, though she is twice his age (cf. 753a). Anthemion supports a marriage; Pisias as a Platonic lover of Bacchon does not. Ismenodora is 'wealthy . . . of high birth and exemplary life'. Bacchon's mother is a friend of hers, but clearly from a family of lower standing: she 'viewed the position (*baros*) and pride (*onkos*) of Ismenodora's family (*oikos*) with disquiet. It was altogether above the young man's station' (749e). The Greek terms *baros* and *onkos* mean respectively 'weight(iness)', 'influence', frequently in a bad sense of 'oppressiveness'; and 'mass', 'bulk', hence '(self-)importance', 'pride'. Thespiae was a small town, which filled up periodically for the great festivals of Eros and the Muses (F. Graf 2006). The people who mattered in such a place were Galen's 'few', and the mother's worries about the *baros* and *onkos* of her rich neighbours in the event of a mismatch were perfectly justified.

Matters of wealth and age centred on Ismenodora dominate the discussion for the first two-fifths of the essay alongside comments on the love of boys versus the *koinōnia* of married love. Again the conversation is brought back by Pisias to the fundamental issue of the *baros* and *onkos* of Ismenodora, whose wealth has enabled her to reject 'so many offers of honour, family, and wealth'. Shortly after this news is brought that she has taken matters into her own hands by kidnapping Bacchon from the gymnasium and is staging a marriage ceremony in her house, a 'virile' act which has led some – surely rightly – to identify her with the Markia Ismēnodōra who is named in first position on a list dating to the second half of the first century and commemorating the members of the 'upper gymnasium' at Thespiae.[17] Plutarch's friend Soclarus suggests that the whole affair has been staged by Bacchon, though Anthemion refuses to believe it (755). Fortunately both Pisias and Anthemion are called away by the events and this leaves Plutarch free to conduct a general disquisition on the nature of love, in which he states unequivocally, building distantly on and inverting the Stoics' justifications

[16] Görgemanns 2006 provides useful essays on various aspects of the text, particularly philosophical ones. Translations below are from Donald Russell's *Plutarch: Selected Dialogues and Essays*. Note in general Nikolaidis 1997 for a rich survey of Plutarch's thoughts on women across his corpus.

[17] *IG* VII.1777. Markia was evidently a benefactor of the institution. Cf. Görgemanns 2006: 10–11.

of boy-love (Babut 1969: 110–11), that women possess true virtue and are capable of real devotion. They can evoke love quite as much as boys (767a). Having set out the basis of the spiritual side of marriage, he turns to the sexual relationship that for him, as for Musonius, Bryson, and Clement of Alexandria, is an intrinsic part of the married condition and confirms the emotional investment of each partner in the other. 'The intercourse of man with man – immorality or assault, it would be better named . . . We regard men who take pleasure in passive submission as practising the lowest kind of vice . . . Yet for married couples, sexual relations are a foundation of affection (*archai tauta philias*), a communion, as it were, in a great mystery. The pleasure may be momentary, but the honour, grace, and mutual love and trust arising therefrom day by day proves the Delphians right when they gave Aphrodite the name Harma – "Harmony" – and Homer right when he used the word *philotēs* – "loving friendship" – of this association' (768f–769a). There follows a ringing endorsement of a woman's suite of virtues (cf. Phintys, Bryson, Musonius, and *Oikonomika III*): 'Why speak of their temperance, intelligence, loyalty, and justice, when manliness, boldness, and greatness of spirit are manifest in so many? . . . They are affectionate to children and husbands, they have a fund of loving care, abounding in persuasion and charm, a fertile soil for affection to grow . . . Nature endows them with charms for the eye, persuasiveness of tongue, and seductiveness of form; she therefore contributes both to the deceptive delights of the wanton woman and to the conjugal affection and kindliness of the chaste' (769b–c).[18] 'No mutual pleasures are greater, no mutual services more constant, no form of affection is more enviable and estimable for its sheer beauty than "When man and wife in harmony of mind / Keep house together" (*Odyssey* 6.183–4)' (770a). Love of boys hardly ever produces 'the permanent relationship' (*suzugia*) that exists between men and women, 'preserving a community (*koinōnia*) of loyalty and ardour in every circumstance' (770c). The dialogue ends with a rousing story of such loyalty followed by the news that they must all make haste to witness the sacrifice in celebration of the wedding of Bacchon and Ismenodora.

Plutarch does not enact a symmetry between man and woman: men are superior and that is that. The symmetry he is forcing on his readers' attention

[18] τί δὲ δεῖ λέγειν περὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ συνέσεως αὐτῶν, ἔτι δὲ πίστεως καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὅπου καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸ θαρραλέον καὶ τὸ μεγαλόψυχον ἐν πολλαῖς ἐπιφανὲς γέγονε . . . καὶ γὰρ φιλότεκνοι καὶ φίλανδροι, καὶ τὸ στερκτικὸν ὅλως ἐν αὐταῖς, ὥσπερ εὐφυὴς χώρα καὶ δεκτικὴ φιλίας, οὔτε πειθοῦς οὔτε χαρίτων ἄμοιρον ὑπόκειται . . . ἡ φύσις γυναικὶ περιθεῖσα χάριν ὄψεως καὶ φωνῆς πιθανότητα καὶ μορφῆς ἐπαγωγὸν εἶδος, τῇ μὲν ἀκολάστῳ πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀπάτην τῇ δὲ σώφρονι πρὸς εὔνοιαν ἀνδρὸς καὶ φιλίαν μεγάλα συνήργησεν.

is that between the Platonic/Stoic ideal of the perfect young man, who may attract true spiritual love according to philosophical ideals, and that of the wife, who is capable of giving and receiving spiritual love in exactly the same way. At the same time he insists on a clear distinction between sexual intercourse as a licit and essential expression of love between man and woman and sex between men, which he terms *akolasia*, 'immorality', and *epipēdēsis*, 'assault'/'rape' (a term implying animal behaviour; 768e). Bryson, Musonius, and Dio express comparable views about male–female married intercourse and pederastic or homosexual sex. This does not mean that men were having fewer sexual relations with men or boys. We have only to consider, to take one example, Libanius' remarkable oration from the end of the fourth century in Christian Antioch, the *De festorum invitationibus* (*Or.* 53), which deals with the problems boys even in the company of their fathers faced at public banquets from any predatory male sitting next to them, who would reach behind and, in Reiske's delicate paraphrase, 'digito pro pene utitur' (8).[19] In the later second century we have two well-known and intentionally amusing discussions of the relative sexual merits of boys and women, in which the bodies of boys are preferred (Achilles Tatius, *Leucippe and Clitophon* 2.35.3–38, cf. 1.8.1–9, Ps.-Lucian, *Loves*; Wilhelm 1902, Effe 1987), and the whole debate is taken up at length in Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists* Book 13. Yet in another way Plutarch, Musonius, Dio, and Bryson did predict the future and help to shape it, for they certainly had an input into Christian morality and regulation, in which (practice notwithstanding) male–male sex was strongly anathematized.

As far as their own society is concerned in the first and early second centuries, it is impossible to determine the truth about sexual practices. But the condemnation of sex between men in conjunction with the valorization of sex between man and woman within marriage is deliberated and significant. Nor is it simply a moral matter. The emotional and physical investment in marriage in the *Dialogue on Love* is placed against a background of friendships and rivalries within and between the leading families of a small town. The marriage has caused widespread 'disturbances' and friction among the magistrates responsible for regulating the young men, the gymnasiarchs (756a), but it ends with all sides united in the 'procession through the agora to the temple' (771d). The civic–political dimension cannot be missed. The link between the families of Ismenodora and Bacchon threw up its own

[19] J. J. Reiske, *Libanii sophistae orationes et declamationes*, vol. 3, p. 112 n. Cf. 53.10 on the father who prostitutes his son so his belly is filled not with food 'sed eo modo, quo virgini venter solet impleri, semente humana (Reiske, p. 114 n.).

particular issues and problems around wealth, status, and age. The spotlight cast on it and the way in which all sides come together to validate it shows the central role of marriage as an institution. The *Dialogue*'s job is to analyse its basis and to promote its benefits and pleasures.

The combination of social and family life in the context of a strong endorsement of marriage is at the centre of *Advice on Marriage*, which is the second key work by Plutarch in this area.[20] *Advice* is addressed to the son of Plutarch's friend Soclarus (see above), L. Flavius Pollianus Aristion, and his new wife, Memmia Eurydice (Puech 1981, 1992: 4873, 4879–83, 4849; S. B. Pomeroy 1999: 42–3). Unusually Plutarch calls his friend's son by his Roman name, Pollianus, whereas he tends to call Greek speakers who possessed Roman citizenship by their Greek names only. Perhaps this was how the younger generation wished to be known. The wife, Eurydice, was the daughter of a priestess at Delphi called Clea (Puech 1992: 4842–3). It was for her that Plutarch wrote his short work *Virtues of Women*, where he sets out the Platonic thesis that female virtue is the same as male with qualitative differences. The families were, then, well known to Plutarch and perfect recipients of his work.

Advice puts the issues around marriage in sharper relief than the *Dialogue*. The majority of the 'similitudes' (so chosen, Plutarch says, because they would be easy to remember) are addressed to Eurydice and this includes much of the long final section (no. 48) which attempts to deter her, with Pollianus' assistance, from 'absurd behaviour'. The overall tone is of the wife's submissiveness, but not inferiority, before her husband. There is plenty of talk of sharing, but the shares turn out to have unequal worth. Nevertheless, this *oikodespoina* (140c, 141d, 141f, 142b), a word that may have had a Neopythagorean connotation,[21] has her own status and the couple are invited to act like a unit, paying attention to one another's feelings and making their marriage bed a place of reconciliation, respect, and pleasure. The 'discourse of marriage,' says Plutarch at the start, is where 'philosophy charms those who come together to share their lives,[22] and makes them gentle and amenable to each other' (138b). At the very end the work is stated to be for those who 'admire culture (*paideia*) and philosophy'.

[20] Παραγγέλματα γαμικά. I prefer this title to Russell's *Advice to Bride and Groom*. I again use Russell's translation, with changes, and indicate the key Greek terms in brackets. See the essays in S. B. Pomeroy 1999, including that of Goessler.

[21] It occurs in Theano's letter to Timareta along with οἰκοδεσπότης (the letter is known from Pollux, *Onomasticon* 10.21 = p. 200 Thesleff) and in Phintys, is otherwise rare, but is found in Plutarch seven times.

[22] τοὺς ἐπὶ βίου κοινωνίᾳ συνιόντας.

There is much traditional material here, but also much that is new. 'A marriage between lovers has natural unity (*sumphuēs*); a marriage for money or children is made of units connected together; a marriage based simply on the pleasure of sleeping together is made of separate units, and should be called cohabitation (*sunoikein*) rather than a shared life (*sumbioun*). Scientists tell us that liquids mix completely (*di' holōn genesthai tēn krāsin*): so should the bodies, resources, friends, and connections of a married couple', for they have 'everything in common' (no. 35, 142f–143a). The idea of a 'shared life' is key in Musonius' 'What Is the Main Purpose of Marriage?' (see below, pp. 337–9) and for him having children is a significant expression of unity; but Plutarch hardly mentions children in *Advice*, and this is clearly conscious. When he does mention them at no. 20, 140e, the reference is technical (*to gennōmenon*) and has to do with sharing of bodies; again, at no. 42, 144b, the concern is with adultery (not sowing seed in another body) rather than with children themselves. *Dialogue on Love* again only mentions children tangentially (752a). In *Advice* Plutarch concentrates on the couple and their relationship. This befits newly weds, but it also serves to focus on the specific relationship of husband and wife at any point in the marriage. In Plutarch's circle parents would, of course, have benefited from slaves to look after the children, and they may thus have impinged less on that relationship than for other social groups. He insists on the 'tunefulness of marriage' and on the couple acting together through 'persuasion' (preface, 138c). 'The husband should rule the wife, not as a master rules a slave, but as the soul rules the body, sharing her feelings and growing together with her in affection (*eunoia*)' (no. 33, 142e). There are parallels here with the Neopythagorean treatise of Callicratidas (p. 318). Again, 'it is good for a wife to share her husband's feelings, and a husband his wife's, so that, just as ropes gain strength from the twisting of the strands, so their communion (*koinōnia*) may be the better preserved by their joint efforts, through mutual exchanges of good will (*eunoia*)' (no. 20, 140e). The idea of shared feelings is *sumpatheia*. It is quite natural to Plutarch to express it in the same breath as he speaks of the husband's traditional 'rule'; and in another context the limitation of freedom extends into the emotional responses of the wife, who must match her husband's mood and have 'no feelings of her own' (14, 140a *idion pathos*). Plutarch is particularly alert to disputes; the theme of minor or serious annoyances runs throughout the work from the end of the preface as the ever-present danger of discord in the 'shared life'. All of this makes *Advice* more real (and there are good parallels in Bryson and *Oikonomika III*). The answer for most of difficulties is the marital bed. 'You

should reflect that it is wrong to sleep together for pleasure while sleeping apart when you are angry or have a difference; for that is especially the time to call in Aphrodite, who is the best doctor for such troubles. Homer teaches this lesson, when he makes Hera say: "I'll end this endless quarrel / letting him come to me in love to bed." A wife must always and everywhere avoid offending her husband, and a husband his wife. It is particularly important to be careful about this in sleeping together . . . [D]isputes, quarrels, and angry passions bred in bed cannot easily be resolved at any other time or place' (nos. 38–9, 143c–e).

Some of these disputes concern sexual practices, a topic Clement is more specific about than Plutarch and other authors.[23] At no. 10, 139c, respect/self-respect/modesty (*aidōs*) is what the virtuous wife (*sōphrōn*) wears in bed when her clothes are off, 'and the sign of great love is great modesty (*aidesthai*) towards each other'. At no. 47, 144f–145a, the husband 'should respect (*aidesthai*) no one more than he does his wife. The bedroom will be her school of discipline (*eutaxia*) or immorality (*akolasia*). A husband who enjoys pleasures which he prohibits in his wife is like a man who tells his wife to fight the enemy to whom he has himself surrendered.' At no. 16, 140b, a man who is *akratēs* in his sexual pleasures should pursue these with 'a mistress or a maidservant' – boys are not mentioned – out of 'respect' for his wife in order to spare her from immorality and physical abuse (*hubris*). The good husband should of course keep himself 'pure and clean of intercourse with others' when he goes 'to his wife's bed' (no. 44, 144d). But chaste sexual practices are clearly more important to Plutarch than absolute fidelity. The expectation is that the wife will not (want to) do things in bed that a mistress will (so that a mistress has a complementary function): 'it is precisely when the lamp has been removed that (the wife) needs to be different from ordinary women; when her body is not seen, her chastity, her faithfulness, her discipline, and her affection must be apparent' (no. 46, 144e).

Plutarch, like Clement (*Paedagogus* 2.10.96.2–97.2), evidently considered sex proper only in the marital bed in the dark. A passage in *Table Talk* 7.8 throws a nice sidelight on the thought behind this. Plutarch's friends are here discussing subjects suitable as entertainment for men who go out and attend dinner parties, in other words, practically every member of the

[23] *Paedagogus* 2.10.83–7 (Sources Chrétiennes edition, 1965); here Clement condemns anything other than face-to-face, vaginal intercourse, i.e. procreative intercourse, with frank (cf. 2.10.92.3) allegorical interpretation of the bodies and behaviour of the hare and the hyena (cf. *Letter of Barnabas* 10; Pujiula 2006: 319–23; and possibly in allusion to contraceptive strategies, Augustine's 'membro mulieris non . . . concesso', *On the Good of Marriage* 11.12; ignored in Hopkins' study of contraception in the Roman empire, 1965: 140; cf. Chapter 6, p. 367).

educated/social elite of the Greek town.[24] The speaker Diogenianus, who always reflects Plutarch's views (Puech 1992: 4846), recommends performances of the plays of Menander to the wine-drinking guests.

> The blend of seriousness and humour seems to have been composed for no other reason than that of combining pleasure with profit for men who have been drinking and relaxing. Why, even the parts about love are right for men who have been imbibing and will be going to bed soon enough when they leave for their own wives. In all these plays there is no love-affair with a boy. Seductions of virgins usually turn into marriage. Relationships with girls who are forthright and bold are cut short by being taught a lesson or by second thoughts on the part of the young men. With nice girls who return love for love a respectable father is discovered to exist or more time is measured out for the affair, which allows for the sympathetic workings of conscience. Now, for people who are doing something else, none of this may be worthy of attention. But when we are drinking I wouldn't find it surprising if the plays' delightful polish not only has a formative influence but also a reforming effect which makes our characters kinder and fairer. (712c–d)

The absence of pederasty and the emphasis on marriage go hand in hand. This is the 'reforming effect' that puts men in polite society in the right frame of mind for sleeping with their wedded wives.

For Plutarch love without sex (*ta aphrodisia*) was impossible: 'If Eros . . . can exist without Aphrodite – as there can be drunkenness without wine, from drinks made of figs or barley – the excitement it causes is barren and unconsummated, quickly turning to satiety and disgust' (*Dialogue* 752b). Consensual sex was only thinkable with a woman, and only approvable with a wife. This is the private experience at the heart of marriage. But for most of the time the couple were on show and needed to behave as a unit. 'The houses of the rich,' says Plutarch, are filled with a 'great noisy throng of visitors saying hello and shaking hands' (*On Having Many Friends* 94a–b). This picture of the big house crops up in several of the oeconomica, which take note of wider family and friends. By opening the door the wife opened herself to title-tattle and superstitions (no. 19, 140c–d, cf. no. 48, 145c–d; no. 40, 143e). Yet she was 'mistress of the estate'. This means real responsibility in Bryson; and if the role is underplayed or unstated in Plutarch, that is because it was obvious to all his readers. It was the man who went out to the agora, and this is where his personal life was especially on display and where he was open to temptation. If he 'proposes to produce harmony in the city or in the marketplace [i.e. in business relations] or among his own friends, he must have harmony

[24] For the potentially deleterious effects on health, see Swain 2008: 126–7 on Rufus of Ephesus' case history of the man who became ill as a result of late dining, 132 on Plutarch's guidance about such problems in *Advice on Health*.

at home'. And Plutarch warns him that, 'Wrongs committed by wives are more often overlooked than wrongs done to them' (no. 43, 144c). With the man's power came Libanius' 'obligation to be self-controlled' (see above).

The theme of putting one's own house in order before advising others is a strong one throughout Plutarch's moral–political essays (and indeed in his *Parallel Lives*). At *Advice* 144c it is the man's wrongdoing towards his wife which is unlikely to *lanthanein tous pollous*, literally 'to escape the notice of most', implying that the social–political process itself depends on domestic fidelity and harmony. This is the domain in which the husband must 'practise' before he steps out into public (*On Anger* fr. 148, cf. Isocrates, *Nicocles* 41). The lives of notables like Pollianus and Eurydice were social and political, like Ismenodora's. They interleaved duties to the community with duties to 'the families each of us has come from'. This, in a word, is the reason for the attention to marriage which is behind the book of 'precepts' (*parangelmata*) Plutarch sent them, with its focus on the dynamics of their emotional and sexual life and the association between Pollianus' behaviour as a 'free man' and his conduct towards his spouse. To this extent there is conjugality and symmetry; at the same time we must remember that Pollianus is told to 'rule', and Eurydice to refrain from 'absurd behaviour'. This ethics was addressed to male and female, but it was, as Foucault might have said, focussed on the husband and in his favour.

2 FROM XENOPHON TO THE NEOPYTHAGOREANS

(a) Xenophon

The relationship of the married couple is built into the oeconomic genre from the start. In Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* the economic functioning of the estate depends on the *koinōnia* between husband and wife. But there is a complete absence of emotional experience, and absolutely no suggestion that the husband, Ischomachus, will learn anything about himself from successfully understanding the feelings of his wife. That said, the wife's role within the unit is highly significant, so much so in fact that Xenophon 'is the first Greek author to give full recognition to the use-value of women's work, and to understand that domestic labour has economic value even if it lacks exchange-value' (S. B. Pomeroy 1994: 59). When set beside traditional views of earlier and later authors Xenophon appears radical.[25] It is clear that

[25] I rely here on Sarah Pomeroy's translations in her parallel text edition (1994) except for one or two instances, and have profited from her excellent commentary.

Bryson was heavily influenced by him, with one crucial difference: Bryson's wife does not work, she manages.

Traditional marriage in classical Athens involved the formal 'giving away' of the bride by her father or guardian. When Ischomachus' bride is introduced in ch. 7 of the *Oeconomicus*, Socrates casually notes that Ischomachus has 'received' her from 'her father and mother'. The joint arrangement looks forward to some of the Hellenistic marriage contracts and signals the level of involvement Xenophon expects in the woman. The marriage was arranged, as normal, and the bride was aged fifteen, again in accordance with prevailing norms. She knew only 'how to take wool and produce a cloak'. Immediately Ischomachus is cast into the paternal role of kindly educator (a role for which we have already been prepared in the frame dialogue between Socrates and the rich Athenian Critobulus, 3.10–15). 'Tell me what you began by teaching her?' (7.9). Ischomachus replies that his wife was first 'tamed and domesticated so as to be able to carry on a discussion (*dialegesthai*)'; this is a rebuke to Critobulus, who hardly talks to his wife (3.12), and an elevation of the wife into the male world of philosophical instruction (with interesting implications: cf. Humphreys 1993: 44). Ischomachus and his bride were both chosen to be the 'best partner' for the benefit of the *oikos* and for having children together. The estate is *koinos* and 'there is no need to calculate precisely which of us has contributed more' (i.e. money, a position explicitly rejected by Plutarch, *Advice* no. 20, 140f). Ischomachus quickly finds out to his delight that his wife's main qualification is 'self-control' (*sōphronein*), *the* female moral quality (and the subject of Phintys' treatise); he immediately claims this as his own also (cf. 2.1). It is this quality that will put 'their property . . . in the very best condition' and result in 'the greatest possible increase . . . by just and honourable means'. Her desire is indeed to 'help increase the *oikos*'. She is likened to the queen bee in charge of a hive, a commonplace image which is noteworthy because the lead bee was often considered to be male. The gods have made this 'yoke' to produce children, who will care for their parents in old age, and shelter (7.4–19). We next have a section with analogues in the 'anthropology' subgenre (Chapter 3, pp. 228–9) describing the complementary division of jobs between male (outdoor) and female (indoor) (7.20–5). Both partners show 'concern' (*epimeleia*) to the same degree, both are 'continent' or 'restrained' (*enkrateis*). The gods and the law supervise joint procreation and joint ownership, and (importantly) their respective realms of operation (7.26–32). The wife is again the queen bee, a position which, says Ischomachus, gives her control over the slaves and the finances.

This *de facto* recognition of the responsibilities of the wife's role on a large estate belonging to a member of the liturgical class (i.e. those who were

obliged to undertake major public benefactions) does not correspond to the formal legal capacity of the woman in classical Athens or to the 'normal situation' of the average family (Schaps 1979: 15). In the frame dialogue Socrates expresses the same view as Ischomachus: 'property (*ktēmata*) generally comes into the house through the exertions of the husband, but it is mostly dispensed through the *tamieumata* of the wife. If these activities are performed well, estates increase, but if they are managed incompetently, estates diminish' (3.15). The word *tamieumata* (of which this is one of only three occurrences listed by the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*[26]) seems here to mean 'acts of stewardship' or 'financial decisions' – we might compare Musonius' (and almost certainly Bryson's) description of the wife as *eklogistikē* ('capable of calculating', 'financially able'). This is how Philodemus interpreted Xenophon, as we shall see shortly. Ischomachus' comments are unambitious in Pomeroy's translation: 'you must receive what is brought inside (*ta eispheromena*) and dispense as much as should be spent. And you must plan ahead and guard whatever must remain in reserve' (7.35–6, cf. 7.39). But perhaps we should translate 'what is brought inside' as 'income' (in cash and kind) and take 'guard whatever must remain in reserve' (ἃ δ' ἂν περιττεύειν δέῃ) as 'preserve the sums which are to constitute the surplus'; for there is economic planning here, and it is the wife's duty to manage it. We might recall that, in the opening conversation with Socrates, Critobulus says he needs a 'big surplus (*periousia*)' to pay for his civic and social obligations (2.5–10). Thus I think Pomeroy is right to take *dianomē* at 7.39 as 'budgeting'. Here and in 7.40 the equal worth of the wife's economic input is strongly affirmed. Furthermore, she is to have the pleasure of teaching servants the skill of spinning to 'double' their value, which corresponds roughly to the known exchange value of skilled over unskilled slaves.

The next chapter (ch. 8) is the hymn to order – 'the discussion I had with her about the arrangement (*taxis*) and use (*chrēsis*) of our equipment'. This is the wife's job, and if the decision where to put things is joint (8.10), in practice Ischomachus gives the instructions on how to carry it out (9.2). This allows him to tour the house showing his wife what needs to be done where. Both are responsible for appointing and training the 'housekeeper' (*tamias*). The wife is masculinized (cf. Murnaghan 1988, and above) as 'guardian of the laws' and 'garrison commander' in relation to her rule over the household, but is also 'queen' (9.15). (Later on she is constituted as judge of Ischomachus, 11.25.) Her main lesson in management is that she herself must take responsibility for what are 'her own possessions' (9.17–19).

[26] www.tlg.uci.edu/. To which add Philodemus: see below, p. 306.

The final thoughts about the wife concern sexual attractiveness (ch. 10). Ischomachus begins with the already standard misogynistic topos of make-up and its deceptiveness, which he approaches from the angle of his own honesty about revealing the value of his property and the fact that he does not adorn himself. The section is introduced by Socrates' observation that the wife has a 'masculine mind' (*andrikē dianoia*). Ischomachus tells her that they had been 'joined in marriage to share our bodies with each other'. Naturally in Ischomachus' presentation the wife understands the error of cosmetics when he explains the pleasure for her of seeing and touching his own natural skin with its 'good complexion' (10.4–5). He fantasizes about improving his wife's own complexion by means of the exercise occasioned by the household chores (an idea with a long history ahead of it), and then confides in Socrates that 'compared with a slave (*diakonos*), the appearance of a wife who is unadorned and suitably dressed becomes a sexual stimulant (*kinētikon*), especially when she is willing to please as well, whereas (a female slave) is compelled to submit' (10.12). Whether Ischomachus is really alluding to the attractiveness of male and female slaves as Pomeroy suggests (since *diakonos* is of common gender), the compulsion is explicitly only of a female (*anankazomenēn*). Xenophon has now said all he wants to say about Ischomachus' wife, and Socrates remarks drily, 'I think I've heard all I need to know about your wife's activities for now' (11.1).

In this account both gods and human laws segregate the duties of the spouses (7.29–31). Thus, while the relationship of Ischomachus and his wife is shared, it is strongly demarcated. Likewise in their sexual relationship they share their bodies; but this relation is not an exclusive one for Ischomachus, for he clearly has slave girls or possibly boys as well. There is *philia*, 'affection', but it is not a means to integrate the couple to be 'a complete mixture' in Plutarch's Stoicizing terminology.[27] The very attractiveness of the wife is assured by her oeconomic chore of 'shaking and folding clothes and linens' (10.11). There is no integrated relationship.

Xenophon had an enormous influence on later Greek literature. As Philodemus remarked, 'Everyone has mined (the *Oeconomicus*) as the preeminent source' for this topic. It is hardly surprising that his breakdown of the duties and responsibilities of the couple remained appealing. Cicero translated the work and this gave Xenophon a new lease of life in the Roman world. The author who tells us most about this is Columella in his remarks on the slave farmer's wife at the start of *On Agriculture* Book 12, and it is worth having a brief look at this. Columella's *vilica* is a substitute in the

[27] Ultimately developing *Laws* 773d.

modern age for the good Roman wife of yesteryear, and the preface to the book is a summary of Cicero's lost version of the *Oeconomicus*. Either Cicero or Columella emphasized more than the original the divinely planned complementarity between male and female. This allowed Columella to combine his usual gripe about decline (Chapter 3, pp. 162, 179) with a reactionary, misogynistic depiction of today's Roman woman, who spends her husband's wealth rather than conserving it. Since he does not want to appear too censorious of 'the morals of our times', he then turns to the duties of the *vilica* who does what the *matrona* should be doing. The introduction to her duties has some recognizable themes (12.1–3). She should not be too ugly or too beautiful, for the *vilicus* himself must neither be 'turned off' (*aversus*) nor permanently 'complexibus adiacentem feminae'. The master's complete control over his slaves' bodies is presupposed, in fact, in the whole account, and this explains what Columella chooses or discards from his source and what he adds to it. Bailiff and wife must resemble each other in character and must both ardently hope to be rewarded by their master for good behaviour. Like Xenophon, Columella gives the husband overall responsibility for the domestic affairs. She must stay 'at home' completely or for the most part. Details of her tasks in the house are provided to the extent that so appalled Philodemus. Columella takes his chance to follow Ischomachus and hymn the wonders of good order (12.2.1–3.5), following this with advice on the *vilica*'s tough management of the lower slaves. Of course there is nothing on joint ownership by these slave stewards. Given the very straight tracks along which Columella is moving in refashioning Xenophon for the world of the slave-owner, we can say nothing about what this Roman male actually thought about the freeborn wife.

(b) Philodemus

Before turning to Aristotle and Ps.-Aristotle, it is worth staying in the Roman period to hear what Philodemus (Chapter 3, pp. 208–25) made of Xenophon in his *On Oikonomia*. As far as Epicurus was concerned, 'the wise man shall not marry or produce children' (Diogenes Laertius 10.119).[28] So we should expect his follower to disapprove of involving the wife in the running of the *oikos*. In the frame dialogue of the *Oeconomicus*, Socrates upholds the worth of wives working with husbands for the good of the estate: 'I can show you

[28] Reading μὴν μή for μήν with Marcovich's Teubner (1999); the negative is guaranteed by what follows, 'he may marry if there is some special circumstance in life'. The Stoics said special circumstances allowed one *not* to marry (Hierocles, *On Marriage*, Stobaeus 4.22a.22 = p. 502 Hense, p. 73 Ramelli).

men who treat their wives so as to have fellow workers (*sunergoi*) in improving their estates, while others treat them in such a way that they cause utter disaster'; and in answer to Critobulus' obtuse question about whether the man or the wife is to blame for disasters, Socrates replies that, 'if she manages badly, although she was taught what is right by her husband, perhaps it would be proper to blame her. But if he doesn't teach her what is right and good and then discovers that she has no knowledge of these qualities, wouldn't it be proper to blame the husband?' He asks Critobulus, 'Is there anyone to whom you entrust a greater number of serious matters than your wife?' Having received an affirmative answer, he goes on to specify the contribution of her *tamieumata* (see above). It is this passage that riles Philodemus.

> Critobulus is obviously well aware that some men have wives working with them (*sunergōs*) in making money (*chrēmatismos*), but others have wives who are terribly harmful (in this regard). Whether a wife is something necessary and advantageous for estate management conducted on a philosophical basis (*hē philosophos oikonomia*) and in general for the peaceful life; and, further, whether every woman is capable of being taught what is relevant; and whether the man should be responsible for all the errors or for some or them, (Critobulus) perhaps did not know and could have expected to learn from Socrates. (Col. ii.3–19)

He then outlines Socrates' remarks on the contribution of the wife to the economic planning of the estate (her *tamieumata*). 'And this is a lie; and if it's not, it's simplistic; and if it's not, it's unclear for which profit [text breaks off].' Such is Philodemus' irate conclusion to the suggestion that the wife helps to increase the estate's value. It chimes with his blast against the comparable idea of Ps.-Aristotle (Theophrastus in his mind) that the wife is important for the success of the *oikos* (Chapter 3, pp. 212–13). For this Epicurean of the first century BC, there was no question of a conjugal marriage improving the *oikos*, and the suggestion was unacceptable.

(c) Ps.-Aristotle, Oikonomika I

Ps.-Aristotle on the wife's role in the *oikos* is enlightened in contrast to Philodemus, but not in absolute terms. In Aristotle's *Politics* the *oikos* is the bedrock of the *polis*. But Aristotle actually has surprisingly little to say about the relationship of the husband with the wife, which he evidently did not consider to be an essential part of the functioning of the family estate.[29]

[29] On late antique reports of an *Oikonomikos* (*vel sim.*) by Aristotle with the same topics as Bryson but in reverse order, see Chapter 2, p. 129.

Ischomachus asserts that he had told his wife he would be happy if she made 'me your servant' (7.42), and, as we have seen, there are other examples of the masculinization of her role, which is an attempt to express the idea that her contribution is equal in some way. There is certainly no possibility of this in the Aristotelian tradition. In *Politics* Aristotle merely says that the husband rules the wife: 'the male is by nature better suited to leadership', for the male is always superior in relation to the female (1259b2–10). In response to the proposals of Plato's Socrates to abolish marriage and families, Aristotle asks in panic, 'Who will manage the house?' (1264b2). This paucity of comment left the author of *Oikonomika 1* an opportunity to fill in the gaps, while keeping to the tenor of what he had been taught.

Oikonomika 1 stresses that 'the elements of the house are both personnel and property'. The importance of the wife is brought out in the quotation of Hesiod's *Works and Days*, which Philodemus chose to read so differently (Chapter 3, pp. 212–13). He concludes that, 'Matters concerning the relationship (*homilia*) with the wife have to be managed carefully (*oikonomēsasthai kalōs*). This means establishing exactly what kind of relationship it should be' (1343a23–4).[30] This is then developed in chs. 3 and 4. In ch. 3 *koinōnia* is the natural form of organization of male and female. The focus is on procreation. People 'cooperate for the good life (*to eu einai*)'; but this orthodox Aristotelian goal is immediately defined as the 'advantage' of being able to have children who (as in Xenophon) will care for one in old age (1343b21–3). It is then emphasized that the relationship of male and female is one of complementarity which 'aims at *koinōnia*': man and wife 'are distinguished by the fact that their abilities are not adapted all to the same means, but some of them are opposites, though they tend towards a common goal' (1343b27–9), which is exactly the point Aristotle makes in his discussion of *philia* between spouses at *Ethics* 1162a22–3. Ps.-Aristotle then continues his binary scheme, developing *Oeconomicus* 7.18–25 in a manner which was to prove popular in later authors including Bryson. The one sex is stronger, the other weaker; the one is better at guarding (*phulaktikōteron*), the other at active defence, the one acquires, the other saves, the one is sedentary, the other 'good for action'. And he finishes on the matter of most importance to him: procreation is 'shared', but thereafter the couple divide between them the jobs of 'nurturing' (mother) and 'educating' (father).

[30] Cf. Wartelle (Wartelle and van Groningen 1968: 2) 'établir quel genre de relations, etc.', rather than 'what sort of woman she ought to be' (Forster 1921 in the Oxford Aristotle translation, cf. Zoepffel 2006: 16), for the choice of wife is not pursued.

Chapter 4 addresses the form of the relationship, beginning with certain 'conventions' (*nomoi*[31]). First is the injunction to the husband 'not to do wrong, for in this way he himself is less likely to be wronged' (1344a8–9). The wife has the status of a suppliant (*hiketis*) in her new house 'as the Pythagoreans say'; and wrongdoing is specified: 'relationships on the man's part outside the house'. As commentators note, the idea of 'outside' sexual pleasures is a topos in classical literature; but it also accords with Aristotle's prohibition of adultery in the ideal city of *Politics* Book 7. Abstention is situated in self-interest ('less likely to be wronged'), not engagement with the wife either as marital or economic partner. The next sentence – 'concerning relations' (*homilia*) – is difficult to interpret and too concise to avoid the need for expansion both in the Greek and in translation; but there is no doubt that it reflects the husband's perspective.[32] It probably does not concern the wife's sexual appetite, as some translators have wanted it to (with reference to ancient misogynistic views), nor the husband's (Forster 1921), but the wife's level of dependency on the husband: 'there should be no need of him when he is there' – 'le donne non devono importunare i mariti' in Renato Laurenti's version,[33] 'la femme n'ait pas à poser continuellement des questions à son mari' (Wartelle 1968) – 'nor should she be unable to remain quiet when he is away, but (he) should accustom (her) to be capable when he is there or not there'. Bryson §84 speaks of the expectation of the wife's abilities during the man's presence or absence (etc.), which may confirm this interpretation. Habit formation is characteristically Peripatetic and the following quotation from Hesiod (*Works and Days* 699) explicitly states the advantages of marrying a young woman/virgin to ensure this and glosses the quotation by saying that, 'differences in habits completely destroy affection' (1344a18). The idea of the *parthenos* is here less about sexual than moral purity, and it is the same emphasis on habit forming that is voiced by Ischomachus. The theme continues with remarks on adornment/dress/display (*kosmēsis*): just as husband and wife should not 'approach each other showing falseness in their characters', nor should this happen with their bodies, or they will be like actors on the stage.

[31] On the text here and the possible meanings of *nomoi*, see Zoepffel 2006: 452–4. As she notes, there is no reason to see a sign of the Νόμοι ἀνδρὸς καὶ γαμετῆς attributed to Aristotle in the late-antique catalogue of Hesychius (Rose 1886: 17 no. 166; cf., Chapter 2, p. 129).

[32] περὶ δὲ ὁμιλίας μήθ' ὥστε <παρόντος> δεῖσθαι μήθ'ὡς ἀπόντος ἀδυνατεῖν ἡσυχάζειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἐθίζειν ὥστε ἱκανῶς ἔχειν παρόντος καὶ μὴ παρόντος. Van Groningen (Wartelle and van Groningen 1968:4) brackets ἡσυχάζειν 'ut duplicem lectionem'. See Victor 1983: 134–7 for the various interpretations.

[33] In Natali 1995a. Natali (p. 43), interprets it as a call for the wife to be 'piuttosto fredda sul piano erotico'.

So ends *Oikonomika 1* on the wife. Apart from the second quotation of Hesiod, the word 'marry'/'marriage' does not occur because the focus is actually very narrow: children. There is nothing on the wife's economic input and no question of presenting her as joint owner of the estate. In this sense the text is far 'behind' Xenophon. As I have remarked, Xenophon's wife probably has far more to do with the estate, and receives far greater recognition for it, than his male contemporaries allowed in their own lives. Nevertheless, if we take the well-known, earliest marriage contract from Elephantine in Egypt dating to 311 BC (P.Eleph. 1; translation in e.g. Hunt and Edgar, *Select Papyri*), i.e. from around the time of *Oikonomika 1*, which is one of the fullest and best preserved of all the contracts, we find the integrity of the wife's dowry strongly emphasized along with the requirement for its repayment, with a fine of the same value, if the husband does wrong. This offers a rather different view of the wife's position in marriage, at least in theory. We might perhaps recall the limited objective and the compression of *Oikonomika 1* to account for its regressive presentation; but the misogynism of its Aristotelian heritage is more relevant.

(d) The Stoics: Antipater of Tarsus

Nothing much is known about the earlier Stoics' view of the wife in the *oikos*; it is unlikely there was anything very positive or surprising, even though the Stoics were decidedly in favour of marriage on the ground that it assisted the state (Zeno, *SVF* 1.270) and advantaged man and wife (Praechter 1901: 68, 88, 121–50 on Stoic and other περὶ γάμου literature; Torre 2000: 19–22 on the older Stoics, 22–28 on Antipater). The changed ethical position of the middle and later Stoics allowed their thought to pass beyond the confines of the School. And from the later second century BC are preserved extracts of an evidently well-read treatise by Antipater of Tarsus, which was probably known to Bryson. In a short but incisive study Daniel Babut (1963) disagreed with the thesis set out by Praechter (1901: 149–50) that the later Stoics were even more in favour of marriage and were consequently against pederasty, and there is something in what he says. An orthodox Stoic like Marcus Aurelius could still uphold the old Stoic ideal of boy love (as opposed to boy sex) at *Meditations* 3.2.3 ('with chaste eyes'), in the same way that the orthodox, hack Platonist orator, Maximus of Tyre, lays down the purity of Socratic love towards the end of the second century (*Orr.* 18–21; Buffière 1980: 543–50, translated in Trapp 1997). But one cannot look at schools in isolation by the time of Plutarch or before. It is really most unlikely that Hierocles the Stoic (as Babut wants) wrote a lost tract on the

joys of innocent boy love. As Plutarch said, love involves sex. Musonius and Dio (neither of whom is a full-time Stoic) attack male homosexual practices and are not so naïve as to include paeans to the unsullied virtue of the ideal youth.

As we have seen in Chapter 3, Antipater (d. *c.* 130 BC) had serious interests in economic thought. But he is better known today for the two extracts from his work concerning marriage, which are preserved by Stobaeus. The first (4.22a.25) is a longish piece from an *On Marriage*. The second is short with the title *On Living with a Wife* (4.22d.103), but is probably part of the same treatise (Hense 1920–4: 300–2).[34] In the first extract Antipater begins by saying that the 'young nobleman', who is 'civilized and public-spirited (*politikos*), understands that both his *oikos* and his life will not be 'complete' without a wife and children. Every house (*oikia*) and city needs descendants. The patriotic duty, he says in keeping with classic Stoic policy, is to breed, especially for the 'best citizens'. 'Being blended together in marriage' is one of the 'primary duties' for the 'salvation' of the city and to bring 'honour' to the gods. Wife and children allow one to taste 'the most true and genuine affection (*eunoia*)'. Other minglings are like the way pulses are served on the plate, but with men and women we have 'total mixtures, like wine with water' (cf. Plutarch). Property (*ousia*), children, soul, bodies – all are shared. But the wife looks to '"one soul"' (quoting Euripides), that of the man. Antipater then laments the decline of marriage which contemporaries consider like letting a garrison into one's town. They do not take the trouble to instruct the wife about 'estate management or how to increase the estate or the reason they have come together or piety towards the gods'. In fact the 'wedded wife is one of the sweetest and lightest of burdens'. Instead of one hand or foot, one suddenly has two for one's needs. One gains two pairs of eyes and hands. 'Another self' will prove indispensable for helping you do your literary or civic work. The more we are distracted from *oikonomia*, the more we require somebody else to take on the *dioikēsis*, 'administration', of the estate. In the second extract Antipater gives a warning, with some humour, about taking courtship seriously and not being duped by wealth, lineage, or beauty. Look at the parents' qualities, he advises. Have they brought the daughter up like them or spoilt her? Inquire by all means and persons having social or business contacts with the family. This material was used by Nicostratus of Macedon (early to mid second century AD) for his traditional but also humorous look at choosing a wife (*On Marriage*), which is also preserved in Stobaeus (4.22d.102,23.62–5).

[34] Translations can be found in Gaiser 1974: 36–9 and Deming 2004: 221–30.

These extracts show us that, if there are elements in Antipater of the economic role the wife plays in the *Oeconomicus*, the level is low; and that Antipater's wife, a burden but a nice one, is there simply to help the husband in what appears to be a familiar dissymmetry. Emotional and physical conjugality is not on the agenda. The wife provides children for house and city. This point of view ('politisch–patriotisch'; Praechter 1901: 68) is still on display in Hierocles 250 years or so later; and its presence, albeit in the background, can certainly be seen in the more 'advanced' ideas of marriage in Bryson, Plutarch, and Musonius.

(e) The Neopythagoreans

Bryson is a Neopythagorean text, at least in form. He certainly has things in common with the Neopythagorean oeconomica on the subject of marriage and family life. The Neopythagorean texts as a whole are a diverse group consisting of semi-philosophical and ethical works which are difficult to date (see the studies cited at Chapter 2, p. 124 n. 25). In the modern literature on the oeconomica Bryson is mentioned only in passing, if at all, because of his exiguous remains in Greek. Of the other Stobaean oeconomic extracts, Phintys (*On Woman's Self-Control*, *Περὶ γυναικὸς σωφροσύνας*) and Perictione (*On Woman's Harmony*, *Περὶ γυναικὸς ἁρμονίας*) also receive marginal interest in comparison with more philosophical treatises. Callicratidas (*On the Happiness of the Estate*, Περὶ οἴκου εὐδαιμονίας[35]) has fared better, since he was at least the subject of detailed discussion in Armand Delatte's *Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne* (1922). Fortunately all four works were examined in Wilhelm's 1915 study of 'Die Oeconomica der Neupythagoreer'. The Neopythagorean letters which share themes with the oeconomica have, again, been the subject of a detailed treatment by Alfons Städele (1980).[36] Both Wilhelm and Städele advance strong contextual arguments, including specific linguistic points, for dating these texts to the first or second century AD. Their studies need to be consulted directly to assess the weight of their arguments, and one must remember that they may be wrong. In his *Introduction* to Neopythagorean literature Holger Thesleff placed all these works in the Hellenistic era; and there is no doubt

[35] I give the *koinē* form of the title used by Thesleff from Stobaeus 4.22d.101; Stobaeus uses the Doric form at 4.28.16 Περὶ οἴκω εὐδαιμονίας.

[36] An English translation of these texts can be found in K. S. Guthrie, *The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library* (rev. edn 1987); but note that the translations are often loose or inventive or wrong. Laurenti's Italian of Perictione, Callicratidas, and Phintys (1968: 140–50) is reprinted with some notes in Natali 1995a: 123–37. All texts are edited by Thesleff 1965.

that Pythagorean writings were produced in this period (Burkert 1961). But Thesleff's arguments against Wilhelm on the oeconomica (1961: 57–9) are brief and weak (cf. in general Macris 2002: 85) when set beside what he called Wilhelm's 'imposing but fairly mechanically evaluated collection of material' (p. 34). There is truth in this criticism of Wilhelm's piling on of parallels: not all of them are apposite. Moreover, linguistic arguments are easy to challenge, given the loss of so much earlier literature, especially that of the Hellenistic age. However, Thesleff's focus in his study was largely on Doric prose, and he had little interest in later Greek thought or in the literature of the Roman imperial period, topics in which Wilhelm was expert. I find Wilhelm's stress on the congruence of the oeconomica with Musonius, Plutarch, and Hierocles largely convincing. Whether these texts are early Roman or late Hellenistic, they are obviously relevant to Bryson in terms of language – something that might not have been as obvious, if we did not have the pseudo-Doric fragments from Stobaeus. The differences between him and the other oeconomica in terms of content and approach are as instructive as the parallels.

I begin with Phintys and Perictione. Both works present traditional views of a woman's place. Phintys (Stobaeus 4.23.61; Wilhelm 1915: 206–21) is a short extract written in pseudo-Doric. It need not detain us long. She is filed by Stobaeus under the rubric 'precepts of marriage' (4.23). The text begins with the question of whether women should practice philosophy (a topos: cf. Musonius, Plutarch), followed by a strong statement of male and female complementarity along standard Peripatetic lines (demarcation of virtues; e.g. *Politics* 1277b24–5 for female and male *oikonomia*), which soon enough leads to the identification of the female virtue *par excellence*, self-control/temperance/modesty (*sōphrosunē*). The implication is that the woman should philosophize, if and only if *sōphrosunē* is the result. However, the best evidence of this quality in the woman is the 'marriage bed' (*eunē*), and the chief sign of it is therefore her children's resemblance to their father (p. 153.15 Thesleff). 'So much on the subject of the *eunē*.' The condemnation of female immorality, which is an affront to the gods and her homeland, leads on to regulations about adornment and make-up, for which there are very numerous parallels in oeconomic and other literature. Her complexion should be natural and 'straight from the water' she washes with. 'Shame' is her best adornment. This is how she will honour herself and her spouse. Trips out of the house will be carefully controlled and preferably concern acts of religion – all of this being material common in oeconomic and other texts. She should keep away from orgiastic rites when at home, which the city's law forbids (cf. *Oikonomika III* ch. 1). The extract finishes with the

demand that 'the woman who is *oikodespoina* and presides at home must be *sōphrōn* and untouched in all respects'.

Perictione's *On Woman's Harmony* (Stobaeus 4.28.19 longer fragment A under the rubric *oikonomikos*; 4.25.50 shorter fragment B under the rubric 'parents') is written in Ionic dialect (with odd Doric and Attic forms revealing the artificiality of its occasionally poetic style and vocabulary: Wilhelm 1915: 202–6, in general 185–206). Pythagoras himself had come from Samos and therefore the Ionic dialect was appropriate, though inappropriate for the high-born real Perictione of Athens, the mother of Plato. The point of the linguistic display was, of course, to seek authority for the content of the treatise. Wilhelm argued that what we have from Stobaeus is all there was, in which case we would be dealing perhaps with an oral performance or 'diatribe'. But fr. A on the wife's morality and fr. B on children's duties towards their parents are quite different, and because they come from the same work (as Stobaeus says), they surely fitted in a larger scheme which was big enough to contain them. Stobaeus 3.1.120–1 offers two short extracts from a work called *On Wisdom*, and this time Perictione wrote in pseudo-Doric, which shows a versatility typical of the educated elite of the Hellenistic or Roman period. In this regard the 'hexameter elements' (Wilhelm) in *On Woman's Harmony* perhaps do not reveal a poetic source but a mind thoroughly familiar with producing the occasional verse that was a hallmark of both periods (e.g. Bowie 1990, Cameron 1995).

Perictione's wife is expected to be extremely tolerant or subservient at home, but she is not downtrodden: the woman who is virtuous, with virtues of a Stoic colouring, will perform 'noble acts' (*ergmata kala*) for herself, husband, children, and *oikos*, 'and often for a city, if she happens to rule cities or provinces'. If she controls her desires, she becomes holy and harmonious, and will be loving 'to man, children, and the whole *oikos*'. Infidelity, however, causes the destruction of all the things 'she and her husband hold in common'. The author then voices the familiar condemnation of bodily luxury and indulgence in fancy clothes and foods including the moralist's nightmare of imports, for all this visits 'every evil on marriage beds and the rest'. A specific attack is mounted on the ever-objectionable cosmetics. Painted women want men to gaze at them. 'The beauty that comes from intelligence (*phronēsis*) . . . is what pleases women of good birth.' She must care nothing for nobility, wealth, hailing from a great city, etc., for these things cause more harm than good. She must honour the gods, her homeland's laws and ordinances, and especially her parents (cf. fr. B). 'With regard to her own man, she must live lawfully and uprightly, supposing nothing is private to her, but guarding and protecting her marriage bed; everything

depends on this. She must tolerate all the man's (actions), whether he has bad luck or does wrong due to ignorance or illness or drink, or consorts with other women. For this wrong is allowed to men, but never to women. Punishment has been set for it. So she must remember the law and not be jealous. She must tolerate his anger, meanness, grumbling, jealousy, accusations, and any other faults he has by nature' (cf. Wilhelm 1915: 198–9). In this way 'she is a harmony, loves her whole *oikos*, and makes outsiders [masculine] well disposed towards the house'. But if she has no love, then 'she has no wish to see the *oikos*, her own children, servants, or any of her property safe and sound', but wishes to consort with other men. If she is full of intelligence (*phronēsis*) and self-control (*sōphrosunē*), she will 'not only benefit her man, but also her children and relatives and slaves and the whole house, in which there are possessions and friends from fellow-citizens and from abroad'. She will follow him in the unanimity of the shared life, and associate with those relatives and friends he praises, considering the same things sweet and bitter as he does, 'unless she is altogether devoid of harmony'.

Fragment B need not concern us here, though one can see how the topic of parents (and children) comes into the domain of the big house. In fact the topic is not found in the other oeconomic texts except for *Oikonomika III*. In the Neopythagorean literature there is the short extract from Pempelus' *On Parents* (Stobaeus 4.25.52), but this is no more than an archaizing version of material in Book 11 of the *Laws* (930e–932a; cf. Thesleff 1961: 90). The classic discussion comes in Hierocles (cf. below, p. 341).[37]

Perictione is a puzzling text: the wife is free enough to exercise political power but is constrained enough to be told to put up with her husband's mistresses and foul temper. Although parallels are drawn by moderns with *Oikonomika III*, there are major differences between the two. In *Oikonomika III* the husband's virtues are proved by his considerate behaviour towards his spouse, and the wife (like Bryson's) seeks to understand his faults and wrongs; in Perictione she is given no choice.[38] Again, the world of *Oikonomika III* is private, or as private as the big house can be. Perictione's woman is also part of this world, but in addition is involved with cities and

[37] Note the brief paragraph of 'advice from a father to his daughter when he gives her away' in the Ps.-ʿĀmirī *Book of Happiness* (p. 395 Minovi), which is appended to the material from the Pythagorean philosopher; see below, p. 353.

[38] φέρειν δὲ **χρὴ** δὲ τῶ ἀνδρὸς πάντα, κτλ (p. 144.11–16 Thesleff) versus ch. 1 of *Oikonomika III* (translated below, p. 321) '**decet** . . . si quid autem in rebus deerit, uel ad corporis aegritudinem aut ad ignorantiam animae, esse manifestam, dicat quoque semper optima et in decentibus obsequatur, praeterquam turpe quidem agere aut sibi non dignum, uel memorem esse si quid uir animae passione ad ipsam peccauerit, etc' (p. 37 Van Groningen-Wartelle). Thus Praechter's casual comparison (1901: 134) is unhelpful.

provinces. Finally, and most importantly, the spouses of *Oikonomika III* get along through 'equality of affection and fear' and numerous examples of reciprocation are given. The husband of Perictione, on the other hand, is an unengaged and distant figure. None of this means that Perictione is early in date. The patriarchal views she expresses are not so very far from parts of Plutarch's *Advice on Marriage*, and could be found at any time. But they point up the different thinking of Plutarch, Bryson, Musonius, and *Oikonomika III*.

Before I come to Callicratidas' *On the Happiness of the Estate*, a few remarks are in order about the short letters by Melissa to Cleareta on cosmetics and Theano to Nicostrate on jealousy. I shall refer to other letters as necessary.[39] Melissa is not attested elsewhere. Theano on the other hand was Pythagoras' wife (according to most sources) or pupil/quasi-daughter (in others). For the most part she came to function as the 'ideal wife and mother' and was a suitable vehicle for apophthegms and anecdotes (Thesleff 1965: 193–5). The letter of Melissa (pp. 160–3 Städele, cf. pp. 282–7 language/date '2. Jh.n.Chr.'; = Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci* p. 607, pp. 115–16 Thesleff) has all the familiar elements of the male discourse concerned with women's use of make-up, with the aim of constructing an ideal, 'virtuous' woman whose natural beauty is to be found in her soul (etc.; cf. Städele 1980: 255 'die klare Unterordnung der Frau, deren Haupttugend im σωφρονεῖν besteht'). Theano to Nicostrate (pp. 170–5 Städele, cf. p. 308 'das 2. Jh.n.Chr. wahrscheinlich'; = p. 604 Hercher, pp. 198–200 Thesleff) is more interesting. Theano counsels a wife whose husband consorts with *hetairai* to put up with his behaviour because his relationship with them is 'for pleasure' whereas his relationship with her is for (her and his) advantage, a common theme (e.g. Plutarch, *Advice*). His 'ignorance' (*agnoia*, cf. *Oikonomika III*) is something to bear silently. He loves the *hetaira* with passion (cf. *ibid.*), but you with sense, her for a brief spell, you for life, and he will soon 'repent'. You must have *eutaxia* for him, *epimeleia* for the estate, good relations with acquaintances, love for your children. You will achieve honour by adopting *kalokagathia*, and by this quality you will be superior to his 'power'. Tolerance will make him feel shame and seek reconciliation, and his affection will be 'more engaged' (*prospathesteron de philostorgēsei*) when he realizes his wrongdoing towards you, the 'attention' you pay 'to his life/livelihood' (*epi tou biou*, 'Vermögen' Städele, cf. e.g. Callicratidas 104.12 Thesleff, Aristotle, *Politics* 1256a20, etc.), and the reality of your 'affection' (*storgē*) for him.

[39] Myia to Phyllis on choosing a nurse: cf. Chapter 6, p. 374; Theano to Euboule on bringing up children: Chapter 6, pp. 380–1; Theano to Callisto on dealing with slaves: below, p. 329 n. 51.

Such reconciliations are like a recovery from illness (cf. *Oikonomika III*). Theano then changes tack and explores two alternative reactions the wife may be considering. First, she can beat him at his own game. He is sick, you can be sick with worry (*lupai*). He's making a mess of his reputation, you can harm your own *kosmos*. He's ruining his *bios* ('Vermögen'), you can ruin the (common) advantage. 'Then you'll seem to be fighting against him and to hurt him and yourself because you're being hurt.' If you leave him and go off, you'll soon try another man, then another, 'because being single (*chēreia*) is intolerable for young women; or you will remain alone without a man like someone who's never married'. Second, 'you can neglect the estate and destroy your man', and reap the consequences. 'Revenge on the *hetaira*?' She'll fight back. 'Or is it right to fight your man every day?' That just makes the dispute worse without stopping his licentious behaviour. Theano concludes by noting that Greek tragedy teaches us against jealousy and advises that, just as one keeps one's hands away from eyes suffering from an infection, so you should avoid adding to the problem, and be patient.

Theano's wife, then, is quite independent – she can up and leave if she wishes. Yet she would be better off seeing where her advantage lies and using her intelligence to make her husband repent and seek to repair their relationship. There is no question of sexual continence on his part. He should be allowed his 'flings'. He has power, and she can only hope to make him feel shame and true affection for her by her *kalokagathia*, the quality of polite, civilized, well-bred conduct which serves to 'masculinize' her and fix her dependence, like the wife of Ischomachus, firmly on male values (cf. Chapter 3, p. 245).

I turn finally to Callicratidas' *On the Happiness of the Estate*. This is a pseudo-Doric treatise preserved in four extracts by Stobaeus (under the rubric of *oikonomikos* at 4.28.16–18; and 4.22d.101 under the rubric of 'courtship'; Wilhelm 1915: 167–85). It seems best to take these in the order 4.28.16, 4.22d.101, 4.28.17–18 following Wilhelm.[40] *Happiness of the Estate* has points of contact with most of the above works. Wilhelm's parallels with other Neopythagorean writings are extensive. The reason for this is the text's analogies between micro- and macrocosm, cities and families, and its Pythagorean interest in music. Apart from Bryson, it is the most comprehensive of the Neopythagorean oeconomica and the only other directly focussed on the *oikos*.

The longest extract, Stobaeus 4.28.16 (fr. 1 in Wilhelm's ordering), begins with a statement about the form of the universe (*to holon*) as a 'system

[40] 1915: 167; Thesleff retains the Stobaean ordering. Guthrie translates Stobaeus 4.28.16–18 only.

(*sustāma*, a basic Pythagorean technical term) of kindred association'. Every *sustāma* is made of opposites, is arranged for 'the best', and aims at 'common advantage'. Hackneyed comparisons are drawn with the organization/construction of the choir and the ship. We are then told that, 'the *oikos* is also a *sustāma* of kindred association'. It is arranged for 'the best', which is defined as the *oikodespotēs* himself, and for 'common advantage', which is defined as *homophrosunē*, 'fellow feeling', 'understanding', 'love', a poetic term incorporated in Neopythagorean and later prose (cf. below, p. 319 on Ocellus, p. 336 Plutarch) from the much-loved line at *Odyssey* 6.181 (cf. 15.198) where Odysseus expresses to Nausicaa his desire that the gods will provide her with 'both a man and an *oikos* and delightful *homophrosunē*' (cf. *Oikonomika III*, *Dialogue on Love*; Hierocles, *et al.*; Praechter 1901: 78–9). Callicratidas then explains, 'Put simply, every *oikos* is like a *psaltērion* ('harp') and needs to possess the following three things: arrangement, composition, and a certain treatment or musical usage.' There are good parallels for the terms used here, *exartusis*, *sunarmoga*, and (*ep-*)*aphē*, in the Neopythagoreans, and the terminology (which presumably goes back to the fourth-century theorist Aristoxenus) is consequently important in Iamblichus' *On the Pythagorean Life* (64, 114). The particular idea of arrangement, composition, and treatment appears to have been borrowed from the fuller examples of the image which are found in Hippodamus' *On Government* (p. 99, esp. 18–21 Thesleff) and Euryphamus' *On Life* (86.16–27 Thesleff).[41] 'Arrangement,' says Callicratidas, 'is the assembly of all the actual parts from which both the whole and the total *sustāma* of kindred association reach completion.' The chief of the parts are 'person and property'. 'Of the persons who complete the *oikos*, some are kin and some are connected with the house (*oikēioi*).' The latter are 'acquired kin' from the 'partnership of marriage', i.e. one's in-laws. There is a very important third category which benefits the *oikos*: friends; 'for it becomes greater and more distinguished not only by property and by becoming populous in kin but also by a multitude of friends', a Stoic formulation for which Wilhelm aptly compared Cicero, *De finibus* 5.65 (and might have cited Hierocles: see Ramelli 2009: lxxxii–lxxxiii). In other words, the prestige of the *oikos* depends on 'reckoning up friends as part of the complement'.

These friends should not be taken in a modern sense: the great *oikodespotēs* is measured by the number of those who call on him, whether they like him or not. Plutarch's *On Having Many Friends* is instructive. The constant strain of 'being involved with many people on a frequent basis' (93c) and

[41] On Hippodamus' influence see Delatte 1922: pt 2, ch. 5, esp. 160–9 on Callicratidas.

supposing casual acquaintances are actual friends is a problem that affects 'the houses of the rich . . . with their great noisy throng of visitors saying hello and shaking hands' (94a–b). The result is either partiality and potential for embarrassment or an impossible adaptability to all comers (95b, 96f–97b). In Callicratidas the danger is more the ethical fault of despising everyone else on account of one's own wealth and the pride resulting from it. Effective leadership is required of all these personnel, relatives, and in-laws: fortunately the man is 'the ruling', the woman 'the ruled', and the offspring 'the ancillary' (*epikouron*) part, a division again transposed from the governance of the city (and very common in the Neopythagoreans: e.g. Hippodamus, *On Government*, p. 98.19–22 Thesleff) to the family, with parallels in Phintys (p. 152.27 Thesleff), Hierocles 4. 22a. 24 *parastatai*, *epikouroi* (pp. 503, cf. 641 Hense, pp. 77, cf. 83 Ramelli), cf. *Oikonomika III* (pp. 39.21–40.2 Van Groningen-Wartelle).

It will already be clear how different Callicratidas is from Bryson's practical, managerial presentation of the *oikos* and the wife's role within it. Callicratidas writes as a philosopher. His second extract (Stobaeus 4.22d.101) in particular draws an analogy between the soul and the governance of the universe and the role of the male and female (monad and dyad) in the household, which is quite foreign to Bryson. The effect is to elevate the running of the *oikos* far beyond the real world and to justify male domination at home and abroad. The third fragment (4.28.17) moves to an Aristotelian scheme of different classifications of power – despotic, supervisory, and political. Following *Politics* Callicratidas figures the man's power in the house as *politikā*, meaning that it is legal and civic. Such rule aims at the 'common advantage' (cf. fr. 1). The *polis* and the *oikos* with this type of government reflect the cosmos. In marriage, which has been established as a 'partnership for life', husbands who rule 'politically' are 'admired and loved' by their wives. He brings 'pleasure by offering love (*tōi agapēn*)' and wins respect by avoiding base acts (which may be a veiled allusion to sexual practices and licit pleasures, cf. the sequence of thought at Ps.-Aristotle, *Oikonomika I* 1344a8 τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, κτλ, above, p. 308, and above on Plutarch, *Advice*, p. 299).

The final extract (Stobaeus 4.28.18) concerns the choice of the wife, and in particular the problem of fortune and lineage, a common theme (cf. e.g. Dio Chrysostom, above p. 292; Antipater, above p. 310) which Bryson uses and Perictione had applied directly to the woman. Callicratidas' wife should be neither richer nor poorer, for in the former case she will rule (cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* 1161a1–2), in the latter the 'standing and majesty of the *oikos*' will be damaged. The marriage should reflect the 'tone of the soul' (cf. the beginning

of *Advice*). The husband must go about his courtship 'rationally' and thereafter act as master and teacher. For a bride he will seek out a girl (*paidion*; the marriage is of course arranged) who is born of 'good ancestors'. Girls 'marrying for the first time' (*prōtonumpheutoi*, a term not found elsewhere) are malleable, and disposed to fear and show affection to their man. So our text ends.

There is nothing Foucauldian or Musonian about Callicratidas' idea of marriage. The importance of the institution is clear: it is the basis of the social life of the estate with its multiple human memberships, but no more. Children are not mentioned, and this is obviously by design (cf. *Advice*) to allow the focus to rest on the 'partnership for life', but here from the man's perspective alone. The thorough parallelization between *oikos*, *polis*, and *kosmos* dignifies the *oikos* as an entity and firmly entrenches the power of its male ruler. The role of the wife is not specified, only her subservience. The emotional experience of the couple is broached through allusion to Odysseus' remarks to Nausicaa. Sexual experience may be alluded to, but is hardly obvious or important. This is not a work about how to run an estate, but how to promote a philosophical *eudaimonia* in it. The *koinōnia* is unequal.

We may compare and contrast Part 4 of the Neopythagorean Ocellus' *On the Nature of the Universe*, which was composed around 100 BC (Harder 1926: esp. pp. 120–34; text also pp. 135.9–138.12 Thesleff).[42] Ocellus offers good parallels to Callicratidas on the connections between the *oikos*, *polis*, and *kosmos* ('the most important'), and fills in some of the gaps about the sexual purpose of marriage by offering austere advice on procreation (there is to be no 'pleasure' in the act) and a condemnation of those who are wanton and uncontrolled in bed and have 'depraved, discordant, and worrying' thoughts while making love. Men who breed correctly will 'dwell in well-governed cities and manage their own estates properly'. Marriage is once again characterized as *homophrosunē*. The passages on the choice of the wife are in fact more or less identical (Ocellus p. 136.20–5 Thesleff, Callicratidas p. 106.17–19 Thesleff); unfortunately it cannot be proved that Callicratidas is the later version, though it may be assumed. The wife herself is of equally little importance in either text.

The Neopythagorean oeconomica do not represent the more 'progressive' thinking of Plutarch, Musonius, Bryson, and other authors. But, as I have said, this is no reason to date them earlier or much earlier than the first century AD. They too are part of the intensified focus on marriage

[42] See above, Chapter 2, p. 125 for the textual history of this work.

and family life. These works were ignored in *The Care of the Self*, perhaps because Foucault did not know of them rather than because they did not fit his thesis. Nevertheless, they do not fit. We should hardly think it unexpected to find the perpetuation of a very traditional view of marriage. After all, the wife according to Plutarch himself is ruled by the husband. But what makes Plutarch, Musonius, and Bryson different is that they also ventured to enquire about the moral position of the man in relation to his wife, and they go more deeply into the emotional mysteries of love and sexual love within marriage, in some cases including a denunciation not only of male infidelity but also of homosexuality. It seems likely that *Oikonomika III* should be included with them, for here also there are signs of something new. If we had it, we would probably say the same of the *Oikonomikos* of Musonius' pupil, Dio.

3 OIKONOMIKA III

Oikonomika III is mysterious in origin. Although it survives only in two late medieval Latin versions, no one has any doubt that it is a Greek text in origin, as the 'Durandi' translation states. Greek phraseology and constructions can be glimpsed behind the Latin. There are two main versions from the thirteenth century, which are very close but show important variations: the 'Translatio Vetus' and the perhaps slightly later 'Translatio Durandi', which seems to have known the 'Vetus' as well as the Greek (but the relationship between the versions and between the 'Durandi' and the lost Greek is disputed). In addition, it has been argued by some that glosses to the 'Translatio Durandi' represent a third, lost version. At the end of the 'Durandi' is an *explicit* which gives the title as 'Yconomica Aristotelis'. Full but in some details quite variant discussions can be found in Laurenti (1968: 61–81), Wartelle (1968: xviii–xxvii) (note the important comments of Thillet 1969: 568–74, 587–9), Zonta (2003: 552–3), and Zoepffel (2006: 233–5), ultimately all resting on the basic picture established by Susemihl (1887), who printed both versions (so also Gigon 1987: 352–7). Published translations and texts take the 'Durandi' as a basis (in the pagination of Rose's 1886 edition of the fragments of Aristotle),[43] though Armstrong's English in the Loeb Classical Library incorporates some of the plausible readings of the 'Vetus', as does Zoepffel's German.[44]

[43] Rose printed *Oikonomika III* as the *Nomoi andros kai gametēs*; see Chapter 2, p. 129.

[44] The re-edition of the texts by Christoph Flüeler promised as vol. XXX in the *Aristoteles Latinus* series is badly needed.

The contents (relying on the 'Durandi' unless specified) are as follows.[45] Chapter 1 treats the duties of the wife, ch. 2 those of the husband. Chapter 3 offers further advice on keeping faith with the wife, while ch. 4 pursues the theme of the married state. In ch. 1 the 'good woman' stays in the house and keeps out female strangers (cf. Praechter 1901: 133 on this widespread misogynist theme). She spends on *festiuitates* as her husband allows, and obeys the 'laws of the city' regarding luxury and ornament. Her true adornment is her *modestia*. With the exception of her own sphere inside the house, she must 'strive to obey' him. She will pay no attention to public affairs, and lets him arrange the marriages of the children. His 'character is a law for her life, imposed by the gods'. She will want to 'serve' him in prosperity and adversity. 'If he suffers a reverse due to bodily illness or ignorance in his soul, she must be there to help (*esse manifestam*). Let her always say the most positive things and show obedience at the right times. She must avoid doing anything disgraceful or unworthy of herself, nor bear a grudge (*memorem esse*) if he has wronged her because of some mental distress (*animae passione*). Let her make no complaint on the ground that it was his doing, but put all these things down to illness or ignorance or incidental wrongs. The more attentive she shows herself in this, the more gratitude he will display once he has been cured and freed from his illness. And if the woman fails to obey him when he commanded her to do something bad, so much the more will he acknowledge this when he is cured.' She will serve him better than if she had come to his house as a bought servant – 'for she was bought for a great price, i.e. partnership in his life and the procreation of his children'. (For the language, cf. Shaw 1987: 35.) If she demonstrates her worth in bad times, she will win the highest praise, and think herself like Alcestis and Penelope. These, then, are the 'laws and ways' of the woman.

In ch. 2 the man is to follow 'similar laws', for the wife has come to his house as (in the 'Vetus') a 'suppliant' (cf. *Oikonomika 1*, ch. 4). She will bear him children to be their *senectutis pastores*. Their parents must bring them up virtuously, or be despised by them. 'On this account' the husband must attend to his wife's 'education'. Just as we tend our soil properly, so must we properly prepare the mother and nurse of our children and thereby honour the gods of marriage. The *sobria* (i.e. σώφρων) wife receives honour when she sees that the husband 'keeps himself chaste for her', cares for no other woman, and thinks of her as his own affectionate wife. If she sees he is faithful, she will rightly be faithful herself. He must not omit the honour due to his parents, wife, and children. A wife wishes especially for an 'honoured

[45] The Latin is difficult and often obscure and I have been guided by the several translations available.

and faithful partnership with a husband'. So he should not sow his seed anywhere or consort with any woman (cf. Ps.-Plutarch, *Training of Boys* 2) and waste his seed, or else it will be difficult to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children, his wife will be deprived of honour due to her, and shame will attach to his sons.

Chapter 3 continues the man's obligations on a more intimate level. He should 'approach his wife with decency (*honestas*), much self-control (*modestia*), and fear (*timor*)'. His words will suggest 'lawful and decent acts, treating her with much restraint (*modestia*) and trust . . ., forgiving her wrongs', and not being hard on her. Passion 'is typical of the relationship between mistress and adulterer', whereas between a free woman and her own man there should be 'equality of affection and fear, combined with reverence and shame'. This true fear (the kind that shows 'reverence and shame') is what he must choose so that she is 'at one with him, faithful, and belongs to him'. It will thus make no difference if he is present with her or not – she will always behave as if he were there 'since they are trustees of common business'. And 'if he totally masters himself, he will become the best guide for (her) whole life and will teach his wife to follow such (conduct)'. Homer shows that love must be accompanied with restraint and shame. There follow several examples, including the Ulysses who could not bear to 'betray his wife's fondness, affection, and faithfulness . . . So firmly did he preserve his faithfulness to his wife; and in return received the same from her in equal measure.'

This theme continues in ch. 4. Homer shows us Ulysses wishing Nausicaa a marriage that is a meeting of minds. He praises the mutual 'subservience' (*unanimitas ad inuicem . . . seruitia*) that is 'combined with understanding and wisdom'. This unity will hearten the couple's friends and dismay their enemies (cf. *Odyssey* 6.184–5). 'In all this it is clear that he is instructing them to prevent either one doing anything disgraceful or immoral, and saying that they should help each other without hesitation to accomplish for themselves anything which is virtuous and seemly as far as they are able.' This means being dutiful to parents and parents-in-law, 'children, friends, property (*res*), and the entire household (*domus*) as something shared (*communis*)'. Each will 'vie with the other to be the cause of the most benefits for the common good (*commune*)'. In this way, when they reach old age, they will be in a position to answer their children as to which of them has made the greater contribution, and to know that bad things have come about by fortune whereas all that is good has been brought about through virtue. This is how one achieves the greatest reward from the gods and support in old age by one's sons. Thus one should have particular respect for gods and men in

private and in public (*proprie et communiter*[46]), 'and particularly for one's wife, children, and parents'.

So ends *Oikonomika III*. The text appears to be complete – unlike the extracts of the Neopythagoreans and others found in Stobaeus. In this regard it is paralleled only by Bryson. But dating the work has not been found easy. Susemihl (1887) viewed it as a product of the Peripatetic school, which was later reworked under Stoic influence in the Roman era. Most other commentators (beginning with Praechter 1901 and including Wilhelm) have seen it as a product of this later Stoicism to which Musonius, Dio, and Hierocles belong in the later first and early second centuries AD, and several of them have found a congener in Perictione's *On Woman's Harmony*. Zoepffel (2006: 237–43) has a careful discussion of the problem and concludes that the case for a later date is not proven; rather, nothing forbids placing it in the second half of the fourth century BC – which of course helps her to justify the inclusion of *Oikonomika III* in a commentary on Ps.-Aristotle *Oikonomika I–II*. There are certainly numerous 'timeless' elements in *Oikonomika III*. The wife's obedience is stressed, as it could be in any period of antiquity or today in many cultures. There is an emphasis on mutual respect, and a complementarity of roles (ch. 1 'it is not fitting ['Vetus': it is difficult] for a man to know what goes on inside the house'), which reminds us of Xenophon and others. Marriage is principally about children who will care for their parents in old age.

On the other hand, as Laurenti observed (1968: 152–3), the characterization of the wife's relationship with the husband is very far from what we find in the Aristotelian view of such an association, which in his brief discussion of marital *philia* at *Ethics* Book 8 is presented as a complementary union where both utility and pleasure have their part, but the basis of 'living together' is in fact 'justice' (*dikaion*) (1162a16–31). *Oikonomika III* is quite different. The relationship is characterized by forgiveness: the wife seeks to understand her man when he wrongs her and does 'not bear a grudge' if he has acted from 'some mental distress' (a passage which has clear points of contact with the affective description of the wife at Bryson §§101–2, and with Perictione's wife, above p. 314).[47] When he is over his problems, he will be grateful to her ('the more attentive . . . the more gratitude') and acknowledge how well she has handled him (ch. 1). She is self-controlled (*sobria*) and he responds by preserving his *castitas*, caring for no other woman, and honouring the whole

[46] Following the interpretation of Zoepffel 2006: 702.
[47] For the Latin see p. 314 n. 38.

family of parents, wife, and children (ch. 2). His own personal morality is defined in terms of the relationship with her, for he approaches her with the qualities of *honestas*, *modestia*, and *timor* (deep respect or reverence). He will propose to her only 'lawful and decent acts' (surely a reference to sexual practices but not excluding a more general application). He treats her with *modestia* and *fides* and in his turn forgives her wrongdoing. These matters are reciprocal: there is 'an equality of affection and fear (*aequaliter diligere et timere*)'. The husband is like Ulysses, preserving his faithfulness and receiving his wife's 'in equal measures (*aequaliter*)' (ch. 3). In ch. 4 Homer is right to picture between husband and wife 'a mutual unanimity (*unanimitas ad inuicem*)', which is combined with *animus* and *prudentia*. The spouses' obligations are extended to the whole household common to them. They 'vie' with each other (*colluctantes ad inuicem*) to the benefit of the whole house.

The stress in *Oikonomika III* on the interaction of the couple distances the text not only from Aristotle and Ps.-Aristotle, but also from Xenophon, if not completely, at least in important respects. The great gap in our knowledge concerns Stoic thought, for which we must rely on the extract of Antipater in Stobaeus. But Antipater stresses what we know other Stoics also stressed: the wise man must have children as a patriotic duty to the *polis* to assure its salvation and to honour its gods. In *Oikonomika III* we are in a private realm, along with the wider family and friends and enemies. The state has no look in (other than an oblique mention of sumptuary laws in ch. 1); in reality the *polis* gets no more regard than it does in Bryson. Although children are the major goal of the partnership, the purpose of having them is to provide their parents with assistance in old age, a theme which is important in some of the Neopythagorean treatises and in Hierocles. The emphasis of the couple's mutual obligations has left no space for anything on practical aspects of the estate: the economic aspect has been reduced to practically zero. For management of *this* estate means management of the self and the wife and the success of their marriage.

Oikonomika III, then, is hardly a work of the fourth century BC. Its interests and its limitations suggest close kinship with Plutarch, Musonius, Bryson, and the concerns of their world. In this group of texts we must, as I have said several times, count Dio (despite the almost complete loss of his *Oikonomikos*; see below, pp. 340–1); and given the connections between the writers (Musonius' use of Bryson; Dio as Musonius' pupil and possible use of Bryson, Chapter 3, pp. 241–2, Chapter 4, p. 265; Plutarch's lost works 'To Dio', 'Lamprias Catalogue' nos. 204, 227), it may well be that the identity of the author of *Oikonomika III* – like the identity of Bryson himself – would not be a surprise to us, if only we knew it.

4 BRYSON'S WIFE

Bryson's section on the wife looks backwards and forwards within his book. The wife has control over the personnel of the *oikos* and specifically the servants (*khadam*, ?*oiketai*;[48] §§91, 96). Although she is not mentioned in section two on the slave, she is clearly responsible for helping to implement the regime proposed there, at least within the household. This joint supervision recalls Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (7.35–7, 9.5), where it appears innovative (Pomeroy 1994: 281, 295, 297). Her responsibility for the management of finance in the house, which also recalls Xenophon, links her to section one, where however everything is expressed through the man. Although there is no individual mention of the wife or the child/children there, a principal theme of the first section is the owner's provision and care for the people of the *oikos*, and both wife and children are evidently included among the *ʿiyāl* ('family', §§42, 53), an Arabic term which means those who are fed, nourished, and sustained, and which corresponds in extension to Latin *familia* (i.e. both family and servants) and Greek *oikos*. A further link with section one is suggested by §§77–9 on the origin of the child (embryo), where we are told that male and female bodies are needed to make a child owing to the 'dissolution' caused by the qualities of heat and moisture on a single body (see above, Chapter 3, p. 232). This recalls the 'scientific' basis for the development of the crafts in the 'commercial anthropology' (§§5–6), and more generally the body imagery Bryson applies to capital growth at §§34–5. Looking ahead, section three obviously prepares the way for the following section on the child (boy), as the wife's childbearing and child-rearing is one of her two major functions, and her relationship with her children expresses her perfect character in the affective ending of the section. In section four the wife is mentioned in the very important passage that marks the culmination of the book (§§159–60).

Bryson begins section three by answering the question, Why do men want a wife? (§74). Behind the question is an extensive, ancient literature on the advantages and disadvantages of marriage, which was wrapped up with the question of whether to raise children and with the issue of women's equality or inferiority in relation to men. The themes of marriage and children are conveniently summed up in late antiquity in Libanius' rhetorical exercise on the question (or *thesis*), 'Should One Marry?'[49] Among the points he lists which chime with the texts already reviewed and with Bryson

[48] See Chapter 4, p. 269 n. 26.

[49] Text: ed. Foerster: VIII 550–61, reprinted with a translation (on which I draw with changes) in Gibson 2008: 510–19. Themes: Praechter 1901: esp. 143–6, rhetorical technicalities: Schouler 1984: 134–6.

are the following. The gods have marriage partners: it is therefore impious to refuse marriage. We must not counter Nature, whose plan necessitates 'intercourse, childbirth, and children' (9). We do harm to ourselves and our cities if we do not have offspring. The wife is there for her husband both in good and bad times. 'He makes money by spending time in the market, while she, staying inside, takes it and protects it' (14). He cannot give public service and also keep house. She will be by him when he is sick. She rules the slaves and prevents them from idling by 'inspecting everything they do, and casting her eyes around everywhere' (17). Having plenty of friends is good, but adding to your family is more beneficial. 'The greatest, most beautiful, and most useful fruit of marriage is the children – now being partners in our work, now tending to us in old age' (19). Getting married is easy: the prospective groom 'approaches those who handle such things', and they arrange it. Status and wealth should ideally be similar on both sides (22). In general a free man depends on his wife for his public reputation (23; see above, p. 290). A married man will be trusted more readily 'for a wife provides a great obligation (for a man) to be self-controlled' (25). Counter-arguments that a man has to face his wife's adultery and the potential death of children are spurious. Reflect rather on 'the wedding song, the cheering, the people in your escort, the guests, torches, feasting, the hopes for children, and the children themselves' (31).

There are two practical reasons for marriage in the Brysonian world. The first is that the man has business 'outside his estate' and is therefore 'obliged to leave it on its own'. In any other text this business would be civic; but Bryson is presumably thinking of commerce or farming. No one will manage the estate properly on the man's behalf except a 'partner' (*sharīk*, *koinōnos*), which means a spouse. Bryson recalls here the complementarity of roles which is embedded in all our texts from Xenophon on: the man is active and goes out, the woman is quiet and stays in; and he will return to the point shortly from a different angle. Even here, though, he hints also at an affective element in the relationship: this partner will possess the estate as 'he possesses it', will care for it 'as he cares', and will 'manage it as he manages' it (§75).

The second reason for wanting a wife is again traditional, and again Bryson does something different with it. It is Nature's requirement which stems from God's decision to make humans mortal. The phrase 'impermanence of the World' (§77) might suggest a monotheistic viewpoint. But classic Stoic theory, building on Empedocles, envisaged the periodic destruction of the world through massive conflagration, and this may be in Bryson's mind. If the requirements of Nature are part of the literature on marriage,

often illustrated with arguments from the behaviour of animals (Praechter 1901: 143–4), Bryson tampers with the theme by returning to his 'scientific' interests (§§77–9). Apart from linking back to the 'commercial anthropology', this brief report on the construction of the embryo serves to distance him from περὶ γάμου/oeconomic literature, at least for the moment. Since he follows the passage with a clarification of the difference between men and women and then a statement of her 'subservience and obedience' to him (§82), we might wish to know more: do male and female make an equal contribution to the formation of the embryo, or would Bryson have sympathized with the Aristotelian 'one-sex model' (Laqueur 1990: 38), where the female's contribution is an inferior, less powerful version of the male's perfect form? 'Development, growth, and movement cannot occur without heat.' Bryson is not saying that women lack heat, only that they have relatively less of it than men, for both qualities are active in all bodies (§6). Parmenides and some Hippocratic texts had advanced the idea that women in fact possessed much heat, and this is still expressed in our period (Plutarch, *Table Talks* 3.4, 651a–c). The standard view, however, was that most heat came from the man, and this is what Bryson follows. The man's contribution is to top up the supply of heat in the woman which then unites with the necessary quantity of moisture to produce the child. In the little that Bryson tells us there is no sign of Aristotle's notorious description of the female as a 'deformed male' (*Generation of Animals* 737a28). In Galen's *On Semen* it is male heat and female coldness that have to be balanced in the man's and the woman's contribution. For Galen these are the 'active qualities'. Bryson speaks of heat and moisture, but it comes down to the same thing. The precise idea of heat seeking out the right amount of moisture is not, it seems, attested elsewhere; but with so many medical texts lost it is not surprising if Bryson has a variant. We should recall his strong, and probably original, interest in the workings of the qualities.

Next (§80) Bryson develops the complementary contribution of male and female in embryology by leaning on Xenophon and *Oikonomika 1* to demarcate male and female character. But complementary character does not interfere with the 'feeling of love and intimacy' that reigns between man and woman (§81); and the effect of this feeling is to abolish any proprietary instinct in the man so that he gives her 'unrestricted control' over the 'management' of the *oikos*. Thus man and wife have a profound 'partnership', and God has 'made both of them as if they were one person (literally: one soul)'. This is not the 'one soul' of Antipater (quoting Euripides, *Medea* 247), which Antipater is careful to state (as Medea herself complains) is 'that of the man' (Stobaeus 4.22a.25). Bryson's 'one person' is genuinely affective and

recalls the end of section four where the boy is warned against sexual intercourse 'or coming near it' before marriage with a timely reminder of Plato's athlete Iccus (*Laws* 839e–841c). If husband and wife have only ever known sex within their own unique relationship, Bryson says, 'the love of each one of them for the other partner is the greatest love there is. His heart enfolds her and her heart enfolds him' (§159).

The oeconomic dimension is applied to the wife's subservience to her husband (§82), a common requirement (cf. Meno in Plato's *Meno* 71e, cf. 73a; Musonius III, pp. 11.22–12.1 Hense). It is justified by his sharing of the *oikos* with her. Bryson notes that the wife will say this is nonsense: 'it is to *his* advantage'. He agrees, but gets round the problem by saying that benefactors are still benefactors whether their kindness is in their own interest or not. The husband needs to make it clear why he wants her: children *and* caring for him and the estate when he is present, absent, healthy, or sick (§84), common themes in the literature. Sustaining him during sickness was another commonly expressed and no doubt sincerely cherished hope (*Oikonomika III*, Perictione – but there it is part of her toleration of his faults). Bryson's husband must not marry for status, wealth, or beauty (§85), another standard motif, as Antipater, Perictione, Callicratidas, Ocellus, Clement, Nicostratus, and others all show (Praechter 1901: 82–3, Wilhelm 1915: 177, 193). It is at this point, from §85 to halfway through §96, that Musonius' starts to draw on Bryson for Discourse XIIIb, beginning with the theme of rank, riches, and beauty (Chapter 2, pp. 116–17, and below, p. 338). Callicratidas' comments on this are particularly relevant. In the fourth extract from Stobaeus (4.28.18) he insists on finding a wife of equivalent wealth, for if she has more, 'she will decide to rule the man's affairs'. Bryson amplifies this danger and turns Callicratidas' idea of 'contending for leadership' to the specific problem of the ensuing neglect of the *oikos*: 'the business of the estate only prospers if its superior member' rules the rest (§§85–6).

At this point Bryson summarizes. The wife is needed for children and management. How to go about this? He again denounces rank, wealth, and beauty (§§88–9). This is not a repetition, for now these problems are common to men ('makes a man highly pleased with himself') and women – another innovation on a standard theme. He next proceeds with the two reasons for having a wife. First, and briefly, children:[50] sound body and mind are required in the woman in order to get children (§90; cf. Phintys p. 152.13–14 Thesleff

[50] Throughout section three the Arabic term for children is *al-walad*, which may be a singular or a collective. The sense demands a plural in English. Cf. Chapter 6, p. 364.

of the man and the woman). Second, the estate (§§91–6). This is treated in detail, as we would expect, and entails a continuing focus on the wife's virtues. Bryson begins with a list of five. The first, intelligence, reprises soundness of mind in §90. The second is the archetypal female virtue, *sōphrosunē*. Next, 'humility (*dhilla*) of soul', which could be translated simply as 'submission' (cf. §§82, 86 *tadhallul*); this is the quality she displays to her husband. Fourth, tenderness towards her children. Fifth, 'fairness ('*adl*, often 'justice') of conduct' towards her servants, the problem that confronts a girl 'along with marriage'.[51] The number five crops up in several contexts in Pythagorean lore. In oeconomic texts we can recall the five ways to recognize the wife's self-control in Phintys (p. 152.20 Thesleff). In number symbolism five had a particular meaning: by thinking in terms of 2 + 3 (the first even = male number and the first odd = female number), five was interpreted as signifying 'marriage' and this was helped by the fact that the word *gamos* has five letters (Burkert 1972: 33–4 with references, e.g. Plutarch, *The E at Delphi* 388a 'it has been given the name "marriage"'). Bryson's division for once shows a dash of authentic Pythagoreanism, and in an appropriate context. Note also that there are two sets of virtue which apply to the woman (?and the man – quite possibly, as this is the even pair), and then three virtues (humility, tenderness, fairness) which apply to the woman's relationship with her husband, children, and servants. Men and women, he continues, need the same virtues to the same degree. She needs them the more due to her weakness; yet the man needs her help to assume virtues in order to consolidate what he already has (§93). By this Bryson apparently means that the man can only refine his character (his receptiveness to virtue, a Peripatetic idea) by investing in his relationship with his wife. What we notice in this list of virtues is the complete absence of the remarks extolling the woman's rejection of *philokosmia*, nor any specific allusion to her sexual fidelity. 'Self-control and self-restraint from the appetites' (cf. §§98–9 for the same idea) is the closest Bryson comes to these textbook themes of misogyny. In section four, where the boy must learn to avoid female habits, women's clothes and 'adornment' (§§138, 140) are condemned for males but not for women.

The author of the first attested (or accepted) *oikonomikos*,[52] Antisthenes the Socratic, held that male and female 'virtue' (*aretē*) was identical

[51] 'Letter of Theano to Callisto' 1 (pp. 174–8 Städele = p. 605 Hercher, pp. 197–8 Thesleff), which is concerned in its mannered way to engender the 'good will' between the mistress and her maids that results from 'fair treatment'. Cf. Musonius, 'Should Daughters Be Educated in the Same Way as Sons?', p. 14.10–11 Hense 'the wife could not manage the house well unless she did it fairly'. Bad treatment by mistresses is a common theme: e.g. Plutarch, *Consolation to his Wife* 609c.

[52] Diogenes Laertius 6.16; the MSS read περὶ νικῆς οἰκονομικός, but there is clearly confusion.

(Diogenes Laertius 6.12). The Platonists took a similar line (*Republic* Book 5, *Meno* 72d–73c). But the clearest influence on authors like Bryson comes from Stoic thought, which took equality of virtue in the sexes seriously (e.g. Cleanthes' *That Virtue Is the Same in Men and Women*, Diogenes Laertius 7.175; restated famously in Seneca, *To Marcia* 16.1, cf. *To Helvia* 19; Musonius Discourse IV, on which see below, p. 339). This position was academic, not practical. If we may judge by Antipater, Stoic *peri gamou* literature ignored it. Yet for Bryson, Musonius, and Plutarch, and to a lesser extent Hierocles, equality of virtue is fundamental. Bryson's argument that men need the kind of wife who will help them acquire virtue fully is a development of the theme.

The couple's partnership in virtue is illustrated by the striking and original image which led Baldassarre to detect Bryson's influence on Musonius: the straight and crooked pieces of wood. The conclusion is that the man and wife must 'jointly' possess intelligence, chasteness, and justice. The reason is typically Brysonian: if they do not possess these virtues, 'there is no accord and the management of their estate goes to ruin' (§§94–6). The editor of Musonius, Otto Hense (1905: 70), remarked that the metaphor of the straight and crooked word was an 'imago Stoicis usitata', and listed two parallels, Diogenes Laertius 7.127 and Seneca, *Moral Epistles* 50.6. The second is irrelevant, while the first relates to Chrysippus' black-and-white distinction between virtue and vice: 'wood must be either straight or crooked'. Obviously Bryson's remark develops this idea of the incompatibility of good and bad. But he does something more interesting with it by applying it to marriage.

It is on this high point that Musonius XIIIb finishes in Stobaeus. We cannot be sure that this is where the discourse on marriage actually finished; but it makes sense to suppose that it did. Whatever the case, Musonius also drew on the material immediately following this ('She is without any doubt the caretaker and manager of the estate, etc.') and running to the tricolon coda on the woman's sterling worth at 103 for the central part of his third discourse, 'That Women Also Should Study Philosophy'. As I have noted in Chapter 2, although the overlap begins and ends with close citations of Bryson's endorsements of the wife, Musonius largely goes his own way in between. Yet he does imitate Bryson's style by including his own list of rhetorical questions (pp. 10.19–11.11 Hense). The piling on of questions by Bryson in §§97–100, in response to an alleged doubter (§96), offers a memorable presentation of the wife's excellences. For the opening statement of her role as 'caretaker and manager' we may rely on Musonius' third discourse to show us the Greek: 'the woman must be capable of managing

the household (*oikonomikē*), capable of calculating (*eklogistikē*) what is good for the estate (*ta oikōi sumpheronta*), and capable of governing (*archikē*) the servants' (Greek at Chapter 2, p. 121 n. 17). The phrase 'what is good for the estate' occurs also in Arius' report of the Stoic definition of the 'oeconomic disposition' (Chapter 3, p. 204). The wife's control of 'quae sunt intus' (as *Oikonomika III* puts it) is a standard acknowledgement of her sphere. But her financial and supervisory capabilities are expressed with particular clarity by Bryson, and he follows this statement of her contribution with a hymn to good management and female intelligence.

In this section (§§97–100) the woman is on her own as proprietor of the *oikos*. It is her moral qualities that entitle her to rule, not the man's permission (as it was earlier). Note again the absence of an explicit reference to the usual concerns about female temperance, the body, infidelity, and adornment. Noteworthy too is the focus of the wife on husband and children only without parents, in-laws, or friends. The 'extended' family and its acquaintances are important in section one, as we have seen in Chapter 3, and reappear here in §103. For the moment, though, concentrating on her management, Bryson focusses hard on the basic relationships. Contrast e.g. *Oikonomika III*, where the parents are so important and to both spouses. In *Oikonomika III* the children are as important as they are in Bryson, but in a rather different way. Though there is a moral dimension to their upbringing (the parents will be accountable for getting it right), their principal role is the practical one of becoming the 'shepherds' of their parents' old age. In Bryson children and husband allow the wife to display her high qualities. If one counts the material on children in section three together with section four, a good third of Bryson's book is devoted to the child, and this makes it extremely unusual in Greek and Roman literature. In section four the emotional relationship of parent to child is, however, entirely absent.

Bryson now moves to further important comments on the wife's affective relationship with husband and children (§101). Greek literature is full of wives who have to put up with husbands' moods and misdemeanours. Andromache's wistful recollection of her support for Hector's amours is an oft-cited example from tragedy (Euripides, *Andromache* 222–5). Among oeconomic texts Perictione's wife must put up with her husband's numerous flaws. Plutarch's wife in *Advice* will have 'no feelings of her own' but matches her man's temper. The wife of *Oikonomika III* will comfort her husband when he is in trouble and 'not bear a grudge if he has wronged her because of some mental distress' (ch. 1). The girl in Naumachius' didactic poem (second or third century) on the choice of a husband is advised that she must tolerate her husband's foolish behaviour, which she is forbidden to disclose to

anyone (ll. 28–33).[53] And so on. It is no surprise to find Bryson's wife preferring to suffer wrong from them than to do them wrong herself. The theme of the bad times and illness which may cause bad behaviour is part of the literature; Bryson's woman also 'bears no grudge' and, like Naumachius', gives nothing away (§101). But there is a difference, for in Bryson it is the father *and* the children to whom she is so forgiving.[54] Her reflection on their troubles (i.e. outside the house, a standard idea) reinforces her tenderness. This is how she demonstrates concord towards them. The focus here is solely on the wife; but the earlier remarks on the couple's joint concord should not be forgotten (§§94–6). After this elevated celebration of the woman's lovingness comes the fine coda (§103) which was taken over by Musonius, where to make the tricolon Bryson distinguishes her benefit to her husband and children, her *ahl* ('people', 'kinsfolk', 'family'), and to all women.[55]

Set against the surviving oeconomic literature, Bryson's wife is envisaged as playing a prominent role. The presentation is highly schematic and there is much that is not said. It appears that this wife is to stay put on her estate. She is to serve her husband and bear children. Her influence results from his decision to share the estate with her. All of this is traditional. Untraditional is the avoidance of standard misogynistic themes, notably her potential for infidelity and love of cosmetics. Untraditional too is the obsession with management. Bryson's wife does no work herself (no bed-making or weaving to make her more attractive): she manages others. His husband has much to learn from his wife about virtue, and that is a reason for choosing her (§93). Her management shows 'emotional intelligence' (§91, especially §§97–9). The couple must possess the same qualities in this domain (§96). Love between husband and wife is an ancient theme. But emotional engagement to the degree Bryson wishes it is not. There is an intensity to her relationship with husband and children (§§100–2) that appears unparalleled in the Greek male's imagination of what he wanted in a wife. Her love, founded on equal possession of virtue, is as deep as the love of Plutarch's ideal wife in the *Dialogue on Love*, but the rhetorical presentation of it makes it all the more powerful. If we recall again the end of section four on the need for both man and woman to know and to have known no other sexual partner in their

[53] Naumachius is known from Stobaeus 4.22b.32, 4.23.7, 4.31c.76. The extracts are assembled by E. Heitsch, *Die griechischen Dichterfragmente der römischen Kaiserzeit*, vol. 1, 2nd edn., 1963, 92–4.

[54] Cf. Perictione (in a different train of thought) p. 143.3 Thesleff 'loving towards husband, children, and the whole *oikos*', p. 144.18 'she loves the whole *oikos*', 144.25–145.1 'is a benefit not only to the husband, but also to the children, relatives, slaves, and the whole house'.

[55] Cf. Clement, *Paedagogus* 3.67.2 κοσμήμασι (finery hand made by the wife), δι' ὧν ἀγάλλονται πάντες, οἱ μὲν παῖδες ἐπὶ τῇ μητρί, ὁ δὲ ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ τῇ γυναικί, αὕτη δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις, πάντες δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ θεῷ, Perictione's tricolon 'she is a harmony, etc.' (above, p. 314).

lives, on the virtue that results from this, and on the profound love and happiness that both of them will thus experience, Bryson's affective presentation appears exceptionally strong. His wife manages the estate and its people with a spectacular effortlessness.

If we turn for a moment to real lives and letters of the well-heeled women of Roman Egypt, which have been collected by Bagnall and Cribiore (2006),[56] we find excellent evidence of these women's routine ability to run estates and the presumption that others will listen to them. A good example is the Diogenis whose two letters from the mid second century regarding properties she owns show her dealing 'brusquely and efficiently with her dependents'. This highly literate woman is someone who 'will not tolerate mistakes' (§239). One letter issues instructions prior to a visit and shows her character well (P.Mil.Vogl 2.77[57]):

> . . . and sell the wheat necessary and collect the bronze at your house while I come, because I need it. Go to Myrtale and ask her for the money. If she does not want to give it to you, lock her up. See that I do not come and find the wall built up. And make the exedra ready and let the dining room be paved, according to the arrangement Aphys wants; shake out the woollen cloths and the clothes and watch the children and things at home. Watch little Isidora. I pray that you are well. Pachon 25.
>
> [Postscript]: . . . but the keys . . . I arrive; it will be your concern that I arrive.
>
> [Address on back]: . . . from Diogenis

In the other she writes to an administrator to get himself ready (P.Mil. Volg 2.76):

> Diogenis to her dearest Kronion, greeting.
>
> Be expecting me when I come up to you at Tali. But I pray that once I am there I will not find you at fault in anything: I hope that none of these things will happen. My brother Lourios will communicate to you everything concerning me.
>
> [second hand] I hope that you are well. Salute all my relatives and Isidora, and let her go to a woman teacher.
>
> [first hand] If Didymas opposes the payment to Lourios, get out my box, and send his documents under seal. Epeiph 20. But if you also have need of him for the *artabia* (tax) or something else, go to him and he will do everything.
>
> [Address on back]: . . . from Diogenis

[56] I refer to the fuller online edition (ACLS Humanities e-Book), which is divided by paragraph; the translation is taken from there, slightly adapted.

[57] Text available online via link in Bagnall and Cribiore to Perseus or directly at www.perseus.tufts.edu.

The impression of these and the other letters is of financial and managerial effectiveness. There are certainly women who enjoyed large landholding (e.g. P.Oxy. 1.71; Rowlandson 1998: no 177; Banaji 2007a: ch. 5 on third/fourth-century examples), though overall the Egyptian women appear to embrace no very major undertakings or decisions. But, in broad terms, what we see squares well with Bryson's expectations. If we had letters from other parts of the empire, they would tell the same story. The papyri can inform us about many other aspects of women's lives and experiences in general. Unfortunately they do not tell us what a Diogenis thought of *philokosmia* or the other restrictions imposed on women in the oeconomic literature or what they thought of their husbands. But it is likely they would have shared the attitudes of a Phintys or a Timoxena or the assumptions imputed by Clement of Alexandria to the wealthy readers, male and female, of his *Paedagogus* (Chapter 6, pp. 386–7), where Alexandrian society was firmly in mind.

In conclusion, then, Bryson offers a reworking of the oeconomic material on the role of the wife, including important variations on the traditional themes, in combination with a significant exploration of the emotional and affective relationship between wife and husband and mother and children. He is closest to *Oikonomika III* in many ways. Setting the wife in an economic and managerial framework is his original contribution, taking its departure from Xenophon but going far beyond him in the presentation of her ability to deal with people and things, and building the section on the wife into a total account of the workings of the *oikos*.

5 MUSONIUS, DIO, HIEROCLES

(a) Musonius

Musonius Rufus (*c.* ad 30–95) is a well-known figure to students of the social thought and non-technical, 'popular' philosophy of the early empire. He was Etruscan (whatever that meant at this time), of the equestrian property class, and wrote in Greek in keeping with his identity as a broadly Stoic philosopher. A significant amount of his words survive, collected by a disciple (see the introductions in Hense 1905, Lutz 1947, Ramelli 2001, also Baldassarre 1978b), just as the words of his own more famous pupil, Epictetus, were collected by Arrian of Nicomedia. As we have seen, Musonius made good use of Bryson in two of his discourses. His thought on marriage has even

swayed a hard-headed quantitative historian (Saller in Cohen and Saller 1994: 54 'exceptional'). The 'feminism' of Musonius is in fact a reasonably old notion. It was apparently first suggested by the Swiss Latinist and patristic scholar, Charles Favez (1933; *non vidi*); and the idea that the Stoics advocated a 'feminist' approach to women is older still (see Engel 2003: 267). In Musonius' case the matter has been interpreted hand in hand with the supposed overlaps between him and Early Christian thought. Some scholars have found these links convincing enough to speak of 'una effettiva conoscenza reciproca tra Musonio ed i Cristiani' (Ramelli 2001: 32). But the reciprocal nature of the acquaintance is one way, i.e. the unacknowledged use of Musonius by Clement (which was first set out, and is still worth studying, in Wendland's dissertation of 1886 and his further thoughts in his comments on popular Stoic philosophical themes in Philo, Musonius, and others, 1895: 68–73). The parallels between Musonius and the New Testament writers are in fact as bland as they always turn out to be between the pagan authors of the first and second centuries and the writings of Early Christianity (for Musonius in particular see van der Horst 1974). That Early Christians could adopt some of the thinking of non-Christian philosophers and intellectuals on the ethics of marriage and sexual relations is not all that surprising given the objective of Early Christianity to be accepted intellectually and socially by mainstream society, and (more importantly) given the pagan education that Christian intellectuals like Justin, Clement, and Origen had enjoyed (cf. Chadwick 1966). I say 'parallels', not 'convergences'; and that is the best way to look at the matter. The more austere pagan reflections, tending to renunciation and asceticism, and with a heritage traceable to the *Laws*, to Cynicism, and other classic texts, were bound to appeal to a religion that had so many problems with bodies. But pagan thinking on marriage, sex, and women is simply not religious in a Christian way: it is socially based for the most part. The essential gulf between Christianity and pagan thought on this level should never be ignored (cf. recently Stroumsa 2009: ch. 1).

The convergences between Musonius and Bryson, on the other hand, are very real. In setting out the reasons why we can say that Musonius used Bryson (rather than vice versa), I have suggested among other things that, though Musonius does not rise to the affective height of Bryson's loving and selfless wife at the end of section three, he develops a conception of the institution of marriage beyond Bryson's purposes or ability; and this is what I want to consider now. Musonius discusses marriage in three discourses, XII 'On Sex' (Stobaeus 3.6.23), XIIIa–XIIIb 'What Is the Main Purpose of

Marriage?' (4.22c.90, 22d.104), and XIV 'Is Marriage an Impediment to Being a Philosopher?' (4.22a.20).[58] In XIV 'marriage is the foundation of everything encompassed by the *oikos*' (p. 73.10 Hense).[59] This discourse offers traditional Stoic views on the patriotic duty to marry and raise legitimate children, and tailors these views to the objection of a young man who has foolishly asked if marriage will interfere with his practice of philosophy; but the approach is far wider than the concerns of the Stoic wise man.[60] Musonius goes further than tradition when he suggests that the relation of 'a wife of one's own mind'[61] to her husband is a more important relationship than that of brother to brother or son to parents, and he asks, 'What could we more appropriately describe as "a work of sexual love (*aphrodision ergon*)" than the union of wife and husband?'[62] This statement of the *aphrodision ergon* puts sex at the heart of the marriage, as in Plutarch's *Dialogue*; and Plutarch reminds us elsewhere that 'Aphrodite is the artisan of men's *homophrosunē* and *philia* for women' (*Dinner of the Seven Sages* 156c–d). In keeping with this Musonius makes no attempt to imagine the responses or feelings of the woman; whereas Plutarch in the *Dialogue* is clearly talking of the mutual investment of husband and wife. Discourse XII has been taken by Nussbaum (2002) to be one of the texts which show Musonius' 'incomplete feminism'. The term 'feminism', whether complete or incomplete, is inapplicable to the ancient world. Even if one means in general terms advocacy of equality in social and economic rights between men and women, Musonius is hardly up to the description. But he does break some moulds, as I put it earlier. Discourse XII is part of a longer treatise (the rest is lost) on self-indulgence and wantonness (*truphē*), which is how it was filed by Stobaeus. Sex, says Musonius, is not the smallest part of this problem because men go hunting girlfriends and boyfriends to pursue 'disgusting forms of intercourse' (*sumplokai*).[63] The right kind of sex is 'within marriage

[58] To which we may add XV (XVa–XVb) on the duty to raise all children born. For this Lutz's text should be used, which incorporates a papyrological fragment unknown to Hense. For the other discourses I refer to Hense; cf. Chapter 2, p. 115 n. 10.

[59] ἀρχὴ δὲ οἴκου περιβολῆς γάμος. *Peribolē* refers to the perimeter literally defending the integrity of the estate and also to the space enclosed within.

[60] It is worth noting here Seneca's thoughts on marriage (from the generation before Musonius), so far as they can be constructed from his surviving works, which appear to make it a locus of virtue for the Stoic sage (Torre 2000: ch. 3). Regrettably, however, nothing sure can be said about his *De matrimonio*, which is known only from its use by Jerome in his campaign against Jovinian. To judge by Jerome's gross distortions of Plutarch's *Advice* (p. 90) and other texts, no trust can be placed in any reconstruction of the work; cf. the cautious remarks of Treggiari 1991a: 215–20.

[61] γυνὴ καταθύμιος: cf. Antiphon the Sophist fr. 49 Diels-Kranz (=17 Gernet).

[62] τί δὲ καλοῦντες ἀφροδίσιον ἔργον προσήκοντως ἂν μᾶλλον καλοῖμεν ἢ τὴν γαμετῆς τῷ γεγαμηκότι σύνοδον;

[63] Cf. Clement, *Paedagogus* 2.10.97.2.

and for procreation'. Sexual pleasure in itself, 'even within marriage', is illicit (cf. Ocellus, Seneca, *To Helvia* 13. 4). This austerity was approved by Clement, who took the passage over (*Paedagogus* 2.10.92.2). Adultery, says Musonius in full flow, is exceptionally bad, and male homosexuality is simply an 'outrage against Nature'. Adultery means intercourse with a married woman, thereby harming her *husband*, not your *wife*, for he goes on to say that relations with women 'outside adultery' are no better because no (married) man can approach a prostitute and preserve his own *sōphrosūnē*. The crime in the case of the prostitute or the unmarried woman is against 'oneself', not the woman in question nor the man's wife. This leads finally to the strong criticism of the husband for having sex with a slave girl, which is often cited with admiration by moderns. The husband would find it intolerable if his wife did the same with a slave boy. Such intemperance would show he is inferior to women, though in fact men should be stronger and rule. The argument is 'obvious'.

Here again there is no attempt to imagine the wife's feelings, and Foucault was wrong to make Discourse XII into 'the most detailed statement of the principle of a symmetrical conjugality' (1986b: 172). Women are as subject to male control here as they are in all the texts of this era. For the point of the married relationship is to allow the husband to demonstrate his own self-control. The short Discourses XIIIa–XIIIb are the clearest statements of the commitment to the institution of marriage and reproductive sex within marriage. They are split by Stobaeus from one treatise, but the order cannot be guaranteed and the assumption that XIIIb follows directly from XIIIa is dubious.[64] Given their importance and the use of Bryson in XIIIb, a translation is worthwhile:[65]

> [XIIIa] The main point of marriage is partnership for life and procreation of children. The husband and the wife, he said, must come together for this reason, each with the other, so that they live with each other together, produce children together, and consider everything shared and nothing personal, not even their bodies. The birth of a human being, which is the achievement of this couple, is a marvellous thing. But to the husband[66] this on its own is not enough, since it could happen as a result of other sexual unions, just as animals unite with each other. Marriage entails the practice of a joint life in every respect and mutual care by the man and the woman in health, in sickness, and in every circumstance. Since this is what both desire, just as they

[64] The initial 'therefore' (διό) in XIIIb does not pick up the argument at the end of XIIIa. see Chapter 2, p. 115 n. 11.

[65] Cora Lutz's 1947 translation is good but rather loose and too ready to interpret (see below); a complete new English version of Musonius is needed, taking account of Ramelli's Italian.

[66] τῷ γαμοῦντι: 'husband and wife' (Lutz); correct in Ramelli: 'lo sposo'.

desire children, they enter into marriage. Where such care is perfect and by being together they make a perfect provision of it to one another, with each of them striving to outdo the other, this marriage will work as it should and will be worthy of emulation, for a partnership of such a sort is beautiful. Where each looks to his own interest and neglects the other (or, what is worse, one of them is like this), lives in the same house but in his mind is looking outside, not wishing to share the aims and needs of his fellow, then of necessity the partnership will be destroyed and the affairs of those who are living together will go to the bad. Either they will split up from one another completely or find that remaining together is worse than being alone.

[XIIIb] [§1] Therefore men marrying should not look at family, to see if it is of the nobility, nor wealth, should some people have much, nor at bodies, should they be beautiful. For wealth, beauty, and good birth do not have it in them to enhance partnership or, likewise, concord, nor do they make for stronger procreation. Bodies fit for marriage are healthy ones, with a normal figure, and capable of doing work.[67] These are less likely to fall victim to the unscrupulous, more likely to do manual work, and should bear children without defect. One will hold that the most suitable minds are those naturally disposed to self-control, fairness, and to virtue in general.[68]

[§2] What sort of marriage is beautiful if there is no concord? What sort of partnership is successful? How could people who are bad be in concord with one another? How could a good person be in concord with a bad one? No more than crooked wood could fit with upright wood, or two pieces of crooked wood with each other. For a crooked piece cannot be made to fit an equally crooked piece, still less a straight piece different to it. In a word, a bad person cannot be a friend with a bad person nor in concord with him, and far less with a good person.

This is a male ethics. It is 'to the husband' that procreation is 'not enough': *he* wants both partners to be determined on the joint life (*sumbiōsis*), etc. Nevertheless the level of reciprocation demanded by him is more intense than in other texts; and he is keen to stress the involvement of both partners 'together'. The final part of XIIIa on the dangers of 'looking outside' and the loneliness of a bad marriage shows the elevation of the topic in Musonius' hands. He goes far beyond Bryson in promoting marriage as a perfect institution involving both partners. In Bryson the section corresponding to XIIIb §2 takes as its starting point not marriage but 'the affairs of the estate' (§94). We should note, however, that Musonius nowhere forbids sex before

[67] αὐτουγεῖν ἱκανά: cf. Discourse III p. 11.21–2 Hense, where αὐτουργικὴν καὶ κακόπαθον means suckling her own baby, serving her man, doing menial tasks.

[68] Lutz adds '<These qualities should be present in both man and wife>'.

marriage (for the man) as categorically as Bryson does at the end of section four; and, as I have said, though Musonius' wife cares, he is not interested in detailing her loving response to the problems of her husband and children.

Discourse IV 'Should Daughters Be Educated in the Same Way as Sons?' takes the standard Stoic line that women and men have the same virtues and argues that they therefore need the same education. But some occupations are more suitable for one sex than the other: spinning and housekeeping are specified for women (p. 17.4–5 Hense). When it comes to the primary virtue of justice/fairness, this will help the man to become a 'good citizen' and the woman to undertake 'good management of the estate' (p. 14.10 Hense). Her role is not intended by Musonius to be negligible, but there is nothing about equality here. The whole matter has been discussed reasonably by David Engel (2000, 2003: 274–83, with criticism of among others Asmis 1996). For Musonius, unlike the old Stoics, sexual and gender relations were at the centre of moral thinking – for the man/husband, that is; and the focus was on life in its primary organization of the *oikos*.

In Discourse III 'That Women Also Should Study Philosophy' Musonius again used Bryson, and the stress on philosophy (as opposed to the estate) should not obscure his influence. After stating very clearly the intrinsic natural disposition to virtue in men and women, Musonius turns to examine the attributes that are necessary for a woman 'who wants to be (morally) good'. This is where Bryson (§96) comes in:

> For a start the woman must be capable of managing the household, capable of calculating what is good for the estate, and capable of governing the servants. It is these abilities, I say, that a woman practising philosophy must have in particular (p. 10.2–5 Hense).

This, he goes on, is where philosophy turns into 'a science of living'. After listing other, moral qualities centred on self-control, he imitates Bryson's series of rhetorical questions about the qualities the woman needs:

> Shouldn't a woman practising philosophy be just (*dikaia*), a blameless partner for life, an effective contributor to concord, a dedicated carer of her husband and children, and wholly free of greed and the desire to gain an advantage? Who could be more like this than the woman who is a philosopher? If she should actually be a philosopher, she will accept absolutely that doing wrong is worse than suffering it because it is more disgraceful, believe that coming off worse is better than gaining an advantage, and moreover love her children more than her life. What woman could be juster than the one who is like this? (p. 11.1–11 Hense)

He follows this with the picture of the 'brave' woman who will both stand up to tyrants *and* suckle her baby *and* 'serve her husband with her own

hands', and finishes by borrowing from the final words of Bryson section three:

> Would not such a woman be a blessing to her husband, an adornment to her family, and a fine example to women who know her? (p. 12.2–5 Hense).

What in Bryson is overtly a matter concerning the running the estate (§97 'Can there then be management without . . . ?') and the family (§100 'provide for the children's upbringing . . . serve the husband') in Musonius allows the definition of the philosophically educated and virtuous wife (and in a framework of Stoic male friendship; cf. Reydams-Schils 2005: 115–76). This is beyond Bryson's interests. But Musonius makes a clear allusion to his source at the end of his discourse. The main point of philosophy, he says, is to teach 'shame', 'modesty', and 'self-control'. Then he adds that it will also 'encourage her to manage the estate (*oikonomein*)' by 'establishing that the capacity for managing (the house) (*oikonomikē*) is a virtue' (pp. 12.19–13.1 Hense). Such is the importance that Musonius attaches to this role that he earlier raises *oikonomikē* to a work of philosophical 'science' (p. 10.6 Hense), albeit he dispenses with Bryson's obsessiveness. So management has a strong place. Is this just male fantasy and convenience (as Bryson happily admits: §82)? Primarily it is; but we must also remember the well-heeled Egyptian wives who show that running a big estate was a serious endeavour, and one which did not need men.

(b) Dio of Prusa

Before passing to Hierocles, a word must be said about Dio. Dio was a pupil of Musonius, as has been mentioned, and among his many works was a lost *To Musonius* (for much speculation on this see Moles 1978). Fr. VI (ed. von Arnim = Stobaeus 4.23.59) is all that remains of the section on married life in his *Oikonomikos*: 'piety in a woman is her love (*erōs*) for her husband'.[69] References to women in Dio's numerous works do not add anything unexpected: there is a clear preference for marriage and for sexual activity within marriage (Hawley 2000). In particular one may note his strong aversion to homosexuality, pederasty, and effeminacy (Swain 2007b: 189–90). Orationes 21 *On Beauty* is especially interesting in this regard as one of several places where Dio praises genuine 'archaic' male beauty and laments the fact that today female beauty is rated above this, a situation which leads to men feminizing their appearance (Hawley 2000: 137–8). The

[69] εὐσέβεια δὲ γυναικεία ὁ πρὸς ἄνδρα ἔρως.

final sections of *Or.* 7 should also be mentioned, for here Dio caps his discussion of acceptable employments for the poor (cf. Chapter 3, pp. 241–2) with a tirade against prostitution and pederasty (§§133–52). This attitude is shared with Musonius and would surely have coloured his presentation of male behaviour within marriage in the *Oikonomikos* and of social conduct in general.

(c) Hierocles the Stoic

Musonius does not seem to have had any influence on Hierocles. But it is difficult to be sure, since Stoic commonplaces on men–women–*oikoi* are shared by both. The influence of Antipater of Tarsus (or his sources), on the other hand, is, very clear. Hierocles was a paid-up Stoic writing school philosophy, whereas Musonius was eclectic in some degree and was categorized as a Cynic, doubtless on account of his ascetic tendencies, by the fourth-century biographer, Eunapius (*Lives* 2.1.5). Hierocles is an obscure author, and even major library catalogues may still confuse him with his later Neoplatonist namesake, Hierocles of Alexandria. There is no excuse for this: Karl Praechter's *Hierokles der Stoiker* (1901) established conclusively that the Stoic extracts on moral duties to family members in Stobaeus had nothing to do with the later Hierocles and proved the existence of a new author. This was quickly followed by Hans von Arnim's edition (1906) of a Berlin papyrus containing a lengthy fragment of Hierocles' *Elements of Ethics*, which deals with the concept of *oikeiōsis* ('affinity', 'belonging') in animals, beginning with their self-awareness and consciousness of others (Sorabji 1993: ch. 10 and index; Inwood 1984). Von Arnim also re-edited the Stobaean fragments. The appearance of Ilaria Ramelli's extensive introduction, text, translation, and commentary in 2009 makes this important author readily available in English.[70]

There has been general agreement that the Stobaean extracts come from a comprehensive work *On Duties*, though the title is not attested. This is plausible, and we are in any case surely dealing with a single work, for there are cross-references in several of the Stobaean texts. These treat (in von Arnim's ordering) the gods, one's country ('after the discourse [*logos*] on the gods . . .'), marriage, *poluteknia* (having many children: 'in the section [*topos*] concerning marriage and procreation, a discussion [*logos*] about having many children should be included'), parents ('after the discussion [*logos*] of gods

[70] I have used the Ramelli translation (in the English version of David Konstan) in what follows, with changes as necessary. The later Stoic contexts of Hierocles' family thought is well explored also in Ramelli 2008.

and country'), brothers, and relatives ('it is right to add to our statements [*ta eirēmena*] about the treatment of parents, brothers, wife, and children . . .'). Whether the remaining extract 'from Hierocles' *Oikonomikos*', which deals with male and female duties in the house and with the husband's masculinity, should be seen as part of *On Duties* is another matter. An *oikonomikos logos* should (also) contain material on money and property, which we know Stoics wrote about. If the *Oikonomikos* can be identified with the work called *Ta peri oikōn* (*Treatise on Estates*) mentioned at the start of the second extract on marriage (Stobaeus 4.22a.22), the discourse on duties in marriage apparently belonged to a separate work, i.e. the *Oikonomikos* was not part of *On Duties*.[71] Moreover, as we shall see, the *Oikonomikos* extract has a somewhat different feel to the rest.

Before turning to the *Oikonomikos*, I shall say a little about the parts of *On Duties* dealing with marriage and procreation (Stobaeus 4.22a.21–4, 4.24a.14). These take a standard line, that marriage is a patriotic duty. It is tasked by nature with 'one common job': procreation and the *diexagōgē* ('achievement', 'implementation') of a stable livelihood (*bios eustathēs*). The house is 'incomplete' without it. It is divine, since it entails 'the generation of children as its fruit'. The children will become our caretakers. The wife cares for the husband after a busy day. When he is away, she ensures that the *oikos* is 'stable and not completely without a leader (*aprostatētos*)'. She looks after the servants. She provides *sumpatheia* (as Eurydice does in *Advice*). The text is actually less staccato than I am making it sound, and about two-thirds of the way through, before turning to the disadvantages of marriage according to the familiar rhetorical scheme, Hierocles elevates his subject by announcing that marriage is 'beautiful'. The 'adornment of the household' is not expensive peristyles and gardens but,

> the union of man and wife, who share each other's destinies and are consecrated to the gods of marriage, birth, and hearth, being in accord with one another and considering everything in common including even their bodies, or rather their very souls, who are engaged in the management (*prostasia*[72]) that falls to them concerning the house and the servants, and the upbringing and care of the children . . . (Stobaeus 4.22a.24, p. 505 Hense, p. 54 von Arnim)

Capping these remarks with the familiar quotation of *Odyssey* 6.182–3, Hierocles dismisses potential burdens and advises on ignoring wealth and

[71] Cf. 'On Marriage', p. 502 Hense, 'we have established in our *Treatise On Estates* (ἐν τοῖς περὶ οἴκων) that for the wise man life combined with marriage is preferable': the form of the title (*ta peri*) is different from the terms used in the cross-references (see above in text).

[72] Cf. Chapter 3, p. 247.

beauty in making one's choice of wife, who is to be selected for 'procreation of children and partnership for life'. The extract on *poluteknia* follows on naturally and makes familiar points about children as our helpers in old age, but also maintains that they are pleasing to our parents, friends, and relatives, and good for our country.

In terms of the relation between the man and the wife and the development of the man's character, Hierocles seems to have made little advance on Antipater, to whom he evidently owes much. But there is some hint of a deeper conception of the married relationship: cf. 'their very souls'; and the idea of a joint *prostasia* is new. Yet the more 'advanced' parts of Musonius' thinking have made no impact on him.

The *Oikonomikos* is similar in this respect. In the short extract that is preserved it offers us a most interesting and deeply felt perspective on the dangers presented by life at home to the man's sexuality. The passage (Stobaeus 4.28.21) begins with a theme addressed by Musonius (Discourse IV), but resting on classical material about male versus female virtues: which jobs can be done by men and which by women? Musonius had argued that tasks carried out predominantly by women may be carried out by men. Hierocles is not interested at this point in the question of the complementarity of virtue, but in running the *oikos*. The husband takes *ta kat' agron* (the agricultural business), *ta peri tās agorās* (its commercial business), and *ta peri tēn astupolian* (its civic business).[73] The wife has spinning, bread making, and household chores (the role of the servants in these areas being understood). But she may herself be 'in the country' and thus carry out the 'duty of overseeing the labourers and fulfilling the role of the *oikodespotēs*', just like Diogenis; while the husband may correspondingly attend to the household, acquaint himself with its doings, and deal with matters in it. 'The elements of the partnership would be more firmly bound together, if they both participated mutually in matters of importance.'[74] So far as it goes, this is not very different from Musonius or Bryson.

Hierocles now offers a more detailed consideration of gender. Although luxury and sloth are common today, he remarks in the mode of a Columella, in actual fact it is rare for men not to like sowing, planting, and the other work of the farm. This ideal picture he calls *autourgia*, 'personal labour'. The term *may* be taken literally. Musonius, Discourse XI 'What is an Appropriate

[73] ἀστυπολία means τὸ ἐν ἄστει διατρίβειν, ἄγριον ὄντα (*Lexica Segueriana*, ed. L. Bachmann, 1828, p. 155). But Hierocles' owner clearly fits the usual pattern of urban living with the possession of rural properties.

[74] οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐπισυνδέοιτο μᾶλλον τὰ τῆς κοινωνίας, εἰ συμμετέχοιεν ἀλλήλοις τῶν ἀναγκαίων φροντίδων.

Form of Income for a Philosopher?', fantasizes (with an eye on the legend of Cleanthes, which was allegedly lived out by Dio himself at the end of Musonius' life, Philostratus, *Lives* 488) that agriculture is an activity conducive to teaching and learning, thereby showing that he had had no experience of agricultural labour. To be fair to Musonius, he does state at the start of the discourse that the rural work he is thinking of should not tire one out and prevent the mind from concentrating. As far as Hierocles is concerned, *autourgia* hardly means digging: it was enough for milord to organize others (who are the 'labourers' directed by the wife just above).[75] Respectable men, however, will not think 'the other sort of tasks' (in the home) are 'for them'. There follows an outburst concerning the reason for this: 'since for the most part it is dirty little men and that tribe of effeminate little women (*gunnides*) who make a beeline for wool-working in their eagerness for femininity, it does not seem right for a real man to lower himself to such occupations. Consequently I for my part would probably not advise those who cannot provide complete assurance about their own masculinity and self-control to touch such a thing.' Only if the man is free of 'suspicion' should he engage in this part of the domestic sphere. Knitting, then, is out, but the more tiring household chores are fine. And the wife can reciprocate – and make herself more sexually attractive ('if she is not yet worn out by pregnancies') – by doing physical work around the house (like the wife of Ischomachus) and by helping the workers out in the fields.

In this extract *autourgia* is not a matter of philosophical posturing, as it is in Musonius. Rather, here it is the raw material of one's very identity as a man. What one does in private in the day-to-day life conducted with one's spouse at home was potentially very risky. To whom did these exposed husbands have to 'provide complete assurance' about their masculinity? The answer is not the wife – that is not in Hierocles' mind at all, still less his automata servants. Rather, it is in part the 'great noisy throng of visitors saying hello and shaking hands' all day long in the big house; and also his agricultural, commercial, and civic business with his peers in the big world outside, or in Hierocles' own terms (as given in his thoughts on 'relatives') each of the ten circles of increasingly distant relationships surrounding ego and including in final place the whole human race, to the people of each of which were owed certain duties. The problems faced by Hierocles' manly man remind us of Epictetus' Cynic who has to bath the baby for his wife and

[75] Contrast e.g. Clement, *Paedagogus* 3.11.67.1 where the wife's *autourgia* (housework) is hers, cf. Chapter 6, p. 387.

is weighed down by a host of 'domestic duties' just when he is trying to act like a sage (*Discourses* 3.22.69–74).[76]

6 THE ROLE OF THE WIFE

Habrocomes the hero of Xenophon of Ephesus' (?) second-century novel, *The Ephesian Story*, feels that his wife Anthia is simply 'the reason . . . for his whole existence' (*Ephesian Story* 5.8.2). But to the writers of the oeconomica the wife was not romantic, as she had to be in love stories. For Hierocles she was on the same level – in circle two – as parents, brothers, and children. I doubt if Bryson would have objected to his categorization. This wife enjoyed considerable recognition and responsibility. But for whose benefit? Wives' efficient management of estates made a crucial contribution to the preservation of wealth, as Xenophon had recognized long before in the *Oeconomicus*. Above all her role was of benefit to the next generation, with which texts like *On Duties* are so concerned. She represented the joining of forces with another *oikos* and the aim of ensuring that one's line and one's wealth would continue. 'The generation of children and the achievement of a stable livelihood' (Hierocles, 'On Marriage', Stobaeus 4.22a.22) – these factors concentrated the mind on finding the right kind of wife, without whom the *oikos* was 'incomplete' by the standard Stoic terminology. The pressure to get this match right necessitated an industry of go-betweens and negotiators to balance the personal, familial, and financial interests. For any man who 'married with his eyes' only was accounted a fool (*Advice on Marriage* 24, 141c–d).

In some of the many texts from the first and second centuries which deal with marriage – Plutarch, *Oikonomika III*, Bryson, Musonius, also Hierocles but to a lesser degree – this social and economic focus took an affective turn, which is distracting to modern scholars, and led to discussion of the man's conduct. He shapes his own virtue within the marriage, and may give thought to his wife's feelings in relation to him and his behaviour. The basis of this limited symmetry is her possession of equal or equivalent virtues. All the several texts which valorize marriage assume the husband's right to rule and the wife's obligation to serve. His identification as a 'real man', as Hierocles puts it, with 'the persona of a free man' (Libanius), depends upon

[76] δεῖ αὐτὸν κουκκούμιον, ὅπου θερμὸν ποιήσει τῷ παιδίῳ, ἵν' αὐτὸ λούσῃ εἰς σκάφην . . . ποῦ σχολὴ τῷ εἰς τὰ ἰδιωτικὰ καθήκοντα ἐνδεδεμένῳ; ('where can a man tied to domestic duties find the time?').

this precondition. The female authors Phintys and Perictione take the same line because they have an interest in the same system, in which they knew they held considerable power ('if she happens to rule cities or provinces', Perictione). Without independent evidence and independent female voices we are unable to come up with a 'useful theory or history for women' (to paraphrase Amy Richlin). The male ethics which our sources present us with obviously imposed many limitations on wives of all social groups. Her feelings are half-allowed by Plutarch but never really imagined except by Bryson (and then of course it is her devotion to her husband and children that is described). She is permitted respectable, reproductive sex only. The accent on procreation necessarily restricted her hugely. For the upper classes pregnancy and birth were as dangerous as they were for the rest, but the task of bringing up the children was at least made easier for the rich mother by the use of nurses and maids, though one should note the appearance of texts in this period which make it her duty to breastfeed.[77]

Musonius was dead by around 95, Plutarch by 120, Dio of Prusa by about 115. Hierocles can be dated reasonably to the early to mid second century. As I have remarked in the Introduction, if we put Bryson much earlier than these authors, his views become the more radical and out of joint, and there are limits to what is plausible. To leave other factors aside, the congruity of approach toward the wife makes it clear that Bryson belongs in the same era as Plutarch and Musonius. In fact we might suppose that Musonius used him because he knew him. *Oikonomika III* is part of this group – for, again, the further back in time we push it, the more radical and isolated it becomes, and that does not make sense. Bryson's love between the couple is no greater, and no less, than it is in Plutarch, Musonius, Hierocles, *Oikonomika III*, or Dio, and just as essential to the progress of the marriage. But in one respect he goes further: only he institutes a total ban on sex before marriage, a restriction that even Plato in the *Laws* felt was unworkable, and in a passage to which Bryson himself refers (§160; 839e–841c). Perhaps the closest to Bryson is the advice of Epictetus: 'Before marriage keep yourself as pure as you can from sexual intercourse'; and he adds, 'if you do engage in it, keep to what is legal; don't be offensive or critical to those who do it, or continually parade the fact that you don't' (*Handbook* 33.8).[78] Bryson's straightforward prescription of virginity accords intercourse in marriage a truly enormous anticipation. His marriage becomes what Musonius called

[77] See Chapter 6, p. 374.

[78] Cf. Foucault 1986b: 168 (but note that the English translation's 'guard yourself with all your ability' alters the French original's 'dans la mesure du possible' to suggest complete abstention, which is not what Epictetus says).

it: 'a work of sexual love', not so much (in Plutarch's words) 'a foundation of affection . . . in a great mystery', but *the* foundation. And, we would add, sexual intercourse becomes, in a work focussed on the estate's prosperity, an act intimately associated with and guaranteeing the legitimate transference of property.

We have a large group of texts focussing on marriage and family, and may assume more existed. This group is a continuum with major differences from one end to the other, let us say between a Phintys and a Bryson. There is much traditional, 'patriarchal' material all the way through, but also a 'progressive' end. In this continuum we must find room for the stories of the novels, which have attracted so much work in recent years. In these romances, as I have remarked, 'nearly all characters . . . aim at marriage' (Haynes 2003: 156), not just the protagonists, and they do so with an accent on reciprocity (Konstan 1994) that is easy when the fiancées were 'not yet worn out by pregnancies', as Hierocles indelicately remarked. It is worth reminding ourselves that this genre of literature begins in the first century AD or not long before it. Foucault rightly observed its importance as a milestone in the history of sexuality.[79] The heroes and heroines have the same upper-class attributes and behaviours as their readers. One of the most famous of the novels, Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe* (?AD 200), is actually set on the rural estate of the family of the protagonist who, abandoned at birth according to a familiar strategy of family planning (Chapter 6, p. 367), is reunited with his biological family at the end and happily assumes his social privileges in the city. Together with Plutarch, Musonius, Dio, and Hierocles, the novels help us to see something special about Bryson. For theirs is a world centred on urbanism, whatever problems they may have with it. As I have noted several times, Bryson himself departs from the Aristotelian model of the citizen in the *polis* by more or less writing the city out of his book. It is not that he enacts a wholly private sphere in the modern sense; that would be impossible for the notables of antiquity. His owner keeps open house, and is active in trading beyond the *oikos*. But though we may certainly assume he is a city-dweller, the city as community interests him as little as it does the author of *Oikonomika III*. In Bryson section four the young man's 'ambition' (literally 'love of honour') is directed towards his education/culture (*adab* =

[79] 1986b: 232 'This new erotics [of the novels] organizes itself around the symmetrical and reciprocal relationship of a man and a woman, around the high value attributed to virginity, and around the complete union in which it finds perfection.' It is worth noting that the 'ideal novels', as they are sometimes called, of Chariton, Xenophon of Ephesus, Achilles Tatius, Longus, and Heliodorus, are part of a much larger production of fiction in the Roman era; see Reardon 2008 for translations and brief orientation.

paideia): this is a social matter, but there is no thought of public life, which is the domain of *philotimia* as it is usually conceived of by historians. In section three procreation is a matter for the family, not the city (as it is in Musonius, Dio, and many others according to an ethics which needs no school label because it reflects simple, political–social facts). Bryson's children in sections three and four are part of the *oikos*, not the city. Naturally the private life of the wealthy necessarily involved extensive interchange. But public life is excised by Bryson as it is in Clement of Alexandria. Although this is for different reasons, the ensuing reflection on a more private domain provides a greater space for the woman in both authors and is surely one factor in the particular role of Bryson's estate-owning wife.

We must enquire finally into a difficult question: what happened to the thought of Bryson, Musonius, and the others after the period we are interested in? The accent on marriage remained. The novels, some of which are first-century but the majority later, are a very good index of the interest in marriage and the lengths to which people could imagine themselves going to find the right partner. The texts of interest in this chapter stayed in circulation. Why were they not added to? Part of the answer may be that they and other lost works, such as we may assume, already constituted a large enough body of family information. Another reason may be the rapid growth of Christian intellectual writing, which by the early third century was undoubtedly provoking a hardening of the Hellenizing/classicizing tradition among the pagan upper classes, which engendered different focusses and priorities by intellectuals (Swain 1999b, 2009). Moreover Christianity soon came to monopolize radical thinking about the body and its representation (e.g. Brown 1988, Perkins 1994). To see this one only has to think about the multiple works on marriage and female behaviour by Tertullian at the turn of the third century (*To a Philosophical Friend, On the Problems of Marriage*; *To his Wife*; *Exhortation to Chastity*; *On Marrying Once*; *On Modesty*; *On the Need for Unmarried Women to Wear Veils*). Clement's *Paedagogus* from around the 190s, which I shall be using in the next chapter, is a sort of halfway house in this regard, in that it draws extensively on pagan thought (including Musonius and perhaps Bryson) but subordinates it to the religious aim of submission to Christ. When Clement discusses sex at *Paedagogus* 2.10, there is an amazing difference from our moralists. The classical paradigm offered a self-control intensified in key texts in the privacy of marital relations, and could even rise to a self-awareness of that little piece of the divine that is inside observing our vices (Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.8.11–14). This was still an interior ethics. In the case of sexual relations the man's role was to teach *eutaxia* (pp. 299, 315). But for Clement, discipline resided in the

external check of Christ the Paedagogus who personally berated Christians erroneously supposing that their love-making was private by throwing at them a powerful combination of Scriptural citation:

> [The husband] commits adultery with his own marriage if he uses it like a mistress, and does not hear the voice of the Paedagogus shouting out, 'The man who ascends his bed, who says in his soul, "Who sees me? Darkness is around me, and the walls are my covering, and no-one sees my sins – why should I be careful? . . ." Most wretched is such a man . . ."For he knows not," says Scripture, "that brighter ten thousand times than the sun are the eyes of the Most High, which look upon all the ways of men, and cast their glance into hidden parts."' Thus again the Paedagogus threatens them through the words of Isaiah, 'Woe unto those who hide deep their counsel, and say "Who sees us?"' (2.10.99.3–5)[80]

7 THE ISLAMIC FAMILY: ASPECTS OF BRYSON'S INFLUENCE[81]

The ethics of marriage in Islamic law and tradition as they developed in the first two centuries of Islam were antithetical to the Brysonian view of marriage. The jurists viewed marriage as a contract, in which the husband pays dower and support in return for exclusive sexual access to the wife. They drew a direct parallel between marriage and slave concubinage, viewing both as forms of control (Ali 2006, 2010). The Hadith material complemented this contractual view of marriage.[82] The main themes of the non-legal Hadith are the requirement for the wife to always be available sexually, even if she is on the back of a camel or working the oven, and the authority of the husband over a subservient and grateful wife. Some traditions even link a woman's salvation to her conduct with her husband (Abou El Fadl 2001: 211–19).

Unlike Bryson, neither the Hadith nor the law views the married couple as an economic unit. In fact, the underlying assumption is of a strict separation of property. It is in this context that some traditions speak of the wife as a custodian of her husband's property in his absence: 'The wife is the shepherd of her husband's house and his child [or in other versions, 'his property'], and responsible for them', in the same way that a husband is responsible for his household (*ahl baytihi*) and the slave for his master's property (Muslim, *Book of Governorship*, 1829). Another Hadith praises the virtue of a 'pious woman, who obeys her husband's orders, makes him happy when he looks at

[80] Ecclus. 23:18, 23:19; Isaiah 29:15. Cf. Broudéhoux 1970: 135–6.
[81] This section is co-authored with Dr Yossef Rapoport.
[82] Hadith references are given by the name of the collector, the title of the book, and the number of the *ḥadīth* according to the *tarqīm al-ʿālamiyya* system used at http://hadith.al-islam.com.

her, does not cause him to break his vows, and in his absence is earnest with him (*naṣaḥathu*) in respect to her body and his property' (Ibn Majah, *Book of Marriage*, 1857; or 'in his absence, safeguards him (*ḥafiẓathu*)' (Abū Dawūd, *Book of Zakāt*, 1664). These traditions are concerned solely with keeping the husband's property safe, not administering it. A wife can use her husband's property only to give charity, and even then the Hadith limits the charitable donations to gifts which would not affect the wealth of the household, such as cooked meals. Her rights in this regard are specifically assimilated to those of the treasurer (*khāzin*) of public funds, who can mostly act only with explicit permission (Bukhārī, *Book of Zakāts*, 1370, 1372, 1373).

The Hadith says very little about the domestic labour of the wife. There is one tradition that deals with Asmāʾ, daughter of Abū Bakr, who as the wife of the poor Zubayr did a long list for chores for him and his camel. When the Prophet then sees her carrying date-stones and offers her a lift, she is embarrassed, and afraid of Zubayr's jealousy. Eventually, Zubayr tells her that is more painful for him to see her carrying date-stones than to ride with the Prophet. The point of the Hadith, echoed in the early legal literature, is clearly that elite women should not be doing the household chores, and that husbands should pay for a slave-girl to do them for them. Domestic labour was certainly not a legal obligation of the wife (Katz forthcoming).

Apart from providing husbands with sexual access and wives with support, marriage was often seen as means of political alliance (Stern 1939: 75–84). Household management, on the other hand, is very rarely mentioned as a reason for marriage. According to a tradition from Ibn Abbas, in pre-Islamic times only travellers married for this purpose. It was one of the reasons for *mutʿa* (temporary marriage, later prohibited by Sunnis): 'a man would arrive in a land that he was not familiar with, so he would marry a woman for the extent of time that he thought he would remain there, and she would safeguard his belongings and look after him (*fa-taḥfaẓ lahu matāʿahu wa-tuṣliḥ lahu shayʾahu*)' (Tirmidhī, *Book of Marriage*, 1122; trans. Gribetz 1994: 13).

The Hadith material has very little to say about love in marriage, which is more often seen as an affliction and a duty. This is all the more remarkable because the Koran does have much to say about marriage as a place of tranquillity and love (Motzki 2006): cf. Q 7: 189 'God created you from a single soul (*nafs wāḥida*), from which he then created his mate, so that "he may rest in her" (*li-yaskuna ilayhā*).' The love between couples is a sign from God: Q 30: 21 – he created for you from your souls mates (*azwāj*) so that you might repose in her (*li-taskunu ilayhā*), and he created between you amity and mercy (*mawadda wa-raḥma*). In marriage, women and men complement each other: 'Women and men are garments to each other' (2: 187).

The Koran also states that 'wicked men are for wicked women, good men are for good women' (Q 24: 26), for which Bryson's comparison of the crooked and straight wood offers an interesting comparison. Yet these verses do not attract the attention of jurists and are not the focus of Hadith material. They do not even interest early exegesis (e.g. Ṭabarī 1969: III 489, XIII 304). Similarly, the Hadith material reported in the name of the Prophet stands in contrast to the accounts describing the actual conduct of the Prophet with his own wives. He is said to have displayed a gentle and playful demeanour with them, never struck them, and would seek their counsel; there are also several accounts of his wives arguing with him to the point of leaving his bed (Abou El Fadl 2001: 214).

When the first *adab* anthologies appear, by the middle of the ninth century, the institution of marriage has been transformed by a shift from rural or nomadic values to the urban societies of Iraq and the wider Middle East, and primarily by the widespread availability of slave-girls. The slave-girl was now the only available object of romantic attachment in literature. The slave heroine of the ʿAbbasid period is contrasted, by the ʿAbbasids themselves, with two types of female heroines who could exist only in the past: 'The Umayyad Bedouin heroine, forbidden to marry her suitor and forever chaste and unattainable; and the aristocratic Umayyad virago, who goes unveiled, taunts her admirers, and marries and divorces her way through the rank of the nobility at her pleasure' (Bray 2004: 138).

As slave-girls become the sexual outlet for elite men, the close link between marriage and sexuality is loosened. The anthologies of Ibn Qutayba, al-Isfahānī, and Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih reflect some of this shift. There is still a good deal of material about the sexual role of the wife. The advice of one Arabian father for his daughter, on the eve of her marriage, is to use much perfume because she does not smell as good as Qurayshi women. The anthologies also include Persian traditions, which seem to focus on the dangers of following a woman's advice: this is at least the main thrust of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, who is quoted as saying that women should not be delegated control over what is beyond them – this is better for their mind and beauty, since the wife (*mar'a*) is *rayḥāna* ('agreeable', 'a seat of peace') and not *qaharmāna* ('stewardess') (Ibn Qutayba, *ʿUyūn al-akhbār*, Cairo edition 1930, IV 78–9).

But the anthologies also include anecdotes about the emotional attachment between the spouses that go beyond the sexual and the authoritarian nature of the Hadith material. One long story about the Umayyad judge Shurayḥ conveys an intimate picture of a marriage in which the new wife asks her husband what pleases and what displeases him and whether her relatives might visit her. Another Arabian piece of wisdom which is quoted in

the anthologies is that 'if she [the wife] will be his servant, he [the husband] will be her slave' – an adage that is unthinkable in the Hadith, and which has Greek parallels (Xenophon; *Oikonomika III*). The section on women in the anthology of Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih (d. 328/940) opens with an anecdote about a mother, Umm Iyās, giving advice to her daughter before marriage: obedience, showing only her good side to her husband, constantly mindful of his sleep and food, caring for his money and guarding his honour and secrets (*ʿIqd*, Beirut edition 1987, VI 83–4; cf. Ghazālī trans. Farah 1984: 123). El Cheikh's analysis is correct: the wife has to care for his well-being both practically and emotionally, and, furthermore, to internalize, even efface, her own needs as well as her own feelings of sadness and unhappiness. El Cheikh adds, however, that this important anecdote 'reiterates already codified ideas about the feminine ideal' (El Cheikh 2002: 187). In fact, this 'advice to daughters' material was fairly recent, and did not form part of the Hadith material; in particular, the emphasis on the effacement of the wife's needs brings to mind Bryson §§100–3.

The influence of Bryson on Islamic writings on marriage becomes evident first in the work of Miskawayh, as acknowledged by the author himself when he copies a large chunk of Bryson's section on the child in the *Refinement of Character*. In the same book Miskawayh treats marriage under his discussion of different types of friendship and love as an example of an association that is due to external causes. The pleasure shared by a man and a woman is the cause of love between them – however, pleasure is unstable, and one of them may cease deriving pleasure while it endures in the other. Moreover,

> To give an example: there exists between a man and his wife common goods and mixed benefits (*khayrāt mushtaraka wa-manāfiʿ mukhtalaṭa*), which they seek in cooperation. By this I mean the goods external to us, which are the causes of the prosperity of home life (*tuʿmar bi-hā l-manāzil*). The wife expects these goods from her husband because it is he who earns and procures them; while the husband expects his wife to administer (*ḍabṭ*) these goods because she is the one who safeguards and manages them (*taḥfaẓuhā wa-tudabbiruhā*) in order that they may become fruitful and not wasted. When either of them fails, their love changes and complaints begin to arise, and things continue in this way until love either ceases, or remains along with complaints and reproach (trans. Zurayq p. 129; text: Zurayq pp. 142–3).

There are several elements here that are new to the Islamic tradition, and are certainly derived from Bryson (as is shown by the marker, 'to give an example'). The concept that couples are a kind of economic unit, which shares benefits and goods, is, as we have seen, not part of the Hadith or the law. The use of the term *manzil* is significant, since it is very rarely used in

the Hadith in this context. While the Hadith views the wife as the custodian of her husband's property, Miskawayh views her as someone who both safeguards *and* manages the property, using the verb *dabbara* to convey this sense as Bryson Arabus does (cf. Bryson §§75, 96). Moreover, Miskawayh's marriage is not only built on the foundation of shared economic interests, but is like Bryson's characterized by love. This understanding of marriage is far removed from the view of marriage in the Hadith or in the legal tradition, and its Brysonian terminology is new. Neither is found in the earlier work of Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, who was also working in the Greek ethical tradition but did not use Bryson.

Further evidence of the penetration of Bryson's influence in Islamic philosophical literature is provided by the anthology entitled the *Book of Happiness and Causing Happiness* (*Kitāb al-Saʿāda wa-l-Isʿād*). Its first editor ascribed it to the Neoplatonist philosopher al-ʿĀmirī (Minovi 1957–8), but there is no justification for this (Wakelnig 2006: 35–9). Arberry observed that no source later than the first half of the tenth century was cited in it. Taking this with the most distinctive feature of the work, its blend of Greek and Persian wisdom 'treated with equal respect', he guessed that it was written for one of the independent Persian princes of the later tenth century (1955: 22). A date in the first half of the eleventh century would be equally possible, and perhaps more likely. Indeed the equal treatment of Persian and Greek wisdom reminds us of Miskawayh himself, though the style is utterly different.

As part of the sixth and final part of the work on the king's relations with the divine and human realms the author includes a section reporting the views of 'the female philosopher "Pythagoras"' or 'the female philosopher' (*ḥakīma*) (pp. 389–95 ed. Minovi). The name is presumably garbled, and perhaps represents a misunderstood Πυθαγορεία, which was originally accompanied by a personal name. This section represents 'fragments from a [Greek Neopythagorean] treatise on the duties of the wife' (Gutas 1994: 4964). One instruction is ascribed to the real (male) Pythagoras. There are also several sayings of the Prophet (pp. 391–2; see below). Tacked onto the advice of the *ḥakīma* is a single section of 'advice from a father to his daughter when he gives her away', which has parallels in the Arabic *adab* anthologies (cf. above, p. 314 n. 37). It is not clear that this is from the same source, but the material is surely also Greek (e.g. the best perfume is water, she should match her husband's moods, were she to be 'his serving girl, he will be a slave to you', and so on).

The accent in the Greek sayings is on the wife's inferiority, her duties towards her spouse and his family with the aim of 'effecting the good life',

her education of the children, his supervision of her clothing and make-up (*zīna*) – unless he approves, and so on. The picture is traditional and akin to some of the Neopythagorean women's letters by 'Theano' and others. The wife clearly plays an important part in this household, which is the 'big house' of the Greek oeconomica (p. 393 *et al.* for 'the people of her husband's house and his relatives'). None of this comes from Bryson. But we might compare p. 391.7–8 where 'the woman is wanted for two things, for children and to help secure the good life' with Bryson §88 on 'the two purposes for which the woman is sought, i.e. children and the management of the estate'. Further, at pp. 392.19–393.1 the wife has to 'devote effort and thought (*fikr*) to manage/arrange (*tadabbur*) what brings about the good life'. This is clearly an allusion to *tadbīr al-manzil*, the managing and not simply the safeguarding of the property, and in Arabic and Persian medieval literature this invariably indicates Bryson. Bryson §96 presents the wife in similar terms as the *mudabbira* and *mufakkira* of 'what is good for' the household (*fī mā yuṣliḥuhu*). This is the idea that Miskawayh took away from his reading of Bryson section three. The notion of the good life is of course wholly Greek (cf. Chapter 3, p. 236 on Bryson's 'Aristotelian' characterization of money as a means 'to make life good', *fī maṣlaḥat al-maʿāsh*); the picture of the wife contemplating how to do this is specifically Brysonian. If this is right, the author combined Brysonian elements with his alternative Greek source.

That Ps.-ʿĀmirī had access to another Neopythagorean author for his overall conception of the wife's role – and one no doubt more in accord with his own inclinations – is particularly interesting. It has already been suggested that Neopythagorean family literature was far more extensive than the extracts that remain to us, and the *Book of Happiness* serves to confirm this. But our author did not stop with Greek material. His liking for a traditional relationship between the spouses was reinforced by the inclusion of nine sayings of the Prophet which stress the wife's dependence on her husband's 'permission' (*idhn*). Among other things she must not leave her donkey anywhere but the matrimonial *bayt*, and (in keeping with the main themes of the Hadith) she must not refuse the husband sex 'even if she is on a camel' (cf. above). It is noteworthy that Ps.-ʿĀmirī clearly saw the two traditions – Hadith and Greek ethics – as wholly compatible. While very many authors found the combination of Greek and Islamic material easy, the result of rooting Greek sources in Prophetic lore takes this seriously and shows an attempt to legitimize non-traditional elements in a context of changed sensibilities with the expectation of approval by readers.

It was the Shāfiʿī jurist and theologian al-Māwardī (972–1058) who first incorporated Brysonian marriage into a work that lies securely within

Muslim orthodoxy. Māwardī is widely known for his *Ordinances of Government*, which is seen as the classic formulation of Islamic political thought. His *Adab al-Dunyā wa-l-Dīn* (*Religious and Worldly Ethics*) also had a wide readership, and was assigned as a manual of morals in the official programmes of al-Azhar as late as the twentieth century (Arkoun 1963: 7). It is a work that mixes Koran, Hadith, and the Greek tradition, and seems to owe a great deal to Miskawayh (Māwardī 1900; trans. O. Rescher 1932–3). Like Miskawayh, al-Māwardī's discussion of marriage comes in the context of categorizing association and friendship. In fact, it is discussed under the heading of *muṣāhara*, 'acquiring in-laws'. Māwardī takes as a starting point Hadith material about the qualities sought in wives. He explains the superiority of piety over money and beauty, which are not durable qualities and lead to instability (Māwardī 1900: 149–52). Then, in the second part of the chapter, he suddenly embarks on a novel formulation of what he views as the three permissible aims of marriage. The first is a desire for children. In this context he cites a Prophetic Hadith recommending virgins, and another Hadith preferring a child-bearing black woman to an infertile beauty. He also cites an Arab adage about choosing non-close relatives, as they are better for child-bearing, and past sages (*ḥukamāʾ*) who said that the best children are born from mothers in their twenties and fathers in their thirties or forties. The third and most lowly aspect of marriage is *istimtāʿ*, sexual satisfaction. It is the most lowly and most unmanly, as in it one follows animal instincts and urges. If at all, one should use slave-girls for this purpose.

It is, however, the second aim of marriage which is of most interest to us. 'The second aim would be performance of the management of the household (*tadbīr al-manzil*), for which women are responsible' (p. 154). This phrase, together with the influence of Miskawayh, reveals knowledge of Bryson. However, Māwardī qualifies his statement by pointing out that, while these chores can be performed only by women, it is not the most distinctive trait of wives because other women may also undertake such care. He then cites, anonymously, Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, who said that the wife is *rayḥāna* and not a *qaharmāna* (see above). He also notes that the 'housewifely' aspect of marriage has no bearing on religion or on the qualities of manhood. If it is the main aim of a particular union, it is best to take old women, who have had experience in running a household (*tadbīr al-manzil*) and are acquainted with the ways of men.

Māwardī appears to be the Muslim first author to set a hierarchy of the objectives of marriage. This in itself is new and perhaps reflects Bryson's 'two purposes'. Within this hierarchy Māwardī places household management as second only to procreation among the chief aims. This has no basis

in the Hadith or the law (indeed, no Prophetic Hadith are cited here), but is derived from Bryson §88 ('two purposes for which the woman is sought, i.e. children and the management of the estate'). There is no reason to think this came via Miskawayh. However, Māwardī is reluctant to follow the Brysonian model to its logical end because that would mean a certain control by wives over husbands: a wife should manage the household, but not be its stewardess or leader. Other women – presumably slave-girls, but perhaps also relatives – can do the household chores. Still, it is an important reason to marry, more important than sexual satisfaction, and in some cases wives should be chosen with this aim in mind.

The reticence of Māwardī about the role of sexual satisfaction and marriage stands in contrast to the favourable view of sexuality in the Hadith material (Maghen 2005). But it chimes well with the growing influence of the mystical movement, which, at its early ascetic stage, was marked by a negative attitude to sexuality. Sufism allowed room for pious women such as Rābiʿa l-ʿAdawīya (d. 801), but almost always at the price of their sexuality. Most of the biographies in a collection about pious Sufi women by al-Sulamī (937–1021) make no mention of marriage, and the main tone is ascetic and self-denying (Sulamī 1999). Others are identified as wives of prominent Sufis, and contribution is first and foremost financial – the wealthy and generous wife, who feeds her husband and his Sufi brethren. The tension between wives' philanthropy and their sexuality is solved by the 'Platonic' marriage of Rābiʿa of Syria to Aḥmad ibn Abī l-Ḥawārī. She offers herself in marriage with the sole aim of contributing her substantial inheritance to Aḥmad. Aḥmad, who claims to lack any sexual desire, agrees to the marriage with the blessing of his Sufi master. He then marries several additional wives, with Rābiʿa selflessly feeding him so that he would be able to perform his duties with her co-wives (Sulamī 1999: 64, 138; Schimmel 1975: 427). This self-serving story emphasizes an early Sufi view of a wife as a sexual danger, but a welcome benefit.

The negative Sufi view of sexuality is expressed most clearly by Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 998), in his *Qūt al-Qulūb fī Muʿāmalat al-Maḥbūb*. In the forty-fifth chapter on whether to marry or not (which is the better), al-Makkī states that 'in our days' it is better for the Sufi *murīd* ('disciple') to abandon marriage if his soul does not pull him towards sin, and his eyes do not lead him to prohibited things, and his penis is not dominated by sexual urges. There are several reasons: first, it is better to be alone in order to improve oneself. This struggle is difficult enough: there is no need to add another devil. Second, the ways of making livelihood have become corrupted, and most of them are only achieved through sin. It is impossible

to support a family save through illegal or unethical means. Third, most women, at least in these times, are of little piety, and driven by passion and ignorance (Makkī 1963: 2: 489–94; German trans. by Gramlich). Makkī is aware of the overwhelming quantity of Koranic verses and Hadith material in favour of marriage, and he cites them extensively, together with some *adab* anecdotes. He is arguing, however, that the Sufi way of life is often not amenable to marriage, especially given the economic difficulties facing heads of households and the growing corruption of women today.

It is in the context of, and in response to, the early Sufi anti-matrimonial attitude that Bryson makes his most lasting impression on the Islamic ethics of marriage. Makkī's *Qūt al-Qulūb* had a major influence on al-Ghazālī, who mentions it by name as a source of inspiration for his conversion to Sufism (Khalidi 2005: 76). The chapter on marriage in Ghazālī's *Revival of the Religious Sciences*, which would become the classic formulation of Sunni orthodoxy, relies heavily on the material presented by Makkī. But the material is rearranged in a more formal way, and, ultimately, Ghazālī advocates marriage as the preferred choice, under normal circumstances, for the pious Sufi (Immenkamp 1994). He counters the Sufi arguments against marriage by bringing the Koranic and Hadith material to the fore, but also with the use of a Brysonian model of marriage as an economic partnership. Specifically, Ghazālī considers 'household management' as one of the permissible aims of marriage, and incorporates it into his view of orthodox Islamic matrimony.

Like Māwardī, Ghazālī draws up a list of the legitimate and illegitimate aims of marriage, although his is much longer and more elaborate. The most important aims are procreation and the prevention of sin. These correspond to most of the Hadith material about marriage, and Ghazālī devotes long discussions to their respective merits. The third legitimate objective of marriage is to provide comfort and relaxation to the soul through the company of women. Ghazālī relates this aim to the verses that speak of women as means by which men relax (e.g. Q 7: 189, see above). However, as has been noted, there is not much in the Hadith to support this view of marriage, which is usually seen as an affliction or duty. Ghazālī himself admits that few men marry with this aim in mind, and some relax by simply looking at flowing water (Ghazālī, *Iḥyā'*, Beirut edition 1987, II 28–9; Farah 1984: 66).

Ghazālī introduces *tadbīr al-manzil* as the fourth legitimate aim of marriage. He says that marriage frees the pious man from the burden of running the household (*tadbīr al-manzil*), i.e. the duties of cooking, sweeping, making beds, cleaning utensils, and the means for obtaining support. If someone lives alone, then he has no time for learning and working. The

virtuous woman who takes care of or is good for the house (*al-muṣliḥa li-l-manzil* – a Brysonian term, see above) helps religion in this way. He then cites Abū Sulaymān al-Darānīm, a Sufi authority well known for his opposition to marriage, as saying that the virtuous woman frees you to prepare for the Hereafter – her contribution is to take care of the house (*bi-tadbīr al-manzil*) and satisfy sexual desire. Ghazālī continues by citing Hadith extolling the virtues of a faithful, virtuous wife, who assists her husband towards the next world. These Hadith are clearly about virtue in general, and convey nothing specific about household duties. But the way Ghazālī constructs the chapter makes them seem relevant. Moreover, he notes, in a way that squares with Bryson, that this aim entails not more than one wife: polygamy is expensive and disrupts domestic affairs. Under this heading he also mentions the benefit of family ties with other groups or families according to the 'big house' model (II 29–30).

Ghazālī's purpose in introducing the concept of *tadbīr al-manzil* is to offset the Sufi argument about the financial hardship caused by marriage. He concedes that under the prevailing economic circumstances a married man finds it difficult to make ends meet, and the dangers of poverty are the main disadvantage of marriage. However, by pointing to the theme of *tadbīr al-manzil*, he suggests that without a wife many men have to deal with mundane chores and have no time for prayer and Sufi devotion. Household management is here specifically 'cooking, sweeping, making beds, and cleaning utensils', as well as acquiring provisions. Wives have no authority over making decisions. As implied by Māwardī, but here stated in detail, the meaning of household management is the performance of female duties, but no control over property or the running of the household. This argument can only work if wives have an obligation to perform these chores. As we have seen, this was not the view of the jurists, and the Hadith material conveys a negative attitude towards domestic work by elite women. Even Māwardī noted that the chores can be performed by women other than the wives. Yet Ghazālī has no qualms. He returns to the subject right at the end of the chapter, citing the Hadith for Abū Bakr's daughter who was subjected to domestic service by her poor husband. Contrary to what appears to be the original message of the Hadith, Ghazālī claims that it implies an ethical injunction for wives to do whatever tasks they are capable of (II 55–6; Farah 1984: 126).

Ghazālī returns to Bryson in his ethical summa, the *Mīzān al-ʿAmal* (*Balance of Deeds*), a work largely derived from the philosophical writings of Avicenna and his contemporary al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (Janssens 2008). In his discussion of sex, Ghazālī states that the two commendable purposes of

marriage are procreation and protection against excess desire (*Mīzān*, Beirut edition 1983, p. 81). The text here is taken almost verbatim from al-Iṣfahānī's *Kitāb al-Dharīʿa*. However, Ghazālī then adds a third, Brysonian objective not found in Iṣfahānī: 'there is also benefit in a third objective, which is that he will have in his home someone to manage the affairs of his house (*man yudabbir amr manzilihi*), so he might be freed for study and worship'. Marriage is thus transformed into a part of worship, since acts are judged by their intentions. Ghazālī follows this with a casual observation that women are indeed sought for their beauty, which would protect the husband from falling into the temptation of desiring other women, and for their good character in household management (*ḥusn al-khuluq li-tadbīr al-manzil*).

Was Ghazālī using Bryson directly? It is difficult to say. Leaving aside Bryson's status as the classical representative of the 'practical' science of *oikonomika*, there can be no doubt that he himself did know of Bryson, since he made close use of Miskawayh's section on the child which is clearly labelled as a paraphrase of the Greek author (see Chapter 6, p. 409). Moreover Bryson's presentation of marriage as an economic partnership had already been incorporated into the works of Miskawayh and Māwardī, and there is no doubt that Ghazālī was intimately familiar with these ethical treatises. Bryson was naturalized. Ghazālī's *muṣliḥa* ('doing good to', 'benefiting', cf. above) recalls Bryson §96 on the wife who 'calculates what is good for' the house (*fī mā yuṣliḥuhu*); and this key term at any rate is not part of Miskawayh's discussion of the friendship between the spouses. Whether the influence was direct or indirect, it cannot be doubted that the concept of *tadbīr al-manzil* as used by Ghazālī descends from Bryson. It has little foundation in the Hadith material or in the views of the early jurists. By mixing the Brysonian concept with Prophetic Hadith, Ghazālī more than anyone else incorporated a specifically Greek view of marriage into the mainstream of Islamic orthodoxy.

We should not imagine that all Muslim authors were convinced of the usefulness of the Brysonian model. Mawārdī's great contemporary Avicenna (d. 1037) was not for one. He also certainly knew of Bryson, for he recommends reading him, as we have seen (Chapter 1, p. 87). But when he treats the spouse in his *Book of Government* (ed. Cheikho 1911b, Shams al-Dīn 1988: 232–60) he avoids Greek influences in the main (but not as much as Plessner had supposed). His main advice for 'governing' the woman is to inspire 'awe' (*hayba*), show her 'respect' (*karāma*), and find her things to do (*shugl*). Since he knew his Bryson well, however, he starts by declaring that 'the sound wife is the man's partner (*sharīka*) in his wealth (*milk*) and the guardian of his money (*māl*)'. Among other qualities

she should 'be proficient at *tadbīr*'. In the section on 'awe' he outlines the dreadful consequences of the wife who is not afraid of her man: 'she turns into the manager (*mudabbira*) and he turns into the managed (*mudabbar*) . . . she inflicts on him her lack of judgement and her bad management'. There are a number of phrases which recall Bryson here, including 'bad management', albeit Bryson applies this to the incompetent master. But we notice that the property is not joint: it is his only; and the tone of the three matrimonial parameters is decidedly more oppressive than anything in the Greek tradition. There is nothing on love and affection. When it comes to occupying her mind, children and 'the management of her domestics' (*tadbīr khadamihā*) are not so far from Bryson, but there is nothing on managing the estate and the alternative for the unoccupied mind is a familiar misogynism which Bryson avoids: she will think of ways to stand up to her husband about her desire to use cosmetics (cf. Ps.-ʿĀmirī) and her wish to 'make her figure look fine'.

As we shall see in Chapter 6 (pp. 406–7), Avicenna differs from Bryson also on the slave and the child, and it was this difference that appealed to the author of the most successful book of ethics written by a medieval scholar, al-Ṭūsī. More is said about the *Nasirean Ethics* (trans. Wickens 1964, ed. Minovi and Ḥaydarī 1981) in Chapter 6, since, though Ṭūsī followed Avicenna (as he states) for his section on the household (e.g. *ahl* in the sense of wife), he did not neglect Miskawayh and Bryson on the child. There do not seem to be many traces of Bryson in the section 'concerning the chastisement [*siyāsat* in its Persian sense] and regulation of wives' (pp. 161–6 Wickens). Ṭūsī begins with a classic Brysonian statement of purpose: 'the motive for taking a wife should be twofold, the preservation of property and the quest of progeny', and he glosses this straightaway by saying that 'a good wife is the man's partner (*sharīk*) in property, his colleague in housekeeping and the regulation of the household (*tadbīr al-manzil*)' (p. 161 Wickens). The dual purpose is Brysonian, and the partnership initially seems more equitable than that envisaged by Avicenna. But in fact Ṭūsī's eye has already turned to his principal source and the following description of the ideal spouse is nothing but an elaborated version of the Chief Shaykh. Avicenna is the background for most of the section on the wife and the centrepiece of it is his three matrimonial parameters. When Ṭūsī has finished expanding Avicenna and turns to another source or his own thoughts (pp. 164–6 Wickens), he can become more misogynist. He warns against love, against disclosing the value of the husband's property and capital (otherwise there will be 'numerous calamities'), and against the wife's 'foolish pastimes' and bad company. So much for the 'partner in property'.

Ṭūsī does, however, consider marriage as a form of partnership in other ways, and it leads him to advocate monogamy for successful households and divorce for failed ones. When a man has a good wife, he should not add another, whatever qualities other women may have. This is because polygamous marriages sow jealousy and discord, and bring about the corruption of the household. The man in the household is like a heart, which can support only one body, not two. Only kings should have a licence to marry more than one wife, because royal marriages are solely for procreation, and the spouses of kings are effectively slaves. In all other marriages, by implication, the aim of household management should lead to monogamy. The gist of this was briefly noted by Ghazālī, but Ṭūsī is much more emphatic, and the strength of his opposition to polygamy is probably unique among Medieval Muslim authors. On the other hand, when a man has a bad wife, he should do his utmost to have himself rid of a 'despot'; the level of detail points to personal investment. Bishop Barhebraeus, Ṭūsī's direct contemporary, liked this part so much that he attributed it to Bryson, though it is pure Ṭūsī and (as Plessner and Zonta remarked) at some level shows the influence of Islamic divorce law (Chapter 2, p. 142). Certainly Greek thought on marriage does not offer advice on divorce. The proverbial adages of the 'Arabs' which are the culmination of Ṭūsī's whole section, leave one with the strong impression of the unpleasantness of married life.

We come back to Bryson in the final author we are able to discuss here, Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ and his mirror of princes, *Conduct of the Ruler in the Management of Kingdoms* (see Chapter 1, pp. 101–2). A glance at the footnotes of Bryson section three will show the often verbatim parallels between Bryson and the work's section on the 'wife' (*zawja*, pp. 115–17 ed. Takrītī 1978); as has been remarked, Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ made assiduous use of Bryson's other sections too. In the context of the development of thinking about the couple in Islam his close use of Bryson is very remarkable, since he was not a lazy writer who simply copied any book he found in front of him. *Conduct of the Ruler* is a tightly written work, highly sophisticated in its organization into a tabular form intended for handy reference by busy readers at the highest level. Thus Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ thought he was serving up what his audience wanted or were prepared to countenance, a wife who is a full co-owner and a full co-manager of the *manzil*. It is noticeable that Bryson's affective wife is not taken up, and this is not simply due to the practical nature of the book. The Brysonian dual purpose – managing the estate and bearing children – is all that interests our author. More to the point, at the end of his treatment Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ found his copy of the *Nasirean Ethics*, the first edition of which was written about 1235 (see Chapter 6, p. 408), i.e. some ten

to fifteen years before the *Conduct of the Ruler* itself. He summarizes the wife in six points. The first two are taken, slightly altered, from Bryson §84: she is wanted for children and caring for 'his *manzil* and its management'; and she will preserve the *manzil* in his presence or absence, health or sickness. Then a surprise: 'he must not give her access to his capital' and he must not display 'excessive love' to her. Fourth, he must conceal his secrets and not consult her about anything. Fifth, he should restrict himself to one wife as 'this is more conducive to order'. Lastly, if he has a bad wife, 'let him contrive to be liberated from her as quickly as possible'. A look at pp. 163–4 of Wickens' translation of *Nasirean Ethics* will confirm the origin of these un-Brysonian sentiments.

Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ retains Bryson's managerial wife but spectacularly dumps the 'conjugality' which underpins the running of the household–estate in Bryson and makes Bryson part of the more 'progressive' thinking of certain of the Greek authors of the first and second centuries. To speak in one breath of a property-sharing partner and in another of keeping her from one's wealth (in strong contrast to Bryson §81) seems a glaring contradiction. We should nevertheless assume that the mixing of 'Greek' and 'Islamic' elements in the presentation of the wife was felt to be harmonious. Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ stresses that it is the 'capital' (*ra's māl*) that she must not get her hands on, and this perhaps allows her day-to-day financial administration in his mind. Even if that is right, the recommendation of secrecy is very different from the Greek oeconomic tradition, where the wife is there to listen to her mate after his hard day in the forum. Equality of intellect and virtue is quite absent from Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ. Finally, as noted, the 'valorization' of marriage among Greek writers did not permit discussion of breakdown. Here, then, are the limits of Bryson's spouse. Fortunately Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ did not have space to indulge in Ṭūsī's naked misogynism, but he perhaps shares his realism or resignation. For by ending his section on wives with divorce (which in classical Islamic law is a procedure essentially restricted to men), he emphasizes a characteristic feature of the matrimonial landscape of medieval Islam (Rapoport 2005, Ali 2010).

The above survey of Bryson's influence on the 'Islamic wife' is necessarily incomplete and suggestive. Much more work is needed to examine the topic properly. But the provisional results are very important. We know that Bryson's book was widely available and considered as recommended reading on household affairs after its translation around 900. Its status as the representative of ancient Greek thought in this area made its naturalization easy; and it is significant that no Islamic text really emerged to replace the ethical

aspects of Bryson until the *Nasirean Ethics*. In respect of section three on the wife the flexibility of the phrase *tadbīr al-manzil* made the threshold of acceptance all the lower. The idea of the property-owning partner of the estate who shares in the management of its external goods, as we see it in Miskawayh, remained faithful to Bryson's intentions at the 'progressive' end of the Hellenizing market. The restriction of *tadbīr* to housework did not (but is quite in keeping with other Greek traditions). Even in this case, the active involvement of the wife, as we see it in Māwardī and Ghazālī, shows a remarkable change from early Islam. It is through Bryson that Muslim authors were able to transform the contractual marriage of the law and the Hadith into what we recognize today as the 'traditional' Islamic idea of marriage: a form of unequal partnership, in which wives have a duty to run the household in respect of its chores. This single fact shows the significance of Bryson's short treatise. Indeed in terms of lasting influence it may be argued that the Brysonian wife had more impact on Islamic authors and on Islamic society than Bryson did on the medieval child or on the origin of human trade and the spending of wealth.

CHAPTER 6

The boy

1 CHILD, FAMILY, AND ESTATE

Bryson gives the subject of section four as the 'child' or 'children' (Arabic *al-walad* can mean both and corresponds in broad terms to Greek παῖς/παίδες or τέκνον/τέκνα). The spotlight, however, is exclusively on the son or sons, for, unlike Musonius and Plutarch,[1] he shows no interest in the education of daughters. After the opening he speaks only of *al-ṣabīy*, 'the boy' (or *al-ṣibyān/ṣubyān*, 'boys'), a word which tends to indicate an oldish boy or a teenager or even someone in their (early) twenties ('adolescentulus', Freytag), but may also refer to a small child. Bryson's usage seems to suggest a boy or sometimes a teenager; and a slightly older age may be envisaged in some passages. The Greek original, then, most likely had παῖς, but μειράκιον (which might also be *ghulām* in Arabic) should not be excluded.[2] Section four is linked to the previous sections in various ways. As we have seen, children feature prominently in section three where the wife's virtues and character are established in part through her devotion to her children. In section two Bryson advises that the regime of punishment should be the same for the slave and the child (in section four the boy's reaction to punishment must, however, contrast with the slave's: §152). In both two and four Bryson suggests that habituation works best with young children. In section one there is no specific mention of boys or children, but they, like the wife, are evidently included among the family members for whom the owner has responsibility. In four the boy's instruction in the use of money takes us back to the advice of section one on correct acquisition and expenditure.

[1] Musonius; see Chapter 5 p. 339. For Plutarch's *Ὅτι καὶ γυναῖκα παιδεύτεον*, see frr. 128–33 ed. Sandbach, Loeb Classical Library *Moralia*, vol. XV (1969); nothing much remains. cf. below, p. 371 on Plutarch's interest in childhood.

[2] μειράκιον (and even νέος) may be translated by *ṣabīy*: Ullmann *s.vv*. On the problem of defining the age of the 'child' in history, cf. Boswell 1988: 26–39 '"Child" is itself not an uncomplicated term.'

There is again no need to provide here a general account of current thinking on the Roman family. Modern approaches will be mentioned as relevant; but comparative material for section four is to be sought in the domain of manners and habits and in such ancient literature as exists on upbringing. Bryson tells us virtually nothing about family relations as such and nothing about the experience of being a child. There are no affective comments (in contrast with the mother–child relationship in section three). Section four focusses exclusively on inculcating social norms in the boy who will grow up to be the owner of section one. It deals with the period during which he is being prepared for the regulated adulthood he will enjoy while the estate remains in his father's hands. The utility of the precepts for the adult man is stressed at several points (§124 'also better for the man', §§131, 135, 145 'also proper for the man', cf. §151 'manliness') in accordance with an equation familiar in Greek political language (the ruler as father or teacher, the citizens as children), and at the end of the section the boy, as we have seen, becomes the man who shall have no woman other than his wedded wife. But we should not imagine there is no difference between boy and man. Thus at §145 the man 'is sometimes obliged' to swear an oath, whereas the boy must never, and further differences are envisaged regarding alcohol (§131 not 'before he is on the verge of manhood') and sexual intercourse (§159 not 'before he is married'). I return to this below.

The importance of section four lies in the fact that treatises about children from antiquity are very rare. Studies of embryology go back to Hippocratic medicine, and there are (parts of) works on lactation, nursing, and pediatrics. But the domain of childhood itself was left unwritten. This invisibility has often struck historians. Why, then, is Bryson different? In the last chapter I suggested that the attention to marriage in the 'male ethics' of the first and second centuries AD is to be explained by the distinctive social and economic position of the Greek elites, who set a premium on the success of the married relationship as the guarantor of their future interests. I further suggested that in some of the authors who discuss marriage this attention provoked a focus on the workings of the couple's own relationship. As we also saw, whatever emotional and sexual community the man wished to enjoy with his wife, he continued to believe that it was he who had a right to rule, even in writers at the more 'progressive' end of the spectrum. Confident in his persona of manliness the notable strode forth from his wife to his business of the city and returned from it to govern his *oikos*. In his capacity as ruler the basic ingredients of marriage were 'the generation of children and the achievement of a stable livelihood' (Hierocles) or 'children and the management of the estate' (Bryson). At this level – that is, without

any pretence of conjugality or symmetry – the woman was ultimately no more than a mother for his heirs, and it could be argued that, since the children themselves were merely a function of his property relations, there was no reason to speak of them as children. This is the view argued for in an important study by Brent Shaw on the family upbringing of Augustine in late-fourth-century Roman North Africa.[3] At the end of the article Shaw briefly distinguishes the Western, Latin-speaking family of Augustine and his coevals from 'the family types found in the eastern Mediterranean in antiquity which were part of a different world of sentiment, dependence and behaviour' (1987: 51). His summary of the situation in the East seems true for the 'limited milieus' considered in the last chapter, at least for some occasions. I suspect that the average member of the Eastern elites viewed his family in a manner that Augustine would have had no difficulty in recognizing. If that is right, books about children's moral development were not on his mind. But in the 'limited milieus' who were responsible for the thinking of Plutarch, Musonius, *Oikonomika III*, Bryson, Dio of Prusa, and Hierocles on the *koinōnia* of the husband and the wife and the restraints on the man in relation to his behaviour at home, it may not be such a surprise to find specific attention paid to the development of the child as a member of the family rather than an aspect of property. That is not to say this approach was common, only that it was possible; and it must be said that it did not necessarily translate into an affective engagement.

As far as Bryson himself goes, person and property on the estate are associated closely. The wife is an active partner in the management of the wealth of the *oikos*, not an administrative tool. In the same way she is not a simple nourisher of infants or someone to play games with the children, which is the role she has, for example, in *Oikonomika I*. Rather in section three the bond of the woman with her husband and with her children is expressed strongly. In an author for whom the couple mattered so much, the outcome of matrimony in the procreation of the children must be one reason for attention to the figure of the child.

But property is crucial – this is a book of estate management – and we should note a major difference between the child of section three and section four. In section three the appropriate sense of the Arabic's *al-walad* is 'children'. In section four we are concerned with only one child, 'the boy'. The focus is on the single boy (except for three generalizing references to boys at §§147, 150, and 152). One might suggest that the usage is a shorthand: 'the

[3] 1987: 47 'The single overwhelming idea imparted by Augustine . . . is that the family was *the* unit of social and economic production and reproduction.'

boy' stands at least for the other male children of the family. That is true on one level; but in fact the spotlight is on the son who is heir. In this matter Bryson looks conservative, for among his contemporaries what Hierocles the Stoic calls *poluteknia*, 'having many children', was a live issue, and one that ran counter to Plato's recommendation to have one boy – the heir – and one girl: *Laws* 740c, 930c. We know in fact that elite families often did *not* have many children, certainly not as many as might be expected. The explanation of this, as Keith Hopkins argued many years ago (1965), is (in part) the use of contraceptive strategies. Hopkins' fascination in his study with *coitus interruptus* – the 'evidence' for which 'is virtually nonexistent' (Riddle 1992: 4) – as *the* method used to exercise control over the size of the family tells only part of the story, and indeed concerns only one of the contraceptive methods that might be employed (Chapter 5, p. 299 n. 23). Alongside birth control of whatever form there was choice about whether to raise children at all. The alternative was not infanticide (though this was an option: e.g. S. B. Pomeroy 1983), but the practice of *expositio*, that is, of leaving babies to be found by others, who would often be slave dealers (Boswell 1984, 1988: chs. 1–2; Harris 1994; cf. Chapter 4, p. 267 n.). In virtually all of the moralists considered in the last chapter, the call to procreate is non-negotiable, and this meant raising all children born. Thus *expositio* was subject to forceful condemnation. Economic motives for it were attributed to both poor (cf. Plutarch, *Love for Offspring* 497e[4]) and rich. The rich abandoned children born later on 'so that the older ones could have greater wealth' and 'a larger share of the patrimony (*ta patrōia*)' (Musonius XV, pp. 98.30–100.2 Lutz[5]), for children who were *expositi*, as an orator recorded by Seneca the Elder put it, disappeared from the property regime: 'you won't find them in wills' (*Controversiae* 10.4.14). As far as Musonius was concerned, apart from fulfilling civic duty the advantage of raising all one's children (his word is *polupaidia*) was to give the older ones more 'brothers'. We are put in mind of Plutarch's essay *On Loving One's Brother* and Hierocles' work of the same title (Stobaeus 4.27.20), which may be part of his supposed *On Duties* (Chapter 5, p. 341). It is not certain that there was a specialist earlier literature on the topic of *philadelphia* (though there are classic statements about the ideal friendship of brothers: e.g. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.3.19). It is at any rate clear that the term becomes common from the first century onwards, and then especially in Christian literature, and it would not be wrong to see this attention to the figure of the brother as part of the case

[4] Regrettably this declamatory text breaks off as it embarks on the topic.
[5] For the use of Lutz's text here, see Chapter 5, p. 336 n. 58.

against the practice of abandonment and for the expansion of the core family unit. Bryson does not mention legacies or inheritances or *expositio*. But if we think about the economic well-being of the estate, which is his overriding concern, the focus on a sole male child is not accidental. Implicitly he shares Plato's view that one boy is sufficient and that *poluteknia* is not a good idea.

On this level Bryson's attention to the single boy may be seen as part of his examination of the *oikos* as a unit of property. This may be related to the form the attention takes, that is, to the emphasis on behaviour in situations of daily life and education. What Bryson says about the boy in section four is quite unlike what we find in those oeconomica where children are mentioned. In these texts – Perictione, Pempelus, *Oikonomika III*, and also Hierocles[6] – the primary role of children is to care for their parents as the 'shepherds of their old age'. In Callicratidas and others offspring are specifically 'the ancillary' part of the family (Chapter 5, p. 318). Bryson has none of this. He is only interested in the boy's conduct and in the disciplinary routine that can establish correct behaviour in him so that it becomes a habit or reflex which will serve him throughout his life. His boy must obey his parents (§§150, 159), but the parents are merely one of several such groups (teacher, elders, *pepaideumenoi*). The focus is rather on the boy's own character and his pursuit of 'the Good' (*al-khayr* §111, clearly *to kalon*, and corresponding to 'the Good' in section one §§41, 46, and 51[7]). Naturally the greatest part, and perhaps all, of the material on manners in eating and drinking, and so on (but not the advice on sexual continence), is traditional and in the common domain, though we ourselves should always envisage some ebb and flow in the spaces occupied by such manners, reflecting adjustments over the centuries to what Norbert Elias, writing on the very different matter of the development of social practices between the late medieval and early modern periods, called 'the threshold of repugnance' (2000: pt 2), i.e. the inner knowledge that allows one, upon being socialized, to see instinctively that sneezing in company is wrong. A line-by-line commentary on section four would furnish multiple parallels in ancient authors for the individual details. It might also answer questions about the historical phases of manners at table and so on. Bryson with his static presentist assumptions in fact sees no development: the injunctions are as timeless as the *oikos*; and in this sense he is no Elias (Nadeau 2010: 36–48). Given this, we need to ask, what was the purpose of repackaging such traditional material as a series of instructions – for a focus on the heir could have been expressed differently?

[6] For children in the Neopythagorean treatise included in the Ps.-ʿĀmirī *Book of Happiness*, see Chapter 5, p. 353.

[7] Where however the synonym *al-jamīl* is used.

And why, if Bryson wanted to examine manners, did he do so for the child rather than the adult owner?

We are used to thinking of *paideia* primarily as a matter of literature and good taste in language because the word tends to crop up in our literary sources emphasizing literary education. But, as I have mentioned several times, it signifies an indivisible combination of education and culture, where culture means signs of culture in the sense of Shakespeare's 'in graces and in qualities of breeding'. As far as literary attainments go, correct language and pronunciation were badges of membership of the elite, who are the people in this context with the time to perfect or affect an 'atticizing' style in their formal Greek (in other words, a style displaying signs of education in the classical Greek authors and specifically those of Athens); and much of this learning of good Greek was displayed on the many occasions calling for formal speech (Pernot 1993, Gleason 1995, Swain 1996: chs. 1–2, Schmitz 1997). Beyond language *paideia* meant proper control of one's body and proper conduct in one's relationships with others above and below on the social and political scale. In all these aspects the upper classes were under constant observation by their peers. Deportment and demeanour (including scrutiny of masculinity; see Chapter 5, p. 344) were taken as manifestations of a pedigree actualized by successful education. *Paideia* was a private and a public matter. One had to learn to act alone as one acted in company inside and outside the house. Even the marital bed was a 'school' for *eutaxia*, 'discipline' (Chapter 5, p. 299). It concerned the rich in particular, since the poor, as Bryson observed optimistically, had no choice but to behave themselves (§§122, 150), whereas the rich could get away with things unless they learnt control. Given its parameters in the private and the public domain, *paideia* was more of a concern for men than for women. For ultimately this culture of manners was validated by visibility. The claim to be *pepaideumenos* is associated particularly with the period of urban growth and economic prosperity of the first to third centuries Although interpretation is difficult, it does seem that there was greater attention to social rules and regulations now than before or after this period, at least in the sense that these manners were part of an overall investment in the cultural Greekness – the Hellenism – that elites all over the 'Greek East' were prepared (literally) to buy into; whereas from the end of the second century, as Clement's *Paedagogus* and *Rich Man's Salvation* show very well, Christianity began to function as an alternative that was taken increasingly seriously. There is nothing in Clement (as we shall see) to suggest that Christianity altered the quality of manners accepted in daily life (indeed, it was important for the new religion that it should not do this). But the Christ–Paedagogus functions as a mighty

external brake on private thoughts and acts, and this is new (see Chapter 5, p. 349, and below in this chapter).

It seems that the answer to the question of why almost a third of *Management of the Estate* is devoted to ethical formation has to do with a feeling that these signs of culture should not be left to chance any more than the correct relationship with the wife and that guidance on social behaviour was as necessary as guidance on the estate's economic responsibilities, for one could not exercise these responsibilities without knowledge and practice of 'the Good'. In this sense Bryson's decision to repackage long-approved ideas compendiously mirrors the accent on correct conduct in private and public *and* inserts it into his understanding of the economic existence of the estate. The focus on instructing the *child* is not difficult to explain. In the introductory part of section four Bryson notes (with Plato somewhere in mind; see below) that it is the early years that need direction and where direction will be effective. This obvious reason can be tied into the general problems of the socializing process: the greater the attention to refined behaviour in adults, the greater the need to discipline children, who can so easily undo or devalue the rules which adults themselves control with difficulty. As Elias noted (2000: 141), the imposition of manners on children results from this problem. If habit formation works, the problem is solved. Bryson's boy 'must' and 'should' time after time. There can be no negotiation or explanation in the case of the child, for too much was at stake.

I have suggested above that the focus on the child should be taken together with the focus on the couple. One particular problem in the acquisition of *paideia* demands attention in regard to the 'world of sentiment'. For Bryson details the making of the child through sex; yet he is determined to prevent children having any knowledge of the emotions or pleasures of intercourse and to make the rite of marriage the entry point into sexual activity. This would have seemed an entirely natural prescription to the Victorian age. But in many cultures, and at most times in history, knowledge of bodies and what adults do with them was normally available to children, because family living, bathing, and sleeping were simply more communal and subject to considerably less neurosis than it is in our own semi-Victorianized era. So Bryson on this point is more radical than we might imagine. The heavy charge he places on marriage is what provides him with a category of 'child' before marriage turns the child into an adult. It is what gives him a boy to instruct. As we have seen (p. 365), there are things which neither the boy nor the adult must do, and the link between the expected behaviour of grown-up and minor may be pointed out. The areas of alcohol and above all sex are, however, as it were frontiers of boyhood. There is a zone of transition (§131 'verge of manhood'

for alcohol, §159 the implied desire to have 'knowledge' of sexual intercourse and come 'close' to it before marriage). But the border itself is closed until the culmination of the section and the book (§§159–60).

In the first and second centuries AD a small number of other texts were composed on aspects of the upbringing of the child. The phenomenon cannot in any way be compared with the level of investigation into marriage, to which it surely forms an adjunct, for the number of surviving works is simply too low and the differences between them too wide, making it difficult to form any conclusions. Nevertheless these works give some context for Bryson's approaches and interests, because, whatever the differences, the reasons for writing them are probably comparable.

Plutarch's *Consolation to his Wife* on the death of their two-year-old daughter (Bradley 1999), and his declamation, *Love for Offspring*, which seeks to prove that affection for children is natural ('which would suggest there was doubt about this', Boswell 1988: 92), are both significant markers of the interest in children; and where he can, Plutarch himself takes the childhood of the subjects of his biographies very seriously (cf. Pelling 2002 index *s.v.* childhood). The concerns with parents and small children in these two works are not, however, directly relevant to Bryson section four and I shall say no more about them here. Rather, the first text I shall be looking at below is the one work which has long been accepted (in the absence of knowledge of Bryson) as the sole surviving ancient treatise dedicated to bringing up a child, Ps.-Plutarch *Περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς* (*De liberis educandis*) or *Training of Boys*. The common translation of the title as *The Education of Children* (Loeb), *De l'éducation des enfants* (Budé), *vel sim.*, is wrong, since females receive no mention other than as lovers or wives or (at the very end) as a mother determined to secure the best for her boys, and daughters do not appear. The male child is at all times the point of reference and 'sons' are specified at several points. In addition to *Training* I shall be saying something alongside it about a curious treatise which was incorporated as an example of Greek learning in the *Eternal Wisdom* of Miskawayh under the title *Plato's Exhortation Concerning the Education of Young Men*. There is no doubt that this is a version of a Greek text from the late Hellenistic or Roman period. Whether it should be claimed as Neopythagorean, as it was by the Greco-Arabist scholar Franz Rosenthal (1941), is difficult to say. On balance, though, he was probably right. The text is translated in Appendix I below. I shall also briefly discuss one indisputably Neopythagorean text, the short letter of 'Theano to Euboule' on upbringing, which is probably from the first or second century AD. I include a translation in Appendix II.

This authoress speaks of *paidia*, 'children', and we should assume both boys and girls are meant. Apart from Musonius IV and the lost work of Plutarch on educating women (see above), there is very little on how girls should be educated in any sense. There are, however, interesting remarks in the preface of a late-antique philosophical compendium that again survives only in Arabic. This text, which is not generally known, has some parallels with Bryson on forming habits in children (but in relation to a daughter rather than a son) and the preface from it is translated below at p. 393. Other Neopythagorica mention children in passing, if at all (cf. p. 368); the work of the female 'Pythagorean' included in the Ps.-ʿĀmirī *Book of Happiness* (see below, pp. 405, 409; Chapter 5, Section 7) mentions the mother's duty to inculcate 'shame' (p. 394 Minovi) in her (male) children, but although the material is Neopythagorean, it is too brief to merit comment.

Both *Training* and *Exhortation* have comparanda with Bryson, but also quite different interests and focusses. If we put these together with Quintilian (whom I shall be mentioning in passing) and Plutarch and Dio (from what we may assume of his *Oikonomikos*[8]), we can see some context of thought about the child and its upbringing which Bryson amplifies. But there is little in these texts resembling the behavioural programme Bryson insists on.[9] For this aspect of section four we must turn to a work not directly concerned with children but which has plenty to say about manners and behaviour, and this is Clement of Alexandria's *Paedagogus*. The *Paedagogus* consists of three books. Important areas of social and personal life are addressed in Books 2 and 3, and in terms of specific advice (which is, however, limited in extent) on bathing or laughing or eating these books have until now represented the most compendious presentation of rules of appropriate conduct, rules which, as Clement says at the end of Book 1, were 'well known to everybody' (1.13.103.2). For the most part Clement comments from a moral or religious perspective and does not give advice in the style of Bryson. In Book 1 itself he outlines the educational process for the newly baptized so they can become full members of the Christian community, and he certainly also addresses himself to established Christians who were too ready to behave like their pagan neighbours once they left the Christian meeting house (3.11.80.1–4). His work is for adults, explicitly men and women according to the Stoic model of shared virtue (see Chapter 5, pp. 329–30), for Stoic thought is important throughout (Stelzenberger 1933, esp. Spanneut 1957). On the other hand, all Christians are, it is stressed, children

[8] Cf. fr. IX τὸ μὲν γὰρ τίκτειν ἀνάγκης ἐστὶν ἔργον, τὸ δὲ ἐκτρέφειν φιλοστοργίας ('upbringing is an act of parental love').

[9] Note Dio fr. VII on control of laughter (ἑταίραις ἀκμάζων καὶ παίδων τοῖς ἀφρονεστέροις).

in Christ, and the title of the work is taken from the figure of the *paidagōgos* who escorted boys to school and ensured they were attending properly. The transposition is not original: Seneca, *Letters* 89.13; Paul, Gal. 3:24 (quoted at *Paed.* 1.6.30.3); but only Clement makes it into a title and theme of a work. Images of innocent childhood abound in the *Paedagogus*. Although his sources (influences) are difficult to identify, leaving aside the great quantity of quotation from classical literature, Scripture, and so on, Musonius and a Stoic tradition seen in parts of Epictetus are certainly present in the recommendations of specific moral conduct, and I have suggested that Bryson is cited in one of these passages (Chapter 2, p. 123). Whether the *Paedagogus* is richer 'than any other text in revealing the daily life of a great city in the Roman world of the late second century' (Mondésert in Mondésert, Matray, Marrou 1970: 8, firmly in the tradition of Marrou's 'document historique d'une valeur inappréciable', 1957: 540) is a question I shall have to return to, for it touches on the applicability of Bryson's own advice.

2 TRAINING OF BOYS, PLATO'S EXHORTATION, THEANO TO EUBOULE

Training of Boys is a literary and philosophical work, and its author is not shy of expressing his belief in his competence as an educator. Like the *Paedagogus*, it is equipped with copious quotation from Greek literature but also anecdotes and examples from Greek history. This combination makes it very Plutarchan, and there are certainly overlaps with Plutarch's genuine writings. This is not surprising given the fact that these contain an enormous fund of anecdote and quotation. These formal characteristics, together with some of the topics covered and the popularity of the work in the Byzantine period, were enough to lodge it in Plutarch's own corpus (see Ziegler 1951: cols. 809–12[10]). The Budé editor, Jean Sirinelli (Flacelière *et al.* 1987: 27–8), romantically suggested that someone took 'notes or drafts' on this subject from the Master's papers after his death, or used reports of pertinent discussions, and then stitched them together with other materials to produce a work that breathed the spirit of the Sage of Chaeroneia. But the crossovers are too general to prove anything. *Training* could be late Hellenistic or early Roman. But it fits well with cultural developments in the later first to early second centuries AD. First, it makes

[10] Ziegler mentions connections drawn between *Training* and John Chrysostom's important *On Vainglory and How Parents Should Raise Children*. On this see Malingrey 1972: esp. 31–2: in fact what is shared is 'un certain nombre de vérités de bon sens'.

paideia a subject of enquiry and elevated attention. Second, it was written at a time when ideal Platonic or Stoic boy-love was deemed unacceptable by many, perhaps the majority. Third, it reflects what seems to be a later first/second-century debate about the desirability of breastfeeding by the natural mother (see below).

After a short preamble the work (ch. 2) begins with a word about the importance of not saddling one's children with the slur of *dusgeneia*, 'low birth', as a result of breeding from prostitutes or mistresses. Parents must be 'distinguished' (*diasēmioi*), the author says, thereby announcing a reactionary attitude which he applies to various topics in what follows. After advising on a matter 'which was certainly not overlooked by those before us (*tois pro hēmōn*)', i.e. the avoidance of procreative sex when drunk,[11] he embarks (ch. 4) on the hackneyed theme of the need for nature, reason, and habit to work together, if one is going to attain virtue (see e.g. Berry 1958). There is 'myriad upon myriad' of examples, and the author treats his readers to a number of these before giving 'just one more', Lycurgus' demonstration of the power of habit by rearing 'two puppies from the same litter' in different ways so that one becomes a glutton and the other a hunter.[12]

The author next begins a chronological treatment of the life course. He starts (ch. 5) with a recommendation that mothers should suckle their infants. Although we cannot rule out the existence of earlier treatments of the topic, it is clear that there is a cluster of discussions from this period, and the inclusion of the topic is a valuable indication of date. Plutarch (*Treatise on Nurses*, Lamprias Catalogue no. 114; cf. *Consolation to his Wife* 609e on Timoxena's selfless breastfeeding), Musonius (Discourse III, p. 11.22 Hense), and the cryptorchid philosopher Favorinus in the Hadrianic era (summarized by Aulus Gellius at *Attic Nights* 12.1) assumed maternal breastfeeding was the wife's duty. Other texts advise on the best kind of wet-nurse (the Neopythagorean 'Letter of Myia to Phyllis', pp. 162–3 Städele, p. 608 Hercher, pp. 123–4 Thesleff; Städele 1980: 282–7 for the date), Soranus, *Gynaecology* 2.18–40 (mother's milk is best, but the wet-nurse is to be preferred for medical reasons), Galen, *Matters of Health* 1.7,9 (mother's milk is best, but the use of a nurse by his readers is assumed).[13] It may be significant that only the female author Myia fails to mention the duty of the mother to feed.

[11] 'Those before us' is no evidence of earlier writers on the subject.

[12] Norman Abbot's Oxford doctoral thesis (1981) has full details of parallels on this and the rest for those who wish it. There is also a copy in the British Library.

[13] One should add Rufus of Ephesus' ?*Περὶ ἐκλογῆς τιτθῆς*; but the title is from Oribasius, *Coll. Med.* (*libri incerti*) 2.31, and Rufus is not actually mentioned. Cf. Ilberg 1930: 30. Ullmann 1994: 1337 defends the attribution as part of Rufus' lost *Περὶ κομιδῆς παιδίου* (with comparison of the Arabic tradition).

For most women, and for most couples, the use of a nurse would have demonstrated economic status, whatever some male philosophers thought, and would hardly have been refused.[14] *Training* allows nurses if the mother is weak or in a hurry to have more children. It makes the same point as Soranus, that the nurse must be 'Greek in character' to ensure the infant learns good manners from the start.[15] The author advocates much the same for the servants to be assigned to small children (ch. 6), and then for those who are appointed as *paidagōgoi* when the children are older (ch. 7). Next he indulges himself on the topic of how to achieve the 'normative education (*nomimos paideia*)' that is the 'root of *kalokagathia*' (the quality of polite or civilized male behaviour, on which see Chapter 3, p. 245, Chapter 5, p. 316). The key is the choice of a morally upright teacher; but too many fathers, he laments, simply do not care. Boys who are neglected go to the bad in a number of ways, which the author details before (ch. 8) hymning the 'excellent upbringing and normative education' he envisages, which is clearly a matter of form rather than curriculum. This is clear from (ch. 9), where he reproves 'panegyrical' oratory and the 'theatrical and paratragic' style in public speaking. The *enkuklia paideumata* are necessary, but all lead to philosophy (ch. 10). This teaches a man how to present himself correctly in relation to gods, parents, elders, laws, strangers, rulers, friends, women, children, and servants. A collection of classical literature enables study of 'knowledge at its source'.

Training next addresses physical exercise, which is especially useful for military service, and suddenly turns to meet the possible objection that its 'precepts (*hupothēkai*)' are just for the rich. Having established satisfactorily that they are, he then moves on to 'fine practices' (ch. 12): punishment (which must be different from that administered to slaves; see Chapter 4, p. 264), praise and blame, appropriateness of tasks set (*summetroi ponoi*), and rest (which is like the case of 'bows and lyres'; Chapter 4, pp. 264–5). Fathers must keep tabs on the teachers and pedagogues they hire, and must seek to develop their sons' power of memory. After this come more good practices: avoidance of shameful language, control of hands (theft), of anger, of the tongue (jibes and untimely abuse). All of this has been about *eukosmia* and *sōphrosunē*, he tells us. The next topic – pederasty (ch. 15) – is something he is undecided about. In fact his own sympathies are apparent from his labelling of (today's) fathers, who are opposed to allowing admirers near their sons, as 'blunt, harsh, and sour' in comparison with Socrates, Plato,

[14] Bradley 1986b, with attention to the epigraphic evidence from Rome.
[15] Contrast Tacitus, *Dialogus* 29.

Xenophon, Aeschines, and Cebes ('that band of famous men'). He then offers a limp defence in cases where such love is not carnal, but the fact that he does not feel able to state his own view openly indicates the climate he is writing in, and is another indication of his date.

With this the author appears to complete his subject, for he now (ch. 16) turns to a moralizing indictment of the youth (*meirakion*). But he quickly resumes the topic of *paides* and *tekna* (ch. 17) in connection with the related problem of associating with 'bad people'. A burst of Pythagorean riddles (*symbola*) shows by his interpretation that he is actually still thinking of teenagers or young adults, and this is confirmed when he presently comes on to the well-loved theme of 'flatterers'. Fathers are given further advice to be lenient (ch. 18). They should marry off sons who are subject to pleasures but be careful that the wives are not overly superior in lineage or wealth (ch. 19). Fathers themselves should lead by good example. We must imitate the 'utterly barbarian' mother Eurydice,[16] who took up learning late in life 'in the interest of her children's study'. That the epigram celebrating Eurydice's acquisition of letters does not say she did this for her sake of her children is no impediment to our author's determination to find a belletristic ending.[17]

In a book often quoted by older generations of scholars, Adolf Dyroff (1897: 238–314) argued at length that *Training of Boys* owed much to a lost treatise of Chrysippus on this topic which is mentioned by Quintilian at *Education of the Orator* 1.11.17 ('a Chrysippo in praeceptis de liberorum educatione compositis'). There are certainly crossovers between *Training* and Quintilian Book 1. But as Dyroff realized, attribution of particular material to Chrysippus is impossible. If we go by Quintilian, Chrysippus' book dealt with nurses, recommended beating pupils, and stressed the importance of exercise/gesture (1.1.4, 16; 1.3.14; 1.10.32; 1.11.17). It seems likely that it also discussed the choice e.g. of the *paedagogus* (Quintilian 1.1.8–9). To go beyond this is guesswork. Moreover, much of what is common between *Training* and *Education of the Orator* is hardly specialized. *Training* surely used Chrysippus, but also common sense and common topics. Its main thrust is moralistic, which is quite different from Quintilian. Even Dyroff concluded that it was a 'reworking' of the lost Stoic work (p. 280).

Where does this leave *Training* and Bryson? Bryson is notable for the extensive specific advice he gives. There is little of this in *Training*. Instead the author wishes to promote himself as an expert who can advise also on teenage years and after. His comments on breastfeeding (not in Bryson) and

[16] Queen Eurydice I of Macedon, wife of Amyntas III (r. *c.* 393/2–370 BC).
[17] Cf. *Anthologiae Graecae Appendix* ed. Cougny vol. 1, no. 124.

pederasty (not explicitly mentioned in Bryson) situate him in the later first to early second century. But leaving aside the general interest taken in the moral health of the family and the son in particular, there is little connection with the oeconomic texts apart from the advice, which comes anyway from the *peri gamou* tradition, about the right marriage partner for the son. *Training* is the only (other) text of its kind to focus on the upbringing (*agōgē*) of the boy and the relation between the boy and the father. On this level the dating of the work to a period of intensified interest in family matters is not surprising and, at the very least, leaves Bryson less isolated.

Plato's Exhortation Concerning the Education of Young Men survives, as I have mentioned, in a work by the tenth-century philosopher and historian, Miskawayh. The aim of his *Eternal Wisdom* was to compare examples of Persian, Greek, and Arabic thought. On the Greek side he also included a translation of the famous *Golden Verses* of Pythagoras (Thom 1995) and the *Tabula Cebetis* (Fitzgerald and White 1983), a work which could be seen as Pythagorean, given what Plato says about the contacts of his character Cebes with the Pythagorean Philolaus (*Phaedo* 61d–e). *Plato's Exhortation* was known to the ninth-century Baghdadian bookseller and bibliographer Ibn al-Nadīm. Further details are given in Appendix 1 below, which contains an English translation. I refer below to the paragraph divisions of this version.

As Rosenthal remarked, in a work known in the ninth century – the heyday of the Translation Movement – the ascription to a Greek author means we are certainly dealing with Greek material. We obviously cannot say when the text was attributed to Plato, but it is a fair bet that this was done by its translator in order to market his work and advertise his discovery of 'Platonic' material. The phenomenon is not unusual and has been commented on, for example, by Dimitri Gutas in his study of a Greco-Arabic gnomology which consists of sayings by Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato (in Neopythagorean guise), and Aristotle (Gutas 1975: 352). If we compare *Plato's Exhortation* with Islamic treatises on education, there is an enormous difference. Such works have a religious content, since they developed in the context of Muslim educational institutions (see further Section 5 of this chapter). In *Plato's Exhortation* the religious element is small and in keeping with a Greek text; indeed, the pagan origin of the work is evident in the reference to 'gods' at 9. Naturally in a work of philosophy we expect to find references to 'God' rather the *hoi theoi*. Of these (2, 8, 11, 14) that in 2 looks classical enough (the Demiurge); in 8 'likeness to God' is standard Platonism, particularly of the Roman period, but the list of epithets may represent medieval piety, and the idea of submission to God here is precisely

what the word *islām* means. The reference in 11 is neutral, but 'God the Ruler of the Universe, the Eternal, the Upholder of Truth and Fairness' in 14 looks like an amplification by the translator or Miskawayh as editor. There may well, then, be other elements that have been introduced into the text during its transmission, especially in the gnomic second half. All in all though, we have an essentially secular text on education which is without doubt Greek in origin and content for the most part. Moreover, there are items in it, as we shall see, which were probably designed to appear 'Pythagorean' to the extent of giving the text authenticity along the lines of the various Neopythagorean works we have encountered.

Exhortation purports to be a speech. It is divided into two parts, with a new address to its audience at 7. The first half concentrates on the instruction of 'pupils'. The second keeps this in mind at several points but is mainly concerned with the moral qualities of the teachers. Much of this latter material is in short staccato sentences and the progression of sense is sometimes poor as we are given *sententiae* in quick succession. Nevertheless the second part is sufficiently well integrated into the overall theme.

The work begins with a speaker's introduction (1). He envisages three groups: those fully educated ('superior') in philosophy and rhetoric, a group which lacks these ('inferior in them'), and a group which lies in between. It is this last that he has 'in mind' and he presumably means by it the teachers who are to be the audience of the treatise. After praising his own learning, he predicts that a 'persuasive writer' will come after him who will be able to satisfy both 'masters and students'. This appears to signal the author of the treatise proper (2–14), who refers to himself as 'writing an easy treatise for you' at 7. By the 'laws' which this author will clarify, the speaker presumably means the ethical guidelines of the main treatise. The author predicted by the speaker has a wider appeal than 'masters and students': the text speaks again of superiors and inferiors but apparently in a more general sense (the inferior class is explicitly 'from the common people', *al-asāfil*), and the speaker ends his introduction by saying that the one envisaged by him will teach both parties 'what I have told him'.

This introduction is confusing, and perhaps reflects the state of the text found by the translator. The moral instructions that follow to the 'teachers and educators' are, however, clear, and are worth our while to the extent that there is nothing exactly like them in the educational material surviving from antiquity. The treatise begins by telling teachers to behave appropriately with their pupils (2). Next comes advice on training and disciplining pupils in various ways educationally and morally. The stress on avoiding certain foods 'like beans' and eating at set times perhaps recalls Pythagorean precepts (3).

In 4 advice is given on choosing a leader from among the boys. This is picked up in 6 on the divisions of the pupils into groups of 'a thousand, a hundred, fifty, and ten', and in the instructions on how to deal with those who flout the rules of 'the community of learners'. Paragraph 5 on the organization and planning of lessons has perhaps been displaced and should follow 6. In the second part the teachers are again the addressees of what is described as 'an easy treatise' (7). Paragraph 8 continues with advice on the sort of pupils one wants, while 9–12 offer various *sententiae* on the addressees' own moral behaviour. This is typical of the gnomic material so beloved of the ancient and the medieval world (Morgan 1998: ch. 4, 2007) and certainly rehearsed in the classroom (Cribiore 2001: 202–4 on use of Isocrates' *To Demonicus*, etc.). With 13–14 we return to the theme of educating and those who have assumed 'the management of young men'.

According to Diogenes Laertius 8.6 Pythagoras wrote three *sungrammata* with the titles *Paideutikon*, *Politikon*, and *Phusikon*. Naturally all writings attributed to Pythagoras as author are later inventions (for a different point of view, see Riedweg 1997). But by the time of the early third century when Diogenes wrote his history of philosophy, the older idea that Pythagoras had written nothing could be regarded as a 'joke' (*ibid.*). The strong association between Pythagoras (and thus the Neopythagoreans) and education comes out in three speeches put into his mouth by Iamblichus in *On the Pythagorean Life* (cf. Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 18), which was the product of real research into the Pythagorean tradition (Macris 2002). In the first (37–44) Pythagoras addresses the young men (*neaniskoi*, *neoi*) in the gymnasium of Croton on ethical matters, culminating with a laudation of *paideia* and *agōgē*. In the second (45–50) he speaks to 'the Thousand', the governing body of the city, and they persuade him to address the children of the town. In 51–3 he gives a short speech of moral advice to these *paides*. Pythagoras is presented as taking particular care over the education of his pupils later in the work (71–9, 90–2). It is a reasonable guess that the *Paideutikon* (whatever its origins) was the source of some of this material.

Can *Exhortation* be fitted into this context? Rosenthal noted various parallels in the text with Pythagorean *dicta* about behaviour recorded by Iamblichus (1941: 390). Furthermore he was surely right to suggest that the very communal education of the young men envisaged in *Exhortation* was intended to have a Pythagorean ring. The placing of the students' communal property under the supervision of key members of the student body in Iamblichus' work (72) parallels *Exhortation* 4. The Pythagorean procedure for selecting pupils (Iamblichus 71–9, 94) and the expulsion of those who do not make the grade (95) again recall *Exhortation*. Further, the dietary

recommendations in *Exhortation* 3 invoke a Pythagorean atmosphere. More persuasive is the work's citation of the 'Letter to Hipparchus' ascribed to Pythagoras' disciple Lysis in which Hipparchus is attacked for divulging the true teaching of the Master. In the Letter false teachers 'pour doctrines and liberal discourses into troubled and turbid characters, as if one were to empty pure, clear water into a deep well full of mud – it stirs up the mud and the water disappears' (pp. 112.18–113.1 Thesleff, cf. Iamblichus 77). This is close in words and sense to *Exhortation* 8 on the teaching of people 'who are not pure' (see translation, §8). Since this fictitious letter was fairly well known on account of its initiatory themes (cf. Burkert 1961: 17–23 for its possible origin, Macris 2002: 94, below p. 392 for its use by Clement), the citation does not prove a Neopythagorean environment. But taking everything together there is probably enough here to accept Rosenthal's suggestion, bearing in mind his remarks about elements which may have been imported into the text later (p. 387). After all, there is far more of Pythagorean character in *Exhortation* than in Bryson himself. In sum, although the *Exhortation* is a rebarbative piece of writing, its possible, perhaps likely, Neopythagorean origin makes it important, and especially so given the dearth of extant educational literature from the ancient world. Its gnomic character recalls parts of Bryson section four and adds further context to this material.

I turn now briefly to the Neopythagorean *Letter of Theano to Euboule* (text and translation in Städele 1980: 166–9; p. 603 Hercher, pp. 195–6 Thesleff). The letter could be late Hellenistic or early Roman in date. Städele's view was that it was later rather than earlier within this period: 'wohl im 1./2. Jh.n.Chr.' (p. 293). As I have remarked in Chapter 5, one has to look at Städele's detailed linguistic commentaries on the Neopythagorean letters (in this case, pp. 293–301) to understand why he draws his conclusions. Caution is called for, and in the case of the Theano letter his dating is more impressionistic than for some others. But if he is right, and I think he is, the work squares well with the attention accorded to family matters in the first/second centuries and to the focus on upbringing attested by Quintilian, Ps.-Plutarch, Dio, and Bryson. Theano's function as 'ideal wife and mother' (Chapter 5, p. 315) made her a perfect pseudonym for Neopythagorean thoughts on family matters. As to Euboule, it is a typical 'nondescript name', as Städele says, but it also implies appropriate common sense.

The text is translated in Appendix II. It is fairly clear that the 'popular' presentation owes as much to approaches that are often taken to indicate Cynic and Stoic 'diatribe' literature (but see below on this, p. 385) as to the Pythagorean claim to authority in matters of how to live properly and

educate the family. The letter form is intended to impart a personal touch that is absent, for example, from a treatise like *Training*, and it does so well. The constant antithesis and rhythmical effect of Theano's Greek show that the purpose was certainly literary, but that does not exclude exhortation. In content her work belongs to the world of *Training* and Bryson section four, but distantly, as well as to that of other Neopythagorean letters on family matters.

3 *CLEMENT*, PAEDAGOGUS

With Clement of Alexandria we come to a writer vastly superior to those considered so far. For a figure so important in general and for the development of Christianity in particular, the secondary literature is necessarily very large, and it is beyond my purposes to go into it. Moreover I shall restrict my analysis to the *Paedagogus* and make very little reference to Clement's other works.

It is often said casually that the *Paedagogus* is a handbook of etiquette, but this is wrong. It is in fact concerned with living a morally good Christian life and in Book 2 in particular the perils and pitfalls of this life are explored by considering the needs and experiences of men and women in trying to control their bodies and appetites. Broadly the themes take readers from the time of the evening meal in company, through the period of sleep and *paidopoiia* ('making of children'), and on to dressing and bathing the next day. Book 3 picks up some of these themes and develops others in a way which recalls Book 2 but lacks the unifying structure of the 'time' of the Christian. For the most part Clement writes in general and, frequently, condemnatory terms, with liberal use of irony and sarcasm to reprove bad habits. Occasionally he includes passages of specific, detailed guidance of how to behave or not behave in certain contexts. His sources for his material on manners are largely unidentified. The limits of *Quellenforschung* in Clementine studies were exceeded long ago by the lengthy double dissertation of Gabrielsson (1906, 1909), who argued strongly for lost works of Favorinus, specifically the *Pantodapē Historia*, as the source of Clement's 'realenzyklopädische Notizen'. There is certainly use of Musonius (particularly in Book 2 chs. 1, 2, 10, 12: Spanneut 1957: 111) and (it seems in one passage) of Bryson; but it is a mistake to look always for written sources, especially lost ones, since this type of material was in the public domain, as Clement says. Even when he uses e.g. Musonius, he reorders source material to his own liking (Marrou in Marrou and Harl 1960: 51). Overall he employed a wide range of pagan and Biblical texts to make his points, exploiting opportunities to form the connections

he wanted as he wanted. The 'Index des auteurs anciens' in the third volume of the Sources Chrétiennes edition (Mondésert, Matray, Marrou 1970) may be consulted to see the citations of or allusions (which are for the most part unsure 'rapprochements') to pagan authors (for example, Plutarch, use of whom cannot be proved), and Clement's fondness for the comic writers who were so useful for illustrating social situations. The detailed notes to the editors' text provide discussion of key instances. Or one may consult the parallels in the 'Similienapparat' of Otto Stählin's standard text (vol. I, 3rd edn, Berlin, 1972) and indices (vol. IV, Leipzig, 1936). Unsurprisingly instances of Scriptural citation and allusion outweigh those of the secular works. Sometimes the sense of the original passage, whether pagan or scriptural, is seriously distorted to suit the argument, as we should expect in a writer of this ability and confidence.

This question of sources is related closely to the question of historicity. Parts of the *Paedagogus* are almost a pastiche of classical literature and Scripture and this at least calls into question the utility of the work as a source for social history. I return to this matter below.

Before turning to Books 2–3, I must say something brief about Clement's purpose in writing the *Paedagogus* as he informs his readers of it at the start and end of Book 1.[18] In the first chapter of the first book Clement uses technical philosophical vocabulary to sketch a threefold function of the divine Logos: conversion, education in its role as a *paidagōgos*, and teaching. It is clear from what he says that conversion has been dealt with in his *Protrepticus*, and that he assumes that (most of) his audience is baptized (1.6.25–32). The material in the *Paedagogus* concerns moral and spiritual progress (*proaktikos*), and not, he says, point-by-point systematic teaching (*methodikos*). The figure of the *Paidagōgos* is *proaktikos*, focussed on *ēthopoiia* ('making character') and giving instruction through *hupothēkai* ('precepts') and *eikones* ('exempla').

Already at the very start of ch. 1 Christians are addressed as 'my children', and the image of the Christian as child is developed throughout (see esp. chs. 5–7; Quatember 1946: 95–108 for the religious aspects, Broudéhoux 1970: ch. 6 in general) and revisited in the last chapter and the hymn of Book 3. Clement is careful to reject any idea that children are inherently childish; and through baptism Christians have access to the purest and best knowledge, not the puerile knowledge of real children (6.25.1). The common gender of the Greek word for 'small child' (*paidarion*) helps Clement

[18] References here are to the Sources Chrétiennes text and are made by book, chapter, section (the section numbers run continuously throughout each book), and subsection, as appropriate.

to reformulate within Christianity the Stoic idea that women and men have 'the same virtue' (4.10.1), an idea with the limitations it has in pagan thought (H. König 1999; we should not forget that God too combines the best of both genders, *Rich Man Salvation* 37. 2 'Father . . . Mother. By loving the Father became female'). The final chapter of *Paedagogus* Book 1 (ch. 13) is concerned with 'right action' (*to katorthōma*) and other core elements of Stoic philosophy. The Christian life is presented as a system of acts in accordance with *logos* or the *Logos* and the practice 'which we call faith'. 'This system comprises the precepts (*entolai*) of the Lord.' Of the duties incumbent on the Christian 'in the plan of divine *paidagōgia*', some pertain to 'daily life' and 'are widely known even among ordinary people',[19] others to the 'good life', which are to be understood from their 'outline' in Scripture by those who are able to do so.

The debate among patristics scholars as to whether Clement envisaged the lengthy *Stromateis* as the third member of a tripartite work following *Protrepticus* and *Paedagogus*, as *Paedagogus* 1, 1 may suggest, is irrelevant to my purposes here, since I am interested in what Clement wants to do with 'daily life', the concern of Books 2–3. There is in any case no good evidence for such a grand plan (see e.g. Pujiula 2006: 53). Nor does the somewhat lax structure of the *Paedagogus* itself encourage one. Book 1 on the role of the Christ–Logos as instructor is in fact the most coherent and successful part of the work. There is some logic to Book 2 if we think of the themes as following the Christian's evening, night, and morning routines; but one cannot press this too far and the final chapters on clothes/dyes/colours, footwear, and gold/jewellery are timeless. Book 3 is then a series of loosely or poorly connected discussions – though this is not really a problem at the chapter level – which are capped by what are effectively two final chapters, the second of which is an afterthought designed to introduce the beautiful hymn to Christ the Saviour.

Book 2 begins with a weak link to the theme of Book 1:

> (2.1.1.1) Now, to keep to our purpose and select Scriptural passages which concern the life-assisting (*to biōpheles*[20]) part of our *paidagōgia*, we shall set out in summary form what kind of person someone called a Christian must be throughout his life. We must begin from ourselves and how we should order our life. (1.2) Therefore, to attain proportion (*summetria*) in our treatise, we shall say how each one of us must conduct himself in relation to his own body, or rather how he must direct it.

[19] τὸ ἐθνικὸν ζῆν . . . ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς τοῖς πολλοῖς δεδήμευται. 'On peut hésiter sur le sens [of *ethnikon*]' – Marrou, who rejects 'pagan' and translates, surely rightly, as 'la vie ordinaire' or 'la vie commune' (Marrou and Harl 1960: 294 n. 3).

[20] A Chrysippan term, very common in Philo, who is one of Clement's major sources.

We must not care for exterior things, Clement continues, but must cleanse the essence of the human being, 'the eye of the soul'. This is how we receive the greatest aid on our journey towards the task of comprehending God (2.1.1.2–3). With this short introduction Clement turns straight to the topic of food (2.1.1.4 'Other men live to eat . . .') beginning here with a double serving of Musonius, Discourse XVIIIb 'On Food' (pp. 102.7, 102.8 Hense). The chapter (which runs to 2.1.18.4) shows his procedure and the range of material he brings to bear. He starts by commenting on the medical problems of gourmandism, citing a range of tasty dishes in the list format he so enjoys and which often recalls lists found, sometimes word for word, in authors like Athenaeus (*Sophists at Dinner*) and Pollux (*Onomasticon*; cf. e.g. Marrou 1955: 187) or in comedy (2.12.124 is one of the best examples). We next have a denunciation (2.1.4–7) of the 'little dinner parties' which some Christians are daring to call by the name of the liturgical meal, the *agapē*, a fierce attack on gluttony, on meat originating in sacrifices, and on the bleak future awaiting gourmands (2.1.7–8). 'We do not want to abolish social life, but we do feel that the dangers of meeting up may lead to disaster' (2.1.9.4). The problem of eating with pagans (2.1.10) leads to further criticism of gluttony and immoderation (2.1.11–12).

At this point comes the first of the several groups of comments on personal behaviour in specific situations (2.1.13). 'One must abstain from all behaviour typical of a slave and all lack of control by taking the food served in a polite manner, by keeping one's hand, couch, and chin free of food stains, by retaining the composure of one's face unruffled, by not distorting it even when swallowing, by holding out one's hand in an orderly fashion from time to time, etc . . . It is best not to eat and drink simultaneously, etc.' (2.1.13.1–2). This kind of material never continues for long in the *Paedagogus*, and here at 2.1.13.3 Clement abandons etiquette swiftly to praise the 'true simplicity' of the Feeding of the Five Thousand and of the Christian way of life which scrutinizes the occasions, times, manners, and wherefores of doing anything (2.1.13–14). This simplicity in eating occupies sections 2.1.15–17, expressed through a rich mixture of Scripture, comedy, Platonism, Stoicism, and medical science (too much food impedes growth; Spanneut 1957: 200–2, Breitenbach 2002). 'This is why,' Clement concludes (2.1.18.1), 'Plato . . . rekindled the spark of Hebrew philosophy' to attack luxurious living – Plato who was 'not unaware of David' (according to the Christian theme of Greek philosophy's dependence on the Old Testament[21]). The discussion

[21] Cf. e.g. *Stromateis* 6.2.4.1–5.39.1 καὶ ὡς μὲν κλέπται πάσης γραφῆς Ἕλληνες ᾑρηνται, ἱκανῶς, οἶμαι, διὰ πλειόνων δέδεικται τεκμηρίων. Cf. Chadwick 1966: 44 'The plagiarism theme is developed by Clement more than by any other early Christian writer.'

is rounded off with Aristotle on biology, Epicharmus on gluttony, and St Paul's stern prediction that 'their end is destruction'.[22]

Writing later in the sixth book of the *Stromateis*, Clement says that the *Paedagogus* had 'presented in three books the topics of upbringing and nurturing from childhood'[23] with the aim of preparing in adults ('those enrolled among men') a soul 'full of virtue' and ready to receive 'the science of true knowledge'. Within this higher knowledge, what the Stoics called 'life's smaller duties' ('tenuia rerum officia'), as Persius puts it in his poem for his teacher Cornutus (*Satires* 5.93–4), were, as Clement says, 'widely known' (*dedēmeutai*, *Paedagogus* 1.13.103.2). This is one reason why there is relatively little of this type of material in the *Paedagogus* despite the focus on how people should 'direct' their bodies. The several examples perhaps serve to remind readers what they already knew and to refresh that knowledge within a Christian context bolstered by Scriptural citation. This knowledge is oral. For despite what is sometimes asserted, there is no good evidence for the existence of a literature offering advice on these particular situations of daily life. When Epictetus invites us to 'see how I eat, how I drink, how I sleep, how I endure, how I refrain, how I cooperate, how I use appetite, how I decline, how I maintain natural and acquired bonds without confusion or impediment' (*Discourses* 4.8.20), we are to judge from common sense, not books. But on the basis of this and other, less clear passages Paul Wendland (1886: 12–13) conjured up a whole industry of later Stoics (including Clement) who wrote on 'moderationem atque gubernationem volgaris vitae'.

In his 1895 study of 'Philo und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe' Wendland again assumed the existence of works on the morals of daily living, which were loosely called 'diatribes'. His argument met with great success, for the 'diatribe' genre continues to be thought of as the major vehicle of 'popular' philosophy in the Hellenistic and early Roman eras (cf. Wendland 1912: 75–81; the catalogues of themes in Oltramare 1926 represent the height of its development). There was even a typical progression from a golden age (Bion of Borysthenes, and derivative from him Teles, cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1881: 292–319) to the more 'artificial', literary attempts by Seneca, Dio of Prusa, Musonius, and others (the history is recounted in Capelle 1957; see also van Geytenbeek 1963, Marrou 1976). In support of his edifice Wendland leant heavily on Seneca, *Letters* 94, where the value

[22] Phil. 3:19 'Their end is destruction, their god is the belly, etc.'

[23] 6.1.1.3 τὴν ἐκ παίδων ἀγωγήν τε καὶ τροφήν. Cf. *Paedagogus* 1.5.16.1 παιδαγωγίαν δὲ ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι ἀγωγὴν ἀγαθὴν ἐκ παίδων πρὸς ἀρετήν.

of *praecepta* or *admonitiones* (and the figure of the *monitor*) is maintained as an authentic constituent of philosophy.[24] We have met this text before (Chapter 3, pp. 207–8). In it Ariston of Chios objects to the suggestion that special precepts are needed for every situation. He does not require a *monitor* to say, 'walk like this, eat like this' (§8) and holds that such instructions (cf. §5) were likely to be given to children by their 'grandmother', their '*paedagogus*', or their 'schoolmaster': 'if you go into any elementary school, you will find them set for the boys' (§9). Seneca, who goes on to defend the use of precepts, does not mention any literature, and in answer to Ariston's suggestion that an infinite number of precepts would be needed to cater for every situation, he says there are only 'slight distinctions' between times, places, and people and consequently all we need are 'praecepta generalia' (§35). It seems, then, that 'life's smaller duties' were not written down, at least in the main. They were things one learnt in childhood, which is what Clement himself says: 'from childhood', in a process of habituation within the family that gave one the grounding for living among one's fellows. If that is right, it makes Bryson's decision to write out such material all the more interesting.

In the rest of Book 2 Clement goes on to discuss drink and drunkenness (ch. 2), the use of luxury vessels, plates, even silver and gold chamber pots and the like (ch. 3), singing and music at feasts (ch. 4), laughter (ch. 5), lewd conversation (ch. 6), the risks from socializing and attendance at dinners (ch. 7), the use of perfumes and crowns of flowers (ch. 8), sleep (ch. 9), sexual intercourse and procreation (ch. 10), clothes/dyes/colours (ch. 10 *bis*), footwear (ch. 11), and gold and jewellery (ch. 12). Chapter 2 introduces a theme which is very noticeable in Books 2–3: the danger to men from female excess and display. Women are certainly addressees in the *Paedagogus*, albeit mostly from the perspective of a male ethics, since they are inferior in nature (but not spirit; H. König 1999). Clement is prepared to 'relax the tone', as he puts it, to allow them to wear beautiful clothes and those perfumes that 'do not stupefy their husbands' (2.8.66.1; 2.10 *bis*.107.2–3, 111. 1; 3.11.56.1). But there are a number of lengthy passages condemning women's luxury in particular and the potential or reality of seductiveness and seduction (see Book 2 chs. 10 *bis*, 11, and 12, and in Book 3 chs. 2, 4, and 5, and parts of the summary ch. 11).[25] The extent of Clement's employment of misogynistic themes concerning make-up and dress reveals something not about his personal fears,

[24] Wendland also pointed to Cicero's list of topics addressed by consolation literature, *Tusculan Disputations* 3.34.81.

[25] In detail 2.2.33; 2.5.46.3, 47.3; 2.7.58.1; 2.8.64.5, 66.1, 71.1; 2.10 *bis*.107, 111.1–2, 114–15; 2.11.116–17; 2.12.118.4–120.2, 121–29; 3.2.4–14; 3.4.26.3–30.4; 3.5.31–3; 3.11.58, 62.2–64.1, 66.3–73.3, 82.5, 83.4–5.

but about his formation of his reader. The upper-class women who read the *Paedagogus* (Pujiula 2006: 112–15) would have shared this view of women who, they supposed, were not like them. For when Clement labels such women prostitutes or mistresses, those who could be qualified by these terms were as objectionable to his elite female readers as they were to his male ones (whether they consorted with *pornai* or *hetairai* or not). Clement's male and female audience would have found nothing wrong in his assessment of the 'need to regulate (women's) appearances, looks, walks, and voices as far as possible' (3.11.68.1).[26] Good Christian ladies acquired their 'genuine beauty' from the exercise they got, like the wife of Ischomachus, by doing the housework (*autourgia*, 3.11.67.1, cf. 3.8.41.3, 3.10.49.2–3).

Owing to his determination to display his immersion in Greek literature and his familiarity with philosophical and Biblical thought and language, it seems more difficult in the case of Clement to be sure if his attack on any particular personal or social practice represents something actually current in late second-century Alexandria, or how current, which is an even more difficult question to answer. A principal reason for this difficulty is the fact that Clement's world is, like Bryson's, primarily that of the *oikos*. There are no references to the civic–political structures of city life. He does once in passing allude to occasions 'when we are *empoliteuomenoi*'. He says this in the context of the need to wear signet rings (3.11.58.2). But it seems unlikely that the word used here indicates participation in the civic–political or legal structures of the city. Rather it refers to matters of legal, financial, or commercial business which connected the *oikos* with the community. Christians kept away from the official civic business because of its unavoidable religious aspects and the persecutions to which they were periodically exposed. The rest of the sentence about needing rings speaks of 'us administering other matters to do with our farms (*agroi*)'. This is the pattern of life we expect, as is the specific point Clement wishes to make: we need to carry a signet to 'put a mark on things to keep them secure' because, when we are out and about, we are 'often without our wives'. This Christian wife takes care of the property of the *oikos* according to the standard pattern, and her role guarantees a private perspective.

From Clement we would not even know the Roman empire existed and that it exercised a tight control over Egypt.[27] That said, we should not exaggerate the timelessness of his strictures. This problem of historicity has been much debated, but most commentators have accepted the position argued

[26] ἐπανορθωτέον δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ βλέμματα καὶ τὰ βαδίσματα καὶ τὰς φωνάς.

[27] The one reference to Romans (the stern 'Roman lawgivers of old') is badly confused (3.3.23.1).

for by Gussen in his 1955 study, *Het Leven in Alexandrië*. On the basis of a useful but rather mechanical categorization of Clement's sources, Gussen concluded that in the main Clement applied citations of comedy, etc., to real cultural situations. In truth it is difficult to be sure, as it is with any moralist. But there is another perspective which we may bring to bear on this problem, and this is the newness of Clement's readership. A rich and educated Christian audience is a phenomenon of the late second century.[28] It is this audience – a fraction of the population of Roman Egypt – that Clement sets out to help in his *Rich Man's Salvation* by explaining to them that Jesus' command to 'Sell your property'[29] does not mean 'what some take it to mean too rashly: throw away your existing resources'. Rather, it means banishing from your soul your greed and the 'disease' of excitement about money (*Rich Man's Salvation* 11.2, cf. 14.6 'it is to be understood as referring to the passions of the soul'). A man who has 'unburdened himself of his wealth' will be thinking about recovering it so much that he will be unable to concentrate on 'the higher things' (12.4–5) and be of help to the poor, as he should be through his charitable acts (13). God placed him in a 'family with an abundance of money, powerful in its wealth' (26.3) – how, then, can he be at fault? Thus it is that the problematical prooftext about the camel and the eye of a needle, which forms the centrepiece of *Rich Man's Salvation*, is not to be considered a problem for the rich Christian.

It is this same, well-heeled, recently or newly Christianized audience that Clement is addressing in the *Paedagogus*. When he gives general moral advice about dinners or finery or specific and detailed guidance about how to belch, the need to stop spitting 'continually' or clearing the throat 'violently' (2.7.60), and so on, the reference for this audience *was* real, whether Clement is speaking himself or through citations of classical or Hellenistic literature or Scripture. Just as they needed advice on how to deal with their money, and received an overtly Christian reply based on a technique of allegorizing awkward passages that was a familiar part of the legacy of Alexandrian literary criticism (Dawson 1992), so they needed the *Paedagogus* to advise on their moral conduct within a Christian framework and to tell them that they were living the life of a good Christian. There is no need to doubt that the practices Clement discusses were current. But it is very difficult to know *how* current they were, and I return to this here below with regard to the issue of effeminacy.

[28] Cf. Bagnall's discussion of the development of Christian literature in Egypt in response to too early datings of the remains: we should not expect to find anything 'before the Severan period' (2009: ch. 1), i.e. the time of the *Paedagogus*.

[29] Mt 19:21, Mk 10:21 πώλησον τὰ ὑπάρχοντά σου.

Book 3 of the *Paedagogus* reprises a number of themes comparable to those in Book 2 (chs. 2–3 on female and male adornment; ch. 4 on slaves and companions and ch. 5 on bathing, both of which are attacks on women; ch. 9 washing and cleanliness, ch. 10 exercise) but introduces a more overtly Christian feel (ch. 1 on true beauty in the soul and the resurrection, ch. 6 on the Christian as the truly rich man, chs. 7–8 on Christian *euteleia* and the true *didaskalia*). Chapter 11 is 'a concise summary of the best life'. We must strive not simply for the appearance of being free, but the reality (because we are 'educated by God').[30] 'That is why,' Clement continues, 'we must ensure that our posture standing, movement, walk, clothes, and quite simply our whole way of life, are those of a man who is absolutely and totally liberal' (3.11.58.3–59.1).[31] Above all we must present an air of dignity and calm (*to semnon kai to scholaion*) when we walk on the street (3.11.73.4). This aesthetic, with its Aristotelian goal of the semi-private quality of 'liberality' (*eleutheriotēs, Ethics* 4.1–2; cf. Chapter 3, pp. 244–5), is also on view in Bryson's call for his boy to 'be examined in . . . all his affairs' (§115). Correct behaviour in these matters was something one learnt in childhood, as Clement says in the *Stromateis*. Of course the *Paedagogus* concerns the behaviour of adults, not children. But Clement naturally says 'from childhood' to describe the long process of instruction and habituation.

What of the frequency of the bad practices Clement wishes to stop? The issue of effeminacy – which is closely associated with bodily misconduct and display by women – is a good example to look at to answer this question, since Clement sees transgressive sexual behaviour round every corner. As Maud Gleason has brought out so well in *Making Men* (1995), there was a strong desire in the moralists, medical writers, and educationalists of this period to impugn conduct by males which appeared to imitate female codes of clothing, gait, and voice. Polemon's *Physiognomy* offers the clearest construction of the *androgunos*, the 'man–woman', who is the opposite of the normative male. Clement is particularly concerned with the question of maleness in ch. 3 of Book 3. He liked his men to be hairy (showing *to lasion*, 'shagginess'), for this is how God made them, and he begins by lamenting that, 'luxuriousness[32] has gone so far', that men are sick and affect haircuts that are 'vulgar and whorish'. Moreover they are 'hair-haters' (*misotriches*)

[30] Citing the often adapted line of Aeschylus, *Seven against Thebes* 592 οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει.

[31] διὸ καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ βάδισμα καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς τὸν πάντα βίον ὅτι μάλιστα ἐλευθεριώτατον ἐπαναιρετέον.

[32] χλιδή, 'softness', 'effeminacy', conveying a sense of arrogant and exhibitionist display. Cf. Bernhardt 2003: 209–13.

and 'hairless', and use pitch, razors, and tweezers to remove hair everywhere but the head. The beard (*geneion*) is the particular 'sign of a man, by which he shows he is a man' (3.3.19.1). Since God had made man shaggy, it was 'sacrilege' to submit to 'smoothing' (*leiansis*) ('I get hot under the collar when I hear this term!'). '"Even the hairs of your head are all numbered", says the Lord. Numbered too are those on the chin and indeed those on the whole body' (3.3.19.4). He then paints a picture of depilated effeminates displaying themselves in the gymnasium among the noble youths (the *neolaia*), and so on, concluding that 'today the way of life that revels in wickedness has reached such a point of depravity, and a total debauchery has inundated our cities and turned itself into general custom' (3.3.21.2). To finish, he extols the rough manliness of various 'barbarian' nations according to a well-rehearsed topos. There are further comments on effeminacy and hair-care at 3.3.29 and 3.11.60–3.

The impression Clement leaves is of a very common nuisance. Compare and contrast Dio of Prusa in his first *Tarsian Oration* (*Or.* 33). Dio is explicit that 'the majority' (*hoi pleious*) of the Tarsian men are afflicted with the disgusting habits he condemns which are caused by their rampant effeminacy. Shaving the whole body is an important sign that they are trying to turn themselves into total, natural *androgunoi* (33.64). So Dio. But were most of the Tarsian males really like this? The best we can do is to say that Dio is developing a powerful moral anxiety about not being seen to be a real man. His association of proper manhood with true Hellenism in this speech is something we observe in a number of authors of this period. In Dio himself, for example, the men of Rhodes are presented as the last of the Greeks because of their proper walk, hair, and clothes, and the sober noises they make in public (*Or.* 31.162–3), which were so different from the effeminate 'snorting' of the Tarsians. Much of the first part of the *Tarsian Oration* reminds the Tarsians of their Hellenic (specifically Argive) ancestry in mythology (Robert 1977a: 132), and this gives us a clue as to what is going on. The idea seems to be that, if the Tarsians want to be Greek (with all this implies in the way of cultural and racial superiority according to the prevailing model of *paideia*), then they must be real men with full beards and hairy chests and genitalia. It is a scare tactic, and an excellent means of berating an audience which had foolishly asked for it (cf. 33.1). Clement adopts a parallel strategy. Like Dio he plays on the anxiety of his readers' identity, not as putative Hellenes but as recently or newly baptized Christians, who were perhaps unsure about the choice they had made (cf. 3.11.80–2). He paints a picture of a group – *androgunoi* – who are evidently different from *his* readers. The same goes for his remarks about painted and coiffured women:

as I have said, his female readers knew good Christian women were not like *that*. Moreover, the constant allusions to prostitutes in his discussion of female excess and male androgyny suggest that Clement is pushing a second and ever-effective button: that of class. The wealthy Christian he has in mind is not like these bad examples who have more than a whiff of what he calls *to agennes* ('vulgarity', 'ill-breeding') about them.

The frequency of the problems Clement identifies is something we cannot be sure of. But given his likely aims, it would be absurd to take the effect he creates at face value. The same sort of problem confronts us with Bryson, even if Bryson does not leave us with the impression of (e.g.) constant belching and spitting at table. We may look at the matter like this: had effeminacy or poor manners been *this* common, our moralists might have been obliged to proceed more cautiously against (in this case) habits that were widely practised. As it was, their audience was already on side. With Bryson, the audience of parents naturally knew *they* were not like naughty children.

Clement's 'aristocratic ethos' has been observed by many commentators. It emerges strongly in passages advising against specific actions on specific occasions. Consider the following text where Bryson himself seems to have been used directly, or perhaps through Musonius, for one particular.

> (2.7.54.3) Young men should keep their eyes fixed on their couch, leaning on their elbows and not shifting around, and be present through their ears alone. If they should be sitting, they must not have their feet crossed or place one leg over the other or use their arm to support their chin. For it is vulgar (*agennes*) not to carry oneself properly, and a bad sign in a young man. (2.7.55.1) Continually shifting and changing position is an indication of frivolousness. Taking a smaller portion of food and drink without a fuss shows a man of self-control, as does a degree of calm as opposed to too much hurrying, whether at the start or between courses, and also the ability to finish first and not get too excited. (2.7.55.2) 'Eat,' says the Bible, 'like a human being what is put before you, be the first to stop from politeness (*paideia*), and if you sit in the company of several diners, do not stretch your hand out before they do' (Ecclus. 31:16–18). (2.7.55.3) Never rush forward under the influence of gluttony. Your desire for more must not make you keep reaching out for too long because you will demonstrate a lack of control by your persistence. For the rest of the time do not appear mesmerized like animals at their food, and do not take too many of the fancy dishes (for man is not an eater of fancy foods but of grain).

There are a number of parallels here with Bryson §§116, 117, 118, 119, and 121 ('not to rush up before it is served', 'not to gaze at it greedily', 'must not stretch out his hand for food before . . .', 'should not persist in stretching out his hand', 'should not hurry', 'should not be the last to finish', should

be 'content with the frugalest of fare . . . limit himself to bread with nothing on it'). These requirements are commonplace. But *Paedagogus* 2.7.54.3 contains a more immediate parallel which suggests an overall influence from Bryson: 'the boy should not be allowed to place one leg over the other while he is sitting nor to support his head on his arm. For anyone who does this shows that he has gone so far in relaxing . . . that he is unable to support' it (Bryson §144). The combination of the two habits – crossing legs[33] and resting one's head on one's arm – is not otherwise attested, so it is likely that it is not coincidental. If that is right, it is additional evidence for Clement's observed interest in Pythagorean literature (Tardieu 1974 on the *Letter to Hipparchus*, Runia 1995 on Philo the 'Pythagorean').

As far as Clement was concerned, the very 'proportion' (*summetria*) of his book depended on establishing for each of his readers the correct conduct 'in relation to his own body'. This *summetria* is theologically determined: control of the body allows one to 'cleanse' the soul and 'purify' the flesh. Once a man has rid himself of what makes him 'still dust', he may move forward to God (2.1.1.2–3). It is in this way that we may partly explain the inclusion of 'Nebensächlichkeiten' ('trivialities') in Books 2–3 (Pujiula 2006: 120). But that is not the whole story: unspoken concerns are as important as stated ones. For Clement and his readers *paideia* meant the 'aristocratic ethos' in action and, in the case of mealtime behaviour, it effectively meant 'politeness' (as at 2.7.55.2 quoted above). Taking such care over table manners and the like reflects the fact that the notable was on display, at home and abroad, and that he was being watched for lapses in breeding. Lapses revealed a deficient Christianity, and that is Clement's main interest; but they also showed *to agennes*. This is where the *Paedagogus* crosses over with Bryson section four. In Clement moral life as a reflection of God is exemplified only partly through correct manners, whereas Bryson section four concentrates on manners at the expense, it seems, of the larger moral picture. But the larger picture is not absent from Bryson (see 'the categories of the Good' in section one). On this level Bryson and Clement were speaking the same language. It may not be unreasonable in the end to suppose that Clement's sallies into etiquette did take their inspiration in some degree from Bryson, for what Bryson did was to call attention to the importance of commonly available advice by the very act of assembling it and restating it in writing.

[33] A long-reproved action: cf. Aristophanes, *Clouds* 983 οὐδ' ἴσχειν τὼ πόδ' ἐναλλάξ.

4 BRYSON'S BOY

At the start of an anonymous late-antique summary of Aristotelian ethics, which survives in Arabic and is an example of the many lost introductory works that were produced in antiquity, a philosopher writes to his daughter as follows:

> A long time ago, my little daughter, when you were a very small girl indeed, I was in the habit of drawing you on by stages that might be useful to you in the development of your life. I took no little amount of care to organize the daily routine (*tadbīr*) which I imposed on you in order to fix within your soul everything that is good and the praiseworthy ways of moderation. In particular I wanted to ensure that you had all those necessary qualities which are formed by keeping to orderly habits (*ʿādāt*), so that this might serve to introduce you to the highest possible level of polite behaviour (*taʾaddub*). But now God and Time have brought you to an age at which you can conceive of true education (*al-taʾdīb al-ḥaqīqī*). I have formed the purpose of writing for you this tract, which contains an introduction to the art of Ethics, so that theory backed by proof may follow on the habits which you have already acquired in your life's course' (trans. Lyons, 1960–1: 35 adapted).[34]

The treatise, which is unusual for being addressed to a daughter, presents in this introductory passage the idea of carefully establishing a 'daily routine' (or 'management') and 'orderly habits' and offers a nice parallel to Bryson's statement of the best procedure for educating the boy in the introductory paragraphs of section four, even if Bryson has no thought of applying it to girls. Habituation is the 'basis' upon which the education of Bryson's boy is built (§104, cf. §162), and, as with the slave in section two, success is guaranteed by starting with the young child.

The element of habituation (§§105–12) is a standard part of ancient thought on the development of character, reinforced by the closeness of Greek *ethos* ('habit') and *ēthos* ('character/-istic'), and goes back to Plato (e.g. *Laws* 792e character is set by habit in infancy) and especially Aristotle (*Ethics* Bk 2.1, *Eudemian Ethics* 2.2, *Magna Moralia* 1.6). Plutarch's essay *On Character Virtue* is a good example from Bryson's own time (Babut 1969, Duff 1999: 72–8). The underlying thought in such discussions is the disjuncture between nature and acquired as opposed to natural habit (cf. Dihle 1956: 60–4, 84–7). What is noticeable about Bryson is his complete lack of

[34] See Zonta 2005, who cautiously, but not unsensibly, suggests Themistius as the author; but cf. Fazzo 2008: 115–16 on the fourth-century Nicolaus with whom the work is associated in the MS that contains it. The text is edited by Badawi 1979: 394–431. This passage is p. 394.

interest in a philosophical discussion of the matter. Even if we take *Training of Boys* ch. 4, where the author indulges himself on the standard topic of the collaboration of nature, habit, and education, employing a number of hackneyed examples without philosophical discussion, we see how straightforward and focussed on his result Bryson himself is. He appears to make no reference to the *locus classicus* of *Laws* 765d–766a (on the need to appoint the best of the Guardians to look after the education of boys and girls) with its stress on the importance of early development in plants and animals (a passage which forms the basis of the extract from Iamblichus' *Training of Boys* preserved in Stobaeus; Wilhelm 1930). Unlike Ps.-Plutarch, Bryson refrains from relating his discussion to the different parts of the soul (according to the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions). Habit is partly what the boy's nature dictates to him, for good or bad; but Bryson also speaks of habit when he means habituation in good habits. The task of education is to encourage the boy in these good habits so he is not 'neglected and let go' in his bad ways. Habit in its raw form 'is a second nature', as Galen has it in *On Character Types* (which survives in Arabic; trans. Mattock 1972: 257). 'Such characteristics (*akhlāq* = *ēthē*),' he remarks after *Laws*, 'appear in infants as soon as they are born' and develop by the second or third year 'before they acquire polite behaviour'[35] (cf. Bryson §108 'since there has been no *adab* before this'). Thus 'I take the origin of all that I am investigating in this book to lie in what appears in small children' (Mattock 1972: 239–40). This accords with Bryson well enough, and it was natural for Miskawayh to introduce his summary of section four (see below, pp. 408–9, Chapter 1, p. 100) with remarks drawn from the tradition flowing from Galen's influential work (below, p. 403).

After habit Bryson defines the 'best sort of boy' (§§113–14). He possesses the three natural qualities of shame or respect (*ḥayā', ?aidōs*),[36] love of honour (i.e. ambition; *ḥubb al-karāma*, a calque of *philo-timia*), and spiritedness or pride (*anafa, ?phronēma*[37]). The second and third of these (if the equivalents are right) are regularly paired in Greek in a good sense of proper ambition and a desire to forward one's interests or in a bad sense of excessive self-interest. In Bryson the good sense is meant, and is reinforced by the idea of shame or respect. The boy who lacks shame, scorns honour (*karāma, timē*), and is 'far from proud' is to be treated with a combination of carrots and sticks. He needs bribes and beatings rather than the 'praise and blame'

[35] *al-ta'addub*. Mattock: 'before they have been disciplined'.

[36] Cf. §108 'feeling of shame', §113 'shame', §143 'sense of shame', §146 'respect', §158 'showing respect' (*istiḥyā'*).

[37] The term *anafa* tends ordinarily to have a negative connotation in Arabic.

that suffice for the boy of pride and ambition. As in section one, these qualities are related to the life of the *oikos*, not the civic community. Ambition is central to understanding Greek and Roman culture in the period of the early Roman empire. The important work of recovering the documentary record of the elites' public activities, combined with research into the Greek literature of this era, has produced a rich picture of a public life governed by the desire for recognition and the need to be seen to be spending wealth in ways which make a lasting impact in the community and guarantee the position of one's family for generations to come. The goal was 'honour', and the striving for status and recognition is what 'love of honour' (*philotimia*) was all about. The expression of this through the establishment of grand buildings and endowments to pay for civic amenities was so normal among the super-rich that the word *philotimia* came to refer to the benefactions themselves. Indeed, it may serve as a shorthand for the whole culture of commemoration and the multitude of statues and honorary inscriptions it produced.[38] To Bryson none of this matters: his viewpoint is the *oikos* without the civic dimension.

Bryson returns to these qualities of ambition and pride that mark out the best boy later on (§§153–5), and it seems sensible to bring this material in at this point, for he refers back to his earlier remarks (§152 'we have already noted . . .'). Pride, he says at §152, is the key to 'success'. So the boy must 'be made to love being competitive'. The reference is *paideia* (*adab*) – the boy's education and his conduct as someone educated appropriately. He must 'be proud of having no one outstrip him in it'. He must also be proud of not being outdone by peers in the crucial areas of favours and gift-giving. Bryson is quite insistent about this. If the boy cannot match the favour, he must find another way of repaying it. 'Otherwise he is not practising justice, and people will attribute to him a love of gain (*maḥabbat al-ribḥ*[39]), not a love of honour.' These qualities may be public (one of the best examples from this era being Fronto's published exchange with Appian on Appian's disproportionate gift to him[40]); but for Bryson's boy they again seem part of the world of the *oikos*, albeit in its external interaction with the sons of other families. Much the same is said about the boy at §141: he should only be allowed to 'boast of his *adab* and learning (*ʿilm* = *mathēsis, epistēmē*) and to compete on the basis of these'.

[38] Giovanni Salmeri's essay on 'Dio, Rome, and the Civic Life of Asia Minor' (Salmeri 2000) is one of the best single treatments of the phenomenon. For civic rivalry see esp. Robert 1977b. Of original texts Plutarch's *Political Advice* is fundamental.

[39] I.e. *philo-kerdeia*.

[40] *Addit. epist*. 4–5, pp. 242–8 van den Hout (2nd edn 1988), Swain 2004: 23–5.

Having defined the best kind of boy (§§113–14), Bryson marks the end of his introductory part with the remarkable statement of total surveillance: 'the boy must be examined in every situation involving his eating, drinking, sleeping, posture standing, posture sitting, movement, speech, and all his affairs', and he promises that the rest of the treatise will 'set out for you a way to accomplish this' (§115). The extent of Bryson's control is in keeping with the general accent on management and self-management in this age, no matter how extreme it sounds. If we are looking for comparisons other than Clement 3.11.59.1 and 3.11.68.1 (above, pp. 123, 387) and like passages,[41] medical ethics and the whole idea of the 'regime' or *diaita* seem a promising area to turn to. It is not so much the presence of medical material in Bryson that points to this, for medical knowledge was common among those who were not practitioners (and Bryson appears to have been very up to date on certain topics: Chapter 3, p. 231). Bryson indeed calls his advice on eating a 'regime' (§124, cf. below). What is of interest, rather, is medical writers' extension of regimen into contexts that were strictly speaking non-medical, and the expectation among healthy non-practitioners of the need of therapeutic management by medics or along medical lines (Wöhrle 1990, Grimaudo 2008). As Plutarch says in *Absence of Anger*, an essay where the idea of inspection is fundamental, 'among the excellent sayings of Musonius that I can recall is this one: "Those who intend to preserve themselves must live by constantly treating themselves (*aei therapeuomenoi*)"' (453d, Musonius fr. 36, pp. 123–4 Hense). The following remarks from Galen's *Affections and Errors of the Soul* Book 1 ch. 6 both illustrate the approach of the physician–philosopher writing in ethical vein and have a particular resonance with Bryson's discussion of food and drink:

> (6.12) Another person must watch over (*epitēreitō*) us, to ensure that we do not make the same spectacle of uncontrolled appetite as dogs do when they eat, or perform the same undignified guzzling of a cold drink as one in the throes of a constant fever. (13) Even if one is hungry, one should not go at one's food in this violent, uncontrolled manner; nor if one is thirsty should one drink down a whole goblet in one. How much less should a luxurious appetite for everything before one lead to indulgence in an excess of cake or any other rich food. In every case when we are beginning (*archomenoi*) we should call upon others to observe and then tell us what mistakes we have made; in due course we shall be able to supervise ourselves, even without the presence of *paidagōgoi*, and to take care that we eat less than all our companions at table, and that we refrain from rich foods, confining ourselves

[41] Note also *Regitiua domus* p. 165 ed. Gázquez 'et pueri indigent pedagogis, qui metiantur mores eorum in potu, cibo, loquelis, gestu et habitu', with examples that recall Bryson and Clement.

> to a suitable amount of the healthy ones. (14) And after a while you should not even consider the amount consumed by your fellow diners, for it is no great achievement to exercise greater self-control than they do. If you have learnt truly to respect yourself, you should consider only whether your companion manifests more self-control today than yesterday . . . (21) Since beginners are not able to diagnose themselves, we shall have to put in place monitors (*epoptai*), whereas those in training can act as their own because they can recognize for themselves the nature of the errors and affections which they have rid themselves of, and the distance which they still have to go to achieve their goal (ed. de Boer = 5.31–2, 34 Kühn; adapted from Singer 1997 and Barras, Birchler, Morand 1995).

Galen puts the adult in need of moral work in the position of a child (cf. and contrast Clement) who is under the thumb of a *paidagōgos* or a 'monitor' (*epoptēs*). Soon enough the adult will be able to self-police without the need of this overseer. To reach this stage, however, he requires 'training sessions in fine habits' (1.6.18 de Boer = 5.33 Kühn).

Towards the start of his lengthy *Matters of Health* Galen presents the dietetic regime as a *technē epistatousa*, a 'supervisory art' (1.4.2).[42] The concern of the art is conservation/preservation of the body from the unwanted effects of the factors Galen lists conveniently in *Art of Medicine* ch. 23 (1.367–8 Kühn): ambient air, motion–rest, sleep–waking, food–drink, emotions–affections. Each of these, he says there, is considered in *Matters of Health*, which is true, though they are not discussed systematically. The role of the doctor now becomes that of a personal trainer (cf. J. König 2005: ch. 6) who is available to supervise the notable in so many aspects of his life. Not every physician felt this way: the upbringing of the child from school age onwards was a matter for philosophers according to Soranus at the end of Book 2 of his *Gynaecology* (2.57.2 Ilberg). But *Matters of Health* has no inhibitions. It sets out what Elisa Romano has called 'a pedagogical programme' (2000: 42–3, cf. 1991: 148–52; followed by Grimaudo 2008: 180–1) running from cradle to grave, which in her view reflects the 'autocontrol' incumbent on 'the imperial subject and in particular on the functionary'. *Matters of Health* is in fact a rather diffuse work, as Galen admits (see the second preface at 5.1), and it is not keyed into the life course as well as one might think from knowledge of the general movement of Books 1–5. That the doctor feels empowered to lecture well patients on their lifestyle demonstrates the self-confidence of medicine. But I think it is going too far to see this dietetics as an adjunct of political power. At 1.7.14–15 Galen notes that 'the character of the soul is impaired by faulty customs (*ethismoi*) in food, drink, and exercise,

[42] I refer to the text of Koch (1923). There is a translation by Green (1951).

and by sights and sounds and all music', and that 'the hygienist must be experienced in all of these and must not consider that it concerns the philosopher alone to mould the character of the soul'. But he actually makes very little of this type of material or approach in contrast with the passage cited above where he was writing as a philosopher-cum-moralist. In *Matters of Health* he is writing principally as a doctor. The well patient's life is not actually 'minuziosamente regolata'. Galen's main stress is on the need for a constant regime of exercise followed by different types of rub-down and massage. The extent to which this happened is difficult to gauge, as with any prescription. We simply do not know if men really popped round to their trainer for a restorative massage after making love (3.11).

Matters of Health or Celsus' books on medicine can be read as corroborating Ludwig Edelstein's essay (1931) on the shift of focus in the medicine of the Hellenistic era from control of the disease-ridden to supervision of the healthy; but the regime of medico-ethical control is not as intense as is sometimes suggested. Other well-known texts of dietetics show this too. The extract of Athenaeus of Attaleia's *Peri hugieinēs diaitēs* (*Healthy Living*; Oribasius, *Collectiones Medicae* pp. 138–41 Raeder, CMG 6.2.2; cf. Kulf 1970) from the first century BC or AD gives interesting but brief advice on the stages of life with the objective of preparing oneself for old age. Diocles of Carystus' famous 'clockwork' (Jaeger 1938: 45–51) medical day from the fourth century BC (fr. 182 ed. and trans. van der Eijk 2000–1; Oribasius pp. 141–6 Raeder, CMG 6.2.2) deals with personal hygiene on waking, diet and the main meals, seasonal alterations, and briefly with *aphrodisia*. Both of these works are advisory, and not supervisory. None of the other texts in Oribasius concerning exercise or baths or diet suppose anything like the panoptical control envisaged by Bryson. The innovation in Galen in respect of moral supervision lies in his belief that he was a philosopher and thus had a right to regulate behaviour (*On Character Types*, etc.). There are traces of this in *Matters of Health*.

Men were expected to know enough about medicine to be able to look after themselves (see for example Plutarch's *Advice on Health*; Swain 2008, van Hoof 2010: ch. 8). In this sense there was clearly influence on Bryson from the aggrandizement of medical territory, but Bryson's dominance is at heart ethical, not medical, with the aim of producing an heir worthy of inheriting the *oikos* through his pursuit of 'the Good'. The 'way to accomplish this' begins with food (§§116–28). Most of this subsection concerns the main meal in the evening (§123). As Plutarch says at *Absence of Anger* 461c, 'Food should be our starting-point: it is no great hardship quietly to make do with what is to hand, and not worry and fuss . . . which imposes upon

ourselves and our companions the most disagreeable flavouring of all – anger' (trans. Waterfield). The topic was self-selecting (Clement, Musonius 'On Food' XVIIIa p. 94.6 Hense *archē*) and reflects the importance of eating in Greek culture. Some parallels between Bryson and Clement have been noted above. There are, of course, as many parallels as one wants to find and I draw attention particularly to Musonius' second extract 'On Food' (XVIIIb), where we have e.g. the comparison with pigs (p. 100.2 Hense; Bryson §117) and various behavioural failings blended with moral ones. Bryson himself is concerned with manners more than he is with morals. But, as he has an eye on the adult man (cf. §124), like Musonius he promotes *sōphrosunē* (§121, *ʿiffa*, a standard equivalent) as the principal aim, since this will prevent love of money later and 'acquisition by disgraceful means' (a reference to section one). In other words the achievement of self-control through habituation is always in his mind, even if the advice is presented as externally driven ('for this habit will help him towards continence [and] self-restraint'). Thus he calls his instructions about eating a 'regime' (§124 *tadbīr*, a standard equivalent of *diaita*) and says that 'knowledgeable physicians (*ʿulamāʾ al-aṭibbāʾ*) advise it' (specifically that drink is not to be permitted during the taking of food; cf. §120; Oribasius, *Collectiones Medicae* 5.32, etc.). There are, it seems, echoes here of a widely accepted Stoicizing theory of growth in children which condemned meats and 'gross' foods (Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 17.4–5; Spanneut 1957: 200–2). If that is right, Bryson reapplies the theory to the impact of overeating on education/culture (§123 *adab* = *paideia*, §§125, 128).

As in Clement, drink follows food (§§129–32). Bryson recalls common dietetic attention to water but spares us the medical–scientific details (e.g. Oribasius 5.1–5 *et al.*). He also recalls moral–medical injunctions against wine drinking by children (Plato, *Laws* 666a, etc., cited by Clement 2.2.20.3–21.1). But at §132 Bryson's boy – here surely older – also attends 'symposiums', as Clement's young men do (2.7.53.5,58.2), and this aspect of his education even passed into the Islamic oeconomic tradition that was influenced by him.

Sleep follows naturally on eating, as it does in Clement's evening to night movement. It was another standard topic in dietetic literature (e.g. Oribasius 9.14 on beds, from Antyllus[43]). Clement divides his treatment (2.9) between the traditional condemnation of soft living, luxurious bedclothes, and ornate bedsteads and the Christian theme of constant vigilance and refusing to yield to slumber. Bryson has standard concerns (Diocles,

[43] Early second century, if we follow Grant 1960. Cf. Gleason 1995: 88–9, J. König 2005: 280–2.

Oribasius 6.4–6) about removing waste products from the body at dawn and settling down to do hard work in the morning.

At this point we lose any sense of diurnal progression as we turn broadly to areas in the second half of the list of things under surveillance at §115 ('posture standing, posture sitting, movement, speech'). First Bryson introduces another common theme, preparation for different times of year (e.g. Oribasius, *Collectiones Medicae* 9.2; Chapter 2, p. 121 for a similar passage in Musonius), and then proceeds to the general benefits of exercise by 'walking, running, riding, and movement' (e.g. Oribasius 6.21–4, mostly from Antyllus). Correct, simple clothing for the boy leads to condemnation of effeminacy and of imitation of women (§§138–40), with analogues in Clement, Polemon, Musonius (cf. Discourse XXI 'On Haircuts'), and many other authors. Bryson's boy is to grow up into a man proud of his 'culture and learning' (§141, cf. above) and should honour both elders and 'anyone superior . . . in culture and knowledge' (§142). He must also honour the poor man as much as the rich man, which is certainly a matter of self-control but in Bryson should also be seen along with the sympathetic comments on lower-status occupations in section one (Chapter 3, pp. 238–42). Honouring others is immediately defined in concrete terms: control over spitting, nose-blowing, yawning, and belching demonstrate 'a strong sense of shame' (§143). There are good general parallels in Clement (2.7.60, 81, cf. 33 on women's belching). This is followed by the remark about sitting correctly at table that was apparently taken over by Clement.

Next is a group of topics that relate to 'speech' at §115. Oaths, silence, disgraceful talk (see Chapter 2, p. 122 for a parallel between Bryson §147 and Musonius), abuse, truth, and lies (strongly condemned). Telling the truth is the finest part of boy's education. This leads to what Bryson calls 'an enormous benefit': learning to serve oneself, one's parents, teacher, and older people (§§150–1),[44] and he stresses that it is rich children who have to get used to this, whereas poor children have no option (cf. §122). Relations with the teacher are the main focus of what follows (§§152–8). The importance of these paragraphs is the strong encouragement of competition with peers over *paideia* including the giving and taking of favours (cf. above), which could win the boy a reputation for *philokerdeia*, if he got it wrong. He follows this with an exhortation to minimize the worth of gold and silver in the boy's eyes. Finally the boy must be permitted rest (Chapter 4,

[44] Cf. Demetrius of Phalerum *ap*. Diogenes Laertius 5.82 'the young must respect parents at home, passers-by on the street, and themselves when they are alone'.

pp. 264–5). Bryson notes again that he will achieve the greatest success if he obeys 'his parents, his teacher, and educated people' (§158).

At several points, as I have noted already, the adult man is in Bryson's mind as he lays down the law for the boy. In the two culminating paragraphs (§§159–60) before his concluding remarks Bryson uses his demand that the boy should not experience sexual intercourse before marriage to revisit the themes of section three and affirm the value of true love between a husband and wife who have known no other partner (above, pp. 327–8). Although we were promised more in §115 ('all his affairs'), no further topics are introduced and we feel the absence of some standard ones (notably bathing[45] and laughter[46]). The two final paragraphs affirm the value of all the precepts in section four: 'it is upon such foundations that life is built' (§162, cf. §104).

Bryson's fourth section is a major addition to Greco-Roman literature on the upbringing of the child. We cannot tell which of his precepts are original; the supposition must be that most of them were timeless and date back to the classical period, if not earlier. But times change, and both the codes and the elements which form them necessarily alter in accordance with 'the threshold of repugnance'; and the whole area of manners can advance or retreat in its overall contribution to a society's aims. For the group Bryson was addressing – a wealthy, landholding elite which saw its primary zone of operation as the family estate – the rules which guided their dealings with one another amounted to a huge investment in mannered forms of self-presentation. These rules are part of the intensified feeling of Hellenic consciousness, grounded in economic prosperity, that characterizes this age of *paideia*. Bryson's section four built on the elite's need to invest in marriage and procreation, bringing this together with his own managerialist instincts for what the estate required, and somehow reflecting the increased attention to children's upbringing among some of 'limited milieus' to which he belonged, to produce a programme for creating the 'best sort of boy'. Material known to his readership from their grandmothers and teachers was encompassed in an accessible ethical framework of habit formation and sold to his readers as a promise of total superintendence of their son and heir.

There is enough comparative material in Musonius and Clement to show that some, at least, liked what they read. For sure, approval of Bryson's tough

[45] Perhaps omitted because smaller children (at least) were exempted from bathing regularly: Galen, *Matters of Health* 1.10.27 ἀλουτεῖν δὲ ἤδη τὰ πλείω.

[46] Maybe implicit under 'speech'.

line was easier for upper-class parents because the strictures and punishments that went with them could be delegated to the *paidagōgos* or teacher. But practice must always have far less intense than Bryson demands. His promise of all-round 24-hour discipline was unworkable in any normal house. It aims at a maximum imposition of the codes adults used to control themselves and distinguish their class from the lower orders who were 'obliged' to abide by the norms they set (§150). Throughout section four there is an understated sense of the danger of getting things wrong, making a fool of oneself, failing to be recognized as someone of breeding, and becoming a failure as a result. Being young was supposed to be a time of 'privilege without danger', as Clement put it (*Paedagogus* 2.7.58.1). Bryson could not afford to allow this. His boy is watched over like the slave of section two and taken in hand at a tender age. His parents are distant figures who are owed 'respect and veneration'; the standard oeconomic theme of children as future helpers is not relevant in this regime. The father's disciplinary role is crucial (§109). The idea that he might neglect his son's education (*Training of Boys*) is not even considered. Bryson does not deny the difficulty of acting out his recommendations (§§161–2). He is aware that some will discard them, but he has no sympathy: if people fail, they will incur not only 'imperfection' but also the social stigma of 'vileness', leading to profound regret and repentance for not having listened to him when they should have done.

5 RECEPTION AND INFLUENCE

I want to say a little in this final section about educational and manners texts in Islam. Regrettably it is not possible to do for the child what was done for the wife at the end of Chapter 5. There we examined Bryson's highly original and unnoticed contribution to Islamic thinking on the family. The corresponding groundwork on Islamic education and the social 'construction' of the child is yet to be done (cf. the pioneering studies of Gilʿadi 1989: esp. 126–36, and 1992; Essid 1995: 211–16; and Motzki 1986 for a detailed treatment of infants and children in Islamic law with welcome but brief remarks on Hellenizing influences[47]), and this makes interpretation difficult. Thus my aims here are suitably modest.

Some years ago Franz Rosenthal remarked in his paper on 'Child Psychology in Islam' (1952) that Greek influences had assumed a very important role in Islamic thinking about children. After considering various

[47] Notably Ibn al-Jazzār (see below) and the important Ḥanbalī theologian Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's *Tuḥfat al-mawdūd bi-aḥkām al-mawlūd* (in which influence is indirect).

passages indicating the ways in which children could be used to comment on adult behaviour, for example in the Brethren of Purity and al-Ghazālī (see below), he concluded that 'all these reflections on child psychology move along the lines of Greek philosophical thinking', and that it was no surprise that the most detailed treatment 'in Arabic literature' of how the child developed in ethical terms was in fact provided by Galen's influential *On Character Types* (which survives in Arabic, as I have mentioned above). But this is only true to an extent; and even to that extent we should probably say that Greek ethics and other areas of thought were sufficiently absorbed by large sections of the intelligentsia (cf. Strohmaier 2002 on Galen) to be seen as part of the furniture rather than being felt to be 'Greek'. This is true also of the related Greek material on paediatrics (cf. Kahle 1979, 1980), and Ibn al-Jazzār's citation of Bryson on the boy to add an appealing ending to his technical *Treatment and Regimen of Children* shows this perfectly.[48] With respect to child ethics, the Hellenizing approach of a work like Miskawayh's *Refinement of Character* (with its child psychology taken from Galen and Bryson) stands beside Islamic alternatives based on Hadith and accounts of the conduct of holymen and theologians. But even in ethics of the religious kind – I am thinking of the greatest work of all, Ghazālī's *Revival of the Religious Sciences* – Greek influences may be found and were obviously not seen as intrusive. There were other traditions too, with their basis in courtly or political life (mirror of princes and *adab* literature), such as the famous *Qābūsnāma* written by the Ziyārid prince of Gurgān and Ṭabaristān, Kaykāʾūs, for his son Gīlānshāh in 1082/3 as a complete guide to private and public life (Marlow 2007: 45; trans. Levy 1951). Such texts have no bearing on Bryson's influence.

I shall consider first two Islamic works on etiquette and manners which throw light on the limits of the reception of Bryson and *Plato's Exhortation*. Second, I look at the Islamic development of the Greek oeconomic–political tradition (especially in relation to the child/boy) by Avicenna, Ṭūsī, and Shahrazūrī.

I have noted above that Islamic educational treatises are characterized by a religious dimension. The reason for this is that their point of reference is the *madrasa*, the religious teaching institution, complete with a hall of residence for its twenty-odd students, which sprang up from the eleventh century and flourished, it seems, with the Sunni revival of the twelfth century (at least in Egypt: Berkey 1992: chs. 3 and 5; in general Makdisi 1981: 27–32, *EI* 2nd edn

[48] Translated by Jan and Abdul-Halim (1991) as part of a complete German version. Bryson was complemented with Galen's *On Character Types*.

vol. V, 1125–34). There were also works on elementary education in the more widely attended Koran schools (the *kuttāb* or *maktab*), which focus on the Islamic legal and technical sides of instruction – see the ninth-century *Kitāb Ādāb al-muʿallimīn* (*Le livre des règles de conduite des maîtres d'école*, trans. Lecomte 1953) by Ibn Saḥnūn,[49] and its expansion in the next century in the *Detailed Treatise* of al-Qābisī.[50] The *madrasa* texts are more interesting and I shall look at one example of them.

The *madrasa* was the final and most distinctive development of the types of school. The main focus was the teaching of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), though instruction was often given in other 'Islamic sciences' such as grammar. The whole complex of 'scripted forms of self-presentation' in Islamic culture naturally focusses to a large extent on religious performances (Lapidus 1984), and behaviour in the *madrasa* was a key part of this. The title of one of the best-known works shows this well. The *Tadhkirat al-sāmiʿ wa-l-mutakallim fī adab al-ʿālim wa-l-mutaʿallim* of Ibn Jamāʿa (written in 1273) literally means *The Reminder for the Listener and the Speaker Concerning the Conduct of the Learned and the Learner*, but the reference is to religious knowledge and the role of the 'expert' (*ʿālim*) discussant and 'theologian' (*mutakallim*) and his pupils.[51] The subject of the book, however, is not the theological curriculum, but the behaviour (*adab*) of the students as residents and students and the conduct of their teacher. There are parallels, then, with *Exhortation* and also with Bryson on such particulars as eating and sleeping; but the religious framework takes us into a different world. The first of the five chapters is a general introduction to the excellences of (religious) knowledge and 'the people of knowledge'. The second deals with the required competences of the teacher (preparation, religious observances, the form and presentation of the lesson, suitability for teaching), and what pupils can expect of him (learning of the *ḥusn*, 'perfection', of the Prophet, praise of good progress, clarity of instruction, conduct of examinations, fairness of set tasks, equal treatment for all, signs of humility in the teacher). The third chapter concerns the pupil (purity of heart, dedication to knowledge, self-control and piety, regulation of foods and sleep, exercise) and his relations with his *shaykh* (obedience, refraining from quarrelling, modes of entering his room, conduct during the session, gifts on leaving, etc.) and approach to study (things to memorize, etiquette

[49] Cf. p. 80 Lecomte 'on voit qu'il s'agit en grande partie d'un recueil de *fatwā*', the first four chapters of which are more or less exclusively Hadith.

[50] *Al-risāla al-mufaṣṣila fī aḥwāl al-muʿallimīn wa-aḥkām al-muʿallimīn wa-l-mutaʿallimīn* (edited with Ibn Saḥnūn by Ahwānī 1955).

[51] I refer here to the 1935 edition published in Hyderabad.

of deep study, Hadith, commentary, conduct with fellow-students, religious observances at the start and end of class). The fourth chapter is of particular interest (cf. Gacek 1989) since it deals with what Ibn Jamāʿa charmingly calls 'the society of books' (*muṣāḥabat al-kutub*). This comprises all matters pertaining to reading, writing, and copying, and detailed instructions are given on penmanship, correction, and exposition (in the margins but avoiding too many jottings and interlinear notes), with further remarks on methods of emphasis, disapproval of rubbing out (*ḥakk*), the importance of dating, and so on. The final chapter deals with the *adab* of living in the *madrasa* including everything from not slamming doors to what to do with shoes to not eating when walking and not climbing onto the roof, all with an overriding stress on the need for 'purity' (*tanazzuh*).

There are occasions here when we are in the world of Bryson's stipulations, such as the injunctions against fidgeting, clearing the throat, ejecting mucus, yawning, etc., while one is in the *jalsa*, the 'sitting', of the *shaykh* (3.2.8); and the popularity of Bryson's fourth section makes it fair to see a distant influence. But overall we are closer to the world of the *Exhortation* in these passages. That said, the religious presence in Ibn Jamāʿa's work reinforces Rosenthal's arguments for the Greek origin of *Exhortation*.

The comprehensiveness of the rules in Ibn Jamāʿa again raises the question of what such rules are for. There is no doubt that the prestige of (religious) knowledge (*ʿilm*) produced many tensions and attempts to monopolize it (Ibn Jamāʿa himself came from the Shāfiʿī school of *fiqh* and advocates this rite throughout). The behavioural regulations suggest confidence, but a confidence that cannot be taken for granted. Much the same may be said of another very well-known treatise in this area, al-Zarnūjī's short *Instruction of the Student: The Method of Learning*, which is around half a century earlier than the book of Ibn Jamāʿa. Its translators observed with little sympathy that it was 'heavily weighted with the rites, duties and prescriptions of the Mohammedan faith' (Grunebaum and Abel 1947: 2–3). But that is the wrong way of looking at things. The correct relationship between the teacher and learner and the conditions which make for successful instruction are readily inserted into and reinforced by the moral framework of Islam in exactly the same way as Clement's stipulations on control of the body are rooted in Christianity. In both cases the rules prove godliness and are underpinned by it.

As a coda to these matters I may mention the instructions on education ascribed to Plato in the late-tenth-century *Book of Happiness* ascribed wrongly to the philosopher ʿĀmirī, which its editor compared with *Exhortation*. There is a good deal of *adab* and educational/behavioural advice in this large gnomological collection of Greek and Persian wisdom, and not least in the

sixth and final section which deals with human life and behaviour in the context of kingly rule. The 'description of the man who wishes to graduate in wisdom' (pp. 381–2 ed. Minovi) and other related sections on behaviour by pupils and teachers (p. 382) offer no exact parallels but are inspired by similar 'Greek' material. All that can be said is that the unknown author had access to a good library and there is therefore a chance that the material is genuinely classical and has been attributed to Plato in the same way as the *Exhortation*.[52] See below, pp. 409–10 for the earlier section of the book on 'codes of behaviour for young men/boys'.

The Brysonian system, as the authoritative example of its type in the philosophical schema of ethics, economics, and politics, found its real influence among the philosophers. In the eighth of his *Roaming Questions* Miskawayh begins the answer about the origin of 'shame' by citing 'the writer of the *Book on Estate Management*' for shame as the best indicator of a boy's 'success and receptiveness to education' (Amīn and Saqr 1951: 42 ; cf. above, p. 394). I have already mentioned (Chapter 1, pp. 96, 99) Avicenna's *Book of Government* (*Kitāb al-siyāsa*), which Plessner put in first place in his account of the oeconomic literature of Islam stemming from Bryson. There is no doubt that Avicenna did know Bryson (Chapter 1, pp. 75, 83), so we are entitled to look for signs of influence. They are there in the general framework of a book concerned principally with the family; but the *Book of Government* is not a *tadbīr al-manzil*, and since Avicenna recommended Bryson for those interested in managing estates, it is clear he was intending to do something different in his own work.[53] The *Book of Government* begins with an introductory section on God's *tadbīr* of the world and the special place and understanding of Man. This is a sort of 'anthropology' with religion included. People from kings downward need to gather and store their *qūt*, 'food', which makes them unlike the other animals. Servants are needed to help, the *zawj* is needed to protect the house, and the *walad* to perpetuate the man's name and assist him in his old age. The last theme is a standard in Greek oeconomic literature but not Bryson (above, p. 368). After this introduction the first section is a standard ethical one on achieving self-control. Section 2 is on income and outgoings, but, like the *Treatise on Government* attributed to al-Fārābī (Chapter 1, p. 103, Chapter 3, pp. 250–1), it is couched in solely moral terms, and with even fewer economic references.

[52] For the material in the *Book of Happiness* concerning the woman's role in the house, which is taken or adapted from a female 'Pythagorean' philosopher, see Chapter 5, Section 7. For the philosopher's advice about instilling 'shame' in children, see above, p. 372.

[53] Text: above, Chapter 5, p. 359.

Excess 'profit' is very bad, Avicenna says: wealth must be used for charity, benefactions, or life's 'vicissitudes' (cf. Bryson §54). The third section on the wife has been explored in Chapter 5 (Section 7). Four is on the child, five on domestics (*khadam*).

Sections 2–5 take the four Brysonian topics, but both the order and the treatment is different. Wealth (2) follows the ethical section (1) and this perhaps accounts for the exclusively ethical presentation. With regard to slaves, Bryson's are taken immediately after money and appear to be regarded as part of the property of the house, whereas Avicenna's are part of its personnel. Here the treatment is not absolutely foreign to Bryson's, which is necessarily ethical. But the initial thank-you to God for providing slaves is an interesting defence of the institution (cf. Clarence-Smith 2006: ch. 1) and constitutes a major departure, as does the explicit physiognomical material and the absence of the Brysonian three categories. The section on the *walad* is also different. It begins with birth: the child has a right to a fine name (the ceremony of *tasmīya*: Gilʿadi 1992: 132–3 n. 5) and a suitable wet-nurse (a standard theme). Good character is inculcated in him by means of the Koranic ideas of terror and delight (*tarhīb, targhīb*), assisted as need be with a good slap. The child must then learn the Koran and poetry to improve his character. He must sit in a class (*maktab*) of noble boys and aim for the best type of character. Having learnt Koran and Arabic language he shall choose a 'craft' (*ṣināʿa*). Not everybody can master every sort. Whichever one he chooses for his living (and Avicenna thinks solely in terms of professional or intellectual occupations), it costs 'intelligent people' (i.e. the fathers) a considerable sum of money and he must therefore be tracked carefully.

Avicenna pays tribute to Bryson by taking him as a point of departure for his own very different, Islamic presentation. His work, as we have seen, was taken as the basis of the second part of Ṭūsī's *Nasirean Ethics* (trans. Wickens 1964, ed. Minovi and Ḥaydarī 1981, cf. Madelung 1985, Daiber and Ragep 2000), to which I now turn. I have remarked on the phenomenal influence of this book. At the start of the section on oeconomics Ṭūsī names Bryson, but states that he is basing himself on Avicenna along with 'homilies and moral examples derived from both Ancients and Moderns' (p. 155 Wickens). It is apparent to any reader of the fourth section 'concerning the chastisement and regulation of children' that some parts of it have been inspired by Bryson's treatment rather than Avicenna's. In the main this is certainly through Miskawayh's account 'of the education of the young, and of boys in particular, most of which I have copied from the work of Bryson', and from the material immediately following this (pp. 50–7 trans. Zurayk). The secret of Ṭūsī's success was not just his understanding of human nature

but also his ability to write. Thus he easily blends Miskawayh with Avicenna as part of his project of bringing ethics, oeconomics, and politics together under one roof with due attention to the requirements of the Ismāʿīlī sect, to which he belonged at the time of writing. For the oeconomic section in particular it seems probable that he also had Bryson himself open on his desk. It is difficult to be sure of this because Miskawayh's paraphrase is so close to its source; but one example looks clear. At p. 169 Ṭūsī writes, '(the boy) should be accustomed not to drink water while eating, and he should on no account be given wine and intoxicating drinks *before he reaches early manhood*, for they will harm both his body and his soul, exciting him to . . .'. Miskawayh (p. 53 trans. Zurayk), has, 'He should be trained to avoid drinking water during his meals. As for wine and the different kinds of intoxicating beverages, let him indeed beware of them, for they injure him in his body and in his soul and incite him to. . . .' There is no equivalent here of 'before he reaches early manhood'; but the phrase is present in Bryson: 'the boy must not go near wine *before he is on the verge of manhood* because it will damage his body and his soul . . . and lead . . . to . . .' (§131). Ṭūsī certainly used Bryson for his fifth section on slaves in addition to Avicenna, for he mentions Bryson's three types of slaves which Avicenna omits (p. 183 Wickens); and he appears at least to make reference to Bryson on the wife (cf. Chapter 1, p. 85, Chapter 5, Section 7). So it is likely enough that he kept an eye on Bryson section four while using Miskawayh's more elegant rewriting. There may be other phrases drawn from Bryson in the final paragraphs of Ṭūsī's section where he gives a compendium of manners to be used in various situations. Some of these coincidences perhaps represent no more than common practices: e.g. 'let him not lick his fingers' (p. 175 Wickens); on the other hand this particular injunction (e.g.) is in Bryson (§119) but not in Miskawayh (and indeed is not in the tradition of the Prophet, who 'licked his fingers [after wiping his plate clean] until they became red': Ghazālī, *Iḥyāʾ* Book 20, p. 32 trans. Zolondek).

Ṭūsī was an extraordinarily able man. His political skills were recognized by the Mongol invader Hulagu Khan who sacked Baghdad in 1258 and brought an end to the ʿAbbasid Caliphate. It was in his service that Ṭūsī built the great observatory at Marāgha in north-west Iran (Saliba 2007 *s.vv*. Marāgha, Ṭūsī). Before this in honour of one of the Ismāʿīlī governors of Quhistan who were ousted by the Mongols, he had written the first[54] edition of the *Nasirean Ethics* around 1235, apparently while resident in the fortress strronghhold of Alamūt, the base of the notorious Assassins. The rulers of

[54] See n. 59 below.

this Ismāʿīlī order built up a library at this site, which is perched atop the Alborz mountains, and Bryson was presumably among the holdings.

Ṭūsī did not bother to give his section on the child a quasi-theoretical basis of habituation (as in Bryson) or to promote education as the key to moral perfection in the overt manner of Miskawayh. And this is the second reason for his popularity: his book requires little thought. Very different is the first of the final two works I shall consider here, al-Ghazālī's *Revival of the Religious Sciences*. The *Revival* is one of the most important works ever written and is often held to be the most widely read book in Islam after the Koran. It offers a complete account of the man's moral, social, and religious life through a vast collection of Hadith and stories of the saints. The style is the very opposite of Miskawayh and Ṭūsī. We have reviewed in Chapter 5 the evidence for his use of or acquaintance with Bryson's wife. It is in *Revival* Book XXII is where we find Brysonian material on the child. It comes from the third 'quarter' concerning the 'Mortal Vices', which examines the inner life of the soul and its fight against sin. The book's title, *Kitāb riyāḍat al-nafs*, refers to the 'training' or 'spiritual exercise' (*riyāḍa*) of the soul. The presence in the book (and elsewhere) of ideas that are ultimately Greek in origin has long been noted (cf. Gilʿadi 1989: 127, 1992: ch. 4, Winter 1995: pp. xlv–lviii). It has rightly been observed by Tim Winter that the section on the training of boys and the perfection of their character (22.10) 'reads as something of an intrusion' (p. lxiv) because it is based so closely on Miskawayh's borrowing from Bryson and indeed contains many phrases taken over verbatim (*Revival* pp. 96.1–97.19 ed. Beirut 1995 = pp. 58.4–59.11 ed. Cairo AH 1312).[55] Since Miskawayh specifies his source, Ghazālī knew what he was doing. The fact is that Bryson was long domesticated and through Miskawayh had been constituted within Islamic ethics, just as Qudāma had placed him within Islamic political thought. Ghazālī himself ensured Bryson's legacy became part of Islam as faith in the sense that correct behaviour was proof of good religion.

While I am on the subject of Ghazālī mention should be made of Book XI of the *Revival* on eating habits (trans. Johnson-Davies 2000). There is no Greek material here, but the general idea of regulating food and mealtimes naturally offers similarities. The difficulties of determining the limits of Greek influences in such cases is shown well in the aforementioned *Book of Happiness*. The section on 'codes of behaviour for young men/boys' (pp. 370–3 ed. Minovi) is not ascribed to any Greek author, and there are several Islamic signatures (making for an interesting blend). But the repetition of the words 'prevented from' or 'told to' together with the allusion

[55] Borrowings are marked in Winter's translation, 1995: 76–80.

to 'habituation' which makes 'renunciation' of bad habits 'difficult'[56] will remind us of Bryson. Yet the regulations on eating, drinking, sleep, etc., are too general to go further. Either the author knew something of Bryson but lacked a copy or actually felt no need of him in contrast to Miskawayh and Ghazālī, who as ever used the material for their own good reasons.[57]

The final author I want to mention is Shams al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī, who was active in the later thirteenth century and was part of the Persian Illuminationist school of philosophy (see e.g. Fakhry 2004: ch. 10). In their pursuit of the highest wisdom of the 'science of lights' the Illuminationists invoked ancient thinkers and argued that they understood them better than moderns. Thus the founder of the school, al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191), interestingly identifies the Ps.-Archytan *Categories* (cf. Chapter 2, p. 125) as the source of Aristotle in his revisionist book on Peripatetic natural philosophy (the *Talwīḥāt* or *Intimations*, Fakhry 2004: 304, Ziai and Alwishah 2003: introduction).[58] Shahrazūrī idolized al-Suhrawardī and wrote influential commentaries on his main works (including the *Talwīḥāt*). What concerns us is his *Letters of the Divine Tree on the Sciences of the Heavenly Truths*, which date to 1282 (ed. Görgün 2004, with an introduction in vol. III, pp. 11–79). These form a veritable encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences to his time. In the first letter on the familiar topic of the 'divisions of the sciences' he defines *tadbīr al-manzil* in entirely ethical terms as the modalities of the relationship between the different sorts of people in the house, with the aim of achieving order and control. Bryson is named as the author on the topic 'from among the ancients' along with 'other sages' (Görgün 2004: 1 28–9). In the spirit of Ṭūsī the third letter of vol. II (ed. Görgün) concerns 'ethics, oeconomics, politics', and the second section on 'household wisdom' is apparently a combination of Avicenna (to whom the Illuminationists owed a great deal) with, and particularly, al-Ṭūsī, who is followed closely throughout including the section on the child, which remains the longest.[59] The point of significance is that Shahrazūrī does not name his main source and contemporary Ṭūsī but names Bryson, though it is highly doubtful that he had read him. Such is often the fate of 'the most famous' in its field. Ibn

[56] P. 372 ed. Minovi: *taʿawwud . . . ṣaʿuba . . . al-iqlāʿ ʿanhu*.

[57] Cf. the sections on wealth and crafts: Plato 'in the *Republic*' (cf. Chapter 3, pp. 232–3) says each man should practise only one craft (pp. 395–6 Minovi) and stick to it (as the *sunna* commands).

[58] It is not known if Ps.-Archytas was in Arabic. His name was certainly known in mainstream writers: cf. Huffman 2005: 616, Cottrell 2008: 533 for the famous passage on the number of the pseudo-Pythagorica from Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa (*Arkhūṭus*), which was apparently taken up by Shahrazūrī in his biographies of the Greek and Islamic philosophers (*The Promenade of the Souls and the Garden of Joys*).

[59] Shahrazūrī did not have Ṭūsī's second edition of 1264/5 with the added section on children's obligations to parents: Wickens 1964: 311 n. 1758.

al-Akfānī, who makes this statement about Bryson in his populist fourteenth-century encyclopedia (ed. Witkam 1989: 64), may show this himself when he adds that the beneficiaries of the 'sciences of politics, ethics, and oeconomics' are 'kings and others' (§845). This is a far cry from the rather private world of the Brysonian *oikos*.

APPENDIX I PLATO'S EXHORTATION CONCERNING THE EDUCATION OF YOUNG MEN

Plato's Exhortation Concerning the Education of Young Men is first mentioned in the late ninth-century *Fihrist* of Ibn al-Nadīm (p. 307 ed. Tajaddud) in a list of works attributed to Plato 'from what I myself have seen and from the information of a reliable person about what he has seen' (trans. Dodge 1980: 593). The title is *The Education of the Young Men*.[1] Just before this, in a section listing translators into Arabic, Ibn al-Nadīm mentions one Abū ʿAmr Yūhannā ibn Yūsuf al-Kātib and says that, 'he translated Plato's book *On the Conduct of Boys*' (588; p. 305 ed. Tajaddud)[2] which may or may not be the same work. In both places Dodge suggests the reference is to Plato's *Laches*. The *Laches*, however, is listed shortly before the second reference in another list as 'a dialogue which he called *Laches*, about courage' (592). Further references to the *The Education of the Young Men* can be found in Qifṭī, *History of the Sages* (p. 18 ed. Lippert), and Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa (p. 1 54 ed. Müller = p. 86 Riḍā).[3]

The text used is Miskawayh's *Eternal Wisdom* (*Wisdom of the Arabs and the Persians*) edited by Badawi (1952: 270–8). It has been checked against the Oxford Marsh MS 662 (see below). The work was first published by Cheikho (1911c). It appears that Cheikho relied on the Vatican MS which Badawi terms ف. Badawi (pp. 56, 62–3 of his introduction) relies principally on Paris MS BN 3957 (fifteenth century according to de Slane 1883–95: 643). Numbers in square brackets in the translation here refer to this MS and Badawi's pagination. Badawi collated other MSS but not Marsh 662.

It is acknowledged that the Marsh 662 has superiority. According to its colophon the copyist was one ʿAlī ʿUbayd Allah al-Shīrāzī, and he completed it in Muḥarram of 439 (June/July AD 1047), i.e. seventeen years after Miskawayh's death. Franz Rosenthal (1941) offers corrections to Cheikho from the Marsh MS, which Arberry (1963) called 'a veritable masterpiece of calligraphy from the fifth/eleventh century'. Arberry's statement that Miskawayh's book has been 'arbitrarily entitled *al-Ḥikmat al-khālida*' by Badawi seems untrue to judge from Badawi's account of references to the title in the Arabic reception. Badawi's text prints most of the readings offered by Marsh 662. It has not therefore seemed worthwhile to present an Arabic text.

1 كتاب تأديب الاحداث.
2 كتاب فلاطون في آداب الصبيان.
3 كتاب تأديب الاحداث.

[111b; p. 270 B.] *PLATO'S EXHORTATION CONCERNING THE EDUCATION OF YOUNG MEN*, TRANSLATED BY ISḤĀQ B. ḤUNAYN[4]

[*INTRODUCTION*]

He said:

1. I am addressing neither the class which is superior in philosophy and rhetoric nor the class which is inferior in them.[5] Rather I have in mind the class that lies between these two. This is what I have to say.[6]

It is incumbent upon me to mention myself and to spur myself on to education without recourse to any one else to reform and instruct me. Indeed, intelligence determines that I should put myself into the position of a man who can examine for himself and through himself. Since I have done this, my portion is that of men whom culture has raised up. Do you think that, because I am learning and seeking wisdom to that end, I do not know myself, that I am not a man of wisdom, and that I am not in full possession of education? I wish I knew the persuasive writer who will come after me, one who will bring clarity to the laws, which are confusing by nature, select <them> for the fathers, and order the sense of his words. [p. 271 B.] He will be capable of standing between masters and students and satisfying both groups together. He will please the superior class, and educate the class inferior to it from the common people, without upsetting the latter or criticizing the former. He will not honour the former despite their [?] concerns [112a] nor alienate them through fear and intimidation. He will not confuse the latter; and, in dealing with them will conduct himself neither indulgently or negligently. Rather, he will give equal treatment to both parties, and in this I refer to his cultured leadership and his cultured sense of consideration in line with what he has learnt from me. The result will be that he will teach them what I have told him.

[*PART ONE: ADDRESS TO TEACHERS*]

2. You who have acknowledged this teaching so that you may become teachers and educators: understand from me the advice I am giving you and

[4] *waṣīya li-Aflāṭūn fī ta'dīb al-aḥdāth, naqalahā Isḥāq b. Ḥunayn*.

[5] Cf. Rosenthal 391 'the high class in philosophy and rhetoric, nor the low class in them'.

[6] On the difficulties of the introduction cf. Rosenthal 391 n. 1 'An exact interpretation of this introduction to our treatise – *i. e.* the discovery of the source of the introduction – might prove very valuable.'

outlining for you! Your life with your pupils shall be upright, with no excess and no shortcoming. I adjure you and I entreat you by God the Creator of all learning and knowledge: Do not overstep the limits, know your ways, be mindful of the degrees of your rank, be as a spiritual light. To these pupils you should become a shining mirror and a guide for their freedom so that they receive a liberal education. Be careful to keep them away from unpleasant criticism and from all desire which is the cause of distress and death. Also, restrain yourselves from reprehensible desires, and from actions <which are> errors. Do not be led astray by their looks. Let there be an appropriate relationship between you and the 'griefs of the soul' so that zeal and pride arise on this account. Do not get involved in anything from which blame will attach to you. Do not be the cause of reprehensible behaviour on account of which your pupils will become insolent to you. Do not extend to them [?] the right of eating with you. Do not speak of anything detestable in front of them. On no account should you share a secret with them or be alone <with them>. When you are teaching them, do not speak words to them which are inaudible to all of those who are present with you. Do not let them get away with deceits. Do not try to influence them by gifts and grants. Do not laugh in their faces, but treat them according to their deserts. Teach them not to descend from their high standards of knowledge, and see that you yourselves do not descend from your high standards in teaching. Set no store by the dreams [112b; p. 272 B.] of the night and the fleeting shadow, nor by momentary pleasure so that you ruin the purity of your souls and your leadership in teaching. Be modest before them, preserve, respect, and safeguard by noble exhortations both you and your pupils from all reproach and slander.

3. Train them to serve you and they will serve every one and everything that is as respectable as you. Do not prevent them from doing this. Only offer them instruction when the time is right, in accordance with the facts, and by ensuring that no doubt attaches to you concerning it or any suspicion that you may be doing them wrong or acting unjustly towards them. If they become competitive, deflate them; if they are arrogant, put them down. Do not show a fatherly indulgence to those of them who get above themselves. Do not love them as you would relatives, but educate them as you would strangers, and begin to train them from the first time you are with them. If one of their family or kin prevents you from disciplining them also and asks you to show kindness and sympathy to them, eject them from your presence. Do not correct them or strike them in anger or confusion. Do not abandon them by acting negligently towards them or with too little concern for them. Do not conduct yourselves in a disorganized way. Do not leave them

without limits they can recognize for themselves. Be careful not to stare at their bodies or their outlines and shapes: every time you express your love for them and increase your care, you turn them into enemies. Do not forget spiritual teaching in the presence of worldly esteem. Treat them with drugs when they need them, using sedatives to help them clear their minds so that they may take honour and pride in the benefits they have drawn from your knowledge. Train them to keep themselves safe from foodstuffs which cause oblivion like beans, haricots, onions,[7] and garlic, and the fatal poison that is coriander, and from other foods which are like it. [113a] Train them not to eat except at times which are fixed and appointed, and then only from light foods. And warn them against [p. 273 B.] gluttony and drunkenness and departing from the mean. Encourage them to welcome everything that is good for them, the presence of which is compatible with their learning. Deter them from desirous and harmful looks which lead to wantonness. Do not permit them to walk quickly and foolishly.

4. Appoint over them a head boy from among them who will control them. Let him have precedence. It is does not matter whether he is rich or poor, beautiful or ugly. Indeed, have no regard for a fair appearance which is combined with ugly behaviour. Rather, look for fair action. Let the boy in charge of these young men be one who is trustworthy, studious, smart, inspiring, not known for evil associations, a depraved social life, or corrupt personal conduct. Do not consort with those who are known for repulsive deeds, but keep a distance from them. If you can find a head boy like this who is characterized by fine qualities, there is no harm in putting their money and property in his hands so he can administer it on their behalf.

5. Match each of those you educate with the education that suits him, and ensure that your teaching shows planning and organization. Give them the education they are capable of. Do not destroy their morale by being too demanding and imposing burdens they cannot fulfil.

6. Appoint over them heads of groups of a thousand, a hundred, fifty, and ten. Each of them is to give his pupils commands and prohibitions. If one of these heads ceases to do what he has been taught and is himself teaching them, and fails to act as he should in accordance with the advice he is giving them, he should be made to move [?] from his position and another should be appointed to it in his stead. It must be resolved not to trust a disloyal

[7] From p. 55 l.8 Cheihko.

or a lying person, and not to accept from him an excuse for deliberately destroying his soul. If one of the youths listening to the teaching makes an error [113b] or a mistake, his mistake will be forgiven and tolerated two or three times, but if he relapses after the third time, he will be expelled from the community of learners so that he does not corrupt others who desire education.

[*PART TWO*]

7. You brothers who love knowledge! Hear and heed my advice, for I am [p. 274 B.] like you, since I love knowledge, and I am writing an easy treatise for you, showing you how to enter into the knowledge of every logical discipline which each lover of learning delights in and enjoys.

8. The first point is that you should be pure with no fault in you before you make a beginning in this knowledge. For you must not place pure things near foul things, nor foul things near pure things. Do not teach people who are not pure, but rather those who are purer and more pious with a purity that is beautiful. Someone with a foul vice should not approach a man free [?] of vice and foulness. One should realize that no amount of sweet, clear, and clean water can be poured in to equal a well[8] of stinking mud, nor can sore eyes bear the burning rays of the sun. Similarly, one cannot educate a soul in a body where ignorance and greed are concealed. There is nothing more disgusting to an intelligent man than someone who characterizes himself as belonging to the people of intelligence, and who tells them to do the same, even though he is devoid of it, lacks education, and is a confirmed sinner. The definition of wisdom is 'likeness to God' – the Almighty, the teacher of wisdom, the guide of beautiful and virtuous actions, to which He gives success. Be on your guard against jealousy which causes division and disunity. Behave modestly towards one another. Be equal partners in perfect amity. Submit yourself to God and to men of understanding and perfection who deserve to be leaders by virtue of their actions, self-restraint, and contentedness. Place no reliance in those who glory in the fathers who sired

[8] Rosenthal 394 'well', i.e. جُبّ; MSS (incl. Marsh) have حب, which Badawi interprets as جرة ضخمة, 'large vessel'. The word for 'mud' (*ḥam'a*) is properly used of 'black, fetid mud in a well' (Lane 1863–93: II 638). Rosenthal aptly cites the letter of Lysis to Hipparchus included by Iamblichus at *On the Pythagorean Life* 77. Thesleff 1965: 112–13 prints the independently transmitted version: ἐγκίρναντι γὰρ ἤθεσι τεταραγμένοις τε καὶ θολεροῖς θεωρήματα καὶ λόγως ἐλευθέρως [Iambl.: θείως], καθάπερ γὰρ εἴ τις εἰς φρέαρ βαθὺ βορβόρω πλῆρες ἐγχέοι καθαρὸν καὶ διειδὲς ὕδωρ· τόν τε γὰρ βόρβορον ἐτάραξε καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐπαφάνιξεν.

them but who failed to provide them with an education for the mind or a sense of commitment to their duties. They keep mentioning their paternal inheritance in front of the (other) pupils, though [114a] they are not worthy of receiving it. These men are a party of darkness, enemies of wisdom, demons' snares: escaping them and avoiding them is the most important thing.

9. [p. 275 B.] Let every one of you consider his friend to be like himself and a store for his secrets. Let every one of you keep a friend so that one of you becomes the guardian of the other's secrets. Be attentive, obedient, perfect, desirous in your search for truth and wisdom, making the effort, struggling for truth, loving sincerity, arguing for knowledge, knowing the right and the wrong occasion, showing ire to wranglers, determined to establish order, tranquillity, calm, and peace, speaking of good people, having in their eyes and hearts the look of modest and not self-important people, scorning contempt for the gods, learning a lasting lesson about voluntary death,[9] reflecting on spiritual concerns, loving doctrine which leads one to everlasting life, loving the virtues, adhering to all fair things.

10. Do not support the burden of arrogance. Do not exceed your abilities. Do not be puffed up with vainglory. Do not magnify yourselves by boasting. Do not assume the characters of tyrants. Distance yourselves from not knowing, and understand what you practise. Do not be emboldened to overstep your limits. Do not dispute over something where there is no hard truth. Do not argue on the basis of lies. Do not speak by talking nonsense. Be wary of base desires and accustom yourselves not to be inclined to them. Keep reading cultured books. Do not walk quickly. Master the art of listening to men of wisdom. Dread your fathers. Honour your mothers. Love not slumber [114b] and idleness. Distinguish between good and evil. Know profit from loss. If you are not asked, do not answer. Steer clear of quarrels. Make use of light nourishment. Avoid greediness for food. Do not drink too much wine. Let there be a fixed time for eating.[10] Use honey for your spread when you are able to.

[9] Rosenthal 388 'permanent preaching of the voluntary death'; this seems to recall a saying attributed to Plato in Islamic philosophical circles, in which a 'voluntary death' meant killing the appetites. See Wakelnig (2013) on Bodleian Library, MS Marsh 539, fol. 52b6–12.

[10] Rosenthal 394 n. 3 suggests redotting *ghidhā'* to read 'breakfast' (*ghadā'*) because 'honey is mentioned in this context and honey . . . was often used for breakfast by the Pythagoreans', citing Iamblichus, *On the Pythagorean Life* 97. This is possible (cf. Bryson translation §123 n.320), but ἄριστον there means 'lunch' (as it always does except in epic). Muslim educational treatises also recommended honey as an aid for remembering: Grunebaum and Abel 1947: 68.

11. Make frequent [p. 276 B.] remembrance of God's blessings and of his beneficence, singly and jointly. Do not raise your voices before someone older than you, and do not contradict what they have said. Do not let your tongues use rude words in their presence. Do not prefer the pleasure of eating to the pleasure of knowledge. Do not yearn to drink wine, which will turn you into madmen. Do not occupy yourselves mentioning the misdeeds of others. Do not deem yourselves wise, for it has to be someone else who attests to your wisdom. When your views are right and your argument wins the day, do not be too admiring of yourselves. Do not boast of your role in a victory over your opponents. Prefer solitude, tranquillity, and quiet, and do not seek leadership. Should someone honour you, make sure you yourselves are humble. If they give you a particular task, do it well. Suppress your rage and do not be quick to anger. Respect yourselves and you will win great respect thereby. Do not carry out anything when you are discontented.

12. Test friends before you make friends of them, and do not make friends of them before testing them. Do not stand in the markets. If it is proper for you not to walk in them, make sure you do not. For markets are the middens of towns, and a man will find nothing clean or good or pure on middens. Pay no attention to what ordinary people say, especially the market folk, for they are riffraff and scum. They have no attainment [?] [115a] and no opinion and <are> no real help. Do not inform anyone of your secrets. Address leaders with humility and politeness. Bow to each of them. Get to know only a few people because you will rarely be harmed by someone unless he knows you: someone who does not know you will hardly ever harm you. Do not covet what you do not own. [p. 277 B.] The accidentals of this world which are magnified in most people's eyes should certainly not be magnified in yours. If you rebuke a man whose business concerns you in some matter, make sure you scold him for it right away. Don't be two-faced or forked-tongued. Don't let your friendship be fickle and changeable like the changing moonlight, but be like the sun whose light is permanent and does not wax or wane. Do not follow people's wishes in your judgments, but be judges who show no partiality to anyone. Do not slander any who is absent. Do not swear an oath merely to please people. Do not spend time among sovereigns, if they are tyrannical and oppressive. Beware of pastimes that are dishonourable for you and of games that trick your minds. Do not persist in laughing. Do not be inclined to deceits which take in the eye and speak falsehood and which sow confusion in yourselves. Do not keep the company of those who present base desires in a favourable light, who mislead you with tricks and use them to introduce bad desires and corrupt views that make it easy for you to be exposed to snakes and

vipers, to poisons, medicaments, and fatal drugs, men who produce extraordinary things that lack permanence. Stay away from sorcery and the pursuit of magic and spells and from words which cause cackling. Beware of the enemy who shows you friendship, and of a brother whose words contain no truth, whose pledge no validity, and in whose words there is nothing sound.

13. Areas to which young men must give their attention concern [115b] the means needed for organizing wars, marshalling ranks, learning swordplay, shooting, wrestling, commissioning [?], escaping without misjudging the situation or getting bogged down in it. Train yourselves in riding horses and galloping them, and in the employment of weapons. They must also study music, since this is one of the four mathematical subjects,[11] until they have mastered harmonies, composition of tunes, and the types of music which are designed [p. 278 B.] for the lute, the mandolin,[12] and other instruments, the best of which is the organ which has eighty strings[13] and is arranged in accordance with the four natures.

14. You should know that, if you are recognized for this wisdom, hold to it, and are guided towards it, then you will be like the light shining on creation. Be sure to give thanks to God the Ruler of the Universe, the Eternal, the Upholder of truth and fairness. Whoever follows these precepts should assume the responsibility of supervising those undergoing correction and training. To all who err shall come punishment, sooner or later. Punishment in the immediate case should be early so that people are not corrupted and one group does not destroy another through the force, victory, and varieties of evil. And whoever does not resist or take note of what is forbidden him shall be cast out and not welcomed in the community of learners, and he shall not be allowed to drink the water of life. Whoever assumes the management of young men must be like a brilliant mirror since he stands in the position of leader. Whoever is negligent concerning these precepts shall be banned and excluded from this excellent education.

The end of *Plato's Exhortations Concerning the Education of Young Men*.[14] Praise be to God.

[11] Literally 'the four subjects of instruction', i.e. the propaedeutic subjects arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music.

[12] المعزفة; Rosenthal (1941) 389 prints '*mi'falah*', a term which does not appear to exist.

[13] See *Enc. Isl.*, 2nd edn, vol. X (2000) 893–4 *s.v. urghan*. The *urghan*, as here, is 'a stringed instrument', while the *urghanūn* (cf. Marsh *urghanun*) is 'an artificially wind-blown instrument'.

[14] *waṣāyā Aflāṭun fī ta'dīb al-aḥdāth*.

APPENDIX II LETTER OF THEANO TO EUBOULE

The text used is that of Städele, cf. above, p. 380.

(1) I hear that you are pampering your children (*paidia*). A good mother's care for her children is not about giving them pleasure, but bringing them up to be self-controlled. Please see that you are not playing the part of a mother who loves her children, but who panders to them. Pleasure which is part of the children's upbringing makes them uncontrollable. For what is nicer for young men than pleasure they are used to? Children's upbringing, my dear, must not contain any perversion (of what is right).[1] An upbringing is a perversion of Nature when they come to like pleasure in their minds and enjoy it with their bodies, shy of work in the one and soft in the other.

(2) Children being brought up must be trained to cope with things they dread, even if this means upset or suffering, so that they do not become slaves of their passions, avid for pleasures and opposed to hard work, but honour the Good above all things, keeping themselves away from the former while remaining true to the latter. Do not make them gluttonous about their food, extravagant in their pleasures, uncontrolled in heedless playing, and do not allow them to say everything or do everything. You certainly should not mind if they cry, nor be keen to see them laugh, nor laugh yourself if they hit the nanny and swear at you; nor should you provide cool in summer, nor heat and a lot of luxuries in winter. Poor children never get to have any of these things, but they are easier to bring up, grow no worse, and end up altogether stronger.

(3) You look after your children as if they were Sardanapalus' brood and you are corrupting boys' nature through pleasures. What will you do with a child that cries if it doesn't get its food quick enough, picks out the tasty bits when it eats, is lethargic when the weather is hot, (. . .) when it's cold, that throws itself on the ground (. . .), that protests if it is criticized, that sulks if no one attends to its pleasures, that is unhappy if it has nothing in its mouth, that plays horrid tricks for pleasure, and wanders about acting all precious?[2]

[1] διαστροφή, a Stoic technical term: Diogenes Laertius 7.110, *SVF* 229a, etc.

[2] βαταλίζεται. This very rare verb is formed on the word βάταλος, 'arsehole' (LSJ) and may perhaps mean 'arsing around', 'buggering around'. The active is used in the Hippiatrica of a horse 'wiggling its haunches'. But the sense in Theano is of spoiled, attention-seeking behaviour.

(4) You know perfectly well, my dear, that spoilt children turn into slaves when they grow up to be men. Take away such pleasures, make their upbringing austere, not pampered, and let them put up with hunger and thirst, and also cold and heat, and feeling shame before their peers or those in charge. For the noble side of their character comes out when they are encouraged or rebuked. Hard work, my dear, acts on children as a mordant[3] which prepares them for finishing their virtue: if they are dyed in it enough, they will retain the colour of virtue more naturally. Please ensure, dear, that, just as badly tended vines give a poor crop, so children exposed to luxury do not bring forth the vices of outrageousness and general uselessness.

[3] προϋποστυφαί. Not found elsewhere. For the image cf. Iamblichus, *On the Pythagorean Life* 76, Plato, *Republic* 429d–e.

PART V

Texts and translations of Bryson

Annotated Arabic text and English translation

1 PRINCIPLES OF THE EDITION

The text below is based on the Taymūr manuscript. I have already set out reasons for the stability of the recension which it represents in Chapter 2.

Text Given the priority of the Taymūr, a 'diplomatic' edition, in which the manuscript is transcribed as it stands, will seem correct to some. This would show the form of the text at the time of copying; but in reality it would be unduly confusing and unhelpful to most of those using the text. Alternatively, to put in every *shadda* or *hamzat al-qaṭʿ* as well as e.g. providing complete vocalization for passives and less common or uncommon words, as others might wish, would be to modify the text in a manner that is deceptive. For the choice between e.g. *an* and *in* or *anna* and *inna* is implicit in the translation and the text as presented leaves the reader the possibility of making another reading, if desired.

The text presented below, then, adopts a middle ground between representing the orthography of the manuscript and considering the convenience of the reader. The scribe of the Taymūr used dots unreliably and did not always take care to distinguish the several dotted letters of the Arabic alphabet, though he was in the main careful to distinguish *shīn* and *sīn* by marking the latter. The *tanwīn* is marked to a reasonable extent, but the medial and final *hamza* is most often omitted. The *alif* of the acc. m. sg. is not always employed. The *shadda* is rare. These orthographic inconsistencies and omissions are common in medieval copies and they have been corrected silently to bring the text into a form more familiar to modern readers. Thus dots have been placed over the *tāʾ marbūṭa*, dots have been removed from the *alif maqṣūra* which the scribe generally writes ى, and the *hamza* has been added where needed finally or medially. In general only changes affecting the *rasm* of a word have been reported.

Notes In the notes quotations from the Taymūr or the Azhar give the text as found. Quotations from printed editions generally follow the edition of the respective editor. Since Bryson will be read by readers of two quite different languages or no languages, the notes in the English match those to the text in order to provide the non-Arabic reader with the information available to the reader with Arabic (together with a very few interpretative comments) and to permit navigation between the two. In this respect I follow Robert Hoyland's edition of Polemon's *Physiognomy* (Swain 2007a). Classicist and Arabist readers have differing traditions of text-editing and text-annotation as well as a differing pool of background knowledge. The conventions and vocabulary of the classical editor (as encapsulated in English by M. L. West's *Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique Applicable to Greek and Latin Texts*, 1973) cannot be assumed to be familiar to the Arabist (especially one not trained in Europe or in the last decade when virtually no knowledge of classics is to be expected). Arabic editing in fact takes varying forms. The classicist's *apparatus criticus* and *Similienapparat* are one option. A recent Warwick project, Wakelnig's edition of the 'Oxford Anthology' (Wakelnig 2013), is a good example of it. Here the need to incorporate lengthy parallel texts necessitated a substantial *Similienapparat*. Gutas (2010) makes full use of the classicist's techniques in editing a Greek text and its Arabic and Latin translations using a good number of manuscripts and his excursus on the 'Principles of Graeco-Arabic Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique' will set standards for this kind of work. But these standards are not appropriate or useful for every task within (Greco-)Arabic studies (cf. de Callataÿ and Halflants 2011: 72–4). Notes instead of an *apparatus criticus* are usual in Middle Eastern editions and many done by Westerners (e.g. again de Callataÿ and Halflants 2011), even where a classicist is a joint author (e.g. Bielawski and Plezia 1970). Arabic sigla are also used commonly in such editions. Indeed one could argue that the use of Latin in the footnotes or *apparatus* of an Arabic text makes little sense. Here in the notes to the Arabic below manuscripts or equivalents are designated by English letters, names of medieval authors are spelt in full, and names of modern authors are abbreviated as set out below.

Numeration Within the text page numbers in round brackets (e.g. p. 62) refer to the pages of the Taymūr. Numbers in square brackets [e.g. 100b] indicate the approximate corresponding foliation of the Azhar. Plessner's paragraphs 1–162 have been retained in round brackets in text and translation for convenience.

2 EXTANT MANUSCRIPTS

(a) T. Cairo, Dār al-kutub al-Miṣriyya, *Akhlāq* no. 290 Taymūr, pp. 62–96; fourteenth century AD.

Edited by L. Cheikho, *al-Machriq* 19 (1921) 161–81; title given on p. 962 as "كتاب تدبير المنزل لنرسيس (؟)" (cf. Cheikho 1925: 111: كتاب نرسيس (؟)); repr. in cheikho (1920–3) 13–14 (preface [Arabic]), 14–33 (text).

Edited from Cheikho by Plessner (1928).

Description of manuscript: Cheikho (1899), Ṣafā (1913) 173–7 (cf. Chapter 1, p. 69), Kraus (1937) 3–8.

The Dār al-kutub al-Miṣriyya holds a modern copy of the Bryson and other works contained in manuscript no. 290 Taymūr done in 1942; the Bryson is no. 2826 و (كتاب برسيس في تدبير الرجل لمنزله). It has no independent value.

(b) A. Cairo, al-Azhar, maj.1182, fos. 100a–114a; twelfth/thirteenth century AD. Cf. Sezgin (1971) 91.

3 LOST MANUSCRIPTS:

(c) Y. Edited Yāzijī (1899–1900) ; cf. Yāzijī, *al-Ḍiyāʾ* 1 (1898–99) 660–1. Title: كتاب بروسس في تدبير الرجل لمنزله. Date unknown (*al-Ḍiyāʾ* 1: 661 'a copy of an ancient treatise', 2: 199 'from an ancient book which came into our possession some years ago'). For Maʿlūf's and Cheikho's dispute over the age of the manuscript used by Yāzijī, see Chapter 1, p. 70.

(d) Copy of Taymūr, *Akhlāq* 290 held in the Bibliothèque orientale, Université Saint-Joseph, Beirut: Cheikho (1925) 111 no. 344 'papier ordinaire moderne . . . copie récente, fin du XIXe siècle'. This is marked as 'disparu' in the Université Saint-Joseph copy of Cheikho's catalogue which is available in digitized form at the 'Vivarium' site of Saint John's University and the College of Saint Benedict (Hill Museum and Manuscript Library) http://cdm.csbsju.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/HMMLCollect&CISOPTR=7774&REC=4; the image can be found at CAT1C109.

4 SIGLA

Manuscripts

T = Taymūr
T^1 = Taymūr margin
T^2 = Taymūr above line
A = Azhar
A^1 = Azhar margin
A^2 = Azhar above line
Y = lost manuscript used by Yāzijī (1899–1900)

Modern authors:

بر = Bergsträsser (in Plessner 1928 *app. crit.*)
بو = Bouyges (1924), or (1931) if specified
برو = Brockelmann (in Plessner 1928 *app. crit.*)
ش = Cheikho (1920–3)
بل = Plessner (1928)
را = Rapoport (pers. comm.)
سو = Swain
زو = Zonta (1995)
ز = Zurayk (1966)

ص = page
س = line
ح = note
ب = chapter
م = section
فقرة = paragraph

< . . . > inserted material absent from the Taymūr manuscript
{ . . . } material in the Taymūr which is to be omitted
[--] letter(s) lost in the Taymūr owing to damage to the paper

Medieval and ancient authors

ابن ابي الربيع = (Aḥmad b. Muḥammad) Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ, *Sulūk al-mālik fī tadbīr al-mamālik* (ed. al-Takrītī 1978)
ابن الجزار = Ibn al-Jazzār, *Kitāb siyāsat al-ṣibyān wa-tadbīrihim* (ed. al-Ḥabīb al-Hayla 1984)

اخوان الصفاء = [Brethren of Purity,] *Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ wa-Khullān al-Wafāʾ* (ed. al-Ziriklī 1928)
ثامستيوس = Themistius, *Epistula De re publica gerenda* [*Risālat Thāmistīyūs*] (ed. Shahid 1974). Paragraph numbers are given in accordance with the English translation in Swain (2013)
الدمشقي = (Jaʿfar ibn ʿAlī) al-Dimashqī, *al-Ishāra ilā maḥāsin al-tijāra* (ed. al-Shūrbajī 1977)
مسكويه = Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb al-akhlāq* (ed. Zurayk 1966)
قدامة = Qudāma ibn Jaʿfar, *al-Siyāsa min kitāb al-kharāj wa-ṣināʿat al-kitāba* (ed. al-Ḥiyārī 1981)

5 ABBREVIATIONS TO TRANSLATION

T: Taymūr manuscript
T^1: Taymūr margin
T^2: Taymūr above line
A: Azhar manuscript
A^1: Azhar margin
A^2: Azhar above line
Y: Yāzijī (1899–1900)

Berg.: Bergsträsser (in Plessner 1928 *app. crit.*)
Bouyges: (1924), or (1931) if specified
Brock.: Brockelmann (in Plessner 1928 *app. crit.*)
Ch.: Cheikho (1920–3)
Pl.: Plessner (1928)
Rap.: Rapoport (pers. comm.)
Sw.: Swain
Z.: Zonta (1995)
Zurayk: Zurayk(1968)

For editions of Arabic authors, see above. In addition, note that 'Ritter trans.' refers to the partial German version of al-Dimashqī in Ritter (1917).

(. . .) additions in Bryson translation to help sense of English
[. . .] transliterated Arabic words or other explanatory material
< . . . > inserted material absent from the Taymūr manuscript
{ . . . } material in the Taymūr which is to be omitted
[--] letter(s) lost in the Taymūr owing to damage to the paper

(p. 62) [100b]
بِسم ٱللَّهِ ٱلرَّحمنِ ٱلرَّحيم وهو عوني
كتاب بروسن[1] في تدبير الرجل لمنزله

(1) قال ان امر المنزل يتمّ بارِبع خصال اولها المال والثاني الخدم والثالث المرأة والرابع الولد.
(2) اما المال[2] فلأن الخالق تبارك وتعالى وان كان جعل في الانسان القوى التي يحتاج اليها لقوام بدنه وصلاح امره[3] فانه قد جعله مع ذلك منتقصًا[4] مستحيلًا منقضيًا[5] ولذلك صار الانسان محتاجًا الى ان يستمدّ ويستردّ مكان ما يتحلّل منه،(3) اعني بقولي القوى[6] القوة التي ينتزع[7] بها كل واحد من اعضائه ما يشاكله من الغذاء بالمقدار[8] الذي يحتاج اليه، والقوة التي تحيل ذلك الغذاء وتقلبه حتى يصير شبيهًا بالعضو[9] الذي يغتذي منه فإن كان المغتذي به لحمًا صار لحمًا وإن كان عظمًا صار عظمًا وإن كان عصبًا صار عصبًا، (4) والقوة التي تحفظ على العضو ما اجتُذب اليه ما دام سيّالًا حتى يجمد و يتّصل به، والقوة التي تنفي عن كل واحد من الاعضاء ما يبقى من ذلك الغذاء من الفضل مما يبعد من طبعه فلا يقوى على قلبه واحالته الى طبيعته (p. 63) والقوة التي تنميه وتمدّده[10] حتى يزيد في طوله وعرضه وعمقه على مقادير اجزائه.
(5) [101a] فاقول انه وإن كان قد جُعل[11] في الانسان هذه القوى كلها وقوى اخرى كثيرة معها

1 في T: برَسين (؟)؛ ش: برسيس؛ Y: بروسس؛ راجع فقرة ١٦٢ (برونس ؟). A: برونس، A^2 بروشن.
2 مثلًا: τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τὰ χρῆματα, πλοῦτος
3 قارن ثامستيوس فقرة ١ (ص ٨٢، س ١-٢) :ان الله تبارك تعالى خلق الانسان. . .وجعل فيه قوى ثلثًا.
4 كاذا، قارن ابن ابي الربيع في ح ٢١؛ A وY وش: منتقضًا
5 A؛ لعله في T؛ قارن Y: متقضيًا؛ ش وبل: متقضبًا.
6 ش: <اى>
7 كذا في T؛ في ش: ينزع.
8 T^1؛ قارن A.
9 A وY (وش)؛ وفي T: بالعظو.
10 زيادة A: في الثلثة الاقطار؛ يراجع العبري.
11 A: كان قد جعلت؛ ش:وان كان قد جعل [الله].

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate, Who Is My Aid:

The Book of Bryson,[1] *On the Man's Management of his Estate*
(1) He says that the business of the estate comprises four aspects: first, property; second, servants; third, the woman; and fourth, the child.

(2) *PROPERTY* [2]

The Creator – He is Blessed and Sublime! – placed in man the faculties he needs for the sustenance of his body and his well-being.[3] At the same time He made him wanting,[4] mutable, and ceasing;[5] and because of this man stood in need of replacing and restoring what was dissolved from him. (3) I mean by the term 'faculties'[6] (i) the faculty which each one of his body parts uses to derive[7] from food what is similar to it, in the quantity[8] in which it needs it; (ii) the faculty which changes and converts the foodstuff so that it becomes similar to the body part[9] that is to be nourished by it: thus if what is to be nourished by it is flesh, it becomes flesh, if it is bone, it becomes bone, and if it is nerve, it becomes nerve; (4) (iii) the faculty which retains in the body part what has been attracted to (the body part) while it remains fluid and until it becomes solid and is joined to (the body part); (iv) the faculty which expels from each one of the body parts the residue which remains from this nourishment as waste; this is material unrelated to the nature (of the body part) and (the body part) has no power to convert or transform it into its nature; (v) the faculty which causes (his body) to grow and develop[10] until it increases in height, breadth, and volume in correspondence with its parts.

(5) If all of these faculties were placed in man,[11] and many others along with them which he uses for the management of his body, I say that there are

[1] T: *Burasīn*; the 'a' is marked with a vowel sign; since the 'b' is not dotted, Ch., following Ṣafā (1913: 173), and reading with him a final 's', was able to suggest names based on alternatives Br-sīs/Tr-sīs/Thr-sīs/Nr-sīs, preferring the last which he proposed to take as 'Nerses, Narcissus, Neresius'. Cf. *ad* §162. A gives *Burūnus*, A[2]*Burūshun*.

[2] *māl* = τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τὰ χρῆματα, i.e. 'property'; but 'wealth' has been used more frequently in the translation, as has 'funds' (§36) and 'money' (§§36, 38, 121, 122, 138, 139). For the pl. *amwāl* I have used 'wealth' (§§23, 36).

[3] Cf. Themistius 1 (p. 82.1–2): God – He is Blessed and Sublime – created man . . . and placed in him three faculties.

[4] Cf. Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ in n. 21; A, Y, and Ch.: 'corrupted'.

[5] A, probably T, and Y with a variant form; Pl. and Ch.: defective. The words are very similar in form.

[6] Ch. adds 'i.e.'

[7] In Ch.: 'extract'.

[8] in the quantity] T[1]; cf. A.

[9] to the body part] reading of Ch., A, and Y.

[10] A adds: in its three dimensions; cf. Hebr.: in its three sides.

[11] In Ch.: God placed in man.

بها يكون تدبير بدنه فانه قد جُعل فيه شيآن[12] بهما قوامه واحدهما يفني الآخر ويحلّله (6) وذلك ان قوامه بالحرارة والرطوبة ومن شأن الحرارة ان تحلّل الرطوبة وتفنيها فلذلك لا يمكن ان يقف على حال واحدة لكنه[13] يتحلّل تحلّلًا[14] دائمًا متصلًا ولذلك يحتاج الى ان يستمدّ مكان ما يتحلّل منه <بالحركة>[15] واستمداده[16] هو الغذاء[17] الذي يغذيه[18]،(7) ولو كان البدن مع هذا من جنس واحد لكان الذي يحتاج اليه انما هو نوع واحد من الغذاء، لكنه لما كانت اجزاؤه مختلفةً احتاج لذلك الى اغذية مختلفة[19] الانواع والطعوم وجميعها من النبات والحيوان لان غذاء كل شيء من اقرب الاشياء اليه وليس شيء اقرب الى طبيعة بدن الانسان من الحيوان والنبات.

(8) والنبات والحيوان محتاجان الى انواع من الصناعات حتى يكونا ثم حتى يتمّا[20] بعد كونهما.[21] اما[22] النبات فيحتاج الى ان يُزرع او يغرس[23] ثم يسقى ويربّى الى غير ذلك مما فيه تمام الانتفاع

12 تصحيح بر؛ T: شيين (= شيئين).

13 كذا في T وA؛ وفي ش وY: ولكنه.

14 T^2. A: ينحلّ (A^2: يتحلّل).

15 في فقرات ٥-٦ قارن قدامة ص ٣٥، س ٣-٥: (اللّٰه) وجعل العمدة. . .الحرارة والرطوبة. . .ومن شأن الحرارة تحليل الرطوبة وافناؤها وفشّها وابطالها، لم يكن بد له، اذ كان مركّبًا مما يُفني بعضه بعضًا وينقصه دائمًا متصلًا، من اخلاف مكان ما يبطل منه مثله. <بالحركة>: انظر ح ٢١.

16 اهمله ش.

17 في T: العدي؛ تصحيح ش؛ بل: الغذى.

18 ش وY؛ في T: الدي يعيديه.

19 ش؛ في T: مخلتفه.

20 Y وA وبل (مراجع الدمشقي)؛ في T: ينميا.

21 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٢، س ٨-١٠: لما كان الانسان منتقصًا دائم التحلّل، احتاج الى ان يستمدّ من الغذاء مكان ما يتحلّل منه بالحركة [قارن ثامستيوس فقرة ٦، ص ٨٦، س ٧: يتحلّل دائمًا بالحركة]. ولما افتقر الى الاغذية وجد اعدلها وارفقها له الحيوان والنبات، وكلاهما يحتاج الى مراعاة.

22 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٢، س ١٢: واما النبات فيحتاج الى ان يزرع ويغرس ويسقى ويربى الى غير ذلك.

23 Y: يعرّش؛ لكن A: الى من. . .يغرسه.

two things[12] in him upon which his subsistence depends; but one of them causes the destruction and dissipation of the other. (6) For (man) subsists by heat and moisture, and it is in the nature of heat to dissipate and destroy moisture. For this reason it is impossible for him to remain in a single state. Rather,[13] he undergoes continuous and permanent dissolution[14]. On account of this he needs to replace what is dissolved from him <by movement>,[15] and the replacement[16] is the foodstuff[17] which nourishes[18] him. (7) If, in this situation, the body were homogeneous, its need would be for one type of nourishment. But since its constituents are different, it accordingly needs foods of different[19] types and flavours. All (foodstuffs) come from plants or animals because food for each thing comes from what is closest to it, and there is nothing closer to the nature of man's body than animals and plants.

(8) Plants and animals need various types of crafts in order to come into existence and reach completion[20] after they have come to exist.[21] Plants[22] need sowing or planting,[23] then watering and cultivating, and so on, to

[12] Pl. correction.

[13] In Ch. and Y: But rather.

[14] T². A: disintegrates (but the words, which are closely related in Arabic, are frequently switched in manuscripts – quite apart from A's tendency to rewrite; NB A²: dissolves).

[15] For §§5–6 cf. Qudāma p. 35.3–5: (God) made the basis (of his existence) . . . heat and moisture . . . It is in the nature of heat to dissipate, destroy, remove, and nullify moisture, and since (man) is compounded of what destroys part of him and makes him in continuous and permanent want, he has to put back in place of what is nullified something similar to it.
For <movement> see n. 21.

[16] and the replacement] Ch. omits.

[17] foodstuff] correction in Ch.

[18] nourishes] correction in Ch. and Y.

[19] different] correction in Ch.

[20] reach completion] in Y, A, and Pl. (cf. Dimashqī); in T: grow.

[21] The word 'crafts' translates *ṣināʿāt* (sg. *ṣināʿa*); it may also be rendered 'occupation', 'trade', etc., and more generally 'art' or 'skill' (Latin *ars*). In what follows the translation 'craft(s)' has been used throughout. On the difficulty of finding the right term, cf. Ritter 1917: 47 n. 4. For §§1–8 cf. Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 112.8–10: since man is wanting and subject to permanent dissolution, he needs to replace from food what is dissolved from him by movement. Since he required foodstuffs, he found the most balanced and convenient for him were the animals and plants, but both of them needed taking care of. For 'dissolved . . . movement' cf. Themistius 6 (p. 86.7), 'undergoes permanent dissolution owing to movement': the two passages make it highly likely that Bryson's text originally contained the word 'movement' (cf. above n. 15); *kinēsis* is a key term in Galen's conception of the workings of the 'faculties' and generally of bodily processes. See Chapter 3, p. 181.

[22] Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 112.12: as to plants, they need sowing, planting, watering, and cultivating, and so on.

[23] In Y: trellising. A confirms T.

به،[24] (9) واما[25] الحيوان فالى ان يغذّى[26] ويحفظ[27] ويكنّ[28] (p. 64) <و>[29]ما اشبه ذلك مما فيه مصلحة.[30] (10) ويحتاج ايضًا لجمع الغذاء واعداده[31] وتهيئة ما يكون به الانسان والحيوان الى صناعات اخر كثيرة مختلفة،[32] والانسان وان كان قد جُعلت فيه قوة الاستنباط لكل صناعة وقوة التعلّم لها فليس[33] يمكن الواحد من الناس لقصر عمره ان يستنبط ذلك ولا ان يتعلّمه لان له في استنباط صناعة واحدة او تعلّمها [101b] شغلًا عن استنباط سائر الصناعات او تعلّمها،[34] (11) وإن[35] كان فيه احتمال لتعلّم كثير منها فليس فيه احتمال لتعلّمها كلها، والانسان محتاج في تدبيره معاشه[36] الى جميع[37] الصناعات،

(12) والصناعات[38] ايضًا مضمَّن بعضُها ببعض كالبناء الذي يحتاج الى النجّار والنجّار الذي[39]

24 الدمشقي ص ٢٠، س ٥-٨: وكل واحد من هذه الحاجات يحتاج الى انواع من الصناعات حتى تتكوّن ثم حتى تتمّ، كما يفعل في النبات وحاجته ان يُزرع او يغرس ثم ينقى ثم يسقى ويربى ثم يحصد او يلقط ثم يحتاج الى صناعة أخرى يكون تمام الانتفاع به.

25 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٢، س ١١ :واما الحيوان فيحتاج ان يحفظ ويغذى ويكنّ من الحرّ والبرد؛ الدمشقي ص ٢١، س ٩-١٠ :واما الحيوانات التي تحت ايدي الناس فلكونها محصورة فتحتاج الى ما يغذوها ويكسوها ويكرمها وإلا هلكت.

26 Y؛ في T: يعتدي.

27 سو، قارن A: الى من. . .يحفظه، ابن ابي الربيع في ح ٢٥؛ T وY: ويحرّك؛ ش: يتحرّك؛ بل: يحرز.

28 كذا في T وA؛ ش: ويكبر؛ بر: يكنّن.

29 A وY وش.

30 كذا في T (مصلحه)؛ ش وY:مصلحته.

31 T^1.

32 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٢، س ١٣: واحتاج ايضًا لجمع الغذاء واتّخاذه الى صناعات اخر كثيرة. وذلك هو السبب في اتّخاذ المدن والممالك.

33 الدمشقي ص ٢٠، س ١٤: ولم يمكن الواحد من الناس لقصر عمره أن. . .؛ قارن الفكرة في اخوان الصفاء ص ٦٢: ولا يمكن الانسان الواحد ان يبلغها كلها لان العمر قصير والصنائع كثيرة؛ وفي ثامستيوس فقرة ١١، ص ٩٠، س ١-٥: وكذلك احتاج الى الصنائع والعلوم التي بها يعمل هذه الاشياء. ولان الانسان الواحد ليس يمكن ان يعمل (؟يعلم) الصنائع كلها احتاج بعض الناس الى بعض. . .فاتّخذوا المدن. . .

34 قدامة ص ٤٣، س ٦-٧: لأن احدى الصناعتين يشغله الاخذ فيها عن التشاغل بغيرها.

35 الدمشقي ص ٢٠، س ١٥: وان كان فيه احتمال لتعلّم كثير منهم فليس. . .

36 راجع قدامة ص ٤٥، س ١ (انظر ح ٤٣).

37 اهمله ش.

38 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٢، س ١٥-١٨: فان النجّار يحتاج الى الحدّاد، والحدّاد يضطرّ الى صناعة اصحاب المعادن، وتلك الصناعة تحتاج الى البناء. وكل واحدة من هذه الصناعات، وإن كانت تامّةً في نفسها، فانها تحتاج الى الأخرى كما يحتاج بعض اجزاء السلسلة الى بعض؛ الدمشقي ص ٢١، س ١-٣: ولأن الصناعات مضمومة بعضها إلى بعض كالبناء يحتاج إلى النجّار والنجّار يحتاج إلى الحدّاد وصناع الحديد يحتاج إلى صناعة أصحاب المعادن وتلك الصناعات تحتاج إلى البناء.فقرات ١٢-١٣ = بروسن نبذة ١: انظر ب ٢، م ١(أ).

39 في T: الي الدي؛ ؛ Y: الذي؛ ساقطة من ش.

ensure their usefulness is complete.[24] (9) Animals[25] need feeding,[26] protecting,[27] and sheltering,[28] and[29] similar things which are beneficial (for them).[30] (10) For the collection and preparation[31] of foods and for processing what man and animals subsist on, there is a need of many other different crafts.[32] In man has been placed a faculty for discovering every craft and a faculty for learning it. But owing to the brevity of his life, it is impossible[33] for one person to discover and learn (each of them) because the discovery of one craft and the learning of it will make him too busy to discover the rest of the crafts and learn them.[34] (11) Although he has the potential to learn many of them,[35] he does not have the potential to learn all of them. But for the management of his life[36] a man needs all[37] the crafts.

(12) The crafts,[38] moreover, are connected to each other. For example, the builder who needs the carpenter, the carpenter who[39] needs the craft of the

[24] Cf. Dimashqī p. 20.5–8 (cf. p. 47 trans. Ritter): each one of these needs requires various crafts to come into existence and reach completion, such as we do with plants and their need for sowing or planting, then thinning, then watering and cultivating, then harvesting or gathering. After this they need another craft to ensure their usefulness is complete.

[25] Cf. Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 112.11, 'animals need protecting and feeding and sheltering from heat and cold', Dimashqī p. 21.9–10 (cf. p. 48 trans. Ritter), 'with animals under man's control their existence is restricted and they need something to feed them, cover them, and give them good treatment, otherwise they will perish'.

[26] feeding] in Y; in T: to feed.

[27] Sw., cf. A and Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ in n. 25. T and Y: setting in motion; Pl. 'guarding'.

[28] So in T and A; in Ch.: 'made bigger'. The correct reading was divined by Berg.

[29] and] addition in A, Ch., Y.

[30] for them] Y; also Ch.

[31] In T[1].

[32] Cf. Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 112.13: for collecting and making foods there is a need of many different crafts. This is the reason for forming cities and kingdoms.

[33] Cf. Dimashqī p. 20.14 (cf. p. 48 trans. Ritter), 'and it is impossible for one person owing to the brevity of his life . . .'; cf. Brethren of Purity, p. 62 'it is impossible for a single man to acquire all of (the crafts) because life is short and the crafts are many'; Themistius 11 (p. 90.1–5), 'on account of this man needed the crafts and the sciences by which he might accomplish these things. But because it was impossible for any one man to undertake all of the crafts, people had a need of other people . . . Thus they formed cities . . .' (reprised in Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 137).

[34] Cf. Qudāma p. 43.6–7: because embarking on one of these two crafts (farming, medicine) makes him too busy to occupy himself with others.

[35] Cf. Dimashqī p. 20.15 (cf. p. 48 trans. Ritter): although he has the potential to learn many of them, he does not . . .

[36] Cf. Qudāma at n. 43.

[37] all] Ch. omits.

[38] Cf. Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 112.15–18, 'the carpenter needs the blacksmith, and the blacksmith is obliged to (use) the craft of the miners, and this craft needs the builder. And each one of these crafts, if it is complete in itself, yet it needs the other, in the way that the parts of a chain need one another'; Dimashqī p. 21.1–3 (cf. p. 48 trans. Ritter), 'and because each of the crafts is linked to another, for example the builder needs the carpenter and the carpenter needs the blacksmith and the craftsmen in iron need the craft of the miners and these crafts need the builder'.
For Bryson fr. 1 see Chapter 2, Section 1 (a).

[39] who] cf. Y; Ch. omits.

يحتاج الى صناعة الحدّادين وصناعة الحدّادين التي[40] تحتاج الى صناعة[41] اصحاب المعادن وتلك الصناعة الى البنّاء،[42] (13) فكل واحدة من الصناعات وإن كانت تامّةً في نفسها تحتاج الى الاخرى كما تحتاج اجزاء السلسلة بعضها الى بعض وإن ارتفعت صناعة واحدة بطل بارتفاعها الباقي من الصناعات، (14) فلما كان كل واحد من الناس يحتاج في تدبيره (p. 65) امره[43] الى انواع مختلفة مما يغتذي[44] به[45] ويستتر[46] به[47] وكان يحتاج لذلك الى جميع الصناعات <و>[48]كان لا يمكن ان يكون الواحد محكمًا لجميع الصناعات[49] صار الناس جميعها محتاجًا بعضهم الى بعض في تدبير معاشهم، ولهذه[50] العلّة احتاج الناس الى اتّخاذ المدن والاجتماع فيها ليعين بعضهم بعضًا بالصناعات.[51]

(15) ولما كان الناس محتاجًا بعضهم الى بعض ولم[52] يك وقت حاجة كل واحد منهم وقت حاجة صاحبه في اكثر الاوقات ولا[53] مقادير [102a] ما يحتاجون اليه متساويةً ولم يكن سهلًا[54] في الامور ان يُعلم ما قيمة[55] كل شيء من كل شيء وما مقدار ثمنه من ثمنه وما مقدار اجرة كل شيء مما يُعمل

40 ساقطة من ش.
41 ساقطة من ش.
42 في T: البِنا؛ بل: البناء.
43 قارن قدامة ص ٤٥، س ١-٢: لما كان كل واحد من الناس محتاجًا في تدبير معاشه ومصلحة امره الى غيره. . .؛ يراجع بروسن فقرة ١١: في تدبيره معاشه.
44 بل: يُغتذى.
45 في T: يغتدي به {من ~~الملبس~~}.
46 بل: يُستتر.
47 ساقطة من Y.
48 ش؛ A: وليس يمكن.
49 قارن قدامة ص ٤١، س ٤ - ص ٤٢، س ١: ولم يكن في وسع انسان واحد استيعاب جميع الصناعات الكثيرة المتفرّقة، الخ.
50 الدمشقي ص ٢١، س ٣-٤ :فاحتاج الناس لهذه العلّة إلى اتّخاذ المدن والاجتماع فيها ليعين بعضهم بعضًا لما لزمتهم الحاجة إلى بعضهم بعضًا.
51 زيادة في الدمشقي ص ٢١، س ٥-٨: وأما باقي الحيوانات فليس بهم حاجة الى بعضهم بعد قوة الشر - اذ كانت مكتسية من ذاتها ملابس طبيعية اما شعر او صوف او وبر او ريش او قشور اصداف واقواتها معرضة لها من حيوانات او نبات ومساكنها كذلك وكل واحد منها ليس بحاجة الى غيره.
52 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٢، س ١٨ - ص ١١٣، س ٢: ولم تكن حاجة كل واحد منهم في وقت حاجة صاحبه في اكثر الاوقات ليعنوا بالمعاوضة. ولم تعلم قيم الاشياء واجرة الصناعات فاحتيج حينئذ الى شيء يُثمّن به جميع الاشياء وتُعرف قيمها. فمتى احتاج الانسان الى شيء ما دفع ثمنه او وزن اجرته من هذا الجوهر النفيس؛ الدمشقي ص ٢١، س ١٢-١٣: فلما كان الناس يحتاج بعضهم الى بعض. . .ولم يكن وقت حاجة كل واحد منهم وقت حاجة الآخر.
53 الدمشقي ص ٢١، س ١٤-١٥: ولا مقادير ما يحتاجون اليه متساويةً ولم يمكن ان يُعلم ما قيمة كل شيء من كل جنس.
54 قارن قدامة ص ٤٥، س ٣: ولم يكن متسهّلًا ان تتّفق اوقات حاجات الجميع.
55 تصحيح T^1.

blacksmiths, the blacksmiths' craft which[40] needs the craft of[41] the miners, and this craft (needs the craft of) the builder.[42] (13) So each one of the crafts, even if complete in itself, needs another, in the way the parts of a chain need each other, and if one of the crafts is removed, the rest of the crafts cease to exist as a result of its removal. (14) And since each man needed for managing the affairs (of his life)[43] a variety of things to feed himself[44] with[45] and to cover himself[46] with,[47] and for this purpose was in need of all the crafts; <and>[48] (since) it was impossible for one man to be expert in all of them,[49] all people needed one another for managing their lives, and for this reason[50] people needed to form cities and live together in them to help each other with the crafts.[51]

(15) People, then, had a need of each other but[52] the occasion of each person's need was usually not the occasion of his associate's need. The amount of what they needed was not equivalent.[53] Nor was it an easy matter[54] for the value [*qīma*][55] of every item to be known in comparison with every (other)

[40] which] Ch. omits.
[41] the craft of] Ch. omits.
[42] the builder] T has 'building' instead; but the *rasm* of *binā'* is written identically to *bannā'*, 'builder', which makes better sense (so also Pl.), and T's indication here of the *kasra* (i-vowel) is no guarantee of anything.
[43] Cf. Qudāma pp. 45.1–2: and since each man needed other (people) for managing his life and ensuring the well-being of his affairs, etc.
Cf. below 'managing their lives' and §11 'for the management of his life'.
[44] Pl.: be fed.
[45] T adds: {from ~~men~~}.
[46] Pl.: be covered.
[47] with] Y omits.
[48] and] Ch. adds. Cf. A.
[49] Cf. Qudāma p. 41.4–42.1: it was not within the ability of one man to comprehend all the many separate crafts, etc.
[50] Dimashqī p. 21.3–4 (cf. p. 48 trans. Ritter): people for this reason needed to form cities and live socially in them to help each other, since need drove them into each other's hands.
[51] Dimashqī p. 21.5–8 (cf. p. 48 trans. Ritter) adds 'as for the rest of the animals, they had no need of one another *ba'da quwwat al-sharr* [see Chapter 2, n. 30], for they were dressed as they were in natural coverings such as hair or wool or fur or feathers or scales or shells, while their food was provided from animals and plants and their dwelling places in the same way, and none had any need of another'. It is likely that most of this stood in the text of Bryson. See Chapter 2, pp. 127–8.
[52] Ibn Abī l-Rabī' pp. 112.18–113.2, 'but the need of each one of them did not usually occur on the occasion of his associate's need so they could attend to an exchange of contracts. The values [*qiyam*] of items were not known nor the recompense for the crafts, and therefore one was then in need of something by which all items could be priced and their values be known. So, whenever a man needed some item, he paid its price [*thaman*] or weighed the recompense for it in this precious substance'; Dimashqī p. 21.12f. (cf. p. 48 trans. Ritter), 'people, then, were in need of each other . . . but the occasion of each person's need was not the occasion of another's need'.
[53] Dimashqī p. 21.14 (cf. p. 48 trans. Ritter): the amount of what they needed was not equivalent, and it was impossible for the value of every item of a class to be known.
[54] Cf. Qudāma p. 45.3: nor was it considered easy for the occasions of everyone's needs to coincide.
[55] value] $\widetilde{T}^1$.

من اجرة كل شيء آخر،[56] (16) احتيج الى شيء يثمَّن[57] به جميع الاشياء وتُعرف[58] به قيمة بعضها من بعض، فمتى احتاج الانسان الى شيء مما يباع او مما[59] يُستعمل دفع قيمة ذلك الشيء من هذا الجوهر الذي جعل[60] ثمنًا للاشياء وحدّه،[61] (17) ولو لم يجعل هذا هكذا لكان الذي عنده نوع من الانواع التي يحتاج اليها صاحبه كالزيت والقمح وما اشبه ذلك وعند صاحبه انواع اخر لا يتّفق اذا احتاج هذا الى ما عند ذاك ان يحتاج ذاك الى ما عند هذا فتقع المبايعة (p. 66) بينهما، (18) ولا يتّفق ايضًا إن وقع الاتّفاق بينهما في حاجة كل واحد منهما الى ما في يد صاحبه أن يقع الاتّفاق بينهما في ان يكون يحتاج هذا مما في يد ذاك الى ما يكون قيمته[62] مقدار[63] ما يحتاج اليه ذاك مما في يد هذا، فيقع الاختلاف اذ ذاك بينهما،[64] فإما ان ينصرف كل واحد منهما عن صاحبه اذا[65] لم يجد عنده تمام حاجته وإما ان يتبايعا (19) ثم يحتاج احدهما ان يطلب تمام حاجته من بائع آخر وكان يحتاج مع هذا الى ان يعلم كم قيمة الجزء من كل واحد من الانواع التي فيها مصالح الناس مثل

56 قارن قدامة ص ٤٥، س ١٣ وما يلي: ان يعرف مقدار كل صنف من غيره، وقدر كل عمل مما سواه.

57 A وبل وبر (يراجع الدمشقي)؛ في T: تمير، Y: يميّز.

58 الدمشقي ص ٢١، س ١٧ وما بعده: ويعرف به قيمة بعضها من بعض، فمتى احتاج الانسان الى شيء مما يباع او يستعمل دفع قيمة ذلك الشيء من ذلك الجوهر الذي جعل ثمنًا لسائر الاشياء. ولو لم يفعل ذلك لكان الذي عنده نوع من الانواع التي يحتاج اليها صاحبه كالزيت والقمح وما اشبهما وعند صاحبه (p. 22) انواع اخر لا يتّفق أن يحتاج هذا الى ما عند ذاك ويحتاج ذاك الى ما عند هذا في وقت واحد فتقع الممانعة بينهما، وإن وقع الاتّفاق بينهما في حاجة كل واحد منهما الى ما عند صاحبه لم يقع بينهما اتّفاق في ان يكون يحتاج هذا مما بيد ذاك الى ما يكون قيمته مقدار ما يحتاج اليه ذلك مما في يد هذا.

59 Y: ما.

60 ش وبل: جُعل.

61 سو، قارن A: الجوهر الدى به تثمن الاشيا وحده؛ Y: وأخذه؛ T: واحَده؛ ؛ برو وبر: واجرةً.

62 Y (والدمشقي) ؛ في T: قيمه.

63 ساقطة من ش.

64 الدمشقي ص ٢٢، س ٧-٨: فيقع الاختلاف بينهما إذ ذاك، فنظرت الاوائل في شيء يثمّن به جميع الاشياء.

65 ش ونل: اذ.

item, nor the level of its price [*thaman*] in comparison with the price (of the other item), nor the level of recompense [*ujra*] for anything put to use compared with the recompense for every other item.[56] (16) There was therefore a need of something one could use to price[57] all items and know[58] the value of one in relation to another. So, whenever a man needed something that was for sale or something[59] for use, he could pay the value [*qīma*] of this item with this substance, which set[60] a price on things and fixed it.[61] (17) Unless it was set like this, there would be a man with one of the products an associate of his needed – oil, wheat, etc. – while the associate had other products; and it would not happen, when the first needed what the second had, that the second needed what the first had, so barter could take place between them. (18) Even if there were to be agreement between them concerning each one's need of what was in the possession of his associate, it would not happen that there would be agreement between them that the first needed something in the possession of the second for a value [*qīma*][62] equal in amount to[63] the second's need of what was in the possession of the first. In this case a disagreement would arise between them,[64] and either each one of them would abandon his associate when[65] he could obtain no satisfaction of his need; (19) or they would barter, but then one of them would look for complete satisfaction of his need from another seller. In addition, one would need to know the amount of value [*qīma*] of the part of each one of the products in which people find benefit, e.g. honey, butter, wheat, and of other, different

[56] Cf. Qudāma p. 45.12f.: to know the level of every type (of product) from another, and the worth [*qadr*] of every job from a different one.

[57] price] A; so Pl. and Berg. (referring to Dimashqī p. 22.7–8; cf. Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ above, n. 52); T and Y: distinguish.

[58] Dimashqī p. 21.17ff. (cf. p. 49 trans. Ritter): and know the value of one in relation to another. So whenever a man needed something that was for sale or something for use, he could pay the value of this item with this substance which set the price for the other items. Unless this was done, there would be a man with one of the products an associate of his needed – oil, wheat, etc. – (p. 22) while his associate had other products; and it would not happen that the first needed what the second had and the second needed what the first had on the same occasion and opposition would arise between them. Even if there were agreement between them concerning each one's need for what his associate had, there would be no agreement between them that the first needed something in the possession of the second for a value equal in amount to the second's need of what was in the possession of the first.

[59] Variant reading in Y.

[60] set] in Ch., Pl.: was set (to give); cf. Z. 'è stata stabilata per determinare il prezzo e il costo delle cose'.

[61] Sw., cf. A 'substance by which he priced things and (?) fixed it'; Y and (?) T: and kept it; Brock. and Berg.: for things and a cost. Although Brock. and Berg. change the *rasm* attested by T, Y, A, they may well be right.

[62] value] better variant in Y, cf. Dimashqī.

[63] equal in amount to] Ch. omits.

[64] Dimashqī p. 22.7–8 (p. 49 trans. Ritter): in this case a disagreement would arise between them. So the Ancients proposed something which they could use to set a price for all items.

[65] Ch. and Pl.: because.

العسل والسمن والقمح وغير ذلك من الانواع الاخر على كثرة الانواع واختلافها[66] في القيمة (20) واذا عُرف ذلك في وقت من الاوقات فقد يحتاج الى ان يُعرف في اوقات اخر كلما تغيّرت حال نوع من تلك الانواع بكثرة الجلب او قلّته وبما يعرض من حاجة الناس اليه واستغنائهم عنه وعن الاستكثار منه[67] عند اختلاف الازمنة وما يستعمل الناس من كل نوع في كل زمان.

وكذلك الصناعات.

(21) فلذلك طبع الناس الذهب والفضّة والنحاس وثمّنوا بذلك جميع الاشياء واصطلحوا عليه لينال به الانسان حاجته في وقت حاجته[68] (22) ويكون من يصير في يده شيء اراد ان يُخلف به ما خرج (p. 67) [102b] من يده ويصرفه[69] الى غير ذلك لم يتعذّر ذلك عليه، فقد صار من حصلت[70] هذه الجواهر التي سمّينا في يده فكأن[71] الانواع التي يحتاج اليها كلها قد حصلت في يده[72] ولذلك احتيج في مصلحة المعاش الى هذه الامور.[73]

(23) فنحن مبيّنون كيف يصلح التدبير في الاموال فنقول ان الناظر في ذلك ينبغي ان ينظر في ثلثة اشياء <اكتساب>[74] المال ثم حفظه ثم انفاقه.

(24) فاما اكتسابه فينبغي ان تُحذر فيه ثلثة اشياء الجور والعار والدناءة.[75] (25) اما الجور[76] فمثل

66 تصحيح T^1.

67 تصحيح T^2.

68 الدمشقي ص ٢٣، س ٢-٣: وجعلوهما (ذهب وفضة) ثمنًا لسائر الاشياء فاصطلحوا على ذلك ليشتري الانسان حاجته في وقت ارادته؛ اخوان الصفاء ص ٦٢: فاما ما اصطلحوا عليه من الكيل والوزن والثمن.

69 ساقطة من ش.

70 ش: حصّل.

71 ش: كأنَّ؛ Y: مكان.

72 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٣، س ٣-٤: انه من صار في يده شيء من هذا الجوهر الذي سمّيناه، فكأن الانواع التي يحتاج اليها كلها قد حصلت في يده؛ الدمشقي ص ٢٣، س ٣-٤: كأن الانواع التي يحتاج اليها حاصلة في يده.

73 قارن تأويل A: واحيتج. . .في مصلحة المعاش الى اثمان.

74 زيادة في Y وش؛ ساقطة من T؛ تحوير A: ان ينظر في ثلثة اشياء في اكتساب المال وفي حفظه وفي نفقته.

75 الجور = ἀδικία، العار = ἴβρις، الدناءة = αἰσχύνη, ταπεινότης (وما اشبه ذلك).

76 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٣، س ٧ وما يلي: ١ - اكتسابه:. . . أ - الجور: ١ - كالبخس في الوزن؛ ٢ - التطفيف في الكيل؛ ٣ - الجحود للحقّ؛ ٤ - المغالطة في الحساب.

products in accordance with the diversity of the products and the difference[66] between them in value [*qīma*]. (20) Even if one knew this on one occasion, one would need to know it on other occasions, whenever the situation of one of these products changed owing to greater or lesser availability on the market, the level of people's need of it, or their lack of need of it, or of excessive amounts of it[67] at different periods, and people's use of each product at any time.

The above holds true also for the crafts.

(21) For this reason, then, people coined gold, silver, and copper and by this means they set prices for all items. They established this convention so that a man could obtain what he needed at the time of his need.[68] (22) So, someone who possessed something and wanted to replace with it something that had gone out of his possession, or to spend it,[69] and so on, would have no difficulty. Whoever has possession[70] of these substances we have named becomes, as it were,[71] one who has possession of all the products he needs.[72] Hence there was a need for these objects to make life good.[73]

(23) We shall now explain the best way to manage wealth, and we say that the student of this must study three topics: <the acquisition of>[74] property, its preservation, and its expenditure.

(24) *Acquisition*

It is necessary to be aware of three failings: wrongdoing, outrage, baseness.[75] (25) Wrongdoing[76] consists, for example, in giving short weight, not filling

[66] and the difference] correction in T[1].

[67] of it] T[2].

[68] Dimashqī p. 23.2–3 (cf. p. 50 trans. Ritter), 'and they made both (gold and silver) (function as) a price for the other items. They thus established this convention so that a man could purchase what he needed on the occasion when he wanted it'; cf. Brethren of Purity, p. 62 'the convention they established regarding measure, weight, and price'.

[69] or to spend it] Ch. omits.

[70] has possession] variant proposed by Ch.

[71] Y: was in the position of.

[72] Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 113.3–4, 'someone who has some of the substances we have named becomes, as it were, one who has possession of all the products he needs'; Dimashqī p. 23. 4 (cf. p. 50 trans. Ritter), 'as it were has possession of the products he needs'.

[73] Note the interpretation of A: there was a need for prices to make life good.

[74] acquisition of] addition in Y and Ch.; cf. the alteration in A: study of three topics, of the acquisition of property, of its preservation, and of its expenditure.

[75] *jawr* (regularly for ἀδικία), *ʿār* (Lane(1863–93): 'a thing that occasions one's being reviled'; but in translations from Greek regularly for ὕβρις), *danāʾa* (ταπεινότης, αἰσχύνη, *vel sim.*).

[76] Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 113.7f.: I. Acquisition: . . . (a) wrongdoing: (1) like giving short weight; (2) not filling the measure; (3) evading the truth; (4) practising deception in the account.

البخس في الوزن والتطفيف[77] في الكيل والمغالطة في الحساب والجحود للحقّ والدعوى بغير حقّ وما اشبه ذلك مما يُجتمع فيه من[78] الآثام الموبقة[79] انه يزيل الاكتساب ويقطع المادّة ويدعو الى الحرمان، (26) وذلك لِما ينتشر فيه من سوء الثناء فيصرف ذلك المعاملين عن صاحبه ويدعو من ابتُلي به منه[80] ان يخبر به غيره حتى ينقطع عنه من عامله ومن لم يعامله حتى انه لو اقلع عن ذلك لم ينتفع باقلاعه للامر الذي شاع له وشُهر به،

(27) واما العار فمثل الشتم[81] والصفع وما اشبه ذلك[82] من الامور التي يحتملها بعض الناس لشيء يناله (p. 68) ممن يفعل ذلك،[83]

(28) واما الدناءة فأن يدع الرجل الصناعة[84] التي كان آباؤه واهل بيته يعالجونها من غير عجز عنها الى صناعة اخسّ منها كالرجل يكون آباؤه واهل بيته اِما قادة جيوش واِما ولاة ثغور فيدع طلب[85] ذلك وهو يقدر عليه ويقتصر على الغناء والزمر وما[86] اشبه ذلك، (29) ولسنا [103a] نقول فيمن كان آباؤه في صناعة خسيسة فاقام عليها انه قد اتى دناءةً من الامر او فعل ما ينبغي ان يُذمّ عليه لكن نقول انه محمود اذ رضي بحظّه ولم يتعدّ طوره، (30) ولو كان[87] واجبًا ان يطلب[88] كل انسان صناعةً فوق الصناعة التي ورّثه ابوه لوجب ان يقصد الناس كلهم الى صناعة واحدة وهي اعلى الصناعات (31) فكان ذلك يُبطل سائر الصناعات وكان تلك الصناعة ايضًا التي يقصدون اليها تبطل لأنها لا تتمّ الا

77 Y وش؛ في T: الطفيف.

78 بل؛ في T: مع؛ لكن A: وما اشبه ذلك فان ذلك مع رداته في جميع الخصال يقطع على المستعمل له باب الاكتساب ويحرمه اياه لسوء الثنا الذي ينتشر له عند من عامله.

79 في T لعلّه: الموثقه؛ ش: الموثقة (كذا)؛ تصحيح بل؛ الصواب عند Y.

80 Y: منهم.

81 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٣، س ١١ وما يلي: ب - العار: ١ - كمثل الشتم والصفع والاهانة؛ ٢ - واحتمال اشباه ذلك طلبًا للكسب.

82 ساقطة من ش.

83 ش؛ في T: دلك {به}.

84 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٣، س ١٣: ج - الدناءة: ١ - بأن يترك صناعة آبائه من غير عجز.

85 T^1.

86 T: اما.

87 في T: تطلب؛ صحّحه بر؛ الصواب في Y: ولو كان واجبًا على كل انسان ان يطلب صناعةً؛ قارن A: ولو كان يجب.

88 بر؛ في T: يطلب الي.

the measure,[77] practising deception in the account, evading the truth, alleging untruth, and similar things which consist of[78] grave[79] offences, put a stop to acquisition, interrupt the flow of exchange, and lead to exclusion. (26) This is because the spread of a bad reputation turns people doing business away from a person of such ill repute and leads anyone who has suffered at his[80] hands to inform others about him. The result is that both those who have traded with him and those who have not stay away from him. Consequently, if he renounces such behaviour, his renunciation brings no advantage because of the matter which is being talked about concerning him and for which he is notorious.

(27) Outrage[81] consists of insulting and slapping and things like that,[82] which some people tolerate to get something from persons who practise such (behaviour).[83]

(28) Baseness[84] is when a man abandons the craft his ancestors and relations have been practising, though he is not unable to do it, for a more dishonourable craft – like the man whose ancestors and relations were generals or governors of provinces but gives up pursuing[85] this (way of life), though he is capable of it, and reduces himself to singing and piping and such like.[86] (29) We are not saying that a man whose ancestors were in a dishonourable craft and remains in it is affected by baseness as a result, or that he is doing something that should attract blame. Rather, we say that he is to be praised because he is content with his lot and does not exceed his limitations. (30) Indeed, if every man were[87] obliged to seek[88] a craft superior to the one his father bequeathed him, the consequence would be for all people to aim at one craft, the highest of the crafts. (31) This would have the result of abolishing the other crafts, and the very craft they aimed at would also disappear

[77] not filling the measure] correction in Ch. and Y.

[78] Pl.; T: along with. A is modified but may confirm T ('and similar things and this, *along with* his badness in all aspects, interrupts, during the deal he is attempting, the matter of the acquisition, and excludes him from it because of the spread of a bad reputation among anyone doing business with him').

[79] grave] probably so in T.; correction in Pl., cf. Y.

[80] Y: their.

[81] Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 113.11f.: (b) outrage: (1) like insulting, slapping, humiliating; (2) the toleration of such things in the pursuit of gain.

[82] that] Ch. omits.

[83] T adds: {on him}.

[84] Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 113.13:(c) baseness: (1) that one leaves the craft of one's ancestors, though not unable.

[85] pursuing] T[1].

[86] such like] T spelling error.

[87] were] correction of Berg.; already in Y (with slight variation). Cf. A: if it were necessary.

[88] Correction of Berg.

بالصناعات الاخر اذ[89] كان الجميع مقرونًا بعضه ببعض كما بيّنّا قبل، فهذا ما ينبغي ان يُنظر فيه من باب الاكتساب.

(32) واما باب الحفظ فيُحتاج فيه الى خمسة اشياء اولها[90] ان لا يكون ما ينفق الانسان اكثر مما يكتسب فانه متى فعل ذلك لم يلبث المال ان يفنى، (33) والثاني[91] (p. 69) ان لا يكون ما ينفق مساويًا لما يكتسب لكن يستفضل ما يكون عُدّةً له[92] لحادث ان حدث او آفة ان نزلت او وضيعة[93] ان كانت وايضًا فان من العدل ان يكون لرأس المال حصّة من النفقة، (34) ويشبه[94] حال من فعل ذلك حال البدن الذي هو في النشوء[95] والنماء ويشبه حال من كانت نفقته مساويةً لكسبه حال من قد انتهى نشوءه[96] وانقطع نموّه، فاما حال من ينفق اكثر مما يكتسب فانها تشبه حال الابدان الهرمة الذي لزمها النقص ودبّ فيها الفناء (35) وذلك ان البدن الذي هو في النشوء[97] والنماء يغتذي باكثر مما يتحلّل منه والبدن الذي قد انتهى منتهاه[98] يغتذي بمقدار التحلّل والبدن الذي قد صار الى الهرم يغتذي باقلّ مما ينحلّ منه فكما ان البدن الذي قد صار الى الهرم[99] قريب من الموت فكذلك المال [103b] الذي يؤخذ منه اكثر مما يزاد فيه سريع الى النفاد.

89 في T: اذا؛ تصحيح ش وY.

90 الدمشقي ص ٨٠، س ٦-٨: حفظ المال يحتاج الى خمسة اشياء: - اولها ألا ينفق أكثر مما يكتسب فانه متى فعل ذلك لم يلبث المال ان يفنى ولا يبقى منه شيء البتّة ([ولا. . .البتّة: انظر ب ٢، م ٣)؛ ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٣، س ١٥-١٦: ٢ - حفظه:. . .أ - احدها: ان لا يكون ما ينفق اكثر مما يكسب.

91 الدمشقي ص ٨٠، س ١٧-١٨: والثاني ألا يكون ما ينفق مساويًا لما يكسب بل يكون دونه ليبقى ما يكون عنده لنائبة لا تزمن او آفة تنزل او وضيعة فيما يعانيه ان كان تاجرًا؛ ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٣ س ١٧: ب - الثاني: ان لا يكون ما ينفق مساويًا لكسبه. . .

92 في T: غدّة له؛ الصواب عند Y وA (شيا يكون عدّة الخ)؛ ش عدّةً؛ بل: عنده.

93 A (الوضيعة) وبل في الحاشية مراجع الدمشقي ص ٨٠، س ١٨؛ في T (وY): ضيقة.

94 يراجع الدمشقي ص ٩٥، س ١٢ وما يلي: فقد شبّه بعض متقدّمينا ما كان حاصله اكثر مما يلزم له باجساد الأحداث التي توجد بالنمو زائدة على ما كان عليه الخ.

95 Y: النشء.

96 Y: نشؤه.

97 Y: النشء.

98 Y: نماؤه.

99 (يغتذي باقلّ مما ينحلّ منه فكما ان البدن الذي قد صار الى الهرم): ساقطة من Y.

because it is only completed by means of the other crafts. For[89] all of them are connected to each other, as we have explained above.

This, then, is what one must consider under the heading of acquisition.

(32) *Preservation*

Five considerations are required here. The first[90] is that what a man expends should not be greater than what he acquires. For when he does this, it is not long before his property is consumed. (33) Second,[91] that what he expends should not equal what he acquires. Rather, he will ensure he has a surplus of possessions[92] against the possibility of an accident, a disaster, or commercial losses.[93] Also, it is right that a portion of his expenditure should go towards his capital. (34) The condition[94] of a man who does this resembles the condition of the body when it is developing[95] and growing. The condition of a man whose expenditure equals his gains resembles the condition of someone whose development[96] is now over and whose growth has stopped. The condition of a man who expends more than he acquires resembles the condition of very old bodies which are constantly in want and are being taken over by decay. (35) For the body that is undergoing development[97] and growth takes in more nourishment than is dissolved from it, while the body that has reached its peak[98] takes in as much nourishment as is dissolved, and the body which has now reached decrepitude takes in less nourishment than is dissipated from it. Just as the body which has reached decrepitude[99] is close to

[89] For] correction of Ch. and Y.

[90] Dimashqī p. 80.6–8 (cf. p. 75 trans. Ritter), 'the preservation of property requires five considerations. The first is that he should not expend more than he acquires. For when he does this, it is not long before his property is consumed and nothing remains of it at all' (for 'and . . . at all' see Chapter 2, p. 131); Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 113.15–16, '11. Preservation: . . . (a) first: that what he expends should not be greater than what he acquires.'

[91] Dimashqī p. 80.17–18 (cf. p. 76 trans. Ritter), 'the second, that what he expends should not equal what he acquires, but should be less than this so that what he owns should be maintained against a temporary crisis, a disaster which befalls, or commercial losses in what concerns him as a merchant'. Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 113.17, '(b) second: that what he expends should not be equal to his gains . . .'

[92] surplus of possessions] correction in Y and Ch. (omits 'his'); Pl. 'what he owns' (*ʿindahu*), but the (slightly corrected) reading of T, *ʿudda*, means property, instruments, etc., 'that one has prepared for the casualties of fortune' (Lane 1863–93: *s.v.*).

[93] commercial losses] A (and Pl. citing Dimashqī); T and Y: financial straits.

[94] Cf. Dimashqī p. 90.12f. (cf. p. 89 trans. Ritter): some of the ancients before us have already compared the income (of a land) that is greater than its needs with young bodies which are undergoing growth and increasing beyond their basic requirements, etc.

[95] Variant spelling in Y.

[96] Variant spelling in Y.

[97] Variant spelling in Y.

[98] Y: its growth.

[99] takes in less nourishment than is dissipated from it. Just as the body which has reached decrepitude] Y omits *per haplographiam*.

(36) والثالث[100] مما يُحتاج اليه في حفظ الاموال ان لا يمدّ الرجل يده الى ما يعجز عن القيام به كالرجل يشغل ماله في ضيعة لا يقوى على عمارتها او في ضياع متفرّقة لا يمكنه مباشرتها وليس له من يعينه على القيام بها او يتّخذ من الحيوان ما تتجاوز[101] النفقة عليه مقدار (p. 70) ما يبقى[102] من ماله، (37) وحال من فعل ذلك يشبه حال[103] الشره الذي يأكل ما لا[104] يستمرئه فكما ان من اكل ما لا[105] يستمرئه لم[106] يغتذ منه بشيء[107] بل ربما خرج منه واخرج معه من بدنه ما يُضرّ به خروجه فكذلك من تعاطى من الاكتساب ما يتجاوز طاقته كان وشيكًا ان لا يفوته الربح فقط دون ان يذهب رأس ماله،

(38) والرابع[108] مما يحتاج اليه في حفظ المال ان لا يشغل الرجل ماله في شيء[109] الذي يُبطئ خروجه من يده وانما يكون ذلك في الشيء الذي يقلّ طلابه[110] لاستغناء[111] عوامّ الناس عنه

100 الدمشقي ص ٨١، س ٥-١٢: الثالث مما يحتاج اليه في حفظ المال ان يحذر الرجل ان يمدّ يده الى ما يعجز عنه وعن القيام به مثل من شغل ماله في قرية يعجز عن عماراتها او في ضياع متفرّقة لا يمكنه مباشرتها وليس عنده اعوان ولا كفاة يقومون له بها او يتّحذ من الحيوان ما تجاوز النفقة عليه مقدار ماله وحال من فعل سيئًا من ذلك كحال الشره من الناس الذي يأكل ما لا تستمرئه معدته فإن من أكل ما لا تستمرئه معدته لم يغتذ جسمه بل ربما اخرج من بدنه ما يُضرّ به خروجه منه، ومن تعاطى ما تجوزه طاقته كان خليقًا ألا يفوته الربح فضلًا عن ان يذهب رأس ماله؛ يراجع ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٣، س ١٨: ج - الثالث: ان لا يكون يمدّ يده الى ما يعجز عن القيام به.

101 Y؛ في T: يتجاوز؛ قارن الدمشقي وA (ما تجوز).

102 Y: تبقّى.

103 ساقطة من ش.

104 ش: لم.

105 ش: لم.

106 Y: لا.

107 A؛ في T: يغده.

108 الدمشقي ص ٨١، س ١٣-١٦: والرابع مما يحتاج اليه في حفظ المال ألا يشغل الرجل ماله بالشيء الذي يبطئ خروجه عنه وانما يكون ذلك مما يقلّ طلابه لاستغناء عوامّ الناس عنه كالجوهر االذي لا يحتاج اليه إلا العظماء والملوك. . .ومثل كتب الحكمة التي لا يطلبها إلا الحكماء والعلماء؛ يراجع ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٤، س ١:د - الرابع: ان لا يستعمل ماله في شيء يُبطئ خروجه عنه.

109 ش: الشيء.

110 ش وبل: طلّابه.

111 في T: لاستغنى؛ الصواب عند Y؛ ش وبل: وتستغني

death, in the same way capital will quickly be exhausted when more is taken from it than added to it.

(36) The third[100] consideration required for the preservation of wealth is that a man should not undertake something he is incapable of sustaining. For example, the man who invests his money in a landed estate [*ḍayʿa*] he is unable to develop, or in scattered estates [*ḍiyāʿ*] which it is impossible for him to attend to because there is no one to appoint to maintain them, or who acquires livestock the expenditure on which exceeds[101] the amount of his remaining[102] funds. (37) The condition of one who does this resembles the condition of[103] the greedy man who eats something he cannot[104] digest. Just as someone who eats something he cannot[105] digest does not[106] receive any nourishment from it,[107] but often it passes out of him, and along with it he then expels from his body something that does him harm when it is expelled – in the same way, when someone ventures on the acquisition of something beyond his capacity, there is an immediate risk that not only the profit will be lost, but his capital will also disappear.

(38) The fourth[108] consideration required for the preservation of wealth is that the man should not invest his money in anything[109] that is slow to leave his hands. This is the case with an item that is little in demand[110] on account

[100] Dimashqī p. 81.5–12 (cf. p. 76 trans. Ritter), 'the third consideration required for the preservation of wealth is that the man should be wary of undertaking something he is incapable of and incapable of sustaining. An example is someone who invests his money in a village which he is incapable of developing or in scattered landed estates which it is impossible for him to attend to because he has no assistants or competent staff to give him support regarding them, or who acquires livestock the expenditure on which exceeds the amount of his funds. The condition of one who does something like this is like the condition of the greedy person who eats something his stomach cannot digest: if someone eats something his stomach cannot digest, his body receives no nourishment but rather he often expels from his body what does him harm by being expelled. And when someone ventures something that is beyond his capacity, it is very unlikely that the profit will be lost to him without the capital going too'; Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 113.18, '(c) third: that he should not undertake something he is incapable of sustaining'.

[101] exceeds] reading of Y (cf. Dimashqī, A).

[102] Variant with same meaning in Y.

[103] the condition of] Ch. omits.

[104] Variant with similar meaning in Ch.

[105] Variant with similar meaning in Ch.

[106] Variant with similar meaning in Y.

[107] does not receive any nourishment from it] reading of A. In T: it does not nourish him.

[108] Dimashqī p. 81.13–16 (cf. p. 76 trans. Ritter), 'the fourth consideration required for the preservation of wealth is that the man should not invest his money in anything that is slow to leave him. This is the case with an item that is little in demand on account of the fact that the general population does without it, like the gemstones which nobody needs except magnates and kings . . . or like books of philosophy [*ḥikma*] which only philosophers [*ḥukamāʾ*] and scholars demand'; cf. Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 114.1, '(d) fourth: that he should not seek to use his money on anything that is slow to leave his hands'.

[109] Variant with same meaning in Ch.

[110] Variant with similar meaning in Ch. and Pl.

كالجوهر الذي لا يحتاج اليه إلا الملوك وكتب العلم التي لا يطلبوا إلا العلماء، (39) والخامس مما يُحتاج اليه في حفظ المال ان يكون الرجل سريعًا الى بيع تجارته بطيئًا عن بيع عقاراته وإن قلّ ربحه في ذلك وكثر ربحه في هذا.[112]

(40) واما[113] انفاق المال فينبغي ان يحذر فيه خمسة اشياء وهي اللؤم والتقتير والسرف والبذخ وسوء التدبير، (41) فاما اللؤم فهو الامساك عن الانفاق في ابواب الجميل[114] [104a] مثل مؤاساة القرابة والإفضال على الصديق وذوي[115] الحرمة والصدقة في المحاويج بقدر ما يمكنه ويتّسع له،

[112] الدمشقي ص ٨٢، س ١-٢: والخامس مما يحتاج اليه في حفظ المال أن يكون الرجل سريعًا إلى بيع تجارته بطيئًا عن بيع عقارة وإن قلّ في ذلك ربحه وكثر ربحه في هذا.

[113] في اليونانية مثلًا: ἀνελευθερία/εὐτέλεια, γλισχρότης/αἰσχροκέρδεια, ἀσωτία, πολυτέλεια, κακῶς οἰκονομεῖν. الدمشقي ص ٨٢، س ٤ وما بعده: اما انفاق المال فينبغي ان يحذر فيه خمس خصال وهي اللؤم والتقتير والسرف والبذخ وسوء التدبير. (س ٥) فاما اللؤم فهو، يا اخي، الإمساك عن ابواب الجميل مثل مؤاساة القرابة والإفضال على الصديق وتفقد ذوي الحرمات وتعاهد ابواب البرّ مثل الصدقة على محاويج الناس وكل ذلك على قدر الإمكان والوسع والطاقة. (س ٩) واما التقتير فبالتضييق فيما لا بد منه ولا مدفع له مثل اقوات الاهل ومصالح العيال. (س ١١) واما السرف فهو الإنهماك في اللذّات واتّباع الشهوات. (س ١٢) واما البذخ فهو ان يتعدّى الرجل ما يتّخذه اهل طبقته وطوره فيما يتغذّى به او ما عساه ان يلبسه طلبًا للمباهاة. (س ١٤) واما سوء التدبير فان لا يوزّع نفقته في جميع حوائجه على التقسيط والاستواء حتى يصرف الى كل باب منها قدر استحقاقه فانه متى لم يفعل ذلك واسرف في واحد وقصّر في آخر لم تتشاكل اموره ولم تنتظم احواله ولم يشبه بعضها بعضًا،
(زيادة الدمشقي؟) ومن سوء التدبير ايضًا ألا يتقدم في اتّخاذ الشيء الذي يحتاج اليه عند كثرته وامكانه والأمن من فساد يعرض له، فيؤخر ذلك الى حين تدعوه اليه الحاجة مع شدّة الاضطرار فيأخذه كيفما اتّفق وبما كان من الاثمان ويزول (س ٢٠) من حكم الاختيار، ومن سوء التدبير ايضًا ان يتقدّم في اتّخاذ ما يحتاج اليه لمدّة يفسد فيها كشرائه قبل اوان الحاجة اليه او يتلف باهماله لصيانته وترك الحوطة عليه.
ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٤، س ٢: وانفاقه: ينبغي ان يحذر فيه هذه الامور.

[114] ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٤، س ٣: اللؤم: هو الامساك عن الانفاق في ابواب الجميل.

[115] ش: ذي.

of the fact that the general population does without it,[111] like the gemstones which nobody needs except kings, or the scholarly books which only scholars demand. (39) The fifth consideration required for the preservation of wealth is that the man should be quick to sell his merchandise but slow to sell his real estate (*ʿaqārāt*), even if his profit from the former is small while his profit from the latter is large.[112]

(40) *Expenditure of wealth*

One must be aware of five failings:[113] sordidness, meanness, profligacy, extravagance, and bad management. (41) Sordidness consists in holding back from spending on the categories of the Good,[114] such as supporting relations, benefiting friends and clients,[115] and charity to the needy, as far as

[111] does without it] correction in Y.

[112] Dimashqī p. 82.1–2 (p. 77 trans. Ritter): the fifth consideration required for the preservation of wealth is that the man should be quick to sell his merchandise but slow to sell his real estate [*ʿaqār*], even if from the former his profit is small while his profit from the latter is large.

[113] Arabic *luʾm, taqtīr, saraf, badhakh, sūʾ al-tadbīr*: e.g. Greek ἀνελευθερία/εὐτέλεια (here in the sense of 'une avarice sordide' (Kazimirski 1860), meanness which stops appropriate spending), γλισχρότης/αἰσχροκέρδεια, ἀσωτία, πολυτέλεια (or ?something based on δαψιλής; *badhakh* carries a meaning of arrogant superiority and display, and is used here in the sense of 'roving beyond just limits or prescribed methods' (Samuel Johnson) and showing off one's splendour by excessive and damaging spending; Ullmann 2006 lists it for ἡδυπάθεια, ἀσωτία, ἀπληστία), κακῶς οἰκονομεῖν. Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1121b21–1122a7.

Dimashqī p. 82.4ff. (cf. p. 77 trans. Ritter): regarding expenditure of wealth one must be aware of five aspects, and these are sordidness, meanness, profligacy, extravagance, and bad management. Sordidness, My Brother, consists of holding back from the categories of the Good, such as supporting relations, benefitting friends, looking out for clients, practising pious actions such as charity towards needy people, all of this in accordance with opportunity, ability, and capacity. Meanness consists of restricting essential and unavoidable items like people's food and things for the welfare of his family. Profligacy consists of being engrossed in pleasures and the pursuit of lusts. Extravagance consists in a man overstepping the assumptions of his class and station in regard to his food or the clothing he he might wear [cf. n. 119 below] due to a desire to show off. [14] Bad management is when he fails to apportion expenditure among all his things that need it with equity and equality by spending in every area as is justified. For if he does not do this, but is profligate in one and curtails another, his affairs will be out of step, and his arrangements will be haphazard and out of sympathy with each other.

[There follows a further section on bad management which is probably Dimashqī's own development of Bryson here together with §52.] Another sign of bad management is when he does not act early to get hold of an item he requires when it is freely available, accessible, and secure from the effects of deterioration, but postpones it till need really calls him to it and he has absolutely no option but gets it in whatever state it happens to be in and at whatever price, and is not free to exercise any discrimination. Another sign (p. 78 trans. Ritter) of bad management is when he is too early in getting what he requires on account of the time it (then) has to deteriorate inasmuch as his purchase was before the time of his need or perishes owing to his neglect in looking after it and his failure to keep it safe.

Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 114.2: His expenditure: it is necessary to be aware of the following matters.

[114] Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 114.3: sordidness: consists of holding back from expenditure on the categories of the Good.

[115] Variant with same meaning in Ch.

(42) واما التقتير فهو التضييق فيما لا بد منه مثل اقوات العيال ومصالحهم،[116] (43) واما السرف فهو الانهماك في (p. 71) الشهوات[117] واللذّات،[118] (44) واما البذخ فهو ان يتعدّى الرجل ما يتّخذه اهل طبقته <فيما يتغذّي به او ما عساه ان يلبسه>[119] طالبًا للمباهاة،[120] (45) واما سوء التدبير فهو ان لا[121] يوزّع الرجل نفقته على جميع ما يحتاج اليه بالسواء[122] حتى يصرف الى كل باب منها بقدر استحقاقه فانه اذا لم يفعل ذلك واسرف في واحد ونقّص من الآخر كانت اموره غير مشاكل بعضها بعضًا، وان[123] لا يتّخذ الشيء في وقت الحاجة اليه.

(46) فاللئيم[124] يؤتى من قبل انه لا يعرف[125] الجميل وما فيه من الفضيلة، (47) والمقتّر يؤتي من قبل انه لا يعرف الواجب وما في تركه من النقص، (48) والمسرف يؤتى[126] من قبل ايثاره اللذّة[127] على صواب الرأي، فاللئيم والمقتر ممقوتان عند الناس لانهما[128] على طرف[129] من الجور والمقتر

116 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٤، س ٤: التقتير: هو التضييق فيما لا بد منه، مثل قوت العيال.

117 T^2.

118 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٤، س ٥: السرف: هو الانهماك في الشهوات واللذّات.

119 عن الدمشقي؛ انظر ح ١١٣.

120 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٤، س ٦: البذخ: هو ان يتعدّى المرء ما يتّخذه اهل طبقته مباهاةً.

121 كذا في T؛ A: ألا؛ ساقطة من ش؛ ألحقه بل مراجع الدمشقي.

122 كذا في T؛ ش: بالسوء؛ تصحيح بل.

123 Y: فاضطرّ ان.

124 الدمشقي ص ٨٣، س ١ وما بعده: فاللئيم يؤتى من قبل جهله بالجميل وقلّة معرفته بقدره وفضيلته. (س ١) والمقتر يؤتى من قبل انه لا يعرف ابواب الواجب ويجهل العدل وما في تركه من النقص، (س ٣) والمسرف يؤتى من قبل ايثاره اللذّة على صواب الراي، فاللئيم والمسرف ممقوتان عند الناس لأنهما على طرف من الجور. والمسرف مذموم عند الخاصة بجهله وعند العامّة بنوع من الحسد له. (س ٥) وصاحب البذخ اسوأ حالًا من الجميع لأن اللئيم والمقتر وإن كان الناس يمقتونهما فانهما على حال يرجى ان يُحفظ معها مالهما والمسرف وإن كان مذمومًا فهو يربح التمتّع بلذّاته، (س ٧) واما صاحب البذخ فلا مال حفظ ولا لذّة التذّ واسوأ منه حالًا من كان سيّء التدبير لأنّه انما يؤتى من قبل انه لا يعرف مقادير النفقة ولا اوقاتها.

125 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٤، س ١١:٥ - سوء التدبير:. . .ويؤتى صاحبه من قبل انه لا يعرف طرق الجميل.

126 كذا في T؛ ساقطة من ش.

127 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٤، س ٩ وما يلي: (سوء التدبير. . .) ويؤتى صاحبه من قبل ايثاره اللذّات.

128 في T: عند الله\عند نس (؟)؛ ش (وY):عند الله لانهما؛ صحّحه بل؛ A: عند الناس.

129 في T: طرق؛ تصحيح بل (يراجع الدمشقي)؛ الصواب عند Y؛ A: على ضرب من الجور.

he can and is capable. (42) Meanness consists of restricting essential items such as his family's [*ʿiyāl*] food and things for their welfare.[116] (43) Profligacy consists of being engrossed in lusts[117] and pleasures.[118] (44) Extravagance consists in a man overstepping the expectations of his class <in regard to his food or the clothing he might wear>[119] due to a desire to show off.[120] (45) Bad management is when the man fails to[121] apportion his expenditure equally[122] among all the things that need it by spending in every area as is justified. For if he does not do this, but is profligate in one and cuts back in another, his affairs will be out of step with each other. (Bad management is also) when[123] he cannot get an item at the moment he needs it.

(46) The sordid man[124] is undone because he does not know the Good and the excellence it contains.[125] (47) The mean man is undone because he does not appreciate (his) obligation and the want caused by his neglect. (48) The profligate is undone[126] because of his preference for pleasure[127] over correct judgement. The sordid and the mean types are detested by people because[128] they represent an aspect[129] of wrongdoing, and the mean man particularly, for he is the more unjust of the two. The profligate man is

116 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 114.4: meanness: consists of restricting essential items such as his family's food.

117 lusts] T².

118 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 114.5: profligacy: consists of being engrossed in lusts and pleasures.

119 From Dimashqī; see n. 113 above and cf. Chapter 2, p. 131.

120 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 114.6: Extravagance: consists in a person overstepping the assumptions of his class due to a desire to show off.

121 fails to] Ch. omits (Pl. restored comparing Dimashqī).

122 Ch.: evilly. Pl. corrects.

123 Y adds: he is forced.

124 Dimashqī p. 83.1ff. (cf. p. 78 trans. Ritter): the sordid man is undone because of his ignorance of the Good and his poor knowledge of its worth and its excellence. The mean man is undone because he does not appreciate the terms of (his) obligation and is ignorant of fairness and of the want caused by his neglect. The profligate man is undone because of his preference for pleasure over correct judgement. The sordid and the profligate types are detested by people because they represent an aspect of wrongdoing, and the profligate is rebuked by the upper class because of his ignorance and by the lower class due to envy of him. The condition of the extravagant man is worse in all respects, because the sordid and mean types, though people detest them both, are at least in a situation in which they hope that their wealth will be preserved; while the profligate, though objectionable, makes a profit from savouring his pleasures; but with the extravagant man there is no wealth to preserve and no pleasure to be had. Worse than him is the condition of the man who is a bad manager, since he is actually undone because he does not understand amounts of expenditure nor the occasions for it.

125 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 114.11: (bad management: . . .) this sort is undone because he does not understand the ways of the Good.

126 is undone] Ch. omits.

127 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 114.9: (bad management: . . .) this sort is undone because of his preference for pleasures.

128 people because] Pl., cf. A; Ch. (and Y): in the sight of God because.

129 aspect] T: ways; Pl. corrects (following Dimashqī), cf. Y; A's 'sort' (*ḍarb*) confirms 'aspect' *(ṭaraf)*.

خاصةً فانه اجورهما، والمسرف مذموم ممقوت ومن مقته الناس او ذمّوه لم يكن له في مجاورتهم خير ومن لم يجاور الناس فقد صار في عدد الاموات (49) إلا ان صاحب البذخ اسوأ حالًا وذلك لان اللئيم والمقتر وإن كان الناس يمقتونهما فانهما على حال يربحان[130] حفظ اموالهما، والمسرف وإن كان مذمومًا فانه يربح التمتّع بلذّاته، واما صاحب البذخ فانه لا مال له[131] يحفظ[132] ولا لذّة يتمتّع بها، (50) واسوأهم جميعًا حالًا من كان سيّئ[133] التدبير وانما يؤتى من قبل انه لا يعرف [104b] (p. 72) مقادير النفقة[134] ولا اوقاتها.

(51) فمن[135] عرف ابواب الجميل ورغب فيها[136] وعرف ابواب الحقّ اللازم[137] واوجبها على نفسه واقتصد في الانفاق على لذّاته ولم يتعدّ ما يفعله اهل طبقته وعرف مقادير[138] ما يستحقّ كل باب من

130 كذا في T وA؛ بل: يرجوان.

131 زيادة ش؛ ساقطة من Y ،T.

132 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٤، س ٩ وما يلي: (سوء التدبير. . .) لا مال يحفظ صاحبه.

133 كذا في T؛ ش: يسيء.

134 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٤، س ٨: (سوء التدبير. . .) ويؤتى من قبل انه لا يعرف مقادير النفقة.

135 الدمشقي ص ٨٣، س ١٠ وما بعده: فمن عرف ابواب الجميل ورغب فيها وابواب الحقّ اللازم ولم يُخلّ بها واقتصر [واقتصد؟] في الانفاق على لذّاته ولم يتعدّ طوره وأهل طبقته وفهم مقادير ما يستحقّ كل باب مما يحتاج عليه وانفق فيه بقدر استحقاقه ولم يزد في باب فيضطرّ إلى ان يقصر في آخر، وعرف اوقات الحاجة إلى كل شيء فلم يقدم اتّخاذ شيء يفسد او يضيع قبل اوان الحاجة اليه ولم يؤخر شيئًا قد قرب وقت الحاجة اليه فيكون (س ١٥) اتّخاذه ايّاه على حال إعجال واضطرار او يفوت اوان الحاجة اليه فيكون اتّخاذه بعد ذلك باطلًا او يعزّ فلا يجده إلا بالغلاء، فإن ذلك اي القائم بهذه الأعمال منسوب إلى الكرم والسخاء والاتّساع والبرّ والمؤاساة والقصد والحزم وحسن التدبير. ومن كان كذلك وكانت غلّته او ربح ماله او جاريه [بر: جازيته] عن خدمته تقوم بمؤنته ونفقة عياله ويفضل له بعد ذلك فضل يصرف بعضه في ابواب البرّ التي (س ٢٠) تقدم وصفها وبعضها يدّخره لزمانه ونوائب دهره فينبغي ألّا يطلب اكثر من ذلك فإن طلبه لأكثر من هذا شره؛
ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٤، س ١٣ وما يلي: ١ - ان يرعف ابواب الجميل، ويرغب فيها ويبتغيها، ويستميل اليها. ٢ - ان يعرف الحقّ اللازم، ويوجبه على نفسه. ٣ - ان لا يقصد الانفاق على شهواته ولذّاته. ٤ - ان لا يتعدّى ما يفعله اهل طبقته. ٥ - ان يعرف مقادير استحقاق كل حال مما يحتاج اليه.

136 (عرف ابواب الجميل ورغب فيها) ساقطة من ش؛ بل (مراجع الدمشقي والعبري): عرف <طرق الجميل ورغب فيها وعرف>.

137 ساقطة من Y.

138 ساقطة من Y.

rebuked and detested: someone people detest and rebuke will get no advantage by associating with them, and if he does not associate with people, he is already numbered among the dead. (49) But the condition of the man of extravagance is worse, because the sordid and mean types, though people detest them both, are at least in the situation of making a profit by preserving their wealth;[130] while the profligate, though rebuked, makes a profit from savouring his pleasures; but the extravagant man has[131] no wealth to preserve[132] and no pleasure to savour. (50) Worst of all is the condition of the man who is a bad manager,[133] for he is in fact undone because he understands neither the amounts of expenditure[134] nor the occasions for it.

(51) Someone[135] who recognizes the categories of the Good and desires them[136] also recognizes the categories of obligatory[137] duty and makes them incumbent upon himself. He is economical in spending on his pleasures and does not transgress the normal behaviour of his class. He knows the amounts[138] justified by each category of his needs, and he spends on it

[130] making a profit by preserving their wealth] so also A; Pl. (cf. Dimashqī): hoping they will preserve their wealth.

[131] has] Ch.; T, Y omit.

[132] Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 114.9f.: (bad management: . . .) this sort does not preserve his wealth.

[133] who is a bad manager] Ch.: who ruins management.

[134] Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 114.8: (bad management: . . .) he is undone because he does not understand the amounts of expenditure.

[135] Dimashqī p. 83.10ff. (cf. p. 78 trans. Ritter): someone who recognizes the categories of the Good and desires them and the categories of obligatory duty, does not violate them and is limited [?read: is economical] in spending on his pleasures, does not transgress his station and the people of his class, and comprehends the amounts justified by every category of his needs and spends on it according to the value of its claim. He is not excessive in one category and then obliged to be restrictive in another. He understands the times when each thing is needed. He does not obtain something in advance which deteriorates or perishes before it is needed, nor does he delay (obtaining) a thing when the time of its need is already at hand and thus (15) obtains it in a state of haste or under pressure or the time of its need has passed and obtaining it at this stage is futile or difficult for him and he cannot find it except at a high price. In sum this man, the one who upholds these practices, is associated with noble-mindedness, liberality, affluence, piety, beneficence, moderation, resolution, and excellent management. (p. 79 trans. Ritter) If someone is like this, his revenue or the profit on his property or his recompense [?] for his work sustain his provisioning and the expense of his family. Beyond this there is a surplus which he spends partly on the categories of piety (20) already described, partly stores away for his fate and the vicissitudes of his destiny. Thus he must not demand more than this, for to demand more than this is avarice.

Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 114.13f.: (attitudes required in a man regarding his money:) (1) that he should recognize the categories of the Good, desire them, strive after them, and incline towards them; (2) that he should recognize obligatory duty and make it incumbent upon himself; (3) that he should not direct his expenditure towards his appetites and pleasures; (4) that he should not transgress the normal behaviour of his class; (5) that he should know the amounts justified by every situation of his needs.

[136] recognizes the categories of the Good and desires them] Ch. omits; Pl. (altered from Dimashqī and the Hebr.): <recognizes the ways of the Good and desires them and recognizes>.

[137] obligatory] Y omits.

[138] the amounts] Y omits.

الابواب مما يحتاج اليه وانفق فيه بقدر استحقاقه ولم يزد في باب فيضطرّ الى تقصير في الآخر، (52) وعرف اوقات الحاجة الى كل شيء فلم يقدّم[139] اتّخاذ شيء[140] قبل وقت الحاجة اليه[141] فيفسد[142] او يضيع الى ان يحتاج[143] اليه ولم يؤخر شيئًا حتى يفوت وقت الحاجة اليه فيصير اتّخاذه له بعد ذلك باطلًا او يعزّ عليه فلا يجده إلا بالغلاء، فمتى لزم الانسان ما ينبغي من فعل وترك[144] حينئذ[145] يُنسب الى الكرم والسخاء والاتّساع والمؤاساة والقصد والحرّية وحسن السيرة والعيش،[146] (53) ومن كان كذلك فاذا كانت غلّته او ربح ماله يقوم بنفقته على مصلحة بدنه ومؤونة عياله ويفضل له عن ذلك ما يصرف بعضه في مؤاساة قرائبه واصدقائه واهل الحرمة به وبعضًا في[147] فقرائه ومساكينه (54) ويذخر[148] بعضًا ليستظهر به على دهره ونوائبه فينبغي له ان لا يطلب اكثر من ذلك فان المطلب[149] اكثر[150] منه شره، وهذا هو الحدّ الذي لا ينبغي للحرّ ان يتعدّاه فإن تعدّاه نُسب (p. 73) الى الشره[151]،[152] فهذه حال المال والتدبير في اكتسابه وحفظه وانفاقه.[153]

(55) واما العبيد والمماليك فالحاجة اليهم في المنازل كالحاجة الى جميع[154] الناس في المدن وقد بيّنّا لايّ شيء احتاج الناس الى ان يتّخذوا المدن ويجتمعوا فيها، (56) والعبيد ثلثة عبد الرقّ وعبد

139 Y: يقدم على.

140 (الى كل شيء فلم يقدم اتّخاذ شيء) ساقطة من ش؛ ألحق بل (مراجع الدمشقي): وعرف اوقات الحاجة <اليه فلم يقدم اتّخاذ شيء>.

141 (قبل وقت الحاجة اليه ف-) ساقطة من ش.

142 ش: فلا يفسد.

143 (الى ان يحتاج) بر (مراجع الدمشقي): قبل اوان الحاجة.

144 ش: او تركه.

145 Y: فحينئذ.

146 γενναιότης, ἐλευθεριότης, εὐπορία, εὐεργεσία, μετριότης, ἐλευθερία, καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τοῦ βίου: مثلًا

147 (Y: على.)

148 Y: ويدّخر.

149 Y: الطلب.

150 ش: لأكثر

151 Y: الشرد؛ خطأ مطبعي او في المخطوطة؟

152 (وهذا هو الذي لا ينبغي الحرّ ان يتعدّاه فان تعدّاه نُسب الى الشره) وضع بل في الحاشية؛ لكنه في A.

153 Y وA؛ في T: ونفاقه (ش: وإنفاقه).

154 في T وY؛ وفي A: جماعة.

according to the value of its claim. He is not excessive in one category and then obliged to be restrictive in another. (52) He understands the times when each thing is needed. He does not obtain something early[139] before[140] the time when it is needed so[141] it deteriorates[142] or perishes before it is needed,[143] nor does he delay (obtaining) a thing till the time of its need has passed when obtaining it is now worthless or hard for him and he can only find it at a high price. So long as a man perseveres with what he must do and[144] what he must leave, then[145] he will be associated with noble-mindedness, liberality, affluence, beneficence, moderation, freedom, and excellence in his conduct and manner of life.[146] (53) If someone is like this, his revenue or the profit from his wealth sustain his expenditure on the well-being of his body and on the provisioning of his family [*ʿiyāl*]. Over and above this, he has a surplus which he spends in part on supporting his relations, friends, and clients, in part on[147] his poor and his beggars, (54) and in part he saves[148] so he may call on its aid against the vicissitudes of his destiny. He must not demand more than this, since the demand for[149] more[150] is avarice. Indeed, this is the limit which the free man must not transgress: if he does, he will (certainly) be associated with avarice[151].[152]

This is the situation with wealth and the management of its acquisition, preservation, and disbursement.[153]

(55) *SLAVES AND SERVANTS*

The need for slaves and servants on estates [*manāzil*] is like the need for a multitude[154] of people in cities; we have already explained the reason why people need to form cities and live together in them. (56) Slaves are of three

139 Y: does not come to obtain something.
140 the times when each thing . . . before] Ch.: the times; Pl. (altered from Dimashqī): the times of its need <and does not obtain something early>.
141 before the moment when it is needed so] Ch. omits.
142 Ch.: does not deteriorate.
143 Berg. (altered from Dimashqī): before the moment when it is needed.
144 Ch.: or.
145 Y: so then.
146 E.g. γενναιότης, ἐλευθεριότης, εὐπορία, εὐεργεσία, μετριότης, ἐλευθερία, καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τοῦ βίου.
147 Y: for.
148 Variant with same meaning in Y.
149 demand for] variant in Y: claiming.
150 variant with same meaning in Ch.
151 avarice] Y: fugitives (result of printing or scribal error).
152 Indeed . . . avarice] T and A; Pl. relegates to *apparatus*.
153 disbursement] A, Y, Ch.; T: expenses.
154 A: congregation.

الشهوة وعبد الطبع، [105a] فعبد الرقّ هو الذي اوجبت الشريعة عليه العبودية[155] وعبد الشهوة هو الذي لا يملك نفسه لغلبة شهواته وخواطره عليه ومن كان كذلك فهو عبد سوء وانسان سوء لا يصلح لشيء،[156] (57) واما عبد الطبع فهو الذي له بدن قويّ صبور على الكدّ وليس له في نفسه تمييز ولا معه من العقل إلا مقدار ما ينقاد به لغيره ولا يبلغ به الى ان يقدر ان يدبّر نفسه[157] وهو في طبيعته قريب من البهائم التي يصرّفها[158] الناس كيف شاؤوا،[159] ومن كان كذلك وإن كان حرًّا فهو عبد والاصلح له ان يكون عليه رئيس يدبّره.[160]

(58) والعبد[161] والعبيد يُحتاج اليهم لاشياء فمنهم من يراد[162] لتدبير المنزل ومنهم من يراد للخدمة والمعاطاة ومنهم من يراد للاعمال الجافية[163] فينبغي للرجل اذا اراد شرى[164] مملوك ان ينظر اليه فإن كان قد[165] جمع مع عبودية الرقّ عبودية الشهوة فينغي ان لا يتعرّض لشراه[166] ولا ان يوطّن نفسه على قمعه وتقويمه إن طمع في (p. 74) ذلك (59) ومن اشترى عبدًا هذه حاله فقد اشترى عبدًا له موالٍ غيره واذا كان كذلك فليس هو عبده إلا باسم واذا كان الانسان لا يملك نفسه فغيره احرى بان لا يملكه، (60) وإن كان المملوك حرًا بالطبع وكانت نفسه نفسًا قويةً وبدنه بدنًا لطيفًا[167] فهو ممن يوكَّل بالتدبير [105b] والحفظ وإن كان[168] حرًا بالطبع وكانت نفسه نفسًا ليّنةً ذليلةً وبدنه بدنًا

155 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١٢٠، س ٩: ٢ - عبد الرقّ: هو الذي اوجبت الشريعة عليه العبودية.

156 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١٢٠، س ٢٠ وما يلي: ٣ - عبد الشهوة: هو الذي لا يملك نفسه لغلبة شهوته وخواطره ومن كان كذلك فهو عبد سوء لا ينتفع به.

157 (ولا يبلغ به الى ان يقدر ان يدبّر نفسه) T^1 وA.

158 Y (في T: تصرفها)؛ بل: يصرفها.

159 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١٢٠، س ٧ وما يلي: ١ - عبد الطبع: هو الذي قوي على التعب، وليس له في نفسه تمييز ولا معه من العقل إلا مقدار ينقاد لغيره، ويقرب من البهائم.

160 فقرات ٥٦-٥٧ = بروسن نبذة ٢؛ انظر ب ٢، م ١(ا).

161 ساقطة من ش وY؛ A: العبد المملوك.

162 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١٢٠، س ١١: (٢ - عبد الرقّ. . .ثلاثة اقسام:) الاول يراد للمنزل. . .

163 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١٢٠، س ١٧: (٢ - عبد الرقّ. . .ثلاثة اقسام:. . .) الثالث يراد للاعمال الجافية. . .

164 Y: شرآء.

165 ساقطة من ش؛ A: فإن كان قد الخ.

166 Y: لشرآئه.

167 في T: بدن لطيف؛ تصحيح ش (وكذا في Y).

168 (وإن كان) تصحيح الكاتب في السطر.

(sorts): the slave 'by (the institution of) servitude', the slave 'by appetite', and the slave 'by nature'. (i) The slave 'by (the institution of) servitude' is one on whom the law has imposed slavery.[155] (ii) The slave 'by appetite' is one who cannot control himself because he is dominated by his appetites and feelings. One who is like this is a bad slave and a bad person and is good for nothing.[156] (57) (iii) The slave 'by nature' has a strong body and endures toil. He has no discernment in himself (between good and bad), and there is no sign of intelligence in him except to the extent that he is obedient to another, but without getting to the point of being able to manage himself.[157] In his nature he is close to the beasts, which men dispose of[158] as they wish.[159] One who is like this, even if he is free, is still a slave, and the best thing for him is to have a master to manage him.[160]

(58) The slave and the slaves[161] are needed for a variety of things. Some of them are wanted for managing the estate [*manzil*],[162] others are wanted for serving and ministering, while others are wanted for rough labours.[163] So, when a man wants to purchase[164] a servant, he must inspect him. If he already[165] combines slavery 'by (the institution of) servitude' with slavery 'by appetite', one must not proceed to purchase[166] him nor expect to break him in, even if one is keen to. (59) Whoever buys a slave in this condition has bought a slave who has another for a master, and this being so he is not his slave except in title. For if a person cannot control himself, someone else is even less likely to control him. (60) If the servant is free in nature, strong in spirit and lithe[167] in body, he is someone who may be entrusted with management and custody. If he is[168] free in nature, his mind is gentle and

155 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 120.9: (2) slave by servitude: this is one on whom the law has imposed slavery.

156 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p .120.20–121.1: (3) slave by appetite: this is one who cannot control himself because he is dominated by his appetites and feelings; one who is like this is a bad slave and there is no use in him.

157 but without reaching the point of being able to govern himself] T[1], confirmed by A.

158 Y offers correct reading, so Pl.

159 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 120.7 f.: (1) slave by nature: this one is strong for labouring. He has no discernment and there is no sign of intelligence in him except to the extent that he is obedient to another. He is close to the beasts.

160 §§56–7: for Bryson fr. 2 see Chapter 2, Section 1(a).

161 The slave and the slaves] Ch. and Y: slaves. Cf. A: the owned slave (*al-ʿabd al-mamlūk*).

162 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 120.11: ((2) slave of servitude . . . three types:) the first is wanted for the estate . . .

163 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 120.17: ((2) slave of servitude . . . three types:) the third is wanted for rough labours . . .

164 Spelling variant in Y.

165 already] cf. A; Ch. omits.

166 Spelling variant in Y.

167 Ch. correction (also Y).

168 If he is] corrected by scribe in line.

صافيًا[169] فهو ممن يوكّل بالخدمة والمناولة،[170] وإن كان عبدًا بالطبع[171] وُكّل بالاعمال التي يُحتاج فيها الى الشدّة والصبر.

(61) والعبيد يشبّهون باعضاء البدن الذي[172] تملّك الانسان افعالها. اما الموكَّلون بحفظ المنزل وتدبيره فهم بمنزلة الحواسّ[173] لانه بالحواسّ يُعرف ما يضرّ فيُدفع وما ينفع فيُجتلب والموكَّلون بالخدمة يشبّهون باليدين[174] لان بهما يتوصّل الى ادخال المرفق[175] على[176] البدن، والموكَّلون بالاعمال يشبّهون بالرجلين[177] لأن عليهما كل البدن وثقله، (62) فينبغي[178] للرجل ان يحفظ مماليكه كحفظه لاعضائه وان يفكّر لهم في امرين احدهما الجنس الذي يجمعه وايّاهم والآخر فيما[179] ابتُلوا به، فانه اذا فكّر في جنسهم علم انهم اناس مثله ويمكنهم[180] ان يفهموا ما يفهم ويفكّروا فيما يفكّر فيه ويشتهوا ما يشتهي ويكرهوا ما يكره (63) وانه[181] متى عاملهم على حسب ذلك اكتسب (p. 75) مع الفضيلة التي تصير له في نفسه المحبّة ممن يُرزق الملك عليه، واذا يفكّر[182] فيما ابتُلوا به علم انه لو ابتُلي

169 Y: جافيًا.

170 يراجع ابن ابي الربيع ص ١٢٠، س ١٤ وما يلي: (٢ - عبد الرقّ. . .ثلاثة اقسام:. . .) الثاني يراد للمناولة: ينبغي ان يكون حرًا بالطبع، ذا نفس ليّنة ذليلة وبدن متوسّط. . .

171 عبد الطبع؟ انظر فقرة ٥٧.

172 ش: التي

173 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١٢٠، س ١٢: (٢ - عبد الرقّ. . .ثلاثة اقسام: الاول يراد للمنزل:. . .) وهذا منزلة الحواس لان الانسان بهم يعرف احوال منزله.

174 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١٢٠، س ١٥ وما يلي: (٢ - عبد الرقّ. . .ثلاثة اقسام:. . .الثاني يراد للمناولة. . .) وهذا منزلة اليدين لكونه يتوصّل بهما الى اخذ الموافق ومنع المنافي.

175 بل وY: المرافق.

176 بر (مراجع ابن ابي الربيع): الموافق الى.

177 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١٢٠، س ١٨: (٢ - عبد الرقّ. . .ثلاثة اقسام:. . .الثالث يراد للاعمال الجافية. . .) وهذا منزلة الرجلين لأن بهما وعليهما كل البدن وثقله.

178 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١٢١، س ٣: ١ - ينبغي ان يحفظ عبيده كما يحفظ اعضاءه، ويفكّر لهم في امرين: الاول الجنس الذي يجمعه وايّاهم. الثاني فيما ابتُلوا به. ٢ - ويجب ان يفكّر في جنسهم. . .

179 Y: ما.

180 Y: يمكنهم.

181 (ويكرهوا ما يكره وانه) ساقطة من Y؛ لكنه في A.

182 في T وA؛ Y: فكّر.

docile, and his body is pure,[169] he is someone who may be entrusted with serving and with ministering.[170] If he is a slave 'by nature',[171] he is entrusted with labours which require force and endurance.

(61) Slaves resemble the limbs of the body, the actions of which[172] the man has in his control. Those entrusted with the custody and the management of the estate fulfil the role of the senses[173] because it is through the senses that one knows what is harmful and removes it, and what is beneficial and attracts it. Those entrusted with serving resemble the hands[174] because it is with them that one succeeds in fetching something useful[175] for[176] the body. Those entrusted with labours resemble the legs[177] because upon them rests the whole of the body and its weight. (62) Therefore the man must protect his servants as he protects his limbs, and this involves thinking about them in two ways:[178] first, the species which unites him with them; second, what[179] they have suffered. If he thinks about their species, he realizes that they are people just like him, and[180] capable of understanding what he understands, of thinking about what he thinks about, of desiring what he desires, and of hating what he hates.[181] (63) When he deals with them in this manner, in addition to the virtue which accrues to him in his heart, he acquires affection from one whose ownership has been assigned to him. When he thinks[182] of what they have suffered, he realizes that if he suffered something like it, he

169 Y: rough.

170 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 120.14f.: ((2) slave of servitude ... three types: ...) the second is wanted for ministering: he must be free in nature, possessed of a gentle and docile mind and a medium-sized body ...

171 by nature] T, Y, A: in nature; but see §57.

172 Ch. makes 'limbs' antecedent.

173 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 120.12: ((2) slave of servitude ... three types: the first is wanted for the estate: ...) and this one fulfils the role of the senses because it is through them that a person knows the condition of his estate.

174 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 120.15f.: ((2) slave of servitude ... three types ... : the second is wanted for ministering: ...) and this one fulfils the role of the hands because he is the one who uses them to fetch agreeable things and block unsuitable ones.

175 something useful] P. and Y: useful things.

176 something useful for] Berg. (cf. Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ): something agreeable to.

177 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 120.18: ((2) slave of servitude ... three types: ... the third is wanted for rough labours ...) and this one fulfils the role of the legs because through them and upon them rests the whole of the body and its weight.

178 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 121.3: (as for living with them ...) (1) he must protect his slaves as he protects his limbs, and this involves thinking about them in two ways: first, the species which unites him and them; second, what they have suffered. (2) And he must think about their species ...

179 Variant with same meaning in Y.

180 and] Y omits.

181 and of hating what he hates] T and A; Y omits.

182 thinks] T, A; Y: thought.

بمثله لَأحبّ ان يرزق مولًى يرقّ عليه ويترفّق به،[183]

(64) واذا جاءت من المملوك الزلّات فينبغي للسيّد ان يتغافل عنه مرّةً ويقوّمه اخرى، ويكون تقويمه ايّاه اولًا بالعتاب وتحذير والانذار فإن عاد فبالغضب وإن عاد فبالضرب،[184] (65) ولا يعاقبه على ذنب اتاه من غير معرفة ولا تعمّد ولا يترك عقوبته على ذنب اتاه عن شرارة [106a] وخبث ولا ينبغي[185] اذا اساء المملوك ان يعاقَب إلا بمثل ما يعاقَب به الولد اذا اساء[186] مثل تلك الاساءة، فاذا[187] ذلك اصلح للمملوك والولد جميعًا.[188]

(66) ويجب ان يُجعل للمماليك اوقات راحة فان المملوك اذا أُردف بعمل على عمل[189] وكُلّف نصَبًا بعد نصَب ولم تكن له راحة فتر عن الخدمة وإن كان حريصًا عليها، والراحة تجدّد قوة البدن وتحبّب الى صاحبه العمل، (67) ومثله في ذلك مثل القوس فانها إن تُركت موترةً استرخت وإن حُطّت[190] الى وقت الحاجة اليها دامت شدّتها وكان اجدر ان يُنتفع بها، (68) وإنّا لنعجب من القوم نراهم يُعنون بدوابّهم ويحرصون على راحتها وعلى الاحسان اليها ولا يعطون مماليكهم نصيبًا من ذلك، والمملوك وإن لم يكن محتملًا من الراحة ما تحتمله الدابّة (p. 76) لأن كثير[191] الراحة ربما ابطره وفرّغه لِما يضرّه والدابّة ليست تشبهه في ذلك، فانه غير مستغن من الراحة عما يستديم[192] قوته ويستدعي نشاطه ولا يبلغ المقدار الذي يُخاف عليه ضرره، (69) وبعد فهو من جنس المالك له فقد ينبغي لمالكه ان يراعي[193] مع توخّي حسن التدبير فيه الرحمة له وما[194] يتذكّر من ضعفه فان دابّته احمل[195] للتضييع

183 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١٢١، س ٥ وما يلي: (٢ - ويجب ان يفكّر في جنسهم،) وانه لو ابتُلوا بمثله ما ابتُلوا به لَأحبّ ان يرزق من يلطف به.

184 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١٢١، س ٧ وما يلي: وينبغي ان يتغافل عن اول زلّة، ثم يعاتبه على الثانية، ثم يحذّره ثم ينذره ثم يعاقبه.

185 T^2.

186 ش وY؛ في T: اسي (ش: اشي).

187 ساقطة من ش.

188 (فاذا ذلك اصلح المملوك والولد جميعًا) ساقطة من Y وA.

189 (على عمل) T^1.

190 حطت؛ ش: حُفظت، بل: حُلّت.

191 كذا في T؛ ش: كُثْر.

192 Y؛ في T: يسبدم؛ ش: يسبد ىمر (يسند به)؛ تصحيح بل.

193 Y؛ في T: ينتزعه؛ ش: ينزع. . .<الى> الرحمة.

194 ش: لما.

195 في T تصحيف: اجمل؛ صحّحه بل.

would prefer to be assigned a master who would be gentle to him and treat him with kindness.[183]

(64) If the servant makes mistakes, the master should ignore him the first time and correct him the second time. Correcting him should initially be done with censure, warning, and admonishment; if he does it again, with anger; if he persists, with blows.[184] (65) He should not punish him for an offence he committed in ignorance and unintentionally. But he must not neglect to punish him for an offence he committed out of badness and wickedness. If the servant does wrong, he should[185] only be punished as the (master's) son is punished when he does[186] something similar wrong. For[187] this is the best thing for both the servant and the son.[188]

(66) One must designate periods of rest for the slaves. For if the slave is made to perform task after task[189] and burdened with labour after labour and has no rest, he will become too weary for work, even if he is eager to do it. Rest renews the body and makes work attractive to (the body's) possessor. (67) In this regard he is like the bow: if it is left strung, it becomes loose; but if it is put aside[190] till the moment when it is needed, its strength endures and it is more suitable for someone to use it. (68) We are really astonished by people we see who care for their riding animals and are keen to rest them and be good to them, but give their servants no part of this. Although the servant should not take as much rest as the animal because (too) much[191] rest makes him insolent and gives him time to do things that harm him, whereas the animal is not like him in this regard, he cannot do without a rest to keep up[192] his strength and revive his energy, though without it reaching the point where one fears it will be harmful for him. (69) Furthermore, since he is of the (same) species as his owner, his owner, in addition to endeavouring to manage him well, must maintain[193] (a feeling of) compassion towards him and[194] a recollection of his weakness. For his animal is more tolerant[195] of

[183] Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 121.5f.: (And he must think about their species) and the fact that if he suffered something similar to what they suffer, he would prefer to be assigned someone who would be kind to him.

[184] Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 121.7f.: one should ignore the first mistake, then censure him for the second, then warn him, then admonish him, then punish him.

[185] he should] T^2.

[186] Spelling corrected in Ch. and Y.

[187] For] Ch. omits.

[188] For this is the best thing for both the servant and the son] Y omits (and A).

[189] after task] T^1.

[190] put aside] Ch.: kept; Pl.: unfastened.

[191] (too) much] Ch.: a large amount.

[192] to keep up] Y (and probably T). Ch.'s variant reading is corrected by Pl.

[193] maintain] Y; T: withdraw him/it; Ch. emends: incline towards.

[194] Ch.: and to.

[195] more tolerant] Pl.; T: more beautiful.

منه،[196] (70) ولا ينبغي لاحد ان يغتنم[197] من مملوكه إن يكون يرى انه لا بد له من قبول امره شاء او ابى[198] بل يلتمس ان تكون خدمته له بالمحبّة منه لذلك والنشاط له والحرص عليه وينبغي[199] ان يحرص على ان يكون انقياد مملوكه بالحياء اكثر منه بالخوف وبالمحبّة اكثر منه بايجاب الطاعة.[200]

(71) وافضل المماليك الصغار لأنهم احسن طاعةً واسرع قبولًا لِما يعلَّمون وهم الذين يألفون الموالي ويلزمون ما يجرون عليه من الاخلاق، وخير المماليك للرجل من لم يكن من جنسه لأن الناس مولعون باستصغار اقاربهم والحسد لهم فالمجانسة من هذا نصيب،

(72) ومن حقّ المملوك ان يُكفى كل ما يحتاج اليه وان لا يكلَّف ما لا يقدر عليه ولا يحلّ له، وعليه الطاعة وإن لم يطع بعد هذا وجبت عليه العقوبة على ما رتّبنا من حال بعد حال، (73) وينبغي ان يكون للمماليك عند مواليهم مراتب من (p. 77) الاحسان [106b] والتفضيل[201] واذا احسن احدُهم رفعه من مرتبة الى مرتبة بقدر استحقاقه فان ذلك حثّ[202] للباقين على ان يلحقوا به، فهذا ما قلنا في المماليك بعد الذي قلنا في المال.[203]

(74) فاما المرأة فاول ما ينبغي ان نبتدئ[204] به من ذكرها الإخبار عن الغرض الذي تراد[205] له

196 (فان دابّته احمل للتضييع منه) ساقطة من Y.

197 كذا في T؛ ش: يغتنم (يغتمّ ؟).

198 ش؛ في T: ابا.

199 Y: وينبغي له.

200 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١٢١، س ١٣ وما يلي: ٦ - ان تكون خدمتهم محبّة لا خيفة، وطاعتهم رغبة لا رهبة.

201 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١٢١، س ٩ وما يلي: ٤ - وينبغي ان يكون للمماليك عند مواليهم مراتب من الاحسان كلما احسن احدهم رفعه.

202 ش وبل؛ في T :[T[1]: في] ذلك حثا؛ A: في ذلك حثا؛ Y: فان ذلك فيه حثٌّ.

203 (فهذا ما قلنا في المماليك بعد الذي قلنا في المال) ساقطة من Y.

204 بل؛ في T: يبتدي.

205 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٥، س ٤ وما بعده: والزوجة تراد لشيئين: احدهما من طريق الرأي، وذلك ان اكثر اشتغال الرجل خارج منزله فهو مضطرّ الى الخروج عنه ولا بد له اذ هو كذلك من يحفظه له ويدبّر له ما فيه. وليس يمكن ان يبلغ احد من العناية بشيء غيره ما يبلغه بشيء نفسه. فلما كان الامر كذلك، كان اصلح الاشياء للرجل ان يكون في منزله شريك يملكه كملكه حتى يعني كعنايته ويكون تدبيره كتدبيره، فهذا هو الباب الذي دعا الرأي اليه ودلّ على الاختيار.

negligence than (his servant).[196] (70) Nor should anyone take advantage of[197] his servant when he sees that there is no alternative for him but to accept his orders, like it or not.[198] Rather, he will seek to ensure that (the servant's) work for him is done with affection, zeal, and keenness for the task. Finally, one[199] must be keen to ensure that his servant's submissiveness is due to respect more than fear and to love more than compliance and obedience.[200]

(71) The finest servants are young because they are more capable of obeying and quicker to accept what they are taught. It is they who get used to their masters and retain the habits they follow. A man's best servants do not come from his (own) race, since people are given to despising and envying those related to them, and racial similarity is part of this.

(72) The rights of the servant include having sufficient of what he needs and not being burdened by a task he is incapable of and is illegal for him. Obedience is compulsory for him, and if he does not in consequence obey, punishment is necessary for him according to what we have established for each case incrementally. (73) Servants should stand with their masters in (varying) grades of favour and distinction.[201] If one of them behaves well, he will elevate him from one grade to the next in relation to his merits. For this acts as a spur[202] to the rest to catch him up.

This, then, is what we had to say about servants, following what we said about property.[203]

(74) *THE WOMAN*

The first point of discussion about the woman, which we must start with,[204] is advice concerning the purpose for which she is wanted.[205] We say that there are two sides to this. The first is from the perspective of common sense,

196 For his animal is more tolerant of negligence than (his servant)] Y omits.
197 Ch.: ?worry about.
198 Ch. corrects spelling.
199 Y: he.
200 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 121.13f.: (6) . . . that (the servants') work for him is a matter of affection not fear, and their obedience is a matter of desire not terror.
201 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 121.13f.: (4) servants should stand with their masters in (varying) grades of favour. Each time one of them behaves well, he will elevate him.
202 Ch. correction, so Pl.; T and T[1]: in this is a spur.
203 This . . . property] Y omits.
204 The . . . start] Pl.; T: the first thing that someone discussing her must start with.
205 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 115.4ff.: the wife is wanted for two reasons. The first of them is from the perspective of common sense, relating to the fact that most of the man's business is outside his estate and he is therefore obliged to go out from it. Given this, there is no alternative for him but to have someone to keep it safe and manage the contents of it for him. It is impossible for someone to give another's affairs the attention he gives his own. Since this is so, the best thing for the man is that there should be a partner in his estate to possess it as he possesses (it) with the result that he cares (for it) as he cares and manages as he manages it. This is the aspect which common sense indicates and choice suggests.

فنقول ان ذلك الغرض شيآن احدهما من طريق الرأي والآخر من طريق الطبع، (75) فاما الذي من طريق الرأي فهو ان اكثر اشغال الرجل خارجًا[206] من منزله فهو مضطرّ الى اخلائه من نفسه والخروج عنه ولا بد له اذا كان كذلك ممن يحفظه له ويدبّر له ما فيه وليس يمكن ان يبلغ احد من العناية بشيء غيره ما يبلغه من العناية بشيء نفسه[207] (76) فلما كان الامر على هذا كان اصلح الاشياء للرجل ان يكون له في منزله شريك يملكه كملكه هو له ويُعنى به كعنايته ويكون تدبيره فيه كتدبيره فهذا هو الباب الذي دعا اليه الرأي ودلّ عليه الاختيار،[208]

(77) واما الباب الآخر الذي يوجبه الطبع فان[209] الخالق تبارك وتعالى لما جعل الناس يموتون وقدّر بقاء الدنيا الى وقت جعلهم يتناسلون وجعل التناسل من شيء يجمع فيه الحرارة والرطوبة، فاما الحرارة فلِانّ النشوء والنماء والحركة لا تكون إلا بها واما الرطوبة فلِانّ الانطباع والتصوير[210] على (p. 78) اختلاف مقاديره واشكاله [107a] لا يكون إلا فيها،[211] (78) وليس للرطوبة مع الحرارة ثبات ولا بقاء لان الحرارة تحلّلها وتفنيها[212] فلا يوجد من كل واحد منهما في بدن واحد مقدار القوة التي يكون[213] منها الولد فلذلك صار الولد من ذكر وانثى لان الحرارة في الذكر اقوى والرطوبة في الانثى اكثر، (79)

206 ش وبل؛ في T: خارجٌ.

207 ابن ابي الربيع وA (ما يبلغه الانسان من العناية بشيء نفسه)؛ في T: بنفسه.

208 كذا في T؛ ش: الاختبار؛ صحّحه بل.

209 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٥، س ١٦ وما بعده: فان الخالق تعلى لما جعل الناس يموتون وقدّر بقاء الدنيا الى وقت ما جعلهم يتناسلون وجعل التناسل من شيء يجتمع فيه الحرارة والرطوبة. فاما الحرارة فلانّ النشوء والنماء والحركة لا تكون إلا بها واما الرطوبة فلانّ الانطباع والتصوير على اختلاف مقاديره واشكاله لا يكون إلا فيها، وليس للرطوبة مع الحرارة ثبات ولا بقاء لان الحرارة تحلّلها وتفنيها فلما كان لا يوجد من كل واحد منهما في بدن واحد مقدار القوة التي يكون منها الولد فكذلك صار الولد من ذكر وانثى لان الحرارة في الذكر اكثر والرطوبة في الانثى اكثر، فاذا القى الذكر في الانثى من الحرارة ما قدّر البارئ عزّ وجلّ ان يكون مثله الولد، استمدّت تلك الحرارة من رطوبة الانثى ما يكون منه تمام الخلقة بقدرة الله تعالى وتقدّس.

210 بل: تصوّر؛ قارن A: (الولد) ويتصوّر.

211 قدامة ص ٣٩ س ٣ وما بعد: كان جعله يموت وينقرض، لو لا التناسل الذي قدّره بلطفه. . .الى وقت افناء جميعه، وجعل. . .التناسل سببًا لاخلاف مكان المنقوص منه؛ ص ٣٥ س ٣ وما يلي: الحرارة والرطوبة، فإن بهما كان نشؤه ونموه وعليهما مدار حركته وجمهور امره.

212 بل؛ في T: وتفنيها {منها}.

213 ش؛ في T: تكون.

the second from the perspective of Nature. (75) The perspective of common sense relates to the fact that most of the man's business is outside[206] his estate. He is obliged to leave it on its own and go out from it. Given this, there is no alternative for him but to have someone to keep it safe and manage the contents of it for him. It is impossible for someone to give another's affairs the attention he gives his own.[207] (76) Since this is so, the best thing for the man is to have a partner in his estate to possess it as he possesses it, to care for it as he cares, and to manage it as he manages. This is the aspect which common sense indicates and choice[208] suggests.

(77) The second aspect, which Nature requires, relates to the fact that when the Creator – He is Blessed and Sublime![209] – made people to be mortal and ordained the impermanence of the World, he caused them to procreate, and made procreation from something in which heat and moisture unite. Development, growth, and movement cannot occur without heat. Imprinting and formation[210] in accordance with a variety of sizes and shapes cannot occur without moisture.[211] (78) Moisture in conjunction with heat has no stability or permanence because heat causes its dissolution and destruction.[212] The strength of each of these two in a single body is insufficient for the child to come to be.[213] For this reason the child arises from male and female. For in the male heat is stronger, while in the female moisture is greater. (79) When the male introduces into the female the amount of

[206] Following Ch.'s correction.

[207] T: in himself; cf. Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ and A: the attention a person gives to his own affairs.

[208] choice] Ch.: advice.

[209] Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 115.16ff.: when the Creator – He is Sublime! – made people to be mortal and ordained the impermanence of the world, He caused them to procreate, and made procreation from something in which heat and moisture unite. Development, growth, and movement cannot occur without heat. Imprinting and formation in accordance with a variety of sizes and shapes cannot occur without moisture. Moisture in conjunction with heat has no stability or permanence because heat causes its dissolution and destruction. And since from each of these two there is in a single body insufficient strength for the child to come to be, for this reason the child arises from the male and the female. For in the male heat is the greater, while in the female moisture is the greater. When the male introduces into the female the amount of heat from which the Creator – He is Almighty and Exalted! – has ordained that the child should thus arise, this heat seeks out in the female the amount of moisture through which the created nature will reach completion by the omnipotence of God – He is Sublime and Hallowed!

[210] formation] Pl.: appearance; cf. A: (the child) forms its appearance.

[211] Qudāma ibn Jaʿfar p. 39.3ff.: He made (some of creation) to be mortal and perish, were it not for procreation which He ordained in His kindness . . . till the time of the destruction of all (animals), and He made . . . procreation by reason of replacing what was deficient in them; p. 35.3f.: (to preserve his spirit and facilitate movement) He made heat and moisture, for his development and growth are due to these two and the amount of his movement and the greatest part of his affairs depend on both of them.

[212] destruction] Pl.; T adds: {from it}.

[213] Following Ch.'s correction.

فاذا القى الذكر في الانثى من الحرارة ما قدّر الخالق ان يكون من مثله الولد واستمدّت[214] تلك الحرارة من الانثى من الرطوبة ما يكون فيه تمام الخلق تمّ[215] الولد.

(80) ثم من تمام التدبير في ذلك انه حيث جعل في الرجل الطبيعة التي يميل بها الى الحركة والظهور والتصرّف وكانت به حاجة الى من يقوم مقامه في منزله جعل[216] في الانثى الطبيعة التي تميل بها الى السكون والاستتار لتقوم مقامه فيما فقد من نفسه من الصبر على لزوم منزله ويقوم مقامها فيما فقدت من نفسها من الحركة في طلب المعاش، (81) ثم جعل بينهما من المحبّة والالفة[217] ما ارتفع معه الحسد والمنافسة والبخل من كل واحد منهما على صاحبه فيما يجوز[218] له من ماله واطلق له من[219] التدبير فيه، ولو لا[220] ذلك لكان شغل كل واحد منهما بصاحبه اكثر منه بغيره للمقارنة والشركة وقرب المتناول لكنه (p. 79) جعلهما كانهما نفس واحدة.

(82) فالواجب على المرأة الاذعان للرجل والطاعة له والتذلّل فيما يأمرها به اذ كان قد جاد لها بمنزله وملّكها ايّاه ولم يستأثر عليها بشيء منه، فانها وإن قالت انه انما فعل ذلك لانه اصلح له فليس قولها هذا مما يُبطل عنها منّته ويزيل عنها رئاسته (83) لان جميع ما يأتيه الانسان من الاحسان وإن كان يرجع اليه فضله[221] وحسن الذكر فيه وكانت المنفعة في ذلك اكثر منها لمن يصل ذلك الاحسان اليه فليس ذلك مما يزيل الشكر عن من احسن اليه ولا يجعل له السبيل الى كفران نعمته،

(84) فينبغي للرجل [107b] اذا اتّخذ المرأة ان[222] يبدأ[223] فيُفهمها المعنى الذي ارادها له

214 ش: استمدّت.
215 ش: ثمّ (صحّحه بر).
216 T^2.
217 في T: والفه؛ تصحيح ش.
218 لعله في T؛ ش: يحرز؛ بل اقترح خرم.
219 اهمله بل.
220 سو؛ في T: ولوىالولا (؟) ؛ ش: من التدبير فيه. ولو <زال> ذلك لكان. . .
221 في T: فضله {احده (= اخذه)}.
222 T^1.
223 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٦، س ١٧ وما بعده: (وينبغي ان يستعمل صاحب المرأة هذه الاحوال الستة:) الاولى: ان يبدأ ففيهما انه لم يردها للولد دون العناية بمنزله وتدبيره؛ الثانية: ان يأمرها بحفظ منزله، في حضوره وغيبته، وصحّته ومرضه، وسائر احواله.

heat which the Creator has ordained is about right for the child to come to be, and[214] this heat seeks out in the female the amount of moisture through which the created thing will reach completion, then the child is complete.[215]

(80) Moreover, it is part of the perfect disposition of this matter that whereas He gave the man a nature which makes him prefer activity, visibility, and independence, and therefore a need for someone to stand in for him on his estate, He gave[216] the woman a nature which makes her prefer to stay still and keep out of sight. Thus she could compensate for his lack of patience for staying at home, while he could compensate for her lack of action in pursuing a livelihood. (81) Next, He established between them a feeling of love and intimacy,[217] which leads to the removal from each one of them of jealousy, rivalry, and meanness towards his companion with regard to the property which the one permits[218] the other (to use) and over which the one gives the other unrestricted control in respect to[219] its management. Even if this were not so,[220] each one of them would be preoccupied with his companion more than he would be with another owing to their association and partnership and readiness to take (from each other). But He made both of them as if they were one person.

(82) It is the woman's duty to show the man subservience and obedience and to submit herself to his commands, for he has bestowed the estate upon her and made her the owner of it and does not exclude her from any part of it. If she says that he actually does this because it is to his advantage, what she says will not invalidate his good will towards her nor end his authority over her. (83) The reason is that, although the credit[221] for all a person's acts of kindness and his good reputation for them redounds to him and the profit in this regard is greater than it is to the beneficiary, this is not something that stops (a beneficiary's) gratitude towards him or allows (the beneficiary) a way of denying his favour.

(84) When he takes the woman (in marriage), it is necessary that[222] the man should begin[223] by making her understand the reason he wanted

[214] and] Ch. omits.
[215] then the child is complete] Ch.: (and) then the child.
[216] He gave] T^2.
[217] intimacy] following Ch.'s correction.
[218] Probable reading in T; Ch.: he guards for him; Pl. posits a lacuna.
[219] in respect to] Pl. omits.
[220] Unclear reading in T; Ch.'s 'even if this <stopped> . . . ' is on the right lines.
[221] T adds: {he takes}.
[222] that] T^1.
[223] Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 116.17f.: (and the spouse must employ the woman in the following six situations:) First: that he begins (by saying) for both of them that he did not want her for children without caring for and running his estate. Second: that he commands her to safeguard his estate during his presence, absence, health, sickness, and his other situations.

وانه[224] لم يردها للولد دون العناية به والتفقّد لاموره في حضوره وغيبته وصحّته ومرضه وحفظ جميع ماله ومعونته على جميع امره وما يجب عليها[225] من ذلك بالاسباب[226] التي شرحناها، (85) ولا[227] ينبغي ان يكون قصد الرجل من المرأة لحسب ولا لمال[228] ولا جمال لانه متى قصد لواحد من هذه وكان موجودًا عندها رأت المرأة انه قد ظفر ببغيته <من> ها[229] ولم يبق عليها شيء تحتاج الى ان تتقرّب به <اليه>،[230] (86) بل تظنّ انها إن [--]ات به[231] او قصّرت في حقّه كان فيما نال من حاجته منها[232] ما (p. 80) يجب عليه احتمال ذلك معه، وانه اولى بطاعتها والتذلّل لها منها بان تفعل ذلك به، وعند ذلك يفسد تدبير المنزل اذا كان الاخسّ من صاحبيه قد صار في مرتبة الافضل <وصار الافضل>[233] اِما تابعًا للاخسّ واِما منازعًا له ومحاربًا فيما يخالفه فيه، (87) ومع المنازعة الشغل ومع الشغل التضييع فليس يصلح امر المنزل إلا بان يكون افضل من فيه هو الرئيس على سائر اهله ويكون سائر اهله سامعين مطيعين له.

(88) وقد بيّنّا الغرضين الذين تُقصد لهما المرأة وهما الولد وتدبير المنزل فينبغي ان يُنظر ما الذي يحتاج اليه لهذين الغرضين حتى يُطلب، فاما الحسب والمال والجمال فليس من ذلك في شيء[234] (89) بل ربما ضرّت هذه الوجوه كلها لان الجمال[235] يكثر من يرمّقه ويبصره، فربما كان ذلك سببًا

224 (له وانه) T^1.

225 ش: عليه؛ يراجع A: ما يجب اليه.

226 ش: للأسباب.

227 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٦، س ٧ وما بعده: وليس ينبغي ان يكون قصد الرجل من المرأة هذه الامور: ١ - لا حسبًا. . .، ٢ - ولا مالًا. . .،٣ - ولا جمالًا. . .، فانه متى قصد واحدًا من هذه وكان موجودًا عند المرأة، رأت انه قد ظفر ببغيته منها ولم يبق عليها شيء تتقرب به اليه، فقصّرت في تدبير منزله الذي ارادها له وفسد حاله.

228 ش: مال.

229 منها] ش؛ T لا بيّنة (ورق مختلّ).

230 ش؛T لا بيّنة (لكنه يوجد عند ابن ابي الربيع).

231 [--]ات به] كذا في T؛ ش: <اساءت اليه> .

232 ش؛ في T: فيها.

233 زيادة في بل.

234 بر: فيه.

235 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٦، س ١٢ وما يلي: ٣ - ولا جمالًا: لكثرة من يرمّقه ببصره فيكون سببًا لفساد صاحبه.

her: that[224] he did not want her for children without (also) caring for him and checking on his affairs during his presence, absence, health, and sickness, having custody of all his wealth and aiding him in all his affairs, and (for) her[225] duties in respect of these, on account of[226] the reasons we have explained. (85) The man[227] must not look for rank, for[228] wealth, or for beauty in the woman, because if he looks for any one of these and it is found to exist in her, the woman sees that he has achieved what he desires from her[229] and there is nothing remaining that she needs in order to get close to him.[230] (86) Rather, she thinks that, if she [---][231] him or is careless of his rights, the fact he has obtained what he needs from[232] her obliges him to put up with this, and that he is readier to obey and submit to her than she is to do so to him. In this situation the management of the estate goes to ruin, since the inferior of the two owners is occupying the rank of the superior. <Now either the superior is>[233] to follow the inferior, or to quarrel and fight with him when he is in dispute with him. (87) And with quarrelling comes distraction, and with distraction comes negligence. For the business of the estate only prospers if its superior member is the head of the rest of the household [*ahl*], and the rest of the household [*ahl*] listens to him and obeys him.

(88) We have now explained the two purposes for which the woman is sought, i.e. children and the management of the estate. One must consider what is required to pursue these purposes. Rank, wealth, and beauty are of no relevance here.[234] (89) Rather, these attributes are often all detrimental. There[235] are many who gaze and stare at beauty, and frequently this is a cause of corruption in its possessor. As to rank, it leads its possessor to rely on it

224 that] T[1].
225 T; Ch., A: his.
226 Variant with same meaning in Ch.
227 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 116.7ff.: the man must not look for the following things in the woman: (1) not rank . . . ; (2) and not wealth . . . ; (3) and not beauty . . . If he looks for any one of these and it is found to exist in the woman, she sees that he has achieved what he desires in her and there is nothing remaining that she uses to get close to him, and so she is careless about the management of the estate, which is what he wanted her for, and his affairs go to ruin.
228 for] Ch. omits.
229 from her] Ch.; T defective due to paper damage.
230 to him] Ch. suggestion for unclear reading (cf. Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ).
231 lacuna due to paper damage; Ch.'s suggestion of 'does harm to' is not supported by the remaining letters.
232 from] following Ch.'s correction.
233 Addition in Pl.
234 Berg. emends unnecessarily.
235 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 116.12f.: (3) and not beauty: owing to the many who gaze and stare at it this is a cause of corruption in its possessor.

لفساد صاحبه والحسب[236] يدعو صاحبه الى الاتّكال عليه وترك كثير مما يزينه والمال[237] يبطر[238] الرجل في نفسه ورأيه[239]،[240] فكيف[241] بالمرأة التي هي الى نقص مائلة.[242]

(90) فالذي يحتاج اليه من المرأة للولد[243] امران[244] احدهما من البدن والآخر من النفس، فالذي[245] من البدن صحّة البنية والذي من النفس صحّة العقل فانه[246] <ليس>[247] مع سقم البدن وفساد العقل غاية،[248]

(91) فاما[249] تدبير المنزل <فيحتاج>[250] الى فضائل كثيرة اولها العقل والكيس ثم قوة النفس والبدن (p. 81) من[251] [108a] ضبط النفس والكفّ[252] لها عن الشهوات ثم ذلّة النفس لتستعمل ذلك فيما بينها وبين زوجها ثم رقّة القلب لتستعمل ذلك فيما بينها وبين ولدها ثم العدل في السيرة لتستعمل ذلك فيما بينها وبين خدمها، (92) فلا ترى شيئًا مما يحتاج اليه الرجل من الفضائل إلا وقد تحتاج المرأة الى مثله بل <اكثر>[253] لانها اضعف وهي الى اكتساب الفضائل احوج (93) واذ[254] كان ليس[255] كل نفس تقبل الفضائل بالتأديب فقد ينبغي للرجل ان يجتهد في اتّخاذ من يعينه على قبول الفضائل بالطبع ليمكنه ان يبني[256] على ما عنده ويزيد فيه.

236 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٦، س ٨ وما يلي: ١ - لا حسبًا: لكونه يدعو صاحبه الى الاتّكال عليه ويترك كثيرًا مما يزينه.

237 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٦، س ١٠ وما يلي: ٢ - ولا مالًا: لكونه يبطر الرجل ويفسد ماله، هذا مع فضيلة الرجل، فما ظنّك بالمرأة ونقصانها.

238 ش؛ في T: ينطر.

239 (في نفسه ورأيه) بل: فيفسد رأيه.

240 بل: <هذا مع فضيلة الرجل> (يراجع ابن ابي الربيع من دون مبرّر).

241 T^1.

242 اقترحه بر؛ في T: ما هي.

243 ش: اليه الولد من المرأة.

244 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٥، س ١٠ وما بعده: . . .امران: أ - احدهما النفس: وهو صحّة العقل وجودته والعمل به؛ ب - والآخر البدن: وهو صحّة البدن والبنية وكمال الاعضاء وبعض الحسّ.

245 ش (ورق T مختلّ).

246 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٥، س ١٤ وما يلي: ومتى خلت من هذين الامرين، فليس مع سقم البدن وفساد العقل نجابة اصلًا.

247 ش (ورق T مختلّ)؛ بل يراجع ابن ابي الربيع.

248 كذا في T؛ بل: نجابة (عن ابن ابي الربيع)

249 ش: اما.

250 زيادة ش (ورق T مختلّ).

251 كذا في T؛ ش: مع.

252 T^2.

253 زيادة ش.

254 بل؛ في T: ادا.

255 في T: ليست؛ A: وليس كل نفس تقبل.

256 T لا بيّنة: ينمي\ينبمني (؟)؛ ش: ينعنى (يُبقي)؛ بل: يبنى (مراجع العبري)؛ A: ان يبنى.

and to abandon much that adorns him.[236] Wealth[237] makes a man highly pleased[238] with himself and his opinions[239].[240] How much the more,[241] then, does this apply to a woman with her tendency[242] towards imperfection!

(90) For children, two things are needed[243] in the woman.[244] The first of these concerns the body, the second the soul. <What pertains>[245] to the body is soundness of build; what pertains to the soul is soundness of mind. For[246] with physical sickness and mental corruption there is <no>[247] end.[248]

(91) The[249] management of the estate <requires>[250] many virtues. The first of these is intelligence and acumen. Second is strength of soul and body based on[251] self-control and self-restraint[252] from the appetites. Third is humility of soul, which she is to use in her relationship with her husband. Fourth is tenderness of heart, which she is to use in her relationship with her children. Fifth is fairness of conduct, which she is to use in her relationship with her servants. (92) You will not find any of the virtues the man needs that the woman does not need in the same degree. Rather, <the more so>[253] because she is weaker and it is she who has a greater need of acquiring virtues. (93) Since[254] not[255] every soul is receptive to the virtues through instruction, the man must make an effort to find someone who will help him assume the virtues naturally so that he is able to build up[256] and increase what he (already) has.

236 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 116.8f.: (1) not rank: owing to its nature leads its possessor to rely on it and to abandon much that adorns him.

237 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 116.10f.: and not wealth: owing to its nature it makes a man pleased with himself; and his (own) wealth goes to ruin – and this despite the man's virtue. What, then, is one to think of the woman and her imperfection!

238 makes . . . highly pleased] following Ch.'s correction.

239 with himself and his opinions] Pl.: and corrupts his opinion.

240 Pl. (comparing Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ without cause): <and this despite the man's virtue>.

241 How much the more] T^1.

242 tendency] following Pl.'s suggestion.

243 For children two things are needed] Ch.: children need two things.

244 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 115.10ff.: two things: (a) one of these is the soul, and this means soundness and excellence of mind and acting in accordance with it; (b) and the other is the body, and this means soundness of body and build and perfection of the limbs and some of the senses.

245 Ch. (paper is damaged).

246 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 115.14f.: and when she is devoid of these two things, then, alongside physical sickness and mental corruption, there is no nobility at all.

247 Ch. (paper damaged); Pl. compares Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ.

248 end] Pl. (from Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ): nobility.

249 Lit. 'and as for': Ch.: as for.

250 Ch. (paper damaged).

251 based on] Ch.: along with.

252 self-restraint] T^2.

253 Addition in Ch.

254 Since] following Pl.'s correction.

255 Following Pl.'s correction (cf. A).

256 build up] Pl. (cf. Hebr.), A; unclear in T; Ch.: preserve.

(94) وليس يستقيم امر المنزل حتى يوافق خُلق المرأة خلق الرجل وطريقه وليس يوافق خلق امرأة[257] السوء وطريقها خلق الرجل السوء وطريقه[258] (95) ولا يتّفقان[259] إلا ان يكونا صالحين كما ان العود المستوي لا يطابق إلا العود المستوي فاما العود المعوجّ فانه لا يطابق المستوي ولا المعوجّ لان الاستواء طريق واحد والاعوجاج الى طرق كثيرة،[260] (96) فلذلك يحتاج الرجل والمرأة جميعًا ان يكونا عاقلين عفيفين منصفين وإن لم يكونا كذلك لم يتّفقا وفسد تدبير منزلهما،

ومن شكّ فيما قلنا من انه يحتاج الى ان يجتمع في المرأة جميع الفضائل <فبيّنّا>[261] ذلك فانه[262] لا يشكّ[263] انها قيّمة المنزل ومدبّرته [108b] والمفكّرة فيما (p. 82) يصلحه والمتولّية لسياسة من فيه من الخدم وغيرهم،[264] (97) فهل يكون التدبير إلا من ذي عقل ومعرفة، وهل تكون السياسة إلا من ذي رفق واناة مع الشدّة في موضع الشدّة، وهل تكون المصلحة إلا مع الضبط والحفظ، وهل يكون حسن القيام إلا مع الكيس والذكاء، (98) وهل يتمّ هذا كله إلا مع صيانة النفس واطّراح الشهوات واللذات إلا ما[265] حسن منها وبعد من الغلو، ثم الصبر على الاذى واحتمال المشقّة والسخاء بالنفس والانقياد للعدل، (99) وإلا فكيف يصون منزله من لا يصون نفسه، وكيف يتفرّغ لما يصلحه من هو مشغول بشهواته ولذّاته، وكيف يضبط من تحت يده من قد عجز عن ضبط نفسه، (100) وكيف يدوم على الطريقة من لا صبر له، وكيف يصبر على مؤونة الولد في تربيته والقيام بشأنه وعلى خدمة الزوج من لا احتمال له، وهل يؤثر[266] على نفسه إلا من في نفسه من القوة والنجدة ما يسهّل

257 ش؛ في T: مرة.
258 راجع A والعبري، ص ٥١٧.
259 ش؛ في T: ينفعان (؟).
260 فقرات ٩٤-٩٥ = موسونيوس روفوس ١٣ب عند النهاية؛ انظر ب ٢، م ١ (ب).
261 سو؛T (ورق مختلّ): [--]ا؛ ش: يتحقّق؛ بل: فنبيّن له.
262 ش: بأنه.
263 بل: شكّ.
264 فقرة ٩٦ = موسونيوس روفوس ٣؛ انظر ب ٢، م ١ (ب).
265 ش وبل؛ T: مع.
266 في T: يوتر؛ ش: ىؤير (يؤثر ؟).

(94) The affairs of the estate will not be straight until the character of the woman corresponds to the character and way of the man. The character and way of a bad woman[257] will not correspond to the character and way of a bad man.[258] (95) The two of them will not be in concord[259] unless both are good – just as straight wood will fit only with straight wood and crooked wood will fit neither with straight nor with crooked wood because straightness constitutes a single way whereas crookedness (goes) in many ways.[260] (96) The man and the woman, then, must jointly be intelligent, chaste, and just. For if they are not like this, there is no accord and the management of their estate goes to ruin.

If anyone doubts what we said about the need for all the virtues to be united in the woman, we <can state>[261] that (is so), and that[262] she is without any doubt[263] the caretaker and manager of the estate, who calculates what is good for it, and who is charged with ruling the servants and the other persons within it.[264] (97) Can there then be management without someone of intelligence and knowledge? Can there be rule without someone of kindness and consideration, together with severity when severity is in place? Can there be benefit without control and custody? Can there be proper execution without acumen and skill? (98) Can any of this be perfected without preserving the soul and ridding oneself of appetites and pleasures – excepting any[265] considered fine and free from excess? Or, moreover, without patience in the face of suffering, toleration of hardship, giving of oneself freely, and submitting to justice? (99) If not, how can one preserve one's estate if one cannot preserve one's soul? How can one devote oneself to what is good for it if one is occupied with one's own appetites and pleasures? How can one control those in one's power if one is incapable of self-control? (100) How can one persevere on the road if one has no patience? How can one have the patience to provide for the children's upbringing and for supporting their needs and to serve the husband unless one has tolerance? Will one give them priority[266] over oneself unless one has the strength and the courage in oneself to make

[257] woman] following Ch.'s correction.
[258] Cf. A and Hebr. at p. 517.
[259] be in concord] following Ch.'s correction.
[260] For the Greek fragment of §§94–5 embedded in Musonius Rufus XIIIb, see Chapter 2, Section 1(b).
[261] Paper damaged; the remaining letter rules out Ch.'s and Pl.'s suggestions (though Pl. was on the right track).
[262] Ch. minor variant.
[263] any doubt] Pl. suggests variant.
[264] For the Greek fragment of §96 embedded in Musonius Rufus III, see Chapter 2, Section 1(b).
[265] excepting any] Ch., Pl.; T: without.
[266] give them priority] Ch.'s reading.

ذلك عليه، وهل يصبر على الظلم <إلا>[267] من[268] الانصاف والعدل اقلّ ما عنده، (101) فانه ليس لاحد ان <يقول>[269] ان المرأة يتّفق[270] ما بينها وبين زوجها وما بينها وبين ولدها <إلا ان>[271] تخيّر ظلمهم[272] لها على ظلمها لهم وتحتمل غضبهم وجهمهم[273] واش[--][274] في اوقات ضجراتهم وعند العلل التي تعرض لهم ثم تريهم ان الـ<عيب>[275] (p. 83) في ذلك كله لها دونهم ثم لا تحقده عليهم <و>لا[276] يكون في نفسها منه شيء[277] (102) بل اذا ذكرته في بعض الاوقات[278] جدّد لها رقّةً عليهم ورحمةً لهم وجعلته مكان الاعتذار به عليهم ذكرًا لتلك الحالات التي دعتهم اليه[279] من ضجر او اغتمام او علّة، فرقّت[280] لهم من ذلك وتفجّعت له وكانت امنيتها ألا ترى مثل ذلك لنفسها وانها تكره[281] مثل الذي كان منهم ولكن ابقاءً[282] عليهم وشفقةً من كل ما اذاهم وغيّر حالهم، (103) فاين نفس اكمل من نفس تجتمع فيها هذه الخصال واذا اجتمعت هذه الخصال في المرأة فقد سعدت في نفسها وسعد بها زوجها وولدها[283] وشرف بها اهلها وصارت قدوةً للنساء.[284]

(104) ثم يتلو امر المرأة امر الولد فاقول ان افضل الولد ما كان من حرّة صحيحة البدن صحيحة العقل جامعة لهذه الخصال فهذا هو اول صلاح الولد والاساس الذي بني عليه تأديبه ويقوّم طريقته

267 ش؛ T (ورق مختلّ): ا[--].
268 ش: من <كان>.
269 T (ورق مختلّ): يق[--]؛ ش:يقوى؛ A: وليس يمتنع احد من ان يقول ان المرأة الخ.
270 (ان <يقول> ان المرأة يتّفق) لعله كذا في الاصل (ورق T مختلّ)؛ ش: ان يقوى <على> المرأة فيتّفق؛ بل: ان يقول <ان> المرأة يتّفق.
271 بل (ورق T مختلّ)؛ ش: <لكي ؟>؛ A: إن لم تختر ظلمهم لها على ان تظلمهم.
272 (تخيّر ظلمهم) لعله في T؛ انظر A في ح ٢٧١.
273 لعله كذا في T؛ ش: وحههم (وجَهمتهم)؛ بر: وجهمهم.
274 ورق T مختلّ؛ ش: <واستبدادهم>؛ بر: <وتراقبهم>؛ سو: <اشتدادهم>.
275 سو (ورق T مختلّ)؛ ش: <الفضل ؟>؛ بل: <الاثم>.
276 ش؛ في T: لا.
277 بر: شرّ.
278 في T: الاقوات؛ T^1 بخطّ غيره.
279 بر؛ في T: اليها.
280 بر؛ في T: قربت.
281 بر (يراجع العبري): <لا لانها> تكرَه.
282 بر: إتّقاءً.
283 (زوجها وولدها) على الارجح في T؛ A: اسعد زوجها وسعدت به.
284 فقرة ١٠٣ = موسونيوس روفوس ٣؛ انظر ب ٢، م ١ (ب).

this easy? Can one endure wrong <unless>[267] one has[268] the least fairness and justice? (101) For nobody can <say>[269] that the woman is concordant[270] in her relationship with her husband and her children <unless>[271] she prefers their wrongdoing[272] of her to her wrongdoing of them and tolerates their anger and sullen looks[273] and <violence>[274] at times when they are vexed or afflicted by illness, and, further, shows them that the <fault>[275] in all of this lies with her and not with them, and, finally, bears them no grudge for it <and>[276] shows no trace[277] of this in her soul. (102) Rather, when she recalls it sometimes,[278] it renews in her a feeling of tenderness and compassion towards them and makes it an occasion for excusing them for it as she recollects the situations of annoyance, anxiety, or illness which led them to it.[279] And so she is tender[280] to them because of this and is distressed by it. It is her wish that she should not experience such things, as she hates[281] the kind of behaviour they exhibited due to a desire to spare them[282] and from loving care towards them on account of everything that harms them and changes their circumstances. (103) Where is the soul more perfect than the soul in which are united these qualities? For when these qualities are united in the woman, then she is blest in herself, her husband and her children[283] are blest on her account, her family [*ahl*] is held in honour because of her, and she becomes an example to women.[284]

(104) *THE CHILD*

The subject of the child follows that of the woman. The best child is one (born) of a free woman who is sound in body and sound in mind and combines these

[267] Ch. (paper damaged).
[268] Ch. adds verb.
[269] Paper damaged; Ch.: have power over the woman; but cf. A: say.
[270] Lit. '<say> of the woman there is concordance . . .'; following Pl. (paper damaged, but reading is likely); Ch.: and there is then concordance.
[271] Pl. (paper damaged); Ch.: so that; A: if she does not choose their wrongdoing of her over doing them wrong herself.
[272] she prefers their wrongdoing] probable reading (paper damaged); see A in previous note.
[273] sullen looks] perhaps in T; Berg. corrects Ch.'s variant suggestion.
[274] Sw.; Ch.: <tyrannical behaviour>; Berg. (cf. the Hebr., but the form appears not to exist): observing.
[275] Sw.; paper damaged and one word missing (only definite article survives); Ch.: excellence; Pl.: offence; the remaining letter forms forbid Pl.'s suggestion, but sense is on his side.
[276] Ch.
[277] no trace] Berg.: evil.
[278] sometimes] T^1 (in different hand) corrects spelling error.
[279] it] following Berg.'s correction.
[280] she is tender] Berg.; T: close to.
[281] she hates] Berg. (cf. the Hebr.): <not because> she hates (what was done by them).
[282] spare them] Berg.: guard.
[283] her husband and her children] probable reading in T; cf. A: her husband is blessed and she is blessed in him.
[284] For the Greek fragment of §103 embedded in Musonius Rufus III, see Chapter 2, Section 1(b).

(105) [109a] وينبغي[285] ان يؤخذ بالادب من صغره فان الصغير اسلس قيادًا واسرع مؤاتاةً ولم تغلب عليه عادة تمنعه من اتّباع ما يراد منه ولا له عزيمة تصرفه عما يؤمر به (106) فهو اذا اعتاد الشيء ونشأ عليه خيرًا كان او شرًّا لم يكد ينتقل عنه، فإن عُوّد من صباه المذاهب الجميلة والافعال المحمودة بقي عليها (p. 84) ويزيد فيها اذا فهمها، (107) وإن اهمل وترك حتى يعتاد ما تميل اليه طبيعته <مما غلب عليها او عُوّد اشياء رديئة مما ليس في طبيعته>[286] ثم اخذ بالادب بعد غلبة تلك الامور عليه عسر انتقاله على الذي يؤدّبه ولم يكد يفارق ما قد جرى عليه،

(108) فان[287] اكثر الناس انما يؤتون من[288] سوء مذاهبهم من عادات الصبا[289] فانه لم يكن يقدّم لهم في الادب[290]، وقد رأيت كثيرًا لا يُحصون يعلمون ان مذاهبهم مذاهب رديئة ولا تُخفى عليهم الطرق المحمودة ويعسر عليهم الرجوع الى تلك الطرق لغلبة تلك المذاهب عليهم، فإن حمّلوا انفسهم

285 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٧، س ٨-١٥: وينبغي ان يؤخذ بالادب من صغره فان الصغير اسلس قيادًا واسرع مؤاتاةً ولم تغلب عليه عادة تمنعه من اتّباع ما يراد منه ولا له عزيمة تصرفه عما يؤمر به، فهو اذا اعتاد الشيء ونشأ عليه خيرًا كان او شرًّا لم يكد ينتقل عنه، فإن عُوّد من صباه المذاهب الجميلة والافعال المحمودة بقي عليها وزيد فيها اذا فهمها ، وإن اهمل وترك حتى يعتاد ما تميل اليه طبيعته مما غلب عليه او عُوّد اشياء رديئة مما ليس في طبيعته ثم اخذ بالادب بعد غلبته تلك الامور عليه عسر انتقاله مع الذي يؤذيه، ولم يكد يفارق ما قد جرى عليه، فان اكثر الناس انما يؤتون في سوء مذاهبهم من عادات الصبا.
بروسن فقرة ١٠٧ (على الذي يؤدّبه): قارن A.

286 زيادة في بل (عن ابن ابي الربيع).

287 ابن الجزار ص ١١٤، س ٥-٦: وقد قال أبو واس الفيلسوف إنّ أكثر الناس إنّما أوتُوا في سوء مذاهبهم مِن عادات الصبا إذا. . .[س ١٥-١٦] وذلك أنّا قد نرى من الناس مَن يعلم أنّ مذاهبه رديئة ولا يخفى عليه الطريق المحمود ويعسر عليه النزوع إليه لتقدُّم العادة المعتادة [ص ١١٥، س ١-٢] فيهم، وإن <حمّلوا> أنفسهم <عليها في> بعض تلك الحالات تصنُّعًا وحياءً من الناس في الظاهر لم يعدموا إذا خلوًا أن يرجعوا إلى المذاهب. . .

288 A وابن ابي الربيع: يؤتون في؛ ش: ريّون (يرثون ؟)؛ بل (عن ابن ابي الربيع): يؤتَون سوء مذاهبهم.

289 ش: الصباء.

290 ش: لم يكن مُقوِّمٌ لهم في الآداب؛ A: وانهم لم يؤخذوا بالادب منذ الصغر.

qualities. This constitutes the primary well-being for the child and the basis upon which his education is built and his way (of life) is directed. (105) His education must begin when he is small,[285] for the small child is readier to obey and quicker at cooperating. He is not yet ruled by habit which prevents him pursuing what one wants of him, and he lacks the determination that diverts him from orders. (106) When he has become accustomed to something and grows up with it, be it good or bad, he cannot readily be turned aside from it. If he becomes accustomed from his youth to fine practices and praiseworthy deeds, he stays with them and supplements them as he comes to understand them. (107) But if he is neglected and let go until he becomes accustomed to <the dominant characteristics> to which his nature inclines him, <or has become accustomed to base things which are not in his nature>,[286] and is then taken to be educated once these things have achieved dominance over him, it will be difficult for whoever is teaching him to turn him aside, and he will not easily be separated from what is (now) normal for him.

(108) Most[287] people come by[288] their bad practices as a result of the habits of boyhood,[289] since there has been no education before (this).[290] I have seen many beyond counting who know their practices are base, and from whom praiseworthy ways are not concealed, but who find it difficult to return to such ways because these practices are dominant in them. If they (ever) set

[285] Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 117.8–15: His education must begin when he is small, for the small child is readier to obey and quicker at cooperating. He is not yet ruled by habit which prevents him pursuing what one wants of him, and he lacks the determination that diverts him from orders. When he has become accustomed to something and grows up with it, be it good or bad, he cannot readily be turned aside from it. If he becomes accustomed from his youth to fine practices and praiseworthy deeds, he stays with them and supplements them as he comes to understand them. But if he is neglected and let go until he becomes accustomed to the dominant characteristics to which his nature inclines him, or has become accustomed to base things which are not in his nature, and is then taken to be educated once these things have achieved dominance over him, it will be difficult to turn him aside, given what is causing him harm, and he will not easily be separated from what is (now) the norm for him. Most people indeed are undone in bad practices arising from the habits of childhood.

NB A confirms that T's 'for whoever is teaching him' (§107) is correct and not the 'given what is causing him harm' of Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ. Teaching (يؤدّبه) and harming (يؤذيه) are written similarly and could easily be confused in transmission.

[286] <the dominant . . . his nature>] Pl. (from Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ).

[287] Ibn al-Jazzār p. 114.5–6: Bryson the Philosopher has said that most people come by their bad practices as a result of the habits of boyhood, since . . . [15–16] We have seen people who know their practices are base, and from whom the praiseworthy way is not concealed, but who find it difficult to aspire to it because of the establishment of the habit to which they have become accustomed. [p. 115.1–2] If they (ever) <set> themselves <against this> in some contexts out of dissimulation or shame before other people in public, once they are alone they do not fail to return to the practices . . .

[288] come by] Ch.: inherit; partially right in Pl.

[289] Variant spelling in Ch.

[290] there has been no education before (this)] Ch.: there was no one to <correct> their education and culture. Note A: for they did not begin education from their youngest years.

عليها في بعض الحالات حياءً من الناس في الظاهر لم يعدموا اذا خلوا ان يرجعوا الى المذاهب الأُخر التي قد غلبت عليهم وتمكّنت في طباعهم، (109) ورأيت ايضًا كثيرًا من الاولاد ما دام آباءهم وغيرهم ممن ياخذهم بالادب احياءً فهم ملازمون الطرق[291] المحمودة فاذا فقدوهم صاروا الى اخبث الطرق وارداًها، (110) وليس من الاسباب شيء اقوى في ذلك من عادة الصباء، إلا ان الصبي اذا كان في طبعه ان يميل الى الاشياء الرديئة [109b] وسلك مع هذا طريق الاعتياد لها كان عليها احرص واليها اسرع وفيها اشدّ دخولًا حتى تستحكم فيه ولا يكون له الى مفارقتها سبيل، (111) وبازاء[292] هذا ان يكون الصبي جيّد الطبع (p. 85) يسلك به طريق الاعتياد للخير فيكون كل واحد من طبعه وعادته مقوّمًا لصاحبه حتى يقوى الخير فيه ويستحكم، فكما ان ذلك لا يقدر على مفارقة الامور <الرديئة فكذلك هذا لا يفارق الامور>[293] المحمودة (112) وفيما بين ذلك ان يكون الصبي جيّد الطبع ثم يُحمل على الاشياء <الرديئة>[294] او يُطلق في[295] مقارنة اهلها او يكون رديء الطبع ثم يُحمل على الاشياء المحمودة او يتّفق له ان يرى من يسلكها فهذان قد تنقلهما العادة عن الطبع وقد يمكنهما النزوع بعد ذلك عن العادة والرجوع الى ما عليه البنية[296]،

(113) واصلح[297] الصبيان من كان[298] منهم[299] مطبوعًا على الحياء وحبّ الكرامة[300] وكانت له

[291] بل؛ T: الطريق.

[292] كذا في T؛ ش: وباداء (وبازاء ؟).

[293] زيادة في بل؛ ش: <الرديئة لا يقدر هو مفارقة الامور>.

[294] زيادة في ش.

[295] (او يُطلق في) را؛ في T: اد يطلق ومقارنة؛ ش: <او يتّفق له>.

[296] بل: البنية (يراجع العبري)؛ في T البينه؛ ش: البينة (البيئَة)؛ .

[297] ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٧، س ١٥-١٩: واعلم ان اصلح الصبيان من كان منهم على الحياء وحبّ الكرامة، ومن كانت له انفة. واذا كان كذلك كان تاديبه سهلًا، ومن كان من الصبيان بالضدّ عسر تاديبه. ثم لا بد لمن كان كذلك من تخويف عند الاساءة، ثم تحقيق ذلك بالضرب اذا لم ينفع التخويف، ثم الاحسان اذا احسن.

[298] ابن الجزار ص ١١٦، س ٣-٦: أعني أن يكون مطبوعا على الحياء وحبّ الكرامة. . .فإنّ تأديبه يكون سهلا. . .فإن <كان> الصبيّ قليل الحياء مستخِفًا للكرامة. . .عَسرُ تأديبًا.

[299] ش: بينهم.

[300] φιλοτιμία، راجع ح ٣٨٠.

themselves against these (practices) in some contexts owing to a feeling of shame before other people in public, once they are alone they do not fail to return to the other practices which have become dominant in them and ingrained in their natures. (109) I have also seen many children who maintained praiseworthy ways[291] as long as their fathers and others in charge of their education were alive, but turned to the worst and basest of ways when they lost them. (110) There is no reason more powerful for this than habit formed in boyhood. However, when the boy has a natural inclination to bad things and in addition to this follows the course of accustoming himself to them, he is more eager for them, quicker to attain them, and goes into them more deeply with the result that they become well established in him and there is no way for him to separate himself from them. (111) The opposite of[292] this is that the boy is naturally excellent and one takes him along the course of accustoming himself to the Good, and then his nature and his habits each act to correct the other until the Good becomes strong and well established in him. And just as the first boy is not in a position to separate himself from <bad> things, <the second will not separate himself from> praiseworthy <ones>.[293] (112) In intermediate cases, where the boy is excellent by nature, but is then led into <bad>[294] things, or is abandoned in[295] the company of people who (practise) them, or where he is bad by nature, is then led to praiseworthy things, or happens to see someone who practises them, habit has diverted both of these from (their) nature; but it is possible that after a while they will break with habit and revert to their make-up.[296]

(113) The best[297] sort of boy is[298] the one[299] who is endowed by nature with shame and love of honour,[300] and takes pride. If he is like

[291] Pl.; T: way

[292] opposite of] Ch. reports a different reading but corrects to this.

[293] <bad . . . ones>] Pl.; Ch.: <bad> things, <he is not in a position to separate himself from> praiseworthy <ones>.

[294] Ch. adds.

[295] or is abandoned in] Rap.; T: once abandoned, and; Ch.: <falls in with>.

[296] make-up] Pl. from Hebr.; T. has misspelled the word; Ch.: environment.

[297] Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 117.15–19: Know that the best sort of boy is the one who is endowed with shame and love of honour, and who is someone with pride. If he is like this, it is easy to educate him. If he is one of the boys of the opposite (kind) it is difficult to educate him. And with this type there is no alternative but to employ fear when he does wrong, then to accomplish (one's aim) with blows if using fear does not work, and finally to treat him well, if he behaves well.

[298] Ibn al-Jazzār p. 116.3–6: he is endowed by nature with shame and love of honour . . . educating him is easy. If the boy has little shame, despises honour . . . he is difficult to educate.

[299] one] Ch.: among them.

[300] *ḥubb al-karāma*: almost certainly for φιλοτιμία, so also in §114. Later on in §155 this appears as *maḥabbat al-karāma*. For Greek compounds in φιλο-, either *ḥubb* or *maḥabba* (both meaning 'love') could be used (cf. Ullmann 2006 *s.vv.*, and below n. 380); because of the following *karāma*, 'honour', in the next line, I have here translated as 'love of honour', which is also more suitable than 'ambition' in §§114 and 155.

انفة واذا كان كذلك[301] كان تأديبه سهلًا، ومن كان منهم قليل الحياء مستخفًّا بالكرامة بعيدًا من الانفة عسر تأديبه، (114) ولا بد لمن كان كذلك من تخويف[302] عند الاساءة وافزاع ثم <تحقيق ذلك بالضرب اذا لم ينفع التخويف ثم>[303] الاحسان اذا احسن، فاما الذي له انفة وفيه حبّ الكرامة فالمدح[304] والذمّ يبلغان منه عند الاحسان والاساءة ما لا تبلغه[305] العقوبة والعطية من غيره،

(115) وينبغي[306] ان يُتفقّد الصبي في جميع حالاته من مطعمه ومشربه ونومه وقيامه وقعوده[307] وحركته وكلامه وجميع اموره ويعلَّم في جميع هذا تجنّب القبيح والقصد الى[308] الجميل فانه اذا عرف الجميل (p. 86) والقبيح في هذه الأشياء [110a] وقاما في نفسه تنبّه عليهما وفهمهما في غيرها[309] من جميع الامور ولم يحتج في كثير من ذلك الى تقويم، وانا مبيّن لك طريقًا الى ذلك.

(116) فاوله امر الطعام فاقول انه ينبغي ان يعوّد الصبي ان لا يبادر اليه حتى يوضع ولا ينظر اليه نظر الشره {اليه} وان يُحتال في تصغير قدر الطعام في عينه[310] (117) وإن ظهر منه شيء من الشره ان يعيَّر به ويبيَّن له قبحه ويعلَّم ان الشره من طريقة الخنزير فمن شاركه فيه لم يكن بينه وبينه فرق، واذا جلس على الطعام مع[311] من هو اكبر منه فلا يمدّ يده الى الطعام قبله إلا ان يؤمر بذلك، (118) ولا ياكل إلا من بين يديه[312] ولا يكثّر من مدّ يده مرةً الى شيء ومرةً الى آخر ولكن يقتصر في اكثر اكله على

301 كذا في T؛ ش: ذلك؛ صحّحه بل عن ابن ابي الربيع.
302 كذا في T؛ ش: تحريف (تخويف).
303 زيادة في بل عن ابن ابي الربيع والعبري؛ A: ولا بد لمن كان كذلك من ضرب وتفزيع.
304 ش وA؛ في T: فبالمدح.
305 ش؛ في T: يبلغه.
306 ابن الجزار ص ١١٦، س ٨-٩: وينبغي أن يُتفقّد الصبيّ في كلامه وقعوده بين الناس وحركته ونومه وقيامه ومطعمه ومشربه.
307 T: وقوعده؛ تصحيح T^2 بخطّ غيره؛ A وقعوده.
308 زيادة بر في الحاشية؛ كذا في A.
309 بل؛ في T: غيرهما.
310 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٩، س ٣: (وللولد حالان: ١. . .) أ - يجب ان يصغّر الطعام في عينه. . .
311 A (ساقطة من T)؛ ألحقه بل عن العبري.
312 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٩، س ٤: (وللولد حالان: ١. . .) ب - ويؤمر ان ياكل من بين يديه خاصةً. . .

this,[301] it is easy to educate him. In the case of a boy who has little shame, despises honour, and is far from proud, educating him is difficult. (114) And with this type there is no alternative but to employ fear[302] and terror when he does wrong, then <to accomplish (one's aim) with blows if using fear does not work, and finally>[303] to treat him well, if he behaves well. In the case of the boy with pride who has a love of honour, praise[304] and blame following good or wrong behaviour achieve what punishment and gifts cannot achieve[305] in a different boy.

(115) The[306] boy must be examined in every situation involving his eating, drinking, sleeping, posture standing [*qiyām*], posture sitting [*quʿūd*],[307] movement, speech, and all his affairs. He will be taught in all of these to avoid unseemliness and strive for[308] decorum. If he recognizes what is decorous and what is unseemly in these matters, and both concepts are established in his soul, he will heed them and grasp them in all other matters,[309] and for the most part he will not need correction.

I shall (now) set out for you a way to accomplish this.

(116) The first step is the matter of food. The boy must be accustomed not to rush up before it is served, and not to gaze at it greedily. A way must be found to minimize the importance of food in his eyes.[310] (117) If he shows signs of greed, he should be rebuked for it and the disgrace of it should be made plain to him. He should be taught that greed is a characteristic of a pig and that whoever associates himself with (a pig) in this regard cannot be distinguished from one. If he sits down to eat with[311] someone who is older than him, he must not stretch out his hand for food before he does, unless told to. (118) He should only eat what is in front of him.[312] He should not persist in stretching out his hand, now for one thing, now for another.

301 like this] T, Pl. (from Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ); Ch.: this.
302 to employ fear] Ch. has alternative reading, but corrects to this.
303 Pl.'s addition (from Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ). Cf. A: there is no alternative but to use blows and fear if someone is like that.
304 Following Ch.'s correction; so also A.
305 Following Ch.'s correction.
306 Ibn al-Jazzār p. 116.8–9: the boy must be examined in his speech, posture sitting in company, movement, sleeping, posture standing, eating, and drinking.
307 posture sitting] T^2 in different hand; cf. A.
Cf. Clement, *Paidagogus* 3.59.1: posture standing [*stasis*], movement, walk, clothes, and quite simply our whole way of life.
308 for] A, cf. Berg.
309 other matters] Pl.; T: matters other than these two.
310 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 119.3: (two situations of the child: 1 . . .) (a) it is necessary to minimize (the importance of) food in his eyes.
311 with] Pl. confirmed by A.
312 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 119.4: (two situations of the child: 1 . . .) (b) he is told to eat what is in front of him specifically.

شيء واحد ولا يرغب في كثرة الالوان ولا يسرع في الاكل ولا يعظّم لقمه (119) ولا يلطّخ يديه ولا فمه ولا ثيابه ولا يلطع[313] اصابعه ولا يكون آخر من يرفع يده عن[314] الطعام ولا ينظر الى احد ممن ياكل معه[315] ولا سيّما إن كان غريبًا.

(120) وينبغي ان يفهم الصبي ان الطعام انما يُحتاج اليه كما يُحتاج الى الدواء فكما ان ليس يُقصد من الدواء الى ان يكون لذيذًا او كثيرًا وانما يُقصد الى منفعته وكذلك ليس القصد من الطعام الى لذّته ولا كثرته وانما القصد الى (p. 87) مقدار منفعته، (121) ويعوَّد الصبي ان يُنيل من سأله مما يطعم فانه يستفيد من ذلك ضبط الشهوة والسخاء والتحبّب،[316] ويعوّد القناعة باخسّ الطعام[317] والاقتصار على الخبز بلا ادم فان هذه العادة تعينه على العفّة وظلف النفس وقلّة الرغبة في المال (122) [110b] والرغبة في المال مذمومة في نفسها وهي مع ذلك ربّما دعت الى اكتسابه من وجوه قبيحة اذا لم يتهيّأ[318] كسبه من وجوه[319] جميلة، والقناعة باخسّ الطعام جميلة بالفقير والغني إلا ان الفقير اليها احوج وهي بالغني اجمل، (123) وينبغي للصبي ان لا يستوفي الغداء[320] وان يجعل[321] استيفاءه للطعام في[322] وقت عشائه فان ذلك نافع له في ذهنه وصحّة بدنه لانه إن استوفى طعامه بالنهار ثقل واعتراه الكسل واحتاج الى النوم وغلظ ذهنه عن قبول الادب، (124) وليس ينبغي ان يعوَّد الصبي التكاسل[323] والنوم بالنهار بل يعوَّد النشاط والحركة والحرص على الادب وهذا التدبير ايضًا للرجل اجود

313 بر عن العبري؛ في T: يلطخ.
314 ش؛ في T: من.
315 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٩، س ٤-٥: (وللولد حالان: ١. . .ب - ويؤمر ان. . .) ولا ينظر الى احد من الحضّر.
316 بل؛ في T: تجنب؛ انظر A: والتحبب الى الناس.
317 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٩، س ٦: (وللولد حالان: ١. . .) ج - ويعوّد القناعة بادون الاطعمة.
318 ش؛ لعله في T؛ اكّده A.
319 في T: وجوهه؛ تصحيح ش؛ A: وجوه.
320 في T: العدآء؛ A: الغذآ، A^1 الغدا.
321 اهمله ش.
322 اهمله ش.
323 بر: كسل (لكن يراجع ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٩، س ٨: ويمنع من التكاسل. . .النشاطة).

Rather, he should restrict himself in most of his eating to one thing and not desire a great number of dishes. He should not hurry in eating. He should not take big mouthfuls. (119) He should not sully his hands, mouth, or clothes. He should not lick[313] his fingers. He should not be the last to take his hand off[314] the food. He should not stare at any one of his table-companions,[315] especially if they are strangers.

(120) The boy must be made to understand that food is needed in the same way as medicine. Just as it is not intended with medicine that it should be pleasant or plentiful but, rather, useful, in the same way the intention with food lies not in its pleasure or quantity but rather in the degree of its utility. (121) Let the boy be accustomed to present part of what he is eating to someone who requests it. For in this way he gains control of appetite, generosity, and popularity.[316] Let him be accustomed to being content with the frugalest of fare,[317] and to limit himself to bread with nothing on it. For this habit will help him towards continence, self-restraint, and the least wish for money. (122) Desire for money is in itself blameworthy. In addition it often leads to its acquisition by disgraceful means when there is no opportunity[318] to acquire it by fair ones.[319] Being content with the most frugal fare is an excellent thing for rich and poor – except that one who is poor has a greater need to do this, while in one who is rich it is a sign of greater worth. (123) The boy must not eat his fill at breakfast,[320] but do[321] so (only) at[322] the time of his evening meal. For this is beneficial for his mind and his bodily health because, if he eats his fill during the daytime, he grows heavy, idleness takes hold of him, he needs to sleep, and his mind becomes too gross to receive education. (124) The boy must not be accustomed to laziness[323] and sleeping in the daytime, but should be accustomed to energy, movement, and zeal for education. This regime is also better for the man: if he is accustomed to it from

313 lick] Pl. (an easy change, on the basis of the Hebr.); T: sully.
314 Ch.; T: from
315 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 119.4–5: (two situations of the child: 1 . . . (b) he is told . . .) not to stare at any one of those present.
316 popularity] following Pl.'s correction; A: popularity with people.
317 Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 119.6: (two situations of the child: 1 . . .) (c) be accustomed to being content with the humblest of fare.
318 Ch.; probable reading of T; confirmed by A.
319 Following Ch.'s correction, confirmed by A.
320 T offers a form which could be *ghadāʾ*, 'breakfast', later 'lunch' (Lane 1863–93: *s.v.*), or *ghidhāʾ*, 'food'; A has *ghidhāʾ* (A[1] *ghadāʾ*). The sense here seems to be avoidance of too much food before lessons, which should take place in the morning (§134).
321 do] Ch. omits.
322 at] Ch. omits.
323 laziness] Berg. suggests variant (but Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 119.8 confirms T).

فإن عُوّده من صباه كان اسهل عليه وانفع له، (125) ولا يكون اكثر اكله اللحوم والاشياء الغليظة فان تركهما انفع له في الذكاء وصحّة البدن وفي سرعة النشوء لان الغذاء الثقيل يُثقل الطبيعة ويمنعها من النشوء، (126) ويعوَّد (p. 88) الصبي الاقلال من الحلو والفواكه فان ذلك انفع له في نفسه وبدنه اما في نفسه فلان[324] لا يغلب عليه الترفّه وحبّ اللذّات واما في بدنه فلسرعة استحالة الاشياء الحلوة والفواكه وفسادها في الابدان الحارّة، (127) ويعوَّد الصبي ان يكون شربه بعد الفراغ من طعامه فان ذلك اصلح لبدنه ونفسه،[325] اما لنفسه فلضبطه لها واما لبدنه فلان ذلك اعون له [111a] لاستمراء الطعام واجدر ان يقوّي بدنه وقد عرف ذلك من جرّبه وعلماء الاطبّاء يشيرون به والمستعملون الانبذة يعلمون[326] به، (128) ووقت الطعام بالنهار للصبي هو الوقت الذي يكون قد فرغ فيه من وظيفته التي يتعلّمها وتعب تعبًا كافيًا،[327] ومتى رأيتَ الصبي ياكل الشيء، وهو يحبّ ان يُخفي اكله ايّاه فامنعه منه فانه لم يستر اكله إلا وقد علم انه لا يحتاج اليه وانه في اكله له مخطئ،

(129) ويعوَّد الصبي ان لا يشرب الماء على غذائه ولا سيّما في الصيف فانه اذا شرب ثقل الغذاء وفتر بدنه وكسل ونفد الطعام ايضًا عن معدته سريعًا واحتاج الى غيره وان كان الشتاء فهو مع ذلك يبرّد البدن، (130) ويجمل بالصبي ان يضبط نفسه عن شرب الماء في اوقات شغله بالتعلّم وحضور من يجب اجلاله (131) ولا ينبغي ان يقرب الصبي النبيذ (p. 89) حتى يصير الى حدّ الرجال لانه يضرّه في بدنه ونفسه، اما في بدنه فلانه يسخّنه وهو لا يحتاج الى السخونة لحرارته واما في نفسه فاذا كان النبيذ يغيّر اذهان الرجال المحنّكين ويُخرجهم الى السخف وسرعة الغضب ورداءة الفكر والقحة والتهوّر فالصبى احرى ان يفعل ذلك به،[328] ودماغ[329] الصبي[330] مع هذا رقيق فبخار النبيذ يسرع الى افساده

324 A؛ في T: فلين؛ ش: فلانه.
325 بل (يراجع العبري) وA: لنفسه وبدنه.
326 T وش؛ بر (مراجع العبري): يعملون.
327 ابن ابي الربيع ص ١١٩، س ٧ : (وللولد حالان: ١. . .) د - ويجعل طعامه وقت الفراغ من وظائف الاشتغال؛ مسكويه ص ٥٩، س ١٨-٢٠ (مثلا): وينبغي ان لا ياكل حتى يفرغ من وظائف الآداب التي يتعلّمها، ويتعب تعبًا كافيًا.
328 T^1 بخطّ غيره (؟): اقول وعلى كل حال فترك الشراب اولى واحرى للصغير والكبير فانه مادّة كل شرّ.
329 ش: دماغه.
330 اهمله ش.

boyhood it will be easier for him and of greater benefit to him. (125) Meats and gross things should not form a majority of what he eats. Putting these aside is more beneficial for (achieving) sharpness of mind and bodily health, and for promoting rapid development because heavy food makes one's nature heavy and prevents it from developing. (126) Let the boy be accustomed to have only a little confectionery and fruit. This is more beneficial for his soul and his body – for his soul because[324] luxury and love of pleasures do not get the better of him; and for his body, because of the speed with which confectionery and fruit are broken down and because of their corruption in hot bodies. (127) Let the boy be accustomed to having his drink after he has finished his food. This is healthier for his body and his soul[325] – for his soul, because it regulates it; and for his body, because it is more helpful for the digestion of his food and more likely to strengthen his body. Anyone with experience already understands this, knowledgeable physicians advise it, and those who take wine know about[326] it. (128) The right time for the boy to have food in the day is when he has already finished the lesson he has been studying and is fairly tired.[327] Whenever you see the boy eat something and he wants to hide the fact he is eating it, forbid him from doing it, since he is only covering his food up because he knows he does not need it and is at fault in eating it.

(129) Let the boy be accustomed not to drink water with his food, especially in summer, because if he drinks, the food becomes heavy, his body becomes languid and lazy, the meal is speedily consumed from his stomach, and he is in need of more. In addition, if it is winter, (the water) cools his body. (130) It is seemly for the boy to restrain himself from drinking water at times when he is busy learning or in the presence of someone who demands his respect. (131) The boy must not go near wine before he is on the verge of manhood because it will damage his body and his soul. In the case of the body, it warms it, though it does not need warming owing to its own heat. In the case of the soul, if wine tends to alter the minds of men of experience in life and lead them to foolishness, irascibility, bad thoughts, insolence, and reckless behaviour, with a boy this is even more likely[328] because the brain[329] of a boy[330] is in addition delicate and the vapour of the alcohol quickly

[324] because] A.; cf. Ch.'s correction of T.

[325] for his body and his soul] Pl. (cf. Hebr.) and A: for his soul and his body.

[326] know about] Berg.: go by. The verbs are similar in form and often changed by copyists.

[327] Ibn Abī l-Rabīʿ p. 119.7: (two situations of the child: 1 . . .) (d) takes his food at the time when he finishes the lessons he has been engaged on; Miskawayh 59.18–20 (e.g.), 'he must not eat until he finishes the lessons in the subjects he has been studying and is fairly tired'.

[328] T^1 in (?) a different hand: I say: in every case, leaving drink aside is proper and appropriate for young or old because it is the stuff of all evil.

[329] Ch.: his brain.

[330] of a boy] Ch. omits.

لقوته عليه (132) ولا ينبغي للصبي ان يحضر مجالس النبيذ[331] إلا ان يكون من فيها من اهل الادب والفضل فاما مجالس العوامّ فلا وذلك لما يجري[332] فيها من قبيح الكلام ويظهر في اهلها من السخف.
(133) واما النوم فيقدّر للصبي منه مقدار[333] حاجته ويمنع من ان يستعمله للذّته[334] به فان كثرة النوم[335] ضارّة[336] له [111b] في بدنه ونفسه لانه يُرخي البدن ويفتّحه[337] ويغلّظ الذهن ويُميت القلب، (134) وينبغي ان يمنع الصبي من ان ينام اذا اكل حتى ينحطّ الطعام ويستقرّ قرارة وينبَّه[338] في السحر ليُنفض عن بدنه ما اجتمع فيه من الفضول والاوساخ ويخفّ فانه[339] ليس شيء اعون على الذكاء من ذلك ولا ابلغ في نشاط البدن وصحّته ولا وقت (p. 90) اجود للمتعلّم من وقت الغداة، (135) والرجل ايضًا يحتاج الى ان ينتبه[340] في السحر فاذا عُوّد[341] ذلك من صباه كان عليه اسهل ويُمنع الصبي من النوم بالنهار إلا ان احتاج اليه لضعف او لعلّة، (136) ولا يُعوّد الصبي[342] النوم بحضرة الناس لانه مع ما في ذلك من القبح يدلّ على انه ليس بمالك لنفسه ولا ضابط لها عن اللذّة والفراش الوطيء رديء للصبي[343] لانه يُرخيه ويفتّحه[344] والصبي يحتاج الى ان يصلَّب وتشتدّ نفسه.

331 زيادة في الهامش بخطّ متفاوت يشبه خطّ القول في شرّ النبيذ؛ لكن انظر A: ولا ينبغي ان يخضر مجالس اصحاب النبيذ إلا الخ.
332 في T: سحرا؛ تصحيح ش؛ A: يجرى.
333 كذا في T؛ ش: مقدلد (مقدار)ٍ.
334 A؛ في T: للنلد (؟)؛ ش: للتلذّذ.
335 T^2.
336 A: ضارّة؛ في T: ضارا (تصحيح ش).
337 في T: ويفتحه؛ ش: يفنّحه؛ يراجع ز ص ٦٠ ح ١؛ وانظر ح ٣٤٤.
338 في T: وينبه؛ لكن ش: وينبد (ويُنبَّه).
339 كذا في T؛ ش: لأنهُ.
340 ش: يُنبَّه.
341 في T: اعود؛ تصحيح ش.
342 T^2.
343 في T: وللصبى.
344 في T: ويفتحه؛ ش: ويفنّحه؛ بر: ويفتّحه (راجع ح ٣٣٧).

corrupts it because of its power over it. (132) The boy must not attend symposiums[331] except when people of education and refinement are there. As for the parties of ordinary people, he should also not attend owing to the fact that abusive language is normal[332] and foolishness is apparent among people there.

(133) The amount of sleep the boy has will be assessed according to the extent[333] of his need. He must be prevented from using sleep for his pleasure.[334] Too much sleep[335] is harmful[336] to his body and his soul because it loosens the body and opens it up[337] and makes the mind gross and deadens the heart. (134) The boy must be prevented from sleeping when he has eaten until the food has gone down and settled properly. He is to be roused[338] at dawn to remove from his body the waste and dirt which has accumulated in it so he becomes agile. For[339] there is nothing more helpful for sharpness of mind than this, and nothing more conducive to bodily energy and health. Nor is there is a better time for someone to learn than early morning. (135) The man also needs to wake[340] at dawn, and it will be easier if he has been accustomed[341] to this since boyhood. The boy must be prevented from sleeping during the day except when he needs to on account of weakness or disease. (136) Nor should the boy[342] be accustomed to sleeping in people's presence because – leaving aside the disgrace involved – it shows that he is not able to control himself or check himself from pleasure. Soft bedding is bad for the boy[343] because it loosens and opens him up.[344] The boy needs toughening and (he needs) his soul to grow strong.

331 Lit. 'meetings/parties for alcohol/wine' (*majālis al-nabīdh*); *nabīdh* is in T^1 in a hand resembling the comment on the dangers of wine, but cf. A: he must not attend meetings of those who use wine (*majālis aṣḥāb al-nabīdh*) except when . . .

332 is normal] following Ch.'s correction; cf. A.

333 according to the extent] so T; Ch. offers an alternative reading but corrects to this.

334 his pleasure] A; T is garbled; Ch.: for taking pleasure.

335 sleep] T^2.

336 is harmful] A. (and Ch.'s correction of T).

337 opens it up] Ch.: weakens. For the correct reading here and in Miskawayh, see Zurayk 1968: 54 n. 17 (on p. 201). Cf. n. 344.

338 He is to be roused] Ch. misreads T and corrects to this.

339 Ch.: because.

340 Ch.: be roused.

341 Following Ch.'s correction.

342 the boy] T^2.

343 Scribal correction.

344 opens him up] Ch.: weakens him. Cf. n. 337.

(137) ولَئِن[345] ينال[346] الصبي طرف من البرد في الشتاء ومن الحرّ في الصيف خير له من ان لا يناله شيء منهما[347] ومن لم ينله شيء من ذلك كان بدنه رقيقًا ضعيفًا وكانت نفسه ايضًا رخوةً خوّارةً، وكذلك المشي والعدو والركوب والحركة خير للصبي من السكون والدعة والخفض[348] والدلال، (138) وينبغي ايضًا ان لا يعوَّد الصبي لبس الليّن والرقيق وان لا يكبّر[349] في نفسه هيبة اللباس وان يفهم ان ذلك انما يليق بالنساء والمترفين فان[350] ذلك يدعوه الى محبّة المال وقد بيّنّا ان محبّة المال رديئة في نفسها داعية الى ما هو اردأ منها، (139) ولا ينبغي ايضًا ان يخرج بلا رداء[351] ولا[352] يُرخي يديه (p. 91) ولا يضمّهما الى صدره ولا يكشف ساعده ولا[353] يسرع في مشيه جدًّا ولا يُبطئ فيه جدًّا فان السرعة في المشي يدلّ على التهوّر والابطاء فيه يدلّ على التيه والكسل وكشف الساعد من فعل الوقاح وارخاء اليدين من الاستخفاف بالناس (140) [112a] ولا ينبغي ان يربّى له شعر[354] ولا يزيَّن الصبي بشيء من زينة النساء بل يعرّف قبح التصنّع والغرض الذي يقصد اليه من يتصنّع ويبغَّض اليه التشبّه بالنساء ويحبَّب اليه التشبّه بالرجال، (141) ولا يلبس الخاتم إلا[355] ان يحتاج اليه ويُمنع ان يفخر[356] بشيء يملكه على من لا يملك مثله[357] ويعاب ذلك عليه حتى ينتهي عنه ويُطلَق له الفخر بالادب والعلم والمباراة[358] فيهما.

(142) ويؤخذ باكرام من هو اكبر منه والقيام له عن موضعه وان لا يُكرم الغني إلا كما يُكرم

345 ش؛ في T: ولين؛ بر: ولَان.
346 لعله في T؛ ش: مال (ينال).
347 ش؛ في T: منها.
348 بل (مراجع العبري)؛ في T: والحفط؛ ش: والحفظ (؟).
349 كذا في T؛ ش: يلبر (يُكبّر).
350 كذا في T؛ ش: وان.
351 في T: ردا، في A: ردآ؛ بل (مراجع العبري): حذاء.
352 مسكويه ص ٦٠، س ٨-٩: ولا يرخي يديه.
353 مسكويه ص ٦٠، س ٨: ولا يسرع في مشيه.
354 مسكويه ص ٦٠، س ٩: ولا يربي شعره.
355 في T: الى؛ تصحيح بل.
356 ش: يفتخر.
357 مسكويه ص ٦٠، س ١٠: ولا يلبس خاتمًا إلا وقت حاجته اليه، ولا يفتخر على أقرانه بشيء.
358 في T: والماراة؛ تصحيح ش؛ A: والمباراة.

(137) If[345] the boy is exposed[346] to a degree of cold in winter and heat in summer, it is better for him than being exposed to neither of them.[347] If someone has had no exposure to any of this, his body will be delicate and weak and his soul languid and feeble. For the same reason, walking, running, riding, and movement are better for the boy than quiet, calm, ease,[348] and pampering. (138) Also, the boy must not be accustomed to dressing in soft and fine clothing. He should not think much[349] of (people's) regard for clothes, but understand that this is appropriate for women and effeminates and[350] that it leads to a love of money. We have already explained that love of money is bad in itself and leads to worse. (139) Further, he must not go out without a cloak,[351] nor let his hands hang slack[352] or fold them over his chest. He should not reveal his arm. He should not hurry too much when he walks,[353] nor be very slow, for speed in walking is a sign of recklessness while slowness is a sign of disdain and idleness. Revealing the arm is an act of insolence, and letting the hands hang slack is a sign of contempt for people. (140) His hair must not be allowed to grow long.[354] The boy must not be adorned with women's adornments. Rather, one should make him realize the disgrace of effete behaviour and the aim of someone who practises it. One should make him hate the idea of looking like women and love the idea of looking like men. (141) He should not wear a ring except[355] when he needs to. He should be prevented from boasting[356] about an item in his possession in front of someone who does not possess such a thing,[357] and should be reproached for this till he stops. He should be allowed to boast of his culture and learning and to compete[358] on the basis of these.

(142) He should be admonished to honour his elders, to stand up from his seat for them, and not to honour the rich except to the degree he honours

[345] Following Ch.'s correction.
[346] is exposed] probable reading in T; Ch. misreads T but corrects to this.
[347] Following Ch.'s correction.
[348] T garbled; Pl.'s reading is translated by him as 'Müßiggang', 'idleness'.
[349] think much] Ch. misreads T but corrects to this.
[350] Variant with same meaning in Ch.
[351] cloak] T, A; Pl. (following Hebr.): shoes. Cloak: the *ridāʾ* is a wrap formed of a long strip of material wound around the upper half of the body.
[352] Miskawayh (e.g.) p. 60.8–9, 'and not let his hands hang slack'.
[353] Miskawayh p. 60.8, 'and not hurry when he walks'.
[354] Miskawayh p. 60.9, 'and not grow his hair long'.
[355] Ch. corrects T's spelling.
[356] Variant with similar meaning in Ch.
[357] Miskawayh p. 60.10, 'and not wear a ring except for when he needs it, and not boast in front of his peers about something'.
[358] to compete] following Ch.'s correction of T; cf. A.

الفقير، ويؤخذ ايضًا باكرام من هو افضل منه في الادب والمعرفة وإن كان اصغر منه سنًّا، (143) ويُمنع الصبي من التبزّق والامتخاط والتثاؤب والتجشّؤ وما اشبه ذلك بحضرة الناس لان فيه دليلًا على ضبطه لنفسه ونظافته وشدّة حيائه[359] وليس تكثر هذه الافعال إلا في من اسرف في المطعم والمشرب والنوم والراحة،(144) <ولا يترك الصبي ان يجعل رجلًا على رجل اذا قعد>[360] ولا يدعم (p. 92) رأسه بساعده ومن فعل ذلك فقد دلّ عل انه بلغ من استرخائه وتفتّحه[361] ان لا يقدر على حمل رأسه <وليس احد يفعل ذلك في وقت النشاط وانما يفعل ذلك في>[362] وقت الاغتمام والانكسار والضعف.

(145) ولا ينبغي للصبي ان يحلف باللّٰه على حقّ ولا على باطل وذلك ايضًا جميل بالرجل إلا انه ربّما اضطُرّ اليه [112b] وليس يعرض للصبي من الامور ما يضطرّه الى اليمين واذا اعتاد الانسان من صغره ان لا يحلف باللّٰه قلّ استعماله لليمين اذا كبر وتوقّاها ولم يجسر عليها في اكثر الاشياء، (146) وينبغي ان يعوَّد الصبي الصمت وقلّة[363] الكلام وان لا يتكلّم بحضرة من هو اكبر منه إلا بما يُسأل عنه، وانما ينبغي للصبي اذا حضر مجلس من هو اكبر منه ان ينصت لكلامه فان الاستماع اعون له على التعلّم والصمت لكلامه[364] يدلّ على الحلم[365] والحياء، (147) وينبغي ان يُمنع الصبي من ذكر الاشياء القبيحة ويُحذر عليه ان يسمعها من غيره فان ذكرها واستماعها[366] يوليانه[367] بها، واذا عاب[368] ذكرها

[359] في T: حياه؛ تصحيح ش؛ A: وشده حسامه.

[360] (ولا. . .قعد) A؛ A^2: ولا يمكن الصبي اذا قعد ان ترك رجلًا على رجل؛ الحق بر مراجع مسكويه (ص ٦١، س ٤: ولا يضع رجلًا على رجل) والعبري: <ولا يودَع إذا جلس ان يضع رجلًا على رجل>.

[361] في T: ويفتحه؛ A: وتفتّحه ؛ ش: وتفنُّحه، بل (خطأ مطبعي): وتفتّحه؛ انظر ح ٣٣٧ و٣٤٤.

[362] A؛ في T: ان لا ان يفعله صاحبه؛ انظر العبري.

[363] مسكويه ص ٦١، س ٩-١١: وقلّة الكلام، وان لا يتكلّم إلا جوابًا، واذا حضر من هو اكبر منه اشتغلّ بالاستماع منه والصمت له الخ.

[364] ش: بكلامه.

[365] ش: الحكمة؛ لكن تاكّد A والعبري وT.

[366] ش؛ في T: فاستماعها.

[367] لعله في T ؛ ش: يؤتيانه.

[368] برو؛ في T: غاب؛ بو: عاف. قارن A:اذا تجنّب ذكرها.

the poor. He should also be admonished to honour anyone superior to him in culture and knowledge, even if he is younger than him. (143) The boy should be prevented from spitting, blowing his nose, yawning, belching, and so on, in the presence of others because this will show self-control, cleanliness, and a strong sense of shame.[359] Such actions are common only in those who are excessive with their food, drink, sleep, and rest. (144) <The boy should not be allowed to place one leg over the other while he is sitting>[360] nor to support his head on his arm. For anyone who does this shows that he has gone so far in relaxing and opening up (his body)[361] that he is unable to support his head; <and no one does this at a time of vitality, but rather>[362] at times of worry, depression, or weakness.

(145) The boy must not swear by God about truth or falseness. This is also proper for the man, except that he is sometimes obliged to (swear). But the boy is not exposed to situations which oblige him (to take) an oath. If someone is accustomed from his youngest years not to swear by God, he will use oaths sparingly when he is adult, guard himself against them, and in most cases not venture them. (146) The boy should be accustomed to being silent and speaking little,[363] and not speaking in the presence of his elders except in reply to something he has been asked. Moreover, when he is present at the assembly of someone older than he is, he must listen to his words because paying attention is beneficial to him for his studies and holding his tongue[364] shows patience[365] and respect. (147) The boy must be prevented from mentioning disgraceful things and be warned against hearing them from someone else. For mentioning them and[366] paying attention to them associates him with them.[367] If he finds referring to them objectionable[368] and regards them

[359] Following Ch.'s correction; cf. A.

[360] A; A^2: it is not possible for the boy to leave one leg on the other when sitting. Berg. (cf. Miskawayh p. 61.4, 'and not place one leg on the other'; and the Hebr.): <he should not be permitted when sitting to place one leg over the other>.
Cf. Clement, *Paidagogus* 2.54.3 (translated in Chapter 2, p. 123, Chapter 6, p. 391).

[361] opening up (his body)] Ch.: weakening himself. A: wearing rings (like a woman); so Lane/Zamakhsharī (but other measures of the root *f-t-kh* refer to suppleness or looseness of the limbs, which would fit well here). Pl. accepts Berg.'s reading of 'opening up' (cf. his trans. p. 253) but fails to print it ('le résultat des distractions d'un typographe', Bouyges 1931: 258). See nn. 337, 344.

[362] <and no one . . . rather>] A; T: but its owner does this. A is probably a rewriting, but the sense is confirmed by the Hebr. 'no one does this at a time of happiness, but . . .'

[363] Miskawayh 61.9–11: and speaking little, and not speaking except to answer, and if one of his elders is present he is occupied in listening to him and staying quiet for him, etc.

[364] holding his tongue] lit. 'silence in his speech'; Ch.: when he [i.e. the older man] is speaking.

[365] patience] Ch.: wisdom; but A and Hebr. confirm the reading.

[366] Following Ch.'s correction.

[367] associates him with them] probable reading in T; Ch.: will lead him to (do) them.

[368] If . . . objectionable] Brock.; T: if referring to them is absent; Bouyges (1931: 258 n. 2): averse to referring to them. Cf. A: if he avoids mentioning them.

واستوحش منه كان لإتيانها اعيَب[369] ومن ذلك اشدّ وحشةً، ولذلك ينبغي ان يحذّر الصبي معاشرة من كان من الصبيان فيه جرأة وتقدّم، (148) (p. 93) وينبغي ان يُمنع الصبي من الشتم واللعن ويعوَّد[370] طيب الكلام وحسن اللقاء <والبشاشة واللين والدماثة وكما يضرّه ان يستعمل هذه الاشياء وكذلك يضرّه ان يرى غيره يستعملها، ولا ينبغي ان>[371] يسمع الذمّ اِلا ممن[372] يقصد الى تأديبه اذا جاء منه الزلل والى تأديب غيره،[373] (149) ومن انفع ما أُدّب به الصبي واجود ما عُوّده استعمال الصدق [113a] وتجنّب الكذب، وإن كذب الصبي فينبغي ان يلام ويُذَمّ ويعيَّر ويُضرَب إن احوج الى ذلك فان افضل الفضائل الصدق واخسّ[374] الدناءة واقبحها واردأها الكذب ومن يعوَّد الكذب ونشأ عليه لم يفلح.

(150) وينبغي ان يعوَّد الصبي خدمة نفسه ووالديه ومعلّمه ومن هو اكبر منه، واحوج الصبيان ان يؤخذوا بذلك اولاد الاغنياء[375] لان اولاد الفقراء يُضطرّون اليه فهم يعتادونه واولاد الاغنياء إن لم يؤخذوا به لم يدعهم اليه سبب، (151) وفي ذلك لمن فعله من الصبيان منفعة عظيمة لانه يخرّج الصبي ويُكسبه رجولةً ودربةً ويعوّده التواضع ويجتلب له المحبّة ويكون به مستعدًّا للنوائب.

(152) ولا ينبغي للصبي إن ضربه المعلّم ان يبكي ولا يصيح ولا يضرع[376] فان ذلك من الفشل والجبن وانما يليق ذلك بالعبد لا بالحرّ وقد قلنا ان من لم يك فيه من الصبيان انفة (p. 94) عسر فلاحه، (153) وينبغي ان يؤدَّب الصبي على الحسد والبغي وغيرهما ويحبّب اليه المباراة في الادب والانفة من ان يتقدّمه غيره فيه ويعوَّد الصبي ايضًا الانفة من ان يبرّه قرنه بشيء لا يبرّه بمثله او اكثر

369 كذا في T؛ بو: اعيف.
370 مسكويه ص ٦١، س ١٢: ويعوَّد حسن الكلام وظريفه، وجميل اللقاء وكريمه الخ.
371 A؛ في T: وان لا؛ يراجع مسكويه في ح ٣٧٠؛ والعبري.
372 A؛ لعله في T: لا يسمع الذمّ إن لا ممن؛ ش: وان لا يُسمِع الدمر لدّه (التذمُّر ؟) ممَّن.
373 (تأديب غيره) A؛ في T: باديه غيره.
374 في T: احس؛ ش: أحسن (واخسّ).
375 مسكويه ص ٦١، س ١٦: واحوج الصبيان الى هذا الادب اولاد الاغنياء والمترفين.
376 مسكويه ص ٦١، س ١٧: وينبغي اذا ضربه المعلّم ان لا يصرخ ولا يستشفع باحد الخ.

as revolting, he will take greater exception[369] to doing them, and strengthens his feeling of disgust as a result. For this reason, the boy must be warned about keeping the company of boys who are bold and forward. (148) The boy must be prevented from abusing and cursing. Let him be accustomed to pleasant speech and a friendly attitude,[370] <a cheerful disposition, amiability, and courtesy. Just as it hurts him to do these deeds, so it hurts him to see others doing them. He must not>[371] hear blame except from someone[372] who is intending to discipline him, when he has made a mistake, or to discipline another.[373] (149) One of the most beneficial elements of the boy's education and the finest of the customs he acquires is the practice of telling the truth and avoiding lies. If the boy tells a lie, he must be reprimanded, blamed, rebuked, and beaten if necessary. For telling the truth is the best of virtues, whereas telling lies is the vilest,[374] foulest, and very worst baseness. Whoever is accustomed to telling lies and grows up doing so will not prosper.

(150) The boy must be accustomed to serve himself, his parents, his teacher, and his elders. Boys who are most in need of admonishment in this regard are the children of the rich[375] because the children of the poor are obliged to do this and get used to it. With the children of the rich, on the other hand, there is no reason for them to do it, unless they are admonished. (151) For children who do this, there is an enormous benefit here. It trains the boy and imparts manliness and experience, accustoms him to modesty, earns him affection, and in this way he becomes ready for life's ups and downs.

(152) The boy must not cry, yell, or beg if the teacher hits him.[376] This is a sign of faintheartedness and cowardice and suits the slave, not one who is free. We have already noted that for boys who have no pride success will be difficult. (153) The boy must be disciplined for envious and oppressive behaviour and other things. Let him be made to love being competitive about education and be proud of having no one outstrip him in it. Let the boy be accustomed to being proud that none of his peers does him a favour in some regard without him doing an equivalent or better favour, that he

369 he will take greater exception] cf. Bouyges (ibid.): he will be more averse to doing them.

370 Miskawayh 61.12: and is accustomed to polite and charming speech, a courteous and obliging attitude, etc.

371 Addition in A; T: that he should not. It is impossible to say how much Brysonian material is present in A's addition; but cf. Miskawayh (previous n.) and the Hebr., which suggests that the latter part has been omitted in the Taymūr tradition: 'just as committing disgraceful deeds hurts him, so he is hurt to see another commit them aside from him.'

372 He . . . someone] A's text; T probably reads this; Ch. misreads.

373 A; T: discipline him in other matters.

374 vilest] Ch. misreads T, then corrects to this.

375 Miskawayh 61.16: boys who are most in need of education in this respect are the children of the rich and affluent.

376 Miskawayh 61.17: he must not scream or call on someone to intervene if the teacher hits him, etc.

منه ومن ان[377] يأخذ شيئًا ويعطي اقلّ منه، ومن ان يحبّه قرنه اكثر مما يحبّه هو (154)، والذي يليق بالكريم ان يبرّ باكثر مما يُبَرّ به ويعطي اكثر مما ياخذ ويليق بالمتحبّب [113b] ان يحبّ اكثر مما يُحَبّ، (155) واذا[378] لم يمكن الصبي ان يبرّ بالوجه الذي برّه قرنه فليتحيّل لمكافاته على ذلك البرّ بوجه آخر والا كان غير متّخذ[379] العدل ونُسب الى محبّة الربح لا الى محبّة الكرامة،[380] (156) وينبغي ان يبغّض[381] الصبي الذهب والفضّة ويحذَّر مسّهما اكثر مما يحذَّر مسّ الافعى والحيّة فان آفة الافعى والحيّة انما تدخل الى البدن وآفة حبّ الذهب والفضّة تدخل على النفس وضررهما في النفس ابلغ من ضرر السمّ في البدن ويُحتال في وضع قدرهما عنده وتهجين من احبّهما،[382]

(157) وينبغي ان يؤذن للصبي[383] في بعض الاوقات في اللعب ولا يلعب لعبًا فيه قبح ولا الم[384] فان اللعب انما يراد لراحة الصبي وسروره حتى يكون ذلك عونًا له على ما يراد منه فيما بعد من التعب في الادب والصبر على مشقّته فاذا (p. 95) كان في لعبه تعب له احتاج الى الراحة في وقت تأديبه فبطل ما قُصد به اليه وبقي التعب الذي به، (158) ومن اجود ما يعوَّده الصبي وابلغه في فلاحه الطاعة لوالديه[385] ولمعلّمه ولاهل الادب والنظر اليهم بعين الجلالة[386] والاستحياء منهم والهيبة لهم ومن لم يكن فيه ذلك من الصبيان ابطأ[387] فلاحه.

377 (ومن ان) ش: وان.
378 ش: وان.
379 في T: متخد؛ ش: متخد (متَّحد او متَّخذ ؟).
380 φιλοκέρδεια, φιλοτιμία. راجع ح ٣٠٠.
381 مسكويه ص ٦٢، س ١: ويبغَّض اليه الفضّة والذهب ويحذَّر منهما اكثر من تحذير السباع والحيّات والعقارب والافاعي، فان آفة حبّ الفضّة والذهب اكثر من آفة السموم.
382 زيادة A: وعنى بجمعهما وحبّ لهما؛ قارن العبري.
383 (يؤذن للصبي) A؛ في T: يودب الصبي؛ صحّحه بل مراجع مسكويه والعبري
384 مسكويه ص ٦٢، س ٣-٤: وينبغي ان يؤذن له في بعض الاوقات ان يلعب لعبًا جميلًا، ليستريح اليه من تعب الادب، ولا يكون في لعبه الم ولا تعب شديد.
385 T^2.
386 مسكويه ص ٦٢، س ٥: ويعوَّد طاعة والديه ومعلّميه ومؤدّبيه، وان ينظر اليهم بعين الجلالة والتعظيم ويهابهم.
387 في T وبل: ابطى.

does not[377] take something and give less in return, and that his peer does not love him more than he loves (his peer). (154) It is appropriate for someone noble to show greater favour than he receives and to give more than he takes. And it is appropriate for someone worthy of love to show love more than he receives love. (155) If[378] it is impossible for the boy to show favour in the manner in which his peer favours him, let him find a way of repaying this favour by other means. Otherwise he is not practising[379] justice, and people will attribute to him a love of gain, not a love of honour.[380] (156) The boy must be made to hate[381] gold and silver and be warned against touching them more than one is warned against touching vipers and snakes. The harm done by the viper and the snake enters the body only, whereas the harm done by a love of gold and silver enters the soul and the damage caused by them in the soul is more effective than the damage of the venom in the body. An effort should be made to play down their value in his mind and to disparage anyone who loves them.[382]

(157) The boy must be permitted[383] play at times, but he shall not play a game involving disgrace or suffering.[384] For play should contribute rather to the boy's relaxation and happiness so that it assists him to achieve what is expected of him later by way of hard work in education and the toleration of its difficulties. Thus, if his play is tiring for him, he will need to relax at the time when he is being educated. The point of it will be lost on him, and only what tires him about it will remain. (158) Among the most excellent things the boy can be accustomed to, and the most effective for achieving success, are obedience to his parents,[385] his teacher, and educated people, looking at them with reverence in the eye,[386] showing respect and veneration for them. Any boy who fails to do this will be slow[387] to achieve success.

377 Ch. varies the construction.

378 If] Ch.: that.

379 practising] Ch.: ' "practice" or "unite"?' But T is clear enough.

380 Respectively *maḥabbat al-ribḥ* and *maḥabbat al-karāma*; these are calques of φιλοκέρδεια (not in Ullmann but see 2007 *s.v.* φιλαργυρία: *ḥubb al-māl*, cf. Bryson §138; *s.v.* φιλάργυροι: *muḥibb*[*ū*] *l-māl*) and of φιλοτιμία (Ullmann 2007 *s.v.* φιλότιμος, Akasoy and Fidora 2005: 609). Cf. above n. 300.

381 Miskawayh 62.1: he must be made to hate silver and gold and be warned against them more than being warned against wild beasts, snakes, scorpions, and vipers, for the harm done by a love of silver and gold is greater than the harm done by venom.

382 A adds: he means collecting and loving them both; cf. Hebr.: collecting and keeping them.

383 The boy must be permitted] A, Pl. (on the basis of Miskawayh and the Hebr.); T: educated in.

384 Miskawayh 62.3–4: he must be permitted at times to play a good game to give him relief from the hard work of education. His games shall not involve suffering and strenuous hard work.

385 T^2.

386 Miskawayh 62.5: be accustomed to obedience to his parents, his teachers and educators, looking at them with reverence and appreciation in his eye, and being in awe of them.

387 Pl. suggests variant.

(159) وينبغي ان يحذَّر على الصبي الجماع او ان يعرَّف شيئًا[388] من امر الجماع او يقاربه[389] حتى يتزوّج فانه مع ما في ذلك من القربة الى اللّه تعالى والثناء الجميل عند الناس وصحّة البدن وحسن النماء وبقاء الطهارة والنظافة والضبط للنفس، ففيه ان الرجل اذا لم يعرف امرأةً <غير امرأته و>[390] كانت المرأة لا تعرف رجلًا غير رجلها كان حبّ كل واحد منهما لصاحبه غاية الحبّ وانطوى قلبه عليها وقلبها عليه[391] وذلك من انفع الاشياء للرجل والمرأة جميعًا، (160) وإن كان الذين يريدون شدّة البدن يصبرون عن[392] الجماع ويؤثرون ذلك عليه فالذين يريدون فضيلة النفس اولى بالصبر عنه[393].

(161) ومن حفظ هذه الاشياء [114a] وعمل بها صار بها الى الفضيلة[394] ونال المحبّة والكرامة من اللّه والناس وبلغ غاية السعادة، ومن اطّرحها وظنّ انه لا ينتفع بها وان منفعتها يسيرة وترك استعمالها نال من اطّراحه[395] ذلك (p. 96) الشيء اليسير وادّاه الى عظيم النقص والخساسة، (162) ولعله يعرف فضيلة ذلك في وقت لا يمكنه فيه تلافيه واستدراك ما فات منه فيحصل الى الندامة، فان اليسير من الخطأ في اوائل الاشياء واصولها ليس بيسير الضرر وكذلك المنفعة في يسير الصواب لان الاشياء تُبنى على تلك الاصول.

تمّ قول الحكيم[396] بروسن[397] في تدبير المنزل والحمد للّه وحده.

388 ش؛ في T: شيء.
389 ش؛ في T: يقارنه.
390 A وبل (مراجع العبري): <غير امرأته و>.
391 T: اليه؛ قارن A: ولم تعلّق قلبه إلا بها ولا قلبها إلا به؛ والعبري.
392 A وبل؛ في T: على.
393 بل؛ في T: عليه.
394 ابن الجزار ص ١١٤، س ١١-١٤: فمن عوّد ابنه. . .حاز بذلك الفضيلة ونال المحبّة والكرامة وبلغ غاية السعادة، ومن ترك فعل ذلك. . .أدّاه ذلك إلى عظيم النقص والخساسة، ولعلّه يَعْرِف فضيلة ذلك في وقت لا يُمكنه تلافيه وأستدراك ما فاته منه فتحصل له الندامة.
395 بر (مراجع العبري)؛ في T: راحة.
396 اهمله ش.
397 في T: نروس (؟)؛ ش: نرولس؛ A: نروس؛ راجع فقرة ١.

(159) A warning must be given to the boy about sexual intercourse or obtaining knowledge of any aspect[388] of sexual intercourse or coming near[389] it before he is married. Apart from the fact that this ensures closeness to God – He is Exalted!, good repute among men, bodily health, proper growth, maintenance of purity and cleanliness, and self-control, if the man does not know a woman <apart from his woman and>[390] the woman does not know a man apart from her man, the love of each one of them for the other partner is the greatest love there is. His heart enfolds her and her heart enfolds him.[391] This is among the most beneficial of things for the man and the woman jointly. (160) If those who seek a powerful body forbear from[392] sexual intercourse and choose the former over the latter, those who seek virtue in their soul have all the more reason to abstain from[393] it.

(161) Whoever keeps to these (recommendations) and acts in accordance with them will attain to virtue,[394] receive love and honour from God and men, and achieve the greatest happiness to be had. Whoever discards them and thinks that he will not benefit from them and that the benefit they offer is insignificant, and fails to make use of them, receives little by discarding[395] them but incurs much imperfection and vileness. (162) Perhaps he will know their excellence at a time when it is no (longer) possible for him to put himself in order or to rectify what he has lost, and he will come to repent. For a little mistake in the beginnings and foundations of life is not little in the harm it causes. Conversely there is benefit in a little right because it is upon such foundations that life is built.

The end of the treatise of the philosopher[396] Bryson[397] on the management of the estate. Praise be to God alone.

388 Following Ch.'s correction.
389 coming near] Ch.; T: 'unite with'.
390 Addition in A, also Pl. (cf. Hebr.).
391 Note A: his heart is devoted [lit. hangs on] only to her and her heart only to him. Cf. Hebr.: his heart hangs only on her and her heart only on him.
392 Preposition corrected in A and Pl.
393 Preposition corrected in Pl.
394 Ibn al-Jazzār p. 114.11–14: (whoever accustoms his son . . .) thereby gains virtue and receives love and honour and achieves the greatest happiness to be had. (Whoever neglects to do this . . .) incurs much imperfection and vileness. Perhaps he will know their excellence at a time when it is no (longer) possible for him to put himself in order or to rectify what he has lost, and he will come to repent.
395 discarding] Berg.; T: rest. The change is easy enough palaeographically.
396 the philosopher] Ch. omits.
397 T: Burūnus (?); A: (?) Burūnus; see §1.

Text of the Epitome in Latin (Yconomica Galieni)

Note: the *Yconomica Galieni* is reprinted here from Martin Plessner's 1928 edition. Plessner's editorial changes to the Dresden manuscript he transcribed were minimal. No alterations have been made here and the orthography of the manuscript has been preserved; but Plessner's division into paragraphs has been changed to accord with the paragraphing used for my Arabic and English.

Numbers in round brackets are Plessner's and correspond approximately to the section numbers he used in his Arabic text, which have been retained in my own edition and translation.

On the *Yconomica*, see Chapter 2, pp. 131–2, 134–6, 141.

Yconomica Galieni translata ab Armengando Blazii de arabico in latinum in monte Pessulano continet quattuor capitula: Capitulum primum de diuiciis seruandis. Capitulum secundum de seruis. Capitulum tertium de uxore. Capitulum quartum de filiis.

Capitulum primum de diuiciis seruandis.

(1) Domus regimen perficitur quattuor rebus scilicet diuiciis seruis uxore et filiis.

(32) Sunt autem diuicie custodiende et seruande propter multa. Pro quanto attendendum est primo circa conseruationem earum, ne quis plus expendat quam lucretur seu acquirere sciat. Quod si faciat, procul procul dubio diuicie non durabunt, sed tandem omnino consumentur. (34) Unde qui minus expendit quam lucretur, similatur corpori nato in augmento existenti. Qui uero expendit quantum acquirit, similatur corpori, quod iam peruenit ad complementum augmenti sui. Sed qui plusquam lucretur dispergit, similatur ei qui consumitur macrescit et senescit. (35) Et hoc quoniam dum corpus in augmento existit, comedit quidem et proficit amplius quam consumatur et dissoluatur. Uerum corpus, cuius

augmentum est perfectum, comedit seu comedere debet tantum, quantum est illud, quod deperditur ex eodem. Corpus autem, cui iam accidit senectus, appropinquat morti, eo quod comedit multo minus quam sit quod ab eo deperditur.

(40) Decet nichililominus circa hec uitare auariciam desidiam prodigalitatem et malam seu indiscretam ordinationem. (41) Est autem auaricia, cum quis non facit bonum, quod facere debet. Utpote cum non bene facit contribulibus suis nec etiam parat se ad complendum uoluntatem amicorum. Nec animaduertit sapientie deseruire. Nec frequentat ianuas dei erogando elemosinas inopibus et egenis et similia. (43) Est autem desidia seu suauitas uite in sensibilibus prosecutio uoluptatum et delectationum sensibilium. (44) Uerum inanis prodigalitas est, cum quis facit plusquam faciant seu facere debeant sibi similes in uictu et uestitu et uectione equorum. (45) Illaudabilis autem et indiscreta ordinatio non permittit hominem regulare seu proportionaliter equare sumptus suos, adeo quod per eum fiunt multi inutiles et non necessarii, et non permittit eos fieri, cum fieri debent, et sic fiunt indiscrete, ita quod unus nequaquam alii similetur.

(55) Capitulum secundum de seruis.
Seruientes procul dubio sunt multum in domo necessarii. (56) Sunt autem seruientium tres maneries. Sunt enim ex seruientibus serui captiui, et quidam sunt seruientes uoluntate, et quidam natura. Est autem seruiens captiuus, quem lex sua captiuat et obligat ad seruitutem. Sed seruiens uoluntate est ille, qui non est dominus sui ipsius, eo quod appetitus et uane meditationes ipsum superent atque uincant. Talis autem seruiens non est bonus. (57) Famulus autem natura est, qui habet corpus forte et robustum, bene dispositum ad faciendum negotia et laborandum, preter quod discernat et intelligat quid agendum sit, nisi quantum precipitur ei. Et talis procul dubio est in natura sua uelut brutum, quod ducitur ubi placet. Et quamuis tales sint liberi a captiuitate (62) sicut patet consideranti de generacione eorum: cum sint homines sicut et dominus, tum poterunt intelligere, quod intelligit dominus, et meditari et appetere, quod ipse appetit et meditatur, nec uolunt aliud quam uelit dominus. (63) Quamdiu quidem seruabitur hoc inter eos, lucrabitur dominus amorem et bonam uoluntatem eorum et ipse erit eisdem misericors et propicius.

(64) Et decet, quod dominus celet et tegat delictum famuli casualiter delinquentis. Decet etiam, quod ignoscat ei. (65) Nec puniat seu arguat eum propter delicta et errores, quos per ignorantiam et debilitatem sui intellectus committet. Nec est unquam puniendus famulus, cum deliquerit, aliter quam filius, cum similiter deliquerit.

(66) Est etiam tempus dandum famulo quiescendi. Nec est precipitandus in operibus suis, ita quod, cum faciet unum, stimuletur ad aliud faciendum. (68) Miror autem ualde de quibusdam, qui dant magnam operam in equis et brutis suis appetentes multum eos meliorare, in nullo curantes de famulantibus sibi. (71) Sunt autem meliores famuli iuuenes et pueri, eo quod sunt magis subditi et melius correctionem suscipiunt. Sunt autem meliores famuli, qui non sunt de tribu domini. Displicet enim hominibus esse subditos contribulibus propriis et tediantur ex proximis suis, quod quidem ratione unitatis parentele conuenit eis.

(74) Capitulum tertium de uxore.
Intentio inducens hominem ad ducendum uxorem bispertita est. Quarum una est a proposito. Et alia est per uiam nature. (75) Que autem est a proposito et per modum consilii inde est: quoniam multa negocia hominis sunt extra domum suam procurando uitam seu necessaria uite sue, pro tanto indiget multum eo, qui conseruet et custodiat quod ipse colligit et aggregat. Non est autem possibile, ut sit quis tantum attentus in aliquo, quantum est in propriis negotiis. (76) Et sic procul dubio una de melioribus rebus est, ut quis habeat in domo sua sociam potenciam habentem in eadem sicut ipse; et est ratio cogens ipsum per modum consilii.

(77) Ratio autem naturalis, qua inducitur homo ad ducendum uxorem est, quoniam deus omnipotens, a quo processit mundus, quia creauit hominem mortalem, sine dubio ordinauit, quod generaret sibi similem, (78) uoluitque hominis et femine generationem esse, (79) cum uniuntur et commiscentur eorum spermata in matrice.

(94) Nec quidem est conueniens et rectum domus negotium, donec mores mulieris conueniant cum moribus uiri et eius natura facta fuerit, qualis est illa uiri. Non autem est possibile, ut mores mulieris nequam et male conueniant cum moribus boni uiri et prudentis, nec econuerso, (95) sicut nec lignum obliquum potest conuenienter uniri ligno recto.

(104) Capitulum quartum de filiis.
Est autem melior ex filiis progenitus a uiro prudente et discreto iuuene et in omnibus membris suis completo et perfecto. (105) Decet autem, quod ab eius puericia ipsius correctio inchoetur. Et hoc quoniam paruus puer est magis dispositus ad suscipiendum correctionem quam magnus. Tunc enim nullus inordinatus seu illaudabilis appetitus uincit eum, qui scilicet prohibeat continuationem eius, quod uult homo ostendere eidem. (106) Rursus postquam mores laudabiles per consuetudinem erunt in eo habituati et

creuerint addiscendo eos, nunquam dimittet eos, immo quidem perseuerabit cum eisdem. (107) Quodsi forsitan permittatur prosequi concupiscentias suas et uoluptates et acquirat mores illaudabiles, qui forsitan nequaquam inerunt ei per naturam, sed potius ex mala consuetudine contingent eidem, et uelis consequenter eum corrigere, postquam erit auctus et eius mores illaudabiles erunt in eo confirmati et habituati, erit quidem ualde difficile transferre ipsum ad mores laudabiles nec poterit assueta relinquere.

(108) Iam enim uidimus quam plures homines bene quidem cognoscentes, quod eorum mores mali sint et illaudabiles ualde, cognoscuntque mores bonos et laudabiles; est nichilominus eis ualde difficile eos acquirere, eo quod sint ualde subiecti eis, quos sunt assueti. (109) Uidimus etiam multos ex filiis, qui, quamdiu sunt in custodia et disciplina patris, habent mores bonos et laudabiles; et cum separantur ab eis, prosequuntur modos illaudabiles. (110) Nec est in hoc maior occasio, quam sit mala pueri consuetudo. Nec oportet dicere, quod, cum ipse est ad aliquod uicium per naturam dispositus et consequentur per prauam consuetudinem in eo inducitur, quin unum altero confirmetur et solidetur. Et circumscripta dispositione naturali, ex quo consuetudine sola confirmatur et dominatur in aliquo perfecte, nequit ipsum dimittere aliquo modo. (111) Et similiter cum puer est bone indolis zelans mores laudabiles et eos prosequitur, procul dubio unum ex predictis confirmabitur, scilicet laudabilis dispositio naturalis, per utilem et laudabilem consuetudinem, et econuerso, adeo quod puer nequeat mores laudabiles et utiles deserere, eo quod sit in eis predictis duobus fortibus adhuc connutritus, scilicet dispositione naturali et longa consuetudine. (112) Cum autem puer bene dispositus per naturam connutritur in malis et illaudabilibus, aut male dispositus naturaliter connutritur in bonis et laudabilibus, procul dubio consuetudo mutabit ipsius disposicionem naturalem. Poterit nichililominus a predicta consuetudine separari, cum erit auctus, inualescente ipsius dispositione naturali.

(115) Decet ergo, ut puer attente regatur et reguletur in omnibus moribus et consuetudinibus suis et primo in potu et cibo ipsius.

(117) Unde si forsitan appetat multum comedere, arguetur (*sic*) multum inde et uituperetur. Quin imo dicatur ei, quod de natura uilium animalium sicut canum est multum comedere, et quod ille, qui uult ei in hoc similari, non differt ab eo multum. Cum etiam sedebit in comestione iuxta maiorem et antiquiorem se (118) non comedat nisi quod erit appositum coram eo. Nec porrigat manum suam ad capiendum aliquid, quod alius teneat coram se uel uelit accipere. Est etiam assuescendus ad hoc, ut sit contentus uno cibo, nec petat plures et uarios in una refectione, et quod comedat tractim,

non impetuose, nec faciat magnos bolos, (119) nec deturpet manus et digitos suos, nec os suum, nec sit, qui ultimo dimittat cibum suum, nec inspiciat aliquem ex hiis, qui comedunt secum, et maxime extraneum.

(120) Est etiam sciendum, quod puer eget cibo sicut medicina. Nam sicut non intenditur, quod medicina sit magna seu multa, nec quod eius sapor sit delectabilis, sed pocius, quod sit utilis et prosit corpori, sic etiam non est intentio in magna quantitate cibi nec in delectabili sapore eius, sed pocius in iuuamento et utilitate eiusdem, quod est solum ad uincendum famem naturalem solum contingentem ex inanitione membrorum. (121) Nutriatur autem et morigeretur bene puer in comestione sua et discat seu assuescat contentus esse solo pane. Hoc enim iuuabit et inducet eum ad hoc, quod sit opulentus et parum solicitus ad acquirendum diuicias indecenter et iniuste. (122) Nam solicitudo acquirendi diuicias est ualde illaudabilis in se. Et hoc quoniam qui est ualde solicitus in hoc et non potest eas bene acquirere, acquirit eas malo modo. Esse autem contentum paucis in comestione sua est quidem in se perutile et laudabile. Pauperi enim est perutile et diuiti ualde laudabile et honestum. (123) Decet autem, quod puer perficiat comestionem suam hora uespertina. Hoc enim expedit saluti mentis et corporis sui. Et hoc quoniam, si perficiat comestionem suam in die, erit quidem grauis, piger uoletque dormire in die; rursus erit tunc melancolicus et tardi motus nec addiscere tunc temporis. (124) Hoc etiam regimen congruit ualde adulto. Si tamen fuerit ipso usus et assuetus a puericia, erit quidem ei facilius et utilius. (125) Nec decet ipsum uti rebus grossis in comestione. Nam fuga predictorum expedit ei ualde ad hoc, ut sit ingeniosus et discretus et ut celerius augeatur. Nam cibaria grauia seu difficilis digestionis aggrauant naturam differuntque ipsius augmentum. (126) Decet etiam, ut uitet esum dulcium et fructuum. Hoc enim congruit anime et corpori eius. Animae quidem prodest multum, eo quod appetitus et uoluntates sensibiles minime uincent ipsum. Sed corpori, quoniam dulcia et fructus suscipiunt de facili corruptionem in corpore, sed magis in corporibus calidis quam aliis. (127) Decet etiam, ut puer utatur et assuescat bibere, cum comedit, et non ante. Hoc enim approbauerunt sapientes medici. Inuenerunt, qui in usu potus uini, temperamento iuuamentum magnum apud eos. (128) Est autem hora conueniens puero ad comedendum de mane, cum didicerit et fuerit aliquantulum exercitatus.

(133) Debet etiam dormire puer, quantum fuerit ei necesse; nec debet nimis dormire. Hoc enim obesset ei multum. Nam superfluus somnus relaxat corpus et uexat mentem et mortificat cor. (134) Nec congruit quicquam amplius ad letificandum corpus et saluti (*sic*) eius et ad discendum quam hora matutina. Pro quanto expedit ualde ut plurimum surgere mane.

(136) Et lectus cum multis operimentis et culcitris est multum nociuus puero, eo quod ipsum relaxat et mollificet seu rareficet.

(137) Decet etiam puerum pati aliquantulum frigora tempore hyemali et aliquantulum caloris tempore calido. Hoc enim expedit ei. Nam corpus eius, qui nichil horum assuetus est pati, subtiliatur debilitatur et relaxatur, cum laborat diu consequentur. Nullus autem est securus a labore. Expedit etiam puero amplius ualde iter agere et equitare et moueri, quam ociosum esse et quiescere. (138) Nec utatur puer uestibus suauibus et delicatis. Hoc enim inducit hominem ad diligendum diuicias. Iam autem est ostensum, quod amor diuiciarum est ualde illaudabilis in se, inducens hominem ad malum finem.

(142) Debet etiam puer cedere et reuerentiam exhibere maioribus, dimittens eis sedem suam et honorans meliores se moribus et scientia, quamuis essent minores diebus et etate.

(145) Decet etiam, ne puer iuret per deum in ueritate ut mendacio. Quod etiam adulto et cuilibet ualde congruit, nisi tamen manifesta necessitate urgeretur. Et tunc etiam in ueritate faciat sacramentum et non aliter. Talis autem necessitas iurandi raro eminet puero. Cum puer autem est a puericia assuetus non iurare per deum, faciet quidem pauca sacramenta, cum erit adultus, nec parui pendet seu contempnet ea, sed pocius timebit facere ea. (149) De maxime autem conferentibus puero est, quod sit uerax. Nam qui utitur mendaciis, confirmatur quidem et habituatur in hoc et inde malus ualde efficitur.

(150) Nitatur etiam puer esse obsequiosus parentibus suis et omnibus maioribus se et melioribus, quod maxime expedit pueris, qui sunt filii diuitum. Expedit hoc nichilominus eis, qui sunt filii pauperum. Ipsi tamen coguntur ad hoc ex conditione status sui.

(156) Decet etiam quod suggeratur puero horror et abhominatio auri et argenti et quod uitet tactum predictorum amplius quam tactum drachonis. Non enim contingit ex dracone nocumentum nisi soli corpori; sed nocumentum auri et argenti ledit et inficit etiam animam. Unde nocumentum et angustie, quae inde nobis contingunt, sunt procul dubio maiores nocumento ex toxico et ueneno corpori contingente.

(158) Expedit autem puero pre ceteris rebus, quod sit subiectus parentibus suis et magistris et quod reuereatur sapientibus et quod intueatur eos intuitu laudabili et uenerabili et quod uerecundetur ex eis et timeat eos.

Explicit Yconomica Galieni.

Text of the Hebrew version

The text printed here is taken from Plessner, with a few orthographical changes and suggested corrections, and is provided for readers' convenience. On its characteristics, see Chapter 2 p. 140. In addition to Cyril Chilson, considerable thanks are owed to Yossi Rapoport for his help.

ב(עזרת) ה(שם) י(תברך)
סדר הנהגת האדם בביתו שחבר בראסון הפילוסוף
והעתיקו הנבון ר' דוד בר' שלמה נ(שמתו) ע(דן) בן יעיש
מעיר אשביליה מלשון ערב ללשון קדש

(1) אמר כי הנהגת הבית הוא שלם בד' דברי(ם) הא' הממון הב' העבדים וגם השמשים הג' האשה הד' הבנים.

(2) ענין הממון הוא א(ף) ע(ל) פ(י) שהבורא ית(ברך) שם באדם כל הכחות שהוא צריך להם לתיקון גופו והצלחת ענייניו עם זה שם אותו כלה ונתך ומתפרד ולפי(כך) הוא נצרך להכין ולהחליף מקום מה שיותך ממנ(ו) (3) רצוני בכחות הכח שימשוך בו כל א(חד) מאיבריו מה שדומה לו מן המזון בשיעור שהוא צריך והכח שהוא משנה אותו מזון ומהפכו עד שיעשה בדמות האבר שהוא נזון ממנ(ו) אם יהיה הניזון בשר יהיה בשר ואם יהיה עצם יהיה עצם ואם גידים גידים (4) והכח שהוא שומר באבר מה שנמשך אליו בעודו ניתך עד שיקפה ויתדבק בו והכח שהוא דוחה מכל א(חד) מהאיברים מה שישאר בו מאותו מזון מן המותר שהוא רחוק מטבעו ואין בו כח להפכו ולשנותו לטבעו והכח שהוא מגדלו וממתיחו בשלשת צדדיו עד שיגדל בארכו ורחבו וקומתו כפי שיעור חלקיו.

(5) ואומ(ר) כי אם יושם באדם אלו הכחות כולם וכחות אחרים (הרבה) עמהם שבהן יהיה הנהגת גופו עם זה הושם בו ב' דברי(ם) בהם יהיה קיומו הא(חד) מהם יכלה הא(חר) ויתיכהו (6) והוא כי תקון הגוף הוא בחמימות וברוטב ומנהג החמימות הוא להתיך הרוטב ולכלותו ועל זה א(י) א(י)פשר שיעמוד על דרך א(חד) תמיד אבל יותך התכה תמידית מדובקת ולזה צריך להכין מקום מה שניתך ממנ(ו) והכנתו הוא המזון שיזון אותו (7) ועם כל זה אם יהיה הגוף ממין א(חד) היה צריך מ(י)ן א(חד) מן המזון אבל לפי שחלקיו הם משונות צריך למזונות משונות גם מטעמי(ם) משונים וכלם הן מהצמחים ומב(עלי) ח(יים) כי כל מזון קרוב לטבעו ואין דבר יותר קרוב לטבע האדם מן החיות והצמחי(ם).

(8) [והצמחים] וב(עלי) חיים צריכין למינים הרבה מהמלאכות עד שיתהוו ועד שיגמרו אחר הוייתם. הצמחי(ם) צריכין לזריעה או לנטיעה ולהשקאה ולגידול ולדברי(ם) אחרים מלבד אלה ממה שיש שלמות התועלת בהן (9) והב(עלי) ח(יים) צריכין למזון ולשמירה ולמחסה והדומה לזה ממה שיש בהן תועלתם וקיומם. (10) וצריך עוד לקיבוץ המזון והכנתו למלאכות אחרות הרבה משונות כי האדם אם ניתן בו כח המחשבה לחשוב בלבו כל מלאכה וכח ללמוד אותה א(י) א(יפשר) שא(חד) מבני אדם לפי קוצר שני חייו שיחשוב בלבו כל זה ולא שילמדנ(ו) כי במחשבת מלאכה אחת או בלימודה יש לו עסק יטרידנ(ו) מלחשוב בשאר המלאכו(ת) (11) או בלימודם ואם יהיה סובל ללמוד מלאכות הרבה לא יהיה בו כח לסבול כל המלאכות כלם והאדם צריך לתיקון מחייתו לכל המלאכות.

(12) והמלאכות הן תלויות זו בזו וצריכות קצתם לקצתם כמו מלאכת הבנין שצריכה למלאכת חרש עצים ומלאכת חרש צריכה למלאכת הברזל והפחמי(ם) ומלאכת הברזל צריכה למוצא המתכות וזאת המלאכה צריכה לבנאי (13) וכן כל אחת מהמלאכות א(ף) ע(ל) פ(י) שתהיה שלמה בעצמה היא צריכה למלאכות אחרות כמו שצריכין חלקי השלשלת קצתם לקצתם ואם תסתלק מלאכה אחת בטלו בהסתלקה שאר המלאכות (14) ולפי שכל א(חד) מבני אדם צריך להצלחת תיקון ענייניו למינים משונים במה שיתפרנס ויתכסה ולזה הוא צריך לכל המלאכות וא(י) א(יפשר) שיהיה אדם א(חד) בקי בכל המלאכות על זה הוכרחו כל בני אדם להיות נצרכים קצתם לקצתם לתיקון מחיתם ולסבה זו הוצרכו בני אדם ליישוב המדינות ולהתקבץ בהן כדי שיסייעו קצתם לקצתם במלאכות.

(15) ולפי שבני אדם נצרכין קצתם לקצתם ואין עת צורך כל א(חד) מהן עת צורך חברו בעת (מן?) העתים ולא שיעור צרכם שוה ואינ(ו) נקל לידע ערך כל דבר ויתרונ(ו) מדבר אחר וסכום שוויו משיווי דבר אחר ומה ערך שכר פעולה אחת משכר פעולה אחרת (16) לפי(כך) הוצרך לדבר שיעריכו בו כל הדברים כלם ויודע בו ערך קצתם מקצתם וכשיצטרך אדם לדבר הנמכר או העשוי יפרע שווי אותו דבר מזה העצם שהושם ערך לכל הדברים ולכל שכר פעולה. (17) ואם לא הושם זה כפי הנזכר היה מי שיש ברשותו מין מן המינין שצריך להן חברו כמו הזית או החטה והדומה להם והיה ברשות חברו מינים אחרים לא יארע כשיצטרך הא(חד) לדבר שיש ברשות האחר [שיצטרך האחר לדבר שיש ברשות הראשון] ועל זה לא יסכימו על המכירה (18) וא(ף) ע(ל) פ(י) שיסכימו שיצטרך כל א(חד) מהן לאותו דבר שיש ברשות חברו לא יסכימו בשיעור הדבר שהוא צריך מאותו הדבר שהוא ברשות חברו ועל זה הן יפרד כל א(חד) מחברו אחר שלא ימצא ברשותו תכלית חפצו (19) או יבקש תשלום צורכו ממוכר אחר ועל זה צריך שיודע כמה ערך כל א(חד) מהמינים שיש בהן תועלת בני אדם כמו הדבש והחמאה וזולתם מן המינים האחרי(ם) כפי ריבוי המינים ושינוי סכום ערכם (20) ואם יודע זה בעת מן העיתים צריך שיודע בעתים אחרים כל זמן שישתנה ענין מין מאותם המינים לפי הרוב שיביאו מאותו מין ממקומו(ת) אחרי(ם) או מיעוטו וכפי מה שיארך צורך בני אדם לאותו מין או מיעוט צרכם לו או לפי רבוי אותו המין בעת חלוף הזמנים וכפי עסק בני אדם בכל מין ומין בכל זמן ועל זה הדרך היא ענין המלאכות.

(21) ולזה הסכימו בני אדם לעשות מטבע מזהב ומכסף ומנחשת והעריכו בזה כל הדברים והסכימו עליו כדי שישיג כל אדם מה שהוא צריך בעת שהוא צריך לו (22) ומי שיהיה ברשותו זה המטבע כל זמן שירצה להחליף בו איזה דבר שיצא מרשותו או ימירנ(ו) לדבר אחר זולתו לא ישתבש זה עליו נמצא כל מי שנכנס ברשותו אלו העצמיים שזכרנ(ו) יהיה כמו אם נכנסו ברשותו כל המינים שהוא צריך להן ולזה הוצרך להצלחת המחיה אלו הממונות.

(23) ואנחנ(ו) מבארי(ם) היאך היא הצלחת הנהגת הממון ונאמר כי המעיין בזה ראוי לו שיעיין בנ' דברים בריוח הממון ובשמירתו ובהוצאתו.

(24) דרך הריוח יאות לו שישמר מנ' דברי(ם) מן העול ומן החרפה ומן הפחיתות. (25) דרך העול כמו הגרעון במשקל והמיעוט במדה והטעות בחשבון והכפירה לאמת והטענה הכוזבת והדומה לזה ממה שיתקבצו מהעוונות הכעורים שבו יסתלק ברכת הממון וישחת המעיין ויביא לידי עניות (26) וזה לפי מה שיתפרסם עליו מהשם הרע ויברחו כל מיודעיו ממנ(ו) וכל הנושאים ונותנין עמו ואותו הניזק ממנ(ו) יודיע לאחרי(ם) עד שיתפרדו מחברתו מי שנשא ונתן עמו ומי שלא נשא ונתן עמו וא(ף) ע(ל) פ(י) שיסור עצמו מזאת המדה הרעה לא יועילנ(ו) בסבת השמועה הרעה שיצאה עליו ונתפרסמה.

(27) והחרפה הוא כמו הגידוף והתכאה והדומה להם מהדברים שסובלין קצת בני אדם כדי להשיג שום תועלת ממי שיעשה לו אותו מעשה.

(28) והפחיתות הוא שיעזוב אדם המלאכה שהיו אבותיו ובני גילו מתעסקין בו ויש בו יכולת להשיגה ויתעסק במלאכה יותר פחותה ממנה כגון אדם שהיו אבותיו ואנשי משפחתו או שרי צבא או מנהיגי מדינות ויעזוב אותה מלאכה והוא יכול לעשותה ויתכוין לעסוק במיני זמר או בפרישות מכוער והדומה לזה. (29) ולא נאמר במי שהיו אבותיו מתעסקין במלאכה פחותה ונתישב בה שעשה פחיתות בזה המעשה או שעשה מעשה שראוי שיגנוהו עליו אבל נאמר כי הוא משובח אחר שנתרצה בחלקו ולא עבר גבול ערכו. (30) כי אם היה ראוי שיבקש כל אדם מלאכה יותר מעולה מהמלאכה שירש מאבותיו היה ראוי שיתכוונ(ו) כל בני אדם להתעסק במלאכה אחת ושתהייה המעולה שבמלאכות (31) ויתבטלו בזה שאר המלאכות וג(ם) כ(ן) תתבטל אותה מלאכה עצמה שיתכוונ(ו) אליה לפי שהיא לא תגמר אלא במלאכות אחרות כיון שכלם תלויות קצתם בקצתם כמו שבארנ(ו) קודם לזה. זהו מה שראוי לעיין בשער קניית הממון.

(32) וענין השמירה צריכה לה' דברים הא' שלא יוציא אדם יותר ממה שירויח כי אם ההוצאה תהיה יותר מהריוח לא תאחר כליית הממון. (33) והב' שלא תהיה ההוצאה שוה עם הריוח אבל יותיר קצת מהריוח במה שיהיה לו עזר למקרה אם יקרה או רעה או חולי או אבדה אם אבדה לו כי מן הדין שינתן לקרן חלק מההוצאה. (34) ודומה מי שיותיר מן ההוצאה קצת ויוסיף בקרן לגוף שהוא פרה ורבה ודומה מי שהוצאתו בשווה עם הריוח לגוף שנגמר גדולו ונפסקה הפראתו ומי שיוציא יותר ממה שירויח דומה לגופים החלשים מזוקן שנתדבק בהן החסרון ונדרך בהן הכלייה והגוף שהוא בחוזק הרבוי וההפראה הוא נזון ביותר ממה שניתך ממנ(ו) (35) והגוף שהגיע לתכלית חנידול הוא ניזון בשיעור מה שיותך ממנ(ו) והגוף שהגיע לזוקן הוא ניזון במיעוט ממה שיותך ממג(ו) ובמו שהגוף שהגיע לחולשת הוקנה הוא קרוב מן המות כך הממון שיוקח ממנ(ו) יותר ממה שיוסיפו עליו הוא קרוב להפסד.

(36) והנ' שצריך לשמירת הממון שלא ישלח אדם ידו בדבר שילאה לקיימו ולהעמידו באדם שישי(ם) ממונ(ו) בשדה שאינ(ו) יכול לעבדה ולשמרה או בשדות מפוזרות שא(י) א(יפשר) לו לפקדם ולעיינם ואין לו מי יעזרנ(ו) לקיימם ולהעמידם או שיקנה מהבהמות ומב(עלי) ח(יים) מה שתהייה ההוצאה עליהן יותר ממה שנשאר [מ]ממונ(ו). (37) ומי שיעשה זה דומה למי שהוא רעבתן בתאותו ויאכל יותר ממה שיתבשל ויתאכל במעיו וכמו שכל מי שהוא אוכל מה שאינ(ו) יכול להתעכל אינ(ו) ניזון ממנ(ו) אבל איפש(ר) שיצא מגופו ויוציא עמו דבר אחר שיזיק לו יציאתו כך כל מי שמלאו לבו לקבץ ממון בענין שעבר גבול כחו אין ספק שיהיה ממהר לא להעדר הריוח בלבד אלא גם להפסיד הקרן.

(38) והד' שצריך לשמירת הממון הוא שלא יתעסק אדם בדברים שיתאחר יציאתם מידו ואלו הדברים הן אותם שיתמעטו מבקשיהן למיעוט צורך המון העם להם כגון המרגליו(ת) שלא יצטרכו להם אלא המלכים וכמו ספרי החכמה שלא יבקשו להם אלא החכמי(ם) וכמו כלי זין שאין הצורך להם אלא לזמן קצוב. (39) והה' ממה שצריך לשמירת הממון שיהא האדם ממהר למכור טלטל סחורתו ומתאחר למכור קרקעו א(ף) ע(ל) פ(י) [ש]הריוח מעט בזלזול [= בטלטול] הסחורה והרבה בקרקע.

(40) ועניין ההוצאה יאות שישמר בה מן הנבלות והכילות והפיזור וההתפארות ורוע ההנהגה. (41) הנבלות הוא קפיצת היד בהוצאה במקומו(ת) ההגונים ונאים כמו החזקת ידי קרוביו וגמילות חסד למיודעיו והנלוין אליו והצדקה לעניים ולנצרכי(ם) כפי אשר חננו אל(ה)ים וכפי יכולתו. (42) והכילות הוא מי שהוא מאמץ לבו וקופץ ידו בדברים ההכרחיי(ם) כמו פרנסת כלכול אשתו ובניו ובני ביתו כפי הראוי. (43) והפיזור הוא מי שהוא להוט אחר התאוות והעדוני(ם) והמותרות ומפזר ממונו באלו הדברי(ם).(44) וההתפארו(ת) הוא מי שיש בו גסות הרוח ועובר לפנים מהשורה שנהגו אנשי גילו וכוונתו בזה להתפאר ולהתגדל.(45) ורוע ההנהגה הוא מי שאינ(ו) מחלק הוצאתו בדברי(ם) שהוא צריך להן בדרך הגון ובשוה עד שיתן לכל שער מהן כפי חיובו הראוי לו כי אם לא ישמור זה הדרך ויפזר במקום אחד ויחסר במקום אחר לא יהיו דבריו מכווני(ם) קצתם עם קצתם ולא יתכוין לתועלת הדברים בעת הצורך להם.

(46) והנבלות יבא מצד שאינ(ו) יודע הנבל ערך חשיבות הדברים הנאים ומה שיש בהן ממדת החסידות. (47) והכילות יבוא מצד שהכילי אינ(ו) יודע השערים הראויים ומה שיש בעזיבתן מן החסרון. (48) והפיזור יבוא מצד כח יתרון התאוות והעדוני(ם) על יושר העצה הנכונה. והנבל והכילי הן פחותין ונבזין בעיני בני אדם לפי שהן נוהגין בקצת החמס והכילי הוא יותר חומס מהנובל. והמפזר הוא מגונה מהבריות ומי שהוא נבזה ומגונה בעיני הבריות לא יהיה לו טובה בשכונתם ומי שאינ(ו) שכן טוב עם שכניו הוא נחשב בחשבון המתים.(49) והמתפאר הוא יותר רע כי הנבל והכילי אם יהיו מגונים בעיני בני אדם הן בוטחים בשמירת ממונם והמפזר א(ף) ע(ל) פ(י) שהוא מגונה הוא מרויח עדון תאותו אבל המתפאר אין לו שמירת ממון ולא עדון תאוה (50) ויותר רע מכלם מי שהנהגתו רעה ויבא מצד שאינ(ו) יודע ערך ההוצאה ולא עתותיה.

(51) וכל מי שהוא יודע הדרכים החשובי(ם) ובקש אותם וידע שערי האמת המחוייבי(ם) וחייבם על נפשו ונתכוון בהוצאתו במקומות ההגונים יותר מעידון גופו ולא עבר גבול אנשי ערכו ובני גילו והכיר שיעור חיוב כל מקום ממה שהוא צריך לו והוציא בו בשיעור חיובו ולא הוסיף בשער א(חד) ובא להיות מוכרח שיחסר במקום אחר (52) וידע עיתות הצורך לכל דבר ולא הקדים לקחת דבר קודם עת הצורך כדי שיפסד או יאבד קודם שיגיע עת הצורך לו ולא יאחר דבר כדי שיחסר בעת הצורך לו ותהיה לקיחתו אחר כן בטלה או יכבד עליו סכומו ולא ימצאנ(ו) אלא ביוקר כל המתנהג בזו ההנהגה ידונ(ו) כל מדותיו לנדיבות ולרחב לב וליקרות נפש ולעזר הקרובי(ם) והחברים ולכוונה טובה ולחירות ולהנהגה טובה וישרה ולהסתפקות (53) והמתנהג בזה המנהג ותהיה פירותיו או ריוח ממונ(ו) כדי פרנסתו ותספיק להצלחת גופו ומזון אנשי ביתו ויותיר חלק על זה שיתן ממנ(ו) לעזור קרוביו ומיודעיו והנלוים אליו וקצתו לגְסִים ולעניי אנשי עירו (54) וישמור קצת להתכבד בו ולהעזר לקורות זמנ(ו) ראוי לו שלא יבקש יותר מזה ואם יבקש יותר מזה הוא נבהל להון ורע עין. זהו ענין הממון וההנהגה בבקשתו ובשמירתו והוצאתו.

(55) ענין העבדים העבדי(ם) והשמשין הצורך להן בבית כצורך המון העם במדינות וכבר ביארנ(ו) לאי זה ענין הוצרכו בני אדם לקחת המדינות ולהתקבץ בהן.(56) והעבדי(ם) הן ג' מינים עבד נרצע ועבד תאוה ועבד בטבע העבד הנרצע הוא אותו שחייב הדין והמשפט עליו העבדות ועבד התאוה הוא מי שאינ(ו) כובש יצרו לגודל תאותו ומהירו(ת) לבו עליו ומי שהוא כך הוא עבד רע ואדם רע לא יצלח לכל (57) ועבד הטבע הוא אשר יש לו גוף חזק לעמל וליגיעה ואין לו היכר בנפשו ואין לו מן השכל אלא שיעור מה שהוא משתעבד לזולתו וזהו בטבעו קרוב מן הבהמו(ת) שינהיגו אותם בני אדם כרצונם ומי שהוא כך א(ף) ע(ל) פ(י) שהוא חפשי מעבדות הדין הוא עבד והנכון לו הוא שיהיה לו שר ומנהיג אחר ינהיגהו.

(58) והעבדי(ם) הצורך בהן הוא לדברים משוני(ם) מהן שהצורך בהן הוא להנהגת הבית ומהן [שהצורך בהן לעבודה ולמלאכה ומהן ש]הצורך בהן לדברי(ם) הנעלמי(ם) והנסתרים. ויאות לאדם כשירצה לקנות עבד שיסתכל [בו ו]אם יתקבץ בו עם עבדות הדין עבדות התאוה לא יארע לו שיסכים בנפשו לסבול ולהכנע לו ואם יבטח לתקנו(ו) ולהחזירו למוטב (59) וכל מי שיקנה עבד שזה עיניינ(ו) כבר קנה עבד יש לו אדון אחר זולתו ומי שהוא כך אינ(ו) עבד אלא בשם בלבד וכשאדם אינ(ו) מולך עצמו כ(ל) ש(כן) שלא ימלוך עליו אחר זולתו. (60) ואם יהיה העבד בן חורין בטבעו ותהיה נפשו חזקה ועצומה וגופו קל זהו ראוי שיפקדו לו [ההנהגה והשמירה ואם יהיה בן חורין בטבעו ותהיה נפשו רכה ונכנעה זהו ראוי שיפקדו לו] העבודה והמלאכה ואם יהיה עבד בטבע יפקדו לו העבדי(ם) הכבדי(ם) שצריכין לחוזק ולסבלנות.

(61) והעבדים דומי(ם) לאיברי הגוף שימלוך האדם פעולותם העבדים שהן מופקדין בשמירת הבית והנהגתו הן במדרגת החושי(ם) כי במדרגת החושי(ם) יכיר האדם הדבר המזיק וידיחנ(ו) והדבר המועיל ויקריבנ(ו) והעבדים המופקדין לעבודה דומין לידים כי בידים יתנהג (sic) לגוף כל צורכיו והעבדים שהן מופקדין בעסקין דומין לרגלים כי עליהם משא כל הגוף וכבדותו (62) ועל זה ראוי לאדם שישמור עבדיו ומשרתיו כמו שהוא שומר איבריו ושיחשוב בענייניהם בב' דברי(ם) הא(חד) הסוג שהוא כולל לו ולהם והענין האחר הרעה שחלה עליהם כי כשיחשוב בלבו סוגם יבין כי הן בני אדם כמוהו [ו]איפש(ר) שיבינ(ו) מה שהוא מבין ויחשבו מה שהוא חושב ויתאוו מה שהוא מתאווה ויקוצו במה שהוא קץ (63) כי כל זה שיתנהג עמהן זה המנהג יקנה עם מדת החסידות שתתחדש לו בנפשו האהבה שהמליכו עליו וכן כשיחשוב הרעה שחלה עליהם יבין כי אם אירע לו מה שאירע להן היה רוצה שיהיה לו אדון יחמול עליו וינהלהו לאט.

(64) ואם יטעה העבד יאות לאדון שיעלים עיניו פעם ויתקן פעם ויהיה תיקונם בדברי תוכחה והזמנה והתראה וגיזום ואם יחזור לטעותו יכעוס עליו ויגער בו ואם יחזור לטעותו ייסרהו בהכאה.(65) ולא יענישהו על חטא שחטא בלי ידיעה ובלי כוונה וכן לא יניח לעונשו על חטא שחטא בגלוי במזיד ובכוונה ואינ(ו) ראוי כשיחטא העבד שיענש אלא בדמות העונש שיענש הבן כשיחטא כמו אותו חטא כי זהו הצלחת העבד והצלחת הבן.

(66) וראוי שיושם לעבדי(ם) עתים לנוח בהן כי העבד אם יכבדו עליו מלאכה תכף מלאכה ויצוו אותו יגיעה אחר יגיעה ולא יהיה לו רווחה ילאה מלעשות א(ף) ע(ל) פ(י) שיהיה אץ לעשותה והמנוחה תחדש הגוף ותחבר לבעל המלאכה על המעשה (67) והמשל בזה דומה לקשת כי אם יניחוה מיותרת במיתריה תתרפה ואם יתירוה עד עת הצורך לא תשאר חזקה ומוכנת להועיל (68)ואני תמה מהאנשים ישימו עיניהם על בהמותיהם וישתדלו במרעה שלהן ולהטיב עמם ולא יתנ(ו) לעבדיהם חלק מזה וא(ף) ע(ל) פ(י) שהעבד אינ(ו) סובל מהמנוחה מה שתסבול הבהמה כי רוב המנוחה איפש(ר) על הרוב שיפסידהו ויביאהו

לידי נזק והבהמה אינה דומה בזה לאדם על כל פנים העבד צריך למנוחה כדי להתמיד כחו ולהביאו לידי שמחה ולא יכביד עולו בשיעור שיפחד שיבוא לידי נזק (69) ועוד כי הוא ממין האדון וראוי לאדון שינהיגהו הנהגה אנושית עם התערכות טובת ההנהגה והחמלה עליו למה שיראה מחולשתו ויראה שבהמתו תסבול יותר העלמת העין ממנ(ו). (70) ואין ראוי לאדם שיבקש מעבדו שע(ל) כ(ל) פ(נים) הוא מוכרח לקבל מצותו ברצונ(ו) או בעל כרחו אבל יבקש שתהיה עבודתו בהשתדלו(ת) ובשמחה ובאהבה וראוי שישתדל שיהיה עבדו סר למשמעתו בבושת פנים יותר מיראה ומאהבה יותר מחיוב השעבוד.

(71) והטוב שבעבדים הן הקטנים כי הן יותר נשמעין למצוה ויותר ממהרין לקבלה והן נצמדין לאדוניהן ונוהגין מה שהן למדין ממדות האדון. וטוב שבעבדים ומשרתים לאדם מי שאינן ממשפחתו ויחוסו כי דרך בני אדם לזלזל קרוביהן ולקנא בם ולכנוי היחס יש חלק מזה.

(72) ומדין העבד שישלימו לו כל צורכיו ולא ישימו עליו עול מלאכה שאין בו יכולת לעשותה ועליו חובה לקבל השעבוד ואם לא יקבל ראוי שיענש כפי מה שסדרנ(ו) בענין אחר ענין. (73) וראוי שיהיה לפני אדוניהם לעבדים מדרגות מהטובות ומגמילות החסד וכשייטיב א(חד) מהן יעלה ממדרגה למדרגה כפי הראוי לו ובזה ימהרו הנשארים להשיג זאת המעלה. זהו מה שדברנ(ו) בעבדים אחר שדברנ(ו) בממון.

(74) ענין האשה ראשית מה שראוי שנקדים בזכרונה הוא הכוונה למה הוצרכה בה ונאמ(ר) כי הכוונה בזה לשני דברים הא(חד) מדרך העצה והב' מדרך הטבע. (75) מדרך העצה הוא כי רוב עסק האיש הוא חוץ לביתו והוא מוכרח לצאת מביתו ולהניחו רק מעצמו ואחר שכן הוא ע(ל) כ(ל) פ(נים) הוא צריך אחר שישמור ביתו וינהיגהו ויתקן מה שיש בו וא(י) א(יפשר) שישיג שום אדם דבר בהשתדלות זולתו מה שישיג בהשתדלו(ת) עצמו (76) ואחר שהענין כך הדבר יותר מועיל לאיש שיהיה לו בביתו שותף שימלוך בבית כמו שהוא מולך בו עד שישתדל בהנהגתו כהשתדלותו עצמו ויהיה תיקונ(ו) כתיקונ(ו) זהו השער שקראה אליו העצה והורה עליו הבחירה.

(77) והשער האחר שחייב הטבע הוא כי הבורא ית(ברך) לפי שגזר המות על בני אדם וגזר השארות העולם זמן קצוב שם באדם כח התולדה וברא התולדה מדבר יתקבץ בו החום והרוטב החום לפי שהגידול והריבוי והתנועה לא יהיו אלא בו והרטיבות לפי שהרישום והחיקוק על חילוף שיעורם ותבניתם לא יהיו אלא ברטיבות (78) ואין לרטיבות עם החום קיום ולא העמדה לפי שהחום תתיך ותכלה אותה ולפי שלא ימצא בגוף אחד מכל א(חד) מהם שיעור הכח שממנ(ו) יתהווה הוולד על זה היתה הוויית הולד מזכר ונקיבה כי החמימות בזכר יותר חזקה והרטיבות והלחות בנקבה יותר (79) וכישים הזכר בנקבה מהחום מה ששיער הבורא שיתהווה ממנ(ו) הוולד ונמשכה באותה החמימות בנקבה מהרטיבות שיעור מה שיהיה ממנ(ו) תשלום היצירה אז נשלם הוולד.

(80) ועוד מגמר מלאכת ההנהגה בזה כי לפי שהושם באיש הטבע שיטה אותו להתנועע ולהראות והוא נצרך למי שימלא מקומו בביתו הושם בנקבה טבע שיַטֶּנָה להשקט ולצניעות כדי שתמלא מקומו במה שחסר מסבלות שקידת ביתו וימלא הוא מקומה במה שחסרה בעצמה מהתנועה לבקש המחיה (81) ועוד הושם ביניהם מהאהבה והבטחון מה שסלק מביניהם הקנאה והחמדה והקטטה והכילות מכל א(חד) מהם על חברו אבל יתנדב זה לזה בממונ(ו) ויתן רשות זה לזה להנהגתו ולתיקונ(ו) ולולי זה היה עסק כל א(חד) מהם להשמר מחברו יותר מעסקם בהתחברות וההשתתפות ותיקון ההנהגה אבל הושמו כאלו הן גוף אחד.

(82) וחייבת האישה שתתנהג בהכנעה ובשפלות לפני בעלה ושתהיה סרת למשמעתו ותעשה מצותו הואיל שהתנדב לה בכל ביתו והשליטה בו ולא שם לנפשו עליה יתרון בדבר מכל אשר בבית ואם היא תאמר שהוא יעשה כל זה לפי שהוא הנאתו ותועלתו אין במאמרה זה מה שיבטל חסדו שעשה עמה ולא יסור בזה מעליה ממשלתו (83) כי כל טוב שיעשה האדם לאחר א(ף) ע(ל) פ(י) שישוב אליו גמילות חסדו ושכרו וזכרון הטוב על מה שעשה והיתה לו התועלת בזה המעשה יותר ממה שהגיע למי שמקבל הטוב ממנ(ו) לא יש בזה מי שיתיר חובת ההנאה והשבח לאותו שהטיב לו ולא יש דרך לכפור בטובה שקבל ממנ(ו)

(84) וראוי לאיש כשישא אשה שיתחיל לבאר זה הענין שצריך ממנה וכי אין הצורך בה לענין הבנים בלבד אלא שתהא מעיינת בו ובהשגחת ביתו ופקידת עינייניו בהמצאו ובהעלמו ובבריאותו ובחליו ושמירת כל נכסיו ולעזרו בכל צרכיו וכל מה שהיא מחוייבת בסבות שבארנ(ו). (85) ואינ(ו) ראוי שתהיה כוונת האיש מן האשה ליחס ולא לממון ולא ליופי כי כל זמן שמתכוין לא(חד) מאלו ויהיה מצוי בה אז תראה האשה כי נשלם רצונ(ו) ושלא נשאר עליה חיוב להשלים דבר אחר מצרכיו (86) אבל תחשוב כי אם תריע לו או תקצרו ממשפטו כי הכל יש לו לסבול אחר שנשלם רצונ(ו) מא(חד) מאלו הדברים וכי הוא יותר מחוייב להשתעבד לה ולהשפיל עצמו יותר מהיא אליו ובזה יפסד תיקון הבית לפי שהנקלה מבעלי הבית חזר במדרגת הנכבד ויחזור הנכבד או נמשך אחר הנקלה או יהיה כנגדו ומתקוטט עמו ונלחם עמו על כל מה שהוא חולק עליו (87) והמחלוקת תביא לידי עסק והעסק לידי בטול תועלת הבית ובזאת הסבה יהיה המרד ועם המרד תהיה המריבה והריב יביא לאבוד הממון ויהיו כל אנשי הבית מזומנים למצותו ומשועבדי(ם) לו

(88) וכבר ביארנ(ו) הב' עניינים שהיתה הכוונה בהם בלקיחת האשה והם הבנים ותיקון הבית וראוי שנעיין בדברים שצריך האדם לעיין באלו הב' עניינים עד שיבוקש (sic) כי בענין היחס והממון והיופי אין הצורך לא(חד) מאלו (89) אבל איפשר שיזיקו אלו העניינים כלם לפי שהיופי מסבב ריבוי ההבטה בו ואיפש(ר) שתהיה סבה להפסד בעליו והיחס יביא בעליו להשען עליו ולהניח דברים רבים שהן תפארתו והממון יבהיל בעליו עד שיפסידהו וישנה שכלו וזה יארע לאיש עם טוב הבנתו כ(ל) ש(כן) האשה שדעתה קלה עליה.

(90) א(ם) כ(ן) מה שצריכה האשה לעזר הולדת הבנים הם ב' דברים הא(חד) מן הגוף והב' מן הנפש ענין הגוף הוא שתהיה האשה בריאת הבנין וענין הנפש שתהיה שלימת השכל כי אין עם חולי הגוף והפסד השכל הצלחה

(91) והנהגת הבית צריכה ליתרון מדות טובות רבות הראשונה השכל ועם השכל החריצות ועוד חוזק הגוף והנפש וכן כבישת היצר מתשלום התאוות ועוד שפלות הנפש וההכנעה בכל ענייניה בינה ובין בעלה וג(ם) כ(ן) רכות הלב והחמלה שתתנהג בזה בינה ובין בניה וג(ם) כ(ן) שתתנהג בצדקות ובמשפט בינה ובין משרתיה (92) ואין אתה רואה דברי(ם) ממה שצריך האיש ממנהג מעלות המדות הטובות שלא תצטרך האשה לדומה להם כ(ל) ש(כן) שהיא יותר חלושה ולפי(כך) היא צריכה לקנות יותר ממעלו(ת) המדות (93) ואחר שאין כל נפש מקבלת תיקון המדות הטובות בדברי מוסר לפי(כך) יאות לאדם שישתדל לקחת מי שיעזרהו על קיבול תיקון המדות בטבע כדי שיוכל לעשות יסוד ובנין ממה שיש ברשותו ויוסיף עליו.

(94) ולא יתישר ענין הבית עד שישתוו ויתכוונ(ו) מדות האשה ודרכיה עם מדות האיש ודרכיו וא(י) א(יפשר) שיסכימו מדות האשה הרעה ודרכיה עם מדות האיש החסיד ודרכיו ולא מדות האשה הטובה ודרכיה עם מדות האיש הרע ודרכיו ולא מדות האיש הרע ודרכיו עם מדות האשה הרעה ודרכיה (95) כי לא יתפשרו ולא יהיה שלום ביניהם אלא אם שניהם

כא(חד) טובים וחסידים כמו העץ הישר שלא יתכוין אלא עם עץ אחר ישר אבל המעוות לא יתכוין עם הישר ולא עם המעוות כי היושר יש לו דרך א(חד) והעוות יש לו דרכים הרבה. (96) ולזה צריך האיש ואשתו ביחד שיהיו משכילי(ם) ופרושי(ם) וצדיקי(ם) ואם לא יהיו כך לא יתפשרו ותפסד הנהגת ביתם ומי שישים ספק במה שאמרנ(ו) בשצריך שיתקבצו באשה כל המדות הטובות נבאר לו זה כי בלי ספק שהאשה היא מנהגת הבית ומעמדת אותו ומחשבת בתיקונ(ו) והמופקדת לסדר כל מה שיש בו משמשים וזולתם (97) א(ם) כן היתכן שיהיה התיקון אלא מבעלי שכל ומדע או תהיה ההנהגה אלא מבעל רחמנות וחמלה והעלמת העין עם התוקף במקום הראוי או תהיה ההצלחה אלא עם קפיצת היד כראוי והשמירה או יהיה טוב העמדה אלא עם החריצות וזכות השכל (98) וגם היהיה שלם כל זה אלא עם צניעות הנפש ועזיבת התאוות והעידונים אלא הראויי(ם) מהן ועוד ההרחקה מן החרפה וסבלנות הנזקי(ם) ושאת עמל היגיעה ונדיבות הנפש והודאת האמת והצדק (99) ואם לאו איך ישמור ביתו מי שלא ישמור נפשו ואיך יפנה למה שיועילנ(ו) מי שהוא טרוד ולהוט בתאוותיו ועידוניו ואיך יכבוש ויצווה למי שהוא תחת ידו מי שמתעצל לכבוש וליסר נפשו (100) והיאך יתמיד להלוך בדרך א(חד) מי שאינ(ו) סובל והיאך יסבול צער גידול בנים ופרנסתם והעמדת צרכיהם ועל עבודת הבעל מי שאין בו סבלנות והיאך יכיר שום אדם יתרון לאחר אלא מי שיש בנפשו מהכח והגבורה שיהיה זה נקל בעיניו והיאך ידום ויסבול החמס אלא מי שהיושר והנכון המיעוט שבמידותיו (101) כי לא יוכל אדם לומ(ר) כי האשה תסתכם בדברי(ם) שבינה לבין בעלה ושבינה לבין בניה אם לא תבחר שיחמסוה יותר משתחמוס היא להם ושתסבול כעסם וחמתם ושיהיו עיניהם צופיות בעתו(ת) קורותם ובעת מחלתם ושתראה להם בכל זה כי החטא כולו תלוי בה ושלא תשטום להם על טעותם ולא ידבק בנפשה חלק ממנ(ו) (102) אבל אם ישיגנה דבר מזה בקצת העתים יתחדש בלבה עליהם בכות החמלה ותשים החמלה והבכיות במקום ההתנצלו(ת) זכרון לאותן הטעיו(ת) בעת שיארע להם הכאה או דאגה או חולי ותראה דאגה וצער על מה שקרה להם מכל זה ותתאווה שלא תראה להם צער לא להנאתה אלא מדאגתה ולצערה וחמלתה עליהם על מה שאירע להם (103) ואי זה נפש שלימה יותר מנפש שנתקבצו בה אלו המדות וכשיתקבצו אלו המדו(ת) באשה יגמר טוב מזלה בעצמה ומזל בעלה ובניה ויתייחסו בה משפחתה ונעשית גברת ומנהיגה לכל הנשים.

(104) ואומר אחר ענין האשה ענין הבנים ואומר כי הטוב שבבנים מי שנולד מאשה בת חורין בריאת הגוף שלימת השכל שנתקבצו בה כל המדות שבארנ(ו) (105) זהו ראשית הצלחת הבן והיסוד שיבנה עליו מוסרו ותיקון דרכיו ויאות שילמדו לבן מקטנותו כי הקטן יותר רך להנהגה ויותר נקל לקבל מוסר ולא גבר עליו הרגל שימנענו להמשך אחר מה שיבקשו ממנ(ו) ואין בו הסכמה מה שתסירהו מלהשלים מה שיצווה (106) וכשירגיל בדבר ויתגדל עליו אם טוב ואם רע לא יוכל לסור ממנ(ו) ואם ירגילו אותו מנעוריו למדות טובות ופעולות משובחו(ת) ישאר עליהן ויוסיף בהן כשיבין אותן (107) ואם יתרשלו בו ויניחוהו עד שירגיל בדברי(ם) שיטה אליו טבעו מאותם שיגברו עליו או הרגילוהו דברים רעים ממה שאין בטבעו ואחרי כן ייסרו אותו אחר שגברו עליו תקשה הסרתו מאותן הדברים על מייסרו ולא יוכל להסיר ממנ(ו) מה שהרגיל בו.

(108) כי רוב בני אדם לא יבאו לרוע מדותם אלא להרגל הנערות או שלא קדם להם דרך מוסר וכבר ראיתי רבים בלא מספר הן יודעים כי מדותם מדות רעות ולא תתעלם מהם הדרכים הנאים ויקשה עליהן לשוב לאותן הדרכים מרוב שולטנות אותן המדות עליהן ואם יכריחו עצמם שלא לנהוג בקצת אותן המעשי(ם) מבשתם מבני אדם בגלוי

יחזרו בסתר למדות האחרות ששלטו עליהם ונדבקו בטבעם (109) וראיתי עוד בנים רבים כל זמן שאבותן או אחרים זולתן מהמייסרי(ם) אותם קיימי(ם) הם שוקדי(ם) בדרכים הטובי(ם) וכשיתפרדו מהן חוזרין לרוע הדרכים ופחיתותם. (110) ואין בכל זאת הסבות דבר יותר חזק מהרגל הנער אלא שהנער כשיהיה בטבעו נוטה אל הדברים הרעים ועם זה הוא הולך בדרך ההרגל בהן יהיה בהן יותר חזק ואליהן יותר נקל ויותר אמיץ לבא בהן עד שיגברו בו ולא יוכל לסור מהן (111) והפך זה כשיהיה הנער טוב הטבע ועם זה ילך בדרך הרגל הטוב ויהיה כל א(חד) מהטבע וההרגל מתקן ומסייע לחברו עד שיתחזק הטוב ויגבר עליו וכמו שאותו שהוא בטבעו רע אינ(ו) יכול לסור מהדברי(ם) המגונים כך האחר לא יסור מהמשובחים (112) והענין האמצעי בזה הוא שיהיה הנער טוב הטבע וידריכוהו בדברים הרעים וחברת בעליהן או שיהיה רע הטבע וידריכוהו על הדרכים (sic) המשובחים או יארע לו שיראה אחרים שידרכו בהן כל אלו איפש(ר) שיעבור אותן ההרגל מן הטבע ואיפש(ר) שיסורו אחר כן מדרך ההרגל וישובו לבנין הטבע.

(113) והמצליח שבנערים מי שהוא מוטבע על בושת הפנים ואוהב דרך הכבוד ושתהיה לו נפש יקרה ואם יהיה כך יהיה נקל למוסר ומי שהוא מהנערים מעט בושת פנים מזלזל בדרך הכבוד רחוק מיקרות הנפש יהיה קשה לקבל מוסר (114) ועל כ(ל) פ(נים) יאות למי שהוא כך שיפחידו אותו על הרעה שעשה ויגערו בו וג(ם) כ(ן) ראוי להכותו אם לא יועיל הגערה וכן שייטיבו לו כשייטיב במעשיו וכל מי שהוא יקר נפש ואוהב דרך הכבוד השבח או הגנאי אם ייטיב או יירע יגיעו לו מן המוסר מה שלא יגיע לזולתו בתוכחה ובעונש.

(115) ויאות שיעיינ(ו) בנער בכל ענייניו במאכלו ובמשתיו ושנתו וקימתו וישיבתו וכל ענייניו ולמדוהו בכל זה הרחקת הגנאי והכוונה לשבח וכשידע הדרכים הנאים והמגונים באלו הדברים ויתקשרו בלבו יתעורר עליהם ויבין אותם יותר מזולתם מכל הדברים האחרים ולא יצטרך ברוב זה במתקן אחר שיתקנהו ואני מבאר לך הדרך בזה.

(116) הא' ענין המאכל ונאמ(ר) כי ראוי שירגיל (sic) לנער שלא יתחיל להגיע ידו במאכל בבהילות ברגע שיושם לפניו ולא יביט בו הבטת הרעבתן ויבקשו דרך שיקטינ(ו) בעיניו שיעור המאכל (117) ואם יראה בו קצת בהלה למאכל יגנוהו בזה ויודיעוהו כיעור זה המעשה וילמדוהו כי החריצות למאכל הוא מטבע החזיר ומי שישתתף עם החזיר בזאת המדה אין ביניהם הפרש גדול וכשישב לאכול עם מי שהוא גדול ממנו לא יקדים למשוך ידו אל המזון אלא יצווהו בזה (118) ולא יאכל אלא מן המזון הסמוך אצלו ולא ירבה לשום ידו פעם אל דבר א(חד) ופעם אל דבר אחר אבל יתכוין ברוב מאכלו אל דבר א(חד) ולא יבקש מטעמים הרבה ולא ימהר באכילה ולא יגדיל לוגמא מן המזון (119) ולא ילכלך ידיו ולא פיו ולא בגדיו ולא ילחך אצבעותיו ולא יהיה האחרון שירים ידו מן המאכל ולא יסתכל בשום אדם מאותם שאוכלין עמו וכ(ל) ש(כן) אם הוא נכרי.

(120) ויאות שיבינ(ו) לנער כי המזון אין צורך בו אלא כצורך משקה הרפואה וכמו שאין הכוונה במשקה הרפואה שיהיה ערב ולא הרבה אלא הכוונה לתועלתו כך אין הכוונה במזון לרובו ולערבותו אלא הכוונה לשיעור תועלתו (121) וירגילו לנער שיתן ממאכלו למי שיבקש ממנ(ו) כי יהיה לו בזה תועלת לכבישת התאוה ולנדיבו(ת) ולחבה וירגילו לנער שיסתפק במאכל יותר פחות ושיסתפק בפת חרבה בלא תבלין וזהו יסייעהו לפרוש מהדברים האסורים והמזיקי(ם) ולכבישת הנפש ומעט החריצות לקיבוץ הממון (122) והנבהל להון מדה מגונה בעצמה ואיפש(ר) שבהלת קיבוץ הממון תביא לקבצו מדרכי(ם) מכוערים [אם] לא יתכן לו לקבצו מדרכים נאים והאסתפקות במזון הפחות היא מדה נאה לרש ולעשיר אלא שהרש הוא יותר צריך לזאת המדה והיא יותר נאה לעשיר. (123)

ויאות לנער שלא יאכל לשובע מן המזון ושיאכל בלילה יותר מביום כי זה מועיל לשכלו ולבריאות גופו כי אם ירבה באכילה ביום יכבד גופו ויתעצל ויצטרך לשינה ויתעבה שכלו מלקבל המוסר (124) ואין ראוי שירגילוהו העצלות והשינה ביום אבל ירגילוהו לשמחה ולתנועה וחריצות על המוסר וזאת ההנהגה היא ג(ם) כ(ן) טובה לאנשים וכשיהיה מנערותו מורגל בזה יהיה יותר נקל עליו ויותר מועיל (125) לו ולא יהיה רוב מאכלו הבשרים ולא המאכלי(ם) הנסים כי עזיבתם יותר מועיל לו לשכל ולבריאות הגוף ולמהירות הגידול כי המזון הכבד והגס יכביד הטבע וימנעהו מהגידול. (126) וירגילו הנער למעט מאכול המאכלים המתוקי(ם) והפירות ובזה יהיה לו תועלת לנפשו ולגופו לנפשו שלא תשלוט בו מדת התענוג ואהבת העידונים ולגופו למהירות היתך הדברים המתוקי(ם) והפרות והפסדם בגופים החמים (127) וירגילו לנער שיהיה משתהו אחר גמר אכילתו כי זה מועיל לו לנפשו ולגופו לנפשו שכובש תאותו ו[לגופו שהוא מסייעו לעיכול המזון ויותר נאות לחזוק גופו וכבר ידע זה מי שנסהו וחכמי הרפואה ירמזו זה והנוהגי(ם) לשתות המשקי(ם) ינהגו זה המנהג. (128) ועת האכילה ביום לנער היא בעת שינמור הרגל לימודו ולאחר שיגע יגיעה מסתפקת וכל עת שתראה לנער שהוא אוכל ורוצה להסתיר מאכלו תמנענ(ו) מלאכול כי לא יסתירנ(ו) אלא אחר שהוא יודע שאינ(ו) צריך אליו ושהוא טועה באותה אכילה.

(129) וירגילוהו שלא ישתה מים תכף אכילתו וכ(ל) ש(כן) בזמן הקיץ כי כשישתה יכבד עליו ויתקרר גופו ויתעצל וירד המזון מאצטומכתו במהרה ויצטרך למזון אחר זולתו ואם יהיה בזמן הקור יקרר הגוף. (130) ויאות לנער שיכבוש נפשו מלשתות בעתות שהוא מתעסק בלימוד וכשהוא יושב לפני מי שחייב בכבודו (131) ואין ראוי שיקרב הנער אל היין ולא אל השכר עד שיהיה בגבול האנשים כי יזיק לגופו ולנפשו לגופו שמחמם אותו והנער אינ(ו) צריך לחמימו(ת) כי הוא חם בטבעו ולנפשו אחר שהיין והשכר ישנה דעת האנשי(ם) המחונכים ויוציאם לליצנות ולמהירות הרעה ולבלבול המחשבה ולעזות פנים ולשטות ק(ל) ו(חומר) שיעשה זה בנער ומוח הנער עם זה הוא חלש ורך ואד היין ממהר להפסידו לפי התגברו על טבעו (132) ואין ראוי לו שישב במסיבת שותי היין אלא אם יהיו היושבי(ם) מבעלי המוסר והחסד אבל לא במושב עמי הארץ וליצני(ם) וזה למה שינהוג ביניהם מהדברים המגונים ויראה ביניהם ממיעוט השכל.

(133) והשינה ראוי שישערו לנער מן השינה שיעור צרכו וימנעוהו שירבה בה כוונתו להתענג כי רוב השינה יזיק לו לנפשו ולגופו כי היא תרפה הגוף ויפתח אותו ויעבה השכל וימית הלב (134) וראוי שימנעו לנער מלישן תכף האכילה עד שירד המזון ויתישב יישוב הראוי ויעוררו אותו משנתו בשחר כי יועילהו לנפץ מגופו מה שנתקבץ בו מהמותר והטינוף ויקל גופו כי אין דבר יותר עוזר לזכות השכל מזה ואין יותר מופלג לשמחת הגוף ובריאותו ואין עת יותר טוב ללימוד מהבוקר (135) והאיש ג(ם) כ(ן) צריך שיעור משנתו בשחר וכשירגיל לזה מנערותו יהיה עליו יותר נקל וימנעו לנער מלישן ביום אלא אם יצטרך לו לחולשת גופו או לחולי (136) ולא ירגילו לנער לישן לפני בני אדם כי מוסף מה שיש בזה מהגנות יורה שאינ(ו) יכול לכבוש נפשו ולמונעה מהתענוג והערש הרך רע לנער כי ירפה אותו ויפתחהו והנער צריך לחזק גופו ודיבוק אבריו ואומץ.

(137) ושישיג לנער קצת קור בזמן הקור וקצת חום בזמן הקיץ הוא טוב לו יותר משלא ישיגהו דבר מזה ומי שלא ישיגהו קצת מזה יהיה גופו רך וחלש ותהיה נפשו שפלה ורקה וכן ההילוך והמרוצה והרכיבה והתנועה יותר טוב לנער מהתשקט והמנוחה וההכנעה והתענוג (138) וראוי שלא ירגילו לנער ללבוש בגדי(ם) רכי(ם) וחלשי(ם) ושלא יגדילו וישבחו בעיניו תפארת המלבושי(ם) ושילמדוהו כי זה יאות לנשי(ם) ולמתעננים ושזה יביא לידי

חמדת הממון וכבר בארנ(ו) שאהבת הממון מדה רעה בעצמה גוררת למה שהוא יותר רע ממנה (139) ואין ראוי שיצא הנער בלא מנעל ולא ירפה ידיו ולא ייגע אותם לחיקו ולא יגלה כתפיו ולא ימהר בהילוכו מאד ולא יתנהל לאט מאד כי מהירות ההליכה תורה על השטוח וההליכה לאט תורה על גסות הרוח והעצלות וגילוי הכתף הוא ממעשי עזי פנים ורפות הידים הוא מזלזול בבני אדם (140) ואין ראוי לנער שיגדל שערו ולא יתקשט בדבר מתכשיטי הנשים אבל יודיעוהו גנאי התכשיטין ומה היא הכוונה בהן וישניאו בלבו ההדמות לנשים ויחבבו בעיניו ההדמות לאנשי(ם) (141) ולא יוליך באצבעו טבעת אלא אם צריך לו וימנעוהו מלהתפאר בדבר שקנה ושהוא ברשותו על אדם אחר שאין לו דבר כמותו ויזהירוהו על זה עד שיתרחק ממנ(ו) ויתנו לו רשות להתפאר במוסר ובחכמה ולהתכבד בהן.

(142) ויצווהו לכבד למי שהוא גדול ממנ(ו) ולקום מפניו ממקומו ולא יכבד העשיר והמיוחס אלא כמו שיכבד לפחות ולרש ויצווהו לכבד למי שיש לו עליו יתרון במוסר ובחכמה ובדעת א(ף) ע(ל) פ(י) שיהא קטן ממנ(ו) בשנים. (143) וימנעו לנער מלהשליך רוקו או לחות נחיריו או להתעטש והדומה לזה בפני בני אדם כי זה יורה על כבישת נפשו ונקיותה וגודל בשתו ולא ירבו אלו הפעולות אלא במי שמפליג באכילה ובשתייה ובשינה ובמנוחה. (144) ולא יניחוהו כשישב שישים רגל על רגל ולא יקשור ראשו עם כתפיו כי העושה זה יורה שהפליג ברפיון ובחולשא שאינ(ו) יכול לשאת ראשו ואין שום אדם עושה זה בעת השמחה אבל יעשה אותו בעת הדאגה והשברון והחולשא.

(145) ואין ראוי לנער שישבע בשם לא באמת ולא בשקר וגם לאיש אינ(ו) נאה להשביע (sic) אלא א(ם) כ(ן) יהיה מוכרח אבל הנער לא יקרה לו דבר שיכריחהו לישבע וכשירגיל האיש מנערותו שלא ישבע בשם ימעט הרגלו בשבועה כשיגדל וישמר ממנה ולא ימהר לישבע ברוב הדברים. (146) וראוי שיורגל הנער לשתיקה ומיעוט הדיבור ושלא ידבר בפני מי שהוא גדול ממנ(ו) אלא שיתן תשובה על שאלה אם ישאלוהו אבל ראוי לו כשישב במושב מי שהוא גדול ממנ(ו) שיקשיב לדבריו כי השמיעה תעזור על הלימוד והשתיקה תורה על הבושה ועל הסבלנות (147) וראוי שימנעו לנער מהזכרת הדברים המגונים ויזהירוהו שלא ישמעם מזולתו כי בזכרונם ושמיעתם יתחברו בלבו וכשיתרחק לזכרם וישתומם מלשמעם יהיה יותר חזק להרחקתם ומעשייתם יותר משתומם ועל זה ראוי שיזהירו לנער חברת הנערים שיש בהן מהירות ועזות (148) וראוי שימנעו לנער מלחרף ולקלל וירגילוהו הדיבור הנאה ויופי ההסבה והאקבלה ורכות הדברים וחלקת הלשון וכמו שיזיקוהו (sic) עשיית הדברי(ם) המגוני(ם) כך יזיקוהו(!) שיראה לאחר זולתו עושה אותן ואין ראוי שישמע גנותו אלא מי שמכוין ליסרו כשיטעה ושייסר לאחר זולתו (?). (149) והמוסר היותר מועיל לנער וההרגל היותר טוב הוא שיתנהג לדבר אמת ויתרחק מן הכזב ואם יכזב הנער ראוי שיגנוהו ויגערו בו ויוכיחוהו ויכוהו אם צריך להכאה כי המדה המעולה שבמדות הוא האמת והדבר הפחות והמגונה שבפחיתות והמדה הכעורה והרעה שבהן הוא הכזב ומי שהרגיל הכזב וגדל עליו לא יצלח.

(150) וראוי שירגילו לנער שימוש עבודת נפשו ועבודת אביו ואמו ועבודת רבו שלמדו ומי שהוא גדול ממנ(ו) והנערים היותר נצרכין שירגילו לזה הן בני העשירים כי בני הדלים מוכרחי(ם) הן לזה ההרגל והמנהג אבל בני העשירים אם לא ירגילו אותן לזה אין להן סבה הכרחית להביא אותן לזה (151) ולנערים העושין זה יש להן תועלת גדולה כי ילמד הנער השתדלו(ת) ומדה האנושי(ת) וחזוק וענוה ויביא לו אהבת הבריות ויהיה מזומן לסבול קורות הזמן.

(152) ואין ראוי לנער אם יכנ(ו) רבו שיבכה ולא שירים קולו בצוחה ולא שיפיל עצמו בקרקע כי זה יבא מהיגיעה וחולשת הלב ואלו המעשי(ם) יאותו לעבדי(ם) לא לבני חורין וכבר אמרנ(ו) כי הנערים שאין בהן יקרות הנפש הצלחתם קשה. (153) וראוי שייסרו לנער על הקנאה והאיבה ויחרפוהו על זה ויחבבו לו הכבוד והמוסר ויוקר הנפש ושלא יקדימהו בזה אחר זולתו וירגילוהו להוקיר נפשו שלא לקבל כבוד מאחר בן סוגו אם לא יכבדהו הוא עצמו בכבוד אחר כדמותו או ביותר יקר ממנ(ו) ועוד שיזהיר שלא יקח משום אדם דבר ולא יתן הוא המעט ממנ(ו) (154) ויאות שיאה(ב) לחברו ביותר ממה שיאהבוהו אחרים (155) ואם לא יוכל הנער לכבד בדרך שכבדהו חברו יעשה כל יכלתו להשלים לו כבוד כפי שכבדהו חברו בדרך אחרת ואם לא יעשה זה יהיה נוטה מדרך הצדק וידינ(ו) אותו שכוונתו לריוח לא לאהבת הכבוד (156) וראוי שישניאו לנער הזהב והכסף ויזהירוהו מהן יותר מהנחשי(ם) והשרפי(ם) כי נזק השרפי(ם) והעקרבי(ם) לא יכנס אלא בגוף ונזק אהבת הכסף והזהב יכנס בנפש [ונזקם בנפש] יותר מופלג מנזק סם המות בגוף וישתדלו לפחות ערכם בעיניו ופחיתות (sic) ערכם שיקבצו אותם ויגיעת מי שהוא יגע בקיבוצם ושמירתם.

(157) וראוי שיתנ(ו) לנער רשות בקצת העתים לצחק אבל לא יצחוק צחוק שיהיה בו גנאי ולא נזק ולא צער כי הצחוק אין בו הכוונה אלא לעורר הנער ולשמחו כדי שיהיה לו בזה סיוע למה שירצו ממנ(ו) אחר כן להגות במוסר ובלימוד ולסבול עול יגיעתו ואם יהיה לו בשחוק יגיעה כבדה הוא צריך למנוחה בעת המוסר והלימוד ויתבטל מה שהכוונה לייסרו ותשאר היגיעה דבקה בו. (158) ומוטב ההנהגה לנער והמופלגת בהצלחתו שיהיה משועבד וסר למשמעת אביו ואמו ולרבו ולבעלי המוסר ושיביטם בעין הגדולה ושיתבייש מהן ושיהיה מקדים שלום להן ושתהיה יראתן עליו וכל מי שאין בו זה מהנערי(ם) תקשה הצלחתו.

(159) וראוי שישמרו לנער שלא ידע דבר מענין המשגל וירחיקוהו ממנ(ו) עד שינשא כי עם מה שיש בזה מן הקורבא אל הש(ם) י(תברך) והשם [ה]טוב בעיני בני אדם ובריאות הגוף וטוב הגידול והשארות הטהרה והנקיות וכבישת הנפש יש תועלת אחר בזה כי מי שלא ידע אשה אחרת זולתי אשתו והאשה שלא ידעה איש אחר זולתי אישה תהיה אהבת כל א(חד) מהן לחברו אהבה מופלגת ולא יתלה לבו אלא בה ולא לבה אלא בו וזה מהדברי(ם) היותר מועילין לאיש ולאשה שניהן ביחד (160) ואחר שאותם שחפצים לשמור חוזק הגוף יסבלו מניעות המשגל ויותירו חוזק הגוף על התאווה כ(ל) ש(כן) אותם שחפצים עלוי יתרון הנפש הן ראויין לסבול ולכבוש יצרם.

(161) וכל מי שישמור אלו הדברים ועשה אותם נתקרב אל החסידות והשיג אהבה וכבוד מהבורא ית(ברך) ומבני אדם והשיג להפלגת המזל הטוב וכל מי שהשליכם וסבר שאין לו בהן תועלת או שתועלתם מעוטה ועזב לעשותן בהשליכו אחר גוו אותו הדבר המועט מכל פנים הביא אותו לתכלי(ת) החסרון ולפחיתות (162) ואולי שיכיר יתרון אותו הדבר בעת שא(י) א(יפשר) להחזירו ולא החזרת מה שחסר ממנ(ו) ויקנה החרטה כי הדבר המועט מזה בהתחלת הדברי(ם) ועיקרם איננ(ו) מעט ההיזק בהן וכן התועלת במיעוט היושר כי כל הדברי(ם) בנויים על אותן העיקרים.

תם תם תם ש(בח) ל(אל) י(תברך)

Text and translation extract from the al-Azhar recension

The extract printed here from the al-Azhar recension fos. 107–8 is from Bryson section three and corresponds to §§91–103.
The orthography has been regularized in text and notes.

Sigla: A^1: addition in margin; A^2: addition over line

(91) [107b] واما المعونة على تدبير المنزل والمعاش فينبغي[1] ان يكون في المرأة فضائل كثيرة اولهن[2] العقل والكيس والثانية قوة النفس والبدن والثالثة [108a] ضبط النفس وكرامتها وصرفها عن الشهوات والرابعة التي هي اعظمها قدرًا استعمال العدل فيما بينها وبين زوجها وولدها وسائر من في منزلها، (92) وليس يوجد للرجل فضيلة الا والمرأة تحتاج الى مثلها لان طبيعتهما واحدة فان قلت ان المرأة اضعف فانّا نقول انها لهذه العلة كانت الى اكتساب الفضائل احوج، (93) وليس كل نفس تقبل الفضائل بالادب فينبغي للرجل ان يجتهد في اتّخاذ امرأة لها من الطبع اساس للفضائل يمكنه ان يبني عليه ويتمّمه، (94) وليس يستقيم امر المنزل بان[3] يوافق خلق امرأة رديئة الخلق خلق[4] رجل صالح ولا خلق الصالحة خلق الرديء ولا خلق الرديئة ايضا خلق الرديء،[5] (95) وإن لم يكونا صالحين لم

1 A^2 بخطّ متفاوت: فيحتاج فيه.
2 زيادة A^1.
3 A^2 بخطّ متفاوت: حتى.
4 A^1.
5 راجع العبري.

TRANSLATION

Paragraph numbers in round brackets show the approximate correspondences with the Taymūr recension. Words in round brackets are additions to help the English.

Sigla: A^1: addition in margin; A^2: addition over line

(91) For assistance in managing the estate and (one's) livelihood it is necessary that[1] the woman should have many virtues: the first of them[2] is intelligence and acumen, the second strength of soul and body, the third self-control, self-respect, and delivering oneself from appetites, and the fourth – which is the greatest in value – is fairness in her relationship with her husband, her children, and the others on her estate. (92) No virtue exists in the man which the woman does not also need to the same degree. This is because both of them have one nature. Now if you say that the woman is weaker, we shall say that for this reason she stands in greater need of acquiring the virtues. (93) Not every soul is receptive to the virtues through education. Thus the man must make an effort to find a woman in whom there is a natural foundation for the virtues. (Then) it is possible for him to build upon this and perfect it.

(94) The affairs of the estate will not be straight while[3] the character of a woman of bad character corresponds to the character[4] of a good man, the character of a good woman to the character of a bad man, or the character of a bad woman to the character of a bad man.[5] (95) If neither are good,

[1] A^2: there is a need.
[2] A^1.
[3] A^2: until.
[4] A^2.
[5] Cf. Hebr.: It is impossible that the measures of an evil woman should match the measures and the ways of a pious man nor the measures and ways of a good woman with the measures and ways of an evil man, neither the measures and ways of an evil man the measures and ways of an evil woman. A. may be more similar to the Hebr. than to T., but this is probably a matter of rewording by the Hebr. translator. T. is closer to Musonius' Greek; above, pp. 120, 139.

يتّفقا كما ان العود المستوي لا يطابق الا المستوي[6] ولا المعوجّ ايضا يطابقه، (96) فلذلك[7] يحتاج الى ان يكون الرجل والمرأة جميعًا عاقلين عفيفين منصفين وإن لم يكونا كذلك لم يتّفقا وبطل تدبير المنزل وفسد، وإن[8] كان ما قلت من انه يحتاج من المرأة الى ان يكون فيها جميع الفضائل ليس يتبيّن[9] عندك فاني ابيّنه لك ان شاء الله تعالى. لا يشكّ احد انه يحتاج من المرأة <الى> ان تدبّر اشياء من امر المنزل [108b] وتتفكّر فيما يصلح اموره بان ترأس خدمها وتسوسهم وتدبّر امرهم، (97) فهل يقدر على هذه الاشياء الا من كان ذا عقل راجح وكيس كامل؟ (98–99) وليس يشكّ احد ايضا انه يحتاج من المرأة الى صيانة وليست تقدر على ذلك الا وهي مالكة لنفسها ضابطة لشهواتها (100) وليس يمتري احد ايضا انه يحتاج الى ان يكون في المرأة احتمال الاذى والمشقّة[10] والمكروه في رضا زوجها ومصلحة ولدها والّا[11] تختار على ذلك الراحة والدعة والخفض وان تبذل نفسها فضلًا على كل شيء للموت دون زوجها وولدها، فهل يقدر على ذلك من ليس في نفسه شجاعة ونجدة؟ (101) وليس يمتنع احد من ان يقول ان المرأة إن لم تنصف زوجها وولدها وإن لم تختر ظلمهم لها على ان تظلمهم لم يتّفق امرها وامر زوجها وليس يكون ذلك الا فيمن كانت في نفسه فضيلة العدل، (103) واي امرأة جمعت هذه الخصال فقد اسعد زوجها[12] وسعدت به ونال بها جميع اهل بيتها الشرف والمدح وصارت قدوةً لسائر النساء.

6 A^1 بخطّ متفاوت: والمعوجّ لا يطابقه ولا يطابق معوجًّا مثله؛ وبالخطّ آخر: ص (= صحيح) ولا.
7 A^2: ايضا.
8 A^2: اذا.
9 A^2: سرد.
10 A^2: ذا الشقة.
11 A^2: وئلا.
12 A^2: بها.

they cannot be in concord – just as straight wood will only fit with straight wood,[6] and crooked wood will, again, not fit with it.

(96) The man and the woman, then,[7] must jointly be intelligent, chaste, and just. For if they are not like this, there is no accord and the management of the estate fails and goes to ruin.

If[8] my words about the need for all the virtues to be united in the woman are not clear[9] in your mind, I shall clarify them for you, if God Most High wishes it.

No one should doubt the need for the woman to be the manager of the affairs of the estate and the one who calculates what is good for it, inasmuch as she rules her servants, governs them, and manages their concerns. (97) Can anyone do these things if he is not someone of outstanding intelligence and perfect acumen? (98–9) Let no one doubt the need for the woman to preserve (her purity); she cannot do this if she is not in charge of herself and able to restrain herself from her appetites. (100) Let no one question either the need for the woman to tolerate suffering and hardship[10] and anything she finds hateful for her husband's pleasure or her child's advantage; that she should not[11] prefer rest, tranquillity, and quiet instead; and that she should give of herself unstintingly and unto death in every matter before her husband and her child. Can one do this unless one's soul has bravery and courage? (101) No one should be prevented from saying that, unless the woman treats her husband and her children fairly and prefers their wrongdoing of her to doing them wrong (herself), her affairs will not be concordant with her husband's. This (concord) only happens when the person possesses in his soul the virtue of justice. (103) (In the case of) any woman who combines these qualities her husband is blest[12] and she is blest in him, the whole of her family obtains honour and praise through her, and she becomes an example to other women.

[6] A^1 in a different hand: and crooked wood will not fit with it nor will it fit with crooked wood like itself; another hand adds: correction, but not so.
[7] A^2: also.
[8] A^2: when.
[9] A^2: coherent.
[10] A^2: someone difficult.
[11] that she should not] A^2: if she should not.
[12] A^2: in her.

PART VI

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