

WOMEN AND THE IDEOLOGY OF POLITICAL EXCLUSION:

FROM CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY TO THE MODERN ERA

EDITED BY
TATIANA TSAKIROPOULOU-SUMMERS
AND KATERINA KITSI-MITAKOU

ROUTLEDGE

Women and the Ideology of Political Exclusion

Women and the Ideology of Political Exclusion explores the origin and evolution of the political ideology that has kept women away from centers of political power – from the birth of democracy in ancient Athens to the modern era. In this period of 2500 years, two parallel tracks advanced: while male authority tried to construct an ideology that justified women's incompatibility with the political organization of the state, women attempted to resist their exclusion and thwart arguments about their inferiority.

Although the issue of women's status has been studied in detail in specific eras, this interdisciplinary collection extends the boundaries of the discussion. Drawing on a wide range of literary and historical sources, including Herodotus' *Histories*, Plato's *Laws*, María de San José's *Oaxaca Manuscript*, and the work of Émilie Du Châtelet, Mary Boykin Chesnut, and Virginia Woolf, the chapters here reveal the various manifestations of the female-inferiority construct. Such an extensive overview of this historical trajectory promotes a deeper understanding of its causes, permutations, and persistence.

Women may have made great gains toward political power, but they continue to encounter invisible barriers, raised by traditional stereotypes, that block their path to success. *Women and the Ideology of Political Exclusion* aims to make these barriers visible, raising awareness about the longevity and tenacity of arguments, the roots of which reach classical antiquity.

Tatiana Tsakiropoulou-Summers received her doctorate in Classics from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is currently teaching at the University of Alabama, USA. Her research focuses on female archetypes in Greek and Roman epic poetry and on the impact of ancient thought on Western civilization, especially the status of women. She has published numerous articles and a collection of essays on women and the formation of ethnic identity in greek culture. She is the director of the Athens Center for Classical and Byzantine Studies at the Athens Institute for Education and Research, Greece.

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Women and the Ideology of Political Exclusion

From Classical Antiquity to the Modern Era

Edited by Tatiana Tsakiropoulou-Summers and Katerina Kitsi-Mitakou

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Acknowledgments

This project is the result of a vision – a vision of transatlantic research collaborations between the University of Alabama and Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece. The research collaborations began in 2012 when Dr. Robert Olin, Dean of Arts and Sciences (A&S) at the University of Alabama, instituted the 'Alabama Greece Initiative'. Ever since, Dean Olin has been committed to the initiative's growth, generously funding groups of A&S faculty to travel every year to Thessaloniki and strike new collaborations with their counterparts there, while supporting also Aristotle University faculty, who visit their partners at the University of Alabama, to get deeper into their research conversations. The Initiative has been widely successful and its fruits are abundant: publications, grants, conferences, student exchanges, and even collaborations on governmental level in all areas of Arts and Sciences.

This volume is the product of one such collaboration and would not have been possible without it. Tatiana Tsakiropoulou-Summers, herself a graduate of Aristotle University and currently professor of Classics at the University of Alabama, has always been fascinated by the impact of Ancient Greek civilization on Western culture. A Classicist by trade, she detects traces of the ancient world in every aspect of life in the US and draws the connections between the two cultures for her students. One of the classes she has been teaching for several years is an Honors Seminar on 'Women from Antiquity to Today', which instigated the idea for this book: the study of ancient women's struggle with ideological precepts that affected their life, education, and rearing as daughters, as well as the obstacles they encountered in their marriage, family, and participation in social, religious, and economic activities and how these are comparable to the life and obstacles encountered by women of subsequent time periods, and especially pioneer women, in Europe and America. Insightful conversations with students on pioneer women's efforts to acquire college education, enter male professions, or get involved in politics raised up the specter of ancient ideological verdicts about women's inferior nature that impeded and excluded them.

Undertaking alone the study of female status and ideology over the past 25 centuries is not a feasible task for a single scholar. The Greece Initiative, however, gave Tsakiropoulou-Summers the opportunity to find in her collaborator from Aristotle University, Katerina Kitsi-Mitakou, professor of English literature and

feminist studies, a scholar who complements her expertise in the ancient world; for this we are both immensely grateful to Dean Olin for his vision and support of the Initiative and the book project. Together, Tsakiropoulou-Summers and Kitsi-Mitakou attempted the daunting task of bringing to the table scholars from different disciplines and from around the world, including four from Aristotle University and four from the University of Alabama, to study the evolution of women's status through the ages and from a variety of perspectives, from literature and ancient epigraphy to law and political science.

The book project benefited also from the advice of publisher George Thompson, the A&S publisher-in-residence, who oversees the College publications process. Thompson suggested that the book editors organize a conference for the authors to help them tune their essays to the overarching theme of the volume. And, indeed, the conference that was held at the University of Alabama in 2016 and was funded by the College of Arts & Sciences gave the opportunity to contributors to exchange perspectives and ideas, and relate to the thematic thread. As editors of the book, we aimed at breaking the barriers that academic specialization creates with its microscopic compartmentalization and its concentration on specific cultures and time periods. The process of completing this volume has been a wonderful experience of conversations among editors and contributors over perspectives, angles, interpretations, ruptures, and directions of the ideological thread, which has deepened our understanding of how this ideology began, evolved, mutated, waned, and resurfaced at various key moments in Western history. We would like to thank the authors of the volume for their commitment to produce original essays with insights in the phenomenon of female exclusion.

We are also indebted to our families for their patience and support over the past two years of intensive work on this book.

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Introduction

The ideological construct of the 'inferior female'

Tatiana Tsakiropoulou-Summers and Katerina Kitsi-Mitakou

Continuities and breaks

Women's social and political status is a topic that has inspired many scholarly studies in the past few decades, but the question of the forces that have shaped it has yet to be considered in the context of its historical continuity from antiquity to the modern era. This volume attempts to address one of these forces, that is, the cumulative effect of the ideology of female inferiority over the past 2500 years, examining it as a phenomenon that has figured roughly continuously in this long period of time, notwithstanding the various breaks and permutations of its pattern along the way. Our effort aims at aligning classical scholarship with studies on women's status in the Western world across a great expanse of time and space. Focusing on the constructs of femininity (and, at times, on masculinity), contributors interrogate the relationship between gender and political ideology across the spectrum of Western history, starting with antiquity. As Wagner-Hasel observes, studying women's life and status in antiquity and, by extension, in the subsequent ages of Western civilization "is not only an attempt to reconstruct a bygone way of life, it is also a discourse over woman's place in modern bourgeois society" (1989: 19). Making the connection between modern and ancient theorists is important for understanding the tenacity of modern conventions and biases regarding women; it is one thing to consider the idea of female inferiority to be four or so centuries old, but it is another to have the weight of a 2500-year-long history behind it.

It is important, however, to make one thing clear regarding the goals of this book: although we attempt to trace the first efforts to a systematic approach of women's role in relation to male power and the 'masculine' state, our objective is not to tear down and discard the overall contribution of ancient thinkers to Western civilization or impute sinister designs to their classifications and definitions, throwing out the good together with the bad; instead, we want to show that it is necessary to read their works with a critical mind, uncover the ideological assumptions and perspectives, and recognize their powerful impact. If we want to make further progress in gender equality, we need to be aware of the ideologies that are latent in legal, political, educational, and other efforts, and understand where they lead. Exclusion of others is not gender specific but is

specific to human nature, which, regardless of gender, seeks power and strives to maintain it in any way possible – just as dominant groups of men in patriarchal societies have held on to power at the expense of other groups, elite women have also held on to the prerogatives of their status at the expense of other female groups in every age and every civilization. Therefore, our objective is to expose the ideological foundations of women's exclusion from political power and to point out that gender ideology is not a fair criterion for empowering one gender at the expense of the other.

In its historical evolution, Western civil structure has been influenced significantly (though indirectly) by classical Greek ideas, especially Aristotelian (Allen 1997; Walcot 1996). Modern society, which was founded on the Lockean social contract and its principles of freedom and equality as birthrights, bears traces of Aristotelian influences on the construction of female identity. Although Lockean thought differs from Aristotelian thinking in fundamental ways, with Locke supporting the natural rights of the individual and Aristotle privileging the community, it is important to note that Locke was familiar with Aristotle's philosophical principles, including those relating to women. The same was true of other political thinkers of his time on both sides of the political spectrum, who were also in a dialectical exchange with Aristotelian perspectives. As Maloy observes, "if there was a 'civic' or 'republican' way of reading Aristotle, there was also a liberal-constitutionalist one" (2009: 237). Therefore, it is important to recognize the influence of Aristotelian ideas, especially his views of women's role in the state, on Locke and his contemporaries. This recognition is pivotal in uncovering latent influences of ancient thought on modern ideological and gender constructs. As an example, we may look at the birthrights of the social contract and the essential principle behind them, that man possesses natural political rights, while woman is naturally subordinated to her husband. This principle creates a conundrum for the position of the genders in Locke's social system; as Pateman points out, there is an inherent contradiction "between the premise of individual freedom and equality . . . and the assumption that women (wives) are naturally subject" (1989: 213). Often, however, it goes unnoticed that the premise of women's subordination originated in Aristotle's axiom that "the male is by nature better fitted to rule than the female" (*Politics* 1259b). The idea may derive from general patriarchal principles, but Aristotle was the first to articulate and defend it, using philosophical and scientific arguments convincingly enough to have a lasting impact on several thinkers, who favored it despite its inherent contradictions. Some early modern philosophers, such as Edmund Burke (Breglia 1997), seem to share Aristotle's concerns about the socio-political role of women and in devising their own systems of social justice tend to adopt the Aristotelian solution of excluding them from political life.

At the same time, the ideological exclusion and the legal constraints placed on women forced them to develop evasive strategies that allowed them to pursue their interests despite ideological and legal limitations. Women were not passive receivers of socio-political directives, but reacted to decisions that affected their social and gender-specific interests (Wolpert 2001: 415–24). The essays in this

volume highlight the complexity of this ideology in its course from antiquity to today, which, far from being straight and uninterrupted, includes inherent fragmentations and contradictions. Examining specific instances of the ideology of inferiority and exclusion reveals both the flawed assumptions that constitute its basis and the fact that male reaction to it has vacillated between tendencies to accept and question women's exclusion from public life. Although Western societies, ever since Athenian democracy was established in the fifth century BC, have generally blocked women from civic participation, the pattern of women's exclusion is studded by various interruptions, such as distinct moments when male authority tolerated women's transgression of established boundaries. The very emancipation of women in the twentieth century is an example of just such toleration of women rejecting legal restrictions and political limitations.

Yet one must also be aware of the relative significance of breaks and changes in the ideology within the wider context of its long existence. John Stuart Mill (*The Subjection of Women* 1869) observed that in any historical period there are examples of husbands who did not use the powers granted to them by law to make their wives subject to them. True as this may be, it does not change the fact that these powers were enshrined in various legal and social institutions, promoting the ideological perception of women as legal minors and inferior to men. Likewise, breaks and changes throughout history in the ideology of female inferiority, significant as they may be, have not been able (until perhaps recently) to eliminate the ideology itself or loosen its grip on Western thought. At the end of their arduous path to emancipation, after women extricated themselves from the centuries-long legal restrictions and managed to move to the center of socio-political life, they found the old ideology about the inferior female still lurking in the social unconscious and still inhibiting their progress. For this reason, placing the origin of women's perception as inferior within the past 500 years at the most, which is often the case with studies of modernity, diminishes its power. Statements like Molland's claim that "how women were viewed 300 years ago, and are still viewed today, has not changed" (1992: 12), although acknowledging the lengthy past of the perception, still minimize the effect of the negative social perception of women, which, in reality, has existed in the Western thought-continuum for over 2500 years since antiquity (Allen 1997: 340).

The clash between democracy and patriarchy

Feminism as a term was coined in the late nineteenth century and was associated with the suffrage movement. Yet in its basic requirement, that male political actors consider the female perspective in their decisions, it may be said that it is as old as patriarchy, since feminism is notionally the counter effort to the patriarchal suppression of women's views. As a notional concept, however, identified with the desire to establish a female perspective, it may be postulated that it was ignited the moment democracy was established in ancient Athens, when two major forces clashed: one was the principle that drove democracy, namely that all citizen-members of the *demos*, the people (including by definition all

male and female citizens), should enjoy the democratic ideals of *isopoliteia* (equal political rights), *isonomia* (equal treatment by the laws), and *isēgoria* (equal right to express one's views freely and publicly); the other was the patriarchal culture that prompted the decision to deny women these rights and exclude them from democracy. Women's exclusion, however, created a conundrum between democratic ideology and practice, since patriarchal culture ('father-power') by definition could not accommodate female empowerment or perceive 'mother-power' (*matriarchy*) as equal to itself. Because ancient Athenians were not ready to share political power with the women, they struggled to explain the conundrum away and ultimately justify women's exclusion. A story that originated in the fifth century BC (the time of the birth of democracy) is suggestive of their struggle with this issue. The story is associated with the mythical foundation of Athens and the occasion of the contest between Athena and Poseidon for the city's patronage. At that time, the story goes, the city's women possessed voting rights and participated in all political deliberations together with the men. But when the matter of choosing the city's patron god was put to the vote and the victory was granted to Athena, Poseidon became enraged at the women for voting as a bloc; his wrathful intervention was so great that Cecrops, the Athenian king, was compelled to strip the women from all rights to pacify him (Augustine, *City of God* 18.9). With this myth, Athenians attempted to explain why women, though part of the Athenian people (*dēmos*), were excluded from the democratic system. Beyond the fact that the story offers an awkward and illogical explanation, it reveals, on the one hand, that men were aware of the arbitrariness of women's exclusion and, on the other, that women were asking questions and demanded explanations about the reasons of their exclusion. Democracy, born within a patriarchal context, had to operate on the premise that, for all political purposes, citizens were only the free, locally born males, whom Aristotle defines as having the right to participate in the government and hold public office (*Politics* 1275b15). Female citizens, however, were not defined clearly and their status was left ambiguous because of the inherent contradiction of their exclusion from the democratic system: openly designating women as citizens would necessitate the extension of political rights to them, whereas openly denying them the designation would affect the citizen status of their legitimate children – according to Pericles' citizenship law, if the mother is not a citizen, neither are her children (Blok 2009: 141). The contradiction created by the disenfranchisement of women was eventually resolved by the ideological framework of female inferiority that Athenian thinkers constructed – it both complied with patriarchal principles and justified women's political exclusion from democracy.

In contrast to the democratic Athens, ancient societies with oligarchical or monarchical political systems, where beyond a small group of people neither men nor women had any political power, had no need for an ideology that diminished female nature. In ancient Sparta, for example, where full-scale democracy was never adopted, men viewed women as strong individuals, worthy of possessing land and property, and capable of managing the household economy and field

production, while the men lived in the barracks and trained as soldiers from age seven to thirty (Cartledge 2001: 79–90). Non-Spartan male authors, such as Plato, Xenophon, and Plutarch, often express their admiration for the Spartan women, whose physical and moral fortitude they extoll in their works (Chapman 2012; Schofield 2006; Tuplin 1994). It is important to stress, however, that Spartan attitudes toward women do not imply equality of genders in the modern sense or the waning of patriarchy. On the contrary, Sparta maintained throughout its history a deeply patriarchal culture that enforced the basic principles of gender hierarchy and a degree of separation in gendered activities. Yet in Spartan society there was never an ideology defining women as weak or inferior. Because the oligarchic Spartan constitution did not grant the right to vote, debate, be elected to office, or have any input in the government to any citizen, male or female, the question whether Spartan women ought to have any political rights was never raised; and neither were Spartan men compelled to restrict women from public activities other than a few that were emblematic of patriarchal culture, such as serving in the army.

Furthermore, anthropological studies show similarities between primitive societies and attitudes to women in non-democratic states in Greece: in primitive societies, it is common for men to fear women as the 'dangerous sex' for their sexual and reproductive powers (Hays 1966; Savramis 1972; Eichler 1975: 917–26; Walcot 1984: 46; Das 2008: 29–42). Aristotle himself articulated the primeval male fear: "What would the need of the male be, if the female could reproduce by herself?" (*Generation of Animals* 741a9–10). Therefore, male fear of female powers typically renders them taboo and motivates men to restrict and control women (Eichler 1975: 921). Consequently, restrictions on female sexuality do not indicate women's powerlessness or weakness, as it is usually assumed. To do so would be postulating a paradox, that powerful men fear powerless women; instead, gender restrictions ought to be understood as acknowledgment of female powers (Eichler 1975: 918–21). Susan Cole makes this point in her study of popular beliefs in ancient Greece about female powers. One of these beliefs was that the presence of menstruating women in the fields could cause the land to become barren. To protect themselves and the land, men drafted laws regulating the activities of menstruating women as early as the seventh century BC (Cole 2004: 37). Falling within the Archaic period, this law code confirms that women commanded social respect in that (pre-democracy) era, since ritual danger is not only "a marker of anxiety" but also "a marker of great social value" (Cole 2004: 113). The rhetoric of the inferior female is not prevalent in pre-classical Greek literature (Freiert 1972; Jensen 1994: 27–45; Delana and Katz 1990–91: 10–14). Ideas of superior/inferior genders may be detected in embryonic form in various patriarchal customs, but, as Tsakiropoulou-Summers shows in this volume, they were not articulated through rational arguments until the introduction of the Solonian law-code and the classical period.

By comparison to the powerful female of the Archaic Era, classical thinkers portray women in the exact opposite way. Although women are still perceived as threats to the male order, the threatening element is now localized more often

than not in their 'weaknesses', their inferior physical, mental, emotional, and moral capacities, instead of their reproductive powers. Various ancient thinkers express an assortment of indefensible precepts about female nature and, despite modern efforts to show that deep down there is a different intent (Forsdyke, 2001: 329–58; Dobbs 1996; Nichols 1983; Saxonhouse 1985), their ideas have been received at face value through the ages and have impacted Western civilization in this capacity. Classical thinkers, for example, argue that women are not the true parents of their children, but merely the vessel that nurtures them (Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 656–66); that female physiology is equivalent to that of immature boys (Aristotle, *Generation of Animals* 728a17–18); that women have a living animal in their body, the womb, whose needs and wants control their emotions and thoughts (Plato, *Timaeus* 91b–c); that women cannot develop self-control, have a limited capacity for sound judgment, and so on (Pomeroy 1976: 112–4). Terms such as 'weaker' (*asthenesteron*) and 'inferior' (*hētton* or *kheiron*) describing the nature of the female sex are juxtaposed to the terms 'stronger' (*ischuron*) and 'superior' (*kreittōn*) used for the male nature. A textual search of these terms throughout the Greek literary corpus with the help of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* shows that, whereas such notions are not used to establish gender hierarchy before the fifth century BC, they become prevalent in the classical period, as ideological constructs, especially in the works of Plato and Aristotle who take a more systematic approach to the socio-political role of the sexes. For example, Socrates in Plato's *Republic*, despite proposing equal education for men and women (456e–d), maintains that in all human pursuits "the male sex is superior to the female" (455c–d). Building on this premise, Plato declares in his *Laws* that woman is "secretive and crafty, because of her weak nature" and, as a result, "the woman's natural ability for virtue is inferior (*kheirōn*) to that of men" (6.781a). Since virtue is for Plato the cardinal characteristic of the good citizen, women, who are incapable of attaining it to its full extent, are "a greater danger" to the state, "perhaps even twice as much" as a man can ever be (6.781a). Aristotle concurs and, on the basis of these principles, justifies the relegation of women to the home and their exclusion from public and, especially, political life (Tuana 1994: 189–206; Deslauriers 2009: 215–31).

In democratic Athens, works such as Aristophanes' comedy *Women at the Assembly* suggest that Athenian men feared that women might react to their exclusion from democratic processes and even conspire to take political power to rectify the injustice they suffered by the male configuration of democracy. The awareness that women's status was devalued in the context of the democratic state and that their identity was compromised as inferior constitutes the subject matter of several tragedies, where female characters of all classes show agency and autonomy of action, defy socio-political limitations and male control, and stand up for their customary rights against restrictive government regulations. These dynamic characters, although portrayed by male authors, imply that the seeds of proto-feminism, in the sense of women recording their displeasure at the suppression of their rights and their desire to resist, were sown early in the history of democracy (Katz 1992: 70–97). Despite their efforts, whether fictional or real,

women for the longest time were unable to counteract either the dominant ideology about their nature or its damaging effects on their status.

Women's discontent with the problematic ideological basis of their exclusion seems to have troubled Athenian and non-Athenian intellectuals. Although female voices of ancient women have not reached us directly, the questions women were likely asking about their status are evident in various works of the classical period that deal with women's nature and their role in society, including Herodotus' *Histories*, the Platonic dialogues, Aristotelian diatribes, Hippocratic treatises, as well as tragedies and comedies. To discern female voices in male-authored works is not paradoxical; as Marilyn Katz argues (1992: 72), we cannot assume that women were merely passive spectators of developments regarding their status in the state, just because there are no sources written by women. Nor is it inaccurate to suggest that male-authored texts convey female voices, since the opposite claim, that they convey purely male points of view, although prevalent among modern scholars, is unnecessarily reductive (Blok 2001: 95–116). The notion of ancient women as a 'muted group' has been also discredited by comparative studies of women in modern patriarchal societies showing that men were listening to women's questions, concerns, and demands for explanations (Paglia 2008: 1–18; Bergren 1983: 69–95; Mathieu 1973: 101–13; Ardener 1972: 135–58).

There are, of course, moments when ancient thinkers express positive views about women. Plato affirms that males and females have the same biological nature, originating in an initial androgynous being that existed before it was divided into male and female (*Symposium* 189a–192e). Extending the biological identity of the sexes to their soul and mind, Plato lays the foundation of qualified equality: "The nature of women and men is the same regarding the governing of the state, except in matters in which one is weaker and the other stronger" (*Republic* 5.456a). Conflicting ideas within the works of the same philosopher exemplify the complexity of views on women, which were not always clear-cut (Foley 2001). Yet as the intellectual giants of classical antiquity provided scientific and philosophical support for a mostly negative construction of female nature, they lent to the ideology of female inferiority the weight of their authority, contributing to its tenacity.

From a modern perspective, the concept of 'female inferiority' is baffling. Even more puzzling is that this argument has been used to support the exclusion of women from political life in Western democratic societies in recent, and more enlightened, time periods. Women have given proof of strength and resilience on countless occasions throughout history (most prominently in the French Revolution, as Zupančič shows in this volume); yet their efforts were dismissed and women continued to be considered weak and inferior. From our perspective, the portrayal of women as inferior and the demise of their political status was not the effect of patriarchy per se, but the result of the clash between democratic principles and patriarchal gender ideology. This clash on a number of issues (not just the status of women) prompted even in ancient democracy the first division of people into two political groups, liberal and conservative, whose political interaction shaped the democratic system. Despite disagreement and debates,

both political sides managed to pass legislation aiming at preventing the rise of women to political power. It was from these restrictive measures that the identity of the inferior female was constructed, while theoretical and scientific principles explained it away. The rhetoric, therefore, propounding the inferior female nature seems to have a relatively clear historical beginning in the early fifth century BC.

Beyond the dismantling of democracy

With the waning and eventual vanishing of ancient democracy as an applied political system in the empires of the Hellenistic period, the Roman world, and Late Antiquity (Allen 1997), when citizenship lost its value and the majority of men were cut-off from centers of political power, the prospect for women to gain access to political life was smaller than ever, save, of course, for the Hellenistic queens. One would think that, under these circumstances, the rhetoric of female inferiority, having no political purpose to serve, would start dissipating. In the post-democracy world of the Hellenistic period, women's status improved in some respects. Women were allowed more freedoms in education and economic activities, and were even accepted in professional or religious associations, as Kierstead shows in this volume, from which they had previously been excluded. Despite improvements, however, patriarchal societies continued for centuries subjecting women to legal dependency on male guardians and holding their role in general as inferior to that of men.

In the thirteenth century, Aristotelian philosophy emerged as the single most authoritative system (Eastwood 1992: 84–99; Grant 1978: 93). Medieval thinkers formulated their various discourses around an Aristotelian core of ideas and propagated an educational system that assumed certain knowledge of Aristotelian principles. Nederman (1996), after considering the diverse discourses that informed medieval thought, concludes that Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* held a central position in formulating and supporting a coherent range of viewpoints in moral and political thinking and that a "detectable strain of Aristotelian learning" (1996: 585) runs through medieval thinking. As the educational system continued embracing classical authors in the Renaissance (Magnard 2001; Hankins 1990; Kristerller 1979), their ideas regarding inferior female nature endured in Western thought (Gotthelf 2012: 345; Magnard 2001; Hankins 1990; Kristeller 1979). Echoing the rhetoric of classical authors, such ideas re-enforced the ideological web that kept women away from centers of political power (Edwards 2007: 449; Garber 2006: 25; Stone 2002: 7–24). Despite regional and temporal variations, male convictions about women's nature and role remained remarkably uniform across Europe even into the early modern period (Allen 1997).

Shift in scholarly focus

One strand of the scholarly discourse on the status of women emphasizes women's inclusion, focusing on their efforts for emancipation and suffrage and

attempting to minimize the ideological inferiority imputed to women. This effort has revealed various breaks in the impact of this ideology, but until the twentieth century these breaks were not strong enough to reverse the tide of female exclusion; as a result, several feminist scholars acknowledge its lasting influence on Western thought (Cadden 1995; Tuana 1993). Not all scholars, though, espouse the idea that the concept of the inferior female is an ideological construct or that it can be associated as such with antiquity (Mayhew 2005; King 1998; Dean-Jones 1994). Yet, in the face of overwhelming evidence, even they admit occasionally the possibility of ideological influence on ancient thinkers' pronouncements about women (Mayhew 2005: 116). Another group of scholars are skeptical about the existence of a systematic effort in ancient literature to justify the political exclusion of women (Saxonhouse 1985; Levy 1990; Salkever 1990; Nichols 1992; Swanson 1992; Dobbs 1996; Schollmeier 2003; Nagle 2006; Stauffer 2008). Others detect an effort for systematic ideology, but see only indirect links to it (Deslauriers 2006; Freeland 1998: 201–47). And although the phenomenon of the inferior female has been studied in depth in its various expressions throughout the Western world and over the ages, it has been done in a compartmentalized way and relative isolation: studies look at the idea, for example, in its Medieval or Renaissance context, or in the time of the struggle for female suffrage, or in the output of specific ethnic writings (as, for example, in Spanish literature or Italian manifestos), but there is a dearth of studies that look at it in a broader context (Ginzburg 2015; Allen 1997; Nederman 1996; Eastwood 1992; Grant 1978). This is an issue that the present volume attempts to address by putting this phenomenon in a wider timeframe, identifying its beginning, highlighting its lifespan of almost 2500 years, emphasizing its overwhelming tenacity, and helping comprehend the enormity of its impact on Western thought. This perspective calls attention to the possibility that, although the concept of female inferiority is no longer an official ideology, its convictions still operate in the background of the modern subconscious, silently undermining female activities and raising arcane barriers to women's advancement (Adams and Fuller 2006: 938). As numerous studies show, some published as late as 2017, there are still invisible but real barriers to women's inclusion throughout the spectrum of high-caliber political, economic, scientific, and intellectual positions (Hewlett et al. 2008: 22–4; Lambert and McInturff 2016; De Welde 2017: 192–211; Ceci et al. 2011: 3157).

Recently, however, a new scholarly perspective has been adopted: scholars have made an intensive effort to rectify the absence of women from recorded histories of various periods in Western civilization (Polska et al. 2013; Wiesner-Hanks 2008; Mujica 2004; Bicks and Summit 2010). These endeavors have brought to light evidence showing that women from different walks of life and through all eras of Western culture have managed to make inroads into traditionally male activities, though not always in large numbers. In turn, this evidence has been used to challenge the theory of 'separate spheres', that is, the notion that throughout most of Western history women were generally restricted indoors, taking care of the domestic world, while men were mostly concerned

with activities outdoors, taking charge of the public realm. Evidence that women were active outdoors has shifted scholarly interest and, as Bristow (2011) shows, has motivated a significant number of studies that aim specifically at breaking down the concept of 'separate spheres'.

There is indeed evidence that in real life the male and female realms have overlapped throughout Western history, including antiquity, more than was previously thought, and that men and women had important roles and a significant presence in each other's worlds. For the ancients, for example, the male and female worlds overlapped on various occasions, such as when men held all-male dinner parties at their private homes, or when female priestesses were appointed to serve at temples and organize community cult activities (Wolpert 2001: 415; Vlassopoulos 2007: 33; Westgate 2007: 229; Kerber 1988: 9). In more recent centuries, women seem to have succeeded in various male professions such as gardeners, writers, scholars, investors, and so on (Page and Smith 2011; Palmer 2011; Batchelor 2010; Doe 2010: 85; Labbe 2010; Pal 2012; Wolfson 2010; Rutterford and Maltby 2007: 305; Phillips 2006; Gordon and Nair 2003). These studies have done a tremendous service to women's cause, since "[n]o longer can any scholar bemoan the lack of records on early modern women, assert that women did not write, or complain that any particular group of women was invisible either in their own time or to historians" (Poska et al. 2013: 24).

Yet, it is equally true that the ideological segregation of gender activities kept women away from centers of political power and under male control in many areas, including economy and religion. For example, chief priestesses in the ancient Greek world may have had a measure of freedom and authority in running temples and organizing cult festivals and activities, but their appointment, salary, and other benefits as well as many of the cult details (down to the dress-style of female participants in religious festivals) were determined by male assemblies that debated and voted on these issues. This is attested by numerous decrees that recorded the decisions of such meetings and made them known to the public as they were set up in plain view outside the relevant temples (Parker 2006: 67). Therefore, while ancient women participated more in religious activities than in any other public event, the agency and freedom that they are thought to have enjoyed were still prescribed by male authority. Decrees controlling women's religious activities are indicative not only of confirmation of male power but also of men's mistrust of women's judgment and their ability to make good decisions, influenced as they were by the ideological premise of flawed female nature.

Therefore, despite the differences between ideology and reality that recent research has uncovered, we should not lose sight of the women's long-standing struggle to combat both the ideology and the real obstacles it created. But to understand the extent of how powerful the grip of the ideological construct of gendered activities is, it is imperative that we make the connection with antiquity and widen the perspective of modern research. Wiesner-Hanks (2008), for example, stresses the point that in early modern Europe male hierarchy was not reinforced uniformly or at the same rate or in the same manner in all geographical areas, which created a significant gap between ideology and reality that women

were able to exploit. Breaks of this nature were very important for women, who found various ways to circumvent legal, social, political, or ideological obstacles. Yet highlighting their achievements should not diminish the enormity of the obstacles women encountered or the impact of the ideology on their efforts, even in areas of relaxed male hierarchy.

Failing to make the connection with antiquity also diminishes the impact of ideology on women's efforts. Clabaugh's study, "A History of Male Attitudes Toward Educating Women" (2010), offers a good example. In discussing various views on women's education, Clabaugh starts with antiquity, but, when he comes to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, he attributes proclamations against educating women to Christian influence or other secular thinkers who espoused the ideology of the inferior female, and does not link them with their ancient origins. Clabaugh cites the philosopher Fichte's observation (*The Science of Rights* 1869) that woman "is not at all speculative in her womanly nature. She cannot and shall not go beyond the limits of her feeling" (Clabaugh 2010: 174); then, he proceeds to credit Fichte's axiom with a tremendous influence on many notable subsequent thinkers, including Schopenhauer, Hegel, Nietzsche, Rousseau, Freud, Kierkegaard, Marx, and others, who "publicly argued or privately expressed the view that women had limited capacity, suffered from incompleteness and general defects, or were either uneducable or at least incapable of genius" (2010: 174). What Clabaugh does not mention is that most of the thinkers in his list had first-hand knowledge of both Platonic and Aristotelian theories, and especially those that classify women as beings of limited capacities, incomplete, defective, and intellectually challenged (Kockelman 2015: 153; Bett 2005: 45; Rousseau and Cooper 2002: 108; Ferrarin 2001; Ware 2000: 287; West 1999: 138; Mansfield 1980: 351; Rohatyn 1971: 130). Even when the connection with antiquity is acknowledged, it is not usually put in the correct timeframe; Caroline Winterer, for example, takes it back only to the beginning of the Renaissance: "Since the Renaissance, classical learning had buttressed European public life, instructing men in such arts of statesmanship as history, rhetoric, and eloquence. Largely exiled from this classical education, women had been judged deficient in a major requirement of citizenship" (Winterer 2001: 70–1). Although she implies that the "classical learning" of Renaissance scholars influenced their thought, she does not relate the concept of female deficiency to its Aristotelian origins.

Another factor that is currently contributing to the shift in scholarly and political focus away from the women's struggle for equality is the ongoing migration of Asian/Muslim populations into the West. The overwhelming social crisis that has engulfed the West, and especially Europe, has forced women's issues to take second place to the urgency of conversations on the rights of migrants and minority groups, and the status of minority women. Siim and Mokre in this volume highlight the complexity of issues involved with female identity and status. To redirect attention to women's issues the authors consider the benefit of merging the discourse on gender, race, citizen/non-citizen and migrant/minority status with the old, latent ideological biases and exclusionary policies hindering

Western women's progress. Therefore, for the women's causes to advance, it is suggested that one solution may be to classify Western women as one of the minority groups of Muslim women, migrant women, non-citizen, so that their issues may be included in discussions regarding the socio-political integration and advancement of minority women in general (Reeder 2017: 31).

Goals and objectives

The cumulative effect of historically negative female-gender constructs has promoted gender hierarchy, justifying traditional male and female roles in systems that, in their majority, have privileged men and banned women from politics and public life. This volume, therefore, attempts to place the evolving scholarly trends on women's status within the context of the longevity and tenacity of the old ideology that may still affect female identity and progress. This effort, therefore, is to resist the trend to diminish the effect of traditional biases and ideologies in modern society. Several essays in the present volume discuss gender constructs and perceptions thereof in different periods and in a variety of cultures in Europe and the Americas; they often point out similarities with ideological premises propounded by ancient thinkers and the influence they have exerted in shaping attitudes toward women in later periods. It may be "ahistorical", as Josiah Ober states in his *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (2009: 6), to call the Athenian government undemocratic for denying women political rights, as did most Western nations until the twentieth century. Nevertheless, his claim that asking the question why the Athenians failed to do so is "less useful" than asking "how the Athenians achieved political equality among the adult male citizens and restricted the political privileges of the elites" is indicative of the prevalent attitude toward the historic exclusion of women from the world of politics (Ober 2009). The point is that, since these are all stages in the process of democratization – wrestling power from the elites and granting it progressively to all citizens, male and female – it is worth investigating why the last stage in the process was delayed for 2500 years. Even when democracy was re-discovered and re-established in eighteenth-century France and America, women were once again denied political rights on account of their inferior nature, an obvious throwback to ancient ideological tenets, as Zupančič shows in this volume.

In the span of the past 2500 years, conditions certainly vary, introducing permutations to the theme of women's status. The precepts bequeathed by classical thinkers are certainly not the only factors in the overall development of the rhetoric sustaining female exclusion in the Western world, but the ancient postulation of female inferiority that was continuously perpetuated through a classicizing educational system is one of the most constant features that influenced the formation of Western thinkers from antiquity to the modern era. The perennial question – why and how the perception of women "has endured for so long and in so many different historical settings" (Bennett 1991: 183) – may be elucidated by the exploration of the ancient roots of the ideology that has shaped women's position across time and space and its connection with its subsequent

offshoots. What research from this perspective may reveal is that from its inception the ideology of inferiority distorted facts, combining truth with fiction and using everyday situations to support abstract doctrines that are false. In his attempt to shed light on the truth/falsity issue in relation to ideology, literary theorist Terry Eagleton defines ideological discourse as "a complex network of empirical and normative elements, within which the nature and organization of the former is ultimately determined by the requirements of the latter" (1991: 22). In order for any ideology to take root, it must correspond to some degree with a certain recognizable reality, so that the subject will not reject it as an impossibility. This is the methodology Plato follows in his *Laws* to argue that women must be barred from political office. As Elizabeth LaFray shows in this volume, Plato initially presents an ideology of inclusion, requiring that girls be educated like boys in order to participate as adults in government and military service; however, when he considers that women's participation is complicated by pregnancy, childbirth, and child-rearing, he concludes that a policy of exclusion is a more sensible approach. Although there are other solutions, Plato's 'facts' are colored by a preconceived view of how women should experience procreation and what their position should be in Athenian society, which compels him to adopt the traditional response to the problem and exclude them from the government.

Such contradictions are evident also in the proto-democratic states of early modern Europe, or in the first established modern European democracy in eighteenth-century France. For example, political subjecthood, as Androniki Dialetti contends in this volume, conflated with male hegemony in Renaissance Venice and Florence, highlighted women's intellectual and physical deficiency to legitimize their political exclusion. It is even more striking to observe that as late as the end of the eighteenth century, during the French Revolution, when 'liberty, equality, and fraternity' were proclaimed to be universal human rights, women were never really given access to the public centers of power. As Zupančič shows in this volume, with the institution of the Napoleonic Code, women were soon deprived of the few privileges they gained under the new Republic.

More recent perceptions of ideology acknowledge decentralized and diverse points of control rather than only one, principal and all-monitoring nucleus of power. But where can these points of divergence be detected and how systematic are they in explaining and evaluating political phenomena or in offering a basic political agenda? A closer examination of the intrinsic incongruities in the ideology of women's exclusion helps us locate counter-hegemonic moves. As a number of essays in this book demonstrate, women have been contesting power throughout history: from the unruly tragic figures in ancient drama who violate the law and dispute the established order (Papazoglou; Gerolemou), and the Roman elite women, who on occasion opposed senate deliberations (Carucci), to sixteenth-century Catholic nuns who undermined male authority from within the system of the Church (Janiga-Perkins), and seventeenth-century female Spanish writers who demanded that women be established as equal to men (Granja Ibarreche). As Virginia Woolf points out in *A Room of One's Own*, although since the dawn of history male scholars have exerted themselves to complete their monumental

treatises "entitled *The Mental, Moral and Physical Inferiority of the Female Sex*" women have found ways to resist exclusion (Woolf 1987: 31).

Up to the late nineteenth century, however, women's acts of rebellion were not sufficiently organized to orient them towards a common set of beliefs and a common political goal. In many cases, women resisting exclusion were not conscious of the fact that they were themselves products and carriers of the same ideology they were fighting. In their effort to overcome external barriers, women have often become victims of what political sociologist Nicos Poulantzas (1975) calls "separation and uniting". While women are united in their struggle against a common oppressor, they are often separated by internal barriers associated with other factors like race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, age, and so on. This is evident also in eras when women were not yet acting as an organized collective, as in the case of the Southern plantation mistresses who, as Theodosiadou shows, during the Civil War and post-revolutionary era sustained the plantation economy by constructing an idealized feminine identity at the expense of black female slaves and their postulated impurity. Even in the anti-discrimination politics of the European Union today, as Siim and Mokre show, the intersections of gender, class, and race are not always addressed. If it took women precious time to comprehend the ways in which ideology has been training them to submit to their own exploitation, it has been (and still is) trickier for the ideology of women's liberation to overcome internal obstacles by concentrating on differences among women on the global landscape and considering intersecting systems of oppression.

Methodological considerations and overview of essays

As this volume of interdisciplinary essays unfolds, it gradually reveals the various manifestations of the female-inferiority construct, with each essay shedding light on a particular aspect of its transmutations over the ages. Although the concept of ideology per se is a later invention and an even later linguistic coinage, the ancients pursued very actively the creation of identity constructs through the retelling of stories, mythological or otherwise, as well as through visual representation of myths in public spaces, adapting them to particular socio-political agendas of a given time and place. Studying an ideological construct in antiquity, although the ancients did not have a specific name for it, is not an oxymoron but a necessity, if we are to understand this stereotype. As the volume covers two large, roughly consecutive periods, the Greco-Roman antiquity and the period from the Renaissance to modernity, it reveals an astonishing reality: in antiquity, this ideology was not received uniformly by all males; Herodotus, for example, questioned the Athenian monolithic exclusion of women from politics, tragedians explored the idea of dynamic and self-assertive females, and Plato considered scenarios of female emancipation. And while the same was true to a great extent in the Renaissance and beyond, when many male voices questioned the stereotype of the 'inferior' and 'weaker sex', it still continued to succeed in keeping women away from the political arena for the most part. Furthermore, the same telescopic view of this construct's function in its historical span of 25 centuries reveals a paradoxical situation: whereas

the ancient Athenian intelligentsia constructed a weakened female identity to address the problem democracy created by introducing the possibility of women's political empowerment, in later periods, when democracy had eclipsed as political system and men were no longer faced with the task of justifying the exclusion of women from politics, nevertheless the majority of male intellectuals continued to reaffirm the construct of the 'inferior sex' to keep women away from public life. It is, therefore, this wider context of the complete ideological spectrum from antiquity to the modern era that allows us to project this ideology to the past and see how its fledgling ancient elements fit in retrospect in the wider picture of this ideological construct. The scope of this book, however, is not only to trace continuities but also to acknowledge and explore ruptures, incongruities, and subversions, manifest in patriarchal exclusionary politics, on the one hand, and in women's reactionary tactics, on the other.

Although this volume does not intend to discuss the trajectory of this ideology and women's resistance to it in an exhaustive manner, it does aspire to address the most characteristic aspects of its manifestation in art, theater, literature, and the laws of various Western cultures, in order to contribute to the conversation about gender, ideology, and citizen participation, especially since vestiges of the ideological conundrum of female inferiority are still lingering in the Western world. In the first part, 'Greek and Roman Antiquity', essays approach this idea as a rising ideology and explore the arguments that supported, promoted, and shaped (or, occasionally, challenged) it at various key moments in history, while women tried covertly to thwart it. In the second part, 'Renaissance through Modernity', the essays deal with the idea of female inferiority in later periods, when it became entrenched in Western culture, pointing out the re-appropriation of the ideology by various European cultures. At the same time, the questions here also explore how women dealt with this incapacitating ideology, how they questioned its logic and efficacy, and how they tried to circumvent its limitations and undermine its authority.

Tsakiropoulou-Summers opens the discussion with "Solon's Legislation and Women's Incompatibility with State Ideology", a study on the origin of the ideology of inferior female nature. Solon's legislation in the sixth century BC did much both to introduce and establish the idea: in his effort to remedy the Athenian social and financial crisis, he instituted a set of laws that directly affected the perception of women – he banned the dowry, regulated women's appearance at festivals and public spaces, changed mourning practices, restricted public expressions of grief, and limited the number of women at funerals. The implication of Solon's invasive laws is that women are generally unruly and incapable of self-control, and, as such, incompatible with the state organization and its ideology. This suggestion, bolstered by other philosophical and scientific observations about women, contributed to the construct of 'inferior female' that ultimately justified women's exclusion from politics. And, while women were able to evade a number of legal restrictions in real life – as suggested by the fact that the state was forced in the fourth century BC to appoint an elected official, the 'Supervisor of Women', to oversee their public conduct – ancient women were unable to disprove the erroneous assumptions of the dominant ideology about their gender.

In "Making Men and Making Women: 'Male Superiority' in Archaic Athens", Matthew Lloyd studies the concept of 'female inferiority' as the corollary of 'male superiority'. The question he asks is not why women came to be considered 'inferior', but how men came to think of themselves as 'superior' and assigned the inferior position to women. Lloyd looks at the development of these ideas in the archaic period based on archeological remains. His findings show that, whereas masculinity was defined in the Homeric epics by how men behaved at war, in archaic Athens the focus shifted to the muscular definition of athletic male bodies that came to reflect the moral quality of the individual: a good body suggested a good person. Gender was tied inextricably to the body, but progressing from gender difference to the ideas of male superiority or female inferiority was the result of the performative actions of the male body, particularly the performance of violence. The physical power of the trained male body, idealized by the *Kouros* statues, along with its performative expressions at war, athletic competitions, and hunting suggests a superior masculinity, while implying two inferior positions: first, the inferior masculinity of non-elite men, who lacked the leisure required to achieve exemplary masculinity but still possessed a modicum of muscular strength; and, second, the de facto inferiority of women who were not allowed in the gym, the battlefield, or the hunt, and, therefore, lacked altogether the means to be acculturated into male activities of body and mind, necessitating in turn their exclusion from male society.

Helen Tank, in "Powerful Women and Gender Ideology in Herodotus' *Histories*", explores the historian's view of gender differences and his belief that the binary gender opposition of 'superior male' and 'inferior female' is a cultural construct that does not reflect accurately gender realities. Instead, for Herodotus male and female are contingent upon the function of *nomos* (law or custom) rather than *phusis* (nature), as he attributes manliness (*andreia*) to female characters such as Artemisia. Considering that Athenian constitution and culture excluded women from masculine pursuits such as exercising legal, political, and military power, Tank argues that Herodotus' inclusion of women alongside men in such activities indicates his non-Athenian perspective and his skepticism about the ideology of female inferiority. Tank analyzes three representative case studies from the *Histories*, featuring women performing politically significant actions with a temperament characteristic of men. She concludes that, for Herodotus, neither men nor women are undifferentiated groups of superior or inferior character respectively, but, in both genders, there are individuals capable of displaying superior 'masculine' qualities, or behaving in an inferior manner. His male and female characters, therefore, are complex and do not follow gender stereotypes. Most importantly, they undermine the stereotype of the powerful woman who wields power only through trickery or sexuality, or whose public interventions lead to social and political chaos in the community.

Examining the stance of the other classical historian, Kelly E. Shannon-Henderson, in her essay "Women in Thucydides: Absence and Inferiority", focuses on the few female characters featured in the *History of the Peloponnesian War*, fought when Athenian democracy was at its peak. Shannon-Henderson

looks at these characters from the perspective of Pericles' admonition in the *History* to the women of Athens, widowed by the war, to "not be worse than their existing nature". Intending to discourage women from seeking involvement in the public affairs of the city, despite their devastating effect on their life, Pericles voiced one of the strongest statements on female exclusion from politics. Analyzing, therefore, the context and purpose of females in this work, Shannon-Henderson raises the question whether Thucydides agrees with Pericles or views women as capable of building a good reputation (*kleos*) by participating in public affairs. Her findings reveal that, although Thucydides does not support completely the Periclean ideal of the silent and invisible female and refers in his narrative by name to some women who influenced certain events, it seems that, influenced after all by the ideology of the inferior female, he considers women a liability for the state. Whenever he discusses women's involvement in public affairs, he shows that they are either unable to effect positive political change, or, even worse, their 'contribution' is decidedly negative, due to their inferior moral qualities. Therefore, for Thucydides, women should have no place at all in political or military affairs, which constitutes a most powerful reinforcement of the ideology that viewed women as inferior and sought to exclude them from the public life.

In her essay "Autochthonous Landscape and Female Exclusion in the Athenian Democracy", Allison Surtees looks at artistic representations of men and women on vases as well as on public monuments of the fifth century BC suggesting the ideological exclusion of women from the political realm. Examining the decorative program of the Parthenon, the Erechtheion, and the Hephaisteion, Surtees fleshes out the subliminal messages encoded in the references to Athena as mother and Hephaestus as father of Athenian citizens. However, representing motherhood on public buildings is not evidence of women's prominent role in public life or their political inclusion, as it has been recently argued. Instead, Surtees suggests, the context of such representations undermines any political role for women in the state: public representations of motherhood may extol women's domestic role, but deny them a public one and advance the notion that women's greatest contribution to the state is to reproduce citizens in the home. If, therefore, motherhood is honored in public imagery, it is praised for actions restricted to the private realm, while it is surrounded by subliminal messages about the threat women pose to the city, if allowed to participate in its political life. Fatherhood, however, is a public role, for fathers introduce their sons into the public world of the polis. As Surtees concludes, mothers give birth to citizens privately, yet fathers create them publicly. Therefore, prominent representations of women constitute public expressions of the patriarchal system that excludes women from public spaces by insisting that they can make a more valuable contribution to the city by staying at home.

Maria Gerolemou, in her essay "The Politics of Female Madness in Greek Tragedy", studies modes of female intervention to public affairs in Greek dramas. This intervention can be assumed to express the contemporary Athenian women's desire to gain a public voice and challenge the inequalities of the

democratic system, which, instead of relaxing the patriarchal restrictions on women, made them even more rigid. As women aspired to overcome gender restrictions and advance a female political vision, dramatists explored the possibility of female agency that would challenge the Athenian patriarchal state and its flawed civic ideology. Gerolemou identifies two contrasting styles of female intervention. The first, adopted by Clytemnaestra, is independent and assertive, but, at the same time, ineffectual: Clytemnestra is perceived as mad and is discounted by the male citizens, who reiterate the dominant male discourse and support the hegemonic ideology of women's exclusion from the democratic *polis*. The second mode of female political intervention is based on submissive behavior. The women accept their inferior status and avoid challenging male actors, as they take up an auxiliary position behind male agency. As a result, although they give political advice, their conduct is perceived as prudent and their voice is heard. Gerolemou shows that the leading females in Euripides' *Suppliant Women* and the *Children of Heracles* foil the assertive but 'mad' Clytemnestra and succeed where the former is defeated. Therefore, the failure of the assertive female and the corollary success of submissive women reinforce the dominant political ideology and suggest that the only woman who would ever want to become a political leader would be a mad woman.

The ancient prejudices about the dangerously passionate and unstable female nature are fertile ground for dramatic conflicts. Eleni Papazoglou, in her "Mechanisms of Exclusion: Women Between Ritual and Emotion", studies the portrayal of women in tragedy, as a negotiation between two contrasting forms of expression, ritual, and emotion. Ritual activity, associated with fertility, marriage, and death, configured female subjectivity according to predominant gender requirements and, at the same time, offered the only occasion for women to assume public action. On the tragic stage, however, rituals appear more often than not perverted and, as such, incapable of securing safe gender identities. It is this perversion, Papazoglou argues, that opens up the space for the emergence on stage of a female subjectivity which is imbued in a (self)destructive emotional paroxysm. Papazoglou discusses Aeschylus' *Suppliant Women* and *Libation Bearers*, Sophocles' and Euripides' *Electras*, and the latter's *Suppliant Women*. In Aeschylus, women are initially introduced performing properly ritual supplication and lament, whereas in Sophocles and Euripides, the female voice appears from the start to indulge in a markedly de-ritualized mourning. In all plays, however, in one way or another, women reach uninhibited despair and/or rage, and their emotional derailment threatens civic order. In some cases, this threat is fulfilled, in others cancelled – yet, in all cases, female paroxysm appears in urgent need of male curtailment. Papazoglou concludes that the progress from the earlier to the later plays shows the female voice distancing itself from ritual and gradually restricting itself solely to (self)destructive emotion. This shift appears to occur along the process from a developing democracy to a radical one, a regime which configured female 'nature' as radically and dangerously 'other' to the world of the *polis* – as civically deficient. Tragic theatre, in most cases, focuses intensely on female passion, cultivating further the concept

of this civic 'otherness', and providing an ideological mechanism that justifies women's exclusion from public and political life.

From the tragedians, Elizabeth LaFray moves on to the philosophers, in her essay "Dangerous Bodies: Plato's *Laws* and the Ideology of Female Inferiority in Fourth-Century Athens", where she examines Plato's perception of women and their role in public life. Although some scholars see him as a proto-feminist, his positions are complex and at times contradictory. While in the *Laws*, for example, Plato reiterates his commitment to the equal treatment of men and women and his view of the latter as legitimate political actors, in the course of the dialogue he limits women's political activity in the ideal city. LaFray proposes that to understand Plato's vision of female participation in the state one must study it in the context of other Platonic dialogues as well as the contemporary cultural and political practices in democratic Athens. Plato, LaFray argues, was evidently deeply influenced by typically Athenian concerns about citizenship and democratic participation as well as by prevalent socio-political and medical ideas about the inferior female body, and, therefore, was always skeptical about women's suitability to political life; this led him to place on women restrictions that reflect the same limitations that had been imposed on women by the Athenian state.

Reacting to Plato's idealistic proclamations about women as political actors, Aristotle takes the unwavering position that female nature is inferior and unfit for political participation. In her essay, "Politics of the Deformed: Women, Slaves, and Democracy in Aristotle", Velvet Yates, based on a connection she detects between Aristotle's ideas in his biological works and those in his *Politics*, argues that Aristotle uses the concept of biological 'deformity' to justify the exclusion of 'deformed' and, therefore, inferior elements, from various categories: the women from biological genders, the slaves from free society, and the democracy from viable political systems. In his *Politics*, Aristotle describes democracy in the same derogatory terms he uses to describe women, whom he defines as deformed and inferior males. For Aristotle, just as woman is a deformed man, democracy is the deformed version of the ideal constitution, the *politeia*. Aristotle, Yates argues, creates a parallelism between women and democracy, in order to exclude the latter from his list of 'normal' political constitutions. Therefore, in as much as women (being inferior to men in masculine courage, self-control, and the deliberative faculty) are excluded from democracy, and slaves (lacking all the faculties that women possess but to a lesser degree than men) are excluded from free society, democracy ought to be excluded from the group of political systems as it manifests the womanish and slavish control of body over mind, which creates a chaotic and effeminate state with the lower elements of the population (workers) ruling over the more refined ones.

James Kierstead in "Women in Associations in Classical and Hellenistic Athens" studies the extent to which the ideology of female inferiority affected the democratic practices still in existence during the Hellenistic period (roughly 325–200 BC), the age of declining democracy. Contrary to the classical period, the inscriptions record in the Hellenistic era indicates that some democratic associations included in their membership women, resident aliens and, on occasion,

slaves. This fact has been interpreted as a positive step toward female empowerment and an indication that the democratic citizens matured and realized that this was a long-overdue application of the democratic principles, equality, and inclusion. However, this trend of 'inclusion' must be seen in the context of the declining democracy and the devaluation of citizenship, as political participation of citizens became less meaningful under the Hellenistic monarchies. With the loss of real political power, citizens no longer cared to ensure the exclusion of non-citizens from various associations and started including individuals that used to be disqualified in the fifth and fourth centuries. Kierstead, therefore, argues that inclusiveness in the Hellenistic age does not indicate a conscious empowerment of women but quite the opposite: had the popular rule continued to be as strong in the Hellenistic period as it was before, females would have continued to be excluded.

Leaving the Greek world behind, Margherita Carucci moves on to the Republican Rome and studies the issue of female inferiority from the liberal feminist perspective and its reflection on the Roman women. In her essay "Female Reticence in Republican Rome: Agency and the Performance of Exclusion", Carucci questions the traditional view of the 'silence' code imposed on Roman women as mere manifestation of women's willing submission to male authority and their acceptance of their inferiority. In her quest to determine whether women's reservation in expressing publicly their views was a male mandate or a conscious choice, Carucci analyzes the few historical cases in which Republican elite women organized themselves, demonstrated publicly their opposition to the Roman senate, and succeeded in influencing the outcome of political deliberations. This capacity to challenge male authority creates an enigmatic contrast with the women's subsequent decision to fade into a silent existence instead of pushing for more rights. Modern feminists interpret it as failure to pursue their liberation, but Carucci argues that the Roman women from the upper classes used the patriarchal modes cleverly, consciously, and to their advantage: maintaining a proper façade of silence and embracing in principle this female virtue helped them make a powerful statement in the few occasions they broke it, defending the prerogatives of their gender and their social status against state attempts to erode their ability to influence, at least indirectly, political affairs. Although Roman elite women transformed silence into an empowering tool, they were aware that the price for maintaining the status quo was their exclusion from public life and from open political participation.

The essays in the second part of the volume, 'Renaissance through Modernity', work on the premise that the ideology of female inferiority became an unquestionable conviction in this period. With the educational system since the Middle Ages centering around the classical authors and, especially, Aristotle, the Renaissance proponents of this ideology recycled the same arguments that had been proposed in antiquity and used them for the same purpose: to exclude women from the political arena. Packaged together with the brilliant contributions Greek and Roman thinkers made to Western civilization, the concept of female inferiority remained axiomatic and continued influencing every aspect

of life and culture, raising insurmountable barriers around women and keeping them corralled in the home. Nevertheless, there is increasingly more evidence of women in these times who tried to combat and overcome the ancient biases against their gender. Their methods in this battle were, in certain cases, variations on the method of subterfuge delineated by Carucci above: working, with a few exceptions, within the framework of patriarchal prescriptions for the female gender and seemingly respecting male authority, women used the principles of the very system that kept them subdued to undermine its grip on them. Their method resulted in a steady, though admittedly slow, change, as they created small but clever occasions of intervention that eventually allowed them to gain a public voice. Change was precipitated toward the fin-de-siècle when women pursued suffrage actively, resisting male restrictions, at times, violently.

In her essay on "Gendering Civic Humanism: Political Subjecthood and Male Hegemony in Renaissance Italy", Androniki Dialeti discusses the formation of Renaissance 'citizenship' on the models of classical antiquity, medieval scholasticism, civic humanism, and republicanism. The concept of citizenship in the Italian republican regimes, such as Venice and Florence, maintained the dichotomy between male and female natures and affirmed the incompatibility of 'femininity' with public life. Political subjecthood and individualism, Dialeti argues, were construed as male attributes associated with newly established forms of hegemonic civic masculinity and the Renaissance ideals of patriotism, moderation, rational thinking, and brotherhood. Supported by arguments offered by religion, medical science, and political philosophy, male educated elites of the republican regimes sanctioned the exclusion of women from politics (along with certain groups of men, including youth, the socially inferior, foreigners, etc.) and reinforced masculinity as an organizing principle of political power with a powerful array of discourses, literary loci, and visual representations.

Constance G. Janiga-Perkins, in her essay "The Materiality of Female Agency: Madre María de San José's Writings in Seventeenth-Century New Spain", studies the mechanisms by which a Catholic nun, Madre María, managed to circumvent the authoritarian, patriarchal restrictions on women and write her *Vida* (a spiritual journal), something usually forbidden to women of her era. Roman Catholicism at the time, influenced by Aristotelianism and Scholasticism, had adopted the ideology of female inferiority and established the need of a guiding, male hand in all aspects of women's life. Yet, Madre María, continuing the strategic maneuvering of the Roman women of antiquity, was able not only to write but also to develop a voice of female agency, which, eschewing Church directives and male supervision, told her story. On the surface, she employs the traditional rhetoric of humility, a known stratagem of weak writing subjects that submit to the expectations of the patriarchy; beneath it, however, the material traces of the manuscript reveal the author's voice as well as her ability to manipulate male authority and impose her will in her writings. Janiga-Perkins, therefore, argues that a non-dominant reading of the *Vida*, focusing on the materiality of the manuscript (such as paper, ink, handwriting, editing decisions, and marginal commentary), can reveal the female agency at work, Madre María's disputes with her spiritual supervisor over issues of censorship, or the

furtive means by which she marks out a text as not hers but as one, likely, dictated to her. All these nuances are lost in the dominant reading of the critical edition, which in creating a sequential text erases the female author's voice.

From covert efforts toward female empowerment in New Spain, Xabier Granja Ibarreche shifts to continental Spain and, in his essay "Woman Reclaimed: Subverting Feminine Exclusion in the Works of María de Zayas in Seventeenth-Century Spain", studies the powerful social commentary Zayas produced on the causes of systemic female oppression in her country. Granja Ibarreche contents that in her mysteries, Zayas uses the motif of male violent crimes against women to expose the character flaws of the Spanish nobility and the underlying problem of social decay. Seventeenth-century Spanish courtiers established their hegemonic status on the Aristotelian maxim of the superior male nature: they privileged masculinity for its unique ability for self-control and excluded women from political life on their presumed inferior and inherently uncontrollable nature. Zayas, however, deconstructs these claims as mere ideological constructs with no actual foundations. In her works, she portrays the flower of Spanish nobility as possessed by an extreme and uncontrollable ire, seething underneath a veneer of self-control and expressed only in secret acts of extreme and unjustified violence against women. Reflecting real-life experiences of contemporary society, Zayas marks this behavior as a sign of profound corruption, endangering not only women's lives but also political stability. The solution she proposes is to adjust the dominant ideology: considering that women prove considerably more upright than the ruling male elite, female nature should be re-evaluated and re-established as equal to men's, in order for women to be allowed to enter political life and redirect Spanish culture to a state of moral balance and stability.

One of the earliest instances in which women tried to flout openly patriarchal biases and act outside their boundaries is the French Revolution. Metka Zupančič, in "Women and French Democracy, 1789–1804: Between the Guillotine and the Civil Code Limitations", shows that a large number of French women of all classes breached the social limitations of their gender, disproving the perception of the 'weaker sex'. In their eagerness to advance away from male control and toward gender equality, a number of women tried to take advantage of the political chaos of the revolutionary period and contribute actively to the cause: they wrote and presented petitions to the king and the Constitutional Assembly, joined the male marches in the streets of Paris and lead the march on Versailles. Their daring actions, however, Zupančič shows, proved catastrophic for the women's cause in the long run: in the years immediately after the declaration of the First Republic (in 1792), the most outspoken of the female revolutionaries were guillotined, while Napoleon's Civil Code took away many of their rights and in some instances reduced women's legal status to that of minors. Consequently, the women's cause in France regressed and remained stagnant for the most part throughout the nineteenth century.

Like the French Revolution, the American Civil War gave women the opportunity to reevaluate themselves in society and challenge gender constrictions. Youli Theodosiadou, in her essay "*Mary Chesnut's Civil War*: Female

Exclusion and Race in the American South", focuses on the status of women in the American South during the antebellum and the Civil War eras through the examination of the autobiography of Mary Boykin Chesnut, a plantation lady from South Carolina. Among other issues, Chesnut discusses the impact slavery had on white women and comments on the repercussions of miscegenation. Even though the plantation lady was placed on a pedestal and projected an icon of southern culture's perfection, she was oppressed by the existing patriarchal culture and excluded from active social and political participation. The primary ideology that dominated white women's conduct was the cult of true womanhood, which delineated the ideal female virtues and expected women to perform an ornamental function in society, reflecting their husbands' power and wealth. However, during the four years of the Civil War, women were forced to acquire a new sense of themselves (born out of necessity) and came to face the postwar world with a feeling of empowerment. Their lives were significantly altered by the abolition of slavery and the destruction of the plantation system. Women's demand for change gradually led to their suffrage and the collapse of the patriarchal system.

Women's claim for the right to vote became the focus of their struggle for equality by the end of the nineteenth century. The fight for female suffrage has a long and complex history and the effectiveness of the militant practices of many suffragettes' groups has been a controversial issue. In her essay, "A 'Society of Outsiders': Virginia Woolf's Feminist Agenda in *A Room of One's Own* and *Three Guineas*", Katerina Kitsi-Mitakou explores the abstruse position of a seminal figure in feminist thought, Virginia Woolf, on women's political rights and the suffrage movement. In *A Room of One's Own*, a long essay written in 1929, Woolf focuses on women's absence from history and their exclusion from public life. Even if women have won the vote, Woolf contends, they are still victims of exclusionary politics, as the ideology of exclusion is associated with control mechanisms like the family and the educational system. Woolf's analysis of female exclusion, Kitsi-Mitakou argues, anticipates the theories of the French philosopher Louis Althusser, as expressed in his 1970s essay on "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", but her proposed plan that will supposedly establish women as active agents in history is utopic in that it fails to consider parameters like class and race which intersect with gender. In *Three Guineas*, a long essay composed during the rise of fascism in Europe, Woolf is perceptive enough to highlight the importance of examining how multiple forms of oppression (religious, racial, sexual, etc.) interconnect. While Woolf's feminist agenda, though, borrows from the women's suffrage movement, she refuses to join them, arguing instead that male oppression and fascism (two terms which are conflated in the essay) can come to an end, only if the women of her class ("the daughters of educated men") are given access to education and the professions.

In "Gender Equality Law in Greece and the European Union: The Trajectory from Exclusion to Inclusion", Anna-Maria Konsta discusses twentieth-century legal reforms concerning gender equality in Greece and the European Union. These reforms were mainly initiated in the first half of the twentieth century by

political elites and legal specialists (internal legal culture) with the contribution to some extent of the Greek feminist movement. Only after the restoration of democracy in the mid-1970s and Greece's membership in the EU in the early 1980s, a rapid change in the general public's mentality, conceptions, and beliefs towards gender equality law (external legal culture) occurred. It was domestic law that perpetuated the centuries long cultural perception of female inferiority, and was used to maintain political exclusion of women in the first half of the twentieth century, and it was EU law as an expedient of change that transformed the legal culture in Greece in the late twentieth century. Therefore, it can be argued that Greece followed an uncommon trajectory: whereas in matters of gender equality legal structures usually follow the demands of grassroots movements and social changes, in Greece gender equality law led the way and preceded social transformation.

In the final essay of the volume, "Gender, Citizenship, and Political Inclusion/Exclusion in the European Union: An Intersectional Approach", Birte Siim and Monika Mokre focus on the intersections between gender and migration and demonstrate that immigrant minorities tend to be victims of exclusionary intersectionality. They argue that although anti-discrimination according to ethnicity/race, religion, sexuality, gender, age, and handicap is part of the fundamental values of the European Union, in political debates gender equality is frequently juxtaposed to cultural and religious claims of minorities, especially of Muslim groups. Against this background, the authors maintain, it seems necessary to use an intersectional approach to different forms of discrimination in order to develop consistent theoretical perspectives, legislative activities, and official discourses on gender equality and anti-discrimination in diverse societies. Hitherto, both in politics and in theory, different strands of activities/claims and thought have developed separately without much mutual influence. With regard to political theories, approaches from the perspective of gender studies, migration studies, and citizenship studies have developed separately without much mutual recognition and inspiration. With regard to EU legislation, the separate introduction of women and anti-discrimination legislation taking place in different periods of time can be observed. These separations in politics and theory are mirrored in public discourses usually lacking an intersectional political perspective.

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Part I

Greek and Roman antiquity

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1 Solon's legislation and women's incompatibility with state ideology

Tatiana Tsakiropoulou-Summers

Introduction

During the seventh and sixth centuries BC, Athenian society underwent a major legal, political, social, and economic transformation that eventually gave birth to democracy in the fifth century BC. A major catalyst in this process was Solon's legislation: in 594 BC, the Athenian statesman and lawmaker was appointed chief magistrate (*archon*) and was called upon to reform the Athenian political system, primarily to restore its ailing economy but also to re-establish peace between rivaling classes, aristocratic clans, political ideologies, and economic interests that ravaged Athenian society (Blok and Lardinois 2006). Although his reforms initially seemed to fail, they were subsequently credited for laying the foundations for the rise of democracy and the transformation of Athenian society (Lape 2002; Ehrenberg 1990). Even in antiquity, Solon was upheld as the man who "founded democracy", in Plutarch's words.[1] Yet, while these changes helped Athenian men soar politically, women were affected negatively by Solon's legislation: his sumptuary laws, his law on dowry, and his restrictions on women's mourning customs cast women's nature in a negative light and prevented their political integration in Athenian democracy.

Solon's legislation, whether in its original form or adapted over the years, held sway in Athens for several centuries – he himself bound the Athenians to keep it in force for a hundred years (Plut., *Sol.* 25.1). In the fifth century, other states under Athenian control also adopted Solon's laws and kept them long beyond his hundred-year stipulation. As Plutarch (*Sol.* 21.5) states, most of Solon's restrictions on women were still part of the contemporary legislation in his homeland, Boeotia, in the second century AD (Garland 1981: 13; Alexiou 2002: 15). Furthermore, influence of Solon's legislation can be detected in decrees passed by various Greek communities and colonies around the Mediterranean for a period of five or six hundred years after Solon.[2] The longevity and geographical expanse of his legislation are indicative of its role in shaping ideas, perceptions, practices, and customs in the Greek world (Blok 2006: 212), proving particularly influential in defining female gender identity. In this essay, therefore, I will attempt to show that in the classical era the ideological perception of women as inferior to men stems to a great extent from Solon's legislation. Although the lack of detailed

records and the spotty material evidence make etiological connections between laws and social trends in antiquity tenuous, in the case of Solon there are several testimonies of ancient authors commenting on the impact of his work on Greek culture. This connection highlights the fact that Solon's legislative restrictions on women are reflected in women's incompatibility with the organization of the *polis*, advanced as it is in literary, philosophical, and epigraphical sources.

Solon was numbered among the Seven Sages of antiquity (Isocrates 15.235; Plato, *Protagoras* 343a4; *Timaeus* 20e1). He was already considered a good statesman when he was elected *archon* (high public officer) in 594 BC, but his reputation as a wise man was based mainly on the legislation he enacted and his philosophical views.[3] The ancients considered Solon an exceptional thinker, whose ground-breaking legislation had no precedent. Plutarch in his *Comparison of Solon and Publicola* (3.2) explicitly describes Solon as a lone agent, who stood on the border between the old and the new era, and blazed a new trail with his monumental public legislation. Aristotle also highlights Solon's unique position in Athenian constitutional history, noting that all legislators that came after him based their work on his laws and simply tweaked his constitution to make it more democratic (*Pol.* 1274a9–10), while they themselves contributed nothing new to Solon's law code (*Athenian Constitution* 29.4.1).

The significance of Solon's legislation lay in the fact that it dissolved oligarchy and established democracy (Arist., *Pol.* 1273b35), for which he was considered "the champion of the people" (Isocrates 15.313). Xenophon characterizes Solon's laws as "excellent and influential" (*Symposium* 8.39), and admits that he himself, compelled by Solon's perception of justice, applied its principles to his own construction of household management (*Oeconomicus* 14.4). Aristotle agrees with Xenophon's assessment and points out that Solon's laws made the Athenians truly prosperous and happy (*Rhetoric* 1398b17), since his reforms helped rectify economic injustices (*Athen. Const.* 5.3.1–5), settled the social strife ravaging Athens (5.2.3), and established the people (*dēmos*) as "masters of the state" (6.23). Solon was not merely honored by the Athenians (Plato, *Symposium* 209d), but was actually loved in the words of Isocrates (15.232) for the way he arranged the social and political organization of the state, so much so that they kept it in force for centuries beyond the initial agreement. As a result, Athenians often attributed to him most of their later laws (Antiphon, fr. 15.4; Aristophanes, *Birds* 1660); and, although this was not always correct, it suggests an awareness of the transformative power of Solon's legislation on Athenian society.

To understand how deeply Solon affected Athenian attitudes, especially in regard to women, we must consider briefly the perception of women in the pre-Solonian era (eighth to sixth centuries BC), when the literary world was dominated by Homer, Hesiod, and Semonides. In the Homeric epics (eighth century BC), female characters appear both fearsome and appealing, ambivalent in their ability to cause both goodness and destruction. On the one hand, the female monsters that populate the world of the *Odyssey*, most notably the Sirens, Scylla, Charybdis, Circe, and Calypso, are clearly menacing forces, able to overwhelm and annihilate men, who were warned to be on their guard around

them (Bergren 2008; Vergados, 2009: 7–20; B. Cohen, 1995; Slatkin 1992 Foley, 1984: 59–78; duBois, 1982). On the other hand, recognizing that men were bound inescapably to women for their reproductive powers, the rhetoric about the relationship between the genders encouraged (to a degree) the incorporation of women into the male world, by upholding positive female archetypes to motivate women to emulate them, while coaxing men to cultivate women's inclusion in their world. In this sense (and only in this sense), it may be said that in the pre-Solonian, archaic, era the general attitude toward women was 'inclusive'. For example, Arete, Nausicaa's mother in the *Odyssey*, is a woman honored by her husband, her family, and the people of Phaeacia for her wisdom, her generosity, and her justice "as no other woman was honored on earth" (*Od.* 7.67).[4] To Nausicaa herself, Odysseus wishes that gods grant her the blessing of a husband and "harmonious interaction" with him, for "there is nothing better or more precious than a husband and a wife communicating in harmony" (*Od.* 6.180–5). Hesiod, in the seventh century BC, despite his reputation for misogyny, complains that Zeus created women deliberately to be an evil for men, yet bound the latter to cherish and embrace the female race (*Works and Days* 58); complaints notwithstanding, good women do exist and, Hesiod admits, for men there is "nothing better than a good wife" (702–3): although the lot of marriage is tough, a good wife can "balance good with evil" (*Theogony* 608–9; Stoddard 2004: 156; Arrighetti 1998: 465). Even Semonides, in the seventh century BC, whose grotesque satire of female types is seen as the hallmark of misogynism in archaic Greece, concedes that there are also women who, like bees, "blameless in everything", make their husband lucky with their hard work and good sense (fr. 7.82). We do not suggest here that conditions were ideal for women in the archaic era, but wish to point out that there were literary attempts to balance negative views of women with a modicum of positive rhetoric. The foundation of positive perspective in literature was bolstered to a great extent by the marital custom of *exogamy*, which made women quite valuable for their natal families in the archaic era (Seaford 1994: 206–11; Vernant 1980: 45–70). Aristocratic daughters would often be given in marriage to men outside their community (*exogamy*), helping ambitious fathers expand not only the base of their political power but also their wealth: the general custom in *exogamy* was for the groom to offer a valuable gift package (*hedna* or brideprice) to the bride's father. In this system, the more daughters a father had, the happier he was.

By contrast, in the classical period, we encounter a drastically different view of women. First, *endogamy* (marriage within the community) gradually replaced *exogamy*, while brideprice was replaced by the dowry,[5] which the father transferred to the groom on the wedding day (Seaford 1994: 209). Shifts in marriage customs are indirectly associated with Solon's laws, to the extent they lay the foundations of democracy: political power in a democratic setting relies more on local support and votes rather than external networks. In a democratic state, a marital alliance, even with a powerful local family, could not guarantee one's rise in the political world, which undercut significantly women's ability to advance men's political interests. Eventually, with Pericles' law of 451 BC, which made citizenship a corollary to

the marriage between Athenian-born individuals, endogamy became the only legal option (Patterson 1990: 40–73; Goody 1976: 20–1). The new marriage customs had fathers of daughters carve out a percentage of their estate to offer as dowry to the grooms; therefore, the more daughters a father had, the smaller the portion of his estate that would be left to his male children. Women, once instrumental in creating networks of reciprocal obligations between their natal and marital families, in the classical era were seen as economic liability and burden by both families: the natal for having to secure a sizeable dowry for their daughters and the marital for having to support the woman in the event of an inadequate dowry (Wilgaux 2000: 659–76; Seaford 1994: 213).

Changes in marriage practices are not the only factors in the decline of women's social value in the post-Solonian era. As we will see below, literary, philosophical, and political authorities started putting more emphasis on the idea of women's inferior nature and exclusion. We must clarify here that in this study we are focusing on the ideological exclusion of women (necessitated, as shown in the introduction, by the patriarchal framework within which democracy developed) and not on the actual conditions of their life – recent studies have shown that women were able to bypass both ideological and legal restrictions, and quietly lead an active life in public spaces (Vlassopoulos 2007: 33–52; Westgate 2007: 229–45) without, however, impacting the official ideology about them. The ideological exclusion of women can be associated in many ways with Solon's laws, which for the first time introduced peculiarly detailed and intrusive restrictions for women into state legislation, regulating among other things women's mourning practices and public appearance, even the number of dresses they could own and wear in public, which, as we will see, sent negative messages about female nature and character.

There are no direct sources of Solon's laws, but several fragments are conveyed to us through various ancient literary, philosophical, and legal works (Ruschenbusch 1966), while further details can be gleaned from later laws that were based on Solon's legislation. Modern scholars offer various explanations of Solon's motives behind the laws he drafted about women, of which Blok gives a detailed overview and bibliography (2006: 197–9). Some scholars understand his motivation as an aspiration to create an egalitarian society and balance power dynamics among social and economic classes for the sake of social peace (Garland 1985; Seaford 1994). Others detect in it the influence of a change in ancient Greek society toward a more secular approach to death and burial (Loraux 1986; Garland 1989; Sourvinou-Inwood 1995); as the state created a democratic model of a public funeral, professional women's lamentations were replaced by funeral oratory (Bennett and Tyrrell 1990: 444). In this context, some scholars see Solon's legislation as aiming at preventing women's excessive display of grief in public to protect his legislation from women's criticism (Garland 1989; Shapiro 1991; Holst-Warhaft 1992; Blok 2001; Alexiou 2002). Following this view, I will show below that Solon's restrictions inserted a wedge between men and women, intensifying their ideological differences and pushing them farther apart, especially in their relation to the state. Our discussion of

Solon's laws will focus on the ideological principles they spawned regarding four aspects of women's life: dowry and marriage, female nature and character, women's conduct at Mystery cults, and funeral and mourning practices. But before we begin our discussion, we should cite the complete text of Solon's legislation regarding women, as Plutarch has it:

> In all other types of marriage,[6] Solon prohibited dowries and instructed that the bride was to bring with her three dresses, household items of small value, and nothing else. For he did not wish marriage to be a matter of trade or a source of income, but wanted the husband and his wife to live together out of favor and love for each other and for the purpose of begetting children . . . Solon also introduced a law regulating women's conduct in their public activities, that is, in mourning and at festivals, preventing disorder (*atakton*) and impropriety (*akolaston*). So, he forbade women to go out of doors wearing more than three garments, carrying food or drink valued at more than an obol, or bearing a basket bigger than a cubit; they were also not to travel about at night, unless they rode in a wagon with a lamp to light their way. For those in mourning, he banned self-lacerations, previously composed lamentations, and the wailing over another's dead at funerals of non-relatives. He also prohibited the sacrifice of an ox at the graveside, the interment of more than three garments together with the dead, and walking up to other people's tombs except at the time of the burial.
>
> (Plut., *Sol.* 20.4–21.5)

Dowry and marriage

Solon is credited as the first legislator to ban dowries and replace them with a small family gift to the bride (*phernē*). As Plutarch says, Solon, "in all other types of marriage, prohibited dowries".

Although modern scholars see in Solon's law an attempt to curb aristocratic displays of wealth (Seaford 1994: 85, 210; Alexiou 2002: 18; Leese 2017), his motive, according to Plutarch, was to raise marriage from the level of monetary transaction to a loving union for begetting children. Despite Solon's ban of the dowry, disputes over it continue to be attested in fourth-century BC court speeches, indicating that the interdiction was ignored to a great degree by social culture. Providing a good dowry to each of his daughters continued to be proof of a man's social standing in the fifth and fourth centuries BC (Seaford 1994: 209). Men were willing even to mortgage their land and go into debt to meet this expectation (Finley 1952: 81–8; Schaps 1979: 99). In case of orphaned girls, their brothers would do everything to furnish them with a decent dowry (Demosthenes, *Against Onetor* 30.12) and would never risk their reputation by defrauding a sister of hers (Dem. *Against Boeotus* 2.40.25). In some cases, the state itself provided dowries to daughters of fathers who fell at war, in order to protect their social status (Pomeroy 1982: 115–35).

Although Solon's ban on the dowry failed to translate into actual practice, it did serve as the ideological basis for bolstering the traditional hierarchy between spouses as well as between men and women as citizens of the state. Plato and Aristotle, although disagreeing on a number of issues, followed Solon and agreed in their concern about the use of dowry as a means of female empowerment to the detriment of both family and state. They both criticized Sparta for its failure to reform the dowry and inheritance system, and, as Aristotle comments in his *Politics* (350 BC), to settle "the issues regarding the women" for the benefit of the state (*Pol.* 1270a5). Plato also condemns Spartan women in his *Laws* (348 BC) for "wallowing in expensive luxury" (*Laws* 7.804e), "living in disorder" (*ataktōs*, 7.806c), and in a manner contrary to the Spartan life-style and the principles of their state (Powell 2001: 137).[7] To substantiate his condemnation, Aristotle claims that lack of regulation on dowry and land-inheritance by women in Sparta resulted in two-fifths of the Spartan land being owned by women; this eventually impaired Spartan military power, which, Aristotle calculates, had dwindled to less than a thousand men in his time (*Pol.* 1270a23–27). Leaving aside the fact that the attribution of dowry to Spartans is erroneous, since they had no custom comparable to the Athenian dowry but their women could possess property through inheritance (Hodkinson 2004: 126–9; Cartledge 2001: 119–21), Aristotle unfairly assumes that the Spartan crisis was solely the women's fault (*aitiai*), blaming their uncooperative nature for not submitting to state regulations: although Lycurgus, the Spartan legislator, "attempted to bring the women under the laws, they resisted and he gave up the effort" (1270a5). The implication of Aristotle's accusation is that women's powerful influence on the legislator proved damaging for the state, a point that he used to bolster his ideological principle that the women's judgment is impaired and unsuitable for decisions that affect the state.

For Aristotle, the dowry is related to the issue of controlling women, the necessity of which he grounds on the essential differences between male and female nature.[8] In his *Politics* (1259b1–1260a23), Aristotle stipulates that men and women have the same virtues (or faculties), but their virtues differ in type according to each gender's role in the family and the state. The man who is by nature more fit to rule than the woman, must possess the full range of all virtues and faculties, while the woman must possess them to the degree they help her function properly in the family. For example, the male virtue of bravery (*andreia*) is shown in the man's ability to rule, while female bravery is in the woman's ability to support her husband's rule (1260a23). Likewise, the male capacity for good judgment (*sōphrosunē*, 1260a21) is not the same as the female: a man, responsible for making executive decisions in the family, must be judicious in every respect, but the woman's good judgment should be evident in her ability to understand that it is to her benefit to accept her husband's decisions. According to Aristotle's syllogism, just as it is best for the emotional part of the soul to be governed by the intellect (1254b5), so it is to a woman's best interest to be governed by a man (1254b12), since the woman is rather emotional, whereas the man has the reasoning faculty more developed than his wife.

Based on these principles, one may conclude that for Aristotle the example of the Spartan women is intended to show that in general women ought not to make decisions that affect the state, since, lacking male-type virtues, they may prove disastrous to it. Since the state is founded on male virtues, women's views, based on a set of principles that have a different outlook from that of men, differ also from state principles and are not in harmony with them. Therefore, any time women's views prevail in the state it is to be expected that they will clash with state principles and cause disorder, as it happened with the Spartan women's insistence to keep their right of land possession and dowry. The dowry is the key in this paradigm, because, as Plato shows below, it empowered women but had catastrophic results for the state.

Like Solon, Plato also banned dowries in his *Laws* (6.742c3), ostensibly to promote the creation of an equal relationship between husband and wife, on the basis of the principle that "an equal exchange consists in neither giving nor receiving any dowry" (6.774c).[9] Since the dowry could empower the wife to treat her husband with insolence (*hubris*) and reduce him to the humiliating status of servant (*douleia tapeinē kai aneleutheros*, 6.774c), ruining the balance between spouses, he banned it. Yet the prohibition of dowry is also related to the traditional hierarchy between men and women that even the egalitarian Plato hides under the cover of equality in the *Republic* (380 BC): as Socrates suggests, female Rulers, equally educated and just as well-trained as male Rulers, would never be able to prove better than (or even equal to) male Rulers in the same category of specialized knowledge and training – this, at least, is suggested by his rhetorical question: "Is there any subject of human study in which men are not superior in every respect to women?" (*Rep.* 455c). Applying this principal to the family, a wife could not be better than her husband in running the household, but a dowry might empower her to impose her views, upsetting the hierarchy between them and destabilizing their marriage.[10] The dowry, therefore, was seen not as a mere financial exchange but as a means of asserting hierarchy and power – as such, it had to be controlled and minimized.

The unequivocal condemnation of Spartan women by Plato and Aristotle is an instance of ideological bias: being experts in political systems and knowing well that women in Sparta had no power to make any legal or political decisions, they should not consider them solely responsible for obstructing legislative reform (Cartledge 2001: 106–26). Had the Spartan men really wished to pass Lycurgus' reforms regarding land redistribution and dowry or inheritance laws, they would have prevailed over the women's objections. But Spartan men clearly stood to gain from women's wish to thwart land reform and, as evidence suggests, even aided women's resistance by ignoring laws intended to balance the distribution of landed property in Sparta (Cartledge 2001: 120). Yet both Plato and Aristotle focus only on women's culpability and criticize them harshly for their intervention. For Aristotle, Lycurgus' succumbing to female pressure empowered the women who, in turn, harmed the dignity of the Spartan state, stripping it of its authority to regulate its citizens (*Pol.* 1270a13). In terms of Athenian ideology, this example applies to all women and, as we will see below, bolsters the

effect of Solon's laws: it highlights the inferior quality of female judgment and suggests the incompatibility of women's views with state organization and interests. Sparta's demographic predicament served as a paradigm of what can happen to a state if women's voice is empowered and left unregulated.

Female nature and character

Considering the purpose of Solon's sumptuary laws, the general understanding is that it was to prevent the expensive custom of one-upmanship among wealthy families at a time of economic crisis, when everyone should live with austerity; the poor were protected from pressures by social conventions to incur debt, and the rich were prevented from provoking the poor with their extravagance (De Ste Croix 2004: 1–72, 109–28; Seaford 1994: 85; Gallant 1982: 111–24). There is, however, something strange in Plutarch's interpretation of Solon's motives: he makes no mention of the state of the economy. Instead, he cites Solon's desire to "regulate women's conduct in their public activities" and prevent disorder (*atakton*) and excess (*akolaston*) as his motive for this law (*Sol.* 21.4). Although such conduct could be exhibited by both men and women, Plutarch associates it only with women and posits it as the justification of laws restricting women's activities in public. The implied syllogism, that 'should women remain unregulated, they would act disorderly and indecorously', suggests that Solon presumed women to be by nature disorderly and indecorous, since limiting and controlling their conduct was the object of his legislation. In principle, laws regulating behavior intend to harness undesirable tendencies in society and instill self-restraint to individuals (Blok 2006: 229). Solon's invasive regulations suggest to Plutarch that women's tendency to act disorderly (*atakton*) and licentiously (*akolaston*) constitute their 'undesirable' characteristics, whose public expression needs to be regulated. Therefore, Plutarch's interpretation is indicative of the fact that Solon's legislation was seen by the ancients as a source of society's negative perception of women, who were theorized to be inherently flawed individuals.

Influenced by the implications of Solonian legislation about women, Plato, toward the end of his life, reaches the conclusion that female nature is incompatible with state organization, due to women's habitual resistance to laws – they can overwhelm even a legislator with their excessive resistance to regulations and especially those introducing changes to their customary modes of life (*Laws* 781d1). Plato expressly classifies women as "hard to regulate" (*dustakton*) because of their nature: in their effort to counteract their natural weakness, women become more secretive and shrewd than men, which enables them to evade rules meant to control their behavior (781a3–5). For this reason, Plato urges legislators not to give up their effort and leave women unregulated, as Lycurgus did with the women of Sparta, because this could prove damaging for the state (781a6). For his ideal state, Plato requires that everything in it be well-regulated by laws, for if a few aspects of life are left unregulated, they can damage the social fabric:

> When everything in the state is done orderly and according to the laws, then everything turns out beneficial in every respect; but when things are done contrary to the laws or are badly-ordered, they counteract the effects even of those elements that are well-ordered.
>
> (*Laws* 780d)

The Platonic principle regarding the *dustakton* female nature (hard to regulate), in conjunction with the Aristotelian axiom that women's nature is inferior (*kheiron*) to men's in virtue, underpins the ideological perception of women as threatening to the state: constituting half of the population, if left unrestrained, women could be a bad influence on men and make them also disobedient to the laws; as a result, the greatest part of the population, not just half of it, could end up being lawless (781a7–781b3). However, Plato, like Solon, does not reach the conclusion that women, due to their resistance to laws, must be excluded from public activities, but requires that, for the benefit of the state, they must be closely regulated, just as men are (781b6). However, his misgivings about women's nature and his postulations about their reaction to regulations, cast their relation to the state in a particularly negative light.

Women at Mystery cults

Plutarch, in speaking of Solon's restrictions for women, who were not allowed to wear multiple clothing items when going out of doors, carry large quantities of food or drink, or travel about the city at night unless riding in a lit wagon (*Sol.* 21.4), also informs us that in his homeland, Boeotia, most of Solon's laws were still in force and that the people had instituted a Board of Supervisors of Women (*gynaikonomoi*) to oversee their enforcement (*Sol.* 21.5; Garland 1981: 13; Alexiou 2002: 15). The *gynaikonomos* was an elected official, charged especially with the task of checking women's appearance and conduct, initially only during festivals and funerals, but later whenever they were in public places without their husband. A state could have one officer or a whole board of them, depending on the size of the population and the range of duties assigned to this office. The earliest records mentioning a *gynaikonomos* go back to the fourth century BC, but the spirit of the office stems from Solon's legislation (Ogden 1996: 371).[11] Solon himself may have not given any practical instructions on how his laws were to be enforced, but their adoption obviously requires officers overseeing their implementation. It is possible that initially every woman's *kurios* (legal guardian) was made responsible for the conduct of the women in his charge, ensuring they followed the laws. There is also evidence in literature that before the institution of the *gynaikonomos* various other officials could intervene occasionally to corral women in public.[12]

The greatest need for a *gynaikonomos* appears to have been the supervision of women at Mystery cults, where the presence of men was strictly forbidden and there was no one to oversee women's conduct. The most important women-only festivals were the Skira or Skirophoria, the Thesmophoria, and the Adonia.[13]

They were organized by women's associations and usually required at least one overnight-stay at the temple precinct. They were fertility rites and, as such, included ritual acts, songs, gestures, and props of a sexual nature. The Skira, for example, was known for its license and suspension of marital bonds (Burkert 1985: 230–3). The Thesmophoria, celebrated in honor of Demeter and Persephone, required purity and sexual abstinence, but included ritual obscenities: the women engaged in indecent speech, sang licentious songs, told ribald jokes, carried around cakes of female pudenda, and baked dough phalluses for the piglet sacrifice (Goff 2004: 128; Burkert 1985: 244). The Adonia was also characterized by a seductive mood and wild lamentations for Adonis, Aphrodite's consort (Reitzammer 2016; Goff 2004: 138–144; Burkert 1985: 245). According to Goff (2004: 143), women-only festivals allowed the exploration of the contradictory roles women played within the patriarchal state: on the one hand, they served it with their reproductive powers, but, on the other, threatened it with their power to cause death and destruction. Women's festivals, therefore, provided the only venue in which women could come out of their homes, band together, express their feelings, act them out, and relieve pent-up frustrations away from male eyes and ears. The ultimate result of these rituals, according to Goff, was that they helped women find relief from oppression and, afterward, return to their communities able to accept their prescribed position within the patriarchal system (2004: 143). Yet they were a source of concern for the male population.

Not allowed to be present in these cults, men became anxious about their sexual content and tried to find ways to oversee the female participants.[14] Reports about women's wild conduct during these festivals made them seem to men as "unmediated threat" not only to the men but also to the state (Goff 2004: 143). Influenced by the ideological premise that women's nature was unruly – "hard to regulate" (*dustakton*, *Laws* 781a5), as Plato described them – and incompatible with the standards of state organization, men were anxious about the possibility that women might conspire during those cults to rebel against their oppressors, encouraged by the secretive nature of the rituals and the absence of male presence. This scenario is comedically explored by Aristophanes in his *Women at the Assembly* and *Lysistrata*, where it is during certain Mystery cults that women plot to take political power in their hands and intervene in state affairs. Suspecting that women's activities at these festivals went beyond the required ritual license, men desired to observe and control what seemed to them as dissolute conduct on women's part – disorderly (*atakton*) and excessive (*akolaston*) in Plutarch's words. Therefore, the institution of *gynaikonomos* offered considerable relief to male concerns but complicated women's life.

A decree from Methymna on the island of Lesbos, dating in the 340s BC, is one of the earliest laws concerned specifically with the conduct of women at a Mystery festival in honor of Dionysus. To satisfy men's desire to place a male figure of authority on the premises of the ritual, the decree appoints a *gynaikonomos* to oversee the night-long women's ceremonies (Garland 1981: 137). The officer was to be a mature man, older than 40 years of age; he was to stand "outside the doors of the temple throughout the night rituals, ensuring that only he and no

other man would enter into the temple and that nothing impious would take place". Passing a state law to this effect was a stroke of genius for the Methymnian men, who managed not only to bypass the traditional prohibition of men's presence at the Mystery cult but also extend male control to all women-only festivals. For the women, this constituted an intensification of male control over their lives: they no longer had a place to band together and act without inhibitions away from men's eyes; the state monitor was present in all public places and at all public events. For the men, however, the office of *gynaikonomos* alleviated their responsibility as legal guardians for women's conduct whenever they were in public areas and, especially, at events men could not attend.

Appointing an officer to oversee specifically women reveals how intensely mistrusted women were and how incompatible they were perceived to be with the state in their views and actions. In ancient Greek sources, the term *gynaikonomos* appears almost always in association with *paidonomos*, Supervisor of Boys, an office first instituted by Lycurgus in Sparta to oversee the conduct and military training of boys, who lived at the barracks from the age of seven and, therefore, were in need of an officer in lieu of parental control (Xenophon, *The Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* 2.2.1–8; Cartledge 2001: 83). According to Aristotle, the *gynaikonomos*, similar to the *paidonomos*, was an office instituted in prosperous states to ensure good order and decorum among women in public spaces (*Pol.* 1322b37–1323a2). The conceptual association between the offices of *gynaikonomos* and *paidonomos* explains in part why it was thought that women needed supervision in the first place. Aristotle supports this association with biological similarities he observes between women (*gynaikes*) and pre-pubescent boys (*paides*). He notes, therefore, that "a boy resembles a woman in form, while woman is like an infertile man" (*Generation of Animals* 728a17–18); furthermore, both women and boys have a full head of hair and are not bald (*History of Animals* 518a30), and both have a higher-pitched voice than men (*HA* 518b68). Aristotle's construct of biological correspondence places women in the ideological position of permanently immature persons who are in need of supervision. In addition, the term *gynaikonomos* is particularly biased in light of the lack of a parallel term or concept of an officer specifically overseeing men – a linguistic possibility for this would have been *andronomos*, Supervisor of Men, which in terms of gender ideology constitutes an oxymoron for ancient Greek culture and does not exist in the Greek language.

Ironically, *gynaikonomos* officers were very active in the Hellenistic era, when women seemed to be more active in the public realm. It is possible, though, that this office was part of a concession made to the women's desire to participate in economic and other public activities. Kierstead, in this volume, shows that in the Hellenistic era women's names appear on membership inscriptions of various professional associations in greater frequency than in the classical period, when participation in those associations was used as evidence of citizenship. Women's access to professional associations in the Hellenistic era coincided with the decline of democracy in the age of the Macedonian and Roman Empires, which means that greater access did not grant women the power or rights associations

used to grant to their members in the classical era. In addition, evidence suggests that the power of the *gynaikonomos* increased significantly during the Hellenistic era: whereas Solon had regulated female conduct at festivals and funerals only, with the institution of *gynaikonomos* the policing of women in public spaces became gradually a daily occurrence (Garland 1981: 38). Harpocration (second century AD) mentions in his lexicon (47) that women, "acting inappropriately in the streets" of Athens, were fined 1000 drachmas, indicating that the *gynaikonomos*, charged with checking dress code and female conduct in public, had power over women in public areas on a daily basis (Llewellyn-Jones 2007: 257, n. 8). At Syracuse, according to a law quoted by Athenaeus, respectable women were not allowed to venture outside their home after sunset, as this was tantamount to expressing their "intention to commit adultery" (521b).[15] This law expands Solon's restriction that women could not travel outdoors at night "unless riding in a wagon with a lamp to light their way" (Plut., *Sol.* 21.4). Even during the day, women at Syracuse had to get the *gynaikonomos*' permission to leave home, on condition that they would be accompanied by a female slave (Athenaeus 521c). Parallel to the increase of the *gynaikonomos*' authority in the Hellenistic era, there was an increased use of a full-face veil, documented by clay figurines from the period between the fourth and first century BC (Llewellyn-Jones 2007: 252). The veil may seem restrictive as a garment, but Llewellyn-Jones argues that it may have enabled women to move more freely in public spaces and participate in a variety of economic activities: functioning, according to Llewellyn-Jones, as an extension of their home, it afforded women both privacy and freedom (2007: 257, n. 8). While this may be so, from the perspective of ideology, the veil objectified women, rendering them invisible, impersonal, and powerless to intervene in any public affair, sealing their inferior position.

The effect of Solon's sumptuary laws on the perception of women is evidenced also in a decree from Andania, dating likely to the second century AD,[16] that recalls Solon's sumptuary restrictions on women's dress: the Andanian law is concerned with setting detailed price-caps on the value of women's dress at the local Mysteries in honor of Demeter and Persephone (Garland 1981: 141–9). Solon's legislation continued influencing laws regulating women's appearance at festivals even during the Hellenistic era, but this decree took his regulations several steps farther, restricting women's dress in minute ways. The Andanian decree places the following price limits to the dress of female participants: for officiating women, it permits a maximum allowance of two minas (about 140 drachmas); for the daughters of the officiating women and for common women 100 drachmas; for the daughters of the common women one mina (about 70 drachmas); and for the servants of common women 50 drachmas. It further regulates how the different groups of women are to be identified visually for ceremonial purposes through specific distinguishing marks on their dresses, the dress material, the style of dress, the type of headdress, and the material of their shoes. Regulations determining dress code and distinguishing marks for ritual purposes are understandable, but the decree divides the women into social classes on the basis of the value and quality of their dress, separating them into free and slave-women, married and

unmarried, officiates and initiates. Dress value, having nothing to do with religious practices or the piety of the wearer, indicates a different function for the regulation, to which we shall return.

In addition to dress limitations, the Andanian decree appoints a *gynaikonomos* at the Mystery to oversee women's observance of the dress code and punish offenders. What is astonishing about this particular law is that it expands the role of *gynaikonomos* from civic to religious, including this officer in the group of men officiating in the ritual and vesting him with religious powers: the *gynaikonomos* is sworn in by the hierophants with a special oath, promising to ensure that during the Mystery "the regulations concerning the dress and the rest of the things that were placed in [his] charge by the decree" are done properly. This means that the *gynaikonomos* has the power to expel from the ritual anyone dressed contrary to the decree regulations, confiscate forbidden items, and punish the offending party in humiliating ways, as suggested by the verb *lumainesthai* (maltreat) in this context. The decree also specifies that the *gynaikonomos* is to choose by lot the marching order of the female hierophants and the maidens, and make certain this order is strictly followed. To top it all, he is to participate in the ritual procession himself, "leading the sacrificial victims" in honor of the gods and even "performing the sacrifices". The expanded powers of the *gynaikonomos* suggest an intensified effort to control women's expenses, possibly to counteract the economic power they had started gaining in the marketplace.

The Andanian decree is 195 lines long; of these, 18 lines are dedicated to women's dress, while only one refers to male attire. The only restriction placed on men is that "those performing the Mysteries are to wear white clothing and no shoes" – nothing else is said of the men in this context, and no price ranges or limits or distinguishing markers are specified. The stark contrast between regulations for men and women reveals a perception of women as very immature beings: they were not trusted to show good judgment, common sense, self-control, or a sincere willingness to obey laws, which recalls Plato's observation that women often found ways to evade legal restrictions (*Laws* 781a3–4). As a result, the legislator of the Andanian decree is extremely detailed in the regulations he sets, as if trying to close all possible loopholes that women could exploit. In addition, serious punishments are spelled out in the Andanian law but only for women – there is no punishment specified for men. In particular, the use of the verb *lumainesthai* to describe the type of punishments that might be imposed on disobedient women is indicative of state attitudes toward them. *Lumainesthai* means "to maltreat, damage, or inflict indignities upon someone" and in the context of punishment refers to the undignified treatment to which a man may subject his opponent, when he takes justice into his own hands (Dem. 23.32–33); this verb, however, is never used to describe the punishment meted by laws or by a jury. A *gynaikonomos*, being a state representative elected by the people, should impose legal punishments (*dikēn*) and not indignities; therefore, the use of *lumainesthai* in the decree suggests a certain animosity toward women who could not (or would not) follow rules and needed to be shamed into obeying them. However, one wonders whether it was even possible for the women to follow the extremely detailed

regulations of this law with any accuracy. By contrast, lack of any punishment for men in this decree may relate to the fact that the rules imposed on them are minimal and easy to follow; yet it also carries the ideological implication that men were trusted to show self-control and good judgment in dressing according to the solemn spirit of the Mysteries and did not need comprehensive laws spelling everything out in detail. The Andanian sumptuary law on women's dress, inspired by Solon's legislation, reveals his influence on the perception of women as immature, unruly, and incompatible with state organization. However, the assumption about men's ability to self-regulate and women's inability to do so, due to their unruly nature, is underpinned by the Aristotelian principle of gender hierarchy: "the natural relation of male to female is for the former to be superior (*kreitton*) and the latter inferior (*kheiron*)" (*Pol.* 1254b13–14). This principle justifies the patriarchal hierarchy of genders, where men are always the rulers and women the ruled ones.

Funeral laws and mourning practices

Solon's funeral legislation changed radically the funeral culture in ancient Greece (Blok 2006: 200–10). In the pre-Solonian (archaic) era, male and female socio-political interests used to converge at funerals, where both men and women were interested in mourning and burying the dead in the traditional manner, giving them their due but also empowering the family clan against claims to power by competing clans. Therefore, when one of the clan members was killed unjustly, the women's call for justice and revenge at the funeral was reciprocated by the men who were motivated to act and avenge the wrongful death of their relative. However, when the *polis* (city-state) organization started forming, the dynamics between men and women changed, influenced by the shifting of their roles as citizens of the state. Intensified separation of the genders in the public realm and divergence of views on issues that affected women and devalued their role caused a rift between the genders. With Solon's laws, the organization of the state was pushed farther toward democratization, making men its primary stakeholders and motivating them to take a more communal stance toward the state. A new ideology was developed, stressing that a prosperous state has prosperous citizens (Arist., *Pol.* 1253a19; *Rhet.* 1398b17) to encourage citizen dedication to it. Inspired by its message, men were willing to subject to the state the interests of the individual and the family, and to do everything for its benefit. They even saw fit that death and the manner of mourning the dead should become subject to the *polis* ideology: the dead who fell in combat on behalf of the fatherland were to be praised and not lamented. Extolling their death encouraged the dedication of soldiers to the state, but also served the practical matter of recruiting new fighters. Demosthenes distils the *polis* ideology with these words: "those who overcome the natural love of life and prefer to die well rather than see Greece fall into misfortune, leave behind them a legacy that words cannot describe" (60.1).

Women, however, seemed to object to the official ideology about death and mourning, for they continued to value the family and their sons above the state. They were invested, of course, in the state as wives and mothers of citizens, but remained loyal to the family interests (Aristophanes, *Lysistrata* 651): although they agreed to send their husbands and sons to war for the state, they also wished to save their lives (Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazousae* 233–34); and, although they accepted the death of their husbands and sons at war, they were not willing to give them up to the state to bury, as it saw fit. Women were attached to tradition and the ancient practices (*archaios nomos*, Aristophanes, *Eccl.* 216) and wished to continue mourning and expressing their pain the way women had always done in the past, in communal laments, where relief could come from wailing, moaning, singing, crying, even tearing their clothes and lacerating their cheeks (Loraux 1989: 10). Given their different perspectives, it is not surprising that men and women found themselves on opposite sides of the funeral ritual in the classical era, after the changes that Solon's laws introduced.

Solon's funeral laws expressly forbade all these modes of mourning, changing drastically not only the traditional funeral practices but also the state ideology about death and mourning. As men embraced the vision of the *polis*, they viewed the state as a more appropriate organization for burying the war dead, and started perceiving the traditional modes of mourning as distasteful, excessive, even barbaric. As a result, they agreed to replace the female lament in public funerals with the funeral oration, a speech delivered by a state representative. This was a radical concept not just for Athenian women but for the rest of the Greeks as well: Demosthenes remarks that only Athenians see fit to deliver funeral orations for their war dead (*Against Leptines* 20.141).[17] But the *polis* ideology justified the change by constructing a new identity for its heroes: the glory of those who died for the state raised them beyond the reach of death and immortalized them (Thucydides 2.44; Lysias 77.80; Holst-Warhaft 1995: 120).

Women, by contrast, having several issues with the *polis* ideology, not just with funerals,[18] did not adopt willingly the moderate mourning imposed by Solon. The only way to make women comply with the new funeral modes that the city found appropriate was to issue more state laws, further restricting women's mourning. In the end, these laws regulated the funeral customs not only for the war dead but for all funerals, whether private or public. When Solon reformed women's mourning, as we will see below, he restricted significantly their role in funerals, forcing them to take second stage: he limited their lamentations, excluded them from all funerals except those of close relatives, and even prohibited them from parts of the cemetery that did not belong to their relatives. These harsh exclusions and restrictions on the women were justified by the political ideology and the philosophical discourse: a civilized society is not compatible with the old, "barbaric" funeral rites, but needs a more restrained, moderate mode of mourning (*kosmiōs*, Plut., *Consolation to His Wife* 4.1). With the institution of *gynaikonomos* around the middle of the fourth century BC, an officer was appointed at all funerals to ensure compliance with the laws and punish offenders for excessive lamentation, even men who adopted "unmanly and women-like manners in their mourning" (Plut., *Sol.* 21.4).

The rift between men and women widened as the women's practices were labeled barbaric (*barbarikon*), harsh (*sklēron*), unruly (*atakton*), and excessive (*akolaston*) (Plut. *Sol.* 12.5). Unable to relate to the new state ideology about death, women could not see themselves or their family men as an interchangeable group, distinguished only for their dedication to the state (Tyrrell and Bennett 2008: 2). Women could not see death as Archilochus did, following the state ideology: a fate that "now visits this person and now another" (fr. 13). For women, death, especially the death of their sons, was a personal assault that caused extreme pain and turned their sorrow into "black wrath" (Loraux 1989: 45). However, for men, some of them at least, death became an exercise in self-control: "the insatiable desire for mourning, leading to excessive lamentations and wailing, is no less shameful than lack of self-control in enjoying lustful pleasures" (Plut., *Consolation to His Wife* 4.2).

Their different views on death and mourning engendered men's and women's different approaches to the state. Articulating the divide between them, Archilochus urged his comrades to act like men in the face of death: "take heart and push aside womanly mourning" (fr. 13); he justifies this by claiming that the men they lost in battle were heroic, deserving a state celebration for their sacrifice from the *polis*, with all the citizens (*astōn*) present, rather than "womanly laments" that might sully their memory. The idea of citizen interchangeability permeated Athenian ideology and underpinned the hierarchy between the genders: Plato calls for total social control, so that every citizen could dedicate his or her talents to the benefit of the state (*Laws* 959e), while Aristotle equates the prosperity of the state with the happiness of its citizens (*Rhetoric* 1398b17), which he defines as the ultimate good for human beings (*Ethics* 1177a12, 1214a8) and predicates upon the woman's subjection to the man and, by extension, to the state (*Rhet.* 1361a11). Solon's funeral laws exacerbated the divide between men and women, making the latter seem incompatible with the new state identity; as the *polis* was heading toward democratization, its ideology excluded women from most aspects of public life, even state funerals to a degree (Loraux 1989: 15). Instructive is the contrast provided by the paradigm of Spartan women: contrary to Athenian women who refused to embrace state ideology, Spartan women adopted it and supported the militarization of their state and its citizens (Plutarch, *Moralia: Sayings of Spartan Women* 240c; Hodkinson 2004: 127). In return for their loyalty to the state and its ideology, they were never silenced, restricted, pegged by Spartan ideology as inferior, or excluded from public spaces. In particular, when a Spartan king died, the law required that all men and women gather together to mourn and lament for him, even in the traditional manner that was considered excessive and barbaric by the Athenians (Herodotus 6.58).

Funeral customs before Solon have been closely studied by various scholars (Garland 1985: 26–34; Sourvinou-Inwood 1983: 36–43; Shapiro 1991: 630–1); here we will briefly refer to them in as much as they bring out the contrast between the pre- and post-Solonian eras, showing the value of women's role and the significance of the customs themselves for the community before classical ideology cast them as barbaric and excessive. The Homeric epics, along

with other literary, archeological, and epigraphic evidence, show that women played a prominent role in funerals, preparing the body for the wake, singing the ritual lament (*goos*) for the dead, following the deceased to his last abode, and keeping the memory of the dead alive with commemorative feasts and repeated mourning.[19] Vase paintings of the geometric and archaic periods show the kinswomen surrounding the bier and lamenting with expressive gestures. These paintings, depicting the mourning women beating their heads or pulling their hair in unison, suggest that the funeral gestures were orchestrated by a head mourner; as such, they were part of the ritual lament and, although extremely evocative, were not expressions of uncontrolled grief (Alexiou 2002: 6; Finkenstaedt 1973: 39–43.). Therefore, women's traditional lamentation (*thrēnos*) was understood by the ancients to be, not an impromptu expression of grief, but a controlled ritual, carefully orchestrated to achieve maximum effect in the purpose it served (Alexiou 2002: 4; Holst-Warhaft 1995: 113–4). Laments clearly aimed at attracting attention to the concerns women expressed in their mourning, but Alexiou, in her study of funerary customs, observes that the attention they attracted "might amount to a social menace, not only indecent but dangerous" (2002: 21). Yet the ancient manner of mourning was not considered "indecent" in the Archaic Era, but was deemed appropriate to be performed even by heroes, as Achilles did for Patroclus.[20] Attitudes, however, changed when Solon's legal restrictions on mourning shed a negative light on traditional modes, portraying them as effeminate, excessive, and barbaric (Holst-Warhaft 1995: 98–108).

In a society without courts of law, the attention women attracted during funeral laments served an important purpose: with their laments, women aimed at communicating to male relatives and friends the course of action necessary to restore justice for the dead (Alexiou 2002: 14–17). Tragedies offer vivid examples of how women could potentially wield power over men through their lament and urge them to avenge a wrongful death or seek social justice. In Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers*, the female chorus of mourners starts the lament calling for the "murder to be repaid by murder" (312–313); then, they weave an antiphonal song with Electra and Orestes who respond to their prompting. As Papazoglou shows in this volume, when Electra reaches a point of emotional frenzy, she wails like a "savage wolf" (421) and demands the death of her mother (430–433) as retribution for murdering her father. Orestes, who is in full agreement with the women's call for revenge (383–384), at first bulks at the thought of killing his mother (434), but is immediately resolved to submit to the necessity of the action demanded of him (435–8), as the chorus of mourners goads him on, urging him to show "merciless wrath" (455). In this elaborate lament, the women's powerful demand for violent action (no less against the rulers of the state), mobilizing the man to undertake it, is truly formidable (Nooter 2011: 399–417). All this was changed by Solonian legislation that required the following:

> For those in mourning, Solon banned self-lacerations, previously composed lamentations, and the wailing over another's dead at funerals of non-relatives.

> He also prohibited the sacrifice of an ox at the graveside, the interment of more than three garments together with the dead, and walking up to other people's tombs except at the time of the burial.
>
> (Plut., *Sol.* 21.5)

To get a complete picture of the legislation, we should also refer to the citation of the law in a court speech by Demosthenes (341 BC) which is extensively discussed by Scafuro (2011: 123–41):

> The deceased is to be laid out for viewing (*prothesis*) inside the house in any way desirable. He is to be carried out for burial (*ekphora*) before sunrise on the day following the *prothesis*. During the funeral procession (*ekphora*), men are to walk in front, women in the back. No woman under the age of sixty is to enter the house of the deceased or follow the deceased when carried to the cemetery, except those within the degree of daughters of first cousins. Also, no woman is to enter the house of the deceased after the dead has been carried out, except those within the degree of daughters of first cousins.
>
> (*Against Macartatus* 43.62)

The ongoing scholarly debate which is discussed by Blok (2006: 197–9), shows how varied is the current understanding of Solon's objectives for the restrictions he introduced to women's mourning. More relevant to our point, however, is the ancient discourse on Solon's objectives, which they understood as aiming at "forbidding the disorder and excess" women caused at funerals (Plut., *Sol.* 21.4–5). To curb this effect, Solon prohibited "harsh (*sklēron*) and barbaric (*barbarikon*) practices" at funerals (*Sol.* 12.5) by introducing a number of restrictions. The first measure he took was to make the viewing of the dead (*prothesis*) private, moving it indoors and allowing the deceased to remain in the house only one day; in the past, the deceased was laid outside (*pro tōn thurōn*), in a public place, and was kept there for two to three days (Thucydides 2.34) for the news to spread and the community to join the mourning of the dead (Ahleberg-Cornell 1971: 292; Johnston 1999: 40; Garland 1985: 23; Toohey 2010: 364). With Solon's law, the publicity of the death was curbed considerably and the number of people joining in the funeral was limited. His restrictions effectively stripped mourning women of the ability to communicate their feelings and concerns to the community. Furthermore, women were no longer allowed to lacerate their cheeks and move themselves to tears, sharing in the pain of the dead (*homopatheia*, Athenaeus 675a); they could not hire professional singers to assist them in their lament and in expressing coherently the litany of their sorrows; they could not share their concerns with the society at large, since the limited space of the house, where the wake was held, did not allow for a large crowd to congregate; and they were not allowed enough time to go through the stages of mourning – limiting the viewing to a single day rushed women to prepare the body for burial and left them stunned by the shock of death, robbed of the time needed to comprehend the extent of their loss and lament effectively.

Furthermore, in the pre-Solonian era, political commentary and criticism of political actions and decisions that affected women had been an important aspect of women's lament. As Suter argues (2003: 19), Euripides in his *Trojan Women* uses the foreign women's lament to criticize indirectly the hubris of the Sicilian expedition and suggest that all Athenians risked perishing – not just those who supported it. Women had no authority to deliver political criticism in public, yet their voice, rising in public lament, drew men's attention (Suter 2003: 21), which is one of the reasons behind successive legislation in the fifth century BC, limiting women's ability to raise a successful lament. As Foley shows (2001: 54, 158), these changes and the evolving Athenian attitudes toward female lamentations are reflected in the course of classical tragedies: in the earlier plays, women are allowed to lament and mobilize the men around them to act, take revenge, or stand up for their just claims in opposition to authority; later plays, however, in their majority marginalize women's lament or curb its effectiveness, reflecting contemporary social practices. Yet, one anomaly in this layout, pointed out by Suter (2003: 23), indicates women's resistance to legal restrictions on mourning practices: Euripides' *Trojan Women*, a late play (415 BC), includes powerful traditional laments that impact male political authority. Whether women were actually able to deliver social and political commentary at funerals, despite legal restrictions, is a tantalizing question. That women were able to do so is suggested not only by Euripides' play but also by the Athenians' repeated efforts during the fourth century BC to revise Solon's legislation and tighten its control on women's public activities (Blok 2006: 210). However, persistent and punitive legislation managed to change funeral customs in later periods and achieve to a great extent women's compliance with state laws. Plutarch (second century AD), in a letter to his wife, consoling her for the death of their daughter, praises her for the manner she handled the funeral; although he was away, she did everything "decorously and in silence", restraining herself from putting on mourning clothes, lamenting excessively, disfiguring herself or her maids, going into extravagant expenses for the funeral, or including anyone in the event beyond close relatives (*Consolation to His Wife* 4.2).

Solon introduced drastic changes also to the second stage of the funeral, the procession (*ekphora*), which brought the dead and the mourners out of the house and into the public realm (Garland 1985: 31–7). Before Solon, the procession went through the city early in the morning and the lamentation continued all the way to the cemetery. Accompanied by the shrill sounds of a reed pipe, the women, walking directly behind the bier, wailed, lamented, and tore their clothes (Alexiou 2002: 7). Solon's laws prohibited all this and required that the procession go through the city in the dark, before sunrise, that the women walk behind the men at the back of the procession, and their numbers be limited: no woman under the age of sixty could attend a funeral unless closely related to the dead. By contrast, no law ever restricted the number of men attending funerals. Two subsequent laws, dating to the end of the fifth century BC, one at Delphi (Garland 1981: 83) and another at Keos (Garland 1981: 81), took Solon's restrictions one step farther, imposing total silence on

the funeral procession. In addition, the Keos decree forced the women to leave the grave area before the men and return home accompanied only by a limited number of close female relatives and friends. The length of mourning was also a concern, and, so, a decree from Gambreion (third century BC) placed time limits on mourning: four months for men and five for women (Garland 1981: 92–3; 1989: 1–15). The effect of the funeral laws was to diminish the noise, the crowd, and the pitiful spectacle of lamenting women processing through the city. These changes were necessary for the men: to keep their composure and abide by the new mode of modest mourning, they needed to shield themselves from the emotional effect of women's laments. As Plutarch admits in his letter to his wife, if she becomes excessively upset about their daughter's death, he will also be affected, for he is not "born of a tree or a stone", without feelings (*Consol.* 2.1). To shield themselves from the effect of the women's laments, men moved to central stage during the public part of the funeral and displaced the women, moving them not only to the back of the procession but to the margins of the whole event. Moderation prevailed at the expense of the women who were demoted, marginalized, rushed, muted, and excluded from their traditional place behind the bier.

Conclusion

Solon's restrictions on women may seem reasonable to an extent, in the context of legislation aiming at resolving a social and economic crisis. Yet his regulations specifically about women remained in force for several centuries, even after the crisis in Athens was settled. Their enforcement, though, beyond the context of a pressing necessity became a source of negative impressions about women: in particular, controlling women's dowries and expenses by state law, during the flourishing Athenian economy in the classical era, suggested that women were a liability to the family and by extension the state. In addition, the difference in the outlook of legislation regarding men and women implicates it in the development of a negative ideology about latter: On the one hand, Solon empowered Athenian men, liberated them from enslavement due to debt, endowed them with freedom of speech, and elevated them from former slaves to "masters of the state" (Arist., *Athen. Const.* 9.1.8; Harris 2002: 415–430; 1997: 55–60); on the other hand, his laws sought to curb Athenian women's economic power by banning the dowry, and restricted what little influence women had before in public lamentations by muting their voices. The obvious difference in the legislative perspective toward male and female Athenians was not lost on the male citizens – even Plutarch observes that Solon's laws regarding women were "absurd" (*Sol.* 20.2 and 23.1). Their effects were devastating for women, who not only were excluded from the political life of the democratic state but were also viewed as incompatible with it; as a result, they were closely controlled and restricted at public events, in which they had a central role before. Solonian legislation, therefore, established the legal framework for women's exclusion from public life, first granting unlimited participation to men and then regulating women's

participation in all public activities, which became the blueprint of male and female social and political roles for many centuries.

Notes

1 Plutarch, *Comparison of Solon and Publicola* 2.1.
2 See below the Andanian and Gambreion decrees.
3 Solon would not proclaim anyone happy, unless he saw how he died; see Photius' *Lexicon*, s.b. 'm', 245.9.
4 Translations are the author's unless otherwise noted.
5 On the dowry, see Demosthenes 47.57.
6 The type of marriage not included in this category is that of the *epikleros* daughter, an heiress without male siblings.
7 Although Plato was the teacher and Aristotle the student, here I look at Aristotle's statements first because his *Politics* (350 BC) were published two years before Plato's *Laws* (348 BC).
8 Some modern philosophers attempt to rehabilitate Aristotle and argue that the subjection of women to men was not the thrust of his work; see Dobbs (1996); Nichols (1983); and Saxonhouse (1982). This, however, has been only a recent construction of the philosopher's views and does not concur with the received understanding of the tenor of his work since antiquity.
9 Translated by R. G. Bury with a minor change (*Plato in Twelve Volumes*, Vols. 10 & 11. Cambridge, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1967 & 1968).
10 Ormand draws a connection between economic exchange and marriage stability, stating that "it is when women are most analogous to objects of economic exchange that marriage becomes least stable" (*Exchange and the Maiden: Marriage in Sophoclean Tragedy* [Austin, 1999]: 18).
11 The earliest epigraphic evidence for a *gynaikonomos* is found in Thasos in the 340s BC; in Athens, it appeared in the early 320s BC (Garland 1981: 87). However, Aristotle mentions in his *Politics* (published in 350 BC) the existence of *gynaikonomoi* in other states, pushing their appearance before 350 BC.
12 Aristophanes mentions a *proboulos* in *Lysistrata* (387), a *prytanis* (*Thesmophoriazousae* 929–34), and a torchbearer as assistant (*dadouchos*, Ar. *Frogs*, 445–8); see further Garland (1981: 27–8).
13 There is little evidence of women's participation in the classical period in Maenadic rites of the type described in Euripides' *Bacchae;* see Goff (2004: 271–9); Burkert (1985: 291) citing later evidence; and Seaford (1994: 257–75).
14 In Euripides' *Bacchae*, Pentheus spies on the women's maenadic rituals.
15 Translated by C. D. Yonge (1854) with a few changes.
16 Ogden (1996: 368) dates this decree to 146 BC, Garland (1981: 141–9) to 92/1 BC; for further discussion, see O. Kern, *Die Religion der Griechen* (Berlin, 1963): 3.188–90; E. Sauppe, *Die Mysterieninschrift aus Andania* (Göttingen, 1860); and C. T. Newton, *Essays on Art and Archaeology* (London, 1880): 177–84.
17 Cicero also observes that in Athens after Solon "no one was allowed to speak in praise of the dead except at public funerals" (*De Legibus* 2.65).
18 See, for example, the discussion on the dowry above.
19 Alexiou (2002: 21, n. 107) notes that women sang the laments unless there was none present, in which case the men would perform this task. Phemio and Demodocos (*Iliad* 24) were male composers and singers of such laments.
20 In the *Iliad*, the mourning pattern of Achilles over the death of Patroclos includes a mourning fast (*Iliad* 24.128), refusal to wash (23.39–47), preparation of a funeral feast (23.48), and lamentation in antiphonal manner between Achilles and the Greeks who responded to his song (24.153).

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2 Making men and making women

'Male superiority' in archaic Athens

Matthew Lloyd

The exclusion of women was a longstanding feature of Athenian political life, but women's exclusion in Athens was not limited to politics. Normative gendering was one of the defining features of Athenian culture and many of the aspects of that culture we consider characteristic – democracy, the symposium, civic life – were exclusive to male citizens (Cartledge 1998: 56–7). This division contributed to an Athenian concept of 'male superiority' that hardened through the archaic period (during the seventh and sixth centuries BCE) with an increasing emphasis on the exclusion of women from Athenian life and culture, focusing instead on the central concepts of archaic Athenian masculinity: bravery, loyalty, athleticism, and self-control. Understanding Athenian masculinity is therefore central to understanding Athenian culture.

In the 1990s, R. W. Connell developed a model for understanding masculinities in the contemporary world (2005: 77–81). Connell's concept of "hegemonic masculinity" refers to the masculinity that is culturally exalted at a particular historical moment; but this masculinity is limited to a small selection of men – an ideal represented in culture by the actions of often-fictional exemplary men (Connell 2005: 214–15). A much larger proportion of men benefit from what Connell calls the "patriarchal dividend" – the social and economic benefits of being male within masculine supremacy – without representing ideal masculinity. She calls these "complicit masculinities", in the sense that they support rather than challenge patriarchy. While this model was designed with explicit reference to the current Western gender order, with some modifications it can be adapted to make sense of sixth-century Athens. Connell's other categories of masculinity – subordinated and marginalized masculinities – would, in sixth-century Athens, largely comprise those men excluded from political action, such as slaves, foreigners, and lower-class men, but who, through their manhood, were not subjected to the constraints of being female. There are no examples in the archaic period – or even later – of non-elite males challenging elite masculinity by championing contemporary women. As Lin Foxhall puts it, non-elite men "virtually always collude with ideals of hegemonic masculinity at least in the suppression of women" (1998: 5).

Foxhall began her introduction to the pioneering collection of studies in ancient masculinity *When Men Were Men*: "The history of classical antiquity is a history of men, though it is never studied that way" (1998: 1). She highlights

that the majority of literature and material culture that we study from antiquity was produced by men, and the ways in which women experienced this world are largely hidden from us. Attempts to understand the lives of women depend on representations from a male conceptual framework (Keuls 1993: 118), and, even when trying to understand how women would have reacted to these representations, we depend on the words of men (Osborne 1994). And yet, this fact must not allow us to be complacent but to understand how we approach the exclusion of women from our sources and the active role men played in this exclusion by being men; or, as Mark Masterson puts it:

> When we study possessors of the male body in the ancient world and ancient masculinity, when we study ancient men as 'men', we call into question the assumption, widely extant in ancient sources, that man is synonymous with humanity *in toto*.
>
> (Masterson 2013: 17)

Since *When Men Were Men* was published, masculinity has more often been acknowledged in studies of classical antiquity, although it often remains the case that while women may be studied separately, men remain the assumed norm.

In this essay, I build on this scholarship by examining how sixth-century Athenian masculinity was constructed, in monuments and in practice, and enforced through the celebration of this masculinity and the exclusion of women. The first section discusses the construction and representation of ideal masculinity and femininity in the context of the cemetery. The next section takes examples of lived masculine experience – athletics, pederasty, and the symposium – and show how men tried to meet the ideal masculinity represented in the cemeteries in their lived behavior, to the complete exclusion of women. The final section shows how masculinity changed and developed in the later sixth century around the advent of Athenian democracy, arguing that democratic masculinity embraced and elaborated upon many of the ideals of female exclusion and male superiority that existed in the earlier period.

Archaic Athenian cemeteries: "a parade ground of masculinity"

Cemeteries play a central role in archaeological discussions of gender. The deliberate constructs of funerary archaeology offer a starting point for understanding the construction of gender as graves and monuments enshrine the ideals of a community, consciously or unconsciously, in the figure of the deceased (Arnold 2007). In this section, I focus on engendered mortuary archaeology in the grave monuments of Athens and Attica in the sixth century.

The late seventh- and sixth-century cemeteries of Attica were dominated by sculpted marble grave monuments. The most prominent were the larger-than-life, freestanding sculptures known in modern literature as kouroi (statues of young men) and korai (statues of young women) (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). These

Figure 2.1 Kouros from Merenda (Myrrhinous) in Attica, ca. 550 BCE, National Archaeological Museum, Athens

Source: Photographic Archives (Photographer: V. von Eickstedt). © Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Sports/Archaeological Receipts Fund

monuments would have required a vast investment of time and resources, and thus are likely to have been accessible only to a small section of society. In addition to freestanding sculptures there were relief stelai (stone slabs), the majority of which in the archaic period depict beardless youths and adult men with athletic attributes or in armor (Figure 2.3), excluding women but for a handful of fragments – in contrast to stelai from the later fifth century BCE onwards, on which married women are predominant. Deceased adult women of the archaic period are largely limited to the more modest ceramic grave markers, including loutrophoroi (ritual pottery vessels) and funerary plaques (Figure 2.4); however, on plaques showing the *prothesis* (laying out of the dead), women outnumber men two to one (Shapiro 1991: 639).

Variation in funerary monuments reveals the ways in which gender values shaped the funerary landscape of Archaic Athens. Robin Osborne (1998: 26) described Athenian cemeteries as a "parade ground of masculinity" because they were dominated by male kouroi – in contrast to sanctuaries, where kouroi are outnumbered by the female korai. Furthermore, the preponderance of men, both youths and adult, on relief stelai and the limitation of married women to ceramic plaques, means that the grave monuments of men were much more visible than those of women. There are several intersecting factors at play here. First of all, age as well as gender plays a role in the funerary landscape. Freestanding sculptures belong not only to men, but to the young in general; while older men are also represented on stelai, they are absent from the freestanding sculptures. But age cannot explain the discrepancy between the appearance of adult men and women on stelai and funerary plaques. Insofar as grave markers are concerned, the most visually arresting monuments are those of men, particularly young men, and unmarried women or girls.

Further light on this gender discrepancy is shed by the inscriptions on funerary monuments, especially those that valorize the deceased. These inscriptions often do little more than name the deceased, with some adding that their parents erected the monument. Lengthier inscriptions list the athletic victories and military achievements of the young man whose grave they mark. An inscription from Anavysos, perhaps the base of the Anavysos Kouros dated ca. 530 BCE, commands the passer-by to stop and mourn the deceased man, named Kroisos, who died in the front line of combat. There are far fewer surviving inscriptions from the bases of female korai and only one goes into great detail about the deceased: the inscription on the base of the korē from Merenda that marked the grave of a girl named Phrasikleia (Figure 2.2) tells us that she died unmarried. Unlike inscriptions on the bases of kouroi, it does not demand that the passer-by stop and mourn, but like them it mourns what has been lost: for the kouroi, it is the virtues expressed in the lives they lived; for Phrasikleia, it is the marriage the gods denied her (Osborne 1994: 92). If we can assume that all korai were the grave markers of unmarried girls – the literal meaning of *korē* – like Phrasikleia, then we see that there is greater investment in their grave monuments than there are in the ceramic markers of married women. Furthermore, while the death of a man carries with it lost virtues and a command for respect, the dead girl has lost only her chance to be married.

Figure 2.2 Korē from Merenda (Myrrhinous) in Attica, ca. 550 BCE, National Archaeological Museum, Athens

Note: An inscription identifies her as Phrasikleia and the sculptor as Aristion of Paros.

Source: Photographic Archives (Photographer: V. von Eickstedt). © Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Sports/Archaeological Receipts Fund

Words are not the only way in which the meaning of what has been lost is conveyed. Grave markers, both stone and ceramic, depict gender in a highly schematic way. At all ages, men are depicted either in action or dressed for action, while girls are stationary and dressed decoratively. These gender-specific markers carry idealized messages of the qualities associated with men and women, both socially and physiologically, in sixth-century Athens, which are all inscribed in the stylized and faithfully reproduced characteristics of the statues, stelai, and funerary plaques marking graves in Athens and across Attica.

The masculinity of kouroi seems undeniable, but its meaning must be examined in context. Some general features of kouroi are universal: their pose, in motion and ready for action, usually left foot forward, with their hands clenched into fists by their sides; their dreamy facial expression, half-smiling and staring straight ahead. But the most striking feature of kouroi is that they are naked.

While by the late fifth century the historians Herodotus (1.10.3) and Thucydides (1.6) consider male nudity to be characteristic of Greek culture, in the sixth century it is more unusual. The Egyptian models that inspired Greek freestanding sculpture wear loincloths; korai are invariably clothed; but even in black-figure archaic vase-painting, male nudity is the exception not the rule, in contrast to kouroi. One function of nudity is the contrast it highlights between figures (Hurwit 2007); in this case, the contrast is their gender.

The nakedness of kouroi statues highlights their gender by revealing their genitals and their athletic musculature. Their genitals are small, flaccid, and arguably unaggressive; while there is nothing in archaic freestanding sculpture with which to contrast them, in vase painting and relief sculpture there are many examples of satyrs with over-sized, erect phalluses. It is possible that the kouroi represent very young men, sexually inactive, a proposal supported by their smooth, beardless faces – they are youths, not men (Osborne 1998: 25). However, the contrast with satyrs may be intentionally ideological: while satyrs are out-of-control, non-human, wild and uncivilized forest creatures, with aggressive sexual appetites on full display, these young men are calm and in control of their bodies, personifying the values of the civilized *polis*. Their self-control can be added to the virtues of military bravery and athleticism; indeed, the three are connected through the self-control of standing fast in the front line of battle, as displayed by Kroisos, and for the regular exercise required for muscular bodies and athletic prowess. Their sexual self-control is not emphasized, but is revealed by their nakedness. The limited variation and marked gender of kouroi suggest an idealized representation of gender, an exemplary masculinity that challenges other men to emulate it.

This exemplary masculinity is also reflected in the more diverse, but still standardized, iconography of relief stelai. Men remain dominant on grave stelai, but they include two age categories, both mature and young men, reflected by the presence or lack of a beard respectively. With a few early exceptions, armed men, both bearded and not, wear armor (Figure 2.3), while athletes, again of all ages, are naked. This distinction holds not only on the main panel, but also in the subsidiary friezes at the top and bottom of certain stelai. As in the inscriptions on the bases of kouroi, men on relief stelai are characterized as either soldiers or athletes. Inscriptions on stele bases are similar to those of kouroi: an inscription on a stele base from Athens to one Tetichos is very similar to that of Kroisos, demanding that the passer by stop and mourn the youth who died in battle, although his position in the line is not stated. Thus stelai emphasize the same kind of exemplary masculine virtues as do kouroi, through slightly different, but still schematic, iconography.

In contrast to the naked masculinity of the kouroi, the femininity of korai statues is based in clothing and gesture. Phrasikleia's korē (Figure 2.2) wears jewelry, a crown, and sandals; her dress, on which some painted decoration survives, falls straight and reveals little of the form beneath. Her right hand holds the dress, while in her left she holds a flower. Unlike the kouroi, korai are not depicted in motion, but they are not inactive – they hold out an offering, such as Phrasikleia's flower. Osborne argues that with this gesture the korē "insists that she is part of a narrative", embodying the idea of the marriage exchange invoked in Phrasikleia's



Figure 2.3 Marble grave stele from Velanideza, Attica ca. 510 BCE, National Archaeological Museum, Athens

Note: The inscription on the base of the stele identifies the deceased as Aristion and the sculptor as Aristokles.

Source Photographer: Photographic Archive. © Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Sports/ Archaeological Receipts Fund

inscription that laments her dying unwed, giving korai an active role in social drama (1994: 90–2); however, this role is as an object to be exchanged in marriage, in dedication, or in death – it is one in which women's value is not as actors, as in the virtues inscribed and depicted in the stone funerary monuments

Figure 2.4 Funeral scene. Black figure plaque, archaic period, 560–550 BCE. Attributed to the Burgon Group. Musée du Louvre, Paris, France

Source: Photographer: Herve Lewandowski. © RMN-Grand Palais / Art Resource, NY

of men, but as objects of exchange between men. In contrast to kouroi, whose exemplary masculinity is expressed through their own actions, the exemplary femininity of korai is expressed through the actions of the men who exchange them in marriage, not what they themselves do.

The themes of funerary plaques and loutrophoroi that marked graves focus on the funeral itself rather than idealized figures (Figure 2.4). The majority depict the *prothesis* – the deceased on their bier – while the *ekphora* or funerary procession is rarer. Depictions of funerary activities are highly gendered. Women are usually near to and around the deceased – male or female – while men never come closer than the feet. This spatial dimension reflects different roles men and women played in the funeral: the responsibility of women was to care for the corpse and to mourn the deceased with great displays of emotion; men's responsibility, by contrast, was to sing dirges, with their emotional displays restrained (Van Wees 1998: 19–41). While women are limited in their presence among funerary monuments, they played an important role in the funeral itself. The reasoning behind this role is significant: Shapiro notes that in Greek thought there were two natural sources of pollution (*miasma*), death and childbirth: "Since women could not escape the pollution of giving birth, as men could, they were presumably better suited to deal with the pollution of death" (1991: 634–5). Their role in the funeral is based on their inability to avoid natural pollution. The investment in these monuments clearly reflects the resources available to those commemorating lost loved ones but also the attitudes that determined who deserved to be commemorated in such a way. That so many more stone monuments to men are known and, correspondingly, more ceramic monuments seem to be for women, indicates that there was deliberate exclusion of women from the monuments into which there was more investment.

Gender shaped funerary monuments, but funerary monuments, in turn, shaped ideologies, as the messages they carried were expected to be emulated. These grave

monuments created a system of remembrance in which the deceased could be seen as an ideal representative of their gender: men, especially boys, were ideally athletic, militaristic, young, and self-controlled; girls were moulded to be married, while married women could be largely side-lined. In the next section I look at how the hegemonic virtues expressed by grave monuments translate into three aspects of men's lives, how those values were learned, developed, and expressed, and how girls and women were explicitly excluded from these activities.

Masculinity in action: athletics, pederasty, and the symposium

Athletic events for both men and women are known in Archaic Greece, but in sixth-century Athens athletic success was an explicitly masculine virtue, celebrated only in the funerary monuments of men and not those of women. The premier athletic competition for Athenian men was the annual Panathanaic festival, and especially the extended Great Panathenaia, held every four years, that the Athenians ranked alongside PanHellenic festivals such as the Olympic Games. The Panathanaia was central to the culture of Athens. The opening procession, which included both men and women, traversed the heart of the city from the Kerameikos cemetery, through the Agora, to the Acropolis, while the Panathenaic Games also took place in the centre of the city. By contrast, athletic contests for Athenian girls were held at rural sanctuaries such as the Sanctuary of Artemis at Brauron, 27 miles southeast of Athens and on the other side of the Attic peninsula. The Brauronia also took place every four years, and, it has been speculated, the procession from Athens to Brauron may have begun on the Acropolis, at the district dedicated to Artemis Brauronia (Nevett 2011: 587). While other female athletic contests such as the Heraean Games at Olympia were held in the same locations as games for men, albeit at different times, Athenian games for girls were restricted to separate, rural sanctuaries. This geographic distinction, especially in combination with the lack of emphasis on female Athenian athleticism, is significant. Male athletics was central to the city and integral to masculinity, while female athletics was not central either to the city or the essence of femininity, since girls' athletic successes were not celebrated as feminine achievements. Indeed, female athletics seem largely to have occurred as prenuptial rites, preparing them for the singular feminine achievement of marriage (Serwint 1993). But the distinction can be overstated. Women were included in the Panathanaic procession, while the Brauronian procession may have begun in the centre of the city, symbolically connecting Athens and its territory (Nevett 2011: 588). Nevertheless, it remains clear that athletics were not central to femininity as they were to masculinity.

There were other gendered aspects of the Panathenaic festival, both athletic and otherwise. From the sixth century, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were performed at the festival of Great Panathenaia, celebrating exemplary masculine heroes (Masterson 2013: 18–20). The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are both concerned with the tensions of masculine solidarity and singularity – the importance of individual attainment and the necessity of holding together as a group (Graziosi and Haubold 2003). But they also have clear ideas about proper masculine

behavior. In the *Odyssey*, there is much emphasis on the path Odysseus' son, Telemachus, takes to manhood (Heath 2001). The community of men that surrounds Telemachus consists of the negative example of Penelope's suitors, who are destroying the household wealth and recklessly courting another man's wife. In the course of the poem, Telemachus seeks out better male models, traveling to Pylos and Sparta, meeting the heroes Nestor and Menelaus, until his father's return presents him with a truly exemplary man to emulate. Indeed, after his father's return, Telemachus explicitly tells his mother that his ability to discern proper behavior has been limited by the constant presence of the suitors and absence of a positive role model (*Odyssey* 18.227–32). There were clearly risks associated with lacking an exemplary masculine role model. For the young men of sixth-century Athens such exemplars were available not only in the monuments to masculine virtue in the cemeteries, but in the victors at the Panathenaic Games, and the heroes in the poems that were performed at their most prestigious civic festival.

Like Telemachus, young Athenian boys needed actual men in their lives to educate them in proper masculine behavior. As for Telemachus, the father would normally be the ideal role model, but in the ancient world as in the modern it is rarely that simple (Connell 2005: 121–2). For the elites of Archaic Athens, an alternative masculine role model could be provided through pederasty, erotic relationships between young boys and older male citizens. The main aim of pederasty in ancient Athens was pedagogical, with the older *erastēs* (lover) showing the younger *erōmenos* (beloved) how to be a citizen. Ideally, this involved instilling in the *erōmenos* the masculine virtues of bravery, loyalty, and self-control. In practice, this seems to have involved activities depicted on grave stelai such as hunting and athletics, as well as attending the symposium. Our knowledge of archaic pederasty comes not from accounts of historical relationships but from idealized sources – contemporary vase painting, lyric poetry, and later philosophical dialogues and law court speeches (Lear 2013). We know of no story of a genuine courtship, save perhaps that young Harmodius was said to have spurned the advances of Hipparchus in favor of Aristogeiton, indicating perceived agency on behalf of the *erōmenos* (Thucydides 6.54), and strong hints in vase painting, poetry, and philosophical dialogues that the gymnasium was an appropriate place for an *erastēs* to court his *erōmenos* (*Theognidea* 1335; Plato, *Charmides*, 154A–C). Therefore, how exactly the *erastēs* went about teaching his *erōmenos* is largely unclear.

By bringing together young and older men, pederasty was one way in which boys could be introduced to the world of adult masculinity. In pederastic relationships Athenian boys were offered a masculine role model and encouraged to adopt it as their own – a process analogous to Connell's "moment of engagement" with hegemonic masculinity (Connell 2005: 122–3). In the modern examples that Connell analyses, the engagement with masculine role models allowed boys to shape their own masculinity through imitation and through experiences. In the example of Athenian pederasty, bodily experience is also part of the moment of engagement. Sexual scenes of pederasty on Athenian vase painting suggest that

the *erōmenos* should not be aroused by the attention of the *erastēs*, even in scenes of intercrural sex, emphasizing the same value of sexual self-control deduced from the kouroi in cemeteries. As the boys matured, they changed status from object of desire to the one acting on their desire. In the poetry collection known as the *Theognidea*, several of which present the poet as a teacher, the pederastic relationship comes to an end with the growth of secondary body hair, at which point the poet's *erōmenos* goes on to claim a beloved boy of his own (*Theognidea* 1327–34). While not universal, pederasty is one method by which young Athenian boys engaged with adult masculinity in a way that completely excludes women from the process. Pederasty kept women peripheral to the adult male world, especially women of the same class, while encouraging sociality between men.

The process of masculine bonding and female exclusion is best shown through the symposium. At these explicitly masculine wine-drinking parties, men would eat, drink, play games, and listen to music and poetry in a room called the *andrōn* (men's room). Alcohol is a common feature of social bonding rituals, as wine drinking stimulates a heightened emotional state that can create strong ties between drinkers (Osborne 2014). It is questionable how intoxicated symposiasts, those attending a symposium, would become: in civilized surroundings wine was mixed with water and drinking unmixed wine was a sign of barbarism, exemplified by the Cyclops Polyphemos in the *Odyssey* or the Centaurs at the wedding of Perithoos. But in the fourth-century dialogues of Plato and Xenophon, intoxication is a ripe subject for discussion: in Plato's *Symposium* it is only Socrates who is completely immune to the effects of the wine. Red-figure vase paintings show the side effects of intoxication, perhaps as a warning: symposiasts vomit, turn violent, and grope youthful attendants, both male and female. Osborne (2014) argues that these decorative schemes must be understood in the context of the symposium, particularly the masculinity of heroic scenes that are common on vases for the symposium. He equates the values of heroic myths, whether they encourage solidarity like the battle with the Calydonian boar or individual acts of bravery such as Theseus battling the Minotaur, to the risk of intoxication: "Drinkers go out to face what has already laid many out flat" (2014: 49). The possibility of overindulgence is one of the thrills of the symposium: in a society in which self-control was a masculine virtue, to avoid intoxication at the symposium was a source of pride – exemplified by the sole-survival of Socrates in Plato's *Symposium*. The boys brought to the symposium were learning to be part of male society, which included self-control and the disparagement of women (Keuls 1993: 158–78). In the symposium, there is a hierarchy of power at play in which citizen men are top, and boys are being educated to join them.

Respectable girls were firmly excluded from the symposium. For the most part, the women who attended symposia were slaves, flute girls, or courtesans; therefore, women attending symposia in vase painting are usually interpreted as non-citizen women belonging to one of those groups. These interpretations, based on the assumption that vase painting directly references everyday life, have not passed unchallenged. The most significant challenge has come from Kathryn Topper, on the basis of a number of Athenian symposium scenes at which women recline as

apparent equals with men and, more significantly, at which women are the only symposiasts (2012: 105–35). Topper interprets these scenes not as representative of everyday life, but rather as intentional depictions of an uncivilized world, either in the Athenian past or elsewhere in the Greek world. Significant to Topper's interpretation are the fine details of the paintings: trees or vines indicating that the scene takes place outside; a lack of furniture, including the symposium couch, so that the drinkers lie on the ground; the presence of weapons or foreign clothing. These scenes represent the symposium before it was civilized: an early world "that had not learned the wisdom of denying political power to its women" and thus allows them to drink alongside their men (Topper 2012: 122). At their more civilized symposia, Athenian men could look at these scenes and laugh at barbarians who did not have control of their women as the Athenians believed they did. In reality, citizen women and girls were excluded from this masculine world and dined in a separate part of the house along with slaves and boys too young to attend the symposium, while the women who actually attended the symposium were treated as social inferiors and degraded. But these vessels were created for use in a symposium and their imagery must be understood in that context: Athenian men, somewhere on their way to intoxication, would look to these images for conversation and, perhaps, comedy. Thus, the presence of women at symposia on vases does not only show us how the non-citizen women who attended the symposium might have been treated, but also that the idea of women attending symposia was considered uncivilized, barbaric, and inferior.

In athletics, pederasty, and the symposium the exclusion of women was formalized in the lives of young men. These encounters, which encouraged both competition and sociality between young boys, did not allow such bonds to form between boys and girls and left women peripheral to civilized society. As I show in the next section, certain social changes that appeared around the turn of the fifth century made male superiority an even more prominent part of Athenian culture.

Herms, tyrannicides, and changing Athenian masculinity

In archaic Athens, the elite gender constructs of exemplary masculinity and femininity were featured in the city's cemeteries, while men kept women peripheral to their civic lives and social activities. But exemplary masculinity was not accessible to all Athenian citizens. The key concepts of Athenian masculinity – and the means by which it was attained – were the priorities of a leisured class, the elite who could rely on slaves and hired hands while they practiced athletics and courted young boys; it is they who are commemorated in the expensive, labor-intensive monuments to masculinity in Athenian cemeteries. It is questionable whether or not the symposium was an exclusively elite activity (Topper 2012: 9); nonetheless, symposia were restricted by social groups so that they boys and men attending them would all be of the same class. Boys were introduced to the symposium and its drinking culture by their *erastēs*, who selected them from the elite-class youth that trained for athletics in the gymnasium. There was little

opportunity for non-elite men to achieve the exemplary masculine qualities represented by grave monuments and elite culture.

We know far less about non-elite masculinities in archaic Athens. The marginalized masculinity of lower-class men can still uphold hegemonic masculinity through action and ideology; still bound by their gender to men of the elite, they can still benefit from the patriarchal dividend without representing the ideal masculinity of patriarchy, as long as they support it rather than challenge it. The question which we must ask is how far these lower-class men supported the hegemonic masculinity of archaic Athenian elites. The answer is revealed by comparing the archaic construct of masculinity to how it changed when these men were given political power in the last decade of the sixth century, as the foundations of democracy were being laid by Cleisthenes. When democracy was born, there was no question that it would be a masculine democracy that excluded women: men demanded it from other men. But how far did elite masculinity change and how did the elite values of archaic Athenian hegemonic masculinity come to be in tune with the equality of male citizens in democracy?

Changes in the civic landscape give us some indication. While in the late archaic period there is a decline in overtly masculine funerary monuments like the kouroi, starting in the late sixth century, the Agora and city streets of Athens would be dominated by a different kind of masculine monument, the herm, which, it has been argued, directly challenged the masculinity of the kouroi (Quinn 2007). The herms, or hermaic stelai, with their bearded, adult male heads representing the god Hermes, the almost featureless shafts of their bodies and prominent erect phalluses, contrast explicitly with the youthful, muscular bodies and small genitals of the late archaic kouroi. While kouroi marked graves, whether in cemeteries or those lining the roads of Attica, herms were spread throughout the city, posted at the entrances to houses and shrines, in the Agora, and potentially at any liminal space. Although kouroi are naked they have control of their sexuality, while the herms display their erect genitals prominently. Masculinity in the civic landscape of Athens was being presented very differently.

The herms signify a change in idealized Athenian masculinity. Like kouroi, they are a generic model that elides the distinctions between individual men, but in contrast the herms' bodies are blank, representing their gender only through the display of their genitals and their maturity through the head of Hermes. The ideals that they uphold are not represented by leisure activities recorded in inscriptions or representations on their bases, but rather the theoretical equality of all men, throughout the city as boundary markers. This apotropaic function of herms as boundary markers also emphasizes the aggressive element of the erect phallus, an element of Athenian identity that would be of increasing importance in the classical fifth century. After the defeat of the invading Persians in 479 BCE, the phallus would become a central part of how the Athenians represented their victory, such as having their allies carry model phalluses in the festival of Dionysus to show how they were part of the "Athenian phallocratic hegemony" (Cartledge 1998: 60). The increasing emphasis on the connection between masculine sexual aggressiveness and the defeat of the effeminate Persians reflected



Figure 2.5 Harmodius (right) and Aristogeiton (left), the Tyrannicides, Roman copy of the Athenian version by Kritios and Nesiotes. Marble. 477–476 BC, Naples, Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Napoli

Source: Album/Art Resource, NY

the changing relationship between Athenian men and women, hardening the idea that men offered the protection that women desperately needed. Thucydides in Pericles' funeral oration emphasizes the valor of the men who died protecting Athens, while the most respected of their widows will be she who is least spoken of (2.45.2). Xenophon expresses this idea through a parable told by Socrates that women are safe in their households because of the presence of men (*Memorabilia* 2.7). Athenian men were aggressive, women needed protection – throughout Athens this idea was expressed visually by the herms' erect phalluses.

The aristocratic masculinity of the archaic period was not completely abandoned in the classical period, nor were individual exemplary men replaced by the blank slate of the herms. Throughout the classical period a statue group of two exemplary men stood in the Athenian Agora: the tyrannicides, Harmodius and Aristogeiton. In 514 BCE Athens was under the rule of Hippias, a tyrant – a word that in ancient Greek does not carry the pejorative connotations that it does today, but simply means an authoritarian, aristocratic ruler. Harmodius

and Aristogeiton murdered Hipparchus, Hippias' brother who was in charge of organizing the Grand Panathenaia, but were immediately killed themselves (Thucydides 6.53–59). Despite the personal motives attributed to the tyrannicides by Thucydides, they were commemorated widely in democratic Athens for their apparent role in overthrowing the aristocracy. At the first Great Panathenaia after the expulsion of the tyrants from Athens in 510 BCE, a bronze sculpture group of Harmodius and Aristogeiton was set up in the Agora. Their statues were so cherished that although they were stolen by the Persians when they sacked Athens in 480 BCE, they were soon replaced in 477 BCE by another, classical statue group, known from depictions on Panathenaic prize amphoras and Roman copies in marble (Figure 2.5). They are depicted mostly naked, muscular, with Aristogeiton the bearded *erastēs* and Harmodius the youthful *erōmenos*. Male nudity becomes much more common in the classical iconography of the fifth century, but, although the nudity of the tyrannicide statues may express the same heroism as the kouroi, there are other ways in which it can be interpreted. Aristogeiton is bearded, an older man, not a beautiful youth like Harmodius or the Archaic kouroi; his nakedness marks the risk he takes to defeat the tyrant and free Athens from his oppression – it is not only heroic, but *democratic* nudity, showing that the tyrannicides were willing to sacrifice everything for their city (Hurwit 2007). Democratic nudity removed the status distinctions represented by clothing; it also united men through their similar male bodies.

As Athens transitioned from archaic, aristocratic political models to classical democracy at the end of the sixth century, representations of masculinity were also changing. But for the most part, these representations rely on similar signifiers of masculinity to those that preceded them. Male nudity, common in archaic cemeteries and temples, became much more commonplace in classical Athens, occupying the Agora as well as the cemetery. As the herms spread throughout the city, it would be difficult to go anywhere in public in Athens without seeing an erect bronze or marble phallus on proud display, threatening outsiders but also claiming protection of Athenian women. The masculine dominance of archaic Athenian elites had been democratized.

Conclusion

Sixth-century Athenian masculinity was represented as active, powerful, and self-controlled. The idealized men and youths of grave monuments are muscular and athletic, while their inscriptions lament the loss of one so brave and powerful. The ideal woman, meanwhile, was largely decorative. These monuments say that men do things, while women simply are. While women also practiced athletics, they were not praised for it – it was just a precedent to marriage. More value was placed on male social activities from which women were deliberately excluded; the idea of women attending such activities was deliberately presented as laughable. By the end of the sixth century, stone monuments – kouroi and korai, as well as stelai – disappear from cemeteries. Individuals are no longer commemorated in sculpture unless their achievements can be spun as democratic, as in the

case of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. The emblem of fifth-century Athens is the aggressive phallic herm that constitutes the dominant male symbol of the city, as its presence is not confined to the cemetery or the sanctuary, but is found in every area of the public space. By the fifth century, women were even more unwelcome in civic life. As they became more equal, Athenian men chose to emphasize those aspects of their culture that were already understood as masculine, and to emphasize that masculinity even further. In doing so, the concept of male superiority and female exclusion became an integral feature of Athenian life.

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3 Powerful women and gender ideology in Herodotus' *Histories*

Helen Tank

For Herodotus, history is more than the public actions of male protagonists.[1] Women feature prominently in his narrative as actors, speakers, and figures of authority as well as voiceless victims of male power (Blok 2002: 225–42; Dewald 2013: 151–79; Munson 2013: 7–9). Both men and women take revenge, mete out cruel and unusual punishments, deceive, trick, and kill. Both also act on behalf of their families, and advise, argue, and command.[2]

Some scholars use the model of gender polarity, the binary opposition of male and female genders whereby male identity is created through rejecting the female, or projecting femininity onto those whose performance of masculinity falls short of the normative ideal, to analyze male and female, in the *Histories*. Cartledge and Greenwood (2002: 363–70) argue that Herodotus uses a polarity model to structure his historiography, so the stories of Candaules (1.8–12) and Xerxes (9.108–113) which frame the *Histories* are exemplary tales of 'Barbarian Men' versus 'Barbarian Women', which Herodotus intends to be a warning and an example to the Greeks. They emphasize that polarities can have a rhetorical purpose in downplaying or emphasizing one polarity over another (2002: 364), following Hartog, who argues that the polarity between Scythians and Greeks in Book 4 of the *Histories* is challenged when the Amazons arrive on the scene – at this point in the narrative, the Scythians "turn into quasi-Greeks", thereby introducing a male-female polarity which destabilizes the Greek-barbarian one (Hartog 1988: 224, 367). Gray (1995: 185–221) also uses a polarity model to analyze the "rhetoric of male/female otherness", but argues that the polarity between barbarian ruler and barbarian subject is more significant than gender difference. Iriarte (2013: 107) presents Tomyris, one of the female characters I will discuss below, as someone who reverses the polarities of "warlike masculinity and peaceable maternity" by becoming a warlike mother.

Other scholars, however, argue that binary oppositions do not account for the diversity of male and female models that we meet in the *Histories*, or for the many instances where women are shown to have agency and authority; instead, they focus on the negotiation of roles and identities required of men and women, and the interaction between them. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (2013: 148) argues against the polarity model, in respect of both gender and ethnicity, on the grounds that it can "reinforce the tendency already existent in Antiquity, to see the Orient

as female, weak and worthless and Western civilisation as male, valiant and valuable". In Munson's study of Artemisia (1988: 91–106), she deconstructs the male/female polarity by drawing illuminating parallels between Artemisia and Themistocles, a Greek queen and an Athenian general respectively, and showing that both embody positive and negative characteristics. Blok (2002: 240–2) also cites the many ambiguities in the story of Artemisia to argue against the polarity model, which in her view is too schematic. She suggests instead that Herodotus was inspired by the Homeric model; in shaping his history, he understood relationships within the household (*oikos*), based on the mutual dependence of men and women, to be crucial to understanding the organization of the city-state (*polis*). Sebillote Cuchet (2013: 430) emphasizes the need to contextualize performances of gender, which may not necessarily be in opposition to each other, and Boedeker (2011: 227) argues that the performance of gender by women often contradicts the inferiority ascribed to them by ideology. Dewald (2013: 152) takes this one step further: "Herodotus' portrait of women emphasizes their active partnership with men in establishing and maintaining social order". She argues that respect for *nomos*, a term indicating both law and custom, requires both men and women to perform roles appropriately, and she sees women as defenders of the values of society against violations of *nomos*.[3]

This scholarly debate reflects Herodotus' self-presentation both as a storyteller, heir to Homer, and part of a sophistic world, in which paradox and antithesis were tools with which to engage, entertain, and provoke an audience.[4] Thus, a manly woman, a trickster king, and a warlike mother all question gender stereotypes, problematize ideological constructs, and build "surprise and irony" (Boedeker 2011: 231) into Herodotus' narrative. In this essay, I investigate how Herodotus portrays gender difference in his *Histories*, and the extent to which his narrative reflects or contests the ideology of female inferiority, which was pervasive in ancient Greek societies. I analyze his characters through the prism of *nomos*, which, by way of methodology, allows me to employ both the polarizing gender ideology and the negotiating practices of gender performance to illuminate his perspective on gender constructs. The polarity model is a useful way to show how an ideology of female inferiority is used as a persuasive strategy in the *Histories*, where Herodotus shows *nomos* to be a coercive force, which can reinforce the ideology, both through forms of government which exclude women from power, and through promoting the belief that women are inferior. At the same time, any model of *nomos* needs to include its role both in shaping the performance of gender roles, and in evaluating that performance, a process that involves both genders. Consequently, I adopt an intersectional approach by which I show that men and women go beyond conventional gender polarities in performing a range of roles and identities.[5] There are important distinctions, moreover, between women in terms of status and power, which may be more significant markers of difference than gender (Boedeker 2011: 229; Sebillote Cuchet 2013: 421). Although the democratic law (*nomos*) of Athens excluded all women from legal and political institutions, this was not the case in other states, where high-status women could exercise political and military power.

In my case studies, therefore, I test the male-female polarity by analyzing the stories of the three women in the *Histories* who perform a masculine role as military leaders. These women are Tomyris, ruler of the Massagetae, a non-Greek people who lived in Sogdiana (modern Turkestan); Pheretime, mother of the ruler of Cyrene, a Greek colony in Africa; and Artemisia, ruler of the Greek city of Halicarnassus (now Bodrum) and Herodotus' own birthplace. It is important to remember that Herodotus, being a non-Athenian himself, brings a non-Athenian perspective to gender ideology and practice for his readers. I compare these women with the male characters in the same stories, examining how both men and women perform gender roles, whether they succeed as military commanders, and how this role intersects with the ideology of female inferiority, often articulated in a military context. In considering Herodotus' own judgment on these characters, both male and female, I show that he highlights the human-divine, rather than the male-female, polarity in all cases.

The rhetoric of female inferiority

In the *Histories*, the ideological belief in the inferiority of women is articulated by both Persians and Athenians, while Artemisia, on the eve of the battle of Salamis, advises Xerxes, king of the Persians: "Do not commit the fleet to a battle, because at sea your men will be as far inferior to the Greeks as women are to men" (8.68).[6] Xerxes echoes her words in the aftermath of his defeat, when he explains it as an inversion of gender roles (8.88). The motif of gender inversion is repeated again before the battle of Plataea the following year, when the Persian horsemen taunt the Greeks, when they were retreating, by calling them women (9.20), the harshest of insults for Persian men (9.107). At the same battle, the Athenians (9.27) seek to gain a place of honor in the battle lines at Plataea, on the basis of the gender-inversion motif, which they use for rhetorical persuasion. They remind the Spartans of their victory over the Amazons, a group of warrior women who, in Athenian myth, were defeated in battle by the Athenians. Herodotus, therefore, shows how both Artemisia and Xerxes adopt an ideology that contrasts the inferior female 'other' with the superior normative male, the Persians use the accusation of female cowardice as an analogy for weakness in battle, and, for the Athenians, the Amazons symbolize the postulated political disorder caused by women acting like men (Loraux 1986: 146).

However, in his wider narrative, Herodotus draws attention to the unreliability of these rhetorical claims; military outcomes tell a different story. As I will show below, Xerxes misreads the actions both of his men and of Artemisia in attributing blame after the battle of Salamis. At the battle of Plataea, the Greeks, though insulted by the Persians as 'women' when they appear weak in a cavalry onslaught, in fact defeat them. However, this is not, in Herodotus' judgment, because they were braver or stronger, but because their equipment, skills, and expertise were better (9.62). Herodotus' Amazons (4.110–117) also do not fit the polarized model of Athenian ideology that sees the female fighters as aggressors and invaders, yet inferior fighters, who must be defeated. Instead, their story is a

reflection on their way of life, their laws and customs (*nomoi*), and their relationship with men, which is based on reciprocity and not hostility; the narrative is "designed to undermine conventional notions of alterity" (Munson 2005: 72). There is a clear disjuncture, therefore, between the rhetoric of war and military outcomes in the *Histories*, suggesting that the performance of gender roles is more nuanced than the ideology of female inferiority portrays it.

The constraints of *nomos* and gender performance

Herodotus agrees with Pindar in personifying *nomos* as despot: "I think Pindar was right to have said in his poem that custom is king of all" (3.38). *Nomos* is shown by Herodotus to symbolize the patriarchal order by excluding women from legal and political institutions within which they have no place, agency, or authority. In a military context, *nomos* commands the Spartans to "win or die" (7.104), a construction of masculine valor which also excludes women. However, *nomos* also acts as an informal, but nevertheless powerful, constraint on behavior, rooted in internal conviction and belief (Demont 2013: 42; Ostwald 2009: 115–16). An important *nomos* is the performance of gender, a "constructed identity which audience and actor come to believe in" (Butler 1990: 179).[7] As Cantarella (2005: 237) puts it: "The law is gendered and at the same time engenders society: on the one hand it reflects the social construction of sexual roles, on the other it reinforces this construction". In this sense, *nomos* involves both genders in assessing performances of masculinity and femininity.

In Persia, the attributes of gender are set down by Herodotus as customs (*nomoi*) which have to be learnt and practised: "After bravery in battle, manliness[8] is proved above all by producing plenty of sons . . . [who] study only three things: horsemanship, archery, and honesty" (1.136). An integral part of this process of socialization is how one is seen to perform gender; social judgments are made on this basis, validating or condemning performed identities, and thereby reinforcing normative gender roles. Manliness (*andreia*), therefore, is not an innate trait but is proved through actions and judged by others, male and female, who decide whether to attribute *andreia* to an individual or group (Rosen and Sluiter 2003: 8). When Croesus excludes his son Atys from an expedition to kill a boar, following a dream in which his son is killed by an iron spearhead, Herodotus expresses the weight of social expectation in the words he attributes to Atys: "What kind of man will my fellow citizens take me to be? What will my new bride think of me? What kind of husband will she think she is living with?" (1.37). The respect of the community and his wife is contingent on him performing a certain gender role; there is a social stigma attached to being called a coward (Branscome 2013: 59, 70). Herodotus himself also makes this kind of gender judgment, for example, in the story of Helen; Hector is "more of a man" (*anēr ekeinou māllon*) than Alexander [Paris] and "not the kind of man to let his brother get away with wrongdoing" (2.120).

Herodotus, therefore, does not just describe gender performances, he also evaluates them and shows his characters doing likewise. By focalizing some of the

stories in the *Histories* through the eyes of female characters, constructing speech for them, and exploring their motivation, he draws our attention to women's agency in acts of cultural affirmation as well as condemnation, which can also have a significant political dimension. For example, Candaules (1.8–12) disregards the customary virtue of female modesty and secretly exposes his wife's nakedness to the gaze of his best friend, violating the boundary between women and unrelated men. He forgets that his wife has power and authority as queen, which she uses to have him killed and achieve a dynastic change in Lydia. Herodotus thereby shows the consequences for those who assume that they are above *nomos* and gender-appropriate responsibilities do not apply to them (Boedeker 2011: 231).

Herodotus also proves *andreia* to be a social construct, not an essential attribute of male nature, by showing that it can be lost as well as won (Harrell 2003: 78–9). This is illustrated by the story of the Lydians, who were once the most courageous (*andreiotatoi*) and warlike race in Asia (1.79). However, after being defeated by the Persians, Cyrus, king of Persia, forestalls future rebellion by changing their gender identity, removing their *andreia*. He accepts Croesus' advice to change external markers of gender, from male to female, to make them perform female rather than male activities, and to train their boys to be retailers rather than warriors:

> Send a message that they are forbidden to own weapons of war, that they are to wear tunics under their coats and slippers on their feet . . . to take up the cithara and the harp . . . and raise their sons to be retailers. Before long . . . you will see them become women instead of men.
>
> (1.155)

The normative male, therefore, is shown to be an unstable construct, subject to socialization as well as continuing judgment and scrutiny, and liable to lose his ability to perform as a man if defeated in battle.[9]

Gender fluidity: the case of Artemisia

When introducing Artemisia as a character in his history, Herodotus makes three key observations about her. She is remarkable (a *thōma*) in going to war against the Greeks, she is motivated by manliness (*andreia*), and she gives Xerxes the best strategic advice (7.99). The first of these observations recalls the historian's programmatic statement at the start of the *Histories* when he announces his intention "to preserve the fame of the important and remarkable (*thōmasta)* achievements produced by both Greeks and non-Greeks" (Introductory paragraph). In finding Artemisia remarkable, Herodotus acknowledges that it is unusual for a woman to fight, but he also recognizes that her military achievements are worth preserving. Artemisia is the only woman in the *Histories* to be given the attribute of *andreia*. As a motivation, her *andreia* is linked to her political autonomy; she takes power on her husband's death, when her son is not old enough to rule, willingly fights on the side of the Persians, and speaks freely to Xerxes, unlike his other

advisors, who are shown to be motivated by fear of the king. Artemisia's freedom from external coercion is in contrast to most of Persia's allies and indeed to most of those fighting for the Greek alliance, and, as Munson argues, links her to the Athenians, whose political autonomy is underlined throughout the *Histories* (Munson 1988: 95–7, 102). This is not a parallel which the Athenians would appreciate; indeed, they "were furious that a woman [Artemisia] was attacking their city" (8.93). It should be noted that the Athenians are the only members of the Greek alliance who voice an objection to a military female, suggesting the ideology of female inferiority in Athens may have been more pronounced than in other states. However, Herodotus himself does not suggest that there is anything inappropriate in a woman ruling a country, commanding a fleet, or exercising political choices.

Herodotus does not explain how she performs *andreia*, which we, therefore, have to interpret from her speech and actions. As we shall see below, in her role as Xerxes' advisor, Herodotus gives Artemisia two speeches in which he shows her to be an accomplished orator and a smart strategist; nevertheless, his judgment on her actions during the battle itself undermines her claims to be an excellent fighter, thus pointing out the disjuncture between her words and deeds. I will argue, therefore, in this section, that Herodotus problematizes the very concept of *andreia* through attributing it to Artemisia, not only because she is female but also because he presents her as a contradictory character; on the one hand, she can give good strategic advice and speaks freely, but on the other, she does not show bravery in battle.

Artemisia as orator

Artemisia's first speech is delivered before the battle of Salamis at the Persian court; she is the only one of Xerxes' counselors to warn of defeat on land as well as at sea if Xerxes engages the Greeks in a sea battle. In constructing a speech for her, Herodotus dramatizes her attempt at persuasion.[10] The ability to speak well and to establish both oratorical superiority over others, and physical dominance, had been a mark of the normative male from Homer onwards.[11] In this context, Artemisia starts her speech with self-praise, intended to impress Xerxes with her qualifications: "I did not play a negligible or cowardly role in the sea battles off Euboea" (8.68). She concludes by reminding him of the baseness and cowardice of others, in an attempt to establish her own superiority: "You do in fact have bad slaves, who are supposed to be your allies . . . all of whom are useless" (8.68). She reminds Xerxes that he has already taken Athens, his ostensible goal, so does not need to take the risk of a naval battle, and points out that the Greeks lack the resources to hold out for long. Herodotus proves Artemisia's oratorical *andreia* by showing her in a verbal combat, and constructing for her a speech characterized by the antithesis of praise and blame (Rosen and Sluiter 2003: 8; Bowie 2007: 157–9).

I have already noted Herodotus' evaluation of Artemisia as an orator; she gave the best advice. What, though, of her internal audience? Everyone on the Persian

side, whether friend or foe to Artemisia, thinks Xerxes is committed to a sea battle and anticipates, therefore, that he will punish her for voicing a different opinion. This, after all, had happened to Artabanus, Xerxes' uncle, who advised Xerxes to be cautious before he committed his forces to invade Europe. Xerxes was furious and said to him: "for your craven cowardice I will humiliate you by not taking you with me on this expedition to Greece; instead, you will stay here with the women" (7.11). As Boedeker (2011: 219) notes, this rebuke makes the invasion of Greece a masculine pursuit; Artabanus is unmanned by being denied the opportunity to prove himself in battle. Xerxes, however "was delighted with Artemisia's point of view; he had rated her highly before, but now she went up even further in his estimation" (8.69). He is pleased with her oratorical performance but does not follow her advice. One way to explain this could be the ideology of gender inferiority; how could a man listen to a woman? However, the text does not suggest this; her enemies were not hostile because she was female, but because of her prominence within the alliance (8.69), while Xerxes later acknowledges that Artemisia "had turned out to be the only one with a realistic plan of action" (8.101).

Xerxes, however, is obliged as king of Persia, to wage constant war. He makes this point explicit when he first declares his intention to attack Greece and achieve world domination:

> Men of Persia, I am introducing no new custom (*nomos*) here; I am simply drawing on traditional Persian ways . . . there has never been a time when we have not been at war, ever since Cyrus deposed Astyages and we took over from the Medes . . . we will make Persian territory end only at the sky, the domain of Zeus, so that the sun will not shine on any land beyond our borders. (7.8)

Xerxes is portrayed as a man who seeks to cross the boundary between Asia and Europe and then obliterate all boundaries by creating a world-wide empire, thereby rejecting human limitations (Asheri et al. 2007: 37–8) but is also subject to pressure to emulate his predecessors (Baragwanath 2008: 243–4; Bowie 2007: 8–11).

His response to Artemisia's speech shows him to be a man who lacks sound judgment; he watches Artemisia's display of her competitive *andreia*, and listens to her caustic criticism of his other allies but discounts her accurate analysis of the Greek position and ignores her advice, to avoid a sea battle and take advantage of Greek disunity. Xerxes, therefore, proves to be constrained by the *nomos* of Persian aggression (Munson 1988: 96), which compels him to reject Artemisia's advice. She, however, is the only one of the king's allies who exercises the freedom of speech (*isēgoriē*)[12] on which the Athenians prided themselves (Munson 1988: 97). By drawing this implied parallel between Artemisia and the Athenians, Herodotus both shows his mischievous side, and distances himself from Athenian gender ideology, which held that women were incapable of the soundness of judgment required to exercise free speech.

Artemisia's second speech (8.103)

The second occasion when Artemisia gives advice to Xerxes is after the defeat at Salamis. He puts to her the two options proposed by Mardonius: he should either launch an immediate attack on the Peloponnese, or allow Mardonius to wage war on his behalf. Artemisia devotes no time at all to Mardonius' first proposal. She commends the second as being advantageous to Xerxes whether Mardonius succeeds or not. If Mardonius succeeds, the achievement will belong to Xerxes, because his slaves were victorious. If he fails, Xerxes and his family will still survive to cause problems for the Greeks in the future. This is clever oratory on Artemisia's part; she gives Xerxes a way to save face. Though he is the one about to flee, she suggests it will be the Greeks who will be running away if Xerxes lives to fight another day. This second speech, therefore, is constructed less as an attempt to persuade, and more as an accurate reading of Xerxes' mind and intentions, which Herodotus makes explicit as the narrator: "I think he was so frightened that he would not have stayed even if every man and woman had told him to" (8.103). On this occasion, he presents Artemisia as voicing a pragmatic solution and acting as the "consummate courtier" (Bowie 2007: 191) who protects herself, since it is safer to advise retreat, than find herself in Mardonius' position, if things go wrong for the Persians.

Artemisia in battle

Artemisia's motive of self-interest (Munson 1988: 101; Boedeker 2011: 219) becomes apparent also in her actions in battle. During the battle of Salamis, Artemisia is being pursued by an Athenian ship, whose skipper has been offered a substantial reward for her capture. Her escape route is blocked by allied ships; the enemy ships are close by.

> She decided on a plan which did in fact do her a lot of good. With the Attic ship close astern, she bore down on and rammed one of the ships from her own side . . . she created for herself a double piece of good fortune.
>
> (8.87)

She manages to deceive both Greeks and Persians. The Athenian captain "assumed that Artemisia's ship was either Greek or was a defector from the Persians fighting on his side, so he changed course and turned to attack other ships" (8.87). Xerxes' men recognize her insignia and draw the king's attention to her performance in the battle: "Master, can you see how well Artemisia is fighting? Look, she has sunk an enemy ship!" (8.88). As none of the crew of the ship sunk by Artemisia survive, there is no-one to correct their assumption. The king's explanation for the defeat at Salamis is "My men have turned into women and my women into men!" (8.88). He attributes *andreia* to Artemisia for her actions in battle, as he contrasts her conduct with that of his men, whom he perceives as cowards.

However, Herodotus' narratorial judgment on Artemisia's performance is less positive: "although she was quite the opposite of the king's benefactor,[13] her actions made Xerxes particularly pleased with her" (8.88). Herodotus attributes her success to good luck, not to courage, and shows that he, unlike the Greeks and the Persians, is not deceived by Artemisia. Moreover, Herodotus does not attribute defeat to cowardice on the part of the Persian force, as he declares:

> The Persians became disorganized and lost their battle plan . . . nevertheless they displayed and acted with far more courage that day than they had off Euboea: every single one of them fought with determination, spurred on by his fear of Xerxes, and each of them imagined that the king's eyes were on him. (8.86)

The larger Persian fleet proved to be at a disadvantage in the narrow straits of Salamis and it was precisely because crews were trying to impress Xerxes with their bravery, "to show the king that they too could perform well" (8.89) that many perished, because they fell into the path of retreating Persian ships.

Artemisia, however, clearly shows tactical skill in deceiving both Greeks and Persians and avoiding capture but Herodotus shows that her claims to be superior to Xerxes' other allies are not justified by her actions, if *andreia* is bravery in battle. This paradoxical situation questions the very meaning of *andreia*, if it can be displayed through practising 'escape and survive' rather than 'win or die', the Spartans' all-powerful *nomos* (7.104). Thus, Herodotus links himself much more closely to contemporary sophistic debates, which interrogated conventional ideas on gender, rather than to Homeric or Spartan models. By problematizing the traditional definition of manly valor, he makes his account more entertaining for his audience, as well as perhaps more convincing, if Artemisia is shown to be a contradictory character.

However, I think it is more significant that Herodotus, as a non-Athenian, distances himself from Athenian ideology, which excluded all women from power on the basis that they were dangerous, deceptive, and incapable of autonomous action. Herodotus reflects his own Halicarnassian cultural heritage by showing that a woman could exercise power without destroying herself or her community. Moreover, he does not make her trickery gender-specific; in addition to Artemisia, male characters also use it. For example, Themistocles, the Athenian general, uses deception as an effective tool to prevent the breakup of Greek forces before the battle of Salamis (Baragwanath 2008: 297; Munson 1988: 103–4). Finally, by drawing an implied parallel between Artemisia and the Athenians, in that both make free choices, he destabilizes the Athenian belief that women lacked the capacity to exercise political or military power.

Tomyris

After 27 years as king of Persia, Cyrus has conquered the Medes, the Lydians, and the Assyrians. He then turns his attention to the Massagetae, who were

ruled by Queen Tomyris. In his clash with Tomyris, Cyrus was influenced by two main factors, according to Herodotus: "the apparently miraculous nature of his birth, and the good fortune that attended him in war, in the sense that any race which Cyrus sent his troops after found it impossible to escape" (1.204).

Herodotus "considers Cyrus' overconfidence as a sign of *hubris*, and prepares the reader for the reversal of fortune" (Asheri 2007: 214), since the king now believes himself to be more than mortal and invincible. In this way, Herodotus signals that the opposition is between mortal and immortal rather than male and female.

Cyrus initially tries to trick the queen with a marriage proposal, foregrounding her gender:

> However, Tomyris realized that it was not her he was courting so much as the Massagetan kingdom, so she rejected his advances. Since Cyrus had got nowhere by trickery, he next marched to the Araxes and started to wage open war against the Massagetae.
>
> (1.205)

Like Artemisia, Tomyris shows an ability to 'read' a Persian king; she rejects Cyrus' proposal of marriage because she knows he makes it to gain power for himself. By focalizing this event from Tomyris' perspective, Herodotus shows the queen's discernment and foreshadows Cyrus' later trickery. When she sees him prepare for war she sends a message, addressing him as an equal:

> King of Persia, abandon your zeal for this enterprise. You cannot know if in the end it will come out right for you. Stop and rule your own people, and put up with the sight of me ruling mine. But no: you are hardly going to take this advice, since peace is the last thing you desire.
>
> (1.206)

In advising Cyrus to avoid a battle with the Massagetae she mirrors Artemisia's advice to Xerxes, to avoid fighting the Greeks at sea; unlike Artemisia, however, she is not eager for war but seeks to maintain her territorial integrity. Her desire for peace is appropriate to her gender but she also speaks like a philosopher, giving her speech authority, echoing Solon's warning to Croesus, the powerful king of Lydia, "to consider the end of anything . . . to see how it will turn out" (1.32). By the time of this story, however, Croesus is subject to the Persian king, having suffered his own reversals of fortune, and so he advises the king to cross into Massagetan territory and fight, telling the king "it would be intolerably demeaning for Cyrus the son of Cambyses to withdraw and give ground to a woman" (1.207). Part of his persuasive strategy is playing to Cyrus' belief in female inferiority. However, victory over the Massagetae is not achieved through a great performance on the battlefield but through a trick. Croesus advises Cyrus to lure the Massagetan fighters, who are not accustomed to luxury or wine, to a banquet,

at which they become intoxicated and unable to fight. Many men are killed and Tomyris' son is captured. Tomyris then warns Cyrus again:

> You bloodthirsty man, Cyrus! . . . You used the fruit of the vine . . . that was the drug, that was the trick you relied on to overcome my son, rather than conquering him by force in battle. Now I am giving good advice, so listen carefully: give me back my son . . . if you do not I swear by the sun, who is the lord of the Massagetae that for all your insatiability I will quench your thirst for blood. (1.212)

By contrasting Cyrus' trickery with masculine warrior courage, Tomyris condemns Cyrus' performance not only as king and military leader, but also as a man. Her warning is ignored, the Persians are defeated in battle, and Cyrus is killed.

In this story, the threat to her son is given as the motivating factor for war (Iriarte 2013: 107), thus foregrounding Tomyris' role as a mother, in contrast to Artemisia, whose status as mother is minimized. Moreover, Herodotus does not show Tomyris glorying in victory. When the battle is over, she fills a skin with human blood, and searches among the Persian dead for Cyrus' body; when she finds it, she pushes his head into the skin, and insults the dead man with these words: "Although I have come through the battle alive and victorious, you have destroyed me by capturing my son with a trick" (1.214). We hear her speak as a mother; there is none of the rhetoric of self-praise that we get with Artemisia. To that extent, her conduct does not mirror that of a normative male, victorious in battle, though her military victory is itself a masculine feat.

However, Herodotus also shows her as a high-status woman exercising military power successfully and speaking honestly and openly; in this way, she acts more like the normative male than Cyrus, who uses a trick, rather than military force, to oppose her (Dewald 2013: 169–70). He is also shown to ignore the two Persian customs of showing honesty and bravery in battle (1.136), thereby losing the *andreia* attributed to him as a young man when he was "the bravest and best-liked man of his generation" (1.123). Cyrus makes a strategic mistake in listening to Croesus, who voices the inferiority of women, rather than heeding Tomyris' warnings; as a result, he fails to live up to masculine norms that require victory in battle and straightforward speech However, his downfall, in Herodotus' judgment, is principally because, like Xerxes, he rejects human limitations. He thinks he is both immortal and invincible, thus trying to cross the boundary between human and divine, the one polarity which, for Herodotus, is inviolable.

Pheretime

In my third case study, it is a woman, Pheretime, who oversteps her mortal limits (Mitchell 2012: 10–11; Dewald 2013: 168).

> Pheretime went to Euelthon and asked him to supply her with an army, to restore her and her son to Cyrene. Euelthon proceeded to give her everything – except an army . . . In the end Euelthon presented her with a golden spindle

> and distaff, and gave her some wool as well. When Pheretime gave her usual response to the gifts, Euelthon replied that these were the kinds of things he would give a woman, but he would never give a woman an army.
>
> (4.162)

This story follows civil strife in Libya, which leads Pheretime to flee to Cyprus. In their verbal exchange, Euelthon gives expression to a standard patriarchal view of the role of women; the spindle was the archetypal gift for a woman, symbolizing her role within the household.[14] Through her repeated refusal of these gifts and her request for an army, she is shown to reject the gender performance expected of her, though her high status as guest-friend is recognized by Euelthon. After her son's death at the hands of men from Barca, another city in Libya, Pheretime persuades the Persian governor of Egypt, Aryandes, to put an army at her disposal (4.167). These forces besiege Barca until the Barcaeans are tricked into letting the Persians enter the city and Pheretime takes revenge, showing the characteristics of a tyrant, for whom gender display becomes a "horrific tableau" of sexualized barbarity (Iriarte 2013: 108–10).

> The Barcaeans who had played the biggest part in her son's death were handed over to Pheretime by the Persians, and she had them impaled at intervals all around the city walls. She also had their wives' breasts cut off and displayed here and there on the city walls too.
>
> (4.202)

Herodotus is clear as to the consequences of her overstepping boundaries:

> Pheretime came to a bad end as well . . . [as] she died a horrible death. She became infested with a mass of worms while still alive, as if to show people that excessive vengeance earns the gods' displeasure.
>
> (4.205)

Pheretime asks for an army and rejects the spindle, showing a disregard for the constraints of *nomos*; her gender transgression may be seen as emblematic of her excess, as is her cruelty and barbaric practice. Is her story, therefore a cautionary tale of the dangers of powerful women? Herodotus' judgment on her death suggests that she is punished ultimately for overstepping the limits set by the gods on human vengeance rather than for her violation of gender norms. The end of the story makes it clear that the issue is not her gender but the same problem highlighted in other stories of male tyrants: power corrupts her, and she oversteps the limits of acceptable human behavior.

Conclusion

In the Athenian city-state, the binary opposition of genders is highlighted by the ideology of female inferiority that goes hand in hand with the exclusion of women from male, political power. However, the ideology still has a firm hold even when

women do exercise power and leads some men to underestimate female capacity. Cyrus thinks Tomyris will be tricked into surrendering her power through a marriage alliance and does not take her advice or warnings seriously. In fact, it is Cyrus who fails to live up to the normative gender performance expected of a Persian man and king, seeking to defeat the Massagetae through a trick rather than through bravery in battle. The performance of warlike masculine valor is by Tomyris, not by him. Xerxes and Artemisia both articulate the binary opposition of male and female. Xerxes, however, is shown to misread the actions both of his men and of Artemisia, casting them as cowards and the queen as brave. His defeat at Salamis, which makes him scared and forces him to retreat, fractures his omnipotence as Persian king. Meanwhile Artemisia, who survives as a free woman, both in speech and action, is very far from the ideological construct of the inferior woman, yet her performance of *andreia* is not straightforward. Her ambiguous characterization as brave in speech, the giver of good advice but also capable of treachery and deception is shown not to be a function of her gender, as these qualities, both positive and negative, are found equally in men. Herodotus also shows that it would be a mistake to read Pheretime's story as a warning on the excesses of female power.

To conclude, Herodotus, a non-Athenian, destabilizes the binary opposition of male and female by showing the disjuncture between the rhetoric of female inferiority and the agency and authority of women in his wider narrative. He characterizes men and women in a nuanced and complex way, and undermines the stereotype of the powerful woman who, for example, wields power through trickery, or whose public interventions lead to disaster for the wider community. He shows men who do not live up to gender expectations, as well as women who defy those expectations. However, Cyrus, Xerxes, and Pheretime all go beyond acceptable human boundaries, thus suggesting that *hubris* causes their ultimate downfall.

Notes

1 I want to thank Tatiana Tsakiropoulou-Summers for her considerable help and advice in shaping this chapter; it is much improved, as a result.

2 For examples on revenge, see Candaules' wife (1.8–12) and Harpagus (1.129); on meting out cruel and unusual punishment, see Mytileneans (5.38) and Amestris (9.112); on deception, see Phronime's stepmother (4.154) and Minyans (4.146); on trickery, Nitocris of Babylon (1.187) and Ariston (6.62); on killing, see case studies; on acting on behalf of family, see Periander's daughter (3.53) and the Macedonians (5.18–20); on speech, see case studies.

3 For women symbolizing respect for culture and the constraints of *nomos*, see Blok (2002: 227); Baragwanath (2008: 153). In the fifth century BCE, *nomos* meant law or custom, written or unwritten; on this, see Thomas (2000: 102). All translations of transliterated Greek words are from Liddell, Scott, and Jones (LSJ) (1996) *A Greek-English Lexicon*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

4 On Homeric and sophistic aspects of Herodotus, see Baragwanath (2008: 35–59); Thomas (2000: 267–9). On Herodotus' self-presentation, see Baragwanath (2008: 78–81); Branscome (2013).

5 On social model of intersectionality, "a deconstructive move challenging the sameness/difference paradigms in law, politics, and civil society", see Cho et al. (2013).
6 All translations of passages from the *Histories* are by Robin Waterfield (1998).
7 See West and Zimmerman (2009: 113–14) on gender as a collective performance, regulated by the group, combining display of the "socially regulated external insignia of sex" with the conduct culturally sanctioned for men and women.
8 *andragathiē* means bravery, manly virtue. The *andr-* element, from *anēr*, connects this word with *andreia*, which means manliness, manly spirit.
9 Thomas (2000: 113–17) on the changeability of *nomos*.
10 Baragwanath (2008: 23–4) on the "rhetorical awareness of Herodotus' contemporary audience".
11 See, for example, Antenor's description of Menelaus and Odysseus; "*When they began to weave their stories and schemes before everyone*" (*Iliad* 3.212) it proved to be Odysseus whom no man could rival, while the education of Achilles made him a "speaker of words and a doer of deeds" (*Iliad* 9.443).
12 *isēgoriē* means 'equal right to speak' and is praised by Herodotus for making the Athenians better at warfare than their neighbours (5.78).
13 *kakon ergasamenēn: kakon* can mean bad/cowardly/harmful.
14 See Mitchell (2012: 10) on the Homeric echo: Hector tells Andromache to go to her loom and distaff, because war is men's work (Hom. *Iliad* 6.490–3).

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4 Women in Thucydides

Absence and inferiority[1]

Kelly E. Shannon-Henderson

In Thucydides' version of the famous Funeral Oration, the Athenian general Pericles addresses the Athenians in 430 BC at the burial of those who died in the first year of the Peloponnesian War. Speaking to the war-widows, he voices one of the strongest statements on female exclusion in Greek literature:

> If I must also say something about womanly virtue (*gynaikeias . . . aretēs*) to all of you who will now be in widowhood, I will make my entire declaration in this one piece of advice: There is great glory (*megalē . . . doxa*) for you in not being worse than your existing nature (*tēs hyparchousēs phuseōs*), and for whichever of you has the least reputation (*kleos*) among men concerning either her excellence (*aretēs*) or her faults.
>
> (Thucydides 2.45.2)

In ancient Greek society, driven by the warrior ethics of the Homeric poems in which the most honorable action a man could perform was to fight bravely on behalf of his city, *kleos* (good reputation) refers to the renown won through a feat of strength or courage on the battlefield (Pucci 1998: 36–7; Lendon 2005: 24, 85). Women, however, had no comparable public role where they could win *kleos* (Gilhuly 2009: 18). If a woman has done something to attract attention, Pericles implies, it was not necessarily good; therefore, no virtuous woman should wish to be talked about in public.

Since at least the time of Plutarch,[2] Pericles' words have been interpreted as the statement *par excellence* of the Greek principle of excluding women from public life, ensuring that they should be neither seen nor heard outside the house, and as a statement of Thucydides' own opinion on women's lack of importance (e.g. Rusten 1989: 176; Cartledge 1993: 130). Some scholars, however, have rightly questioned whether we should read this passage as a programmatic statement explaining why Thucydides included so little material on women elsewhere in his work (Goldhill 1986: 109–11; Kallet-Marx 1993: 135). We should certainly be wary of reading Pericles' speech as universalizing statement about women in general.[3] Nevertheless, since "all wives were potential widows and all women potential wives" (Hardwick 1993: 147), the essential misogyny of these words has a broader application beyond the immediate audience of war widows. Pericles'

observations on female nature (*phusis*) and excellence (*aretē*) echo assessments found elsewhere in Greek thought; many Greek scientific writers believed women's *phusis* to be both physically and morally inferior to men's.[4] When Pericles advises the Athenian widows that they can earn glory by not degenerating from their "existing nature", he implies a "clear . . . sense of limitation" to what women are naturally capable of achieving (Rusten 1989: 177).

Pericles' observations on female *phusis* raise a question about whether Thucydides views women as capable of building a reputation (*kleos*) for virtuous behavior (*aretē*). Pericles' view that *doxa* (glory) is available to war-widows only if they manage *not* to earn *any* sort of reputation is actually very close to the principle that seems to govern Thucydides' treatment of women; if anything, Thucydides is even more of a misogynist than Pericles. Thucydides downplays the presence, and therefore the importance, of women in the course of events by granting them minimal space in the text. As this study will show, even when women are discussed, they are completely unable to effect change in the political realm, or the nature of their involvement is decidedly negative. The political-military historical picture Thucydides creates is one in which women have almost no place at all, and, as the implication of his evidence suggests, probably *should* have no place.

Omission and relegation

Thucydides' attitude to women, insofar as we can reconstruct it, is most tellingly suggested by the fact that women scarcely command his authorial attention at all. Herodotus, Thucydides' major predecessor, uses the word 'woman' (*gunē*) 373 times, but there are fewer than 50 references to women in Thucydides' work (Dewald 1981: 92; Wiedemann 1983: 163). This may simply reflect the prevailing cultural expectation that respectable women should not be mentioned by name (Schaps 1977), but it also highlights each historian's different focus. Herodotus often uses women to make points about different societies' cultural values (Dewald 1981: 112), but Thucydides is much less concerned with cultural differences; his narrative focuses on battles and soldiers, who were *ipso facto* men. Greek women could accompany armies to provide support services such as food preparation,[5] but fighting itself was supposed to be a man's job. As Thucydides' Nicias says to the Athenians, "men (*andres*) are the city, not walls or ships empty of men" (7.77.7). In using the word *andres* ('men') rather than *anthrōpoi* ('people'), Nicias is not only setting up a contrast between the human and the physical elements of a state, but he is also "defin[ing] a sex-based polemology" that specifically excludes women from the sphere of combat, an important part of a state's identity (Payen 2015: 215).[6] Thucydides even leaves out some women who play important roles in other authors' narratives of the Peloponnesian War, such as Aspasia, Pericles' foreign-born partner who was highly educated and politically active (Flacelière 1971: 701; Cartledge 1993: 131),[7] or the Spartan queen, Timaia, whose alleged affair with Alcibiades may have strained political relations between him and her husband Agis (Harvey 1985: 79).

These women, known to have been closely linked with the main protagonists, merit not even a mention; Thucydides clearly thinks them irrelevant to the war's course and outcome.

The few women Thucydides does discuss are often removed from the main action of the war. Some belong to the distant, mythical past, and even they have negative associations with promiscuity (Helen of Troy, 1.9.1) or betrayal (Eriphyle, 2.102.5; Westlake 1977: 358–9). Others live in societies far removed from contemporary Athens and Sparta either in space (distant communities on the northern edge of the Greek world) or in time (Athens in the sixth century BC, when the *polis* was governed by a family of tyrants). These women are often passive bystanders to the events in question, yet unlike Pericles' ideal woman of the Funeral Oration, they somehow earn a small degree of *kleos* by being mentioned in Thucydides' text. Still, they cannot be considered role models for women living in the democratic society of fifth-century Athens; this corroborates the notion that good citizen women must lack any kind of *kleos*. Furthermore, even when women do appear, they are mentioned mostly in passing. They are rarely mentioned by name, but instead are described as someone's daughter, wife, sister, or mother. Elsewhere, women are referred to as an undifferentiated collective when Thucydides discusses a city's female population. This conspicuous marginalization of women is the most telling piece of evidence for any attempt to assess their significance in Thucydides: an author who believed that women were important for determining the course of human events would not have ignored Aspasia or relegated female presence to the temporal and geographical margins of history. We must keep this larger issue in mind as we try to make sense of the few women who do appear in the text: whatever we can say about them, they are outnumbered by their excluded, unnamed, and silenced fellows.

Passivity and detriment: marginalized aristocratic wives

The individual women who appear on the margins mostly come from monarchical or aristocratic societies, where women's political significance is apparently greater than in contemporary democratic Athens. Several women come into play in Thrace, a theater of the war where Thucydides himself was active as a general (4.104.4–105.1; Hornblower 1996: 332–3; Marincola 1997: 182–4). For Thucydides, aristocratic Thracian society, like other barbarian societies (1.6.6), is more old-fashioned than democratic Athens; looking at Thracian women allows him to show us a world more similar to Athens' pre-democratic past, when women secured important marriage alliances between ruling families, and were correspondingly more politically relevant than under a democracy. Thucydides also includes reports of several Athenian women from periods in Athens' history before the *polis* had a democratic form of government. Their stories, told in flashbacks where Thucydides temporarily abandons his war narrative to describe long-ago events, provide a contrast with the women of democratic Athens living during the period of the war itself. These women receive Thucydides' attention in a way that individual women living under the Athenian democracy never do,

but this does not mean that they are more significant. Aristocratic women serve mainly as pawns traded by their male relatives in order to secure marriage alliances and cannot actively influence the course of events in their own right. By mentioning the women themselves only in passing, Thucydides suggests that they personally are largely irrelevant. Furthermore, the outcome of their marriages is usually detrimental, suggesting that this old-fashioned way of doing political business does not produce sound results.

Thucydides mentions two Thracian women used as tools by their male relatives to cement political alliances, with little positive outcome. Nymphodorus, the Athenian *proxenos* (an unofficial representative of Athenian interests) in Abdera, is the brother of the wife of Sitalces, king of the Odrysians. Nymphodorus uses this family connection to secure for the Athenians an alliance with Sitalces. Nymphodorus also brings about an Athenian alliance with Perdiccas, the Macedonian king, a troublesome figure whose loyalty in the Peloponnesian War continually wavers between support for Athens and attempts to work with the Spartans (2.29; Cole 1974). Nymphodorus' sister, Sitalces' wife, is important in the negotiation; Thucydides says that Nymphodorus' strong influence with his brother-in-law is what prompted the Athenians, who had previously considered Nymphodorus an enemy, to pursue the alliance (2.29.1). Thucydides' focus here is on familial relationships, as particularly highlighted in his observation that Sitalces' son Sadocus was granted Athenian citizenship (2.29.5), a coveted status rarely granted to non-Athenians (Hornblower 1991: 288–9). Thucydides does not mention how Nymphodorus' political position within Abdera might have made him attractive or unattractive to the Athenians as an ally; the only relevant detail is his sister's marriage to Sitalces, making this "a very personal style of negotiating and confirming alliances" (Isaac 1986: 101–2). Yet Thucydides does not describe or imply any activity or agency on the woman's part (e.g. persuading her husband to join Athens). This unnamed woman, therefore, plays a role in the shifting of alliances during the war, but does not participate actively or on her own initiative. Furthermore, the digression on the myth of Tereus and Procne that Thucydides includes here (2.29.3) paints an ominous picture of marriage alliances involving Athenians. When Thucydides mentions Sitalces' father Teres, he is reminded of the similarly named Tereus, a mythical king of Thrace, husband of the Athenian princess Procne. This fateful marriage, made as an alliance between the groom and the bride's father Pandion (2.29.3), ended in rape, cannibalism, and tragedy. By inserting the myth of Tereus into his discussion of Athenian diplomatic relations with Thracians and Macedonians on the basis of marriage alliances, Thucydides may have intended to lend a similar air of doom to this marriage-based alliance between Athens and Sitalces, the son of a man of similar name (Rusten 1989: 133).

Indeed, Athens' alliance with Sitalces turns out to be short-lived, and is undone by another marriage alliance. Perdiccas induces Sitalces to abandon his attack on Macedon by giving his sister Stratonice in a lucrative marriage to Sitalces' nephew, Seuthes (2.101.5–6; Cole 1974: 65–6). Stratonice is at least granted the prominence of being mentioned by name; but just like Nymphodorus'

unnamed sister, she influences the course of events only passively, as a material reward granted by one man to another in exchange for political favors. This alliance also turns out to be detrimental to Athens: Perdiccas, bolstered by the Thracians and freed from harassment by the Athenians, will later help to convince the Spartans to send their general Brasidas to Thrace and lend aid to the cities there that are revolting from Athenian control (4.79.2; see Cole 1974: 67–9; Hornblower 1996: 263).

For Thucydides, therefore, these sorts of marriage alliances are characteristic of the exotic North, far removed from the center of the Greek world. They are also highly suspect: Thucydides associates them with myths of brutality and with Perdiccas, whose relentless instances of treachery Thucydides clearly condemns (Chambers 1986). When Thucydidean women are involved in the course of shifting alliances, they may be exerting more influence than would be possible in democratic Athens (although even this is debatable given their mainly passive role as pawns in the marriage-alliance game), but for Thucydides their involvement is not positive: trading women for power is characteristic of the opportunistic Perdiccas and is not exactly a noble way to wage war. Marriage alliances also cannot contribute to the long-term stability of relationships between states, since their benefits can be neutralized by subsequent marriage alliances.

The same is true in Athens, in a story of marriage alliances that stretches back to the time of the conspiracy of Cylon, an Athenian aristocrat who attempted a coup in Athens in 632 BC. Thucydides, in a digression on the episode (1.126), makes a point of noting that Cylon's marriage to the daughter of Theagenes, tyrant of Megara (1.126.3), formed the basis for a political alliance that helped Cylon's own attempt at tyranny (1.126.5). When the coup failed, Cylon's followers were killed in the sanctuaries on the Acropolis where they had taken refuge (1.126.10–11). These murders imparted a curse to the killers, who were members of a competing aristocratic family, the Alcmeonids. Thucydides' purpose in telling this 200-year-old story is to connect the inherited miasma of this curse with Pericles, a modern-day Alcmeonid descendant and the leading Athenian politician and general at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. The connection is already known to the Spartans, who before the war's official outbreak use the Alcmeonid curse as a rallying cry, demanding that the Athenians expel the goddess' curse by exiling Pericles because "they were aware that their designs against the Athenians would easily advance if he were exiled" (1.127.1). So Theagenes' daughter, whose marriage to Cylon made these events possible, has a detrimental impact on Athenian politics and the Greek geo-political scene from beyond the grave. Furthermore, Thucydides stresses the ominous female connection by specifying that Pericles has inherited the curse on his *mother*'s side (1.127.1).[8] This indicates that even in modern, democratic Athens, women are occasionally still relevant and important for the relationships between families that their marriages can procure. But again, this female involvement is portrayed in a decidedly bad light. What connects these two women to the Peloponnesian War is a curse made possible through one woman's marriage and transmitted to Pericles through another's; it is because of women that Athens' most prominent politician is tainted.

In the kinds of societies past and present when women's marriages affect political alliances, to Thucydides, the results are not good for the states in which they live, or for the stability of the Greek world as a whole. So, if pre- or non-democratic societies give greater political prominence to women because of their usefulness in securing these marriage alliances, Thucydides' narrative questions this practice, suggesting that marriage and statecraft should not mix. On the other hand, it is not certain that Thucydides wishes to convey even this message to the reader, for these women are mentioned only in passing. He does not flag them as significant in any way, and (with the exception of Stratonice) does not even give their names, but merely reports their existence as secondary historical details. When political developments occur, it is not due to any active involvement of the women themselves.

This remains true when we examine a portion of Thucydides' text with an "astonishing" (Hornblower 2008: 438) concentration of women: the digression in book 6 on the Peisistratid family that ruled Athens as tyrants in the sixth century BC, where Thucydides provides a detailed account of the rule of the tyrant Hippias and the assassination of his brother Hipparchus at the hands of two other aristocrats, Harmodius and Aristogeiton. The evidence he presents about the tyrant's family is derived from his own first-hand observation of two inscriptions dating from that time: an inscribed stele mentioning Hippias's wife Myrrhine, mother of his five children (6.55.1), and the tombstone of Archedice, Hippias's daughter (6.59.3).[9] It is important and unusual that both of these refer by name to women of the family. The context in which Myrrhine and Archedice are named is a good example of the value of women in tyrant-ruled Athens, where participation in the political process was dependent on family lineage. Myrrhine is mother of the children Hippias must have hoped would continue his dynasty. Archedice shows the importance of dynastic connections even more strongly: as her tombstone proclaims, she is not only the daughter of a tyrant, but also the wife of a tyrant and mother of future tyrants, because her father Hippias married her off to a son of the tyrant of Lampsacus in northwest Asia Minor (6.59.3). The importance attached to marriage and dynastic concerns reveals a world very different from the later period in which Thucydides was writing, especially because Pericles' citizenship law of 451 BC, limiting Athenian citizenship to children of two Athenian parents, would have put a stop to exactly this type of foreign marriage (Humphreys 1974: 93–4; Osborne 1997: 6–9; Blok 2009).

Yet even these prominent pre-democratic women are still treated as less important than the male members of their family. Thucydides is not really concerned with saying anything about Myrrhine, but with establishing how many children Hippias had (6.55.1), thereby underlining his own superior knowledge of the Peisistratid family (Smarczyk 2006: 508–9). Myrrhine is important to Thucydides only insofar as she is a piece of data deployed to convince his audience that his own knowledge of the past is superior to that of his fellow Athenians, who display a shocking ignorance of their own history (cf. 6.54.1). Archedice is portrayed as a convenient tool for her father Hippias's political maneuvering. Thucydides introduces her funerary epigram by telling us that Hippias sought to make a political connection with Darius, the king of Persia, with whom the

ruling family of Lampsacus had a close relationship (6.59.3). Hippoclus, father of Archedice's husband Aeantides, probably arranged for Hippias to take refuge with the Persian king after his eventual fall from power in Athens, and it is merely to prove this that Thucydides mentions Archedice's tombstone at all (Stahl 2003: 6–7; Petrovic 2007: 251). This alliance would prove to have seriously negative consequences: thanks to this connection made possible through his daughter's marriage, Hippias actually went on to help the Persians to attack his former homeland at the battle of Marathon in 490 BC (Herodotus 6.107).

The text of Archedice's epitaph is noteworthy for the prominence it gives to her male relatives. Thucydides is giving the reader a window into a time when matrilineal family connections played a much more important part in the government of Athens than they do in the democratic present of his main narrative (cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2000: 14). But the epitaph also makes a suggestion about the nature of such a (comparatively) woman-centered form of government, in the very modest claims it makes about the woman herself.

> Of a man (*andros*) who was the best of the men in Greece in his time –
> Hippias – the daughter Archedice lies concealed in this dust.
> She had a father, husband, brothers, and children who were kings (*tyrannōn*),
> but did not raise her mind to recklessness (*atasthaliēn*) (6.59.3).

Less than half of the text is really about Archedice at all; her male relatives (father, husband, and children) are the focus. This is extremely unusual: funerary inscriptions of women usually provide information about the qualities of the deceased herself (Lavelle 1986a: 240; Petrovic 2007: 251). The prominence given to her male relatives is also emphasized in the strange word order of the inscription: Archedice's patronym comes before her own name, with the result that the first word of the woman's tombstone is actually "man" (*andros*). Given the usual conventions of funerary inscriptions, the prominence of Hippias in the poem would initially suggest to the reader that the grave belonged to *him*, not to Archedice (Petrovic 2007: 252–3). The best the inscription can say of Archedice herself is that she avoided the *atasthalia* (a reckless, hybristic wickedness particularly characteristic of evil rulers) one might have encountered in a woman from a family of tyrants (Lavelle 1986a: 242–3; Petrovic 2007: 253). Damning Archedice with faint praise in this way is not so different from Pericles' assertion in the Funeral Oration that the greatest glory available to women lies in "not being worse than their existing nature"; the world of tyranny and the world of democracy are not all that far apart where female inferiority is concerned.

One additional woman mentioned in Thucydides' digression on the tyranny further emphasizes that women are peripheral to political developments. Thucydides describes the famous attempt by Harmodius and Aristogeiton to bring down the tyranny of Hippias; the precipitating circumstances involve a woman, this time unnamed. Hipparchus, the brother of the tyrant, wishing to start a relationship with the young, attractive Harmodius, is rebuffed; Hipparchus, in retaliation, insults Harmodius' sister by refusing to allow her to participate in a religious procession, claiming she is "unworthy" (6.56.1).

Lavelle has suggested that we are to understand this as an insult to the sister's sexual purity: Hipparchus implies that she is not a virgin, and is therefore ritually impure and ineligible to participate in a religious festival for which virgins were preferred (Lavelle 1986b).[10] This decision affected not only the sister's status, but the whole family's by extension. Harmodius is described as "outraged" (6.57.3 *hubrismenos*); the word Thucydides uses, also used to describe sexual assault, implies that "Harmodios was sexually insulted through his sister" (Lavelle 1986b: 327). A social stigma of this magnitude would have ruined her prospects for marriage and the respect due to an honorable woman, but Thucydides is not interested in her perspective. Just like the wives of the Peisistratids, she is not an active player. Thucydides also does not name her, nor does he explicitly state what about her was deemed "unworthy"; this lack of detail suggests that she is in his view only a secondary factor in the assassination attempt. Indeed, Thucydides states that Harmodius and Aristogeiton took their decision to assassinate the tyrants "because of an incident involving a love affair" (6.54.1), an idea he repeats twice more in the excursus, ascribing the "beginning" (*archē*) of their plot to "sexual resentment" (*erōtikē lupē*; 6.57.3 and 6.59.1). So, in Thucydides' opinion, the main cause of the assassination attempt was an all-male love triangle in which the girl was an incidental victim of her brother's conflict with Hipparchus.[11]

Therefore, the women of the Peisistratid era, despite coming from a pre-democratic society where we would expect women to have more political value, are both doubly removed from Thucydides' main narrative: even within the digression, they are marginalized. Scholars have shown that the Peisistratid digression, and particularly the portion about Hipparchus, Harmodius, and Aristogeiton, has a close connection with Thucydides' main narrative of the Peloponnesian War, in that the behavior of the tyrants has important parallels with how the Athenian democracy is functioning during the war: the story is told as an important allegory for the way Athens is becoming more like a tyranny as a result of the Peloponnesian War (Rawlings 1981: 90–117; Meyer 2008: 19–23). But since women are only peripheral within the Peisistratid digression, they cannot be part of that lesson. This denigration and marginalization of female involvement suggests that, to Thucydides, women have always been unimportant in politics, even in periods of history where they were comparatively valued.

Women in war: murder, walls, and stasis

Even the rare examples of women's active involvement in the Peloponnesian War are not unproblematic. A good example is the story of Brauro:

> And Myrcinus, a city of Edonia, also went over to [Brasidas], after Pittacus the king of the Edonians died at the hands of the sons of Goaxis and his own wife Brauro; and not long after Galepsus and Oisyme also went over to Brasidas; these are Thasian colonies.
>
> (4.107.3)

Evidently Pittacus was in favor of alliance with Athens; thanks to his death, several Edonian cities previously under his control are now free to go over to Sparta. Brauro therefore contributes to the success of the Spartans against the Athenians by killing Pittacus, so she has a direct effect on the course of the war – an unusually active role for a woman to play. As the wife of a king, Brauro belongs to a non-democratic society; we can imagine that a woman in Athens, or any other democratic *polis*, would not have the same opportunity for political impact (Hornblower 1996: 239). Wiedemann has dismissed Brauro's assassination of Pittacus as "non-rational" (1983: 168), but this assessment is unnecessarily reductive; Hornblower notes, "Without knowing what Brauro had to put up with from Pittakos, or what she thought of his presumably pro-Athenian policies, I do not see how we can be sure that what she did was actually irrational" (1996: 239). Readers have the possibility of viewing Brauro as a political actor in her own right, with her own opinions on statecraft distinct from those of her husband, who takes the drastic step of murdering him to make her homeland change its political alliance in line with her own pro-Spartan sympathies.[12] But even here the ideology of female inferiority rears its head. The action Brauro takes is decidedly negative: Greek literature does not take kindly to women who murder their husbands, a dangerous subversion of the gender paradigm.[13] Even when a woman in Thucydides' text *does* influence the course of events, she reinforces the idea that women are brutal, and resort to murder to get their way.

What of female involvement in the actual fighting? While ancient women could not serve as hoplites or sailors, they may have been more actively involved in fighting than our sources suggest, particularly in defensive warfare during a siege. Since women would mostly have watched the fighting from the city walls, this defensive viewpoint is effectively the only one from which women can participate in war (Schaps 1982: 195–6; Hornblower 2000: 44–5; Payen 2015: 219–20). Thucydides includes four brief reports of women's active involvement in fighting in extreme circumstances. These women, all nameless, are mentioned only in passing as incidental details of Thucydides' larger story. Nevertheless, their activities make a difference to the war on a small scale, opening up the possibility of females influencing the course of events.

Women and slaves sometimes assist with building defensive walls around their cities, an act not only crucial to the war effort, but also central to Greek ideas of statehood and sovereignty. This occurs in both Athens (1.90.3)[14] and in Argos (5.82.6). Both passages are noteworthy for their use of the word *pandēmei*, "with the entire population", so that "this effort involves every person – regardless of social or political position, regardless of age or gender – who might be useful in the defense of city and country" (Georgoudi 2015: 210). Here, the inclusion of women is perhaps an indicator of their communities' democratic values. Something similar can be said of occasions when women are involved in actual combat, a rare example of female heroism as women rally to the cause of their city in its time of need. Thucydides twice describes the women of a besieged city participating in battle by throwing roof-tiles from housetops:[15] first at Plataea, a democratic city allied with Athens under attack by Thebes, a Spartan ally (2.4.2), and again in

the civil war ravaging Corcyra (a north-western Greek island), where women assisted the democratic party (3.74.1). Much like the wall-building women of Argos and Athens, the women of Plataea and Corcyra are forced to participate by the exigencies of wartime, but, in a sense, are also called to participate because of the democratic values of the communities in which they live. Loraux explicitly contrasts their active participation with the more restricted roles available to women in aristocratically governed societies: they "are not . . . forced into servile unions by a tyrant's whim" but "fight . . . alongside the men for the common salvation of the city or *demos*" (Loraux 1995: 232). In particular, the Corcyrean women are a crucial part of the undertaking: Thucydides notes, "The women daringly took part together with them (*tolmêrôs xunepelabonto*) by throwing roof-tiles from the houses and, contrary to their nature (*para phusin*), bearing up amid the tumult" (3.74.1). The verb Thucydides uses to describe their actions (*xunepelabonto*), usually translated as "assisted", actually has connotations of participating in something together with others; the women are not mere appendages to male action, but an important element of the *demos* working in cooperation with other elements to save the city (Georgoudi 2015: 209–10). And the women have some success: in Plataea, they cause such havoc that the Thebans retreat (2.4.2), while in Corcyra, the engagement in which the women take part ends in a rout of the opposing oligarchic party (3.74.2; Loraux 1995: 231). Therefore, the participation of these women in battle not only provides a rare example of female involvement in combat, but also exemplifies what the inclusive values of the *demos* enable a society to achieve: the ability of the *demos* to work together, involving even sectors of the population normally excluded from war, contributes to the city's success. The fact that these nameless women become involved in fortification and combat operations shows that perhaps an average woman living in a democratic state has a better chance of making an active contribution than a queen married off to secure an alliance. Once again, however, Thucydides expends only a few words describing these women's involvement; they are almost a footnote in his accounts of the battles, so their contribution is only small.

Thucydides describes the Corcyrean women as behaving "contrary to their nature" (*para phusin*). This detail, an observation that Thucydides did not make about the otherwise similar tile-throwing women of Plataea, marks the Corcyrean women as unusual and therefore particularly deserving of our attention. It is possible to interpret Thucydides' comment as praiseworthy; much as the war-widows are admonished in Pericles' Funeral Oration to do, these women have perhaps risen above the limitations of their inferior feminine *phusis* (Harvey 1985: 83) to display the positive trait of self-control. But the context of their fighting is *stasis*, civil war, and this undermines the Corcyrean women's success – for Thucydides has a decidedly negative opinion of *stasis*, enumerating its deleterious effects on society (3.82–3). Among these is the way *stasis* warps the characters of those who participate in it: here, "war is a harsh teacher that makes the temperaments (*tas orgas*) of many similar to their present circumstances" (3.82.2). Although Thucydides uses a different word (*orgē* rather than *phusis*), we can perhaps still see a connection with his observations on the women of Corcyra: perhaps in

descending to unladylike tile-throwing they are not rising above their feminine weakness, but sinking below the expected level of feminine decorum. Acting "contrary to nature" (*para phusin*) is not necessarily good, because it is an example of how *stasis* warps character. Furthermore, Thucydides' observation that the women fought boldly (*tolmērōs*) recalls another portion of the *stasis*-passage, where he notes that during civil unrest, *tolma* is a bad quality associated with a lack of reason (*logos*): under the warping effects of *stasis*, he says, "unreasoned daring (*tolma alogistos*) came to be called the courage (*andreia*) of loyalty to one's party" (3.82.4).[16] The women of Corcyra acting "boldly" is therefore an example of how political pressures undermine the fabric of society. Women's only hope, as Pericles admonishes in the Funeral Oration, is to avoid being *worse* than their *phusis* allows; to behave contrary to *phusis* is not necessarily to behave better. It is also significant that the "courage" (*andreia*) that Thucydides claims *stasis* undermines is etymologically related to the Greek word for "man" (*anēr*). *Stasis* is a feminine form of warfare, both in that its weapons (stones and roof tiles) are "the instruments of a type of killing that is not far from murder", and in that it "falsifies the notion of *andreia*" (Loraux 1995: 234, 238). By having women fight with roof-tiles at Corcyra, "contrary to their nature", Thucydides shows us that disintegration firsthand – and it will accelerate, in a later engagement when Corcyrean men also adopt this problematic fighting tactic (4.48.2; Loraux 1995: 325 n. 21; Georgoudi 2015: 211 n. 23).

One of the Plataean women provides a parallel for the connection between women and *stasis*: by raising the specter of internal conflict during the Plataeans' struggle against the external Theban enemy. When the Plataeans have barred the city gates to trap the Theban attackers inside the city so that they can easily be killed, a Plataean woman assists the enemy by giving some of the Theban soldiers an axe that enables them to cut through the gate and escape (2.4.4). This is a rare instance of a woman to whom Thucydides gives agency (Hornblower 1991: 242); but what is the nature of that agency? While we cannot rule out the possibility that the woman did not give up the axe willingly (Harvey 1985: 86 n. 23), she appears more like a traitor to her own city who assists the enemy during battle. Thucydides depicts the feminine element in warfare as unpredictable, something that cannot be counted upon to further the best interests of the city (Loraux 1995: 237). So, Thucydides, far from praising 'girl power', casts serious doubt upon women's contribution to warfare, and thus on their value in the societies for which they fight. While having women fight is a part of the democratic *ethos* that may contribute to the community's success, it is also extremely risky: the kind of exigencies that compel women to enter battle also warp character and undermine loyalty.

Conclusion

The rare presence of women, amounting to near total absence, in Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War, and their passivity or wickedness when they do appear, constitute a powerful statement of the ideology that viewed women

as inferior and sought to exclude them from political affairs. Women are written out of history entirely, left unnamed, relegated to the distant past, placed in the exotic far North, and deprived of political agency. When they do appear, Thucydides insinuates that their involvement is deleterious to society. Most depictions of women in the text seem to lend credence to the notion that women were devalued in democratic Athens in comparison with previous periods or other cities ruled by monarchy or tyranny: many of the women Thucydides mentions come either from Athens' pre-democratic past, or from far-off present-day societies where lineage-based governments are in control, and the marriage alliances women can procure are of great political importance. But even here, women's importance is largely marginal: aristocratic women are still mentioned mostly in passing, or are cast as innocent accessories to (or victims of) the political doings of their male relatives. For Thucydides, the type of society in which a woman appears makes only a minute difference; women are, and always have been, marginal, unimportant, and passive.

Furthermore, female involvement in affairs is usually negative: it sparks feuds that lead to political violence, transmits ancestral curses, and leads to husband-murder. For Thucydides, it seems, women are not, never have been, and should not be active in the affairs of the *polis*. This is also – perhaps even particularly – true in a democratic society. Involving women is to a certain degree part of a democratic ethos: in the exigencies of war, women may be called to help the *polis* along with the rest of the *demos*, as with the relatively positive example of the women of Athens and Argos who contribute to the building of city walls. But the tile-throwing *stasis*-women of Corcyra and the traitorous Plataean woman with her axe contribute to instability in the *polis*. While it may lead to limited, short-term success when women act contrary to their nature, the eventual effect is to undermine what it means to possess masculine courage (*andreia*). In Thucydides' view, the achievement of good *kleos* by a woman seems not merely difficult, as Pericles implied in the Funeral Oration, but perhaps downright impossible. The only time in the text where women are said to act "contrary to their nature", they seem to behave *worse* than usual – as Pericles explicitly admonishes them not to do. Women are a part (albeit a vanishingly small one) of negative developments in their cities; but from functioning and flourishing societies, such as Pericles' ideal vision of Athens in the Funeral Oration, they are banished altogether.

Notes

1 I am grateful to Ted Lendon, Elizabeth Meyer, Chris Pelling, and Tatiana Summers for their comments and suggestions. References are always to Thucydides unless otherwise stated. Translations are my own.

2 Plut. *Moralia* 242E: "[Thucydides] thought that the body and name of a good woman should be shut away, kept from the public eye". On the passage, see Walcot (1973: 112–13, 120–1); Dover (1974: 98); Rhodes (1988: 226); Hornblower (1991: 314); Hardwick (1993: 147).

3 Pericles could be cautioning war-widows specifically not to attract negative attention by mourning their dead husbands immoderately (Lacey 1964: 49; Øivind 1987: 37;

Hardwick 1993: 157; Tyrrell and Bennett 1999: 45–50), or by behaving too promiscuously in seeking remarriage (Øivind 1987: 41–3; Hardwick 1993: 152).

4 E.g. Aristotle, *HA* 608a21–608b15, with Lloyd (1983: 94–105); Yates, this volume.

5 Ten Plataean women assist male combatants in the "not very glorious" (Hornblower 1991: 360) role of remaining in the besieged city to bake bread (2.78.3), perhaps involuntarily (Harvey 1985: 74). For similar examples, see Ducrey (2015: 184, 188–91).

6 Cf. *Iliad* 6.490–492 and Plato *Laws* 7.860a–b. See Kearns (1990: 338); Ducrey (2015: 187–8); Georgoudi (2015: 204).

7 Aspasia's absence is particularly ironic given Plato's testimony that Aspasia composed a funeral oration for Pericles to deliver (*Menexenus* 4.236B, with Bloedow 1975: 43–8; Cantarella 1987: 53–5; Hardwick 1993: 148; Henry 1995: 32–40; Pomeroy 1995: 89–90).

8 Thucydides does not, like Herodotus (6.131), give Pericles' mother's name (Agariste).

9 On Thucydides' use of inscriptional evidence, see Hornblower (1987: 89–91); Smarczyk (2006); Petrovic (2007: 254–9); Hornblower (2008: 448). Aristotle (*Rh.* I.1367e) attributes this epigram to the poet Simonides.

10 The phrase could also signify that Harmodius' family was of low rank/social standing (Dover 1965: 66; Rawlings 1981: 106; Meyer 2008: 17 n. 28).

11 Vickers (1995: 196) highlights the repetition of the adjective *erōtikos*. Hornblower (2008: 436–8) notes Thucydides' attempts to correct Herodotus' account of the same conspiracy, which downplayed the homosexual angle.

12 The role of the sons of Goaxis is unclear. Perhaps Brauro herself was the mastermind and they were her agents, or they may have used her as the instrument to carry out the assassination given her proximity to Pittacus.

13 See Goldhill (1986: 14) and Pomeroy (1995: 21–2, 98–9) on Clytemnestra, roundly vilified in the literary tradition for killing her husband Agamemnon; cf. *Odyssey* 24.199–202, with Russo et al. (1992: 380–1).

14 I follow Harvey (1985: 87 n. 29), Hornblower (2008: 212), and Rhodes (2014: 243) in taking this passage as genuine, not an interpolation (as some have suggested).

15 The roof-tile is the weapon *par excellence* of women, who would not have received proper combat training (Harvey 1985: 73–4).

16 See Price (2001: 39–42). Thucydides also ascribes the actions of the 'tyrannicides' to *tolma* (6.59.1; see Loraux 1995: 238; Stahl 2003: 2).

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5 Autochthonous landscape and female exclusion in the Athenian democracy[1]

Allison Surtees

Athens in the fifth century is remembered for its art, theater, philosophy, and perhaps most of all for its democracy. The political system and its institutions transformed the polis and made a fundamental impact on the roles and lives of Athenian-born men and women. Over the course of the century, the polis developed a direct voting system and a host of laws and institutions which put the power of running and protecting the city in the hands of the *demos*. All participants in the system had equal power and influence, in theory if not in practice, thus promoting equality among them. But Athenian political participation was limited to citizen men, and so this equality applied only to them. All other members of Athenian society were excluded from political life, and the largest group of these was women. While the exclusion of women from public life was not new, the ideology of Athenian civic identity that underlay the fifth-century democracy heightened the distinction between men and women in Athenian society. Against this backdrop, the myth of Athenian autochthony, along with the parental roles of Athena and Hephaestus within it, takes on a new meaning. The omnipresence of the autochthony myth in the Athenian visual and physical landscape (including vase painting, sculpture, temples, and the topography of the Athenian cityscape) supports the new emphasis on Athenian civic identity, and specifically reinforces the roles of mothers and fathers in the creation of Athenian citizens. The ubiquitous references to Athena (and others) as mother and Hephaestus as father promote a gendered paradigm for the creation and maintenance of Athenian citizens and citizenship, one which contrasts the public role of fathers with the domestic role of mothers. The way the visual culture negotiates the relationships between male and female characters in the myth underlines that only men may have a public role, while women must be relegated to the home, thereby furthering the exclusion of women from public life by praising their domestic importance.

Athenian autochthony and motherhood

The birth of Erichthonius and the daughters of Cecrops on Athenian vases

As the story goes, Athena fled from an attempted assault by Hephaestus, and in the chase the god ejaculated on her leg. Athena wiped off the sperm, flung it to

the ground, and from this Erichthonius was born. Gē (as Mother Earth) delivered the child up to Athena, who placed the child in a basket with a snake. The basket was entrusted to the daughters of the autochthonous king Cecrops, with the strict instruction not to look into the basket, a directive which only one of the daughters obeyed. The two other sisters looked into the basket, were driven mad and flung themselves from the Acropolis. The child was then raised in Athena's temple to become later king and the ancestor of all Athenians (Avramidou 2011; Gantz 1993). While this myth was not a fifth-century construction, the way in which it was politically employed was (Shapiro 1998). The priority placed on Athenian civic identity and defining citizenship is most clearly reflected in Pericles' citizenship law of 451/0 B.C.,[2] which restricted citizenship to those with two Athenian parents (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 26.4; Blok 2009). Born from the earth, Erichthonius is the ancestor of all Athenians and thus a symbol of the new insistence on Athenian ancestry as a pre-requisite for citizenship. Autochthony implied that in a collective sense, all historical Athenians descended from Erichthonius and through him, from Athena and Hephaestus. This has important political implications for male citizens. First, all Athenian citizens were equal to one another through their common ancestry, creating a level playing field within the democracy. Second, Athenians were *de facto* superior to non-Athenians through their line of descent from the gods, a concept that played out in Athenian engagement both with other *poleis* and with non-Athenians within their own *polis* (Rosivach 1987; Shapiro 1998).

The corollary of this new emphasis on (male) citizenship was an increased scrutiny of the role of women in the *polis*. The need for citizen status in the running of the *polis* led to a focus on the parents of would-be citizens, for citizenship was a function of parental lineage, not geographical habitation. The necessity of citizens for the running of the *polis* placed an increased importance on the creators of those citizens, the Athenian mothers. It was not only maternal lineage that was important, but the act of motherhood itself. For while a man could sire a child, it was up to the woman to carry the pregnancy to term, give birth, and rear the child in safety. The result was two-fold: on the one hand, Athenian women held an increased status within the state and a more visible role in the public eye; on the other hand, the increased emphasis on Athenian motherhood reinforced the idea that this more visible role was one carried out in private, not public. If women's greatest contribution to the *polis* was carried out in the home, it was in the home that she ought to spend her time. In short, the public glorification of Athenian motherhood reinforced the existing patriarchal and misogynistic structures that supported the ideological exclusion of women from public life.

The connection between Athenian autochthony and misogyny is not new. The argumentation in favor of this reading, however, has focused on the *devaluation* of mothers and motherhood in the myth. Nicole Loraux (1981) reads the myth as a misogynistic expression of the patriarchy in which women were excluded from the political sphere. She argues that the role of Gē as mother replaced women in the myth and dispossessed them of their reproductive function. Marcel Detienne (2003) adds that the mythical removing of maternity

from women provided men with the security of knowing that they alone, and not women, are born from the earth. Alan Shapiro (1998) asserts that not only do women lose their role in reproduction, but also that the daughters of both Cecrops and Erechtheus are not even offered the opportunity for motherhood, as their only role is as sacrificial virgins. Countering this view, Violaine Sebillotte Cuchet (2005) has argued that the role of Gē as mother does not, in fact, negate the reproductive agency of women or suppress women's maternal role, but instead through motherhood connects Athenians as closely to the land as possible. Viktoria Johanna Rauchle takes this reading a step further, discounting feminist scholarship that sees any misogyny in these myths, and stating simply that autochthony was a means of creating "a common identity within the democratic community while at the same time confirming a natural superiority over non-Athenians. It is as easy as that, there is no need to roll out other explanations" (Rauchle 2015: 2). This interpretation, in turn, affects the way she understands the visual imagery of autochthony on the Acropolis, about which she argues that "Athenian wives and mothers were far from being excluded from the political sphere but, on the contrary, were assigned a prominent role in the 'public' face of the *polis*" (Rauchle 2015: 2).

The readings of Sebillotte Cuchet and Rauchle convincingly argue that the autochthony myth affords an importance and agency to Athenian mothers and motherhood. Moreover, Rauchle (2015) identifies in the myth the multifaceted nature of motherhood as conceived in Athenian society: the biological creation of Gē, the social and mental development of Athena, and the nurturing and biological care of the Cecropids. The recognition of the scope of this role, and the necessary time and energy required to fulfill it both acknowledges the significance of motherhood, and suggests that, if done correctly, it leaves little time for anything else. By contrast, fatherhood is represented solely in the figure of Hephaestus, suggesting the more limited nature, and time commitment, of the father in the creation of citizens. But a recognized importance of motherhood does not discount the misogyny in the myth, and to claim, as Rauchle does, that motherhood in public representations of autochthony is absolute evidence of women's prominent role in public life is to misunderstand the function of these images in this context. Public representation need not reflect a public role, and the importance of motherhood in Athenian civic identity does not naturally lead to women's political inclusion.[3] Rather, the prominent role of mothers in public representations of autochthony (the birth of Erichthonius, the Cecropids, the foundation of Athens) actually *reinforces* the ideal of women's exclusion from public life, a message that is further bolstered when read in concert with the Parthenon images of the Contest between Athena and Poseidon, and the Amazonomachy, both of which demonstrate the perils for women who dare attempt to move beyond motherhood and engage in the public sphere.

Fifth-century vase painting depicts both the birth of Erichthonius and the maternal role of the Cecropids. Both sets of images exemplify the accepted and expected roles of mothers and fathers, whereby women take center stage

Figure 5.1 The birth of Erichthonius, Berlin Staatliche Museen F2537

Source: Photograph: Art Resource, New York

in birth and child-rearing while men observe passively from the sidelines. The birth of Erichthonius is seen on roughly sixteen vases dating c. 470–430 (Rauchle 2015: 20 n.6; see also Clements 2015), and while the witnesses to the birth vary, the central composition of Gē, Athena, and Erichthonius is constant. On a kylix by the Codrus Painter c. 440–430 (Figure 5.1),[4] the birth scene wraps around both sides of the cup and includes a large cast of characters. In the center of the obverse, Gē has risen up from the earth and holds the baby Erichthonius out to Athena, and both the mother and child reach towards one another. Athena wears no helmet and has turned her aegis around, away from the baby. To the right, a nude Hephaestus watches the birth, holding a staff in his right hand and resting his left hand on his hip. To his right Herse, one of the Cecropids, moves toward the central scene, followed by her sisters Aglauros and Pandrosos on the other side of the cup. The two sisters on the reverse are joined by future kings of Athens, while king Cecrops bookends the left side of the scene, watching the birth. The three aspects of motherhood are represented by Gē, Athena, and the Cecropids, Hephaestus stands as the solitary father, and the early, autochthonous kings of Athens tie the story ever more firmly to the foundation of the *polis*. It shows a successful birth and rearing, as Erichthonius will grow to become king of Athens, and the citizen from whom all future citizens are descended.

While the birth of Erichthonius itself paints a positive picture of motherhood and the creation of future citizens, the role of the Cecropids outlines the possible dangers of motherhood not carried out correctly. The Cecropids are a cautionary tale to current and future mothers. One sister carries out her duties as instructed, leading to the successful rearing of Erichthonius, while the other two fail and lose their lives in the process. The first certain depiction of the three daughters of Cecrops is found on a cup in Frankfurt dating to c. 480, shortly after the Persian invasions (Shapiro 1995).[5] The scene is divided in two, with a column separating the two sides. On the right half, two sisters flee an enormous snake at the far right of the scene, and race towards the safety of the house on the left. There Pandrosos stands at the threshold, facing her sisters and holding out her arms towards them. Behind her, inside the house sit their father, Cecrops, and their brother, both of whom look towards the fleeing girls and reach out to them. Shapiro notes the implications of this scene:

Figure 5.2 Athena and the Cecropids, San Antonio Museum of Art

Source: Photograph: San Antonio Museum of Art

> By combining the two halves, the painter perhaps wanted to stress the contrast between the one obedient sister and the two who were not . . . This coupled with the contrast between the quiet domestic setting at the left and the wild and dangerous outdoors at the right, presents the three girls as both positive and negative exempla of a central tenet of Athenian gender ideology. A woman's proper place is in the home, under the watchful eye of her father and brothers.
>
> (Shapiro 1995: 44)

A column krater in San Antonio echoes the same theme, although in abbreviated form (Figure 5.2).[6] Two sisters flee towards the left side of the vase while a third flees to the right. All three look back towards the figure of Athena in the center, who strides to the left and reaches out to the two fleeing girls. Though they move in opposite directions, their shared gaze at Athena links the three women, and through the goddess they are visually connected even while they are physically separated. The women are further distinguished by their appearance. The two sisters on the left carry a snake, an allusion both to the basket of Erichthonius and to the dangers of the wild. The appearance of the third sister recalls the safety of the home, as Pandrosos "keeps both arms tightly enveloped in her mantle, a symbol of modesty and proper breeding that helps underline the contrast with the other two" (Shapiro 1995: 44). The sisters move in two different directions both physically and metaphorically; two face the dangers outside of their proper domestic space, while the third returns to her place in the household. Although there is no specific signifier of where the scene takes place, the ancient viewer, knowing the myth and the conventions of vase painting, would have understood that the women are separated between indoors and outdoors. Both vases stress the rewards of obedience and consequences of defiance, and Shapiro sees a clear lesson in asserting women's proper domestic place (Shapiro 1995). These three *kourotrophic* figures (that is, women nurturing a child) are not meant to carry out their maternal role outside the home.

The contest of Athena and Poseidon and the foundation of Athens on Athenian architecture

The importance of motherhood in autochthony and the foundation of Athens also plays a significant role in the decorative programs, cults, and topographical locations of the Erechtheion, Parthenon, and Hephaisteion, three monuments in central Athens dating to the second half of the fifth century (Clements 2016). These three monuments are joined by a line of visual communication from the Agora to the Acropolis that draws out both the maternal and paternal lines of autochthony and underscores their importance in ethnic and civic identification. Upon entering the Acropolis from the Propylaia, the field of vision is dominated by the Parthenon on the right (south) side, and the much smaller Erechtheion on the left (north) side (Figure 5.3). Dating to the latter half of the fifth century,



Figure 5.3 Map of the Athenian Agora and Acropolis

Source: Artist: Simone Reis

the Erechtheion is a complex cult building and the structure most explicitly associated with autochthony (Paus. 1.26–27). The primary sculptural decoration, a frieze that extended around the top of the building, is too fragmented to identify the specific subject matter, although a plausible suggestion is that the frieze represents the war between the Eleusinian hero Eumolpus, and the Athenian king Erechtheus (Rauchle 2015 with bibliography). Many of the fragments are identifiably female, and several are *kourotrophic* figures; such as, a fragmented statue of a woman holding on her lap a naked boy who reaches up with his arms around her neck (Figure 5.4). Rauchle (2015) argues that the prevalence of such maternal figures in the frieze represents their importance to the story, and that these *kourotrophoi* are connected specifically with Pandrosos. As the one obedient sister who carried out her maternal role as ordered, she represents the 'good mother', whose care aided in rearing Erichthonius and ensuring the foundation of Athens. Pandrosos' obedience was rewarded with a cult in a prominent location on the west side of the Erechtheion, next to the tomb of her autochthonous father, Cecrops (Figure 5.3).

The initial view of the Parthenon is of its west end, and specifically the West Pediment, which depicts the Contest between Athena and Poseidon for the patronage of Athens. Athena and Poseidon are in the center of the scene, flanked on either side by a collection of men and women. With the exception of Cecrops, there is no consensus on the identification of any individual figures, although it

Figure 5.4 Kourotrophic figure, from the frieze of the Erechtheion, Acropolis Museum, Athens
Source: Photograph: Hege, DAI, Athens, Neg. Nr. D-DAI-ATH-Hege 849. All rights reserved

is generally agreed that they are figures associated with the foundation of Athens (Fullerton 2000: Spaeth 1991). And a significant number of these figures are women, as noted by Burkard Fehr:

> The women are clearly in the majority in comparison to the men: the considerable number of children is also noteworthy. This is to show that the mythical Athenian community distinguished itself through exemplary wives and mothers who fulfilled their obligation toward the *polis* by bearing and raising auspicious offspring.
>
> (Fehr 2011: 136)

Here again, motherhood is key, as the mothers are the creators of the founders of Athens. The Contest also connects Athena to her role as mother in the city's foundation. In the earliest days of Athens, Athena and Poseidon competed with one another for control of the city by offering gifts; Athena an olive tree and Poseidon a salt spring. Athena triumphed, and this victory is the central focus of the West Pediment, a victory which reflects her very public role within the *polis*. Nevertheless, an ancient viewer would also know precisely *how* Athena won her victory. In one version, the contest was decided by a vote, in which all the women voted for Athena and all the men voted for Poseidon, and as the women outnumbered the men by one, Athena won by one vote (Shapiro 1998). While there are overt political implications to this story, there are underlying domestic implications as well. This vote ties Athena specifically to the mothers who supported her, not to the kings and heroes to whom the foundation is attributed. This maternal connection alludes to Athena's role as a founding mother, or perhaps more correctly *the* founding mother of Athens.

The story of the Contest also ties the Parthenon to the Erechtheion, as the founding mothers on the pediment are thematically linked with the *kourotrophoi* on the Erechtheion frieze. Beyond these mother figures, the two buildings are also linked by Athena's maternal role in the foundation story (Figure 5.3). The tree beside the Erechtheion was Athena's gift in the Contest, tying the building back to the imagery of the West Pediment and Athena's connection with motherhood therein. Moreover, the Erechtheion itself underscores Athena as mother, for it is inside this temple that she is worshipped alongside her son, and Erichthonius' father, Hephaestus. Athena as mother is neither her only nor her most prominent incarnation on the Acropolis; Athena Parthenos, Promachos, and Polias dominate the site. Nevertheless, her connection to the founding mothers of Athens on the West Pediment and to her autochthonous son and his father in the Erechtheion reveal the significance of her maternal role in Athenian autochthony and on the Acropolis.

Athenian autochthony and fatherhood

Hephaestus in Athens

If Athena's role as mother is entrenched in the Acropolis imagery, so too is the role of the father, Hephaestus. And while motherhood may be lauded through this public imagery, it is praised for actions restricted to the private sphere. Fatherhood, by contrast, is a public role, for it is the fathers who will bring their sons from the private world into their public role of founding, governing, and protecting the *polis*. Under the new citizenship law of 451/0, Athenian mothers and fathers are equally responsible for creating citizens, but each parent does so in different ways. Mothers create citizens physically and privately; fathers create them politically and publicly. While Hephaestus is not the only father associated with the foundations of Athens (the presence of Cecrops on the West Pediment and in his tomb in the Erectheion should not be overlooked), in the framework

of fifth-century autochthony he is the most prominent. Nevertheless, Rauchle (2015: 8) passes quickly over him, stating simply that "the paternal principle, embodied by the begetter Hephaestus . . . only played a minor role". This dismissal of Hephaestus as father does a disservice to the role he plays in fifth-century civic identity as represented in the Athenian political and physical landscape.

Prior to the fifth century, Hephaestus seems not to have had a substantial role in the Athenian *polis* in either the visual arts or public cult, although our evidence is admittedly fragmentary (Shapiro 1998; Sourvinou-Inwood 2008). It is in vase painting that the god has the strongest presence in sixth-century Athens, and specifically in the myth of the Return of Hephaestus to Olympus (Hedreen 2004; Surtees 2011). Thrown from Olympus, Hephaestus refused to return when the gods wanted him to come back, and it was only by coercion through wine that Dionysos led the drunken Hephaestus back to the home of the gods (Gantz 1993). Despite being a god, Hephaestus is a marginalized deity; he is mocked by the other Olympians for his infirmity, holds the low social status of a craftsman, and is even expelled from Olympus itself. In Archaic Athens, Hephaestus is most closely connected to the marginalized elements of society, on pots made by low-status members of society, marginalized figures portraying a marginalized deity in a medium without great status (Isler-Kerenyi 2004; Surtees 2011).

A very different Hephaestus appears in the fifth-century. Not only is he depicted in at least half of the birth of Erichthonius vases, a hardly insignificant number, he is an important part of the central birth scene (Clements 2015). Though not actively involved in the birth, he is not peripheral to it; his presence in and observation of the birth affirms his fatherhood and confirms the paternal lineage of the baby Erichthonius. It is not just his presence but also his physical appearance that ties the paternal Hephaestus to the citizen ideal. Hephaestus of the Return scenes is a mature, bearded deity, clothed in a chiton, himation, and hat, often carrying tongs or an axe to show his role as blacksmith (Hedreen 2004). Unlike literary accounts which describe him as physically deformed, he is almost exclusively portrayed as able bodied in the visual record and physically unremarkable, in that his body is not distinguished from any other mature male deity. In the birth of Erichthonius scenes he remains a mature, bearded figure, but in at least some he is presented nude with a clear emphasis on his physical presence. On the Codrus Painter kylix (Figure 5.1), he stands with only a mantle draped around his left arm and shoulder, an iconography which places a new emphasis on his physique and its physical strength. His muscular body with its ideal proportions and symmetry recalls the Polykleitan athletes of contemporary sculpture, and his strength and virility show him as a man capable of producing strong citizen sons, and of providing a noble ancestry to the autochthonous Athenians. In this incarnation, Hephaestus is a proud father watching the birth of his son, and his nudity, strength, and stance evoke images of ideal citizen men (Clements 2015). He is very much the ideal citizen-father, whose role was to affirm the lineage of the child and directly return to his public life in the running and protection of the city. Eventually, he would introduce his son to the city, thereby completing publicly what the women began privately, that is, creating a new Athenian citizen.

In his new role, Hephaestus gains a new physical presence in both the political and religious centers of Athens (Clements 2016). In the mid-fifth century, he is given a new cult and temple, the Hephaisteion in the Agora. The temple is tied clearly to autochthony and to Hephaestus as father; Athena shares Hephaestus' worship in the temple, and it is likely that the base of the cult statue depicted the presentation of Erichthonius (Palagia 2000). With no evidence of a previous cult, there seems to have been no religiously historical reason for placing this temple in such a prominent location, on a hill overlooking the west side of the Agora (Camp 2001). The temple stands in a liminal space, marking the border to the center of the city. To its west, lie the Kerameikos and the potter's quarters just outside the city center, a place for the societally marginalized and their marginalized blacksmith god. To the east is the Agora, where the temple sits above the main political buildings and the bureaucratic center of the Athenian democracy: the Royal Stoa, the Stoa of Zeus Eleuthereus, the Bouleuterion, the Tholos, the Prytaneion, the Strategeion, and later the Monument of the Eponymous Heroes. Here is Hephaestus, the father of Erichthonius and the ancestor of Athenian citizens. The location of the temple is not a casual one, but rather brings Hephaestus into contact with both the craftsmen to the west and the institutions of the democracy to the east, highlighting Hephaestus' dual role as marginalized deity of the Olympic Pantheon and central god in Athenian civic identity and democracy.

Nonetheless, the two sides of Hephaestus are not equal here, as both the topography and the building itself privilege the political identification of the east side. It was standard practice for the entrance of a temple to face east, and so it is the front of the Hephaisteion that overlooks the political buildings of the Agora. But while the entrance necessarily privileged the east end of temples, John Camp stresses that the construction and decoration of the Hephaisteion placed an unusual emphasis on the east end, making the contrast between east and west much more pronounced than is normally found:

> Unusual in a peripteral temple of this sort is the emphasis on the eastern end, an effect carried out by the placement of the sculptural adornment. On the east facade, the ten metopes of the frieze are sculpted with scenes of the Labors of Herakles. On the long north and south sides, only the four easternmost metopes are sculpted, showing the labors of Theseus. Where they stop, the third columns in from the facade on both north and south carry a huge beam surmounted by a continuous "Ionic" frieze which runs across the pronaos. Thus, the east end is essentially framed with sculpture in front of the pronaos on all four sides. This contrasts with the west end, where the outer metopes are not carved. In addition, the columns of the opisthodomos do not line up with the third flank column on the sides, and the frieze of the opisthodomos is thus confined to the width of the interior structure only, rather than extending the full width of the temple, as is the case in the east.
>
> (Camp 2001: 102)

This uncharacteristic structural emphasis serves not only to highlight the east end but to actively marginalize the west, thereby prioritizing the side connected with the political aspect of Hephaestus, the side associated with democracy and autochthony.

Autochthony and Athenian topography

The Hephaisteion looks not only over the Agora, but also up to the Acropolis, bringing it into direct visual communication with both the Parthenon and the Erechtheion (Hurwittt 2004). The communication with the Parthenon is one-sided, for while the Hephaisteion has a direct line of sight to the Parthenon, the Parthenon does not look back. The visual communication with the Erechtheion, however, is more intimate (Clements 2016). The east entrance of the Hephaisteion looks directly up to the north entrance of the Erechtheion, allowing Hephaestus and Athena to look from their place in the Agora up to their counterparts on the Acropolis, and vice versa, a visual exchange between the pair in their respective political and religious locations. The autochthonous parents of Erichthonius metaphorically move from the Agora to the Acropolis and back, firmly connecting the political and religious centers of the city under an umbrella of autochthonous ideology. As these buildings are tied together, so Hephaestus is tied not only to Athena, but to the *kourotrophic* women on the Erechtheion, and to Pandrosos in her adjacent shrine.

The Erechtheion acts as a node in the visual communication between the Hephaisteion and the Parthenon, drawing both buildings toward it and reflecting back out again. The north porch looks down at the Hephaisteion and the south porch looks toward the Parthenon; the six Ionic columns of the north porch are echoed in the six Caryatids on the south, with the *korai* looking from the porch directly across to the Parthenon. The Hephaisteion and Erechtheion reverberate back onto one another through the coupling of Hephaestus and Athena, just as the Parthenon and Erechtheion echo one another through the story of the Contest. But just as the Hephaisteion and Erechtheion are drawn together through both father and mother, so too are the Erechtheion and the Parthenon. The pair sit together in the assembly of the gods on the East Frieze of the Parthenon, Hephaestus bare-chested and draped with a mantle in his citizen incarnation. Moreover, Hephaestus as creator is depicted twice; once on the East Pediment, where he assists in the birth of Athena, and again on the base of the Athena Parthenos statue located inside the Parthenon, where he and Athena were shown together creating Pandora, another autochthonous child (Hurwitt 1995). The ties between Hephaestus and Athena, from the Agora to the Acropolis, run deep and his connection with Athena reinforces the importance of Hephaestus as father of Erichthonius, Pandora, and even part of the creation of Athena herself. Hephaestus as the father of autochthony is at least as important as the various figures of motherhood, and his reach extends all through the center of the city, reinforcing his very public role which in turn highlights the private role of the mothers.

Women in the public sphere: politics and military

As shown through the Cecropids on vases, the ideal role of women in the private sphere is affirmed not only in positive images of mothers, but in messages of the negative consequences women face when attempting to engage in the public sphere. The Contest on the West Pediment of the Parthenon evokes the positive aspects of motherhood and its importance to the foundation of the city. But this message is reinforced by its cautionary message for women against participating in the public sphere. For when Athena won the Contest by the strength of the women's votes, the men responded by taking their voting rights away, thereby removing them from the political management of the *polis*. As Shapiro (1998: 149) notes, "the contest also becomes, in one version, the *aition* for the rigid patriarchy that underlay Athenian democracy in the 5th c.". Clearly women could not expect to be part of public life if they were unable to exercise their vote properly (or in a way the men found suitable). The overall story of the West Pediment is of the foundation of the city, a story which simultaneously glorifies women as mothers of the city founders and vilifies them as political actors. The men immediately exclude women from political life, and then cast this exclusion as a consequence of women's innate deficiency in political matters and their inability to make good decisions for the city. The message that women should be excluded from political life for the sake of the city is reinforced by the echoing of the Contest on and around the Erechtheion.

The political message of the Contest on Parthenon's West Pediment is literally underscored by the battle of the Greeks vs. the Amazons (Amazonomachy) on the West Metopes directly below. The scene depicts the Athenian Amazonomachy, in which Theseus defends the city from an Amazon invasion (Shapiro 1992). The scene is primarily read in concert with the other metopes (Centauromachy, Gigantomachy, and the Trojan War) as a metaphor for Greek (and especially Athenian) victory over uncivilized elements in general, and the Persians in particular (Castriota 1992). But there is a further message about the place of women here, for the Amazons in and of themselves reify the proper place of women in Athens. The Amazons are 'others' because they are women not only acting in the public sphere but also engaging in military activity. In patriarchal ideology, it is citizens and men who are the protectors of the city, a message reinforced by the cavalrymen who take up almost half the Parthenon frieze (Neils 2005). Athenian women have no place protecting the city through arms, while those women who do take up arms against it are defeated by men. The message of the Parthenon's west façade is clear: the Contest explains women's exclusion from political life, while the Amazonomachy confirms women's exclusion from militaristic activity. Not only do the two images reinforce one another, but their placement on the west façade makes them part of the dramatic first impression of the Acropolis landscape, demonstrating where women do, and do not, belong.

One exception is the Athenian queen Praxithea who, with her husband Erechtheus, saves the city of Athens in the war with the Eleusinian king Eumolpus, a story which may be depicted on the Erechtheion frieze. But the protection that

Praxithea offers is not militaristic like the Amazons, but takes a domestic form that is in direct conflict with her role as mother. Praxithea and her husband learn through an oracle that the only way to win the war and save the city from Eumolpus' attack is by sacrificing their youngest, virgin daughter, and together they agree to this course of action (Eur. *Erechtheus*). Praxithea takes on the public role of city protector, epitomizing the ideal citizen by prioritizing the safety of the city above the life of her own child. In doing so, "she keeps control over her maternal instincts and thus overcomes the biological restraints of the 'species of women'" (Rauchle 2015: 14). Praxithea's role as public protector is only possible when she *rejects* that which is innate in the "species of women" and suppresses or overcomes that which defines her as a mother. The same is true for her daughter, who volunteers to save the city by dying a virgin, having rejected (or lost) her chance at motherhood. Both Praxithea and her daughter can participate in civic protection only by actively rejecting motherhood, thereby behaving more like men, or at least less like women. This aspect of female participation in the *polis* is reflected even by the virgin Athena, who protects the city by maintaining her virginity, rejecting marriage and motherhood. This facet of the goddess is exemplified in vase representations of the birth of Erichthonius in which she turns her armor away from the child. When she takes on her maternal role, she minimizes her martial quality, indicating that the maternal cannot be martial and vice versa (Clements 2015). Once again, political ideology expels the maternal element from the public realm in unequivocal terms.

The way men and women are visually represented in public spaces, ancient or modern, often expresses not a reality but an ideal or an expectation. It should be no surprise that women are publicly portrayed and widely represented in important public spaces. But visual representation does not equal actual participation. As mothers, Athenian women did have an important role to play in service to the *polis*, an importance that is revealed in depictions of women fulfilling that role in no less prominent a place than the Acropolis. But this does not mean that women were not marginalized in actual life or in terms of the prevalent political ideology. The predominance of images of mothers in the public space of the Acropolis does not negate female exclusion from public life but rather *reinforces* it by contextualizing the female images and surrounding them with subliminal messages about the threat women pose to the city if allowed to participate in its political life. These prominent representations of women are prominent public expressions of the patriarchal system that excludes women from public spaces by insisting that they can make a more valuable contribution to the city by staying at home.

Notes

1 I would like to thank the editors for their support on this project. I would also like to thank Jacquelyn Helene Clements, Laura Surtees, Kelly Shannon-Henderson, Jennifer Dyer, and Matt Gibbs for their conversation and thoughtful comments as I was working through this material. All errors are my own.

2 All dates given are B.C.

3 One could make the same argument about mothers on American television in the 1950s and 1960s. While there were many television mothers, the message was very clearly that women best contributed by staying at home to care for their family, and one would be hard pressed to argue that this public representation of mothers signaled an active role for women in American public life.
4 ARF kylix by the Codrus Painter, Berlin Staatliche Museen F2537, *BAPD* 217211, *ARV*[2] 1268.2,1689, Avramidou (2011: 103, Pl. 3a, b).
5 ARF kylix by Brygos, Frankfurt, Liebieghaus STV7, *BAPD* 204131, *ARV*[2] 386,398.7, 1649 (Shapiro 1995: 43, Fig. 9).
6 ARF column krater by the Orchard Painter, San Antonio Museum of Art 86.134G.63, *BAPD* 6595 (Shapiro 1995: 43, Fig. 11).

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6 The politics of female madness in Greek tragedy

Maria Gerolemou

Introduction

The interplay between gender relations and democratization in Greek tragedies results in defining normative gender behavior according to the ideology of separate spheres. Men's place is in the public sphere and women's is in the private sphere. Anti-normative female behavior is portrayed as insane, with the purpose of defusing female non-normative actions, rendering them devoid of meaning and, as such, non-threatening to the city's organization. The idea, presumably, is that if unruly women are viewed as mad, no argument against their exclusion from political life can be made. This perspective is explored by Greek dramatists who bring to light another layer of the problem, as women's 'mad' actions challenge the Athenian patriarchal state and its civic ideology, by revealing its flawed premises.[1] Female insanity, therefore, although a social mechanism that supports hegemonic ideology and male superiority, also serves as a platform where difference can be explored with a view to overcoming the restrictions of the inferior female and her exclusion from exercising power. The model of female leader was rejected in the end, but the experiment succeeded in challenging the unquestionable assumption of the weak female that was presumed to be totally incapable to negotiate positions of power.

Defining female madness

In Greek drama, both male and female characters can be portrayed as mad, although their mental condition is gender specific (Mattes 1970; Simon 1978; Padel 1995; Gerolemou 2011; Saïd 2013; Most 2013). Female madness in drama is often the result of male moral blunders. Public activity takes men away from the *oikos* (household), leaving it unprotected and exposed to external and internal dangers (Seaford 1994). Tragic women react in a remarkably emotional manner to this, which prompts their portrayal as incapable of handling a domestic crisis rationally (Foley 1982; Easterling 1988; Rabinowitz 1992: 39, 43, 51; Hall 1997, 2010: 126–37; Mendelsohn 2002: 23–49; Gerolemou 2011: 7–12). Intense emotional expressions are perceived as signs of madness, signified by lack of modesty, coherent argumentation, and sound judgment.[2] For men, insanity is a consequence of committing audacious deeds that defy divine order,[3] and is expressed

through paranoid fears, hallucinations, and frothing at the mouth, as in the cases of Orestes and Heracles.[4] Mad females exhibit most of the times none of these symptoms, but are signified by emotional irrationality that serves as a metaphor of unconventional gender behavior that is threatening to patriarchy.[5] Female tragic madness, therefore, is understood as signifier of a rebellious female who must be excluded from the public realm and restricted in the confines of her home.

Despite the fact that the emotional intensity of female characters is condemned in traditional social contexts, 'maddened' female protagonists, though stylized and dismissed as mavericks, are welcomed on the Athenian stage as an alternative to the traditional patriarchal and, specifically, Athenian way of thinking. While female insanity in drama illustrates the dominant male discourse and the political ideology of the democratic *polis* (city-state) that excludes women, it works also as a medium for female characters, wishing to develop their civic engagement, enrich their gender identity, try out new social or political roles, or even find their female voice away from the powerful male censor and despite the premise that women should stay quietly at home (Saxonhouse 1986: 404; Gutzwiller and Michelini 1990: 70; Effe 1995: 230; Gerolemou 2011). Moreover, female insanity, by bringing women's strength and self-sufficiency to the fore, foregrounds a public representation of women where genders coexist and are free to imagine their subjective experiences; that is, empowered females on stage reveal the tension between the democratic *polis* and the individual citizens, pinpointing at women's desire for social change.

Mad female characters stand in contrast to another group that includes women who, aware of their inferior status, act their part either avoiding public spaces or not challenging men; as a result, such behavior is portrayed as normal, if not ideal, and, in any case, not mad, since it is perceived as non-threatening, rational, and prudent. Such conduct, acting as foil to mad female characters, can be best studied in Euripides' two political plays, *The Suppliant Women* and the *Children of Heracles*, both of which are widely regarded as celebrating Athenian democratic attitudes. A comparison between them will allow us to explore how public female voice is received in the political setting of the plays and, by analogy, in Athenian democracy. In both plays, the female voice is heard and their suggestions are followed, on the precondition that the women are fully aware of their inferiority and that their political contribution, exceptional as it may be, works only as auxiliary to men's greater plans.

In *The Suppliant Women*, Aethra, Theseus' mother, welcomes to Athens the Suppliants, a group of women from Argos whose sons died in the battle against Thebes and their corpses were left unburied by the king as punishment. The women beg for Aethra's help in this impasse, but Theseus, her son, decides not to expose the city to the risk of pollution from the unburied bodies of the Argive soldiers and asks the women to leave. When they turn to Aethra for assistance, she intervenes in a manner that appears supporting and not antagonizing to Theseus. Without telling him what to do, she reminds her son of the principles of civilized order, namely that he has a duty to act against those who thwart the customs of Hellas and disregard the burial of the dead; she also warns him that inactivity in this case could be interpreted as cowardice, while actions insulting the gods

can lead to a man's downfall (*Supp*. 297–331). Aethra, far from being critical of Theseus' decision, behaves in accord with patriarchal norms for women (40–1), acknowledging that women are ill-suited (*achreion*, 299) to give advice to men. Aethras' attitude makes her intervention seem non-threatening, as it focuses on Theseus and his success as king (293, 332); this makes him eager to listen to her advice. He even encourages her to speak her mind, claiming, surprisingly, that "many wise counsels can come from women" (294).[6] Aethra's non-challenging attitude allows Theseus to feel secure and act as the ideal, magnanimous king in an ideal (democratic) city (404–8), striking a balance between male ruling and the inclusion of a discreet female voice in his political endeavor, daring in this way to defy the traditional male conviction that women are unable to provide good political advice (299; Mendelsohn 2002: 135–223). Nevertheless, the ideological conviction that women are to be excluded from politics is still latent in Aethra's demeanor: instead of speaking her mind plainly as a man would have done, she must make a show of her feminine weakness, appearing inferior to the man in charge, moving Theseus with her tears, and coaxing him to act by appealing to his vanity and desire to appear noble and heroic (297–331). Any other approach on her part would have made Theseus feel antagonized by his mother and embarrassed to take a woman's advice, and, so, would have been forced to reject it; otherwise, he would have risked compromising his status as ruler.

Likewise, in the *Children of Heracles*, Macaria, the eldest daughter of Heracles, takes the initiative to sacrifice herself to protect her family that is seeking refuge in Athens from Eurystheus (259–68). When the oracle declares that only by sacrificing a virgin of noble birth to Persephone will Athens succeed against Eurystheus' attack, King Demophon is unwilling to request this from his people. Nevertheless, Macaria offers to be sacrificed and, just like Aethra, acts in perfect feminine style when she steps into the public realm: she defuses male criticism for her audacity (474) to appear in public by apologizing for her presence outside the home (474). Macaria knows that in order to be respected and heard, she must first affirm, instead of defy, the patriarchal female virtues that require women to remain silent (476) and confined (476) in the house (476–7). Her demeanor earns high praise (484–5) from Iolaus, Heracles' nephew. Macaria's sacrifice comes as an answer to Iolaus' and Demophon's frustration, as there are no other alternative plans for saving the children of Heracles, the honor of his family, and the city of Athens (420–4, 439–442, 472–3, 490–7). That is, only because she functions as auxiliary to men's plans and at the same time she is aware of her female inferiority, Macaria manages to be heard in public.

The case of Aeschylus' Clytemnestra[7]

Against the foil of subdued females that cooperate with patriarchy, dynamic women, who step into the public life trying to overcome their gender-limitations, are perceived and portrayed as mad. An important figure in this regard is Clytemnestra. But before we analyze her character in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, we must set the framework of the political and gender ideology that governs the *Oresteia* trilogy

(*Agamemnon*, *Libation Bearers*, and *The Furies*). Granted that the function of the democratic state was based exclusively on male citizens, the dramatic exploration of a mixed-gender citizen body, including both men and women, reveals a threat to the core values of the city-state. This problem is central in Aeschylus' trilogy *Oresteia*, where, in the face of gender fluidity that threatens the exclusiveness of male citizenry, the play constructs gender differentiations and sets gender markers, in order to neutralize the destructive power of the intrusive female and protect the 'purity' of the *polis* (Zeitlin 1984, 1985; Blok 2001). Specifically, in the final play of the trilogy, the *Eumenides*, one of those gender differentiations and markers is constructed by prioritizing the interests of the father over those of the mother. When Orestes, who committed matricide to avenge the murder of his father by killing his mother, is tried by the Athenian court of law, he is eventually declared not guilty on the strength of Athena's argument: since she herself was born without a mother, she can empathize with Orestes honoring his father (*Eum*. 734–40); she also acknowledges the logic of Apollo's claim that the actual parent is the male, with the female simply being a vessel that hosts and nourishes the life entrusted in it by the father (*Eum*. 657–67). This semi-scientific idea, itself a tenet of the Hippocratic school, concurs with the political ideology of the Athenian democratic state that values the male citizens and devalues the female ones. Hence, the ending of the *Oresteia*, a trilogy that celebrates the birth of the democratic justice system, illustrates effectively the idea that the city of Athens has developed a narrow and restricted institutional definition of democracy that favors men. Aeschylus' *Oresteia* portrays Athenian democracy as having no interest in incorporating a gendered perspective other than the one dictated by men, in a way that subtly criticizes its effort to disconnect and polarize the two genders.[8]

Deviating from the traditional version in the Homeric Epics, Aeschylus makes Clytemnestra the sole murderer of Agamemnon. This allows him to explore women's ability (or inability) to assume leading political roles and, possibly, offer justifications for (or question) their exclusion from political life in democracy. The audience is exposed to conflicting points of view. The throne of Argos, a traditionally male institution, has been bereft for ten years (260; Goldhill 1984: 34). Clytemnestra takes advantage of the power vacuum and places herself on the throne; she is an androgynous individual who rules like "a woman with a man's heart" (*gunaikos androboulon kear*, 11; Goldhill 1984: 9–10, 14; Zeitlin 1984: 163–4; Wohl 1998: 103; Gerolemou 2011: 81–131). Clytemnestra's style of exercising power creates mistrust among the men of Argos (548–50), who only have faith in Agamemnon's ability to handle every situation in an optimal manner (18).[9] His governing style is prized by his people because it is characterized by civic concern and duty. For instance, Agamemnon's decision to sacrifice his daughter for the common good (205–17) appeals to the collective consciousness and is eventually endorsed by the chorus (104, 184–91, 799–806; Goldhill 1984: 18; McClure 1999: 72–3). Although he was first accused of being arrogant and impious both before and during the Trojan expedition (218–21, 799–804, 168–70), upon his return to Argos, he assumes an attitude of care for the civic unity of his people.

When the chorus of elders expresses their concern about his uncharitable decision (799–804) to sacrifice his daughter on behalf of the military alliance he had created, he assures them that from now on he will act wisely (849) and will not prioritize the interests of the alliance over civic harmony (830–1, 844–50). With this reassurance, Agamemnon achieves reconciliation with the people and is ready to resume his position as civic ruler. The emblematic maxim of Zeus "wisdom comes through suffering" proves vital for civic unity (*pathei mathos*, 177; Lloyd-Jones 1956; Neitzel 1978). Appeasing the suffering that emanates from feelings of anger and vengeance, he transforms it into a learning experience (160–6, 176–83) that eventually becomes customary habit (*ethos*; Snell 1924: 72–81). Agamemnon's may be the first example of this type of emotional reform, although his emotions do not turn into regret (Konstan 2010: ch. 1).

By contrast, Clytemnestra, even as ruler, cannot forget; she both remembers and continues to experience the pain of her daughter's death. She is tormented by a pain that is *mnēsipēmōn*, as she dwells in the memory of painful events that poison her heart even in her sleep (154, 180, 433–6). In the new order that Zeus establishes (176–8), he offers amnesty to wrong-doers who experience *pathos*, suffering, through which they learn proper civil conduct. However, Clytemnestra's traumatic memory of her daughter's death prevents her from extending the same amnesty to her husband and king of the state (Loraux 1988; Rabinowitz 2014). From the contrast between male and female ruling styles, therefore, she emerges as a caricature of an overly superstitious, self-serving, emotional, and, ultimately, mad individual, who does not inspire confidence as leader, exactly because she puts her individual agenda above the good of the state.

In her quest to punish Agamemnon's injustice and as female ruler to negotiate power with her male subjects, Clytemnestra fails to preserve civic order and convince the male citizens to follow her orders. This is most evident in the way she converses with them, as the dramatist attributes to Clytemnestra a presumed female way of discussing civic matters with the male citizens. When the elders ask Clytemnestra to provide evidence for her claim that Troy had fallen, they expect that she had used the conventional channels for gathering intelligence, such as official reports (86) by trusted messengers. The chorus, therefore, asks Clytemnestra twice for such proofs: "By what *report* are you convinced?" (85–7) and then again, "Have you *heard* anything joyful?" (258–63). Clytemnestra gives two proofs of Troy's fall which, however, as we will see below, make the elders skeptical about her reliability. To make things worse, despite her assurances that the event took place and that she has reliable information, she does leave a small possibility for error, which she attributes, not to human uncertainty, but to the deceptions of the gods: "I do have proof", she exclaims, "How could I not? Unless some god has deceived me" (273). This statement makes the elders *ab initio* suspicious of her report; they immediately change their attitude towards her and do not treat her as a rational ruler but as a shallow female. Attempting to elicit from her the source of her information, they ask her if she believes in dreams (279) or has heard some "unspoken rumor" (276). Their innuendos offend Clytemnestra who responds negatively but still fails to describe in clear and unequivocal terms

the age-old system of *phryktōria* she had set up (281–319), with fire-posts across the sea that conveyed the message of victory from Troy to Argos (Horsfall 2008: 227–8).[10] She casts her report in a poetic, non-realistic manner starting with the words "Hephaistos sent his brilliant blaze from Mount Ida" (281); to this the incredulous and confused elders respond by asking her to repeat her story (317–19). Clytemnestra's second narrative, less poetic and more factual, succeeds in convincing the elders who proclaim that this time she spoke "intelligently" (*euphronōs*, 351), in a mature and non-fanciful manner (275, 277). Nevertheless, the chorus' praise is ambiguous, since the characterization "intelligently" counts for them as authoritative only when couched in masculine terms, and, so, they add as clarification that she spoke "intelligently like a wise man" (*kat' andra sōphrona*, 351; Fraenkel 1950; Denniston and Page 1957: 15–26). This, however, clearly undermines Clytemnestra's stated wish that her report be accepted as authoritative female speech, countering male stereotypes of women as emotional and unreliable: "These are the words spoken by me, a woman" (348). Yet her report does not convince the chorus by merit of its veracity, but by the masculine manner of its final delivery, the clear and detailed account she gives in the end, to which the chorus can relate and in which they can happily discern "reliable evidence" (352).

As soon as Clytemnestra is off the stage, however, the elders start reconsidering their judgment and question among themselves her credibility. Instead of taking notice of Clytemnestra's particularly emphatic use of *phruktos* (382), the official term for state-employed beacons that she repeated twice in her account, they conclude that her report relies too heavily on signs of fire, which they identify as *flox* (*flogos paraggelmasin*, 480) instead of *phruktos* and, eventually, construe as superstitious imaginings. As a result, they classify Clytemnestra's declaration of victory at Troy as childish (*paidnos*, 479) and crazy (*phrenōn kekommenos*, 479), and discount it completely. The elders, therefore, reaffirm the familiar stereotype of the naive and impressionable female nature (*gunaikos*, 483) that believes anything before proven true (484). For this reason, despite their earlier promise to comply with her wishes (353), they ignore Clytemnestra's order that the people offer thanksgiving sacrifices for the army's victory. To them, premature celebrations are also characteristic of stereotypical female gullibility that accepts uncritically any joyful rumor (483–4) and spreads information that lacks rational evidence (484). Therefore, the elders in their private deliberations distrust her reasoning abilities and discredit Clytemnestra entirely; their decision to disobey her command to offer sacrifices and reject her report, opting to wait for the male messenger from Troy, who, they expect, will bring trustworthy information, drives a wedge between the genders and their respective methodologies in negotiating positions of power, thus polarizing and disconnecting them.

In exploring her ruling style, Clytemnestra adopts a fluctuating gender identity, one that is neither committed to a single gender nor has specific gender attitudes, but may adopt male or female traits at will, in order to gain power over others. She can obscure her female vulnerability and act like a man, but can also oscillate between assuming male and female speech and traits, depending on her

immediate purposes. For example, when the elders are confused after her first declarative speech in female style (281–316), she repeats her story in a speech of conventional male oratory (320–50). At another instance, she plays the gender card with dexterity, employing female conventions to deceive her husband: when Agamemnon returns home (914), Clytemnestra welcomes him with an impressive gender-appropriate speech (855–913). She strokes Agamemnon's ego, stressing her loyalty, love, and deep concern for her family and himself (598–614), while honoring him with the invitation to walk on the red carpet she had set out for him, leading into the palace; her goal is to trap him and cause his demise. Deceived by her female demeanor, after a brief show of protest, Agamemnon yields to Clytemnestra and steps onto the carpet, indulging his pride and valor (Fraenkel 1950: vol. 2. 99, 441–2); Denniston and Page 1957: 151–2). Having Agamemnon walk on the red carpet is important for Clytemnestra who wants to prove him unworthy of the elders' trust, eager as they are for him to resume ruling the city. In other words, she wants to point out that Agamemnon had not learned anything all these years: neither humility from his suffering (*pathos*) nor repentance for his crime.

Agamemnon falls prey to Clytemnestra's conventional female act and ends up hacked to death. But prejudices run deep and the elders still find it hard to believe that a woman could kill the king. When they hear his screams coming from the house, they immediately assume the killer is a male pursuer of the throne (1354) and dismiss Cassandra who insists that the perpetrator is a woman: "Female is the murderer of the male!" (1231) she shouts and, then, cries again, "this two-footed lioness . . . will kill me, too" (1258). Even when Clytemnestra appears on stage and claims a political intent for her actions (1372), the elders find her words inconceivable (1399). Clytemnestra wishes to cast the punishment of Agamemnon as a type of sacrifice, reminiscent of the sacrificial death of Iphigenia, so as to restore justice (913), by avenging Iphigenia's death and rebuking Agamemnon for his extra-marital liaisons (1431–48). Nevertheless, the chorus refuses to acknowledge Clytemnestra as a just avenger, equal to her husband, whose revenge on Troy was supremely justified (1396) in everyone's mind. For all the male characters of the play, she is expected to abide by her role as woman and wife, being loyal to his family (606), the "watchdog of his house" (607), "a foe to his enemies" (608), and a spouse uncorrupted by the length of separation (610). Assassinating her husband is simply unfathomable and unjustified to the men (1400; Neuburg 1991; McClure 1999: 97–8).

Clytemnestra has a different sense of her duties as mother, wife, and, especially, female leader. Feeling justified as mother and wife with the double murder of Agamemnon and Cassandra, she declares that she is now ready (1422) to implement her leadership program and fight for the dismantling of the flawed political system, punishing those who had supported Agamemnon's expedition against Troy and his decision to murder his daughter in order to ensure its success (1412–25). By pointing out the flaws of the value system established by the powerful males in charge, Clytemnestra uncovers its failings as a man-made construct

and turns it upside down to serve her own purposes. If the expedition to Troy and the murder of Iphigenia can be presented repeatedly by the men in the play as justified and blessed by the gods,[11] then, she demands by analogy that her murdering her husband be justified as retribution for the multiple injuries he had inflicted on *her* family. Clytemnestra, not only questions the value system of the patriarchal society, but also condemns the principles that inform the social system of ascribing praise and blame, simply by comparing the causes of Agamemnon's crimes to her own (1412–21). More importantly, she threatens to tear down this system and replace it, declaring her readiness to engage in a violent clash with the dissidents (1421) and, if she wins, to enforce her will and punish her opponents, teaching them to have "common sense" (*sōphronein*, 1425; Wohl 1998: 103; McClure 1999: 99–100).[12]

However, the ending of the *Agamemnon* denounces in the face of Clytemnestra the idea that the female can act in his or her own right. Her actions are characterized as tyrannical (1424) and classified as contrary to the community (*polis*) that now seeks to banish her from its midst (*apopolis*, 1410). Moreover, the elders' inability to see beyond stereotypes leads them to discount Clytemnestra's agency by pronouncing her insane (*gunaikos aphrasmonos*, 1401): to them, she must have been driven mad by consuming accidentally some poisonous drink or herb (1407–11). Madness is the only familiar framework that can help them understand her deviant behavior that overturns the ascribed gender-role actions and, ultimately, defuse it.

Clytemnestra's 'madness', however, challenges the patriarchal apparatus that controls women and creates a space for her to experiment with ways of negotiating positions of power. Clytemnestra insists on her female understanding of justice, trying to justify her actions by the same principles that Agamemnon was exonerated: if his actions were seen as justified, hers should be as well. Only when she realizes she cannot convince the chorus that her cause is just by speaking like a man and gloating over the murder she had committed, does she start behaving in a gender-typical manner, invoking the gods of Justice, Atē (Blindness) and Fury (the Avenging Spirit) (1432f). She also tries to soothe the chorus' alarmed reaction and counter their pronouncement that she is mad (*epimainetai*, 1428) by retreating to the traditional position for a woman: for the first time, she calls her partner, Aegisthus, to the stage to have him take responsibility for the murder (1612–16) and vest her actions with masculine authority, while claiming that she has now recovered from her madness (*manias*, 1575). Nevertheless, the elders' earlier proclamation of her madness succeeds in isolating and marginalizing her (1429), effectively excluding her from open political action and restoring male order. In the end, Clytemnestra realizes that if she is to continue ruling, she has to do it through Aegisthus and behind the scenes. In Aeschylus's *Agamemnon*, Clytemnestra's forced resignation from her aspiration to supersede the limitations of her gender, proves once again that female nature is incompatible with public office, especially since the female sense of justice clashes with the patriarchal system, appears as madness, and is, therefore, rejected.

With Clytemnestra's condemnation of the male sense of justice that led to her daughter's sacrifice, the play raises the question of how far a woman should be able to go defending her own view of justice, since this would require her presence in the public realm and her interaction with men. Such tendencies would lead inevitably to paths incompatible with patriarchy, with women seeking self-determination and demanding the reformation of cultural values and norms that kept them away from centers of power and decision. To avoid encouraging this trend, the dramatist turns the tables on the rebellious female character, showing that the more a woman desires self-determination, the more antisocial her conduct appears, leading men to classify it as mad and disorderly. As a result, female political activism is defused and rendered ineffective, while the whole female race is justifiably excluded from public negotiations.

Conclusion

Female mental distortion in the guise of madness is a common feature in ancient tragedy. While *prima facie* it underlines female victimization and patriarchal oppression, it also questions civic ideology. Insanity designates gender distinctions, but, at the same time, becomes a vehicle for social critique, as it creates a space where civic principles are questioned and gender relations can be imagined to function outside the limits of conventions. Considering that the three tragedians wrote during the formative years of Athenian democracy, the questions they raise in their plays relate in many ways to the efforts of Athenian men and women to form their identity as citizens in the new political reality and negotiate their roles in the democratic hierarchy. The paradigm of Aeschylus' Clytemnestra is particularly revealing: the heroine threatens to reform the entire system of civic regulations, because she holds it responsible for the social injustices perpetrated against women; she is thwarted only by the male citizens' proclamation of her conduct as mad and anti-social.

Therefore, while the Athenian civic ideology reinforces hierarchical structures, at the same time, democratic principles foster social and political inequalities and clashes that the tragedians explore in the dramatization of the struggle between the genders. The punishment of female mavericks in drama reinforces the normative gender behavior and the ideology of women's political exclusion. The imaginary world of the tragedies allowed female characters to experiment in the public realm, but their disastrous interventions were most likely interpreted by the male Athenian audience as confirmation of the fact that any woman who wanted to change the rules of civil society was *de facto* mad. This message played powerfully in the hands of the dominant political ideology of the fifth-century Athens, but Athenian playwrights continued to question the rationale of women's exclusion with riveting portrayals of dynamic female characters in their plays.[13]

Notes

1 On political reflections in dramas, see Saxonhouse (1992: ch. 3); Seidensticker (1995); Zeitlin (1984, 1985); Rocco (1997, ch. 5). Rhodes (2003) discusses Athenian drama as reflecting on the ideology of the *polis* in general rather than on the democratic *polis* in particular, in contrary to, for instance, Winkler and Zeitlin, *Nothing to do with Dionysos?* (1992) and Goldhill (2000); further, see Griffin 1998, 2007 and Pelling 1997.
2 For examples, see *Heracl.* 474–7, and *Supp.* 297–300; Gill (1990: 80) suggests that "we interpret the character of the dramatic figures in the light of what they say about *sophrosyne*".
3 Compare for instance Agamemnon in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* 230 and Sophocles' *Electra* 546.
4 For examples of symptoms of madness in tragedy, see further Euripides' *Bacchae* 1122–3.
5 Generally, for emotional symptoms functioning as metonyms for emotional concepts, see Cairns (2016). For madness as a metaphor for deviant gender roles in tragedy see Gerolemou (2011).
6 Compare Eur. *Supp.* 294, 296, 307, and 360, although there he guides her back to the house.
7 An earlier version of this part of the essay appears in Gerolemou (2011, ch. 2).
8 On female bodies as 'speaking' in the Hippocratic texts, see King (1998).
9 See also Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers* 262–3.
10 The communication system based on torches (*phruktos*) was conventionally used by male rulers, including Agamemnon himself, who relied on it to find out the exact moment the Trojan Horse was within Troy's walls.
11 Compare the statements of the chorus (362–3, 367, 704), the messenger (509, 526, 582), and Agamemnon (812, 819–29). For the expedition as blessed by the gods, see 812–54, and esp. 822–4, 83.
12 See also lines 1394, 1401–4, 1419–21, 1530–2, 1561, and 1661.
13 I would like to express my sincere thanks to Tatiana Tsakiropoulou-Summers for her acute and thought-provoking observations and suggestions, which helped improve my arguments throughout this chapter.

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7 Mechanisms of exclusion

Women between ritual and emotion

Eleni Papazoglou

Ancient Greek thought associated female subjectivity with two forms of human expression, which are, in principle, contradictory: ritual and emotion.[1] The former, organized, institutional, and collective, is connected to the worship of the gods; the latter, spasmodic and personal, pertains to the interior of the soul. Ritual offered the only occasion in which women could assume action in the male-dominated public territory: they could abandon their silence and invisibility, and become 'audible' and 'visible' in the public space of the *polis*, as ritual recognized and authenticated their role in the establishment of the community's culture and the maintenance of its welfare (Goff 2004: 4). As Holst-Warhaft (2002: 86) argues, Athenian democracy limited female participation to rituals, where women's presence was significant and, in the case of funerary lament, crucial – despite the fact that death rituals were ultimately under male control (Hame 2008; Sourvinou-Inwood 2004). However, femininity was considered inextricably linked to paroxysmal emotion: contrary to the self-controlled, self-restrained, and rational men, women were considered dangerously emotional, wild, and uninhibited. As such, women appeared in urgent need of male control, and ritual performance, along with marriage and motherhood, provided mechanisms of such a control. Ritual, therefore, was decisive in shaping female subjectivity: the discourse of its performance produced women who conformed to the gender stereotypes of their society, driving them "to internalize a version of themselves useful to that culture" (Goff 2004: 5). Rituals, in other words, stipulated the gender profile that women were expected to *share*: they precluded individuality, they could neither tolerate nor inspire it.

In spectacular contrast to real life, however, rituals on the tragic stage appear, more often than not, 'perverted' and 'corrupt': the divide between sacrifice and murder is blurred; rites of passage are used to problematize – instead of securing – male and female adulthood; funerary rites are either cynically abused or incapable of bringing closure to mourning; and dionysiac euphoria turns into a nightmare (Seaford 1995: 368–405; Henrichs 2004). And if the use – or, rather, abuse – of ritual language and action in tragedy indicates the collapse of moral and social order (Easterling 1988: 101), then ritual perversion produces also the deconstruction of the tragic *persona*. The collapse of ordered and secure social identities drives often the tragic characters to

develop individual personalities that do not submit to orthodox gender roles, but express an idiosyncratic subjectivity, which eventually leads to (self) destructive impulses and emotions (Papazoglou 2014: 377–98).

The characters that best illustrate such a problematic and aberrant subjectivity are female: Deianira, Clytemnestra, Medea, the Danaids, Evadne, the Electras (mainly in Sophocles and Euripides). All these women, in one way or another, distort ritual processes. All of them are culturally 'eccentric': they do what no other woman would do in their place, and they cancel with their transgressive actions their inclusion in both household (*oikos*) and city (*polis*). Their uninhibited emotional expression, leading eventually to a (self)destructive derailment, seems, in turn, to validate the mechanisms of female exclusion posited by the democratic *polis*.

The concept of female inferiority, of course, cannot be said to have originated in the Athenian democracy: it ran (and, in many cases, continues to run) steadfast in non-Athenian and non-democratic communities both before and since and elsewhere. What, arguably, was configured in the context of Athenian democracy was the political 'ideologization' of female inferiority: as political rights became central to the self-definition and self-awareness of the male citizen, female otherness to democracy became vital to both (Just 1989: 25). Thus, democracy forged female exclusion into a fundamental instrument of its ideology.

So, can we discern, within the above typical scenario, a change in the portrayal of 'disruptive' female characters on the tragic stage, as democracy matured during the course of the fifth century? The scarcity of evidence (we only have a small percentage of the plays produced) precludes definitive answers. Yet, a comparison between the character of Electra in Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers* (458/7 BC) and that in the title plays of Sophocles and Euripides (both between 425 and 410 BC), together with a comparison between Aeschylus' and Euripides' *Suppliant Women* (late 460s BC and late 420s respectively) can offer, perhaps, a useful indicator for a shift in perspective. As I will try to show in what follows, in Aeschylus' *Suppliant Women* and *Libation Bearers*, female characters initially use proper ritual language and gestures, adopting, thus, a civic function. In the course of action, emotion may lead them astray – however, their voice, eventually, is either curtailed or side-lined by men. By contrast, in the *Electras* by Sophocles and Euripides, as well as in the latter's *Suppliant Women*, female emotion appears from the start deritualized, paroxysmic, and idiosyncratic. In Sophocles, Electra's obsessive passion contributes directly to the chaos produced at the play's end. In Euripides, Electra may be equally impassioned, yet in the end she repents and she is finally subsumed into the male world and order. Finally, in the Euripidean *Suppliants*, female emotion, although extreme, poses no threat to the male world, because it remains markedly marginalized. The passage from the earlier to the later plays, therefore, shows the female voice distancing itself from ritual and, as such, more civic and collective functions, and gradually restricting itself to (self) destructive emotion. This shift, occurring along the process from a developing democracy to a radical one, relegated femininity to the civically inert interiority of both *oikos* and self.

Vengeful maidens

All three plays that feature Electra share, more or less, the same basic plotline: having spent years of mourning her father, Agamemnon, Electra is eventually joined by her brother, Orestes, who proceeds to kill the perpetrators, their mother Clytemnestra, and her lover Aegisthus.

In Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers*, Electra conforms to the gender expectations of a Greek aristocratic maiden (*Lib.* 84 ff.): she appears pointedly reserved and ritually conscientious, and aspires to display a 'correct' femininity in opposition to her mother's transgressive one (140–1). It is true that, at a climactic point in the performance of ritual lament, Electra is fuelled towards paroxysmal emotion – an emotion that shows her sharing, indeed, her mother's aberrant femininity ("my heart is wild like that of a wolf, because of the mother", 421). However, the voice of revengeful despair and anger in this play is assigned predominantly to the chorus, whose identity is emphatically 'other' to the free Greek male citizens: they are slaves, foreign and female.[2] Burdened by the social stigma of their status, and given that only members of the family were allowed to participate in the household's funerary rites (Goff 2004: 21), this female choral voice can be seen to create a context of ritual perversion, which, albeit momentarily, opens up the space for Electra to give in to emotional paroxysm. The crucial point, however, is that in the second half of the play Electra disappears entirely from the stage, leaving Orestes alone in the execution of the matricide. Consequently, the female agent recedes into the silence and invisibility that befit her gender, while the male figure becomes the exclusive protagonist of the action.

By contrast, in the plays of Sophocles and Euripides, Electra enters centre stage and becomes herself the protagonist – her anguish and rage becoming the primary drives behind the matricide. The grief of Sophocles' Electra is "obsessive" (Foley 2001: 156) and her lament markedly deritualized: it appears solitary, volatile, and transgressive, eliciting the chorus's admonition to moderation and prudence.[3] Electra's emotional excess as inextricably linked with the systematic perversion of funerary rituals by everyone involved (Seaford 1985). And her wild exhortation to Orestes to kill Aegisthus and throw his body to the dogs "confirm[s] the mutual destruction of limits normally imposed on emotional behaviour by ritual" (Seaford 1985: 321). Thus, in her despair and anger, Electra displays a deeply "feminine" self (Segal 1966: 539), with discernible psychoanalytical 'complexes' centering around her fixation to the memory of the father and her sexual antagonism with her mother (Ronnet 1969: 221; Segal 1999: 261; Wheeler 2006: 381). Furthermore, her transgressive nature is decisive in the display of the matricide as problematic: in this play, the killing of Clytaemnestra is revealed as a transgressive act, which problematizes the order of both household and city, renewing the vicious circle of blood and creating a chaotic and 'dark' reality.[4]

In Euripides' *Electra*, ritual irony (and perversion) reigns supreme, permeating all the basic episodes of the action, from Electra's *mariage blanc* to her lethal manipulation of her mother (Zeitlin 1970: 653; Foley 1985: 43). This Electra is also immersed in emotional excess: from the 'exhibitionism' of her lament, to

her sexually charged hate for Aegisthus and the vicious cynicism of her deceit, Electra sustains a character marked by "emotional unbalance" (Barlow 1971: 55). After Clytaemnestra's death, Electra, displaying a markedly gendered volatility, passes from overwhelming anger to overwhelming despair. She finally realizes that with the matricide she transgressed the boundaries of her gender, undercut her female roles, and robbed herself of a future as female subject, both as wife and ritual performer (1198–200).

As in Sophocles' *Electra* (and in contrast to Aeschylus *Libation Bearers*), the quest for revenge in Euripides' *Electra* is not articulated in terms of ritual but in terms of emotion, as the main burden of this quest falls on the shoulders of the passionate female protagonist. Yet, there are two crucial differences between the two plays: first, Sophocles' Electra remains remorseless until the very end, while Euripides' regrets the matricide eventually, substituting rage with desolation; second, in Euripides the gods intervene in the play's finale and ordain that Electra marries Pylades. This marriage integrates Electra into an *oikos* under male protection and control: in the end, this Electra appears rehabilitated, having acquired a 'canonical' female identity. In Sophocles, on the contrary, rehabilitation does not occur: action leaves Electra emotionally and socially transgressive and frustrated – incapable of salvaging (or, rather, gaining) the female 'normality' of her Euripidean version. In Euripides, the gods put the human world in order; in Sophocles, the gods are absent and the *oikos* is left severely traumatized – and so is the *polis*.

To resume: Aeschylus' portrayal of Electra in the first half of the fifth century, in comparison to that of Euripides and Sophocles in the second, shows the female voice shifting from a more 'institutionalized' status to a more 'personal', transgressive, and abandoned state, where the female voice becomes imbued with impulsive emotion and, more to the point, is restricted to it. As a result, the female voice appears in urgent need of male control. When the mechanism of such control is absent, civic institutions immerse in chaos.

Aeschylus' suppliant maidens: when women create problems to men

In Aeschylus' *Suppliant Women*, Danaos' fifty daughters, the Danaids, escape Egypt together with their father, in order to avoid marriage with their cousins, the Aegyptids, sons of Aegyptos, brother of Danaos. The Danaids view this marriage as incestuous and unholy, and despise their cousins. They arrive at Argos seeking refuge, capitalizing in their common ancestry with the Argives, which, according to Greek custom, entitles them to Argive protection.

The Danaids enter the stage bearing supplication boughs and invoke Zeus as the god of suppliants; they refer to the common ancestry with the Argives and stress that their father directs their plea. Their request, therefore, follows all the orthodox references of ritual supplication. Danaos advises prudence and moderation (*phronein*, 176): the girls should not raise their voices, appear overconfident and brash, or speak abruptly, but should keep their glances calm and

yield respectfully to the rulers of the land. Danaos teaches his daughters the self-effaced behavior that ritual protocol requires from strangers and suppliants (Gould 1973: 94) – but also, one feels, the behavior that is required, in all circumstances, from women in general: from those that remain forever 'strange' to the public realm of the *polis* (Zeitlin 1992: 205). Finally, Danaos directs his daughters to the gods' altars and instructs their prayers. Thus, under male guidance, emotion appears here contained by ritual and channeled through it, while female action is emphatically subordinated to male initiative and control. Appearing to have accomplished his role, Danaos retreats from the supplication, allowing his daughters to take charge of the ritual performance.

The negotiations begin with Pelasgos, the Argive king, who, confronted with the Danaids' request, investigates its legal basis. Why, he asks, do they flee their cousins: "Because of hatred or law?" (335).[5] When the girls fail to answer clearly, Pelasgos falters: taking military action to protect them means endangering the city. To his hesitation, the Danaids invoke the divine laws of Zeus and Themis, protectors of suppliants (445). Pelasgos despairs and, eventually, resorts to a democratic solution to the ritual – as well as ethical – impasse: the community of the male Argive citizens should make the decision. The Danaids, however, appear emphatically alien to democratic ethics: they passionately claim that Pelasgos is a monarch and, as such, he can and should be the ultimate judge. However, Pelasgos insists: he cannot decide "alone, apart from the people" (399). Frustrated by this democratic king, the girls decide to drive him to a political standoff: should their plea be rejected, they threaten to hang themselves from the gods' statues – which would bring irreversible pollution to the land (455–67).

In the exchange between Pelasgos and the Danaids, the theological conviction of the female figure clashes with the political reasoning of the male figure. Articulating itself along a *ritual* discourse, the female voice appears capable of problematizing the *civic* discourse. Yet, as the dialogue develops, the Danaids fail to conform to the male advice of their father for moderation. Driven by acute passion, they become bold and insolent, disregarding the fundamental gender and ritual requirement of 'modesty' (*aidōs*, Cairns 1993: 183–93). Their voice and behavior eventually *subvert* ritual protocol (Turner 2001: 35–6) and they reach the point of transgression. Emotion, thus, 'emancipates' them from their father but, at the same time, derails them from the institutional processes of the male community, bringing them in opposition to it.

From the perspective of the plot, the Danaids' threat to hang themselves is not really a decisive factor in the action. Pelasgos takes the issue to the Assembly, as he had already decided to do; the crucial difference, now, is that he invites Danaos to perform the supplication directly to the people. At the Assembly, Pelasgos' arguments take on a legal and political formulation, focusing on Zeus' patronage of suppliants and the Argives' common ancestry with the Danaids (615–21), while Danaos performs a 'secular' supplication, much more suited to Athenian democratic processes (Gould 1973: 90). And the "potent hand of the people" (604)[6] of Argos decides by vote in favor of the Danaids.

Therefore, the agents who eventually solve the ritual and political crisis are exclusively male, while the suicide threat of the Danaids appears as mere 'hysterical' reaction.[7] Contrary to ritual, that had allowed women to communicate directly with the male world, this passionate and aggressive ploy marks their profound 'otherness' to the democratic community. At the same time, however, it is interesting to see that Aeschylus allows emotion to creep into male action: the king hopes that the supplication will stir "pity" to the people and make them "hate" the Aegyptian armada's insolence (486–8). Thus, pity and, more to the point, hate become now civic emotions, 'rehabilitated', as it were, to fit the discourse of the male community.

Soon afterwards, however, the explosion of female emotion appears entirely justified. When a group of Egyptian men arrive on stage and try to abduct the Danaids, they create an extremely violent scene, which drives the girls to utter despair and terror: they wish they died before they fell into their cousins' hands. This time the violence of men elicits the audience's sympathy towards the Danaids. It is, therefore, the 'barbaric' Egyptians that appear now ritually and civically transgressive (Zeitlin 1992: 215). The Argives and their king confront the Egyptian herald rigorously and send him back to Egypt, declaring they are ready to defend the girls in battle: the Danaids appear now subsumed under the rhetoric and action of the democratic *polis*.

However, this subsumption will, once again, be reversed in the final scene of the play, where ritual performance is reintroduced into the action. As the Danaids are escorted into Argos, they begin to sing ritual praises and blessings to the city. Yet, at this point, a second chorus (of ambiguous identity) intervenes, to praise Aphrodite, invoking Desire and Persuasion, Concord and Eros. This chorus declares marriage as every woman's final fulfilment (*teleuta*, 1050) warning the girls "to ask the gods nothing excessive" (1061); the Danaids, however, react strongly against this prospect and pray to Zeus to "keep [them] away from marriage" (*aposteroiē*, 1063). The Danaids' opposition to the second chorus shows them, on the one hand, breaching the most fundamental requirement of the female gender identity, marriage, and, on the other, resisting a most crucial political and democratic principle, persuasion (Zeitlin 1992: 218). Furthermore, this choral dialogue recalls the ritual wedding song (Seaford 1987: 114); thus, by refusing the prospect of marriage in this context, the Danaids corrupt once again ritual process. Indeed, their prayer is eventually twisted into a civically 'blasphemous' appeal, praying that Zeus bestow "Glory and Power (*kratos*) on women" (1068–9).

It is not clear from the text whether the second chorus consists of the Danaids' female servants or the Argive guards who escort them to the city. If it is a male chorus, the conflict that develops between them displays even more powerfully the community's eventual failure to contain the female voice. As this failure produces a new crisis, it prevents action from reaching closure and creates the dramatic currency that will shape the course of events in the play that concludes the *Danaids* trilogy. There, the girls, forced to marry their cousins, will kill them on their wedding night, except for one, Hypermnestra, who pities her husband

and spares his life. Eventually, Aphrodite descends to defend the power of Eros (possibly in the context of a trial), and the Danaids are compelled to enter into marriage with the Argive men and integrate themselves into their *oikos*.[8] Thus, at last, women are properly included in a male-dominated institution, giving a final closure to the plot and settling the gender, political, and religious confrontations that shaped it.

Aeschylus' *Suppliant Women* have divided scholars: some insist that the Danaids' aversion to marriage is legitimate as it is provoked by the violent and transgressive Aegyptids; others that it is transgressive and directed against men in general.[9] The issue can be reformulated: Does the Danaids' request and behaviour rely more on the institutional procedure of a ritual supplication, which is placed firmly within religious, civic and mythical points of reference? Or is it defined primarily by extreme despair and, more importantly, hate? Is the challenge the Danaids pose to the civic community rooted in the performance of an institutional, public *ritual* or does it come about as a result of an overwhelming, personal *emotion*?

The ritual authority of the Danaids' behavior is debated: the Danaids have been seen either as suppliants "in the full sense" (Gould 1973: 90), or as tragic suppliants who "are *atypical* in their embodiment of a dubious cause" (Turner 2001: 34, added emphasis), in which case their "assumption of the suppliant's role is invalid" (Turner 2001: 28). Equally polarized is the understanding of the Danaids' motivation. On the one hand, it is claimed that it is to be found "purely in their own character" (Garvie 1969: 221), an idiosyncracy with psychoanalytical dimensions, as the girls' anxiety towards sex and marriage is seen to be the result of their excessive (and 'oedipal') attachment to their father (Caldwell 1974: 49). On the other hand, those, who prefer (anthropological) grid to (psychoanalytical) couch, 'depersonalize' the Danaids' femininity: their behavior, it is argued, rooted in their social role as virgins of marriageable age, is articulated in the play with reference to wedding rituals. In real life, wedding rituals aimed at curtailing the prospective bride's anxiety about marriage, by symbolically enacting her 'abduction' by the groom, her subsequent 'death' as maiden, and her eventual 'rebirth' as wife.[10] But in the Danaids' case, the female voice struggles "to remain frozen in that fleeting stage of life" between virginity and marriage (Murnaghan 2005: 185), as they seem fixed in the ritual threshold (*limen*), unable to move forward. Thus, the play dramatizes the prevalence of the 'negative tendency' of the wedding ritual, which thus fails to overcome the liminal stage and reach conclusion (Seaford 1987).

It seems to me, however, that it is possible to reconcile the above polarities, despite their radical methodological divergence. As far as the supplication ritual is concerned, it is clear that the Danaids begin with a supplication that conforms to ritual protocol, yet proceed to pervert it by the insertion of emotion, revealing themselves 'atypically dubious' against the composure of the king and his democratic dilemmas. At the same time, Aeschylus' treatment of the wedding ritual motifs provides another manifestation of ritual perversion: if, in real life, the bride's 'abduction', 'death', and 'rebirth' are *symbolic*, legitimate, and under

control, in the Danaids' case, these motifs become *real*, anomic, and uncontrollable, as the excessively violent scene with the Egyptian men demonstrates. In that episode, male sexuality is violent and threatening, abduction appears literal, fear for death is overwhelming. Wedding rituals in real life serve to ease maidens into adulthood, acculturating them into the roles of wife, sexual partner and mother; from this perspective, the perversion of wedding rituals in the Danaids' case appears incapable of securing gender roles, and produces, instead, an idiosyncratic feminine subjectivity that breaches social norms and expectations.

Therefore, ritual perversion, either enacted or suffered by the Danaids, fails to produce and secure a canonical female subjectivity and encourages the emergence of an anomic one. It will take a divine intervention to bring, at last, a solution to the plot – and a final marriage with Argive men, which shall tame these impulsive, dangerous, and transgressive girls and, eventually, incorporate them in the civic institutions of the male-dominated *polis*.

Euripides' suppliant mothers: when women are ignored by men

In Euripides' *Suppliant Women*, Polyneices and his allies are killed in the battle against his brother Eteocles, king of Thebes; as punishment, the Thebans decide to leave all the enemy bodies unburied. The Argive king, Adrastus, who had led the expedition against Thebes, together with the mothers of the dead captains, a group of slaves and the captains' young sons, arrives at Eleusis in Attica; their goal is to supplicate the Athenians to help them recover the dead bodies of their men. Upon encountering Aethra, the mother of King Theseus, they ask for her help. The mothers supplicate Aethra and proceed to perform a lament that reaches an emotional extremity, which appears uncontrollable and almost self-indulging: an "insatiable … agonizing riveting grip of wailing … interminable" (79–82) (Mendelsohn 2002: 163). Aethra reacts favourably to the mothers' plea, but sends for her son, Theseus, adding: "Wise women should always act through men" (40–1).

As with Aeschylus' Danaids, the request of Euripides' female suppliants requires that a city go to war and endanger its survival. In contrast to Aeschylus, however, in Euripides' play the women's vociferous lamentation appears, from the start, ritually 'corrupt' to the point of "sacrilege" (Storey 2013: 20): it disrupts the ritual of Demeter, transgresses the legal ban on supplication in Eleusis, and threatens the city with pollution (Foley 2001: 38; Collard 1975: 63–4; Mendelsohn 2002: 163; Burian 1985: 130). Furthermore, the mothers avoid emphatically the ritual supplication to the gods (or the *polis*) and, instead, supplicate a woman, Aethra, placing the emphasis of their quest not on a compelling and challenging *public* discourse (invoking religion, law, or common descent) but on a powerful *personal* emotion: pity (*oiktos*, 48 ff., 68).

Initially, Theseus refuses to endanger his city by accepting the request of the suppliants because it lacks justice: Adrastus' expedition was based on folly, lawlessness, and impiety.[11] The impasse is finally solved by Aethra, a woman whose rhetoric appears crucially rational and "masculinized" (Mendelsohn

2002: 168), as she articulates the suppliants' plea according to the civic, public, and 'male' standards of Panhellenic institutions; accepting the supplication, Aethra advises, shall bring glory both to her son and to the Athenian *polis*. Thus, pity "drops out of the equation" (Konstan 2005: 58) and, "[b]y the time Theseus makes his reply, cries of woe have been supplemented by persuasive discourse" (Burian 1985: 134–5).

By the end of the fifth century, supplication, "though a living thing … was becoming increasingly a ritual whose binding force was weakening in face of the counter-strain of political realities" (Gould 1973: 101). The transfiguration of the ritual motifs of supplication from Aeschylus to Euripides maps out, also, a gradual 'weakening' in the 'binding force' of the female voice, as women appear to shift from an 'archaic' and more institutional status, capable of encroaching on the public sphere of the *polis*, to a classical and more personal status, which is restricted to giving expression to emotion. This shift, as we will see, shall be further emphasized by Theseus' decision to supplant the women and take over the funerary rites.

At the core of the play's action, a Theban herald arrives, and launches a protracted debate with the Athenian king on the merits and flaws of democracy. Counteracting the herald's oligarchic portrayal of democracy as *ochlocracy* (mob rule), Theseus delivers a thorough and fervent encomium. This political confrontation whets Theseus' desire to go to war, as he now adopts with uttermost conviction the cause of the suppliants. The war of Athens against Thebes becomes a war between two political ideologies: democracy against oligarchy. And women, as in Aeschylus' play, appear subsumed to male and democratic rhetoric and action.

Theseus wins the battle, retrieves the bodies of the dead captains and, then, takes on himself the female role in funerary rites: he tends and lays the corpses in the battlefield and, upon returning to Athens, he proceeds with the cremation and burial, refusing to give the dead bodies up to the mothers – seeing the disfigured bodies of their sons, he argues, will kill them (944). Instead, he invites Adrastus to perform a Funeral Oration, substituting female emotion and lamentation with male controlled rhetoric and praise for the dead. The action emphatically tries "to differentiate male and female roles in funeral rites, to segregate the men from the women, and to establish masculine and civic control over every part of the ritual" (Foley 2001: 40), reflecting, thus, contemporary Athenian practice: one of the most fundamental democratic 'inventions' was the public burial of the war dead, which aimed at appropriating the role of the *oikos* (and women) in funerary rites, substituting lament with Funeral Oration (Loraux 1986).

Excluded from the funerary rites and, as such, from the unfolding of the plot, the women give voice to their despair. Switching from plural to singular (782–822), they appear as isolated individuals and wish they had never married and had children (786–90). Their lament is no longer a collective ritual, but the expression of a highly personal and acute emotion of individual women, who reject the very core of their gender identity and role. Thus, the process from archaic familial ritual to democratic ritual is not entirely successful in terms of

the integration of women into the democratic city and its institutions (Foley 2001: 38, n. 59, 40). At the same time, in the mothers' lament, the rite's negative tendency prevails: instead of securing the separation between the living and the dead, the mothers insist on inhabiting a liminal space between the two worlds: "neither among the dead, nor among the living I am numbered, my lot lies apart from both" (968–70). Whereas mourning rites aim at closure, the women here perform a lament that displeases the gods (a lament that "Apollo does not accept", 975–6) and it is meant to last "forever" (*aei*, 979): a corrupt ritual (*teletē*), bereft of an ending (*telos*).

Despite the transgressive overtones of their lament, however, it should also be noted that, towards the end of their song, the women envisage mourning as being performed carefully *secluded* within the household (*en oikois*, 972): extreme female emotion appears, thus, to be *eventually* controlled and restricted within the realm of the *oikos*. Right against the mothers' 'seclusion' in their home, Evadne, the wife of one of the dead captains, rushes now onto the stage, having 'escaped' from the interior of her household.[12] Followed by an elderly male figure, her father, and unyielding to his desperate appeals, this female figure, overwhelmed by desolation for her husband's loss, commits suicide by throwing herself into his funerary pyre. On the opposite end of the Danaids' impetuous 'anti-eroticism', Evadne displays an impetuous 'hyper-eroticism' – both emotional excesses in urgent need of regulation by the (male) community, yet tragically defying it.

The scene underlines the paroxysmal, uncontrolled, and, more importantly, uncontrollable emotion as a generic trademark of 'uncivic' and idiosyncratic femininity. Evadne's self-destructiveness appears pointedly interlinked with the transgression of various ritual norms: remembering the joyous rites of her wedding, she arrives to perform a mock bacchanal ritual (*ekbaccheusamena*,1001); she desires to unite with her dead husband in a mock intercourse (1018–21); she is dressed in a ceremonial wedding dress that does not befit mourning (1056) but, as she puts it, claims glory (*kleinon*, 1055); she strives to surpass all other women, not in typical female activities and qualities ("the works of the loom and prudence", 1062) but in what she sees to be an athletic and almost military (thus deeply 'perverted' for a woman) contest of individualized virtue (*aretê*, 1060). Finally, wishing to prove herself "triumphant over her adversaries" (*kallinikos*, 1059), Evadne strives to achieve a status that, to ancient thought, is strictly and exclusively associated with male identity.[13] Just as the mothers' lament appeared previously to be ritually uncontrollable and resisting integration with the *polis*, Evadne's idiosyncratic, 'hysterical', and deeply transgressive – literally 'autonomous' – suicide displays now an equally abnormal female subjectivity, which escapes male control.

The action is soon to reach 'closure' – and the mechanisms of female exclusion (and inclusion) will prove instrumental to its course. With Evadne's death totally ignored by the male agents of the action, the young sons of the dead captains bring in their fathers' ashes. In the joint song with their grandmothers, the boys sideline the women, becoming the protagonists of the lament; turning their grief into hate, they promise to avenge their fathers' death. Contrary to the

highly charged voice of these boys, the mothers appear now tempered as they try to restrain their warmongering excess (1147–9; 1157–8). But it is the goddess Athena who in the last scene of the play puts the world firmly back to (male) order: Athena ordains that the city of Argos take an oath of political allegiance to Athens and perform sacrifices to seal it, while predicting the boys' successful expedition against Thebes in the future, anticipating the Panhellenic glory they are to win. Thus, Athena 'rehabilitates' emotion, redresses ritual, and relocates glory to the male agents.

In Euripides' *Suppliants*, a play dubbed in antiquity as 'Encomium of Athens', female behavior, the mothers' continuing lament, and Evadne's suicide remain radically marginalized to the action. Yet, there is a crucial difference between the elderly mothers and the young wife: countering Evadne's 'extramural' and transgressive suicidal despair, the mothers of the chorus *eventually* contain their emotion within the walls of their house. Moreover, their juxtaposition to the passionate voice of the male children shows them able to distance themselves, to an extent, from emotional paroxysm. Seeming to recognize the women's successful return to standards of civil behavior, Theseus acknowledges their civic descent and includes them in his political program, on a level next to Adrastus, addressing them together: "Adrastus and you women of Argive ancestry, look upon these boys carrying the bodies of their brave fathers" (1165). Under this newly gained gender and civic identity, the women leave the stage with an exhortation to Adrastus and a pledge to perform markedly 'male' rituals: "Let us go, Adrastus, and bind ourselves with ritual oaths to this man and the city" (1232–3).

In Euripides' *Suppliant Women*, female emotion appears as a self-destructive behavior, which either lies beyond the horizon of the *polis*, or is redressed and reintroduced into the male 'law and order'. But we should also bear in mind that, in ancient thought, if "female-childbearing-active (outside the *oikos*) is bad … female-postmenopausal-active (in the community) is at least acceptable in some cases" (Demand 1994: 128). Euripides' play shows precisely that contrary to the 'active' Danaids, the Electras, and Evadne, the 'passive' mothers achieve, albeit provisionally, 'acceptance' and inclusion in the democratic *polis* under the aegis of Athena – a virginal, yet markedly 'masculine', female deity.

Conclusion

Suspended between destructiveness and self-destructiveness, female characters on the tragic stage are shown to achieve, through ritual perversion, an aberrant idiosyncracy, which breaches gender requirements and challenges their integration in both household and city. This challenge, consequently, seems to justify the ideological principles men used to regulate the position of women within the community and legitimize their exclusion from the public space. Theatre foregrounds such 'dangerous' women, showing the mechanisms of female exclusion either tragically failing their target or achieving it fortuitously.

Furthermore, there appears to be a shift in perspective, as we move from the first to the second half of the fifth century. In Aeschylus, women summon ritual

discourse in order to intervene into the life of the *polis* and are eventually contained by men; in Sophocles, women's deritualized emotion and ritual perversion produces chaos in both household and city; in Euripides, ritual perversion leads to an excessively emotional female voice which remains markedly marginal to the action; but, when women eventually achieve ritual normality, they are incorporated into male-controlled institutions.

This shift from ritual to emotion seems to take place during the time democracy was maturing, growing from its incipient stages in the first half of the fifth century into a 'radical' democracy in the second, a political system that configured the "Greek suspicion of woman as a passionate, unstable, dangerous creature" (Segal 1966: 539) into a fundamental ideological tool that justified female exclusion from public life.

Notes

1 I would like to thank Tatiana Tsakiropoulou-Summers for her meticulous editing, which improved considerably my essay in both spirit and letter.
2 Slaves and barbarians are two anthropological categories of the ancient thought that views them as sharing many of the female 'deficiencies'.
3 See Soph. *Electra* 121 ff.; Eur. *Electra* 195–8.
4 In my approach to Sophocles' *Electra*, here, I adopt the 'pessimistic' readings of the play (which seem to convince the majority of contemporary scholars). For a detailed discussion of the related bibliography, see Papazoglou (2014: 68–145).
5 It should be noted that, in Athens, marriage between cousins – or between uncle and niece – was considered not only legal, but also obligatory, especially in cases of absence of male progeny: this is the institution of the so-called 'heiress' (*epiklēros korē*).
6 *dēmou kratousa cheir* (604); it should be noted that this is the first instance in the extant texts, where the words *dēmos* and *kratos* are brought together.
7 Bachvarova (2009: 300) relates the Danaids' fanaticism to the syndrome of *hysteria*, as do the Hippocratic doctors (Hipp. *Diseases of Virgins* 8.466–70).
8 It is not clear from the fragments whether it is Hypermnestra that is taken to court or her sisters. The overall plot in the missing plays is debated; here I follow what is agreed to be the most probable version (see the overview in Rösler 1993).
9 I side with the latter. For discussion and basic bibliography, see Garvie (1969: 215–14) and Lévy (1985).
10 On wedding rituals, see Oakley and Sinos (2002); Seaford (1987); and Rehm (1994).
11 Because of these qualities, Adrastus appears 'feminized' (Mendelsohn 2002: 149–50).
12 The idea of escape is emphasized: 1000; 1040–3; 1049.
13 Compare Foley (2001: 42): "[H]er death might well be viewed as a ghastly imitation of heroic male behavior that pointedly interrupts and distorts the appropriation of male courage in the service of the state by Theseus and Adrastus".

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8 Dangerous bodies

Plato's *Laws* and the ideology of female inferiority in fourth-century Athens[1]

Elizabeth LaFray

Plato is often cited for his revolutionary and proto-feminist ideas about politics, philosophy, and women. Yet in the *Laws*, Plato says that women will "use every means to resist being led out into the light, and they will prove much too strong for the lawgiver" (Plato, *Laws* 781c–d[2]). This passage seems to capture, quite neatly, the ways in which he found traditional Greek women to be unfit for life in the city-state – they were not suited for public life, could not be compelled to participate in it, and would not listen to the "right rule". Nevertheless, Plato's ideas about women are more complex than that and appear contradictory at times. For example, in the *Republic* he suggests that "perhaps" women in the utopian state will listen to the right rule, while other key passages in the *Laws* show female participation in political life to a degree unprecedented in contemporary Athenian society. Therefore, Plato's ideas about women must be studied within the context of his larger corpus and not in isolation. Female exclusion was propounded by several elements within the cultural milieu of classical Athens: its political organization, laws, economy, as well as philosophical and medical views on 'female nature'. Plato was an Athenian by birth and was exposed to these influences throughout his life, just as he was influenced by a number of different forms of political and social organizations he had observed. All of these influences are distilled in the *Laws*, which was likely written toward the end of his life and represents the hallmarks of his unique heritage. Modern studies of the *Laws* tend to pick sides – Plato either intended to liberate women and give them rights in the "second best city" or he was simply a pragmatist, interested in harnessing the power of women for the good of the state. Thanassis Samaras (2010: 195) takes the first position, arguing that the legislation in the *Laws* represents a radical departure from contemporary Athenian practice and gives women unprecedented rights in terms of political and military roles. Richard Stalley (1983: 106) takes the latter position, arguing that Plato was not interested in liberating women but in using their abilities for the good of the state, hence his proposition for female participation in the military of Magnesia. My study does not make a liberator or a pragmatist of Plato. Instead, I will examine the instances of female exclusion in the *Laws*, placing them against the larger backdrop of the Athenian cultural milieu, in order to show that Plato's ideas about women were influenced by his uniquely Athenian concerns about citizenship and

democratic participation as well as by the Hippocratics' ideas about the pathological female body, that reinforced existing cultural norms and actively excluded women from participation in public life. In the way of methodology, I will first examine Plato's particular concept of the female in the *Laws* and compare it to his pronouncements in other related dialogues; then, I will situate this concept within the broader context of Athenian cultural ideology about nature, the body and the role of women. In doing so, I will show that while women in the *Laws* might appear to be considered legitimate political actors, the restrictions placed on them in that same dialogue reflect the realistic limitations that traditional Athenian society placed on its women.

Women as political actors in the *Laws* and *The Republic*

Though the exact date of the *Laws*' composition is debated, many place it near the end of Plato's life (Stalley 1983: 1; Bobonich 2010: 3), based on Aristotle's report in his *Politics* that the *Laws* is later than the *Republic*, which was written around 380 B.C. (*Politics* 2.1264b). In the *Republic*, Plato develops his ideas on the ideal state, while in the *Laws* he revisits them, approaching them from a more practical perspective and creating this time a "second best" city, Magnesia (*Laws* 739e). The main characters in the dialogue, an Athenian stranger, a Cretan, and a Spartan man, discuss happiness (*eudaimonia*) and the virtue (*aretē*) of citizens, which he considers to be the ultimate goals of lawmaking. The Athenian stranger describes the nature of virtue and then embarks on a description of Magnesia, the new city to be founded in an unpopulated part of Crete. Unlike the communal structure of Kallipolis, Plato's utopian city in the *Republic*, Magnesia's society is based on private families and households. Therefore, the description of Magnesia's laws and social structure leads to a discussion of the political and social roles of women and how these can be meshed with their role as mothers and wives, which is also a central theme in the *Republic*.

In the *Laws*, Plato imagines a city in which men and women are treated similarly. "For females, too, my law will lay down the same regulations as for men, and training of an identical kind" (Plato, *Laws* 804d). In this passage and the lines preceding it, Plato suggests that all men, women, and children should be educated. After all, educating all citizens is in the best interest of the city:

> Since this state of things can exist, I affirm that the practice which at present prevails in our districts is a most irrational one – namely, that men and women should not all follow the same pursuits with one accord and with all their might. For thus from the same taxation and trouble there arises and exists half a State only instead of a whole one, in nearly every instance.
>
> (Plato, *Laws* 805a)

In contemporary Athens, boys received an education in reading and writing, athletics, and music from the age of six. Girls, however, were kept in seclusion in the company of their mothers and female slaves (Pomeroy 1995: 80). While

it is possible that some wealthy girls may have been taught reading and writing, female literacy in Athens remains an intensely debated topic (Pritchard 2014: 178–9). In light of this, Plato's insistence that boys and girls be educated in the same way is remarkable.

According to Plato, educated women will nearly double the power of the city, both in terms of intellectual and physical strength. The Athenian interlocutor stresses the importance of using both left and right limbs in wrestling, archery, and other physical activities in order to show that it is irresponsible not to train girls as well as boys in physical fitness. Indeed, he argues, ignorance has produced the contemporary practice of educating boys and girls in different ways, which distorts nature: "In natural ability the two limbs are almost equally balanced; but we ourselves by habitually using them in a wrong way have made them different". By analogy, girls and boys, "used" in different ways, have become different but to the detriment of society (*Laws* 794d–795d). Educating the youth equally is upheld in various parts of the work, confirming the idea that this benefits the city. With this in mind, the Athenian suggests that both Magnesian boys and girls must be educated in gymnastics and music, so that their bodies and souls may attain the most excellent form and, as such, profit their city in the greatest way (*Laws* 795d; 813b).

Like in *The Republic*, the purpose of education in Magnesia is to prepare citizens to participate in government and military service, something contrary to contemporary Athenian practice that excluded women from the army. In Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*, when the title character asks her husband about the decisions of the Assembly, he scolds her disapprovingly: "Keep for your web and your shuttle your care, / Or for some hours hence your cheeks will be sore and hot; leave this / alone, war is Man's sole affair!" (519–20). The actual role of women in fifth- and fourth-century Athenian political and military affairs was non-existent. For this reason, David Pritchard notes that this episode between Lysistrata and her husband should remind modern readers that comedies like *Lysistrata* and the *Assembly of Women*, in which women take over public affairs, cannot be considered "proto-feminist works" (Pritchard 2014: 177). However, David Cohen suggests that *Lysistrata* could represent the possibility that war-widows during the Peloponnesian War may have tried to make their voices heard (Cohen 1987: 30). On the whole, *Lysistrata* provides an important example of women's efforts to empower themselves. Importantly, Plato does not appear to share Aristophanes' negative attitude toward women's participation in military affairs. In idealized Magnesia, girls, like boys, are expected to ride on horseback, take part in rigorous military training such as "light skirmishing and heavy-armed fighting", as well as monthly, one-day military expeditions (*Laws* 813d; 829b–e). In another part of his work, Plato acknowledges the relation between serving in the military and gaining political power:

> For women in Magnesia, as well as men, military service opens the door to political power. The limit for official posts shall be forty for a woman and thirty for a man. For military services the limit shall be from twenty years up to sixty for a man; for women they shall ordain what is possible and fitting in each case, after they have finished bearing children, and up to

> the age of fifty, in whatever kind of military work it may be thought right to employ their services.
>
> (*Laws* 785b)

With this regulation, female citizens of Magnesia are allowed to serve in the military and have access to political office. Thanassis Samaras argues that this passage is an "explicit textual confirmation" of Plato's conviction that real women should participate both in the military and in the political sphere (2010: 192). However, Richard Stalley suggests that Plato was not interested in liberating women when he proposed female participation in the military, but aimed simply at using the women's abilities for the good of the state (1983: 106). To be sure, the Athenian stranger does not suggest that women's participation in the state is designed for their own good and he makes some important stipulations on women's military and political participation in Magnesia. For example, for women to be eligible for such service, they must first get married between the ages of sixteen and twenty, and have finished with the task of bearing and rearing children by age forty. Therefore, Magnesian women cannot hold office or take part in military pursuits until their child-bearing years have passed. This is significant for a number of reasons that we will discuss later. Here it should suffice to note that the men of Magnesia participate in politics from the age of thirty and have no restrictions placed upon them because of familial or household duties. Though Magnesian girls and boys are educated with the expectation they will employ their skills and knowledge for the benefit of the city both politically and militarily, women's contribution is postponed for at least twenty years by the duties of motherhood and the maintenance of the *oikos* that take precedence over other obligations. This comes as no surprise in light of the contemporary Athenian practice that made reproduction the most important contribution of Athenian women to the state, especially after Pericles' citizenship law of 451 B.C. that required both mother and father to be citizens of Athens in order for their offspring to be considered citizens as well (*Pol.* 1278a). Therefore, Plato's motivation for keeping the fertile women of Magnesia out of military and political roles may seem straightforward. However, if we take into account two other Platonic dialogues, the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*, we find that Plato's reasons for restricting women's political activity in his second-best state were not simply owing to the practical difficulties inherent in the roles of wife and mother but also to their dangerous bodies.

Unlike the *Laws*, which retains the Athenian woman's traditional role as wife and mother, the *Republic* espouses ideas completely contradictory to Athenian social and political standards at the time. As a result, it has long been lauded as evidence of Plato's feminist tendencies. The aim of Book 5 is to show how the wives and children of Guardians, who will be held as common property of the state "will be managed" (*Rep.* 5.450c). A large part of Book 5 is also dedicated to a debate over whether female human nature is capable of sharing with the male "all tasks, or none at all, or some but not others" (5.453a). For example, in Kallipolis, the utopian city of the *Republic*, Socrates claims that women can be Guardians, the highest officeholders in the city, because the "natural capacities

are distributed alike among both creatures" (5.455d) and thus men and women "naturally share in all pursuits" (5.455d). Nevertheless, Socrates also says that in all pursuits, "the woman is weaker than the man" (5.455e) and that he cannot think of "anything practiced by mankind in which the masculine sex does not surpass the female" (5.455c). Neither can he acknowledge their equal participation as Guardians of the state without saying: "The women and men, then, have the same nature in respect to the guardianship of the state, save in so far as the one [woman] is weaker, the other [man] is stronger" (5.456a). Morag Buchan calls this inconsistency – in which female Guardians are described as both capable and weak – an "if" clause, that reveals Plato's confidence that in reality women will not be able to rule (1999: 143).

Still, common sense tells us that there are three tasks in which women are indisputably superior to men: pregnancy, childbirth, and infant-rearing. The *Republic*, however, mitigates female superiority in childbirth and childrearing by communizing these tasks and removing maternity tasks from women as much as possible. Socrates takes great pains to describe a system of communal childrearing that gives these tasks to nurses and childcare centers:

> The offspring of the good, I suppose, they will take to the pen or créche, to certain nurses who live apart in a quarter of the city, but the offspring of the inferior, and any of those of the other sort who are born defective, they will properly dispose of in secret, so that no one will know what has become of them. That is the condition, he said, of preserving the purity of the guardians' breed. They will also supervise the nursing of the children, conducting the mothers to the pen when their breasts are full, but *employing every device to prevent anyone from recognizing her own infant.*
>
> (*Rep*.5.460c, emphasis added)

However, as noted above, in traditional Athenian households, parentage was an essential element of establishing citizenship and, by association, individual rights and responsibilities within the *polis*. By contrast, in Kallipolis, all tasks are performed for the common good and, as such, all children produced are the property of the state. Morag Buchan argues that Plato diminishes the importance of biological childbirth in favor of the mythical parenthood of god the father, thereby stripping women of their potential power (1999: 128, 138). Mothers are not even to know their children, for they are to be removed from them immediately after birth. Mothers are also to be kept from nursing their own children so that they may not develop bonds with them or favor them over the other children of the community. Socrates justifies the use of women and children as communal property in the context of his effort to create the best Guardian class, but in doing so strips the role of motherhood from women, the most significant natural function in which they surpass men (Saxonhouse 1976: 71).

In the *Laws*, Plato returns these maternal powers to women and as a result the household in this dialogue is similar to the contemporary Athenian household, as the primary unit of social organization. Plato's reason for this change in his

"second best" utopian city is subject to scholarly debate. Aristotle suggested that the purpose of the *Laws* was to create a political system more familiar to Greek people (*Pol.* 4.1.1288b37–9). It is easy to agree with Aristotle – certainly the city of Magnesia would have been more recognizable to Plato's audience. It would have been more plausible too, especially because it did not require a complete reorganization of society. But maternal power in Magnesia was only regained at the expense of the right to participate in the political life of the city. This, I would argue, is because women's bodies were capable of producing citizens, which gave them a sort of invaluable power in Athens. However, women's bodies were also dangerous, both in ideological and physical terms because they were considered to be inferior in terms of strength and physiological design. As we will see below, both Plato and the Hippocratics believed women had a movable womb, the uterus, that weakened their bodies by causing various conditions, ranging from unpleasant to life-threatening, which could only be remedied through sexual intercourse. The remedy itself, unless implemented within marriage, suggested that women's bodies, in their inferior constitution, could lead women to extramarital affairs and since the Athenian state was built upon the foundation of established blood lines, thus endanger both the purity of the citizen populace and the Athenian state itself.

Movable wombs, inferior souls, and the dangers of female nature

The idea that women were affected by strong physical desire and the urge to procreate is prevalent in a number of classical Greek literary sources. In the Hippocratic treatise, *Diseases of Women I*, however, desire, Plato's morally abhorrent condition, is not the primary cause of a woman's behavior. By and large for the Hippocratics, human health was based on physiological and biological factors imagined in the context of the balance between moisture and dryness, cold and heat. Consequently, in women's bodies, the most influential elements in their physiology are menstrual blood and the uterus. Young women were influenced by these elements around the age of fourteen, an age when the average girl at the time started menstruating (Dean-Jones 1994: 50). By puberty, according to the cultural and medical standards, a girl's body contained enough blood to nourish a fetus during pregnancy. If menstruation did not begin by the age of fourteen it was assumed that menstrual blood was trapped inside the young woman's body (Dean-Jones 1994: 48). In a culture in which regular menstruation was tantamount to health for any woman past the age of puberty, failure to menstruate led to a number of interventions by medical practitioners, who feared the gynecological problems that might be caused by the trapped menses.

According to the medical writers of the *Hippocratic Corpus*, menstruation fails to occur when the "mouth of the womb is closed" or if the uterus is excessively dry (*Diseases of Women* 1.15).[3] In order to restore its natural balance of moisture, the womb moves throughout the woman's body and "lays upon" naturally moist organs, such as the liver or the bladder, causing problems by interfering with their functions. In the case of a womb filled with blood but unable to discharge it due

to its tight opening, the womb again travels about the body, seeking moisture but in the process blocking the passages (*poroi*) and causing problems such as suffocation. The author of *Diseases of Women* describes a variety of symptoms caused by the movable womb. (I deliberately use the term "movable" in referring to the Hippocratic description of the womb, in contrast to the more popular "wandering", in order to emphasize that Plato's concept of the "wandering womb" is his own unique and ideologically skewed perception of the female body.) Symptoms include pain in the lower back and abdomen, fever, thick urine, a distended stomach, grinding teeth, loss of appetite, sleeplessness, fainting, vomiting of phlegm, violent thirst, rumbling in the womb, inability to urinate, and improper evacuation of the stomach. Women who fail to menstruate for more than four months also suffer from aphasia, whereupon the corners of their mouths and their tongues function indistinctly. The female patient also experiences biting sensations in the neck, the release of yellow bile, and fretfulness. In particularly dangerous cases, the menses that linger too long in the body move off into the lungs and the woman suffers *phthisis* (coughing up blood) and death. For the luckier ones, survival may entail sterility (*Diseases of Women* 1.33).

The most highly prescribed treatment for the movable womb was marriage and sexual intercourse. Since the womb was thought to move through the body seeking moisture or an aperture through which it could discharge its fluids, physicians considered intercourse the most natural cure for it, as the man's movement opened up the female passages, while his semen moistened the errant womb and allowed it to settle back into its correct position. Thus, while the medical writers did not name desire as the etiology of this disease, the suggested remedy reflects the ways that existing cultural norms influenced and confirmed emerging medical ideas about the movable womb. At the same time, a notable side benefit of this particular kind of cure was pregnancy, which in itself was the end goal for a woman who was not menstruating regularly. A one-time pregnancy, however, did not create permanent effects on a woman's health; as a result, its temporary nature contributed to the notion that women, whenever they were not pregnant, were diseased or pathological.

The movable womb is a troublesome concept that, as far as we know, has its origins in the Hippocratic medical treatises (Dean-Jones 1994: 74). It also appears in philosophical works, such as Plato's *Timaeus*, where the pathological female body constitutes a receptacle for souls that fail to achieve reason: "whoever has failed in this [attaining reason] shall be changed into woman's nature at the second birth" (*Tim.* 42b–c). But what is woman's nature according to Plato? The answer is important and we will pursue it below, as it reveals not only Plato's ideas about the female body, but also the significance of the limitation he places on female political participation during women's childbearing years in the *Laws*.

According to the *Timaeus*, the propagation of men takes place after the demiurge creates the cosmos and puts souls into their bodies. The creation of the "rest of living creatures" (*zoa, Tim.* 90e) takes place "when all those creatures generated as men who prove themselves cowardly and spent their lives in wrong-doing were transformed, at their second incarnation, into women" (91a).

Women, generated by the wrongdoings of men and the subsequent incarnation of inferior souls, are the reason that the gods create sexual intercourse. Then, driven by divinely contrived desire, men and women join in intercourse, sowing "upon the womb, as upon ploughed soil, animalcules that are invisible for smallness and unshaped . . . after which they bring them forth into the light and thus complete the generation of the living creature" (91d). The inculcation of desire in men and women is the key part of this story, for it is here that Plato explicates the nature of man and woman: the gods "construct an animate creature of one kind" in men and "another kind" in women (91a). This animate creature is called the *zôon* and is responsible for feelings of desire in men and women. The male *zôon* is the penis which "like a creature deaf to reason . . . attempts to dominate all because of its frenzied lusts" (91b). The male *zōon* is disobedient and self-willed. Its aim is to generate new life and according to Timaeus is given the nature of an animal by god. Yet the male *zōon* can be mastered through proper education and the application of self-control through which one can master the desires of the body (LaFray 2014: 163). The *Laws* reiterates this idea: proper education makes man a "tame being" (*hēmeron, Laws* 766a). At the same time, if a man is not subjected to education, "he turns out to be the wildest of earth's creatures" (766a).

The female *zōon* is the womb. It is "an indwelling creature desirous of childbearing" and if a woman does not become pregnant, it becomes "vexed". It moves throughout the body "blocking up the passages of the breath and preventing respiration", casting "the body into uttermost distress" (*Tim.* 91c).[4] Not only do women suffering from desire find their bodies in a state of distress, they also suffocate. The suffering caused by a woman's uterus has no cultural or permanent medical cure available for it. Thus, it cannot be mastered through education, or by exercising restraint. Nor can it be healed with the use of medical treatments. According to *Timaeus* distress caused by the female *zōon* does not desist until desire (*epithumia*) and love (*eros*) unite man and woman in sexual intercourse (91c). This is the only remedy for female desire and it recalls the Hippocratic treatment for suppressed menses and the movable womb. Inspired by the Hippocratic notion of the movable womb, Plato describes the uterus as an active agent ascribing to it feelings and desires that force it to wander about the body seeking fulfillment. Plato, therefore, characterizes the womb as 'wandering' (*planomenon*), a term that the ancient medical writers themselves did not use. Nevertheless, Plato's imaginative term influenced subsequent cultural and medical concepts of female biology to such an extent that the phrase 'wandering womb' was used in medical textbooks for over a millennium (until the seventeenth century), while it is still erroneously preferred by scholars over the Hippocratic term 'movable', whenever referring to the ancient concept of the womb's function.

According to Plato, the 'wandering womb' puts women in a semi-permanent diseased state, making the nature of the female body *de facto* pathological, since the only healthy state for it is to be pregnant.[5] In the *Republic*, desires like love, hunger, and thirst are located in the body and constantly challenge the rational part of the soul. Men overcome these desires by mastering them with mental exercises and forgoing the pleasures of the body – living the life of a philosopher

helps them focus on the care of the soul and not the body. Women, however, even if they master the desires of hunger and thirst, cannot overcome the desire to procreate. It is part of their nature. Abstaining from intercourse and failing to submit to the desire brought on by the *zōon* (womb), they fall ill and are perpetually subject to a diseased state. The ancients interpreted these innate weaknesses as evidence of the inherently female inability to think rationally and to subject their body completely to the powers of the soul.

Plato's adoption of the concept of the moveable womb justified his withholding political power from women due to their inability to control their biological desires. Yet, it is more difficult to measure whether average Athenians thought of female exclusion in medical and philosophical terms. Indeed, for most Athenians, female desire was dangerous to the state because of its potential effects on citizenship, a status that was an Athenian concern from the time of Solon. In his description of Solon's family legislation, fourth-century orator Demosthenes describes how the children of a "lawful wife" are guaranteed citizenship (Demosthenes 46.18; Lape 2002/03: n. 16). But to be a lawful wife was no simple thing, and after Solon's legislation, the private practice of *enguē*, in which a man pledged his daughter to a husband for the production of legitimate children and established the amount of the dowry, became a public way of attesting to the legal status of a marriage (Lape 2002/03: 121). A century later the Athenian preoccupation with citizenship came to the fore once again. In 451/0 Pericles instituted his famous citizenship law, making all unions between Athenians and non-Athenians illegal. The law excluded the children of illegal unions from family inheritance as well as a "share" of the Athenian *polis* (Patterson 1990: 61). As a result of this legislation, concern about the activities of citizen women, especially their sexual activities, increased (Patterson 1990: 57). Indeed, children born from unrecognized unions, like those of an Athenian man and his mistress for example, were not considered legitimate stakeholders in the *polis* and as such endangered the purity of the family. Legitimacy, which was ensured by full Athenian parentage, was a serious issue for Athenians (Ogden 1996: 40). For example, the fourth-century Attic orator Isaios describes the *meion*, a ritual in which male children were presented to the men of the *phratry*, a group whose purpose was to verify the credentials of potential members. When a father presented his son, he had to swear that the child he presented was legitimate, that he was "bringing children born of a citizen and pledged woman" (Isaios 8.19; Davies 1977/78: 109). Other festivals duplicated the process of recognition of legitimacy as well: for example, the *amphidromia* in which infants were accepted as part of the *oikos* and thereby recognized as legitimate by their fathers, the head of the household (Davies 1977/78: 110). Rituals like these demonstrate that legitimacy on the part of offspring was not assumed in classical Athens. More importantly, while the father vouched for his child, the mother's status as a legitimate wife was the real guarantor of citizen rights. The regulation of Athenian women, therefore, was an essential occupation of the Athenian state. This reality is reflected in Plato's *Laws*, especially, as we will see below, in its concern about female bodies.

Conclusion: female nature and its implications for political participation in the *Laws*

Book 6 of the *Laws* discusses several related themes, such as the regulation of women, laws relating to communal meals (*syssitia*), and the scope and design of education in the second-best city of Magnesia. While this section of the *Laws* is often used to show Plato's more revolutionary ideas about female political participation, it also includes a number of negative statements about women, especially when considered in the context of the *Republic's* mothers without maternity and the *Timaeus*' pathological female body, that we discussed above. For example, the Athenian interlocutor describes women in contemporary Athens, Sparta, and Crete as thievish and wily because of their inherent physical weakness[6] (*Laws* 781a). Without a man's physical strength to gain the advantage, women were thought to achieve their gains through cunning. An intelligent woman was not necessarily morally weak. For example, the *Odyssey's* Penelope is praised for her wisdom in service of keeping Odysseus' household safe. However, a woman's moral qualities with relation to her intellect were determined by how she put to use that intellect. As a result, Clytemnestra, who uses her intellect against her husband, is described as the worst of all women. The Athenian claims that lawgivers in contemporary society had failed to regulate women adequately, abandoning them instead to their "disorderly condition" (*dustakton*), perhaps referring to their moral and physical weakness. This description of unregulated women in the *Laws* raises similar points with those discussed in *Timaeus* regarding female desire and the wandering womb. In other words, the uterus, being unregulated due to the lack of intercourse, is thrown into a state of disease, much like unregulated women become a malady for a Greek city. The disorderly condition of women and their inherent weakness, both morally and physically, is proof of their inferior nature. As the speaker reminds the Cretan interlocutor, "the female nature (*physis*) is inferior (*cheiron*) to the masculine with regard to goodness" (*Laws* 781b, author's translation). And here, the Cretan suggests that not only are women weaker in terms of the intellect and physical strength, but also in terms of morality.

According to the *Laws*, all institutions should be regulated in common for both men and women. It is in the best interest of the state. Yet the Athenian stranger expresses his uncertainty on the means by which the lawgiver may compel women to participate in common meals (*syssitia*) and take part in public life:

> The female sex would more readily endure anything rather than this: accustomed as they are to live a retired and private life, women will use every means to resist being led out into the light, and they will prove much too strong for the lawgiver. So that elsewhere, as I said, women would not so much as listen to the mention of the right rule without shrieks of indignation; but in our State perhaps they will.
>
> (*Laws* 781c–d)

Women, being completely unaccustomed to public life, are expected by the Athenian to use "every means to resist (*antiteinon*) being led out into the light" (*Laws* 781c). Plato describes female opposition here using the words "to resist" (*antiteino*) and "resistance" (*antitasis*), both of which have medical connotations. For example, in *The Art of Medicine* the noun *antitasis* describes the setting of a dislocated thigh. The only other extant use of this particular noun is found in Plato's *Laws*, where resisting women are to be compelled to comply with state regulations. Female resistance, rooted in the inferior physiology of the female body, must be dealt with in the way that a physician handles a broken or dislocated limb – it must be corrected (781b). Nevertheless, by reflecting on the difficulty the lawgiver will encounter in overcoming female resistance as women are expected to "prove much too strong for the lawgiver" and to refuse to "listen to the mention of right rule" (781d), Plato reveals not only how deeply pessimistic he is about women's ability to contribute to the political life of the state but also how strongly he was influenced by the widespread ideology of the inferior female and her exclusion from public life at all costs.

Inequality between men and women by virtue of gender is indicative of Plato's debt not only to contemporary Athenian society but also to the medical tradition. As shown above, in the *Laws*, Plato couches his discussion of female inferiority in medical terms, recalling his description of the uterus (*zōon*) in the *Timaeus*. At the same time, the lawgiver in the *Laws* tries to diminish, as much as it is reasonably tolerated in a political structure designed to appeal to contemporary Athenians, the female power in the household, by requiring women's participation in daily communal meals (*syssitia*). While he allows political freedom in Magnesia and insists that people in the city must submit voluntarily (and not by force) to the laws suggested by the legislator, those very same laws are designed to control the citizens and make their lives subject to the good of the city (Schofield 2010: 25). Thus, freedom in Magnesia is not the same as the freedom in contemporary democratic Athens. As we have seen, women in Plato's Magnesia have the right to be politically active, but are expected to abstain from making use of it during their childbearing years, in accordance with the *Laws*' concept of voluntary submission. In Athens, by contrast, women had no political rights at all and thus no option to "volunteer". The new constitution of Magnesia is touted to be a combination of monarchy and democracy that is second best in merit only to the one established in Kallipolis, while it is more desirable than the contemporary constitutions of Crete, Sparta, and Athens. Yet, Aristotle's comment in his *Politics* (2.1265a) that the legislation in the *Laws* was more applicable to contemporary society than the system proposed in the *Republic* is very instructive. Indeed, whereas the *Republic* allows for greater political participation among women, the *Laws* restricts female participation during their fertile years, when their femininity is most pronounced. The age restriction of female political participation, when viewed in terms of its biological, cultural, and philosophical consequences, gains a different dimension. Plato had made a similar concession to female biology also in the *Republic*, where he took away from women a considerable part of their biological role as mothers.

Indeed, it was the problem of biology and, especially, the perception of women's bodies as dangerous that led Plato to exclude women from political participation for two decades of their adult life in the *Laws*.

Notes

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2 Unless otherwise noted, translations of Plato's *Laws* come from *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, translated by R. G. Bury (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, London, William Heinemann Ltd, 1967 and 1968).
3 *Diseases of Women* 1 in Emile Littré, *Oevres completes de Hippocrate: Traduction nouvelle avec le texte grec en regard*, volume 8, (Paris: J. B. Baillière, 1853). English translations for passages from *Diseases of Women 1* come from Ann Ellis Hanson, (1975).
4 Adair (1995: 155) offers an alternative translation of the passage suggesting that it does not describe a wandering uterus but rather a wandering *zōon*.
5 Grams (2009: 163) offers more on Plato's concept of disease. On the female body, see further LaFray (2014: 162–5).
6 It is notable that *asthenēs*, while used in the context of the physical weakness in this particular instance, can also be used to describe weakness in terms of power, property, and the intellect.

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9 Politics of the deformed

Women, slaves, and democracy in Aristotle

Velvet Yates

The connection between Aristotle's biology, especially his biology of women, and his *Politics* has been largely ignored or denied. Yet studies of Aristotle's gynecological works (King 1998; Dean-Jones 1994), and Lloyd's incisive essays on aspects of Aristotle's biology (1996) provide evidence of a strong continuity with Aristotle's ethical and political theories. Lacking the context of Aristotle's biology, scholars focusing on political and ethical theory have been rattled by the deeply negative statements concerning women, slaves, and democracy in Aristotle's *Politics*. This has led to highly conflicted statements, even from the same scholar, at different times; for example, Ober, in his 1998 monograph *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens*, presents Aristotle as part of an elite community highly critical of democracy, but in a 2015 article argues that Aristotle's ideal state in the *Politics* is "a (very specific) kind of democracy" (237). Scholarly reaction to Aristotle's theory of natural slavery in the *Politics* has ranged from condemnation as an "embarrassment" (Garnsey 1996: 347), to dismissal as a cultural artifact (Brunt 1993: 379), to simple avoidance of the topic altogether (Lockwood and Samaras 2015). Pellegrin, although he agrees that Aristotle condones slavery, nevertheless hopes that "Aristotle's theory of natural slavery allows us to think that slavery, as it was practiced in his time, did not have Aristotle's support" (2013: 112). And in spite of Aristotle's declaration that the female is, as it were, a deformed male (*Generation of Animals* [GA] 737a), feminist scholars (for example, Bar On 1994) have been unable to convincingly connect this biological statement to women's deficiencies in the *Politics*, while others have declared the connection to be conspicuously lacking (Fortenbaugh 1977; Mayhew 2004; Deslauriers 2009).

Yet, to adapt a phrase from Pellegrin (2013: 106), Aristotle's views in the *Politics* are "inscribed into an understanding of the universe that is itself also Aristotelian". In this essay, therefore, I will demonstrate the connection between Aristotle's biology and his views of women, natural slaves, and democracy in the *Politics*. In particular, I will argue that Aristotle transfers the concept of deformity (used in the biological works to exclude women from the peak of human development) to the social and political realms, in order to exclude natural slaves from freedom, and democracy from consideration as a viable form of government. Defined as woman-like deformities, natural slaves and democracy are moreover prone to the same vices traditionally assigned to women.

I will begin with a discussion of Aristotle's biological definition of woman as a deformed man, due to her colder nature. This physical coldness signifies a lack of spirit (*thumos*) and courage/manliness (*andreia*), both crucial for moral development. Next, I will describe Aristotle's transfer of these female deficiencies to natural slaves, who also lack *thumos* and *andreia*. In the third section, I will examine the vices of *akrasia* (lack of self-control) and *akolasia* (self-indulgence), traditional characteristics of women and slaves, which are propped up by Aristotle's 'scientific' explanation. In the final section, building on the fact that Aristotle in the *Politics* applies biological concepts to 'the body politic', I will demonstrate that he considers all existing constitutions to be deformities of the ideal state, with extreme democracy being especially deformed and especially prone to womanly vices.

Women as deformed men

The human male is the pinnacle of nature for Aristotle (Lloyd 1996: 190), and under certain conditions, as we will see below, he can reach his full potential; yet the human female is doomed from the start, since "the female is, as it were, a deformed male" (GA 737a). The female is not quite a true deformity ("as it were"), because true deformities are rare, whereas females are born regularly. Aristotle locates the cause of this deformity in the female's assumed colder nature. A human being is born male rather than female due to the existence of the proper amount of heat (*pneuma*, defined as 'hot air', GA 736a). Heat gives man a firmer and drier body,[1] and allows him to cook down excess nutritional residue into concentrated and purified semen, which he excretes from his body during intercourse. By contrast, woman's colder and, therefore, wetter body cannot cook down excess nutritional residue, and, as a result, excretes a more voluminous and less pure substance, the menstrual fluid: "for it is through a certain incapacity that the female is female, being incapable of concocting the nutriment in its last stage into semen . . . owing to the coldness of her nature" (GA 728a). Furthermore, man's hot nature also enables the development of spirit (*thumos*) and courage/manliness (*andreia*), which, as we will see, are critically important for questions of individual freedom, political participation, and types of government; on the contrary, woman's cold nature deprives her of these characteristics as well.

There are several passages in Aristotle connecting *thumos* with heat, and fear with cold (Lloyd 1983: 19–22),[2] but a passage in the *Problems* gives the most straightforward explanation. While this work is usually no longer attributed to Aristotle, it often encapsulates his thought, as is the case here:

> Why is it that birds and men and the courageous animals have hard frames? Is it because *thumos* is accompanied by bodily heat, since fear is a process of cooling? Then those whose blood is hot are also courageous (*andreios*) and high-spirited (*thumoeidē*); for the blood gives them sustenance.
>
> (Ps.-Aristotle, *Problemata* 898*a*)

Aristotle connects spirit (*thumos*) to *pneuma*, 'hot air', by locating *pneuma* around the heart, the hottest part of the body (Dean-Jones 1994: 185). In this he follows Plato, who had illustrated his own definition of *thumos* by quoting Homer (*Rep*. 4.441b): "[Odysseus] smote his breast and chided thus his heart" (*Od*. XX.17).[3] Odysseus' action demonstrates both the physical and ethical aspects of *thumos* – he smites his chest, where heart and *thumos* reside, while revealing *thumos* in his self-encouraging speech.

For Aristotle, *pneuma* (hot air) can be broadly categorized as the physical, and *thumos* (spirit) as the ethical, aspects of the same phenomenon, the 'heat of the soul'. Because *andreia* (manliness, courage) is traditionally joined with *thumos*, it too joins this semantic cluster (*pneuma-thumos-andreia*), as in the *Problems* passage quoted above. Aristotle explains that "*thumos* is sometimes also reckoned as *andreia*; for those who act from *thumos* . . . are thought to be brave, because brave men (*andreioi*) are also spirited[4] (*thumoeideis*)" (*Nicomachean Ethics* [*EN*] 1116b). He clarifies further that *thumos* is a necessary, but not sufficient, requirement for *andreia*: "the *andreia* that is due to *thumos* seems to be the most natural, and to be *andreia* if choice and aim be added" (*EN* 1117a).

These qualities are prerequisite for personal freedom and command over others: "the power of command and the love of freedom are in all men based upon this quality, for *thumos* is commanding and invincible" (*Pol*. 7.1328a). 'Command over others' particularly means 'command over women': "the *andreia* of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying" (*Pol*. 1.1260a). Balot (2014: 7) stresses that the concept of *andreia*, as a virtue of the Athenian democracy, was manifested "in the projection of power over others, in the execution and enslavement of enemies, and in the maintenance of hierarchies over women".

Thus, women's political inferiority can be traced directly back to their biological inferiority; their physical coldness handicaps production of *thumos* and *andreia*, qualities necessary for freedom and command. And since humans magnify qualities found across the animal kingdom, women's lack of *thumos* compared to men is even sharper than that generally observed between males and females (*History of Animals* [*HA*] 608b). Moreover, it is "automatically paradoxical" (Just 1985: 171) for women to have *andreia*, which literally means 'manliness" and was appropriately symbolized by the fighting cock, due to its phallic connotations (Balot 2014: 256).

Natural slaves as deformed Greeks

While women lack *thumos* and *andreia* due to nature, natural slaves lack these qualities due to climate. Aristotle specifically has 'Asiatics', the inhabitants of Asia Minor, in mind for his category of 'natural slaves':

> Those who live in a cold climate . . . are full of *thumos*, but wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they retain comparative freedom, but have no political organization, and are incapable of ruling over others. Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in *thumos*; and therefore they are always in a state of subjection and slavery.
>
> (*Pol*. 7.1327b)

As we saw above, *thumos* is a prerequisite for freedom and command. Northern Europeans, full of *thumos* because of their cold climate, are free, while Asiatics, with their contrasting warm climate, have cold bodies lacking *thumos*, and so are slaves. The Goldilocks Zone between these extremes of heat and cold is represented by Greece, whose inhabitants possess *thumos* in just the right amount:

> But the Hellenic race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate in character, having both *thumos*[5] and intelligence. Hence it continues free, and is the best-governed of any nation, and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able to rule the world.
>
> (*Pol.* 7.1327b)

Since the ancient Greeks, especially Aristotle (see GA 721b for a famous example), believed in the inheritance of acquired characteristics, these effects of climate constitute permanent traits that are passed down to offspring. Thus, Aristotle's assessment of Asiatics constitutes an instance of "proto-racism", as Isaac (2004: 74–82) argues. It vitiates Pellegrin's hope that "the slave, whether he is stupid or cowardly, will little by little lose his characteristics once he is removed from his original climate (or if he does not, his descendants will)" (2013: 106).

Aristotle thus marks out Asiatics as the natural slaves who will comprise the farmers of his ideal state. He declares that the farmers should be slaves who "do not have *thumos*" (*Pol.* 7.1330a), and will preferably originate from separate races (to prevent a sense of ethnic identity); but "the next best thing would be that they should be a barbarian country people, and of a like inferior nature" (ibid.). This requirement rules out any existing government as the proper one for the ideal state: Ober observes that farmers "were the main productive class in the polis and the category of persons whose exclusion from citizenship might appear most problematic to a late fourth-century reader" (1998: 345). Cartledge argues that Philip and Alexander's conquest of Asia "entailed exactly the sort of mass enslavement of barbarians by Greeks, and the creation of a barbarian servile workforce, that Aristotle's doctrine had – if not actively sanctioned – then at least made generous allowance for" (1993: 172). Aristotle plays upon existing Greek stereotypes of women, slaves, and Easterners as effeminate degenerates to justify this enslaved barbarian workforce. These stereotypes, codified by Aristotle as ethical deficiencies, ultimately due to a lack of *thumos* and *andreia*, are considered in the next section.

Ethical deficiencies of the deformed: *akrasia* and *akolasia*

Lack of self-control (akrasia)

A stereotypical trait of both women and slaves in Greek literature is *akrasia*, lack of self-control. It is the unnatural state where body rules mind, rather than mind ruling body. As noted above, Aristotle asserts that both women and natural slaves

lack *thumos* and *andreia*, which are prerequisites for personal freedom and command over others. This lack is based on the natural factors of biology or climate, factors beyond an individual's control. Women and slaves, therefore, require an external source of command; they are bodies whose minds, at least in part, reside elsewhere, namely in the persons of their masters. In Aristotle's words:

> the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind. Where then there is such a difference as that between mind and body, or between men and animals . . . the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master.
>
> (*Pol.* 1.1254b)

Aristotle thus codifies a rich literary tradition; as Just observes, "emotionalism and lack of self-control are consistently portrayed in Athenian texts as basic to female nature" (1985: 170), while the feature most consistently characterizing women is their "propensity towards physical self-indulgence" (181). Aristophanes, for example, often depicts women hatching ingenious schemes to gratify their appetites for food, wine, and sex. Praxagora lays out her agenda at the very beginning of the comedy *Women at the Assembly* (*Ecclesiazusae*), in a mock-solemn prayer to the lamp that facilitates women's sneaky night-time activities:

> To thee alone our secret we'll reveal;
> And rightly, for within our bedrooms too,
> When we try our new sexual variations,
> Close by thou standest . . .
> By us thou standest when illicitly
> We open up the brimming granaries
> And stores of Bacchic juice . . .
>
> (lines 7–15, translated by Sommerstein 1998)

Lack of self-control as a specifically feminine trait is mentioned in other genres as well. Aeschines, in his legal oration *Against Timarchus* (1.185), remarks that a woman does shameful things *according* to nature, whereas a man does shameful things *contrary* to nature. To counteract what was believed to be women's natural bent towards laziness and self-indulgence (Cole 1994: 132), Greeks laid heavy emphasis on the virtue of *philergia* (love of hard work) for women. When Aristotle, for example, extols female *philergia* in his *Rhetoric* (1361a), the context indicates that *philergia* in girls corresponds to *andreia* in boys, as boys should have self-control (*sōphrusunē*) and *andreia*, while girls should have self-control and *philergia*.

Encouraging love of hard work for women distances them even further from the world of men, since it contradicts "the emphasis in men's ethical lives on

freedom from toil, on leisure, on distancing oneself from slaves as far as possible" (Cole 1994: 130). In particular, it contradicts Aristotle's requirement for the male citizens of his ideal state: "leisure is necessary both for the development of excellence and the performance of political duties" (*Pol.* 7.1329a). Therefore, the cultivation of *philergia* simultaneously excludes women from the male virtue of *andreia* and the male prerogative of leisure, and therefore from the male privileges of personal freedom (for which *andreia* is required) and political participation (for which leisure is required).

As for the vice of *akrasia* (lack of self-control), slaves were also stereotyped as prone to it. Male slaves, according to Joshel and Murnaghan (1998: 9):

> were attributed with the supposedly feminine traits of deceitfulness, moral depravity, emotional excess, and addiction to bodily pleasures . . . [at the same time] ancient laws, social practices, and popular attitudes worked in various ways to deny the masculinity of the male slave, effacing his confusing distinction from the clearly inferior female.

When Aristotle classifies Asiatics as natural slaves, he incorporates a rich tradition of depicting them as effeminate, even as eunuchs, as observed by Hall (1989: 157): "[t]he palace eunuch of the Greeks' imagination encapsulates their systematic feminization of Asia; emotional, wily, subservient, luxurious, and emasculated, he embodies simultaneously all the various threads in the fabric of their orientalist discourse". Balot (2014: 212) adds that "[t]he absence of normative Greek masculinity among the Persians was a basic and virtually unalterable feature of the standard account". In the absence of a normative masculinity, Aristotle's description of 'barbarian' society conflates the existing stereotypes of women and slaves. Since barbarian men are naturally slavish, lacking *thumos* and *andreia* just as completely as women, they are all indistinguishable: "among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruling principle[6] among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female" (*Pol.* 1.1252b). They need an external source of command – Aristotle quotes Euripides: "It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians" (*Iphigeneia at Aulis* 1400). These 'barbarians' must be Asiatics, as the northern 'barbarians' have too much *thumos* to be enslaved (see above). Aristotle gifts an existing cultural stereotype with the 'scientific' explanation of climate. Asia Minor's hot climate creates a 'cold' body, lacking in *thumos* and *andreia*, for practical and ethical purposes indistinguishable from a woman's,[7] with the same need for external command.

Self-indulgence (akolasia)

Aristotle expands the traditional picture of *akrasia* to define *akolasia*, self-indulgence, a vice exceeding mere lack of self-control. While *akrasia* may constitute a temporary victory of bodily appetite over reason (having an extra glass of wine, even though you know you shouldn't), *akolasia* is an unthinking

habit: drinking wine at every opportunity, just because you can. According to Aristotle, neither reason nor appetite plays much of a role in this behavior pattern:

> This is why we should describe as self-indulgent (*akolastos*) rather the man who without appetite or with but a slight appetite pursues the excesses and avoids moderate pains, than the man who does so because of his strong appetites; for what would the former do, if he had in addition a vigorous appetite, and a violent pain at the lack of the necessary objects?
>
> (*EN* 1148a)

Aristotle seems to be unique in making this distinction between *akrasia* and *akolasia*, which are collapsed by other thinkers. For Aristotle, *akrasia* is a conflict between reason and pleasure, where pleasure wins and reason loses but only occasionally, whereas *akolasia* describes a condition that does not involve reason, and, therefore, there is no conflict involved in this permanent state of pleasure-seeking. As such, *akolasia* applies particularly to women; in Aeschines' words, they do shameful things according to nature. For Aristotle, *akolasia* is pattern of reason-free behavior, as when he says of the Spartan women: "they live self-indulgently (*akolastōs*), in every self-indulgence (*akolasian*) and luxury".[8] He also uses 'looseness' (*anesis*) as a synonym for *akolasia*: "This *anesis* of the Lacedaemonian women existed from the earliest times, and was only what might be expected", that is, from women whose husbands were frequently absent from home. Plato's Athenian interlocutor uses the same term in the *Laws*, when he counters the Spartan Megillus' criticism of Athenian drunkenness at the Dionysia by pointing out the *anesis* of the Spartan women (1.637c). According to Aristotle, the Spartan women's *akolasia* defeated even their legendary lawmaker, Lycurgus: "when Lycurgus, as tradition says, wanted to bring women under his laws, they resisted, and he gave up the attempt" (*Pol.* II.1270a).

For Aristotle, slaves too are susceptible to *akolasia*. Echoing the 'Old Oligarch' (1.10) who had accused Athenian slaves of *akolasia*, Aristotle states: "the slave requires only so much excellence as will prevent him from failing in his function through cowardice or *akolasia*" (*Pol.* 1.1260a). Kraut observes that Aristotle's natural slave "benefits from slavery . . . because, were he not a slave, he would lead a life of idleness, dissolution, and petty immorality" (2002: 297). Unlike *akrasia*, which features a conflict with reason, the automatic pattern of *akolasia* approaches an innate character defect. This character defect springs from the lack of *thumos* and *andreia* caused by the physical defect of a 'cold' body, due either to biology (women) or to climate (natural slaves). Only the external direction of a husband or a master can save women and natural slaves from *akolasia* and, thus, supply a semblance of virtue. Women acquire the virtue of *andreia* only by obeying (*Pol.* 1.1260a), while a slave's virtue only reflects his master's: "for the slave shares in his master's life . . . it is manifest, then, that the master ought to be the source of such excellence in the slave" (*Pol.* 1.1260a–b). While both slaves

and women require external command, Aristotle says that they differ in respect to their deliberative faculty (*bouleutikon*), the significance of which is examined in the next section.

*The deliberative faculty (*bouleutikon*)*

The character defect of *akolasia*, in which reason plays no part, corresponds for Aristotle to a mental defect: "For the slave has no deliberative faculty (*bouleutikon*) at all; the woman has, but it is without authority (*akuron*: literally, 'has no *kurios*'), and the child has, but it is immature" (*Pol.* 1.1260a).[9] Ober remarks on this passage: "Free adult males are 'complete' humans possessing the capacity and desire to deliberate; they are contrasted to children, women, and (natural) slaves, who are thought by Aristotle to be impaired in various ways" (1998: 297). This impairment is due to the lack of *thumos* and *andreia*, but it remains to be seen how women possess a limited *bouleutikon*, while slaves none at all.

A comparison of the master/slave and husband/wife relationships is instructive here. According to Aristotle, the slave is little more than a living tool (*EN* 1161b), which reflects the qualities of the owner. Therefore, the slave of a good master has a limited chance at reflected virtue because "the slave shares in his master's life". There is no independent thought process whereby the slave knowingly chooses virtue. By contrast, a Greek woman marries and willingly submits to an external *kurios*, giving him control of her deliberative faculty, which is *akuron*, has no *kurios* of its own. Her *andreia* consists in obeying her *kurios*, her husband (see above). And since *andreia* is the "footstool of the virtues" (Balot 2014: 3), she can aspire to other virtues only inasmuch as she obeys. As Fortenbaugh puts it, "[h]er deliberative capacity lacks authority, because it is often overruled by her emotions or alogical side. Her decisions and actions are too often guided by pleasures and pains, so that she is unfitted for leadership and very much in need of temperance" (1977: 138). Aristotle transparently codifies social and legal convention as biology, as an Athenian woman was under the control of a *kurios* at all times, since she constantly "require[d] protection and authoritative direction" (Ober 1998: 299). Since "[w]omen are the entirely dependent wards of the male citizenry" (Just 1985: 176), a *kurios* saves a woman from her default character state of *akolasia*, as a master does for a slave.

The difference between the deliberative faculty for women and for slaves, then, seems to be that women, as a matter of course when they marry, submit willingly to a husband, who supplies the *kurios* their *bouleutikon* lacks. Slaves, however, do not even know they need a master and, so, do not cooperate willingly in their own subjugation: they have no *bouleutikon* at all. Aristotle is clearly referring here to natural slaves, the Asiatics, who (he believes) benefit from a master; for them, "slavery is both expedient and right" (*Pol.* 1.1255a). Aristotle provides biological motivation for two blindingly obvious facts of his society: Greek women entered willingly into marriage, but barbarians did not enter willingly into slavery. For Aristotle, this biological motivation should explain on the one hand why women and natural slaves are unfit for self-rule, and, on the other

why popular self-rule, that is, democracy, is unfit for serious consideration as a viable political constitution. This issue is explored further in the next section.

The state: a composite of mind and body

Like any composite, the state consists of ruler and subject, which, Aristotle claims, in living creatures correspond to mind[10] and body:

> In all things which form a composite whole and which are made up of parts . . . a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to light. Such a duality exists in living creatures . . . A living creature consists in the first place of mind and body, and of these two, one is by nature the ruler and the other the subject.
>
> (*Pol.* 1.1254a)

As biological principles apply to political organization, Aristotle's anthropomorphic projection makes human biological and ethical characteristics particularly relevant: "the courage (*andreia*), justice, and wisdom of a state have the same form and nature as the qualities which give the individual who possesses them the characterization just, wise or temperate" (*Pol.* 7.1323b). Aristotle echoes Plato, who in the *Republic* 4.441cd) had blown up the components of the mind (*psukhē*) to state-size in order to find justice: "And isn't the individual courageous (*andreios*) in the same part of himself as the city? And isn't everything else that has to do with virtue the same in both?". Both passages, invoking *andreia* as the "footstool of the virtues", the quality which women and natural slaves lack, reveal how unnatural it would be for women or barbarians to participate in government.

Mind properly rules over body, in both the individual and the state: "[f]or that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave" (*Pol.* 1.1252a). The natural rulers of the state must control the natural subjects: "[a]nd as the mind may be said to be more truly part of an animal than the body, so the higher parts of states . . . are more essential to the state than the parts which minister to the necessaries of life" (*Pol.* 4.1291a).

The state's 'body', described as being "by nature a slave", includes even free craftsmen and laborers: "[t]he necessary people are either slaves who minister to the wants of individuals, or craftsmen[11] and laborers who are the servants of the community" (*Pol.* 3.1278a). Ober (1998: 314) elaborates: "Aristotle is not referring here primarily to persons who are juridically enslaved, but to those whose role in the mode of production rendered them the moral equivalent of slaves". Aristotle, however, aligns the 'juridically enslaved' with the 'morally enslaved' in his ideal state: all craftsmen and laborers *are* slaves. Or to phrase it from another angle, the group of actual citizens is coextensive with the groups of natural and imagined citizens (Ober 2015: 226).

Citizens in Aristotle's ideal state have no part of manual labor, functioning exclusively as the mind of the state. The naturally slavish 'body' of the state is

closely aligned with women in its need for an external source of command. In an actual state with a democratic government, this womanish 'body' consisting of free craftsmen and laborers might have significant political power. But all actual governments are deformities of the ideal state, with democracy doubly deformed (as explained in the following sub-sections). If the body gains control and eliminates reason in either the state or an individual, the defective condition of *akolasia*, self-indulgence, results. As we will see below, Aristotle regarded extreme participatory democracy as the very worst example of such an unnatural state, in which the mass of workers (body) hold power, sidelining the elites (mind).

The ideal state

In Aristotle's ideal state, citizens are banned from all manual labor and expressly forbidden from working as craftsmen, merchants, or farmers (*Pol.* 7.1328b–29a). Instead, they are to adopt "the most desirable mode of living" (7.1323a), being "wealthy enough, through state-provision of land and slaves, to enjoy adequate leisure for continued moral development" (Ober 1998: 236). Only the ideal state has the perfect correlation between mind, leisure, freedom, and citizenship on one hand (as noted by Ober 2015), and body, work, slavery, and non-citizenship on the other. Since, however, this is not the case with any of the existing states or constitutions, all of them fall short of this ideal (4.1293b).

The physical space of the ideal state reinforces this segregation of mind from body: only free citizens are allowed in the Free Agora (marketplace), where senior citizens perform gymnastics. These men visually symbolize the citizens' *andreia*, which Arisototle says is developed through gymnastic exercise (*Pol.* 8.1337b). Merchants, the natural inhabitants of a marketplace, are banned, along with other workers:

> There should be established an agora, such as that which the Thessalians call the Free Agora; from this all trade should be excluded, and no craftsman, farmer, or any such person allowed to enter, unless he be summoned by the magistrates. It would be a pleasing use of the place, if the gymnastic exercises of the elder men were performed there . . . [t]here should also be a traders' marketplace, distinct and apart from the other, in a situation which is convenient for the reception of goods both by sea and land.
>
> (*Pol.* 7.1331a)

This denial of citizenship and freedom to all craftsmen, merchants, and laborers of a city-state would be unlikely in many Greek states of the fourth century, where such workers had a history of being free citizens (as in Athens and other democratic states). We noted above that Aristotle's ideal state seems to anticipate the Hellenistic cities in the Near East kingdoms of Alexander's successors. Aristotle's theory of natural slavery, explaining why the Asiatics freshly conquered by Macedon need and actually benefit from slavery, justifies the mass

enserfment of 'barbarian' populations by Hellenized elites. These 'barbarians', deformed by their climate into virtual women, need a master just as surely as a woman needs a *kurios*.

Existing states: deformed and really deformed

All existing forms of government fall short of Aristotle's ideal state, as they lack the perfect correlation between mind, leisure, freedom, and citizenship. All existing constitutions are considered 'deformed', but some more so than others: "[t]he truth is, that they all fall short of the most perfect form of government, and so they are reckoned among deformities,[12] and the really deformed forms are deformities of these" (*Pol.* 4.1293b). Aristotle charts the merely deformed constitutions alongside their really deformed versions (3.1279b): "of the above-mentioned forms, the deformities are as follows: of kingship, tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; of constitutional government (*politeia*), democracy". In the really deformed states, the body rules the mind, and so they suffer from the womanish and slavish condition of self-indulgence (*akolasia*). Consequently, tyranny differs from democracy only in scale. In tyranny, the *akolasia* of the individual tyrant dominates, whereas in democracy, the *akolasia* of all who constitute the state's 'body' runs rampant over the mind.

Democracy, therefore, is the deformed version of *politeia*, as women are deformed versions of men and natural slaves are deformed versions of Greeks. Democracy has degrees of deformity, depending on how participatory the government is. As will be explained in the next sub-section, the 'least bad' democracy features little participation by eligible voters and is actually an aristocracy in disguise; the worst democracy is controlled by the 'body' of the state, such as the craftsmen, merchants, and laborers, who actually attend Assembly meetings and vote.

The ages of democracy

Much like Hesiod's Ages of Man (*Works and Days* 106–201), and perhaps just as mythical, Aristotle's 'Ages of Democracy' tells a story of decline and decay (*Pol.* 6.1318b–19a; all quotes below come from this section). The best and oldest democracy is the agricultural, nominally controlled by farmers, but they have no time for politics: "[b]eing poor, they have no leisure, and therefore do not often attend the assembly". They leave the affairs of state to the leisured wealthy, so both groups are happy: "[t]he suitable men[13] will then be satisfied, for they will not be governed by men who are their inferiors, and the persons elected will rule justly, because others will call them to account". This is not a true democracy, but a thinly veiled aristocracy. The second-best democracy is the pastoral, dominated by herders. Their outdoor lifestyle makes them "the best trained of any for war, robust in body and able to camp out". In other words, they cultivate *andreia*, so they possess at least one virtue. Like farmers, they live outside town, so they cannot participate much in political business.

The subsequent democracies are much worse, since their work does not cultivate virtue, plus they are able to attend assemblies: "[i]t is clear that the other or inferior sorts will be deformed (*parekbainein*) in a regular order" (*Pol.* 6.1318a). According to this "regular order", the "last form of democracy" is dominated by craftsmen, merchants, and laborers (6.1319), precisely those occupations expressly forbidden to the citizens of Aristotle's ideal state. These workers are not only corrupted by their work, but they also live in the city, so "people of this class can readily come to the assembly" (6.1318a). Mass participation paradoxically ruins democracy (in Aristotle's view), since it marginalizes the "suitable men", the natural rulers of the state. The resulting chaos reflects the workers' *akolasia*:

> The last form of democracy, that in which all share alike, is one which cannot be borne by all states, and will not last long unless well regulated by laws and customs . . . Again, the measures which are taken by tyrants appear all of them to be democratic; such, for instance, as the anarchy[14] permitted to slaves . . . and also to women and children, and the allowing everybody to live as he likes. Such a government will have many supporters, for most persons would rather live in a disorderly than in a sober manner.
>
> (*Pol.* 6.1319b)

In such a government, citizens do not even control themselves, so women, slaves, and children, all needing external control (see above), live in anarchy. Extreme democracy is *akolasia* writ large: a reason-free state in which body controls mind.

Democracy's biggest fans: women and slaves

Democracy is so far from being awash in aggressive *andreia*, as Balot (2014) characterizes the Athenian democracy (see above), that it is the complete opposite of 'manly': democratic forms of government are 'soft' (*malakai*, *Pol.* 4.1290a). The adjective *malakos* not only has strong connotations of 'effeminate',[15] but it is also the quality (*malakia*) Aristotle often pairs with lack of self-control, *akrasia* (*EN* 1145b). Men suffering from chronic *akrasia* are called *malakoi* (*EN* 1147b). Democracy embodies not only *akrasia*, but its extreme form also personifies *akolasia*, characteristic of women and natural slaves. Unsurprisingly, extreme democracy encourages women and slaves to disobey and inform against their *kurios*/master, and so they favor democracies, "since under them they have a good time" (5.1313b).

Conclusion

Aristotle's biological observations have a direct bearing on his ethical and political theories, informing some of his most controversial precepts. Women, deformed by being born with a colder physical nature than men, constitute the 'natural' prototype of deformity for Aristotle, and his template for exclusion. They lack the *thumos* and *andreia* required for autonomy and ethical development, requiring a male

guardian (*kurios*) to save them from *akolasia* (self-indulgence). Natural slaves, i.e. Asiatics, are likewise rendered cold-bodied by the hot climate of Asia Minor; also lacking *thumos* and *andreia*, they too require the control of a master to save them from their default state of *akolasia*. Democracy, far from being the macho fount of *andreia* imagined by the Athenians, is also depicted by Aristotle as deformed. It lacks *andreia* to such a degree that it is a 'soft' embodiment of *akrasia*. Extreme democracy is the worst, manifesting the womanish and slavish state of *akolasia*, where everyone lives as he likes, and women and slaves have a good time. Women, slaves, and democracy all deserve each other.[16]

Notes

1 Cf. *On Regimen* 34: the males of all species are warmer and drier, and the females moister and colder. Reference in duBois (1988: 123).
2 E.g. *de Partibus Animalium* 650b, GA 750a.
3 The translation of Plato's *Republic* is by Paul Shorey, *Plato: Plato in Twelve Volumes*, Vols. 5 & 6. Cambridge, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969, via The Perseus Project (perseus.tufts.edu).
4 Translation slightly altered to render *thumoeideis* more literally. All Aristotle translations from Barnes (1984).
5 Translation slightly altered to render *enthumon* more literally.
6 The more literal 'ruling principle' substituted for 'ruler'.
7 Thus vitiating Deslauriers' (2009: 229) objection: "But if we appeal to differences in temperature to explain the intellectual differences between men and women, we will have to posit a separate mechanism to explain the production of natural slaves who are men".
8 Literally translated by the author to reveal the emphasis on *akolasia*.
9 Garver (1994) also links deficient *thumos* with deficient (or lacking) *bouleutikon*.
10 'Mind' is used to render the Greek *psukhē*, sometimes translated as 'soul'.
11 Substituting 'craftsmen' for 'mechanics' (*banausoi*).
12 The Greek word is *parekbaseis*. Lloyd (1996: 196) discusses these *parekbaseis* in a biological context as *para phusin* (contrary to nature), and so as deformities. I have substituted 'deformity' for the translation's 'perversion'.
13 Using the literal 'suitable men' (*epieikesi*) to show that Aristotle is marking the leisured wealthy as natural rulers.
14 'anarchy' transliterates the Greek (*anarkhia*).
15 See LSJ 9 III.2 for examples of it meaning, e.g., faint-hearted, cowardly, morally weak, lacking in self-control (with examples from Aristotle), effeminate.
16 *Maximas gratias* to Jennifer Rea, Avery Cahill, and the editors of this volume for their feedback on earlier versions of this paper.

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10 Women in associations in classical and Hellenistic Athens[1]

James Kierstead

Introduction

That women could not take part in the political institutions of Classical Athens – one of the world's earliest and most celebrated democracies – is notorious. Indeed, this fact has long been a leading source of malaise among liberal democratic students of classical Athens (Ober 2008: 17). It is perhaps as a result of this that scholars have, over the past few decades, sought to brighten our picture of women in democratic Athens by looking beyond the city's central institutions – at its religious festivals, for example (Foxhall 1995; Nixon 1995; Forsdyke 2013). In more recent work, scholars have focused on Athens' associations – its religious, kinship, social, and financial groups – in the search for arenas outside the household in which men and women interacted, and in which women gained a recognized and respected place (Jones 1999; Gottesman 2014; Taylor 2015).

This essay presents a fresh look at women in Athenian associations, focusing particularly on the direct evidence for involvement that comes from mentions of women in inscriptions. What we will find, perhaps unexpectedly, is that most of the evidence listing women as members of associations comes, not from the period of the democracy (508/7–321 BC), but from the period of its decline (after 321 BC), the Hellenistic period. Of course, this may simply be because, for whatever reason, we have been left with fewer inscriptions mentioning women from the classical period (479–323 BC) than from the Hellenistic (323–30 BC). But I will argue that this is not the case, and that there really were more women involved in associations after the democracy had started to decline. This, in my view, is due to the fact that, with the democracy in decline, male citizens had increasingly less motivation to keep outsiders (women and alien residents) out of social groups that played a role in conferring citizenship, which in turn granted the right to take part in politics.

The evidence

Table 10.1 lists all the explicit mentions of women in inscriptions produced by Athenian associations during the classical and Hellenistic periods.[2] Under 'Association' I have listed the type of group involved; and here readers may

Table 10.1 Explicit mentions of women in inscriptions produced by Athenian associations during the classical and Hellenistic periods

No.	*Association*	*Description*	*Date (all in* BC*)*	*Examples of women's names listed in the inscriptions*
1.	Unknown	List of names	400–350	[Ari]stola, [Aga]thokle[ia]
2.	'the washers'	Dedication to the Nymphs and all the gods, listing dedicants	*c.* 350	Leukē, Myrrhinē
3.	*Thiasos*	Grant of honorary crowns with a list of dedicands	*c.* 300	Hesychia, Erōtis, Aitherion
4.	*Thiasos/orgeon* dedicated to the Mother of the Gods	Grant of honorary crowns to the group's priestess and her husband	272/1	[Aga]thō[n of Phl]y[a and hi]s wife Ze[uxion] (these names also appear elsewhere in the inscription in full)
5.	*Thiasos* dedicated to Artemis	List of members of a *thiasos*	248/7	Simalē, Kompsē
6.	*Thiasos* dedicated to Artemis	Grant of honorary crown to the *eranos*-leader, with a list of members consisting of **37 men's names and 21 women's names** in separate columns	236/5	Zopyra, Hedeia, Aphrodisia (total women listed: 21)
7.	*Eranos* dedicated to Serapis	Grant of honorary crowns to group officers, including the *eranos*-leader	215/4	The [*e*]*ranos*-lea[d]er N[i]ki[ppē] (the Greek word for '*eranos*-leader' is in its feminine form)
8.	*Orgeon* dedicated to the Mother of the Gods	Grant of an honorary crown and statue to the group's priestess	213/2	Glaukon

9.	*Orgeon* dedicated to the Mother of the Gods	Grant of an honorary crown to the group's priestess (who herself then honors a man called Hieronymos, possibly her husband)	211/0	Krateia
10.	*Eranos*	Dedication with list of dedicants, consisting of **10 men's names and 13 women's names**	End of third century	[Hil]ara, Melitta, Nikesō (total women listed: 13)
11.	*Orgeon* dedicated to the Mother of the Gods	Creation of a new role – attendant to the group's priestess	183/2	the priestess
12.	*Orgeon* dedicated to the Mother of the gods	The same group appoints a woman as attendant for life (a role in which she follows her mother); two priestesses are also mentioned	175/4	Metrodōra, her mother Euaxis the priestess Aristodike, Simalē
13.	*Eranos*	List of 94 members in three columns; the middle column has **30 names, all women's**	*c.* 135	Erōtis, Dōris (total women listed:30)
14.	*Eranos*	List of 129 members, with about **40 women's names**, including one identified as the *eranos*-leader	*c.* 50	Isigeneia, Isidōra, Thaleia the *eranos*-leader (the Greek word for '*eranos*-leader' is in its feminine form) (total women listed: 40)

want to consult the glossary below Table 10.1 for more about the various types of association that are mentioned in this essay. In the 'Description' column in Table 10.1, I have tried to say briefly what each piece of evidence is, and in the column called 'Women', I have quoted, in translation, the phrases or words that suggest female involvement. Often these are women's names; sometimes I give a few names only, as examples of a larger number of women's names – and when I do this, I try also to provide the total number of women's names that appear on the piece of evidence in question. Sometimes we only have part of a word preserved on an inscription; and when this is the case, I have tried to indicate how much is missing by enclosing some letters in square brackets. The dates sometimes have a slash in them (for example, 215/4) because the ancient Athenian years ran from summer to summer. Reference numbers for these inscriptions can be found in this footnote.[3]

Glossary of Athenian associations

Hetaireia (plural. *hetaireiai*). Sometimes called 'political clubs,' these were networks of people involved in politics.

Thiasos (pl. *thiasoi*).* A type of religious group, sometimes dedicated to particular deities.

Orgeon (pl. *orgeones*).* A type of religious group, sometimes dedicated to particular deities.

Eranos (pl. *eranoi*).* We find two types of groups that are given this label, 1) so-called 'credit associations', that is, groups of people who band together to issue loans; and 2) a type of religious group; this second type of *eranos* becomes the more common as the Hellenistic period draws on.

Deme (pl. *demes*). The demes were the basic administrative units of classical Athens. These were small settlements that we would probably call 'villages' (the ones in the countryside) or 'boroughs' (the ones in the urban centre). Formal members of demes were called 'demesmen', and the head of a deme (the local mayor) was called a 'demarch'.

Phratry (pl. *phratries*). A group based around the idea of kinship (even though not all of its members were actually related to one another).

* Note that the same group could be referred to as both a *thiasos* and an *orgeon*, or a *thiasos* and an *eranos*.

As I have said, Table 10.1 lists inscriptions produced by classical and Hellenistic associations from Athens that explicitly mention women. This is because I believe that explicit mentions of women in documents produced by the associations themselves represent the gold standard of evidence for women's involvement in associations. Accordingly, I have excluded from the table

everything that was not produced by an association or that does not explicitly mention women.[4]

What we are interested in here is evidence that women were included in associations on the same basis as male citizens. The best evidence for this is when women are listed straightforwardly as members alongside men, or as having contributed to dedications alongside men. When women are listed as priestesses, their position is more ambiguous. On the one hand, it shows that they fulfilled important roles on their groups' behalf; on the other hand, that they did so does not necessarily mean they were considered ordinary members of these groups. We know, for example, that women could not be members of demes, and yet we have plenty of examples of women serving as priestesses in demes (Jones 1999: 123–8). Women, apparently, were not barred from membership in *thiasoi*, *orgeones*, and *eranoi* in the way they were in demes, and so I have accepted mentions of priestesses as evidence that these women were members of these groups.

Now that we have looked at the evidence, we need to consider what it tells us about the involvement of women in Athenian associations of the classical and Hellenistic periods. The main characteristic of the evidence that I want to stress in this essay is that it comes overwhelmingly from the Hellenistic period. A full 12 of the 14 items on our list come from after 323, more than 85 percent. (Conversely, only two of the inscriptions were produced under the classical democracy, just 14 percent.) The explicit mentions of women on inscriptions produced by Athenian associations are almost all from the period when the democracy had already entered its long decline. The question is: Why?

Explaining the evidence

There are two possible explanations for the fact that most of our evidence for women's inclusion in associations comes from the period after the classical democracy. The first is that women were included in associations during the democracy as well as later, but the evidence, for some reason, fails to reflect this. The second possibility is that there is nothing wrong with the evidence, and that women really did only start to be incorporated into associations in the last couple of decades of the fourth century.

Let us consider first the possibility that the evidence is misleading. What factors might have led to a situation where our evidence for women's inclusion comes mainly from the Hellenistic period, if women were actually integrated into associations earlier? One possible theory is that the pattern of evidence for women's inclusion in associations simply reflects the number of inscriptions that happen to have survived in different time periods. If we simply have more surviving inscriptions from after the democracy, this theory suggests, then we will have more inscriptions that feature female members of clubs and societies too. Unfortunately, the evidence in Table 10.1 does not quite track the total number of inscriptions that have survived from ancient Athens (Hedrick 1999). Inscriptions as a whole peak in the last quarter of the fourth century (325–300 BC), a period from which none of our inscriptions come. The total

number of inscriptions then declines in the third century, the century from which no fewer than eight, or almost 60 percent, of the items on our list derive.

But surely, someone might say, the relevant figure is not the total number of inscriptions from Athens, but the total number of inscriptions *from associations*. If we simply happen to have more inscriptions from associations in the third century, that might explain why we have more evidence of women in associations. But in fact we have *fewer* inscriptions from associations in the third century, so this objection, too, founders. The number of inscriptions produced by demes peaks in the late fourth century BC, but collapses in the course of the third, so much so that by the beginning of the second century the record has dried up entirely. *Thiasoi* turn up in inscriptions from the mid fifth century on, but disappear by the end of the third century. And *orgeones* are attested from the fourth century on, but vanish by the mid-second century (Kierstead 2013: 237–51).

Another theory is that we have more inscriptions showing women's involvement in the third century because the legislative environment had changed, making associations feel more comfortable about displaying the inclusion of non-citizens in their ranks (Gottesman 2014: 50). The key moment here is said to be the repeal of a law by one Sophocles of Sounion in 306. Sophocles' law would have established more supervision over associations by the central state; its repeal – so this theory goes – effectively granted associations the right to do whatever they liked, and emboldened them to be more open about the women and foreigners that were involved in their activities. This led them to put up more inscriptions with women's names in them, and has given us the impression that they only started to include women in their ranks at this point, whereas in fact they had been doing it for some time.

The problem with this theory is that we do have a few inscriptions put up by associations before 306 that seem happy to show off the involvement of women. One example is the inscription put up by 'the washers' (number 2 in the table) in the mid-fourth century, which lists names that seem to belong to women, foreigners, and slaves, as well as to a male citizen. Nor is this a solitary example of associations openly inscribing the names of non-citizens in their ranks before the supposed watershed of 306.[5] Evidence for mixed associations first appears not in 306, but in the mid-fourth century. So, if mixed associations really did exist before that, it is at that point that something must have happened that led them to be more open about their existence.

A final theory points out that the law of Sophocles, designed to give the central state more control over associations, was in fact the culmination of a decades-long process by which the centre sought more and more power over Athens' clubs and societies (Gottesman 2014: 51). In response, many groups tried to show they were no threat to the democratic state by putting up inscriptions which showcased how they were organized and run. A by-product of this was that we have more inscriptions from associations which mention female members.

The problem with this theory is that, if we actually read the inscriptions, it is difficult to believe that their primary purpose was to showcase their internal arrangements. The main purpose of the inscriptions in our table was usually to grant an honor to a mortal or a dedication to a god (these two categories account

for eight of the items, or almost 60 percent). Some details of the internal organization of these groups – their membership and officers, and so on – are occasionally on show (and the main purpose of number 11 is to set up a new officer-role for the group). But on the whole, points of organization are mentioned only in passing, which would be strange if the main point of these inscriptions was to showcase them. If these associations put up the inscriptions in the table in order to signal to the state that they were democratic, they could surely have done so more directly.

The idea that the inclusion of women in associations had been going on for quite some time, but that this only became visible in the evidence in the Hellenistic period, is a perfectly reasonable one. But we have now surveyed a number of possible stories about how this might have happened, and found them all to be less than fully persuasive. So let us now consider a second possible explanation of the evidence, namely that there is nothing wrong with it; on the contrary, the evidence reflects an important reality: the welcoming of more and more women into certain associations that had previously been the preserve of citizen males, just as the democracy was starting to decline. If this did indeed take place, we have another phenomenon that cries out for explanation, though this time it is an actual, historical pattern rather than simply a pattern in the evidence. So, what might explain the increased inclusion of women in associations?

Explaining inclusion

One suggestion is that the groups, which started to incorporate non-citizens from the late fourth century on, tended to worship foreign gods. Because of this, it was only natural for them to include foreigners in their activities and gradually extend this greater openness to other non-citizens such as slaves, freedmen, and women (Jones 1999: 302–04). But the table only partly backs this up. True, some of the groups in our table worshipped foreign gods: the Greco-Egyptian god Serapis, for example (7). Others, though, worshipped deities such as Artemis (5 and 6), or the nymphs and the other gods (2), and these can hardly be described as foreign. The Mother of the Gods, the focus of the groups who produced five of our inscriptions, is somewhere in the middle: there had been a shrine to her in Athens since the fifth century, but third-century Athenians may still have thought of her as foreign.

A greater problem for this theory is that the worship of foreign gods earlier in Athenian history does not appear to have led to the development of mixed associations. We know, for example, from Socrates' comments at the beginning of Plato's *Republic* (327a), that there was a Festival of Bendis (a Thracian moon goddess) at which there would be two separate processions, one of Athenians and one of Thracians. The fact that Bendis was a foreign deity, in other words, did nothing in the late fifth century to dissolve the boundaries that existed between citizens and non-citizens. This might suggest that it was not the foreigness of Serapis or the Mother of the Gods that explains the existence of mixed associations of men and women in the third century either.

Another suggestion is that Athenian associations began to open up as a result of almost two hundred years of democracy, which gradually eroded traditional

Greek ideas about who deserved to take place in politics (Ober 2005). The archaic notion that only property-holders had the wherewithal to take part in state affairs was regularly and repeatedly shown up by the successful operation of a range of institutions, like the Council, which depended on the participation of ordinary citizens. As a result of this, and over time, the idea that foreigners, women, and even slaves should be excluded from politics also began to look dubious. This shift can be seen in fourth-century literary texts, such as Aristophanes' *Women in the Assembly* (*c.* 391) and Plato's *Republic* (*c.* 380–360), which play around with the idea of women participating in politics.

This suggestion seems plausible when we look at the first two or three inscriptions on our list, which come from the fourth century, but it seems less convincing when we consider the rest of the table. The practice of democracy may well have made citizens more open to outsiders while the democratic regime was stable; but could this trend really have continued after the democracy had started to decline? That seems implausible; and yet, 12 of our 14 inscriptions (more than 85 percent) definitely come from after 321, when the democracy was first seriously compromised.

But since the history of the Athenian constitution in the early Hellenistic period is an obscure and complicated subject, let us quickly recap the main phases (Habicht 1997).

Timetable of early Hellenistic Athens

321–318: Oligarchic regime of Phocion, imposed by the Macedonian regent Antipater.

318–317: Democratic interlude.

317–307: Oligarchic regime of Demetrius of Phaleron, imposed by the Macedonian ruler Cassander.

307–301: Democracy restored by the Macedonian warlord Demetrius the Besieger, but also compromised by the same man, who is finally expelled.

300–295: Tyranny of Lachares, imposed by Cassander.

294–287: Democracy again restored by Demetrius, and again compromised by him, until he is again expelled.

287–268: Democracy, but with Macedonian garrisons still on Athenian territory.

268–262: Athens tries to break free from Macedon in the Chremonidean War, but fails.

262–229: Oligarchic regime imposed by the Macedonian King Antigonos Gonatas.

If we look back at our table of inscriptions, it will be clear that, while most of the items come from periods of democracy (1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12), others do not (5, 6, 13, 14). Nevertheless, behind the ups and downs of democratic, oligarchic, and tyrannical regimes in the timetable above, it is hard to deny that popular rule in Athens was going through a slow but irreversible decline. It is true that some of the central democratic institutions, such as the Council and the Assembly, continued to function deep into the Hellenistic period. But other practices that were an integral part of the classical democracy were discontinued: for example, state pay for attendance in the Assembly and the courts, crucial in enabling poor Athenians to participate in politics, was abolished in 317. And we know of at least two occasions, in 321 and again in 317, when the number of people who were allowed to participate in politics was reduced to well below classical levels. Finally, some key magistracies went from being selected by lot to being elected, a change which made them more likely to be occupied by the rich and the well-born: this happened sometime after 262 to Athens' chief magistrates, the archons (Habicht 1997).

The period after 262 is the time from which we derive most of our evidence for women's involvement in associations. Democracy was not always in place in Athens in this period, and what democracy there was was increasingly distant from the radical democracy of classical times. In light of this, it would seem difficult to explain the increasing openness of Athenian associations with reference to the cumulative effects of democratic practices. This is especially the case in 321 and 317, when political participation was once again made to depend on the possession of property, a move which was in sympathy with the traditional idea that only property-owners should take part in politics. So, it seems unlikely that this was a period in which democratic practices were making citizens more open-minded about the inclusion of women and other non-citizens.

There is a final problem with the theory that the democracy made citizens more eager to include non-citizens in their associations by the end of the classical period: as we have seen, associations declined in the third century even more quickly than the democracy. Inscriptions produced by demes, we might recall, plummet in the second half of the third century and dry up altogether by around 200; the pattern for *thiasoi* and *orgeones* is similar. Non-citizens appear in associations, then, just as the associations themselves begin to disappear. The long-term impact of democratic practices is powerless to explain this. So, let me now turn to my own theory.

Democracy and exclusion

My theory, in brief, is that, as Athenian democracy declined, its citizens were less and less motivated to exclude women and other non-citizens from associations that helped decide who was a citizen, and, hence, who could take part in politics.

For most of Athenian history, taking part in politics was dependent on being a citizen. Citizenship itself was controlled mainly by a number of associations, as illustrated in Figure 10.1, where the arrows show possible routes to citizenship.



Figure 10.1 Athenian citizenship flowchart

The most important association, the one that finally granted citizenship, was the deme, but being confirmed as a member of a deme almost always followed confirmation as a member of a phratry.[6] Becoming a member of a phratry, in turn, was often made easier by being a member of a religious association such as a *thiasos* or *orgeon* (Lambert 1993). In other words, being a member of a religious or professional association could eventually lead to citizenship and rights to political participation.

Because of this, citizens of the classical democracy would have been motivated to exclude outsiders from religious and professional associations, since they constituted a possible path to citizenship. To be given the right to participate in a direct democracy like Athens was equivalent to be granted a share in the power of the state; letting outsiders into associations risked granting them shares, too. Why might citizens not have liked this? Quite simply, because it would have led to a decline in the value of their own shares, that is, a diminution of their own power. After all, with the addition of extra voters, the power of each individual voter is diminished. If I am in a group of 100 voters, I have 1 percent of the total vote, whereas, if the group grows to 200, my power is slashed to 0.5 percent (Bryan 2004).

Citizens of *classical* Athens would have been especially eager to exclude additional voters because this was the period at which the democracy was most radical, most stable, and most powerful. All three of these facts would have made citizens particularly jealous of their privileges, since all three were factors that made their shares more valuable. The radical nature of the democracy meant that citizens could vote regularly on a wide variety of issues, and that they had a good chance of being selected as magistrates. The stability of the democracy meant that citizens

could be confident that their citizenship would be as valuable in a few years' time as it was then. And the power of the Athenian state meant that citizens could look forward to their votes actually having an impact on the world.

We have already seen how, from the late fourth century on, Athenian democracy became less radical and less stable. We have not yet discussed the waning of Athenian power over the same period, but the number of Macedonian rulers who were able to impose non-democratic constitutions in the chronology above should be suggestive. In fact, Athens' domination by Macedonian overlords was no accident, but was a consequence of the rise of large, rich, and aggressive kingdoms in the wake of the campaigns of Alexander. Athens could not hope to match the power and resources of Macedon, or of the new Greek-run kingdom of Egypt; the result was that its foreign policy options were severely constrained.

The power of Athenian citizens – and the value of Athenian citizenship – was dealt a particularly grave blow in 321 and 317, when, as we have seen, reforms imposed by Macedon made political participation dependent upon the ownership of a certain amount of property. Crucial here, though, is the fact that these reforms did not simply remove citizenship from those who were not wealthy enough to qualify under the new dispensation. Instead, these men remained citizens, but were barred from taking part in politics anyway (Grieb 2008: 52). This severed at a stroke the long-standing link between citizenship and political participation. Citizenship could no longer guarantee the right to political participation. This sent the value of Athenian citizenship into a decline from which it never recovered.

As a result, citizens in the Hellenistic period cared less about citizenship. The task of keeping out new citizens, who might dilute one's own political privilege, now seemed less urgent than it once did. The once-clear link between acceptance as a full member of a *thiasos* or *orgeon* and political power had been sundered. In these circumstances, it no longer seemed so incongruous for women to have membership in these groups (although women's membership in demes and phratries apparently continued to be unacceptable).

This, in my view, is why we only begin to see women as members of associations in the Hellenistic period. It also explains why we only see non-citizens in these associations just as they are starting to disappear. These groups had formerly derived much of their energy, as well as their exclusivity, from the fact that they acted as gatekeepers to citizenship, and hence to political participation. Once the rewards they offered came to seem uncertain or tarnished, their importance to Athenian society ebbed away, as did their own perception of their importance. From this perspective, it is no real surprise that many of the associations we have been discussing disappear at some point in the second century.

All of the inscriptions in Table 10.1 were definitely or probably (e.g. number 1) produced by religious groups, except number 2; this inscription was set up by 'the washers', a group that seems to have involved women, slaves, and foreigners, as well as one male citizen, in its activities. This is a clue, or a reminder, that not all classical associations were exclusive. The ones that provided a path to citizenship were exclusive, perhaps for the reasons I have suggested. But this

group was not exclusive, and in this it may have been more characteristic of the rest of Athenian society than the associations we have been considering in this essay. These associations may, in fact, form an exception to the rest of democratic Athenian society, which may well have been more inclusive when it came to non-political spheres of life. And it is to this phenomenon, as well as to its causes and the implications it has for the ideology of exclusion, that we must now turn.

Exclusion and ideology

At the beginning of this essay, we noted that scholars have looked beyond the central institutions of Athens, and especially to religious festivals, for evidence of women's involvement. In many instances, they have found it. Several studies have confirmed the centrality of women to state religious festivals such as the Panathenaia or the Eleusinian Mysteries, both of which incorporated women and foreigners alongside male citizens (Forsdyke 2013; Nixon 1995). The fact that these religious festivals, many of them dominated by women, underpinned the city's administrative and political calendar says something in itself about women's inclusiveness in certain areas of state life (Foxhall 1995).

Athenian society, then, was not entirely exclusive, and this may well have had something to do with the city's democratic system (Ober 2005). At the same time, Athenian politics always remained exclusive and open only to male citizens. The involvement of women in major religious festivals and other arenas seems to have done nothing to qualify their exclusion from the political sphere. Athenian women have, in our evidence, a peculiarly asymmetrical profile: prominent in the social sphere, yet at the same time virtually invisible in politics. They are listed in funerary inscriptions as wives, mothers, and daughters, whereas men appear on their tombstones as members of their demes, that is, as citizens and participants in the democratic system (Pomeroy 1995).

The only exception to this rule of political exclusion and social inclusion is the set of associations we have examined in this essay. But it is the exception that proves the rule, since the only reason that even religious associations excluded women during the democracy was because they were more political than they at first appear. Because of the nature of Athenian citizenship procedures, these primarily religious groups were exposed to the incentives generated by the city's political practices, incentives which encouraged male citizens to keep these groups as exclusive as their political institutions.

Of course, although the incentives generated by Athenian politics explain the exclusion of women from certain associations, we still need to account for the exclusiveness of Athenian politics in the first place. A full treatment of this topic is outside the scope of this essay, but a fair hypothesis is that the exclusion of women from the democracy at the outset was a consequence of an ideology of exclusion that already existed in the archaic period. This ideology, whose central motif was perhaps that women are not to be trusted, can be found in the work of archaic poets such as Hesiod and Semonides, as well as in the laws attributed to Solon.[7] It had a more social aspect (reflected in Hesiod and Semonides) and a

more political one (reflected in Solon's laws), but in the archaic period it remains a single misogynistic ideology.

Once democracy had been established in Athens, this ideology was split into its two component parts. After Athens' democratic institutions had been set up, the incentives they produced made male citizens even more eager to exclude women, and thus the city's political practices fed back into the ideology of political exclusion that already existed, reinforcing it. At the same time, and in contrast, the ideology of social exclusion was brought to a halt, and eventually pushed back, by the ideas that the democracy gradually fostered. Athenian misogyny came to be predominantly political. The real nightmare for Athenian men was not that women would become involved in social activities, but that they would be involved in politics (Just 1989; Pomeroy 1975). This is the real lesson we should draw from the dystopia that emerges out of female rule in Aristophanes' *Women in the Assembly*.

Athenian democracy thus at the same time supported exclusive political institutions and fostered the development of a more inclusive social ideology. The effects of this on the lives and interactions of the city's men and women are as we have seen: whereas women remained excluded from the political sphere, they were often deeply involved in the city's social and religious life. And the only exception to this, as we have also seen, is the subset of associations that were linked to politics through citizenship procedures. But this may have been the only part of Athenian life where the division between politics and society was bypassed.

Of course, it might be thought that bypassing this division would have been a good thing for Athens. If the ideology of social inclusion had somehow been able to undermine Athens' political exclusion of women and aliens, Athenian democracy would have been a better place, and modern liberal democratic students of it like myself would have less to be embarrassed about. Unfortunately, this never happened. Instead, what happened was the reverse, as the political exclusiveness of Athens' institutions undermined the inclusiveness of Athenian society, if only in a few religious associations.

This was entirely the result of the peculiar way in which Athenian citizenship procedures worked. Athenians put the task of vetting potential new citizens mainly into the hands of associations, that is, groups that were primarily concerned not with politics, but with kinship or religion. This is a feature of Athenian democracy that modern liberals might well feel ambivalent about. On the one hand, having a series of small groups confirm new citizens helped build trust within the citizen body, which in turn smoothed the functioning of the democracy (Kierstead 2013). On the other hand, it made citizenship dependent not only on descent, but on identity as well.

In this essay, we have found another reason to have reservations about this system: by linking society and politics, it provided a bridgehead for the ideology of political exclusion to spread into the otherwise more inclusive territory of Athenian society. To change the metaphor, it afforded channels through which the exclusionary incentives of Athenian politics could trickle down into the



Figure 10.2 Exclusionary incentives flowchart

otherwise inclusive waters of Athenian society. This is illustrated in Figure 10.2, in which the arrows show the path that the exclusionary incentives generated in the central institutions might have taken through Athens' associations.

Conclusion

Athenian democracy was consistently oppressive to women in some ways, and increasingly open to them in others. Increasingly open to their social involvement, it always excluded them from politics; and in some cases, like the religious associations we have looked at in this essay, it extended this exclusion into what might have seemed like purely social territory. We are used to thinking that increasing interaction on a social level leads to an opening up of political institutions. And perhaps, in other cases, it has. What the case of democratic Athens may suggest, however, is that sometimes political exclusion, instead of being broken down by social inclusiveness, can undermine and counteract it. All of which explains the curious and discomfiting phenomenon described in this chapter, in which women gained full membership in Athens' associations only when the city's democracy had started to decline.

Notes

1 I am very grateful to Josh Ober, Claire Taylor, Alex Gottesman, Mirko Canevaro, and Tatiana Tsakiropoulou-Summers for help with this essay.
2 Gathered mainly from the works in the previous note, plus Arnaoutoglou (2011).
3 Nos. 1, 3–9, 11–12: *IG* II^2 2346, 2347, 1316, 1298, 1297, 1292, 1314, 1315, 1328i, 1328ii; nos. 2, 10, 13: *IG II*^{3} 4 635, 654, 661; no. 14: *SEG* 54.235.

4 Hence, I have excluded inscriptions from demes that one scholar has claimed contain implicit mentions of women and other non-citizens, particularly in their references to "those resident in" the demes; it seems more likely that the phrase in fact refers to male citizens from other demes (Jones 1999, esp. 70–81; Kierstead 2013: 135–7).
5 For others, see *IG II*^{2} 1569, 2346, 2943; *IG* II^3 4 633, 634; *SEG* 24.223, 25.178, 42.149.
6 These terms are defined in the glossary above.
7 *Theog.* 603–12; *W&D* 373–5, 695–705; Semonides 7 with Pomeroy (1975, 48–52 and 57 for Solon's laws).

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11 Female reticence in republican Rome

Agency and the performance of exclusion

Margherita Carucci

In the ancient male construction of ideal womanhood, a woman's silence or reticence was considered a behavioral manifestation of her virtuous character.[1] Ancient Romans even celebrated an annual festival in honor of the goddess of silence with the double name Tacita (from the Latin *tacitus*, silent) or Muta (from the Latin *mutus*, speechless, mute). Her story is a cautionary tale: Tacita was a very talkative nymph, as implied by her original name Lala (from the Greek *laleō*, to speak). When at some point she divulged certain secrets, she was punished with the tearing of her tongue and banishment to the Underworld (Ovid, *Fasti*, 2.583–616). The celebration of her festival, therefore, served to remind women of the tragic consequences of the inappropriate or excessive use of speech (Cantarella 1996: 13–5). The list of moral qualities that defined the ideal Roman lady (*matrona*) included domesticity, which originated in men's belief that the natural place for women and femininity was to be found within the domestic sphere of house and family. The characterization *domiseda*, literally meaning 'the woman who stays at home', is often found in funerary inscriptions dedicated to Roman women.[2]

Silence and domesticity, the Roman women's prized virtues, are strikingly contradictory to the essential principles of democracy, speech, and the public sphere. It is surely a basic democratic tenet that freedom of speech is an inherent right insofar as it embodies and reflects inclusion and political participation of whoever may speak. As the etymology of the word 'democracy' suggests, equally important for the functioning of democratic governments is the involvement of people in discussing issues and shaping political outcomes for the benefit of the community. The term that ancient Romans used to describe their system of government was *res publica*, literally 'the public affair', a term that may be misleading, since it may convey the idea of community as an indistinct whole, whose members enjoy equal privileges regardless of sex and social status. In the patriarchal ideology of Roman society, by contrast, freedom of speech and political participation defined manhood and, more specifically, the male members of the elite, as much as silence and domesticity described the quintessence of womanhood. In Roman society, women did not have the right to hold office or vote in elections or in legislation, even if they belonged to the upper class and had more privileges. Their exclusion from the public realm of politics and power was justified by the male ideological conviction that women are unable to deal with political,

financial, and military issues. In the Roman literary tradition, comprising mostly male-written texts, the terms *infirmitas sexus* (female weakness), *infirmitas consilii* (mental weakness), *levitas animi* (immature judgment), *imbecillitas sexus* (female helplessness), and *fragilitas sexus* (female frailty) were interchangeably used to describe the biologically determined vulnerability or incapacity of women.

Yet, textual record attests that on a few critical occasions republican women displayed the exact opposite qualities: they stepped into the public arena of male politics, publicly demonstrated their political views in groups, and shaped issues and outcomes of Roman politics. But what did these women protest? What did they achieve? And what was their legacy? And if Roman women were capable of organizing themselves in a movement that allowed them to be publicly visible, audible, and successful, what kept them from challenging the male ideology of feminine silence and domesticity until its final eradication and from participating in the public realm more actively? The discussion of these few examples of women's political engagement at exceptional moments during the Republic will serve as foil for women's silence as their normal condition in Roman society. Based on textual evidence of how elite women in the Roman Republic staged public demonstrations and negotiated their demands, I question the traditional polarity that equates speech with agency and silence with passivity and powerlessness; instead, I argue that the ideal of female silence or reticence, far from being merely 'absence of speech', was a mode of being for republican women, who used it both as an opportunity to express agency and as a modality of political participation. In other words, the fact that on certain critical occasions the Roman women broke their silence and spoke up for their rights does not mean they did not embrace in principal 'female silence'; on the contrary, women realized that maintaining a proper façade of silence was instrumental for their ability to challenge male prerogatives when they infringed upon their own established rights. At the hands of the Roman women, silence had an empowering quality.

Within the framework of democratic ideals of gender equality, popular participation, and freedom of speech, I will use the term 'silence' with a specific reference to women not voicing their civic rights in public and I will discuss only those exceptional episodes of political action that Roman women took as an organized group with shared goals. The episodes I will discuss occurred over a period of some 450 years, from the fifth to the mid-first century B.C.E., when Rome experienced a profound change: starting as a small city-state in central Italy, it gradually expanded throughout the lands around the Mediterranean Sea, making its institutions more democratic before it became a monarchy again. During the democratic interlude, Roman women, inhibited by the female virtue of silence in the public sphere, were not able to exercise their political voice in a meaningful way as voters or magistrates. Nevertheless, their normal political invisibility and silence were momentarily suspended during two particular incidents which were widely understood as important moments for the history of Roman women and public life: the demonstrations against sumptuary restrictions with the *Lex Oppia* and, later, against the unfair taxation of 1400 of the richest Roman women.

Figure 11.1 Female statue, late republican times, Musei Capitolini in Rome, Palazzo Nuovo, Inv. 264

Note: The Roman woman is portrayed in the so-called *Pudicitia*-type, exemplifying the modest female.

Resisting the *Lex Oppia*

In 215 B.C.E., during the Second Punic War, the Roman Senate approved the *Lex Oppia*, dictating that no woman should display more than half an ounce of gold, or wear a purple garment, or ride in a two-wheeled carriage in the city, except during religious festivals. The sumptuary restrictions introduced by the *Lex Oppia* aimed at limiting the display of wealth in times of war and economic hardship, in order to maintain an appearance of unity and stability in the society. However, twenty years later, in 195 B.C.E., following Rome's victory over Carthage and the flow of wealth from the conquered areas, the Roman elite began to indulge in very extravagant expenditure. Consequently, two tribunes of the plebs, Marcus Fundanius and Lucius Valerius, proposed the repeal of the *Lex Oppia* that had become obsolete, but were opposed by two other tribunes, Marcus Junius Brutus and Publius Junius Brutus, who were supported by the consul Cato the Elder. The opposition of opinions between the Senate and the tribunes was not unusual, but the action of the Roman women, publicly protesting against this sumptuary law, had no precedent in the history of Rome. The historian Livy, writing in the first century B.C.E., describes at length the dramatic events attending the repeal of the *Lex Oppia*. According to his account, the Roman women, after blockading every street in the city and every entrance into the Forum, tried to speak to the men and convince them to repeal the law (Livy, *History of Rome*, 34.1–8).[3] The crowd of women grew larger daily, as women kept pouring into Rome from neighboring towns and villages. The Romans were divided, as shown in Livy's account of the speeches that were delivered in the Senate, one by Cato opposing the repeal and another by Valerius in its defense. The day following these speeches, a crowd of women occupied the public spaces of Rome and as a single body besieged the doors of the houses of the Brutuses, who were vetoing the repeal of the measure; the women did not stop protesting until the tribunes withdrew their veto and allowed the repeal of the *Lex Oppia*. It is difficult to determine what was of greater concern to the Roman men at the time: the potential economic power gained by a large number of wealthy women or their conspicuous consumption that enhanced their visibility in public spaces. One thing is certain, that elite women were determined to preserve the privileges of their class, even with public demonstrations, something they repeated in the late Republic – which brings us to the second incident.

Challenging the Triumvirs' authority

In 42 B.C.E., two years after the assassination of Julius Caesar, the members of the second triumvirate, Antony, Octavian, and Lepidus, ruthlessly eliminated their political and personal enemies and commanded the female relatives of these men to finance their wars against the rest of them. To this effect, they issued an edict requiring 1400 of the richest women of Rome to have the value of their

property assessed and pay taxes on it. The amount, as the Greek historian Appian notes, would be arbitrarily determined by the triumvirs who would require from each woman whatever portion was deemed necessary to help fund the war against Caesar's assassins.

The women affected by the decree decided to resist the unfair measure: they first approached the wives of the triumvirs, as any respectable Roman woman would have done, but, failing to gain support from all of them, held a public demonstration in the Forum, where, according to Appian, they "pushed their way to the tribunal of the triumvirs, while the men and the guards stood apart to let them pass" (*Civil War* 4.5.32.5). Hortensia, chosen as their public advocate, addressed the triumvirs with an impressive speech, in which she made several powerful arguments: having suffered the loss of their male relatives, fathers, husbands, and sons for opposing Caesar, the women ought not to sustain any additional losses from heavy taxation for actions they themselves had never undertaken or wars they had no control over – "We", Hortensia argued in front of the triumvirs, "never voted you public enemies, tore down your houses, or destroyed your armies" (*CW* 4.5.32.27–30). She added that it was unfair for the women to pay additional taxes when they had no part in the honors, the commands, and the policy-making of the state. Hortensia also stressed that they were willing to contribute generously to uphold the safety of Rome, but refused to finance civil strife. When she finished speaking, the triumvirs ordered their guards to drive the women away, but the shouts of the crowd outside forced them to desist and the triumvirs to postpone deliberations to the following day. When they reconvened, the triumvirs lowered the number of women subject to tax to 400 and imposed a tax on all men of a certain economic status. The women, therefore, striving to protect their class privileges, stood up in solidarity for their rights and succeeded in challenging the authority of the most powerful and violent men in the Roman state.

"No taxation without representation" would be the slogan of the protest movement in the mid-eighteenth century that culminated with the Boston Tea Party and escalated to the American Revolution. But, unlike the British colonists, the Roman women objected the triumvirs' edict (as they had done with the *Lex Oppia* more than a century earlier) but, strangely, did not ask for political representation or active participation in policy-making despite their success; they only demanded that their elite-class privileges be guaranteed and their status not be reduced "to a level unsuitable to their aristocratic origins, their life-style, and their female nature" (*CW* 4.5.32.23–25). To secure their class rights, the women made a successful use of democratic instruments: unity as a group, focus on shared goals, communication on the best course of action, systematic organization, public demonstration, and choral demands. While agreeing with Phyllis Culham that participation in a wide range of religious rites might have helped Roman women to develop their democratic skills (Culham 1982: 791), other incidents in the early Republic offered them the same opportunity, as textual record for two further incidents shows.

Taking initiative in the early Republic

Gellius recounts a peculiar incident that occurred in 272 B.C.E. in Rome (*Attic Nights*, 1.23).[4] As the Roman Senate had been discussing a matter of considerable importance and had reached no decision by the end of the day, it was voted that no one should mention the subject of the debate until the matter was resolved. When the young Papirius, who had been in the Senate with his father, returned home and was interrogated by his mother persistently about the secret issue, he had to resort to a colossal lie: the Senate, he said, had been discussing the question whether it was more to the advantage of the state for one man to have two wives or one woman to have two husbands. Panic-stricken, the woman rushed excitedly from the house, spreading the news to other Roman women, all of whom showed up outside the Senate the next day, imploring the senators with tearful entreaties that one woman might have two husbands rather than one man two wives. The episode is used by Gellius to explain why the practice to allow young boys to accompany their fathers to the Senate was abolished. However, pertinent to our purposes is to note how quickly and effectively Roman women organized themselves and invaded the male arena of politics to assert their rights. This action may have been a precursor to what Sarah Pomeroy describes as the "first women's demonstration" (Pomeroy 1975: 177), which she also identifies with the protest against the *Lex Oppia* in 195 B.C.E., some eighty years after the Papirius episode.

Another event that foreshadowed Roman women's ability to assume collective action had occurred even earlier, in 331 B.C.E., when, according to Livy (*History of Rome*, 8.18), many upper-class citizens died one after the other of a mysterious disease. The cause turned out to be poisoning induced by women related to the victims. This was revealed by a slave woman who informed Quintus Fabius Maximus, the magister for enforcing public order (*aedilis curulis*). Caught while preparing the lethal drugs in their house, twenty women were summoned to the Forum and two of them, both of the patrician order, when forced to drink the drugs they claimed had curative qualities, died. In the end, 170 women were found guilty. Though the reasons of the event remain obscure, some scholars have attempted to speculate on them. Herrmann, for example, theorizes that a group of patrician women resorted to this action in an effort to gain equality of civil and political rights, but has no evidence for it (Herrmann 1964: 48). Similarly, Bauman links this episode tentatively to the class conflict between patricians and plebeians and to the women's effort to secure matrimonial reforms (Bauman 1992: 13–21). Even the historian Livy, shocked at the event, attributes it to insanity rather than criminal intent. Regardless of the cause, the episode makes an important point with regard to my argument: in the early Republic elite women were able to organize secretly group action on a large scale, communicate effectively, act in unison, and threaten male authority. Yet they did not use this ability for a wider project with a feminist agenda, that is, organizing themselves in a movement with a common aim, claiming

their civic rights, and participating in the public realm. They could not become active political agents, as they did not have the rhetorical skills for speaking in public. Or did they have such skills? This brings us to the discussion of women and public speech in Roman ideology.

Voice or the 'art of resistance'

Western culture has always equated speech with power, gendering public speaking as masculine and silence as feminine. Similarly, in the ancient Roman Republic, the right of free speech in public was granted predominately to the male members of the elite, while their female counterparts were expected to embody the ideal of silence and reticence. Since the success of their activities in the public arena of politics and the military depended also on the mastery of public speech, elite boys in their early to mid-teens received training in oratory which taught them how to speak well in order to persuade, inform, and please an audience, as, for instance, in deliberations on political matters at the Senate or in court. Elite girls, by contrast, received a broader, liberal education, suitable to their social standing and future role as wives and mothers of distinguished men. In fact, since upper-class women were required to participate in social life and maintain the social and political relations between elite families, their education was deemed important for the social status of their husbands. A learned woman might have been able to directly supervise her children's education as future citizens of Rome: Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi, for instance, was highly praised by the authors of late republican and imperial times for the excellent education she had given to her sons after the death of their father in 154 B.C.E. (Cicero, *Brutus*, 104, 211; Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus*, 1.4.). The education of elite women thus did not prepare them for future careers as public speakers or professional lawyers, but served primarily to increase the social prestige of the male members of their family whilst teaching (and reaffirming) the traditional female virtues of modesty, chastity, and silence in the public. In the Roman moral discourse, speech and silence became signifiers not only of social status but also of moral virtues: in the same way that a man's ability in public speech revealed his aristocratic background and gendered power, so a woman's public silence indicated the nobility of her lineage and the virtue of her character.

As a result of gender dichotomy in the use of speech, if a woman invaded the space of male oratory, she was inevitably subject to fierce criticism. Valerius Maximus, a teacher of oratory in the first century C.E., constructs a binary opposition between properly silent and inappropriately talkative women, that is, as the writer labels them, "women who pleaded before magistrates for themselves and the others" (*On Memorable Deeds and Sayings*, 8.3). On the one hand, are the women who, dressed in a matron's robe, display their natural condition and modesty, compelled to keep silent in the public spaces of the Forum and the law-courts. On the other hand, are the women who employ public speech in public spaces, making a mockery of themselves, such as Maesia of Sentinum and

Carfania. Between these two groups of women stands Valerius Maximus as the arbiter of female propriety concerning the use of speech. It will be instructive to look closer at these case studies.

Brought to trial probably in the first half of the first century B.C.E., Maesia defended herself in the presence of a large crowd with such a great rhetorical virtuosity that she was acquitted at the first hearing with a unanimous vote. However, her triumph earned her a less glorious nickname, making her known as 'Androgyne' (the Man-Woman), which mocked her usurpation of the male role in court (Marshall 1990: 46–59). Carfania is another example: wife of the senator Licinius Buccio in the Sullan period, Carfania used to plead court cases before the Praetor, but her involvement seemed like an intrusion and her words sounded like barking (*latratibus*) to the tribunals, while her name became synonymous to women of shameless behavior. Valerius Maximus' strong disapproval of Carfania's behavior emerges more clearly in the last lines he dedicates to her: in mentioning her death (c. 48 B.C.E.), he comments that "in the case of such a monster, the date of extinction rather than of origin ought to be recorded" (*On Memorable Deeds and Sayings*, 8.3.2). The writer uses the Latin term '*monstrum*' as an appropriate term to describe a woman who does not speak but barks like a dog: the ancient jurists, in fact, define as *monstrum* the baby whose abnormal shape resembles an animal rather than a human being (*Digest* 1.5.14; 50.16.135).

The *damnatio memoriae* of women's voice

In his discussion of Maesia and Carfania, Valerius Maximus does not quote a single word from the speeches they made in the law-courts, suggesting that their words not only lack sound and meaning but are not worth commemorating or being praised as a model for future generations. Though Maesia and Carfania pleaded their cases successfully, their acting outside of their proper place, their embodiment of male and female qualities ("she [Maesia] bore a man's spirit under the form of a woman": *On Memorable Deeds and Sayings*, 8.3.1) and lack of shame ("she [Carfania] had impudence to spare": *On Memorable Deeds and Sayings*, 8.3.2) were for the writer a good reason for not recording their speeches or committing them to the collective memory like the number of male speeches recorded in the ancient male-authored texts, as a form of *damnatio memoriae* that condemns public female speeches to oblivion. Similarly, in his report of the debate over the *Lex Oppia*, Livy relates no words coming from the women involved in the protest, nor does he name their representatives or leaders who, as Hortensia did in a different event, are likely to have delivered public speeches on behalf of their companions. Instead, Livy mentions briefly that the women urged their requests to the magistrates and went on to address other women's husbands, but does not convey any of their requests or addresses. By contrast, Livy reports both Cato's and Valerius' addresses to the Senate, rendering silent the voices of women.

Livy shows the same attitude to women's speech, even when he names some female characters and singles them out for their actions. In his account of the poisoning trials of 331 B.C.E., when a large number of elite women were

condemned, only two women, Cornelia and Sergia, appear to have replied to the accusation of preparing noxious drugs. However, Livy does not report their arguments or what they agreed on when they were given time to confer together. Similarly, in Gellius' story on the matrons' intervention in the Senate's debate about male or female bigamy, the elite women are said to have implored the senators "with tears and entreaties", a form of communication stereotypically attributed to the female sex, whereas the senators deliberated the matter through proper (from a male perspective) use of speech. In conformity with Roman ideology, which viewed the rightful use and correct application of public speech as a fundamentally male prerogative, Valerius Maximus and Livy neglect to report women's words and views in the few occasions they appeared in public with the result that they make women seem completely silent, when in fact the silence is imposed by the male authors.

The only woman in literary record that was praised by ancient male writers for her extraordinary rhetorical skills was Hortensia, who spoke on behalf of the richest 1400 Roman women before the triumvirs. In fact, Valerius Maximus appears to suspend his deprecating judgment on women who pleaded before magistrates when he discusses Hortensia. Amazed at her oratorical skills, Valerius seems to approve of her using them, stating that her speech was worthy of her father, the great orator Quintus Hortensius, who had rivalled Cicero in the courts (*On Memorable Deeds and Sayings*, 8.4.3). In his *Institutes of Oratory* (1.1.6), Quintilian states that her oration was still read at his time and not merely as an honor to her sex. From the perspective of nuanced agency, which will be discussed below, Hortensia's public speech was justified partly by her father's legacy and partly by the historical moment, since the social chaos that afflicted Rome during the age of the triumvirs allowed for the inversion of the gendered use of speech: while the men remained silent out of fear for retaliation, Hortensia came forward into the public sphere and spoke up. The conditions were such that allowed her to perform her role as 'proper woman' without compromising her gender in the male literary tradition.

The Roman male authors' reaction to women speaking in public confirms a basic tenet of Roman ideology: the rightful use and correct application of public speech is a fundamentally male prerogative, while silence is considered both natural and ideal condition of the female sex. A feminist reading of women's invasion of public spaces with the sound of their voice would highlight the revolutionary use of public speech as an act of resistance to symbolic domination. The voice of the elite Roman women was indeed for a public demonstration of their particular perspective, and a challenge to male power. However, contrary to feminist expectations, discovering and gaining a public voice did not lead republican women to develop a gender consciousness. But before discussing the modus operandi of Roman women, a pause is necessary for some observations on what appears to be a 'failure' from a feminist perspective.

It is possible that the various forms of republican women's involvement in public affairs on their own initiative could have prepared them to develop a political consciousness and foster confidence in their ability to take political

action for their own sectional interests. Yet, they never organized themselves in a movement advocating political equality and the right to vote. Why did the success of these few demonstrations not prompt Roman women to campaign for equal rights or participation in government, as did women in modern feminist movements? From a liberal feminist perspective, the lack of action in this direction may be interpreted as a failure on the Roman women's part to push toward the development of political institutions that would have allowed them to participate in the public world.

However, it is possible that in searching for the causes of this 'failure', I, too, am driven by my historically situated perspective of a liberal feminist, living in an industrialized Western society of the early twenty-first century. Examining the modus operandi of Roman women, however, makes me think that perhaps the questions regarding their goals need to be reformulated. Instead of asking, 'why did the women not demand more political rights?', perhaps we should look at the issue from a different perspective that is more in tune with the Roman culture: Did the Roman women of the elite even *want* to gain the right to vote, or acquire freedom of speech, citizenship, political participation, representation, or gender equality? Does their reticence as a form of normative expectation mean that there are no other possible forms of political participation? And, are the concepts of 'talkative' democracy and 'silent' exclusion incompatible? For a discussion of these questions, I will use two universal terms in feminist analysis: agency and performance.

Female agency

Within the wide framework of democratic discourse, the word 'agency' calls to mind the autonomous, empowered, free individual who is involved in the affairs of her community. The term 'agency' is often associated with freedom of speech, that is, the right by which a citizen is enabled to exercise her political voice in a meaningful way. More specifically, in the tradition of feminist studies, women's agency is often intended as action of resistance against the oppressive structures of the patriarchal society aiming at achieving freedom in thought, speech, and action. This perspective has created a dualism between agents and victims, resistance and oppression. However, a woman's agency is not always identical with resistance or subversion of the symbolic order in which she exists; nor do all human beings have an innate desire for freedom that is achieved by challenging social norms. A woman's agency may take other forms or may be expressed through actions that are not necessarily motivated by the desire to subvert or resist the system that secures male domination, especially if the position they occupy within the patriarchal order is one of relative power, as in the case of the Roman elite women.

To understand accurately the meaning of agency, we must locate it in a specific historical and cultural context, creating what I call a 'nuanced agency' that enables specific modes of being and motivates specific actions with culturally appropriate goals. The Roman women of the elite did not demand the right to vote or gender equality, but demonstrated for the right to keep and display their

wealth in the forms of property, expensive garments and jewelry, something that for us seems trivial. However, seen from the perspective of nuanced agency, the agenda of the elite Roman women's action against the *Lex Oppia* and the triumvirs' edict may no longer appear inconsequential. As Hortensia points out in her speech to the triumvirs, the possession of landed properties, such as fields and houses, as well as of dowries and jewelry allowed elite women to maintain a status suitable to their aristocratic birth, life-style, and gender; it also guaranteed their financial independence, one of the fundamental rights of women in Roman culture. Conspicuous consumption by Roman women was not just a vain marker of social status but also a form of identity as free-born individuals. Its social significance for elite women ran much deeper than what Valerius implied when he argued that elegance, ornaments, and finery were women's badges in which they found joy and took pride, or that these ornaments functioned as a sort of compensation for women's lack of access to male privileges, such as magistracies, priesthoods, triumphs, gifts, and spoils of war (Livy, *History of Rome*, 34.7). What Valerius and the male members of his society failed to comprehend is that for women these badges did not merely fill the space of their insignificantly private world; rather, their possession and display were a statement of identity both as women and as wealthy members of society, through which they claimed certain (albeit limited) power and influence on public affairs.

Elite women, in fact, administered their possessions and estates often without the supervision of a male tutor; they had their own staff of slaves; they received visitors and callers at home, where they conducted their private business. Behind the scenes, a woman might have been involved in the business of the male members of their family, the management of their estates, and their political career, especially when they were abroad for military duties, governorship of a province, or in exile. Terentia, Cicero's wife, is a good example of an upper-class Roman woman who was active *in domo et in res publica*. During her husband's exile, Terentia used her financial resources and acquaintance with influential men for solving patrimonial issues and supporting her husband economically and politically (Dixon 1986); she also arranged her daughter Tullia's marriage without consulting Cicero on the choice of his future son-in-law (Cicero, *Letters at Atticus*, 6.6.1). Terentia's visibility in the male spaces and her independent character have certainly contributed to her condemnation in the male-authored texts, both ancient and modern (Treggiari 2007), and perhaps to Cicero's decision to divorce her after thirty years of marriage. The price for a woman's exposure was the loss of her reputation and the loss of her male associates' dignity (Hillard 1992). However, like Hortensia and her companions, Terentia had to suspend temporarily the idealized role of the invisible and silent good wife and step into the public arena for preserving her class identity and the privileges of her social position that her husband's exile might have undermined.

In their struggle to preserve what their ancestors called 'the women's world' (Livy, *History of Rome*, 34.7),[5] Roman women did not aim at subverting the dominant male system, which sustained gender inequality in the access to political power; nor did they ask for the vote. In fact, they argued the exact opposite

point, that the male and female spheres should remain separate, but, according to custom, men should *protect* the matrons of Rome from any legal reform that would diminish the status of their sex. Their demand for preserving their rights within the frame of existing social institutions and dominant ideology makes Roman women appear far from revolutionaries. Nevertheless, they strove to shape and reinforce both their social and gender identity. The fear of losing their identity also compelled Roman women to intervene in the case of the Senate's supposed deliberation on male or female bigamy. If the law had allowed a man to have two wives, neither woman could have preserved the privileged position of authority as the single *matrona* in the house; by contrast, the possibility for a woman to marry two men would have reinforced her identity as wife and mother.

Roman women's deference to social norms can certainly be seen as sustaining their subordination to the patriarchal system and contributing to the justification of their exclusion from full citizen rights. Nevertheless, this deference was not merely a form of passive acceptance of the dominant system by women who were supposedly biologically vulnerable and incapable of dealing with 'male affairs'. It was rather a conscious utilization of social norms as potentialities through which they reinforced their self-identity. When these norms were threatened, the identity of the women as members of the upper class was threatened as well, and in reaction they staged public demonstrations. The cases discussed above suggest that, far from being fully democratic according to our modern description and interpretation of democratic qualities, the design and practices of the Roman *res publica* granted elite women some privileges that they did not want to give up in the name of civic rights. Nuanced by the historical and cultural realities of their time, the women's conscious deference to the existing social norms defined their agency. As Mahmood brilliantly points out, "norms are not simply a social imposition on the subject but constitute the very substance of her intimate, valorized interiority" (Mahmood 2005: 23). One of the possibilities for Roman women's agency or the ways they "lived into the norms" (Mahmood 2005: 22–5) was the performance of silence. I use the terminology of performance to suggest that silence was frequently adopted as a performance staged for a public as part of an ongoing process of self-representation. This brings us to the discussion of the last point of this essay: women performing their gender exclusion.

The performance of gender exclusion

In the Western tradition, reiterated from Aristotle to Audre Lorde (1978) in the twentieth century, silence is generally taken to be a result and a symbol of passivity, repression, and powerlessness, while voice is a common metaphor for the speaker's agency, subjectivity, and power. Within the political discourse, voice is used to signify elective franchise, public expression of one's own view, and full participation in the democratic process. Though silence has also been acknowledged as a source of empowerment by feminist criticism (Malhotra and Carillo Rowe 2013), the equations 'silence = powerlessness' and 'voice = agency', which are reified across literary, academic, and activist contexts, presume a political

imperative: an individual or a group who is silenced must speak up and activate one's voice in order to change the conditions of one's oppression. 'To give voice to the silenced women' is a motif that often recurs in manifestos or speeches in support of women's causes, as silence and muteness, like the Roman goddess Muta, are considered a reflection of disempowerment and a male strategy to perpetuate the ideology of female inferiority. However, by reading silence and voice in line with our normative liberal conceptions of politics and human agency, we collapse distinctions between forms of silence at the expense of understanding the workings of Roman women's agency. A strong emphasis upon speech as a sign of agency and inclusion in democratic practices risks neglecting the multiple meanings and workings of silence. Silence may be imposed on an individual, when she is not given the opportunity to speak up or to be heard. However, an individual may choose to be silent. The design and practices of the Roman *res publica* certainly contributed to impose silence upon women, but to be silent was for elite women also an active choice.

As we have seen, elite women were in most cases muted or silenced on purpose by the imposing male voice. Women like Maesia, Carfania, and Hortensia, showed their ability to make an appropriate use of speech in the public and plead their cases successfully, but, in spite of their public achievements, they did not encounter men's approval. Though Hortensia is praised for her eloquence, her speech should have been remembered with the same distaste as those of Maesia the Androgyne and Carfania the Barking Monster. Valerius Maximus, in fact, includes all three in the same rubric of women acting outside of their proper place. Women's use of speech, or their ability 'to take the floor', raised men's alarm and concern that their female counterparts might have usurped their male modes of behavior and power along with their privileges. As Cato fears in Livy's speech, "As soon as they [women] begin to be equal to men, they will be their superiors" (Livy, *History of Rome*, 34.3). Hence men's fierce reaction: women threatening male prerogatives had to be discounted, ignored, and shut out completely. Men's resistance to women's efforts to assert themselves in the public might have led Roman women, in some occasions, to strategically adopt an alternative form of communication to plead their cases and be heard, namely, public entreaty. As the women's action in Gellius' episode shows, by approaching men with tears and entreaties and appealing to their emotions rather than to their reason, women would have retained their respectable status in the public intervention while making their demands.

Women's political engagement in public life was prompted by extraordinary and critical circumstances: in the ordinary government of the *res publica* by men, women's public silence was the norm. Even if women were silenced in public, however, they talked, deliberated, and expressed their views to each other and to their menfolk within the domestic walls. In other words, women were publicly silent but 'vocally active' behind the scenes, communicating and networking with other women to influence in a concerted way male actions and protect female prerogatives. When the triumvirs decreed the taxation of the richest members of the female elite, the women directly affected by it appealed to the women of the triumvirs' family. Only when Fulvia (Anthony's wife) rebuffed

them brusquely, in spite of the support assured by Octavia (Octavian's sister) and Julia (Anthony's mother), the women decided to press on and stage a public demonstration in the Forum.

Roman matrons' silence may be considered as a matter of remaining mute or being silenced by the male writers. However, their silence was not just an act of deference to patriarchal norms and ideals: it was also a strategy adopted by Roman women, who carefully controlled the timing and context of their silence and speech. For them, to appear modest and reticent about male affairs was an act of performance and a means by which they could affirm their social identity. From this perspective, the performance of silence, as part of the male ideal of womanhood and of the process of women's self-representation, was a form of nuanced agency with significant political implications. Their political agency did not consist in the usual demand for shared participation in political institutions, political equality, and the right to vote or hold office. Instead, their acceptance of authorized models of behavior was a necessary condition for their political agency in the same way male forms of power, from which women were excluded, were a necessary condition for men's construction of their social identity. When political deliberations threatened their social status and identity as elite women, republican women suspended their performance of silence temporarily and made public claims on the state in order to restore those forms of particularistic identity that the other members of the social collectivity recognized and respected.

Therefore, the silence of the elite republican women was not one-dimensional. It cannot be considered as solely the result or the symbol of their passivity, oppression, or disempowerment (Malhotra and Carillo Rowe 2013). Roman elite women were not always silent because they were told to be silent by men; in certain cases, they chose not to let their voice be heard in public. When they broke their silence, though, it was to reaffirm their unique identity as silent (but influential) members of society. This specific performance of silence was their political agency, expressed in a form that encompasses the paradox of republican women's position: they staged collective demonstrations in public spaces and voiced their demands only to defend their own modality of being silent and, as such, excluded from public life and political participation. Republican elite women embraced silence as a strategy for empowering their gender and social identity.

Notes

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2 For example, in a funerary epitaph from Rome, Amymone, wife of Marcus, is praised for being "a woolworker, dutiful, modest, temperate, chaste, and one who stays at home" (*CIL* 6. 11602). Another funerary inscription from the African town of Mactar commemorates a wife and mother "who desired nothing more than to rejoice her house" (*CIL* 8.647).

3 The Livian account and the contest of the *Lex Oppia* have been widely discussed by modern scholars. See, for instance Culham (1982); Bauman (1992: 31–4); Agati Madeira (2004: 87–99); Milnor (2005: 154–79).
4 See also Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, 1.6–19–25.
5 The expression *mundus mulieris* (the women's world) is used by Valerius in his speech for the repeal of the *Lex Oppia* (Livy, *History of Rome*, 34.7); it also occurs in *Digest*, 34.2.25.10 (*Ulpianus*) and Sextus Pompeius Festus, *On the Meaning of Words*, 129.1.

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Part II

Renaissance through modernity

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12 Gendering civic humanism

Political subjecthood and male hegemony in Renaissance Italy

Androniki Dialeti

Introduction: revisiting civic humanism

In 1977 Joan Kelly raised a fundamental feminist question: Did women have a Renaissance? Her answer was negative: there was no renaissance for women – at least, not during the Renaissance. Kelly's statement subverted Jacob Burckhardt's (1860) idealization of the Renaissance and disrupted the historiographical organization of the past as a Western, liberal, and male-centered project (Kelly 1977). Her emblematic question marked the transition from the historiographical paradigm of 'women worthies' (Davis 1976) to the social history of women by suggesting a feminist re-examination of the political, economic, and cultural landmarks of the 'Renaissance', including the birth of the sovereign territorial state, the emergence of commercial capitalism, humanist culture, and the rise of individualism. Challenging the universality of the male historical subject, making women visible in history and 'discovering' their 'lost' voices, experience and agency have been important objectives of feminist historiography since then. Recent scholarship on early modernity has enriched our knowledge on women's agencies, experiences, and practices of everyday life, covering diverse topics, such as family, religiosity, economy, intellectual life and socialization, politics, and sexuality.

Rethinking male-centered topics that had dominated the post-war historiographical domain became a vital pursuit in the new historiographical landscape. Thus, scholars such as Margaret King (2005), Patricia Labalme (1980), Virginia Cox (2008), Diana Robin (2007), and others have discussed Renaissance humanism from a 'female point of view' to explore the opportunities and limitations humanist culture offered or imposed on women's intellectual pursuits. At the same time, less-known texts written by men or women, which departed from the dominant Renaissance discourse and offered alternative, pro-woman arguments on women's physical, intellectual, and spiritual constitution, have come to light (Jordan 1990).[1] Interestingly, however, recent scholarship on Renaissance humanism often still takes women's exclusion from Renaissance political life and culture for granted (Hankins 2003a).

This essay seeks to contribute to the historiographical debate on Renaissance humanism as a gendered category from the analytical perspective of masculinity. Instead of exploring the alternative, pro-woman literature or women's writings,

the essay offers a re-reading of some representative male-written texts of the Italian civic humanist tradition and discusses how political subjecthood and individuality was produced as a male privilege in Renaissance republican regimes. Its argument seeks to show that women's exclusion from Renaissance republicanism was not just another aspect of gender bias in early modern patriarchal societies, but was constitutive of civic humanism, which produced masculinity as an organizing principle of power in an exclusionary discourse that 'otherized' and marginalized women (along with certain groups of men, including youth, the socially inferior, foreigners, etc.). Problematizing civic humanist language, mainly in the Florentine and Venetian intellectual milieu, the essay discusses the terms in which 'Renaissance citizenship' was formulated as an objective and privilege of newly established forms of hegemonic civic masculinity. It was in this specific milieu that fundamental ideals of civic humanism, such as public space, civic virtue, devotion to the common good, liberty, sociability, rational thinking, and rhetoric were conceptualized as masculine qualities; at the same time, the binarism of male versus female, which was deeply embedded in political and moral philosophy, religion, medical science, and educational handbooks, essentialized the incompatibility between 'femininity' or 'deficient masculinity' and political participation.

To this aim and in way of methodology, the essay explores the works of well-known fifteenth-century humanists, such as Pier Paolo Vergerio, Leonardo Bruni, Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, Leon Battista Alberti and Francesco Barbaro, and various sixteenth-century texts, such as those by Sperone Speroni, Paolo Caggio, Lodovico Dolce, and Torquato Tasso, that continued echoing classical humanist values and investigates how they construct masculinity by juxtaposing it with patterns of femininity or deficient masculinity in terms of social and political virtues, conceptualizations of civic and domestic space, education, notions of human nature, and civic duty. The last section of the essay discusses alternative gender narratives of early modernity and examines whether and to what extent they transcended dominant discourses. Paradoxically both the dominant political discourse, which excluded women from the public sphere by essentializing gender difference, and alternative pro-woman narratives, which undermined established gender notions, variously drew on the Renaissance pursuit for a fresh understanding, redefinition, and reorganization of human relations. Admittedly, the relation between the dominant male-centered rhetoric and the pro-woman literature deserves further examination, but falls beyond the scope of this essay.

Before we begin our main inquiry, it would be instructive to discuss the meaning of the term 'civic humanism' and its use in this essay. The term 'civic humanism' was introduced in 1955 by Hans Baron to describe a nexus of ideas, values, and political practices, inherited from the ancient Greek and Roman tradition, which invested political life in republican Florence from the early fifteenth century (Baron 1955). Active political participation, devotion to the common good, civic concord, patriotism, justice, liberty, and the pursuit of civic virtue were prominent features of this tradition. Since the

introduction of the term by Baron, civic humanism as a category of historical analysis has been expanded and variously interpreted to encompass different geographical and cultural environments, such as the political worlds of early modern Venice, England, and America (Bouwsma 1968; Pocock 1975). Civic masculinity as the nucleus of humanist thought was paradigmatically shaped in the Florentine and Venetian political imagery. As the cities of northern Italy one after the other were transformed to principates during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Florence (at least typically until the consolidation of the Medici in 1532) and Venice preserved their republican constitutions. Thus, against the courtly rhetoric gradually dominating in most parts of the Italian peninsula, in Venice and Florence the Renaissance ideal of a 'public government' led by a 'male aristocracy', a rightful and educated oligarchy of 'citizens', was exemplified. The strictly hereditary character of the Venetian patriciate was harmonically embedded into the political imagery of the city as the hub of justice, concord, and unanimity, whereas in fifteenth-century Florence the early Medici sought to reconcile the traditional, humanist ideals with their increasing political hegemony. Margaret King (1986) has argued that Venetian humanism, which developed dynamically in the sixteenth century, was even more exclusionary than its Florentine predecessor, since most Venetian humanists were of noble origins. However, in the Florentine intellectual milieu, humanists were often social newcomers who accepted and culturally enforced the social and political hegemony of the Florentine ruling elite. Despite their diversities, Florentine and Venetian political discourse may serve as a good example to detect the main *loci* and sites of inclusion and exclusion in the Renaissance republican thought. Glorifying the republican ethos as a self-evident virtue, male educated elites idealized the contemporary socio-political edifice, politically and discursively produced and enforced inclusion and exclusion in terms of gender and social class.

Political subjecthood as a male ideal was primarily shaped upon the classical Greek and Roman tradition, which was broadly appropriated, reconceptualized and selectively used. Aristotelian and Ciceronian political and moral philosophy became the basis for theories of male excellence and women's intellectual and physical deficiency, which in turn justified their exclusion from social and political life. Aristotelian ideas in particular were diffused through the Scholastic Aristotelian movement in the Middle Ages and subsequently the European educational system of the Renaissance heavily influencing the Western notions about gender, human nature, the public and private space. The development of printing contributed to the broader circulation of the Aristotelian texts both in Latin and Greek and gradually in the vernacular as well. During the sixteenth century Aristotelianism was diffused beyond the Latin-speaking, university-educated elite, in extra-university circles and academies, including the Orti Oricellari and the Accademia Fiorentina in Florence and the Accademia degli Infiammati in Padua. Occasional references notwithstanding, a thorough exploration of the complicated and multifarious impact of Aristotelianism on Renaissance humanism is beyond the scope of this essay.

Spatial conceptualizations of sociability and political virtue

The humanist ideal of public service and duty is strongly conceptualized in gendered, spatial terms and discursively colored with sharp dichotomies between public and private, collective and individual, motion and immobility. Civic space as a site of male political vocation, sociability, and brotherhood is deeply embedded in the humanist concept of active life (*vita attiva*). The supremacy of the active way of living as opposed to the contemplative one (*vita contemplativa*) which had framed medieval intellectual pursuits was first emphasized by Coluccio Salutati in the late fourteenth century. In his well-known letter to Peregrino Zambeccari, Salutati compares traditional Christian values and civic ideals and proposes "the square, the forum, the court, and the busy places of the city" as the spatial loci in which devotion to the state, family, and friends can be achieved. For Salutati active life serves "as an exercise in virtue" and affirms "brotherly love" (Salutati 1978: 107–11).

Humanist discourse essentialized the ideal of female domesticity and the incompatibility between 'female virtue' and civic intercourse. In his influential work *Libri della famiglia* (1441), Leon Battista Alberti echoes Aristotle's *Politics* and Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* to assert a sharp division of space between male, active, and public on the one side and female, static, and private on the other with important political and moral implications. As Lionardo, an interlocutor on the dialogue, observes:

> it is as though nature thus provided for our well-being, arranging for men to bring things home and for women to guard them. The woman, as she remains locked up at home, should watch over things by staying at her post.
>
> (Alberti 1969: 207–08)

In a similar vein Giannozzo, another interlocutor, reminds readers of the meaningful interplay between male political identity and civic sociability:

> to tell the truth, it would hardly win us respect if our wife busied herself among the men in the marketplace, out in the public eye. It also seems somewhat demeaning to me to remain shut up in the house among women when I have manly things to do among men, fellow citizens and worthy and distinguished foreigners.
>
> (Alberti 1969: 207)

The humanist dichotomy between male/public and female/private confirmed the male ruling elite's monopoly over political power in both social and spatial terms. The ideal of active life as a male duty and privilege is further substantiated through a symbolic interplay between public and private, political and domestic, civic and patriarchal virtue. Paolo Caggio remarks:

> it is very reasonable that the one who has not learnt to govern a house does not deserve to govern a city, and the one who does not know how family affairs work, knows even less about the affairs of the Republic, since private things are examples and real images of public affairs.
>
> (Caggio 1552: 24v)

The arrival of printing consolidated normative literature on marriage and family life, which was further enriched with the ideals of Catholic Reform on female chastity and conjugal devotion. This repertoire of ideas concerning patriarchal household was primarily targeted at the middle and upper social classes. The boundaries between public and private space were often porous and mutable in respect to lower-class women who worked and socialized in the neighborhood and developed social and business relationships beyond the family. On the contrary, for the wives, sisters, and daughters of the social and political elite, honor was inextricably bound to invisibility and immobility. This spatial and social organization of gendered morality involved middle- and upper-class women's enclosure in either home or convent. Terms such as '*publiche*' and '*femine del mondo*' for prostitutes allude to a strong interweaving between female public presence and the risk of dishonor. A complex web of patriarchal meanings and representations correlated female chastity, achieved through domesticity and invisibility, with political authority and civic prosperity. Ironically, it was precisely through their absence from public life that statesmen's female relatives contributed to the common good (Dialeti and Plakotos 2015).

In civic humanist discourse, the political body was represented as a patrilineal family, the continuity of which depends on citizens' imitation of their glorious ancestors and their wives' chaste behavior. According to Leonardo Bruni, men of Florence as descendants of ancient Romans enjoyed domination over all the earth "by a kind of hereditary right, as paternal inheritance" (Hankins 2003b: 146). The potential disruption of this politically and symbolically fundamental filial-paternal bond is invested with patriarchal anxiety. As Francesco Barbaro (2015: 73) asserts, through marriage a man can offer his sons "as outstanding citizens to the republic". Indeed, he explains:

> Time has shown that the children born of legitimate marriages are more inclined to honor, are more responsibly reared, and ultimately make better citizens . . . Experience, meanwhile, that great teacher, demonstrates amply that those who were conceived in lust and outside of wedlock are for the most part violent and dishonest and inclined to all that is base . . . So we may call those born thus honorably 'the walls of the city'.
>
> (Barbaro 2015: 68–9)

Marriage, wifely fidelity, and practices of endogamy, as demonstrated in detailed recordkeeping, became the cornerstones of the legitimization of moral and social supremacy and political continuity of the Venetian and Florentine respectable families.

In the Florentine and Venetian political imagery, the female body often stood as a metonymy of civic space, that had to be protected, ruled, embellished, and rationally ordered. The city of Venice was typically personified either as a virgin, whose intact body symbolized territorial integrity and the purity of the body of the patriciate, or as Venus, whose physical beauty dominated the Mediterranean and seduced the empire's subject territories (Rosand 2001). Similarly, Florence and the Florentine ideals of liberty, fertility, and abundance were symbolically feminized in civic configurations, such as the Ninfa Fiorentina, Santa Maria del Fiore, or Pallas Athene, while the Annunciation lily was a prominent city symbol (Randolph 2002). In this imagery, female embodiments of the state were usually accompanied by the members of the ruling elite who, as powerful guardians, offered paternal, conjugal, or chivalric protection to their maidens. In the rich iconography of the Venetian Ducal Palace, the dominating figures of patricians, grandiose in their crimson velvet togas, interchange with allegorical female figures or pay tribute to the Virgin Mary, confirming their preferential access to power and the divine.

Inherited liberty and natural subjection

Humanists defined liberty as a political position of independence and self-government, as a male virtue which could be achieved only in republican regimes. Those who are 'born to be free' cannot be happy unless they have control over their lives, actions, and governments. However, at the same time self-realization through liberty serves no purpose for the 'others', those of a different nature who voluntarily and naturally accept subjection. This essentialized notion of liberty as the nucleus of active, political citizenry had important gender implications.

The dichotomy between inherited liberty and natural subjection was relocated to the domestic environment and defined the relations between patriarchs and their dependents: wives, children, and servants. The relation between husband and wife, in particular, is conceived as an unequal companionship stemming from man's ability to rule and woman's virtue to obey. In his treatise on female education, Lodovico Dolce denies married women liberty, along with innate rationality, explaining that without their husbands they resemble children that, deprived from their tutors, cannot be "free but errant, devoid of reason and law" (Dolce 1545: 68r–v). Repeating the same exclusionary rhetoric and drawing on the prevalent medical theory of the humors, Gio Battista Assandri distinguishes between the male virtue of commanding and the virtue of obedience (*virtù imperatoria e virtù ministratoria*) which pertains to women, children, and servants. As he further clarifies, the juvenile virtue of obedience lasts until the passage from boyhood to manhood, whereas women's and servants' virtue to obey remains unchangeable throughout their lives (Assandri 1616: 75–6). Torquato Tasso, however, recognizes that some women may have political power. However, he reserves this privilege only for a minority of exceptional female sovereigns. He observes that normally female virtue consists in "knowing to obey man, not in the way that the servant obeys his lord . . . but in a civilized way, as the citizens

of an orderly city obey laws and magistracies"; this has been arranged by nature because "in their company man and woman must have diverse duties and missions" (Tasso 1997: 106–7). Similarly, Tasso continues, the difference between servant and master is based on nature, because "some people have been naturally born to command and some others to obey" (Tasso 1997: 114). In a dialogue by the well-known Aristotelian thinker Sperone Speroni has even a female speaker, Signora Beatrice Pia degli Obizzi, convey the prevalent male views as she is made to admit that "women (and particularly wives) are by their nature real servants of their husbands . . . their servitude ensures their well-being and happiness" (Speroni 1596: 37).[2] All these essentialized notions of authority and subordination in terms of gender, age, and social status are heavily informed by Aristotle's views on human nature in *Politics*.[3]

A similar rhetoric of voluntary or natural subjection was used for the political legitimization of the Venetian hegemony in the mainland (terra firma) and overseas possessions and the Tuscan territorial state. This expansionist imagery was often articulated in gendered and sexualized terms. In Giambattista Zelotti's well-known painting that decorates the ceiling of the Hall of the Council of Ten in the Ducal Palace in Venice, the city is personified as Venus who seduces her terrestrial and maritime possessions symbolized by Mars and Neptune respectively. Mars and Neptune appear here willingly submissive and abandoned to pleasures, devoid of the male ability to rule. In the same vein, in Giambattista Tiepolo's painting in the Sala delle Quattro Porte, maritime possessions are personified as Neptune. He humbly offers gifts and services to Venice, a splendidly attired and imposing woman that holds scepter and rests her left hand on a lion's head, the symbol of the Venetian state. On the contrary, in the symbolic marriage of the Doge to the Sea, which was celebrated on Ascension Day, the *primus inter pares* of the Venetian patriciate casted a gold ring into the sea alluding to the male conjugal authority and the unquestioned imperial hegemony of the Venetian ruling elite, even over nature.

Reason and eloquence as sites of exclusion

Renaissance republicanism was largely modeled on the Ciceronian ideal of citizen-statesman. In Cicero's political thought, civic common good is achieved through reason (*ratio*) and eloquence (*oratio*). Rational decision making and eloquent speech were among the main objectives of humanist learning, and along with sociability, they were regarded as the signs of human nature and a humane way of life par excellence. This idea broadly drew on Aristotle's conceptualization of the political animal as an animal with the capacity for speech and his remark that nature has endowed man alone among the animals with the power of speech. Hence reserved for the male, educated, ruling elite, the oratorical skill signaled not only their political authority and social superiority but also their human nature in its full expression. The art of rhetoric and proper use of language and grammar became important humanist sites, signifying cultural and social difference. In his panegyric to the city of Florence, Leonardo Bruni highlights the

bonds between language and power by observing that Florentines' clearest and purist speech and the elegance of their discourse make them the "unquestioned leaders" of Italy since "all others seem like children compared to them" (Bruni 1978: 174). Similarly, Pier Paolo Vergerio argues that oratorical skill is "the mark of the greatest men and the absolutely fine characters" (Vergerio 2002: 49). Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini observes that silence "brings honor to a woman, but it does not to a man" and continues exclaiming, "since men differ from beasts in that they can speak, what praise, then is worthy of the man who excels other men in the very skill by which men excel beasts?" (Piccolomini 2002: 173). Eloquent speech emerges as a male privilege and a mark of experience in politics and social intercourse. The management of public speech became a primal pursuit of the Venetian ruling elite as demonstrated in a series of laws regarding blasphemy and the creation of the magistracy of Esecutori Contro la Bestemmia (1537) assigned the punishment of those who publicly spoke base, scandalous, and indecent words (Horodowich 2011).

Humanist educational objectives were reconfigured to satisfy the needs of 'female nature'. Language skills for women included knowledge of the vernacular and familiarity with readings that would contribute to women's moral enhancement. However, Latin remained a 'virile language', bound with theological, scientific, and bureaucratic knowledge. For women, language primarily served the internalization of knowledge rather than oratorical display. In an emblematic paragraph, Francesco Barbaro draws on the authority of the Roman past, nature's dictates, and patriarchal morals to denounce women's public speech:

> Likewise, when Marcus Cato the Elder saw Roman women who, defying the limits set them by nature and disregarding the norms of matronly restraint, often walked in the forum, petitioned for support, and spoke with strangers, he railed against them, reproached them, and restrained them, as the dignity of a great citizen and the majesty of empire required . . . So like her arms, so also a woman's words should not be public; for the voice of a woman who speaks out in public should be feared as greatly as the nakedness of her limbs.
>
> (Barbaro 2015: 106–7)

The dominant patriarchal belief that public speech could undermine female honor brought those few women who exposed themselves through their writings to a vulnerable and morally ambiguous position. In her proem to Lodovico Dolce, Laura Terracina apologizes for having used an arrogant virile mode of speaking instead of a womanly way of expression (Terracina 1550: 3v). Similarly, in her dedication to Cardinal Luigi d'Este, the Venetian courtesan, Veronica Franco admitted that she was "just a woman, inexpert in disciplines and lacking ingenuity and oratorical skill" (Franco [1580]).

The performative aspect of rhetoric is also used as an argument against women's public presence. Bruni, who advocates a quite broad educational curriculum for women, bluntly excludes the art of rhetoric, claiming that:

> should [a woman] gesture energetically with her arms as she spoke and shout with violent emphasis, she would probably be thought mad and put under restraint. The contests of the forum, like those of warfare and battle, are the sphere of men.
>
> (Bruni 2002: 105)

Rhetoric as a male act and privilege is ideally embedded in the virile voice of the speaker. Piccolomini advises male young pupils: "In the first place your voice must be formed; let it not break with feminine shrillness, nor tremble like an old man's, nor bellow too much like a cow" (Piccolomini 2002: 175).

Theological bias had identified women's speech with original sin, whereas Christian authors, such as the Apostle Paul and John Chrysostom, highlighted silence as one of the leading female virtues. Christian values were often interrelated with humanist rhetoric, particularly in sixteenth-century literature. Against male speech, which marked and fortified civic sociability, female words were disdained as trivial, impudent, or even dangerous for domestic and civic harmony. In Leon Battista Alberti's *Libri della famiglia*, Giannozzo anxiously remarks that "one should never, in fact, tell a secret, even a trivial one, to one's wife or any woman . . . women themselves can do anything sooner than keep quiet!" (Alberti 1969: 210). In the early seventeenth century, Gio Battista Assandri drew on the same argument, explaining that public affairs concerning the Republic and "male secrecy must remain hidden from women" (Assandri 1616: 99). If male friendship as a humanist ideal is consolidated through speech, female gossip subverts relations among women, as Francesco Barbaro's remarks about women's "usual calumniations" intend to demonstrate (Barbaro 2015: 97).

In civic humanist discourse, rational decision making also constitutes a crucial site signifying a hegemonic male political subjecthood. Rational thinking as a main objective of humanist education presumes moderation and self-control, which are viewed as male attributes par excellence. In Renaissance political and medical discourse, women and the young are taken as unable to control effectively their passions and accordingly are a potential threat to civic order (Varikas 2000). Evoking a spatial conceptualization of rationality, Assandri observes that it is due to their permanent stay at home that women "take things superficially" and are devoid of reason and prudence, which are achieved through experience and intellectual firmness. And thus, Assandri concludes, women's advice, such as that of the young, should not be taken seriously (Assandri 1616: 96–7). Although women's intellectual weakness is presented here as a result of social practice, it emanates from an essentialized feminization of private space. Male intellect is often juxtaposed to female corporeality in a binary opposition of mind/body and culture/nature, which would find its fullest expression in the nineteenth century. According to Torquato Tasso, women's "libidinous nature (*cupidità*)" may disrupt men's reasonable moderation: "woman is to man what desire is to reason" (Tasso 1997: 106). Indeed, lack of self-control and submission to irrational passions defines the behavior of all those who are not destined to reign, that is, women and male plebeians. In his condemnation of the Ciompi Revolt in Florence (1378–1382), Bruni implies that socially

inferior groups, including unqualified males, are deprived of rational, orderly thinking, as is demonstrated in their irrational use of violence, and, therefore, ought to be denied citizenship: "For there was no end or order to the unleashed appetites of the poor and the criminals, who, once armed, lusted after the possessions of rich and honorable men, and who thought of nothing except robbing, killing, and exiling citizens" (Najemy 2003: 85). Virtues such as restraint, solemnity, and prudence are exclusively secured for an imagery that applies only to members of the ruling elite. In Domenico Tintoretto's *The Holy Spirit and the Ten Censors* that decorates the Sala del Collegio in the Ducal Palace, the modestly splendid Venetian officers look confidently and calmly at the spectator. Above their bearded heads, the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove testifies their divinely endorsed mission and guarantees enduring peace and stability.

Learning for men, learning for women

Education gradually became of vital importance for the self-fashioning of the Renaissance social elites both in republican and despotic regimes, since it ensured their moral integrity and marked their superiority over their social inferiors. Largely drawing on authorities of the Roman republican past, and particularly Cicero, humanist education was inextricably bound to republican politics and ideals. In his influential treatise on humanist education, Pier Paolo Vergerio explains that we call these studies liberal which are "worthy of a free man", worthy of those who do not need to pursue "ignoble gain" but who are motivated "by eagerness for praise and inflamed by love of glory" and "obliged to involve themselves in public affairs and human communities" (Vergerio 2002: 9, 22, 49). Venetian patricians, in particular, demonstrated their intellectual supremacy via their studies in the nearby university of Padua, while humanism became a major channel through which the Venetian political imagery of justice, magnanimity, and moderation was constructed. As Margaret King has aptly observed, both in the realm of governance and that of culture, the patriciate ruled, tolerating no resistance or dissent (King 2013: 582). Women were not excluded from the humanist educational project though. In the fifteenth century, Leonardo Bruni wrote the first coherent essay on women's education and dedicated it to Lady Battista Malatesta of Montefeltro. In the sixteenth century, pedagogical treatises for women, such as those of Juan Luis Vives and Lodovico Dolce, which combined humanist ideals with values of Catholic Reform, came to light. Although most women had limited educational opportunities, the ideal of the exceptionally learned woman dominated humanist culture. As Virginia Cox (2008: 28–34) has aptly noted, the Renaissance learned lady "metonymically represented the state of development of an entire culture" and "emblematized the innovative energies and the success of the humanistic project as a whole". Women's perfection through learning attested to their families' exceptional intellectual ambitions and humanist education's marvellous potential. Furthermore, women's learning abilities could serve as a strong argument for those who privileged cultural or social practices over nature

in the formation of human character (Caimo 1629). In practice, women of the middle and upper classes received a more-or-less advanced education at home or in convents, which usually consisted of reading and writing in the vernacular, poetry, music, and painting. However, families scarcely encouraged women's advanced education. Well-known fifteenth-century female Italian humanists such as Isotta Nogarola, Cassandra Fedele, Laura Cereta, and Alessandra Scala were deemed as exceptional by their contemporaries. Although the sixteenth century marked a more ambitious participation of women in intellectual life, thanks to the diffusion of the vernacular, learned women remained a tiny minority in comparison to men.

Pedagogical literature emphasized the different educational goals and priorities for men and women. Spatially conceptualized, female education normally aimed at women's moral enhancement and better administration of the household. Dolce (1545: 18v) explains that in contrast to men who should be learned so as to contribute to the well-being of the republics, their princes, and their friends, women had to be educated only to become useful to themselves and their families, since they had nobody to govern but themselves and their children and they were not going to participate in "debates among men". When associated with life in politics, humanist education was strictly male centered. In his letter to Santo Venier, governor of the Venetian Republic, Francesco Barbaro underlined the vital importance of Greek and Latin literature for those who are responsible for the management of the city and he took pride in how "many patricians in our own age I have seen so committed to these *studia humanitatis* that the republic can anticipate from their learning utility and aid no less than those scholars derive pleasure and honor" (King 1986: 42–3).

Domestic vocation and lack of sociability defined female education as less political than that of men, whereas humanist arts and disciplines were conceptualized in terms of gender. Educational programs, such as those of Vergerio and Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, which were intended for male pupils of the upper classes, underline the public and political utility of philosophy and history. According to Piccolomini, "those men alone are perfect who strive to mingle political roles with philosophy", whereas it is advantageous "to know a great deal of history and to train [oneself] in it, so that by following the example of others [one] may know how to seek what is useful and to avoid what is harmful" (2002: 129, 225). Poetry, by contrast, as Vergerio explains, "contributes a great deal to the life and speech of those who study it, nevertheless seems more suited to pleasure" (2002: 53). Pleasure, along with moral enhancement, is often deemed an acceptable goal of women's education as well. Thus, Bruni (2002: 107) suggests poetry, moral philosophy, and religion as the focal point of female education. Interestingly, Bruni's educational program for women includes history, but in a different, feminized form, as a "pleasant reading", disassociated from its public and political dimensions, with "no subtleties to be unraveled, no knotty questions to be untied" (2002: 109). The idea that education serves only individual and domestic objectives and not public goals for women is also adopted by female humanists who often sought to justify their intellectual pursuits. Cassandra Fedele noticed in the mid-fifteenth century that:

> armed with distaff and needle – woman's weapons – I march forth [to defend] the belief that even though the study of letters promises and offers no reward for women and no dignity, every woman ought to seek and embrace these studies for that pleasure and delight alone that [comes] from them.
>
> (Fedele 1983: 77).

Conclusion: ruptures, continuities, and antinomies

Renaissance humanism supplied medieval Christian thought with new gender polarities, reinforcing traditional political and social relations and conceptualizations of human nature. However, there were also voices that challenged the dominant gender discourse. An alternative set of ideas emerged in the so-called pro-woman literature, a genre that flourished in the Italian intellectual landscape around the 1540s. Philogynic views can be traced back in the fifteenth-century courts of northern Italy, or even earlier in the idealized images of Petrarch's Laura and Dante's Beatrice and in Giovanni Boccaccio's *Famous Women*. With the development of printing in the sixteenth century, pro-woman literature expanded, diversified, and became popular, especially among Venetian intellectuals. Pro-woman authors advocated women's intellectual, moral, or physical supremacy and challenged dominant cultural patterns by citing examples of famous women from history or mythology, and offering alternative readings of religious or classical literature to prove their claims. It is worth noting that challenging Aristotle's authority became part of this literary movement. Ortensio Lando (1545), for instance, in his collection of 'paradoxes' included a chapter on "Aristotle's ignorance and wickedness" along one on "the excellence of women over men".

However, rarely did philogynic literature question the contemporary patriarchal system or claim equal participation for women in social and political life. One such pro-woman writer was Lodovico Domenichi who observed that men had deprived women of every social, political, military, and intellectual position by confining them in the home or the convent and excluding them from "the squares, senate, councils and schools" (1549: 81v). Domenichi disrupted Renaissance patriarchal discourse that drew on Aristotle's view of woman as an imperfect male and the biblical identification of woman with original sin by denouncing "the usurpation of women's authority and liberty" as "contrary to the divine justice and natural order", since it does not derive from "some natural necessity neither from divine reason but from custom . . . education, force and some kind of tyrannical violence, from which they can hardly free themselves" (1549: 117v–118r). According to Domenichi it was "ambition, vanity and uncontrolled self-love" that made Greek authors who have been "the most inconsistent and vainglorious people" to falsely believe that men are superior to women, destined only to bear children (1549: 1v).

Scholarship has often seen these ruptures within the dominant gender discourse as a mere rhetorical game, especially on the part of male authors (Kelly 1984). Pamela Benson calls such instances "exercises in paradox: women, like

folly, baldness, and the ass, have not been valued, and the proof that they ought to be is an essay in proving the unprovable" (1992: 2–3). Interestingly, one may argue that even philogynic literature was part of the male-centered humanist domain as another pursuit of male self-fashioning and group identity formation. Indeed, 'defense of women' in literary or ritualized forms emerged as a constitutive of male identity formation in specific environments, such as the courts, the academies, and the Venetian intellectual landscape of the 1540s and 1550s. Although defense of women initially emerged as a key determinant of elite masculinity which drew on medieval courtly love and the knightly tradition, it gradually became a site of rivalry among different social groups of men seeking to negotiate, redefine, and appropriate for themselves an idealized form of civilized masculinity (Dialeti 2011). Women writers, such as the Venetian Moderata Fonte and Arcangella Tarabotti, articulated sharper social criticism of women's established domestic and religious roles than most of their male predecessors by challenging the necessity of marriage and the practice of forced monachization in convents. In the same vein, the Venetian writer Lucrezia Marinella dynamically defended women's excellence by challenging contemporary (e.g. Sperone Speroni, Torquato Tasso, Giuseppe Passi) and classical authors. Aristotle in particular came under her criticism: "But I truly believe that Aristotle was led by scorn, hate, or envy in many of his books, to vituperate and slander the female sex, just as on many occasions he reproved his master Plato" (Marinella 1999: 40). However, their language did not depart from Renaissance male-authored philogynic tradition, in the sense that they did not claim a radically different position for women.

In comparison to the late-eighteenth-century political discourse on citizenship, as appeared in fundamental texts such as the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* (1793), early modern republican thought did not privilege a universality of 'human rights', nor declared 'liberty, equality, and fraternity' for all human beings. In this sense, early modern political rhetoric explicitly illustrated and further enforced existing social hierarchies. However, like Enlightenment discourse on citizenship and democracy, Renaissance political theory was not a coherent set of ideas, but had its own antinomies, tensions, and ruptures. At some risk of simplification, we could discern in Western political thought a genealogy of inclusion and exclusion, which, having its point of departure in classical tradition, took new forms in Renaissance civic humanism, and later in the Enlightenment (Varikas 1992). This exclusionary discourse was primarily produced in terms of gender, social class, place of origin, and age and was increasingly invested with more racial or sexualized references. It has also produced through a set of meaningful dichotomies, between male and female, public and private, inherited liberty and voluntary subjection, reasoned moderation and uncontrolled passion, active and passive, and a stock of essentialized values, such as devotion to the common good, eloquence, and rational thinking, which were conceptualized as particularly male/human. As this essay has attempted to show, civic humanist masculinity was shaped by the social and political elite as part of a self-referential rhetoric, which excluded from the political community by nature

or by convention women (along with certain groups of men, such as youth, the socially inferior, peasants, the population of the Venetian and Florentine states, etc.). In this sense, gender became an organizing principle of Renaissance political subjecthood both as a social practice and as a hegemonic site for the canonization of the male, according to the values of the ruling elite and the intellectuals that surrounded it.

Notes

1 Important works of this 'alternative' literature have been translated into English and published in the well-known series 'The Other Voice in Early Modern Europe', edited by Margaret King and Albert Rabil Jr. and published by the University of Chicago Press and the Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies of the University of Toronto.
2 It is worth noting that Renaissance dialogues did not claim factual accuracy even when they referred to real settings and individuals. Sperone Speroni's implication that even women themselves admit their inferiority was challenged some decades later by the Venetian writer Lucrezia Marinella, who critically observed that "he endeavors to prove that [women] are born to serve men and generated by nature for this purpose. He attempts to show (oh what inventiveness!) that this is the verdict of women themselves" (1999: 136).
3 According to Aristotle, "the male is by nature superior and the female inferior, the male ruler and the female subject. And the same must also necessarily apply in the case of mankind generally; therefore all men that differ as widely as the soul does from the body and the human being from the lower animal . . . these are by nature slaves, for whom to be governed by this kind of authority is advantageous . . . for the male is by nature better fitted to command than the female . . . and the older and fully developed person than the younger and immature . . . for the slave has not got the deliberate part at all, and the female has it, but without full authority, while the child has it, but in an underdeveloped form" (*Pol.* I.2, 1254b10–20; I.5, 1259b1–5; and I.5, 1260a10–15: trans. by H. Rackman, 1932).

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13 The materiality of female agency

Madre María de San José's writings in seventeenth-century New Spain

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María de San José's *Oaxaca Manuscript* is an excellent resource for examining the ideology of 'female inferiority' and the counterforces it generated in early modern Spanish-American colonial texts written by women. Housed at the John Carter Brown Library in Providence, Rhode Island, the manuscript [Spanish Codex 39–41] consists of 1,102 folios measuring 21 cm × 15, divided unevenly into twelve volumes the contents of which were written over a period of three decades (c. 1691–1717). This study examines the materiality of female agency in *Volume I*, also known as the life story or *Vida* of the Augustinian Recollect nun, Madre María de San José (1656–1719, New Spain), and the mechanisms of evading religious/male authority.

Volume I has benefited from the late twentieth and early twenty-first-century imperative in colonial studies to return to the manuscript and use or re-use the skills of paleography to find what edited and printed editions of colonial texts have obscured in their earnest efforts toward canon revision (Restall 2012: 151). For María de San José's *Oaxaca Manuscript*, this imperative has meant two very special things. First, *Volume I* has been published and is being read and researched. It is the only one of the twelve volumes to be so distributed, appearing in 1993 under the title *Word from New Spain: The Spiritual Autobiography of Madre María de San José* (1656–1717). Edited by Kathleen Ann Myers, this critical edition was published by Liverpool University Press and remains the standard edition used to carry out research about Madre María. One consequence of its publication is that *Volume I* has thus far been read from what Stuart Hall (1980b) calls the dominant or hegemonic position.[1] In María's case, dominant positioning refers to the fact that late twentieth-century academia read and largely understood her *Vida* through the looking glass of the preferred meanings that its institutional/political/ideological order imprinted in its investigation. This means that critics in the main have understood it as a highly codified female spiritual autobiography, and we have continued to read it as such. In its published version, we have therefore found a sequential text that holds together, giving us a view of female agency and the evasion of male authority during the early modern period in New Spain.

As to the second portion of the imperative in colonial studies, scholars are now returning to the *Oaxaca Manuscript* and re-using their skills of paleography to find what has been obscured in the earlier efforts toward canon revision. One

of the consequences of revisiting the manuscript has been the application to its decoding of what Stuart Hall calls negotiated positioning (1980a: 137). For Hall, decoding a work using the negotiated approach lets readers acknowledge the hegemonic definitions at work in the process while reserving the right to make a more negotiated examination of the text. Such an approach allows us to decode María's *Vida* in a manner that takes into account the situational level, where we may find exceptions to the hegemonic reading and/or create new ground rules for approaching the text (1980a: 137–8). Adopting Hall's negotiated approach, this essay examines how the materiality of the manuscript of *Volume I* adds to the discussion of female agency and the mechanisms of evading religious/male authority in colonial Spanish America. Before we look at the manuscript itself, however, we should examine Madre María de San José as a female author and the socio-cultural circumstances under which she produced her manuscript.

The socio-cultural context of the *Vida*

Madre María de San José was born Juana Palacios Berruecos on April 25, 1656 on her parents' hacienda outside Tepeaca near Puebla, in the Viceroyalty of New Spain. By age eleven, she was living as a religious ascetic in the family home, and her greatest desire was to enter the convent, a goal for which she had been fighting for twenty-one years. After her father's death in 1667, the family faced great financial hardship. Nevertheless, with the help of her mother and various religious officials, she gathered the necessary dowry, and in 1687, at age thirty-one, became an Augustinian Recollect black-veiled nun in the Convent of Our Lady of Santa Mónica in Puebla.[2]

After taking her final vows of poverty, chastity, obedience, and enclosure in 1688, Madre María performed well the spiritual (prayer and meditation) and worldly duties expected of a religious woman in her position. Nine years later, she had risen to such prominence that Bishop Manuel Fernández de Santa Cruz, the same man who originally rejected her entry into Santa Mónica, chose her and four other nuns for the honor of founding a new Augustinian convent, Nuestra Señora de la Soledad, in Oaxaca. From 1697 on, Madre María lived, worked, and wrote in Oaxaca, where she also became instructor of novices. The Convent of Nuestra Señora de la Soledad served as her home until her death in 1719, and Oaxaca therefore serves as part of the title of the manuscript.

Like other children growing up in late seventeenth-century New Spain, María adopted the religious fervor of her mother. This, along with her natural inclination toward the ascetic life and her great admiration for the Lives of Saints, had a lasting effect on the formation of her character. At age eleven, María was struck by her father's death and reexamined her life, a typical pattern in saints' life stories, where a spiritual state causes a conversion experience. María's conversion occurred one day when, while playing, a swear word left her mouth just as a lightning bolt struck a nearby garden wall, which fell, crushing an animal to death. Shaken, thinking she could easily have died, she ran into the house and sought refuge in her mother's bedroom. There, María had a vision of the Virgin

Mary, who consoled her and had her take her religious vows. For all intents and purposes, then, María became a nun at the age of eleven and her subsequent entry into the convent was just a matter of time.

Because María was a woman in colonial New Spain, she was educated at home, where her mother taught her the proper role of a Catholic woman within the family as well as in contemporary society, along with a little reading and writing in the vernacular.[3] She also learned how to lead a Christian life (*imitatio Christi*) from the Lives of Saints her father and brother read aloud during meals and work periods in the home. Like many young children, particularly girls, María absorbed the contents of the *Flos sanctorum* and other hagiographic works, and played at being martyrs, saints, and nuns.[4] She was particularly attracted to the Rules that Saint Francis of Assisi crafted for Saint Clare and her followers, the religious order the Poor Clares. She even became a Franciscan tertiary prior to entering Santa Mónica. As a young woman, she also read Saint Peter of Alcántara's *Treatise on Prayer and Meditation*, and was attracted by his efforts at religious reform in Spain. Other models include Saint Catherine of Sienna, Saint Rose of Lima, the hermit Saint Anthony of Padua, the bishop of Puebla and mystic Juan de Palaflox, and Saint Ignatius of Loyola, whose *Spiritual Exercises* provided a framework for her prayer.

Women such as María were taught that they were inferior in every way to men. From this early training as well as from other cultural and societal messages throughout their lives, women internalized a deep sense of inferiority, a belief that they were more given to emotion than logic, more deceptive than men, more capable of morally questionable behavior, and therefore in need of a stern, guiding (male) hand. Early in life, that guidance was provided by the father of the family, or another strong male figure such as a grandfather or uncle. In adulthood, the honorable options for these (upper class) women were marriage, the convent, and in some rare cases spinsterhood under the protection of a brother or another male family member. Many women nevertheless surmounted the obstacle of the 'heavy male hand' in their lives, frequently managing their husband's business after his injury or death, running the family home as either wife or single female, or, in the case of those who entered religious orders, becoming a professed nun with responsibilities within the female religious community (Socolow 2015: 79–147).

María de San José chose the convent, where she confronted not only a strong system of female authority but the 'heavy male hand' of her confessors and the Church hierarchy. Her accounts in volumes two through twelve of the *Oaxaca Manuscript* portray her six confessors as representing a spectrum between extreme harshness and true spiritual intimacy, and their relationships, while often tortuous, also provided the spiritual help she had sought before entering the convent (Myers 1993: 2–28). On the one hand, María welcomed the guidance of her confessors, for she repeatedly stated that she feared for her soul without it. On the other hand, this relationship was often fraught with difficulties, and disagreements abounded revolving around mental prayer, penance, complete confession, and other issues. One of the main causes of disagreement between nun and confessor during the

late seventeenth century in Spanish America was the role of writing. During María's lifetime, women were not permitted to write, except at the invitation of a male figure of authority such as a confessor. Nevertheless, female writing did occur outside this relationship, and both religious and secular women of the colonial era wrote letters, poetry, religious plays, and spiritual autobiography (Franco 1989: 20). However, publication and survival of a woman's texts after her death usually depended on the cooperation of the confessor and Church authorities. María knew that failure to recognize the absolute male authority of the Church could have resulted in her not being permitted to write at all, in the destruction of all her writings, and/or in her appearance before the Inquisition under the guise of the enforcement of orthodoxy (Arenal and Schlau 1989: 16).

Volume I is the product of just such a struggle between a female author and church authorities that at times approved her writings, at others disapproved and condemned them to destruction, while in the end commanding they be rewritten. Prior to 1700, María had written an account of her life before Santa Mónica, at the urging of the bishop of Puebla, Manuel Fernández de Santa Cruz, and her then confessor, Padre Manuel Barros. This may be the account found in *Volume XII* (Myers 1993: 34). If this is true, then the earlier *Vida* had to date from prior to 1696, because Barros was confessor to María from approximately 1691 until 1696 (Myers 1993: 199). This record of her spiritual life came to the attention of diocesan officials when it was shared by both Barros and Santa Cruz. With Barros' death, some of María's notebooks fell into the hands of religious colleagues of the bishop, who were uncomfortable with many aspects of her writing, especially the details she gave about mental prayer and her expressed desire to achieve sainthood. We can imagine, perhaps, a power struggle among diocesan officials, after which several of her notebooks were apparently destroyed. Despite this setback, Juan de Cárdenas, María's next confessor after 1696 at Santa Mónica, urged her to continue documenting her life in written form (Myers 1993: 7). In 1700, Fray Gonzalo Piñero became María's new confessor in Puebla. He also urged her to continue writing down her experiences prior to her entry into the convent.

With the arrival in Oaxaca of Plácido de Olmedo, María's confessor from 1702 until 1709, veneration for her spiritual experiences moved beyond the confines of the convent and a few diocesan officials. The bishop of Oaxaca, Angel Maldonado, and Plácido de Olmedo were both so impressed with María's *imitatio Christi* that they gathered her writings, even attempting to find lost *quadernos* (notebooks) that had been turned over to Church officials under Juan Cárdenas. When the notebooks did not reappear, Plácido de Olmedo charged María with rewriting the ten missing *quadernos*, which are now known as *Volume I*. As Myers aptly points out, *Volume I* is special because it "presents the emotions and events of her years at home from the stance as a nun who has achieved recognition by local clergy for her strong religious vocation" (1993: 6). In other words, this perspective creates an autobiographical lens through which the volume can attain coherence and tell María's story.[5]

Rhetorical stratagems of the weak and the strong

Read from the dominant or hegemonic position of which Hall speaks, María's *Vida*, like the life stories of other religious women during the colonial period, is the product of Catholic confession. A nun would first write down *cuentas de conciencia*, or notes about what she wished to confess, and then, confessor and confessant would speak, within the confines of the sacrament of Penance. During these conversations, the priest, following the manuals of confession used during the period, such as that of Ignatius of Loyola, directed the discourse in directions deemed beneficial to the spiritual development of the female penitent. Afterwards, the confessant would write down her confession, which consisted of an examination of her entire life up to that point, within the narrative framework of the hagiography (Bilinkoff 2005: 31). María's *Volume I* follows this formula closely. In it she shows her pre-convent life to have been founded upon heroic virtue, which is defined as the four cardinal virtues of Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude, and the three theological virtues of Faith in Good, Hope in eternal life, and Charity or faith in action (Myers 1993: 8).

Figure 13.1 *Volume I* (86v–87r) of the *Oaxaca Manuscript*

Source: Courtesy of the John Carter Brown Library, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island

María's narrative persona, I/María, is both protagonist and narrator throughout *Volume I*:

> My Lord and God, it is not the least of the mercies that You grant me now and have granted me before in accepting this confession of mine, which gives a written account of my entire life and of the mercies You have granted me; so that if he so wishes, the one who thus commands me may know and have record of the ingratitude and wretchedness with which I have responded in the course of my life to the benefits I have received from Your most liberal hands, unworthy as I am of a single one, working only to hinder them in the wretched life I had chosen and letting myself be carried away by the stream of my passions. But in the end, Your mercy prevailed, so that loving me with it, You might bear with me and await me.
>
> (Myers and Powell 1999: 8–9)[6]

María authorizes both herself and her account because she is eyewitness to and participant in the events she recounts, while she presents her entire life as the product of God's will. The contents of this passage point to what Electa Arenal and Stacy Schlau called the two types of rhetoric prevalent in Early Modern Spanish American female spiritual autobiography: stratagems of the weak, seen here in the insistence on her wretchedness and unworthiness, and stratagems of the strong, demonstrated in her being chosen by God for salvation (1989: 29). In other words, María's life story is a good example of the double-voiced text in which the writing subject develops a rhetorical strategy that allows her to comply with the demands of her addressees, that is, the male hierarchy of the Church who expected submission and obedience, while also communicating a sense of identity independent from the authority these men wielded (Showalter 1981: 204).

The frequent use of stratagems of the weak throughout the text connotes a writing subject who submits to the expectations of the patriarchy. Revolving around what Stephen Greenblatt calls the three insecurities of early modern Europe, sex, sustenance, and salvation (1990/2007: 29), María's self-portrait is that of a morally deficient woman, a sinner who fears eternal damnation without the guidance of her (male) confessor. She repeats such statements as "I am weak", "I do not know", "I am nothing but a vile worm", "I am a sinner", and "I cannot write". She also suffers several visions of the devil, who manifests himself as a naked, dark-skinned mulatto, suggesting her insecurity with not only her sexual urges but also the changing demographics of the society in which she lived. Perhaps her greatest fear is that the devil is deceiving her by making her think she is talking to God when, in fact, she is communicating with him. Her expressions of struggle with such ambiguities signify to the authoritarian male reader that she is a woman who lacks self-confidence, as she lives in constant fear of losing her soul.

Woven throughout the discourse of *Volume I*, however, are also stratagems of the strong, rhetorical techniques used by María to characterize herself as an

exceptional woman chosen by God to achieve great works here on Earth. Using stratagems of the strong in *Volume I* provides María with the means to craft an independent identity for herself despite the restrictions imposed on women writing. María thereby works around the censorship of self-expression, the silencing of women and other pressures of the patriarchy during her years in religious life. While there are many excellent examples in her *Vida*, I would like to concentrate on two that show clearly how she subverted the power of the Church.

The most important stratagem of the strong in María's text is the claim that her entire life had been prophesied by God; He chose her to save souls, a role reserved primarily for male religious. She claims that God is the true author of her life (and, consequently, her *Vida*) and presents herself as his obedient servant. In other words, she vests herself with God's authority, as she claims in her *Vida* that from the moment the thunderclap struck, God took María into his hands, and made her his bride through the taking of monastic vows. María implies that the rest of her life, the quest to enter the convent and her religious experience, was simply the logical consequence of following God's instructions in this life-changing event. In fact, María describes a vision in which she saw the inside of the cloister in which she was meant to live, although its layout did not match any convent she had thus far visited. Later, we learn that it was the interior of Santa Mónica, suggesting this is where she was destined to enter religious life (Myers 1993: 143).

The second most important stratagem of the strong is the deep mystical relationship with God into which María enters happily and willingly:

> And so every time I set my eyes upon His Majesty [in a painting in her home], it was a dart or an arrow that wounded my heart. And I felt in it a fiery flame by which I would be melted and undone, desiring only to be united with this Lord . . .
>
> (Myers and Powell 1999: 29).

As a soul chosen by God ("*predilecta de Dios*", in her words), María communicates with Him through mental prayer:

> At this time, His Majesty communicated to me greater light and clarity in prayer than before, because I had greater knowledge of the great deeds of Our Lord God and of my own misery and wretchedness; and, thus, I understood the favors that the Lord granted me at this time by His great mercy alone.
>
> (Myers and Powell 1999: 41)

Direct communication with God placed María at risk for persecution by the Inquisition. Yet, she persisted in claiming that she understood exactly what God told her, without the need for interpretation by a priest or the Church.

Such claims circumvented the control of religious women by the male authority of priests and the Church hierarchy. As Myers states, these claims also reveal a persistent undercurrent of self-assertion (1993: 34). Ironically this stratagem

of the strong worked for María because, as her biographer wrote years later, she was always willing to confess these matters and verify their orthodoxy (Myers and Powell 1999: 276–7). Assured of salvation and privy to knowledge that mere mortals (such as confessors) could not know, María wrote herself into the discourse of the *Vida* as a strong woman, an agent, who in cooperation with God chose a life of absolute humility and insignificance to reap the ultimate reward, an elevated place in heaven next to God.

In a particularly poignant scene, we witness María's assured salvation when God sends her a vision in which the devil appears holding a book in which all her sins are recorded. God wipes the book clean, effectively pardoning her before she enters Santa Monica (Myers 1993: 190). Perhaps to indicate her agency, she evades male authority, needing neither Church nor priest because, as she states, quoting fray Nicolás Corona, only future saints receive such *maravillas*. What is important for us to understand is that María portrays herself as the *perfecta religiosa* at the same time as she demonstrates her agency and studies her identity. María managed the double-voiced rhetoric in her discourse sufficiently well to forestall any negative consequences of such controversial content. In fact, Plácido de Olmedo and others supported her within the Church hierarchy, and even promoted her case for beatification at the diocesan level (Myers 1993: 19).

Manuscript materiality and female agency

The negotiated approach to reading espoused by Hall allows us to acknowledge the hegemonic definitions at work in our reading of María's *Vida*, as seen in the previous section. It also makes possible another more nuanced examination of the text in which we take into account the situational level of the *Oaxaca Manuscript* and create new ground rules for approaching it. One new approach is the examination of the materiality of *Volume I*, which reinforces and adds to the agency, identity study, and evasion of male authority detected in the dominant approach to reading María de San José's text. This section of the study centers on how language or discourse and materiality work together at different levels of semiosis, creating additional meaning (Bjorkvall and Karlsson 2011: 148–49). As we return to the manuscript and use paleography to uncover that which has been obscured by previous editions (Restall 2012: 151), we remove *Volume I* from its conventional critical editions and allow it to present itself not as the cohesive totality we believe it to be, but rather as the fragmented work that it, in fact, is, covered with a plethora of editorial marks that reveal much about María's effort to secure the survival of her writings by complying with the dictates of her male supervisors while also conveying certain messages about the process of censorship or her disapproval of external directives to readers other than Church authorities.[7] Some of the issues covered are the intertextuality of *Volume I* with other volumes of the manuscript, the question of whether or not the *quadernos* are the thematic unit of the text, the various systems of enumeration, María's handwriting and the use of corrections, and marginal notes.

As Kathleen Myers reminds us in her introduction, even though *Volume I* can stand on its own, it also represents the intricate weaving of information by María from various other volumes. For instance, María states that her writing dialogues with other notebooks: "in another notebook I am now writing down what I am doing in the convent" (1993: 6–7). Myers believes María is referring here to *Volume IV*. Such intertextuality between *Volume I* and other volumes of the *Oaxaca Manuscript* undermines the impression we have of *Volume I* as a totality and reveals this volume as a dialogue with other texts. Perhaps this was an effort on María's part to secure the survival of her manuscripts by including clues about the existence of other works. In the event these works got lost or censured, she wanted to send a clear message that external interventions into her writings would not, in the end, be able to eliminate them all.

It is also important to note that we should not consider María's manuscript as providing access to a privileged 'original'. As deGrazia and Stallybrass point out about Shakespeare, we should not assume that there is an ideal original behind the text, a preferred version of events that its author meant to communicate (1993: 256–7). Instead we are better served to depart from the idea that texts like *Volume I* are versions of events, not the definitive version but the version we have.[8] Knowing that there are versions of events gives us a glimpse into María's struggle with Church authorities and makes us aware of her possible message that the surviving version is not the one she wanted to write but the one approved by Church officials. We are therefore in the position of having to figure out what an appropriate reading process for Maria's *Volume I* will consist of.

The manuscript of *Volume I* is composed of ten *quadernos* or notebooks. As Myers points out, the confessor parceled out both ink and notebook, "a unit of three or four large sheets of paper folded into quartos, thus producing either twelve or sixteen folios and twenty-four or thirty-two pages per *quaderno* . . . when filled [they] were returned [to the confessor]" (1993: 5–6), who then doled out more. The quaderno is therefore considered by critics to be a significant unit of composition for María, a space and page-division into which the colonial, female writing-subject divided and wrote down her spiritual experiences. In María's case, however, the role of the *quaderno* is not as clear as it is usually assumed.

In *Volume I*, the number of pages per *quaderno* varies between fourteen and twenty-eight, with no blank pages. We do not know if any pages were removed prior to or after compilation. Nor do we know who determined the length of the various *quadernos* though it was likely her confessor. More importantly, however, María's *quadernos* are not the distinct thematic units we might imagine them to be. In fact, nine out of her ten *quadernos* end in mid-sentence and continue the material from their last page on the first page of the following notebook. The *quaderno* doled out by her confessor did not mark the pace of the nun's writing as Myers has suggested since each *quaderno* does not contain the beginning, middle, and end of a distinct event. Examination of the manuscript allows us to see this more easily than the published edition, where the ten *quaderno* numbers appear bracketed within the text.

This material aspect of the manuscript of *Volume I* 'undoes' the impression of a neatly divided text given to us by Myers' division of the material into what she calls five "*quadernos*" (Myers 1993: 20). More like chapters, these newer, artificial divisions, titled thematically, I-Childhood and Conversion, II-Beginning Anew, III-First Attempts to Enter the Convent, IV-Family Tensions, and V-The Convent of Santa Mónica, bypass the messiness of the numerous unfinished segments and the fragmentary nature of some of María's entries, while erasing signals about the writing restrictions she was experiencing that she may have included in her work.

The challenge to *Volume I* as a consecutive text is further supported by the presence of other systems of enumeration that, while absent from the critical edition, appear amid the folio numbers, thereby muddying the neatness of the *quaderno* as a unit. For example, on 3R, the number 2 appears and its presence cannot be explained as page two of the *quaderno* since this would be page five. On 5R, the number 3 refers to something besides the page number, since this would be page nine. Numerous additional examples appear throughout the ten *quadernos* of the volume. The presence of these numbers indicates that María probably wrote pages in groups of four, and that she or someone else numbered the first group of four with the number 1, the second group of 4 with the number 2, and so on. Therefore, for *Volume I*, the preferred unit of writing in fact consists of four consecutive pages, not an entire *quaderno*. Furthermore, as we examine the units of four grouped pages, the pen lifts and differences in ink show that María often wrote in much smaller units, sometimes only several lines long, representing a thought or fragment of memory about events (8V). 71R–72R in section 2 of *quaderno* 6 in fact consists of several separate, though related, fragments treating María's mother's recuperation in Puebla. Other examples in the text abound.

The humanistic cursive handwriting in *Volume I* indicates that at times María wrote with ease, filling up entire pages with even margins (1R), as if her thoughts were flowing well or she were copying from an earlier, edited version. In fact, an earlier version of María's life story can be found in *Volume XII* of the *Oaxaca Manuscript*. Undated but thought to originate from between 1695 and 1700, this is the version that was considered lost, along with other important texts by María. Dated 1703, *Volume I* was written at the behest of Plácido de Olmedo because he wanted María to round out her writings by including information about her life prior to entering Santa Mónica. In other words, he asked her to rewrite *Volume I* from memory to have as much of her life as possible recorded in writing. However, recent studies have noted a close intertextuality between *Volume I* and the life story in *Volume XII*, opening the possibility that she was at least able to consult notes on, if not the contents of, the earlier version.[9]

While there is no concrete proof, such even margins and careful script (1R) could also mean María wrote down the words someone dictated to her. It was common practice for confessors to dictate what their female penitents wrote down. At other times, however, María squeezes letters in at the end of lines (4R), as if her thoughts were running away with her. It is also possible that she had more to say than would fit in the allotted space. Or perhaps she had to fit a certain

amount of information into a limited number of pages so they would match up with a subsequent section already written and numbered. On 2V she appears to leave open a space to which she could return later, but does not. Differences in handwriting both between and within the four-page segments tell us a bit about María, the writer at work: where she started a fresh session of writing, or where she wrote more rapidly, or more slowly, or where she wrote poorly perhaps from tiredness or illness. The handwriting in the manuscript shows us that *Volume I* is a more emotionally and discursively textured work than we might have thought. Within the restricted environment in which she wrote, María sought and found ways to escape and to show herself rather than conform to producing the perfectly written page.

The manuscript also displays the mechanics of the editing process that was brought to bear on *Volume I*, namely material that was added or moved, repeated or crossed-out words, fixed and unfixed errors, as well as marginal commentary. María wrote a substantial number of corrections in her life story, many of which were made to resolve grammatical ambiguity. The most interesting editorial marks, however, are those that alter language to deliver more accurately the message that María is trying to communicate. A particularly good example is the passage in which she narrates her return to the hacienda after Bishop Santa Cruz rejected her entry into Santa Mónica. She immediately reminds the reader, "His Majesty [God] told me that these writings were in no way mine, but rather entirely His and that I was no more than an [add lowly] instrument" (Myers and Powell 1999: 55) or "*. . . de como me dijo Su Magestad que no era nada mio sino todo obra suia i que io no era mas de un [add vil] instrumento*" (103V). Without the added "lowly" or "vil", the stratagem of the weak would not function quite as well here to counteract the image of the privileged and saintly woman whose life is authored by God. María here, as elsewhere in the text, weakens her position to placate the ecclesiastical reader who, at this point, might advocate for its destruction and her silencing based on the development of strong female agency.

Editorial marks in *Volume I* also point to the writing subject's motivation at key moments in the text. For instance, in describing the terrible conflict with her sister, Francisca, María writes a margin note to her confessor revealing how ill at ease she is with discussing the topic: "As soon as you see this quaderno please burn it along with the others, so there remains no memory of me" (Myers and Powell 1999: 46).[10] This note does not appear in the English translation at all. In the 1993 edition, María's desperate plea finds itself in a small endnote (Myers 1993: 179). Neither of these scenarios expresses the same message as the tortured handwriting seen in the margin of the manuscript page (see Figure 13.1). Of course, there are many more examples to be cited, a project being pursued by a new generation of scholars.

These editorial marks, as well as omissions, page changes, margin notes, and so forth, signal a writing subject who materially indicated agency. María wrote, edited, and re-wrote, giving much thought to the effect of the final message upon the reader. She knew how to play compliance to her subservient role as a woman against resistance to Church authority, seen not just in the discourse but also in

the editorial marks of the volume. In a sense, many of the editorial marks form part of her rhetorical strategy that allowed her to comply with the demands of her addressees, the male hierarchy of the Church who expected submission and obedience (stratagems of the weak), while also communicating a sense of independent identity (stratagems of the strong). What I hope to have shown here through a negotiated approach to *Volume I* is that the materiality of the *Oaxaca Manuscript* supports the agency that allowed María to challenge the Church hierarchy and societal patriarchy in the discourse of the text. As Bjorkvall and Karlsson state, "editing is the stuff of agency" (2011: 148). We can therefore conclude that the materiality of the manuscript of María de San José's *Volume I* communicates the shades and hues of agency that the language alone cannot.

Notes

1 Stuart Hall espouses three possible approaches or means a reader can use to position him/herself when decoding a text: the dominant or hegemonic, the negotiated, and the oppositional. The dominant or hegemonic positioning refers to the reader who takes the codes and connotated meaning that have been encoded in the text and accepts them for what they directly signify (1980a: 27).
2 All biographical information on María de San José is from the introductions of *Word from New Spain* (Myers 1993) and *A Wild Country Out in the Garden* (Myers and Powell 1999).
3 Susan Socolow provides information about the life, culture, and customs during María's lifetime (2015: 79–147).
4 Myers depicts María's childhood in *Neither Saints nor Sinners* (2003: 73).
5 This and other aspects of female autobiography are explained in *Women, Autobiography* by Smith and Watson (1998: 3–52).
6 All quotes in English are from Myers and Powell (1999).
7 In addition to *Word from New Spain* (1993), the other available critical editions of selections of María de San José's works are the translation *A Wild Country Out in the Garden* (1999) and *La autobiografía espiritual de la Madre María de San José* (Ortiz et al. 2011).
8 This is particularly important in view of the research now being done at the University of Alabama on the *Vida* in *Volume XII*.
9 For more details, see *The María de San José Project* at www.ua.edu.
10 "*Luego que vuestra Paternidad vea este quaderno lo queme con los demas para que no quede memoria de mí*" (87R).

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14 Woman reclaimed

Subverting feminine exclusion in the works of María de Zayas in seventeenth-century Spain

Xabier Granja Ibarreche

Introduction

María de Zayas, one of the few early modern Spanish female writers, brought society's attention to the hardships women endured in patriarchy with literary works that constitute a social critique of excessive behavior among royal courtiers of seventeenth-century Spain. In her collections of short stories *Novelas Amorosas y Ejemplares* (*Enchantments of Love*, 1637) and *Desengaños Amorosos* (*Disenchantments of Love*, 1649), the young Lisis organizes and moderates a *soiree* in which guests tell stories about violent actions committed by various noblemen. In these tales, Zayas demonstrates how socialization perpetuates aggressive masculine models, which men internalized and acted on, thus falling short of the ideal of self-control that seventeenth-century humanist nobility was expected to adopt in all aspects of life and not merely use it as a façade of social gentility. Zayas' antagonists are notable for the extreme and uncontainable ire they express against women as a critique of the courtly masculinity and its dominant role in Spain. This gender hierarchy originated in early modern Italy, where books known as conduct manuals imbued Aristotelian notions about the 'superior male' and 'inferior female' natures. These works interpreted Aristotle's theories in ways that had a twofold result: first, by justifying male superiority and stressing the shortcomings of females, conduct manuals fostered an environment in which male Spaniards ultimately had little respect for women; second, such manuals created an expectation for noble and educated males to cultivate and exhibit self-control at all times. Overwhelmed by the pressure of extreme social standards and the demand for unrelenting and daily self-control, men often took their anger out on women secretly in private encounters. Zayas was familiar both with the conduct manuals and the subversive misconduct of male courtiers that caused this disconcerting and destabilizing social phenomenon. In her stories, she attempts to show that a restructuring of gender roles may be the answer to this social crisis. To make her point she uses a twofold strategy: first, she subverts the notion of male superiority by undermining men's claims to exclusive and natural moral strength and self-control through gruesome descriptions of the violent acts they commit against women. Second, she implies that women hold the key to social recovery by highlighting the morality of her female characters, whom she represents as

chaste Christian archetypes. This essay, therefore, explores women's exclusion from sociopolitical authority as represented in Zayas' work, which localizes the causes of social decay in the ideological inferiority of women in early modern Spanish patriarchy and proposes that allowing women to harness said authority could repair gender relations, rectify masculine excess, and propel Spain towards a prosperous and egalitarian future.

Courtly identity was the culmination of a lengthy process in the development of hegemonic masculinities that had their roots in antiquity and evolved through time. Aristotle, for example, a fourth century B.C. Greek philosopher, influenced by the idea of natural sexual complementarity, postulates that male is to female as form is to matter and that the male, being the one bestowing form to matter, is superior to the female who possesses only matter.[1] This Aristotelian principle informed the scientific interpretation of anatomical and physiological differences, which scientists have since used as basis for theories on pedagogically significant disparities in temperament according to gender. The concept of female inferiority is solidified by Aristotle's comparison of female physiology to that of a boy and his conclusion that "a woman is as it were an infertile male", because just like a boy "the female, in fact, is female on account of inability of a sort, viz. it lacks the power to concoct semen" (*Generation of Animals* [GA], 728a18–20).[2] These assertions have significant ideological inferences, as in chapter 12 of *Politics* Aristotle argues that the woman's subjection to man is natural and comparable to the subjection of slave to master and of child to father, since they all "possess the various parts [and capabilities] of the soul, but possess them in different ways", which is responsible for the distinguishing characteristics each has by nature (*Politics*, 1260a10–15). The justification of man's unquestionable right to rule over slaves and women is based on the principle that "the slave is wholly lacking the deliberative element; the female has it but without full authority" (*Pol.* 1260a11).[3] Possession of authority for Aristotle designates natural hierarchy, suggesting that superior physical power entails a natural authority that establishes the rule of man over woman and shows that "the male . . . is by nature more expert at leading than the female" (1259a41). Therefore, Aristotle concludes that the male is made by nature to rule and the female to be ruled (1254b10–14).[4] Based on these assertions as well as others describing various deficiencies of the female nature, Aristotle is compelled to classify woman as "deformed male" (GA 737a28), which has, in turn, resulted in several scholars branding him as misogynist (Witt and Shapiro 2017; Freeland 1994: 145–6). Others, however, have disputed this characterization, pointing out that for Aristotle neither gender can exist or reach happiness outside the community with the other. Furthermore, "the only 'disability' Aristotle finds in the female is her inability to ignite a pregnancy" (Dobbs 1996: 80), which implies no more than the fact women are not men. Whether Aristotle is a misogynist or not may be a matter of intense debate today, but the bottom line is that the general impression created by his statements has historically been interpreted as supporting the inferior nature of women and, as such, has been used throughout the past centuries and up to the modern era to reinforce the

ideological oppression of women, their exclusion from political life, and even their violent treatment at the hands of superior, male masters.

Aristotelian discourse influenced several philosophers such as Galen of Pergamon, whose theory of humorism was used in medieval and early modern Spain to explain female emotionality as a consequence of humor imbalance. This discourse, in turn, informed the debate on violence that in the early sixteenth century led Antonio de Montesinos to protest in a 1511 speech the inhuman treatment of enslaved people in the New World and question the Spaniards' right to enslave American natives.[5] His efforts, augmented by the tireless activism of Bartolomé de las Casas in protecting the 'Indians', resulted in the Laws of Burgos, a humanitarian legal code that fueled discourses of gender and ethnic equality in Spain. In *The Civilizing Process* (1939), Norbert Elias details social changes in courtiers' practices since the Middle Ages and identifies ways in which refined urbanites may interact amongst themselves. His work identifies how the renaissance courtly ideal that privileges the exercise of constant self-control becomes progressively more dominant. In *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, Steven Pinker further examines how this historically persistent standard, despite a certain evolution of manners, "inculcated an ethic of self-control that made continence and propriety second nature" (Pinker 2011: 592) for noble men and women. Even more significantly, Pinker attributes the responsibility of promoting this distancing from medieval violence to the newly urbanized governments that encouraged aristocracy to adopt these refined comportments.

Emphasis on displaying moderation in all types of conduct during the fifteenth century prompted the devaluation of physical strength in the medieval construct of masculinity. Extolled until then as the primary Aristotelian characteristic of men and used to justify male social dominance, physical violence in the fifteenth century begins to be considered contrary to the ideal of self-control, which was gaining social prestige amongst urbanites. A new tendency to self-analyze surges and "the coercion exerted by people on one another increases, the demand for good behavior is raised more emphatically" (Elias 1978: 79). Restraint, disseminated through conduct manuals like Baldesar Castiglione's *Il Cortegiano* (*The Book of the Courtier*, 1528), Giovanni Della Casa's *Il Galateo* (*Galateo: The Rules of Polite Behavior*, 1558) and Lucas Gracián Dantisco's *Galateo Español* (*Spanish Galateo*, 1582), establishes a renewed social harmony that has a profound impact on the European elites and serves as a model for lower classes. These manuals, circulating throughout the continent in the midst of an urban expansion, converge in the distancing of a violent nature. In doing so, they rearticulate social codes of cultural hegemony and reveal a new virile archetype that rejects medieval confrontation as it integrates within the newly refined and civilized Spain. Castiglione's *Il Cortegiano* shows its Aristotelian influence when the guest Gaspar refers to "your friend Aristotle, the old Courtier" (283). Various references to the ancient philosopher conflate the search for courtly perfection with Aristotelian approval: Ottaviano emphasizes the unlikeliness that "Aristotle and Plato would have scorned the name of perfect Courtier, for we clearly see that they performed the works of Courtiership" (281). Another interlocutor, Gaspar Pallavicino,

argues that "(as you know is the opinion of very wise men) man resembles form, and woman matter; and therefore, just as form is more perfect than matter, – nay, gives it its being – so man is far more perfect than woman" (182). Despite misinterpreting Aristotle's point, it conveniently works to justify Castiglione's idea of the advantages males enjoy in society due to their perceived superiority. The courtly themes and literary style in Zayas' stories suggest that she, along with most Spanish nobles, was familiar with literary works like *Il Cortegiano* and by extension with the Aristotelian paradigm presented therein. However, Zayas reverts the expected concept of female inferiority due to woman's natural status as deformed male to transform it into a criticism of the ideological inferiority of women. Through Filis, one of the narrators, Zayas counters that "I am not mistaken in that men out of fear and envy deprive women of letters and arms, as Moors do with Christians who serve where there are women, making them eunuchs to be safe" (231).[6]

Short stories: *Desengaños Amorosos*

Despite the profound influence that Castiglione's *Il Cortegiano* had on early modern Spain, Zayas shows that its precepts are constantly infringed upon in life. In her second volume of short stories, *Desengaños Amorosos*, Zayas condemns men who imprison, rape, poison, or torture women as they succumb to their violence in graphic scenes depicting agonies such as eye removals, bleedings to death, stabbings, or fatal thrusts that leave little to no chance of recovery for the victim and redemption for the perpetrator (Vollendorf 2001). In *La Más Infame Venganza* (*The Most Infamous Vengeance*), with Lisis' guest Lisarda as narrator, a story about rape and assassination shows how men used women as weapons to punish unacceptable violence in other males, yet all they achieve is an even harsher control, silencing, and exploitation of those women. The nobleman Carlos has intercourse with chaste Octavia under the pretense that he will marry her, while his ulterior motive is to gain rights to her dowry. Once he spends her riches, Carlos breaks his promise of marriage and moves on to Camila, whose greater wealth he manages to secure only after marrying her. Octavia's brother Juan avenges her honor but employs a problematic method: he rapes Camila to dishonor Carlos. Both noblemen embrace an aggressive masculine identity that is far from courtly expectations: Carlos' materialistic drive and Juan's vengeful motivations constitute authoritative excesses, leading them to repressive acts. Through these "representations of violence, Zayas particularizes the prevailing baroque sentiment of cultural decadence by turning it into a protest of the treatment of women in society" (Vollendorf 2001: 41).

Octavia rejects Carlos' sexual approaches as required by socially established proper female modesty. His insistence prompts her to defend herself when, exasperated, she criticizes "you bemoan ingratitude and cruelty towards you, not considering it is I who would suffer them if I were to do what you ask of me with little regard for my honor" (177). Zayas showcases Octavia's impeccable morality as a way for Carlos to learn restraint: she convinces him to wait two years before he can enjoy her body in matrimony. Her lesson fades and his patience soon gives

in, corrupting Octavia into fulfilling his carnal desire by falsely claiming "I will give you, not once but a thousand times, my word that I will be your husband" (178). Zayas reprimands Octavia for her overconfident conduct which is soon revealed to be a fatal error: the initial conciliatory trust and affection between the two gives way to Carlos' sexual force and his desire to dominate. His lust and opportunism make him lose interest in Octavia, break his promise to marry her, and pursue Camila for her wealth. His outrageous behavior ruins the women close to him: he dishonors and abandons Octavia, only to move on to exploit Camila, marrying her and then killing her, when no longer valuable to him. His materialism drives him to become violent with women to get what he wants from them and gain control over their bodies and resources. Nothing stops him – he even has his own sister imprisoned to steal her dowry. In his excessive and self-serving behavior, he devalues both the women as persons and the institution of marriage as a vehicle for masculine control and material enrichment. The narrator solidifies this point with a caustic remark: "[Camila] was made beautiful by the more than fifty thousand ducats she had as dowry, which Carlos wished to own" (187). The denigration of Camila as a woman starts when Carlos spurns her as a wife. Bored with her, "he did not allow her to eat or sleep around him, nor did he talk to her more than absolutely necessary, making Camila live as a martyr" (195). In the meantime, Camila is also raped by Juan, who, in upholding his brotherly duty to Octavia, chooses to diminish and punish Camila instead of challenging Carlos for dishonoring his sister. But a woman's rape does not go unpunished, especially when she has been divested from her wealth, and, so, Camila, after losing both her material value and her honor, is murdered by Carlos, who jumps on the opportunity to eliminate her annoying presence from his life. Lisarda's denouncement of the situation that "what killed her, as I say, was nothing other than Carlos' cruelty" (197) further cements the depiction of Camila as a symbol of women's suffering at the hands of men who trivialize female personhood due to their distorted Aristotelian concept of women's inferior nature.

The conclusion of this tale highlights the necessity for women to seek reparations, like Octavia does, by demanding that her brother reinstate their familial honor. Zayas emphasizes that "if all women avenged offenses like Octavia there would not be so many mocked and offended [women]" (189) and blames women for their naiveté. Yet, men avenging women's honor is a complicated issue. Octavia's brother Juan, for example, in attempting to avenge his sisters' honor, violates Camila, flouting the courtly model of moderate behavior: Juan dishonors Carlos "by taking his wife's honor as he dishonored [him] by sullying [his] sister's honor" (193). Juan's decision to harm Carlos by defiling his wife shows how important it was for him to harm his enemy in the cruelest possible way and how little he cared that in the process he ruined an innocent woman. For Juan, women's life is in general of little value and, therefore, he feels at liberty to use a woman to achieve his purpose. His dishonorable action, however, escalates Camila's calamity: his outrage against her enrages Carlos who blames his wife for his lost honor. Not able to bear his disgrace, he eventually poisons and kills her to get rid of her.

In contrast to both Carlos and Juan's unseemly deeds, Zayas showcases the woman's perspective by presenting Camila's behavior as an archetype of Christian morality: a martyr in bedrest disfigured by poison, tortuously awaiting death, while giving exemplary advice to those who seek a spiritual life. Through this conclusion, Zayas manages to concoct a dual gender commentary: one, that men, even when trying to help women and avenge their honor, could not show either self-control or good judgment; and two, that despite male abuse of women, such as Carlos' abuse of Camila, women manage to rise above it and prove to be morally superior to men even in the most trying circumstances. In her tireless defense of women, Zayas ends the tale evoking the idea of Camila as "an apostle, giving a thousand examples and good advice" (195), as she awaits her demise, showing that, even when dishonored, Zayas' female characters rise above their condition and maintain flawless morality.

In *Mal Presagio Casar Lejos* (*Bad Omen of Distant Marriage*), Lisis' guest Luisa recounts the story of Blanca's move to Flanders to marry a prince who used to fornicate repeatedly with a male page, while the king continually abuses Blanca until he cuts her veins leaving her to bleed to death. From the beginning of the story, Zayas foreshadows the disasters that are to happen, alluding to the assassination of Blanca's two other sisters: the oldest, Mayor, is killed with a sword by her husband, who simply wants to get rid of her. The second sister, Leonor, is strangled also by her husband, who uses her hair as rope, because she dared compliment another captain's dutiful honor. Blanca's story was not unique, but, as Marina S. Brownlee shows, "through Blanca, Zayas registers the historical fact of unfortunate betrothal practices, whereby women were promised in marriage with little or no consideration given to anything but the financial and social implications of the union" (2000: 47). Blanca incarnates perfect honor, virtue, and chastity, which are incompatible with the character of the man to whom she was given in marriage. Zayas makes the point that, in these situations, women often opted for institutionalized solitude; stating emphatically that, had Blanca known her sisters' destinies before getting married herself, "without a doubt she would not have it, she would rather become a nun" (339).

Shortly after the nuptials, her husband's comportment changes radically, ignoring his wife, whom Zayas now describes as a helpless "innocent dove". The prince quickly abandons the perfect courtly manners he had put on to seduce Blanca, whose disappointment is magnified by the cruelty of her father-in-law, who threatens to "cut [her] wings" (355) if she does not accept her destiny quietly. Offended by this abuse, Blanca announces her dissatisfaction sparking the ire of her new family until "the prince lost his temper with doña Blanca and abused her, not only with words, but with actions, hurting her so much that it was a miracle she managed to stay alive" (356). Embodying the Aristotelian principle of male physicality as proof of natural dominance, the prince and the king's complete lack of self-control escalates into incidents of violent suppression of women's voices, both in their family and in the court. Marieta, for example, the prince's own sister, who "was held in such low esteem by her husband, as doña Blanca was by the prince" (351), is silenced and tortured to death for expressing her sympathy to Blanca's pleas for help.

Unwilling to allow this abuse to continue, Blanca implores her husband to send her back to Spain to become a nun. In the process, though, she finds her husband in a same-sex encounter with the page Arnesto; outraged by his immorality, she burns the sinful bed in the patio. As punishment for her protest, the king and the prince work together to cut her veins, "so that through such small wounds her soul, covered in blood, would leave that innocent victim" (363). The prince's masculinity, however, is questioned as he is too emotionally unstable to finish the job. By contrast, "the father's law stands strong here, as do misogynist and proprietary attitudes . . . [seeking] to violently erase the feminine" (Vollendorf 2001: 113). This story once again portrays a woman, who is an exemplary Christian, with strong moral values, but is excluded from social authority: combating her unequal status, she demands that the prince rectify his sinful conduct to restore familial honor only to be silenced with a violent and unjustified assassination. Despite her virtue, Blanca meets a sadistic end, through which Zayas censures masculine courtly violence and social apathy towards this ideological inferiority of women of Spanish patriarchy that in principle condemns transgressions against women, but does little to punish them.

In *Estragos que Causa el Vicio* (*Devastation Caused by Vice*), Lisis herself concludes the *soiree* telling the most violent tale in the volume: Dionís has an affair with his sister-in-law, Florentina, but when she makes him suspect his wife Magdalena of adultery, he becomes outraged and murders every living being in his household. This story conveys a final anti-marriage message in its portrayal as a dangerous institution for women, since many are killed before they can reach the safe haven of a convent. After Florentina has an affair with Dionís, her stepsister's husband, she decides to make him abandon her, fooling him into thinking "that his wife stained his honor, because, while he was away from home, she had illicit exchanges with Fernandico" (495). Florentina has her housemaid lead the page Fernando to Magdalena's bedroom one night, half-asleep and half-naked; when Dionís sees him, he murders him on the spot and "was so blinded by the offense that, upon finding his wife, drew his dagger and stabbed her as many times as his indignant rage required" (496). These two deaths are not enough to quench his blood-thirsty rage and, so, Dionís goes into a killing spree, murdering all the household maids, pages, and cooks that come his way. When Florentina, horrified by the carnage, confesses to her trickery, Dionís becomes enraged and assaults her mortally as well, clamoring for the fires of hell to consume her soul and restore the innocent lives he has taken. The Aristotelian description of the ideal household as "a cooperative adventure in which the friendship between the members comes from a common concern for the welfare of the unit" (Saxonhouse 1982: 87) is totally ignored by Spaniard males of the seventeenth century, who, influenced by precepts about inferior females, do not value the life of family women. Dionís' rampant rage, therefore, is used to dramatic effect as a warning of the violence to which men may subject women, allowing Zayas to question in general the sincerity of male concern for familial welfare.

Dionís' failure to exhibit the courtly ideal of self-control is exacerbated by his decision to blame Florentina for everything and avoid taking responsibility for

the murders he committed. Emotionally unstable, he cannot acknowledge his inability to control his aggressive impulses or use rational judgment before reacting so excessively. With this story's "warning of the dangers of men's control over female bodies" Zayas portrays vividly the female oppression that permeated early modern Spanish culture and ends the collection with a final "wave of violence, which is precipitated by a fatal act of misreading an innocent body" (Vollendorf 2001: 91).

Gender transgressions in *Novelas Amorosas y Ejemplares*

Zayas does not just showcase chaste women as examples of a superior morality: in her initial collection of short stories, *Novelas Amorosas y Ejemplares*, some of her female characters represent a concept similar to the Aristotelian principle, that "although the particular acts that manifest virtue in a woman differ from those that manifest virtue in a man, a woman's virtue is of no lower rank than man's" (Dobbs 1996: 82). Zayas transgresses culturally established gender identities with characters we might describe as masculine women who suspend the expected feminine code of conduct and convincingly adopt male characteristics. In *María de Zayas Tells Baroque Tales of Love and the Cruelty of Men*, Margaret Greer concurs with this view, arguing that "a woman can identify with the phallic position, which in patriarchal cultures as we know it signifies possession of authority and knowledge, with the illusion (for either sex) of having the phallus" (2000: 166). Greer's suggestion reinforces the possibility that women can ascend to positions of power by transgressing their gender identity. For theorists like Michael Kimmel (2009: 58–70), this represents a threat to hegemonic masculinity whose representatives could conceivably be substituted by a masculine woman. Zayas echoes this notion when she proclaims that "if in our upbringing, as we are given the chambray in our pillows and drawings in our stretcher, we were given books and tutors, we would be as capable for positions and podiums as men are, and possibly sharper, for we are naturally cool-headed" (160).

In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain, change in gender identity is conveyed through visible signs, mainly clothing and physical appearance. Theatrical comedies were the most frequent examples where spectators could see, unbeknownst to them, the feminine figure under a masculine disguise. Greer plays with this concept comparing dressing up versus dressing *up* (the latter emphasizing man's superior position in society) where the virile garments act as a sort of figurative cloak that satisfies the requisites of both the comedic role and social hierarchy of authority. Christian Grünnagel, elaborating on the topic of gender identity and appearance, concludes that:

> what matters for society to distinguish one gender from another are conventional cultural signs that have little or possibly nothing to do with human anatomy . . . [as] a female body [is] able to incarnate the male ideal of bravery and strength.
>
> (Grünnagel 2013: 42)

This transgression has its limitations: despite women's ability to adopt masculine norms "an anatomical attribute such as a dame's breasts would betray masculinity . . . as fraudulent and would invalidate the mask of a woman dressed as a man" (44). This does not, however, diminish the relevance of female imitation of masculine traits, as "clothes function as identifiers and signifiers, situating both the clothes and their wearers symbolically in some structured universe of status claims and lifestyle attachment" (García 2003: 260). By adopting male garb on occasion, Zayas' women are able to sidestep the ideological inferiority of women that insists on limiting their potential.[7]

In *El Juez de su Causa* (*The Judge for her Cause*), Lisis' guest don Juan narrates the tale of a woman who disguises herself as a soldier and ends up becoming a beloved viceroy for her city. This story subverts both the Aristotelian precept of woman having the deliberative element but not full authority to exercise it as well as the seventeenth-century Spanish refusal to accept that females have any power to demonstrate womanly excellence in military or political affairs. Furthermore, the male narrator is a rarity in Zayas' literary production, as she prefers female voices in this position. The choice may indicate a literary precaution on Zayas' part, aiming at balancing Estela's ascension in the social hierarchy disguised as man: as her ploy is discussed by a masculine narrator, Zayas allows masculinity to preserve its social authority, at least as a narrative voice, and minimizes the controversy that might have erupted upon the book's publication.

The basic theme of the story, Estela and Carlos' controversial marriage, is surrounded by two gender transgressions. First, Claudia attempts to sabotage the two lovers' relationship and, disguised as a page, Claudio, seduce Carlos and take him away from his beloved Estela. Claudia's transformed appearance allows her to approach her prey and gain "his favor to the point that she was the recipient of Carlos' most obscure thoughts" (489), while, at the same time, she attains a much higher social status than she could have ever achieved as a woman. In the second instance, Estela, after her abduction, disguises herself as a soldier with the name Fernando and tries to return to Spain. Unlike Claudia, who only imitates masculine clothing and appearance in an ill-intentioned ruse, for which she is later punished, Estela embodies masculine identity on various levels: in Tunisia, she succeeds in "earning not just fame as a brave soldier, but also the Emperor's grace" (502). After heroically battling in Italy and France she reveals her identity to save Carlos, who is about to be imprisoned because Estela "was nowhere to be found dead or alive, he was accused of having killed her after enjoying her body" (503). Her adoption of masculine traits is so convincing that nobody perceives the transgression until she chooses to reveal her identity. This astounds the emperor so much that since "the Viceroy of Valencia had suddenly died, given the need to send a successor . . . [he appointed] our Estela as Viceroy of Valencia, and don Carlos as her secretary and the happiest man in the world" (504).

Having the young woman rise to viceroy, Zayas promotes her idea that women, given the chance, have both administrative abilities and the authority to rule. Zayas emphasizes the importance of giving women the right to participate in political life by highlighting the disservice done to society that stubbornly

ignores them. In the story, both the ideological inferiority of women and gender inequality are proven unfounded by Estela's "fame that made this marvel known throughout the city, causing amazement to everyone who heard that the viceroy was a woman" (511). The emperor himself was "more astonished than anyone, having seen her perform great deeds; still, unable to believe it to be true, he responded to her letters with congratulations and jewels" (511). The story's ending supports Marina Brownlee's observation that these stories are "not attempting to bring down the patriarchy but to endow it with a greater measure of gender equality" (2000: 71). Zayas' search for female agency and power manifests an early modern woman's efforts to refute the inferior status to which all women had traditionally been relegated, partially due to the authority of Aristotelian principles, and reclaim recognition for her gender as a cultural participant yearning for sociopolitical presence, respect, and authority.

In *La Burlada Aminta y Venganza del Honor* (*The Cheated Aminta and Vengeance of Honor*) Lisis' guest Matilde tells the story of a woman who transgresses her feminine identity in order to avenge the dishonor she had suffered and restore her reputation. Aminta refuses to allow her lover to take point in the situation arguing that, "since I am the one offended, and not you, I alone must avenge myself, as I will not be satisfied unless my own hands restore what I lost to deceit" (236). Her attitude marks a clear contrast with the traditional expectation of the man as protector and defender of female virtue. Yet, despite his insistence to allow him to settle the issue, Aminta remains unrelenting in her resolve, arguing that "since it is I . . . who lost my honor by being loose, I must be the one to recover it with my blood" (238). Disguised as a servant and adopting masculine traits, she executes her target, Jacinto:

> Aminta waited for some time and, seeing that all were asleep and the city silent, entered her enemies' quarters . . . Taking her dagger, she stabbed don Jacinto in the heart two or three times, with such force that his cry and released soul were one and the same.
>
> (245)

Aminta's act is remarkable; she took her own vengeance, instead of perpetuating the stereotype of the weak and defenseless damsel, who needs a man's protection and support in everything. Aminta's bravery and determination in undoing her own grievance and restoring her honor reinforce her exemplary fulfillment of masculine traits which allow her to approach her rapist and execute the sentence that clears her name. Despite having committed a murder, Zayas exonerates her actions: Aminta's revenge fits within the male code of honor and her success is enabled by her imitation of masculine identity. Her gender transgression, however, does more than endow her with manly ascendancy: it protects her from authorities who are looking for two male suspects as she escapes punishment resuming her femininity. This deportment casts a negative light on Aminta's actions, however, as it suggests that there may be no other way than disguise for women to prove their worth. At the same time,

it exposes inherent tensions in the courtly ideal of self-control, as society on occasion demands actions incompatible with it.

In conclusion, Zayas creates a literary space that elevates women's identity to denounce and ultimately subvert male violence as a tool for institutionalized female subjection, which men seem to have built based on misunderstood Aristotelian precepts. Zayas presents both good and bad women, just as she presents good and bad men, implicitly suggesting that one cannot classify all women as inferior and all men as superior. In doing so, Zayas condemns the well-established ideological inferiority of women in Spanish patriarchy and emphasizes that, for women's situation to improve, men's violent attitudes such as those analyzed herein must change, since "men's good will lasts no longer than their appetite does" (507). Most of the violence in Zayas's stories challenges the assumed superiority in men by pointing to their voluntary rejection of Christian and courtly ideals during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which had formed the basis for the construction of masculine identity in early modern society. Moreover, in the epilogue, Lisis concludes the *soiree* demanding "that men change their attitude and language towards women, because if my written defense does not suffice, it will be necessary for all of us women to take arms and defend ourselves against their evil intentions" (509). This call to arms intended for women exemplifies why critics such as Lisa Vollendorf suggest that in these novels "the representations of gender transgression challenge dominant constructions of gender at the same time that they open up space for reconceptualized boundaries of behavior" (2001: 160). It would be simplistic to view these women simply as morally eminent or masculine: they crave authority to become political subjects of equal standing in the patriarchy they inhabit. Octavia and Blanca's chastity demonstrates their moral superiority to their male counterparts. Aminta and Estela's actions uphold not their husbands' honor but their own.[8] These women's virtue demands not only recognition but respect and an equal footing in social, military, and political affairs. Their transgressions call to question a certain ambiguity in the presumed rigidity of the traditional gender dichotomy insufficiently divided between male/masculine and female/feminine and point towards the elasticity of gender identities that forebode the possibility – and for some, the threat – of a more egalitarian Spain.

In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle suggests that a society cannot be happy unless women are happy, too. In *Politics* he also suggests that *kreitton* – being stronger or better – enables men's superiority over women and adds that females, unlike slaves, are able to deliberate despite lacking authority. Consequently, in early modern Spain, where physical strength was progressively disappearing as a marker of authority, it stood to reason that the only difference between male and female was possession of such authority, which could allow women to attain happiness in the form of equal social status.[9] Zayas' work calls for such a social reform and thus validates Magnifico Giuliano's protest in *Il Cortegiano*: "The poor creatures [women] do not desire to be men in order to be perfect, but in order to have liberty and to escape that dominion over them which man has arrogated to himself by his own authority" (183).

Notes

1 Aristotle repeats the idea that the female is inferior to male in various works and numerous times; see, for example, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1148b 32, 1162a; *Politics* 1259b, 7.1335b.
2 All translations of Aristotle's passages are from the Loeb editions of his texts, as listed in the bibliography (Peck 1942; Rackham 1932).
3 For other Aristotelian passages justifying slavery, see *Politics* 1.1259b, 1.1252a; and *Economics* 1.1344a.
4 Aristotle justifies this position asserting that "the male, unless constituted in some respect contrary to nature, is by nature more expert at leading than the female" (1259a41).
5 For the original version of Montesinos' speech, see *Documentos Para el Estudio de la Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina*.
6 All translations of the Spanish texts are the author's unless otherwise noted. Reference page numbers pertain to the original sources.
7 Greer indicates that once gender identity limits are transgressed, "on changing to male dress . . . the woman literally achieves invisibility, for no one sees through the clothes . . . [given that men] . . . rarely see through the masculine exterior" (2000: 202).
8 Rhodes emphasizes this understanding of feminine honor arguing that "when Nise recommends that a noblewoman kill whomever stains her honor, when Lisis insists that the noblewoman esteem her honor and act to defend it, when the Virgin Mary contends to Beatriz that Christ loves only women who defend their honor, the author provides evidence that honor is theirs for the defending, that it belongs to them" (2011: 163).
9 Dobbs mentions a similar aim in Aristotle's work, explaining that "women must participate in the government of the polis if they are to cultivate the virtue of practical wisdom" (1996: 87).

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15 Women and French democracy, 1789–1804

Between the guillotine and the Civil Code limitations

Metka Zupančič

The French Revolution is doubtless one of the most interesting social phenomena in Western history, especially with regards to the role of women, not only during the years of social upheaval but also in the aftermath of the violent events. The prevailing patriarchal tendencies throughout the previous centuries as well as male domination and misogyny do not seem to have eased in eighteenth-century France, despite the influence of the Enlightenment and its impact on the French constitution that laid the foundations for a more equitable socio-political order. During a brief interlude, at the height of the French Revolution, roughly in the first few years after its inception in 1789, a large number of French women of all classes, taking advantage of the extraordinary circumstances of the Revolution, breached the social limitations of their gender, disproving forever the perception of the 'weaker sex'. Working-class women, especially in Paris, joined their male companions during the revolts that ended the Old Regime and found themselves "at the heart of Revolutionary politics" (Applewhite and Gay Levy 1984: 64). However, a small number of educated women, mostly from the social elite, formulated in their public appearances and in writing their convictions about the necessary social changes and, especially, the emancipation of women. Nevertheless, the laws that established the Republic and the political rhetoric that supported them disregarded the women's demands for equality.

At the turn of the eighteenth century, two aspects of women's civic and political functions seem to have been at stake: one aspect pertained to the women's role in the private realm of the home, involving their authority in the family, their role in rearing children, their freedom of movement and expression, and their power to seek a divorce and escape spousal tyranny; the other, which is the primary focus of this essay, regarded the women's civic and political role, including public speaking, voting rights, and political participation. During the Revolution, French women were unapologetic about claiming more power, authority, and independence both in the private and the public realms, which, however, triggered a social backlash to their cause. Soon after the Revolution ended and the political world stabilized, social conditions for French women returned to the oppressive, pre-Revolution status-quo; this alone indicates that women's active involvement was perceived to an extent as a threat to male hegemony. French men, influenced by traditional views regarding women,

recoiled from sharing power with them and refused to acknowledge women's contributions to the Revolution or reward them by granting them any rights. My argument, therefore, is the following: although many women participated actively in the public events of the first years of the Revolution and within all political parties, from the pro-monarchists to the Girondins and the Jacobins, nevertheless, in the years immediately after the declaration of the First Republic (in 1792), their leaders, especially the women who eventually became the icons of the revolutionary movements, were discredited, vilified, imprisoned, and even guillotined, ostensibly for their political agenda, but possibly for their open and unapologetic activism that shocked the French patriarchy.

As the Revolution moved progressively away from the initial clarion call, 'Liberty, Fraternity, Equality', its occasion represents for the French women either a missed opportunity or the insurmountable obstacle of patriarchy. Nevertheless, the unprecedented public activism of French women established them as pioneers who paved the way for the women's movement. At the same time, however, the absence of any previous model of female activism in history hindered their cause, as inexperience kept them from creating unity among themselves, overcoming the disparity of strategies, and setting common goals. Had there been an earlier model of female activism, it might have prevented the silencing of the most outspoken women of this period. As their courageous contributions have often been overlooked by historians, the general public may consequently also continue to ignore the depth and intensity of these women's involvement in the French Revolution. Therefore, the scope of the present essay is to highlight and to put into the appropriate context the involvement of some of the women from various walks of life, whose fate appears to be particularly symptomatic of the period. As this essay examines historical sources and juxtaposes them to various historiographic or biographical analyses, its novelty comes from a fresh condensation of data and a critical examination of the scholarship that may have shaped, to a degree, the public awareness about these outstanding women. Those featured in this essay may be seen as the most representative of various tendencies and of the predicaments that befell them. This essay will hopefully contribute to a somewhat amended perception of the period, with an accrued respect for those women who fought the battle that benefits us all.

French women's political activism

It is rather impossible to calculate with certainty how many French women engaged in the revolutionary process in the major cities such as Paris and Lyons or in the provinces. But the prominent French women from the late eighteenth century that were passionately engaged in the social transformation of France can be classified in three categories: first, the educated women mainly from aristocracy who interacted with the French intelligentsia and worked behind the scenes to cultivate a positive environment for social change; second, the female fighters, often from the lower classes, who rose to notoriety thanks to the Revolution and

who participated in the armed conflicts, fighting side-by-side with male revolutionaries and even arguing for the creation of 'Amazon-type' proto-military units for women; and third, women writers, either from aristocracy or from various new middle-class circles, who dared to sign their works with their real names, exposing themselves to persecution.

Educated women: enlightenment and ideology

In most Western patriarchal cultures, women's official status was to be subservient and dependent on men, because of their presumed physical and mental feebleness. In France, many philosophers of the Enlightenment adopted such views in their works, regardless of the rising number of women that were respected in the public sphere. In his introduction to the collective project *Enlightenment Portraits* (1997), Michel Vovelle emphasizes the exclusion of eighteenth-century French women from political power and from a larger participation in the economy. He argues that women had not overcome the old stereotypes, as the "traditional religious discourse saw woman as temptress and sinner; *tota mulier in utero* (a woman is a uterus)" (Vovelle 1997: 27), as the physicians of the Enlightenment claimed. Similarly, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, with his "often brutal misogyny" (Vovelle 1997: 27), saw the service of man as the raison d'être of women's existence: Sophie, the companion of Rousseau's Émile, was said to have been destined to provide with her submissiveness "the well-being and the happiness of her husband" (Godineau 1997: 393).

Another obstacle to French women's recognition was the rhetoric stressing female biological inferiority, continuing the Aristotelian dichotomy between women as nature and men as spirit (Cusset 1999: 7). In his short essay *Sur la femme* (About women, 1772), Diderot perpetuates the ancient tradition that there is a physical cause behind women's disadvantaged nature, the uterus, which imposes its own rhythm on the life of women with its cycle of menstruation, pregnancy, and menopause (1818: 642). The main medical condemnation of women came a few years later from the physician Pierre Roussel, author of the *Système physique et moral de la femme* (Women's physical and moral system, 1775), in which women are considered as fundamentally different from men (1775: 306; 331 *et passim*): their inferiority is a consequence of their unpredictable nature, defined by Roussel as humid and spasmodic, and is caused by the uterus, which falls into a number of disturbing states at different stages of women's lives (1775: 138; 249; 315 *et passim*).

Despite the generally negative male views about women's physical, intellectual, and emotional defects, educated French women were often at the center of social and intellectual interactions with the leading writers, philosophers, and artists of the time. At the literary soirees they organized, they invited the French intelligentsia to their salons and engaged with them as equals in high-level conversations on literary, scientific, and socio-political matters. Nonetheless, as Conner observes, any power these women may have held due to their acquaintances and their interactions with them "did not originate in the law" and did not

"reach beyond their salons and discussions" (1984: 49–50); consequently, they did not have a wider impact on society.

The example of Émilie Du Châtelet (1706–1749), one of the most outstanding intellectuals of the eighteenth century, perfectly illustrates the low regard in which even educated women were held during this period. Du Châtelet was a philosopher, an author, a translator, and a scientist. Her writings in the *Institutions de Physique* (Foundations of Physics, 1740) made a great impact on the Encyclopedia philosophers. Nevertheless, neither she nor any other female author "appears in the pages of the *Enclyclopédie*", as women were considered "subordinate, minor" ("Émilie Du Châtelet"). Linda Gardiner, in her essay on "Women in Science" in the Age of Enlightenment, believes that Du Châtelet managed to achieve some renown in her contemporary scientific circles and claims that hers is practically the only surviving "substantial body of original writing" by a French woman at that time (1984: 183). Yet, both her life and her literary afterlife were covered by silence and sealed by the lack of recognition most French women faced. The reason for such an attitude against women, Godineau observes, is that having no political rights, women lacked political and public identity, which means that in a way they did not exist in the public realm and, therefore, their public work could not be acknowledged: "With no civic or political identity, [woman] was excluded from the centers of powers and existed juridically only through men. Her professional, civic, and political rights were not recognized" (Godineau 1997: 393–4). The lack of independent female existence, not only juridically but also in a social and political sense, is clearly evident in the definition of 'woman' in Diderot's *Encyclopédie* (1775) as "the female of the man" (Godineau 1997: 395; Cusset 1999: 10).

Educated French women, mostly from aristocratic or rich bourgeois circles, became increasingly aware that they constituted a social group with common interests (Rémy 1990: 18). Yet, they were not prepared to unite and rebel together against their restrictive social status. Each woman worked predominantly for her own personal gains and social elevation, without trying to achieve wider social change. Such is the case of the ambitious Madame de Pompadour, a major patron of the arts (Boucheron 2017: 367), who in her effort to be first minister (Conner 1984: 52) managed to become very influential at the court of Louis XV and in French politics in general. Nevertheless, as in the case of other prominent upper middle-class and noble women, her involvement with politics became "synonymous with intrigue", which discredited her talents and diminished her achievements (Conner 1984: 52).

Among the lower classes, however, the situation was very different: fear of famine and insecurity gradually awoke men as well as women, and "drove them to riot" as a unit (Conner 1984: 51). The scarcity of bread and their desperate efforts to sustain their families, a struggle that lasted throughout the eighteenth century, was finally understood as being caused by the ruling elite and the political system in place. Therefore, an accumulation of dire conditions inexorably led to the 'metamorphosis' of political awareness that finally exploded around 1789 (Conner 1984: 51).

Women fighters

The revolutionary process in France was not a single occurrence, but developed progressively because of economic and social conflict. Men and women were actively involved in the transformative process within the French society that began around the end of Louis XIV's absolute monarchy (reigned 1643–1715). His successor, Louis XV (reigned 1715–1774), inherited a kingdom depleted in its resources due to a series of poor harvests, widespread famine, and social conflicts that he aggravated with the introduction of new taxes. Despite the suffering of the people, the notorious extravagance of aristocratic circles not only continued but reached a peak during the rule of Louis XVI (reigned 1765–1792) and Marie-Antoinette. Eventually, the state coffers became practically empty, especially after the French king decided to support the American independence war, in an effort to diminish the British influence around the world.

In 1788, Louis XVI received a list of popular complaints directed at him, some written by women, proving their political will. As Rogers observes, "as early as the end of 1788 . . . a few women petitioned in hope that they might 'have a share in the benefits of liberty'" (1984: 43). However, women's involvement has not always been recorded or acknowledged by historians. As late as 1988, Joan B. Landes, author of *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution*, doubts women's participation and declares that "[w]omen generally did not participate in the officially sanctioned grievance process" (1988: 107). Eventually, however, the discontent of the population led to the fall of the Bastille fortress, the symbol of the oppressive French monarchy, in which both men and women of the lower classes were involved, embodying their will to end the Old Regime. After the National Assembly assumed control of the government, it issued the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* on August 27, 1789, with which it aimed at restoring social justice and preventing government corruption. The reforms promoted by the Assembly between 1789 and 1791 were along the lines of establishing judicial equality, taxation equality, and civil marriage. In a series of important acts, the French Assembly decried subordination and inequality among the male population, abolished nobility titles and feudalism, nationalized Church property, and gave equal rights to Black citizens of French colonies. Yet, it refused to grant women the status of active citizens, thus maintaining the political inequality and women's exclusion from suffrage (Roudinesco 2010: 64).

In many ways, women, "both demographically and politically, were the principal force" of the Revolution (Applewhite and Gay Levy 1984: 67), yet their contribution is still a matter of debate. Whereas Anne Marie Granger, in "Nous aussi des citoyennes" (We too are citizens, 1989/2007), states that women were present at every stage that marked the radicalization of the revolutionary process, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese takes a much less emphatic position: "Even the most brilliant and dazzling eighteenth-century women suffered the constraints of the explicit patriarchalism of the ancient régime" (1984: 24). Admittedly, patriarchal culture had a powerful hold even after the end of the Revolution and, as a result, various legends about some prominent women and distorted facts that

emerged in nineteenth-century literature and historiography damaged women's reputation and diminished their achievement by questioning their motives (Roudinesco 2010: 247–89).

During the period of public upheaval, months before the major assault on the Bastille on July 14, 1789, French women felt compelled to join the male population in the street demonstrations, especially in Paris (Granger 1989/2007). Soon after, in their attempt to protest the scarcity of food for their families, five to six thousand women, mainly merchants from the Parisian market, engaged in the ten-mile-long march on Versailles on October 5–6, 1789, braving the rainy conditions (Michelet 1855: 29–32 *et passim*). Although no one doubts that women were instrumental, at least in taking over the palace in Versailles and, thus, contributing to the eventual downfall of the monarchy, their motives have been questioned and their participation has been discredited even by some modern scholars: for example, Bessières and Niedzwiecki suggest that these women might have been paid to undertake these actions or dragged by force to join the crowds (1991: 4). Others, however, are convinced that women's participation is undeniable and, so, Applewhite and Gay Levy affirm strongly that "[t]he most significant dimension of women's Revolutionary achievement was the direct participation in public affairs by women of the popular classes" (1984: 67).

Often information about women who participated in a variety of events during this time was intentionally distorted, especially by the royalist press. This happened in the case of Théroigne de Méricourt, who was a particular favorite and an icon of the French Revolution, and, thus, a preferred target for counter-revolutionary attacks (Roudinesco 2010: 52; 138 *et passim*). False representations of Théroigne have even been carried over into modern historiography. Landes, in her 1988 study, wrongly identifies her as the ringleader of the 1789 march on Versailles and describes Théroigne, who was reputed for her beauty, in derogatory terms that stress attributes loaded with negative connotations. She identifies her as "a former courtesan and revolutionary activist" and depicts her leading the crowds "mounted on a horseback, in male costume" (Landes 1988: 110). By pointing out her status as "a former courtesan", Landes denigrates her political effort and focuses on her quality as a woman who used her sexual charms for personal aggrandizement and for rising in the society, instead of directing attention to her struggle for women's rights. In the same vein, the reference to her 'male' costume is rather a misrepresentation of Théroigne's legendary (still transgressive) 'Amazon' outfit, consisting of a lady's riding skirt and coat. Landes' uncharitable depiction of Théroigne contradicts Élisabeth Roudinesco's carefully verified finding that on October 5, 1789, Théroigne was already in Versailles, attending the deliberations of the National Assembly and could not be leading the march against the royal abode (Roudinesco 2010: 50; Michelet 1855: 45).

As the first publication of Roudinesco's *Théroigne de Méricourt* (1989) coincided with the bicentennial of the French Revolution, it may be assumed that one of her goals was to rectify some of the erroneous perceptions about her. Nevertheless, Roudinesco was criticized that she used this biography to advance

feminist issues (Lévy-Piarroux and Goddard 1989: 85–6), which indicates that the general understanding of the role of French women in the Revolution has not changed in any considerable way. Roudinesco insisted in her efforts to restore Théroigne's reputation and in the second edition of this biography (2010) included an afterward making the point that Théroigne's exemplary yet melancholic existence was drastically affected by the collapse of revolutionary ideals (2010: 322). Christiane Marciano-Jacob, in her own biography of Théroigne, also contributed to the rehabilitation of this Cinderella-become-a-revolutionary (2001: 33), as she considers her a fearless leader and one of the first feminists.

From these recent efforts, some important aspects of Théroigne's activism have come into focus: born Anne-Josèphe Terwagne in 1762, she escaped from an abusive family situation in the Austrian-ruled Luxembourg area. After traveling through Europe, she joined the Revolution in France. During several years of selfless dedication to the revolutionary cause, now called Théroigne de Méricourt, she often appeared in public, pleading fervently for equal rights for women and social responsibilities (Roudinesco 2010: 68 *et passim*). Her public activism, however, caused a reaction on the part of the royalists against her: in 1791, after a trumped-up accusation against Théroigne for a presumed attempt at Marie-Antoinette's life during the assault on the castle of Versailles, she was abducted by Austrian authorities and, for almost a year, was interrogated in a prison close to Vienna. During that time, she was required to write her confessions, which constitute a solid archival source of information about her life and activities, partly published by Otto Ernst in 1935 (Roudinesco 2010: 21 *et passim*) and Strobl von Ravelsberg in 1892 (Roudinesco 2010: 249). After her release from prison and her triumphal return to Paris in 1792, Théroigne continued influencing public events with her accounts as a victim at the hands of the counter-revolutionaries.

It is ironic (but also indicative of the French women's general lack of experience and unity in their efforts) that her demise was eventually caused by other women revolutionaries who derided her avant-garde positions: she was finally marginalized by a new generation of Jacobin women coming from lower classes, the 'tricoteuses', who rejected Théroigne's repeated requests for the formation of female battalions[1] in defense of France's sovereignty and rebuffed her call for female magistrates (Roudinesco 2010: 140; 331 *et passim*). The final humiliation that put an end to her activism also came from a group of women who publicly thrashed Théroigne in May 1793 (142; 333 *et passim*); after this event, she retreated permanently from public life. Presumably to save her from the guillotine, her own brother had her declared insane and placed in a mental asylum. Théroigne died in the asylum in Salpêtrière in 1817 (Roudinesco 2010: 325–40).

When the national Convention proclaimed the Republic on September 21, 1792, there were no official acts by the new government making any provisions for women's legal participation in politics. Yet, women continued to attend public debates that were open to them, sometimes with children in tow. From political feminism, such as the version promoted by Théroigne, women now entered a

phase of belligerent feminism (Roudinesco 2010: 125). Starting in 1791 and continuing into 1792, women formed more aggressive groups that met throughout France. In view of the pending attacks on France by foreign powers, especially Austria, Claire Lacombe dressed as an 'Amazon' and called again for the formation of women's battalions in July 1792. The following year, Lacombe, assisted by Pauline Léon, founded and led the short-lived, yet vehement association, the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women (Roudinesco 2010: 153).

The Terror period between 1793 and 1794 brought major changes to French politics. When the moderate Girondins failed to protect France from foreign invasions, the Jacobins overthrew them and instituted some of the most drastic reforms, while they guillotined 17,000 of their opponents. Some of the Girondins, then, sought refuge to the provinces and continued holding meetings in Caen. A local woman, Charlotte Corday (1768–1793), educated before the Revolution at a convent, where she secretly read Plutarch, Rousseau, and Voltaire, attended the Girondins' meetings and listened to their debates. Sympathizing with their cause, she saw somewhat erroneously in Marat the main cause behind all these deaths and decided to take it upon herself to avenge single-handedly all those who had perished because of him. After killing Marat, she let herself be caught at the site of the murder while at her trial caused considerable shock to the French society with her declaration that she had acted completely alone and without any male accomplice (Kindleberger 1994: 995); she was guillotined four days later, on July 17, 1793. Ironically, his assassination raised Marat to the level of martyr, as he was adored by crowds of Jacobin women, while Corday was discredited posthumously with the nickname 'Angel of Assassination'. Comparable to Théroigne, she stood up for her beliefs and suffered the consequences of her acts, but was also the victim of vociferous 'tricoteuses' women, today seen as having been manipulated by the Jacobins to support their politics, during the Terror period (Guilhaumou 1989: 88; 95; 99; 120). These furies of the Revolution, known for their raucous behavior at various assemblies, trials, and executions (Godineau 1988: 233), allegedly carrying around their handiwork, often called vehemently for the death of their opponents, including for the death of Charlotte Corday (Albert-Clément 1935: 279). Following her death, in a campaign to disgrace her unconventional activism (Corazzo and Montfort 1994: 35), Corday was made into a man-woman monster and was attacked especially by Marquis de Sade, because she relinquished "the model of a silenced and domesticated woman" (Corazzo and Montfort 1994: 35).

Other women, however, who did not agree with the Jacobin dictatorship and reacted to it, were called to order and forced to return to their domesticated life. When the Convention banned the activities of women's clubs, Claire Lacombe led the members of The Society of Revolutionary Republican Women to penetrate the General Council in Paris in order to protest the ban (November 1793). However, they were barred from entering by the Prosecutor General Chaumette, who held the specter of the monstrous man-woman over their head; his rationale for denying women the right to political involvement was based on reasons akin to the pre-Enlightenment ideology regarding the women's public role:

> It is horrible – unnatural – for a woman to want to become a man . . . Since when has it been decent for women to abandon their pious household tasks and their children's cradles – to meet in public places yelling from the galleries? . . . Impudent women who want to turn themselves into men, don't you have enough already? What else do you want?
>
> (Bessières and Niedzwiecki 1991: 8)

Claire Lacombe and Pauline Léon were lucky to escape the guillotine, though Lacombe was interrogated by the Jacobins and accused of being a counter-revolutionary (Landes 1988: 142). The Convention abolished women's clubs on November 4, 1793 and two years later denied women the right of assembly, declaring that they were required to stay at home, thus, putting an end to French women's participation in politics (Rogers 1984: 43).

Women writers

A group of women writers was also active during the Revolution, but many of them were persecuted and put to death. The rhetoric justifying their execution emphasized their transgression of gender limitations. An outspoken author, possibly considered as the most courageous during this period, is Olympe de Gouges. She rose to prominence even before 1789 with her pamphlets and plays, in which she advocated various causes, including the abolition of slavery in the colonies. Born Marie Gouze (1748–1793) in Montauban, she was widowed at age eighteen. She was mostly self-educated, making a great effort toward it, especially after she moved to Paris in 1770 and became involved in political debates (Diamond 1990). She may be described as a kept woman, but de Gouges made a conscious effort not to re-enter matrimony, refusing to be subject to its constrictive nature. In her suggestion for a 'social contract' between women and men, she argues for gender equality, especially within marriage. She assiduously followed the events of the Estates General and the subsequent assemblies, staying well informed about the social changes.

Concerned with the total disregard of women in the 1789 *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*, Olympe de Gouges decided to argue for equality for women in her own *Declaration of the Rights of Women* (1791). The first of the seventeen articles in her *Declaration* asserts women's equality: "Woman is born free and remains equal to man in rights. Social distinctions may be based only on common utility". In stating her goals in the Preamble, she also urges that "[m]others, daughters, sisters, female representatives of the nation . . . be constituted as a national assembly", which unfortunately never took place. Making a tactical mistake, she dedicated her *Declaration* to Marie-Antoinette, wrongly assuming that the queen would be sympathetic to women's issues and show solidarity with their cause, which she never did.

Olympe de Gouges' passionate support for the underdog in various issues, including illegitimate children, oppressed women in unequal marriages, and slaves, contributed to her unpopularity among men. Article number ten in

her *Declaration* anticipated the reversal of her fate, as her social and political activism led to her imprisonment and final demise: "No one should be disturbed for his fundamental opinions; woman has the right to mount the scaffold, so she should have the right equally to mount the rostrum" ("Olympe de Gouges" 1996). In 1793, she was guillotined for her outspoken criticism of the Jacobins' revolutionary government during the Reign of Terror (Vanpée 1999: 49 *et passim*). Olympe's leading biographer, Olivier Blanc, also emphasizes the role her pro-federalist attitude and her attacks especially on Robespierre played in her death (2014: 7). The notice of her death, published in the journal *Moniteur*, classified her as a conspirator who aspired to become a statesman, but attributed her punishment also to her contempt for the virtues becoming to her sex (Granger 1989/2007). Nevertheless, her downfall may have been due to her political positions, since, evidently, she held many ideas that were at odds with the politics of the time, such as her defense of conciliatory patriotism (Blanc 2014: 120). Jules Michelet, one of the rare nineteenth-century French historians who examined the role of women in the French Revolution, criticized Olympe de Gouges for advocating issues that, as a woman, her 'weak head' could not comprehend, as she was, in his opinion, practically 'illiterate' (Michelet 1855: 105). Olympe herself was aware of her shortcomings, as she was not sufficiently versed in the codified style of her period (Blanc 2014: 104), but was also afraid that her voice wouldn't be heard because of her gender (128).

A much more subdued woman writer but very prominent in her own circle, Manon Roland, was also guillotined. During the Revolution, she was considered the muse of the Girondins, as the political gatherings at her salon were some of the most famous in Paris. "In 1791 the entire patriotic milieu could be found there", Godineau states (1997: 393; 419). Madame Roland, as she is more commonly known, was one of the best-educated French women prior to the Revolution; her philosophical and political views were influenced by Plutarch, Montesquieu, and Voltaire, and she followed closely the Enlightenment ideas.[2] Rousseau's antiquated perception of women as inferior to men and his understanding of female virtue shaped her conviction that she ought to express her political and social views from within, that is, from a seemingly subservient position.[3] "Even before the Revolution, she worked in close cooperation with her husband, helping him write his academic and technical treatises" (Godineau 1997: 419). She became, however, even more involved when the Revolution began: "Manon Roland profoundly inspired her husband's politics, and when he became a minister [in the Girondins government] she wrote some of his most important official texts" (Godineau 1997: 419). Despite her effort to embody Rousseau's feminine ideals of the domesticated female, she nevertheless appeared to the opposing Montagnards as the leading force behind the moderate political ideology of the Girondins. As a result, she was the first among them to be arrested in 1793, when the Jacobin club among the Montagnards took power and ushered in the Reign of Terror.

Struggling to identify the proper place of women, as the reality of the new French state and society conflicted with traditional patriarchal values, Madame Roland started documenting her own involvement with French politics while incarcerated. Fortunately for posterity, her close friend Louis Augustin Bosc was able to smuggle her memoirs out of prison and had them published in 1795 (Gilpin Johnson 2017; Shuckburgh 1990/2007). At the impromptu judicial process for her case, typical of the Terror period, she was not allowed to plead her cause and was summarily condemned and guillotined on November 8, 1793. The surviving letter, in fact her testament, reveals her faith in truth, fatherland, and ultimate commitment to the cause of the Girondins, for which she was willing to sacrifice her life (Seth 2013: 1152–3). However, an article published in the *Moniteur*, "Aux Républicaines" (1793), portrayed her as "a monster in all ways" and accused her of "having sacrificed nature by attempting to raise herself above it; the desire to be learned led her to forget the virtues of her sex, and that forgetfulness – always dangerous – brought her to her death on the scaffold" (Godineau 1997: 420).[4] Regardless of all her reserve, she was condemned "as a woman who had betrayed her gender, for her political activism" (Godineau 1997: 420) and was demonized by the stereotypical image of the man-woman monster, as so many other French women activists. Ultimately, this anti-feminist rhetoric prevailed and influenced the socio-political and legal status of women after the Revolution.

From engaging in the Revolution to the limitations of the Napoleonic Code

The first French constitution was voted in early September 1791 and by October 1, 1791, the first national legislative assembly introduced the 'censitary' suffrage that offered for the first time voting rights to qualified electors, according to their income ('cens'): it was intended only for 'active' male citizens, direct taxpayers of certain income level, and above the age of 25; all others, including women, were excluded from the electoral process, as they were considered 'passive' citizens. Limited universal suffrage for male citizens above the age of 21 was introduced in 1799. Suffrage became truly universal in 1944, when it was extended to women over the age of 21. Women voted for the first time in France in the April–May 1945 municipal elections.

Excluding women from suffrage in the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century created the basis for their treatment as second-class citizens, the consequences of which reverberated until at least the first half of the twentieth century. Exclusion from universal suffrage certainly represents a clear proof of women's lower status. Rogers notices that "women were excluded from 'the right to vote'" as early as December 1789. In 1790, Nicolas de Condorcet, one of the leading thinkers and a defender of women's rights, argued for women's political and social equality as well as for their admission to suffrage, but none of the Assemblies adopted his proposal and women were

eventually denied citizenship in the Constitution of 1791. Rogers suggests, however, that the debates in political clubs, "both mix-sex and exclusively female", may not have focused on demanding women's suffrage, but may have been rather "concerned with improving women's status with respect to marriage laws, education and employment opportunities" (1984: 43). This is certainly supported by the fact that in 1791, marriage, still considered the foundation of society, became a secular institution based on a contract between the spouses. Furthermore, the 1792 marriage law allowed for the first time for the equality of the two partners and for obtaining a divorce by mutual consent (Godineau 1997: 402).

Following the Terror period, continued political strife opened the path for Napoleon, who was hailed as hero, especially after his 1798 military success in Egypt, to become eventually the first modern French emperor in 1804. As the country became more stable politically under his leadership, unfortunately, women's liberties actually shrank even further. The 1804 Civil Code that Napoleon put in place affected dramatically the status of women. Its biases, often subtle, are not always immediately obvious, as the application of laws depended on the views of the men who held the power to decide. For example, the Code described in ample details the requirements for entering marriage, with the stipulation that parents will give their consent until age twenty-five (Art. 146; 148); this gave power of decision essentially to the woman's father. The Code also maintained limited provisions for annulment of marital bonds and for various types of divorce, skewing the limitations in favor of the husband. A wife could claim divorce from an adulterous husband, only if she found him with a concubine in her own house (Art. 230). A husband, on the contrary, could easily divorce an unfaithful wife and even have her committed to prison for a period of three months to two years on charges of adultery (Art. 298). Divorce was eventually banned completely a few years later, during the 1816 enforcement of the Restoration laws; it remained banned for over 60 years and was only re-established in 1884, during the Third Republic.

In principle, the legal system was consistent with the general social expectation of women to show obedience to their husband (Art. 213) and, as such, forced women to live with their husband and even obliged them to follow him wherever he chose to move (Art. 214). Women, however, could not travel abroad or establish their own social connections without the authorization of their husbands, as they were also required to have their husbands' permission for all legal, professional, and commercial procedures, even when disposing of their own assets (Art. 215, 217). The Napoleonic Code clearly excluded women from political rights, whereas the limitations considering advanced education, such as high school or university, were imposed through various decrees (and not through the Code). However, throughout the nineteenth century, French women were increasingly granted greater access to education, but could work only with the permission of a male guardian.

Conclusion: no 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' for women

It is remarkable that the French men, who publicly asserted the principles of liberty, fraternity, and equality, fought side by side with women during the revolutionary times, and benefited from women's courage, dedication, and intelligence, would not allow women to continue participating in the establishment of the Republic. Violent events and popular uprisings continued in the nineteenth century, culminating in the 1871 Parisian Commune, but none of them led to a notable improvement of women's status in French society. It appears, therefore, that the 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' slogan of the French Revolution did not apply to French women. The new laws of the young French Republic, introduced in 1792, three years into the continuous struggles after the initial 1789 revolutionary acts, progressively excluded French women from the public sphere, despite their significant contributions toward the fall of the monarchy. The leaders of the Terror period were particularly vindictive against outspoken women and especially the ones who took the liberty to criticize openly their practices and defend overtly their claims for gender equality in the new society, as did Théroigne de Méricourt and Olympe de Gouges.

The fact that "revolutionary democracy has been studied principally as it affected male population" (Applewhite and Gay Levy 1984: 64) may explain the minimization of women's actions even in popular French history textbooks such as *L'histoire de France* (Labrune et al. 2014). In this work, none of the outspoken eighteenth-century French women have earned so much as a mention, while the authors refer to the participants of the march derogatorily as "the crowd" ("*la foule*", Labrune et al. 2014: 70), negating the important role women played in this crucial event. Another recent volume of 790 pages, *Histoire mondiale de la France* (World History of France, Boucheron 2017), also contains no reference to any woman activist during the French Revolution. Therefore, the recent interest in women's presence during the French Revolution is due only to the rise of gender studies in the late twentieth century and not to traditional historians who have consistently ignored them. Furthermore, contemporary forms of mass communication, especially the proliferation of historic materials and analyses in the web, facilitates access to original sources, not all of which can be found in a published form. At the same time, the availability of resources and materials has given impetus to controversies, as they have raised various questions about the actual role of French women in the Revolution. From these discussions, it is becoming increasingly clear that women's political allegiances and economic interests in combination with influences exerted by powerful traditional male biases did not always allow women to unite and align their political struggle with the promotion of female-gender interests. Divisions and in-fighting among women blured the lines between female supporters and opponents of the Revolution, which, in the end, contributed both to women's failure to gain any legal or political benefits from their effort, and to the silencing of their role in it.

Notes

1 Théroigne's 1792 speech, "Citoyennes, armons-nous!" (Women Citizens, time to arm ourselves!), is reprinted in a 2010 publication featuring two additional speeches by later women activists, George Sand (1848) and Élisabeth Guigou (1998); for this booklet, see the References under 'Théroigne de Méricourt' (2010).
2 See biographical notes in Catriona Seth (2013: 1151–3); this volume of almost 1200 pages is an invaluable source of usually little-known women's memoirs and direct testimonies of the revolutionary times at the end of the eighteenth century in France.
3 According to Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, "Mme Roland simultaneously signals the end of an aristocratic tradition . . . and inaugurates a tradition of bourgeois domesticity", as her "influence on [the revolutionary] events was through men; her acquaintance with the actors was in her own domestic space" (1984: 23).
4 Godineau mentions this much-quoted article ("Aux Républicaines" 1793) in *The Women of Paris and Their French Revolution* (1998: 275), to show that several French women activists were portrayed as 'man-woman monsters', including Olympe de Gouges.

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16 *Mary Chesnut's Civil War*

Female exclusion and race in the American South

Youli Theodosiadou

In the first half of the nineteenth century the passive, dependent, and subservient southern 'lady' was the dominant ideal of white womanhood in the American South. Before the Civil War, the rhetoric of patriarchy and the placement of the lady on a pedestal contributed to the defense of slavery and the division between black and white women. After the Civil War, however, white women were able to extricate themselves from oppressive restrictions and the exclusion they had been subjected to and participate in the public sphere: they could leave the home, get educated, work in the public realm, and move toward political emancipation. At the same time, black women, who had already gained their freedom from slavery, started earning money for their labor and were gradually able to join the feminist movement for political rights. Therefore, the intersection of race, gender, and political power for women was realized after the Civil War, whereas before that catalytic event women moved in two parallel and frustrated lines, divided by race. In this essay, I will show that women were divided into two groups along race lines and were characterized by qualities attributed arbitrarily to each group by white patriarchy: the pure, untouchable, and chaste white ladies on the one hand, and the promiscuous, sexual, and dangerous black women on the other; by withholding pleasure from their white wives and overindulging black women's sexuality in illegal liaisons, men caused frustration to both black and white women, pitched them against each other, and kept them divided along race lines, ultimately managing to undermine women's ability to censor men and to keep both black and white women oppressed, under strict confines, and excluded from public life.

For plantation women of the nineteenth century it was considered unbecoming and unladylike to initiate any political discussion and a woman was not expected to be knowledgeable in political issues or have opinions about them. Politics was considered a male domain and women were not thought of as political beings. As a Savannah patriarch W. B. Bulloch wrote to his daughter in 1831: "I discover my dear Louisa that you have been dabbling a little in politics . . . But as a female and a lady, be aloof" (Clinton 1982: 181). Men voted and spoke in public. Women remained within the sphere of home and family. The right to participate in political activities such as voting, office-holding, or jury duty depended on the holding of property. Since married women could not own property, they could be neither voters, nor jurors, nor office-holders. Women's

relationship to the world of politics, like their legal status, was derivative – it came about through their influence on fathers, husbands, and sons.

Our knowledge about the concept of southern womanhood is enriched particularly by the autobiographical writings of plantation women. One of the most important female autobiographies by a white woman is that of Mary Chesnut of South Carolina, titled *Mary Chesnut's Civil War*. It is not exactly a diary, but an expansion of journals the author kept during the Civil War; it is part history, part autobiography, part social novel. The narrative, which she began writing in mid-February of 1861, was not published during Mary Chesnut's lifetime. As the daughter of a South Carolina governor and the wife of a United States senator, who later became a confederate general, Chesnut knew many of the political and military figures of her day. A very observant person, Chestnut came to know quickly intimate details about the personalities and politics of the confederacy between 1861 and 1865. In 1881 she began a full-scale revision of the journal which went on until her death in 1886. Julia Stern in her study *Mary Chesnut's Civil War Epic* (2010) attempts to return Chesnut to her rightful place among nineteenth century American women writers. She argues for Chesnut as an epic writer because of the heroic tone in which she treats martial strife and her allusions to classical Greek mythology, and claims that the revised 1880s narrative provides a very significant literary critique of racial conflict and the institution of slavery. Moreover, she explains how the text constitutes an accurate portrayal of domestic confederate culture during the height of the Civil War.

A few words about Mary Boykin Chesnut and her background are necessary to set the framework of her diaries. As the first-born daughter of Stephen Miller, a former congressman who rose to governor and U.S. senator, and Mary Boykin, a member of a wealthy planter family in Camden, South Carolina, Mary Boykin Chesnut was educated at home until 1835, when her parents sent her to Madame Talvande's French School for Young Ladies in Charleston. Among the daughters of the Carolina elite, she learned German and fell in love with the French culture and language. In 1840, at the age of seventeen, she married James Chesnut and began her life at Mulberry, the Chesnut estate near Camden (Muhlenfeld 1981: 25, 27, 42). The war changed Mary Chesnut's life and from 1860 to 1865 she lived in constant excitement as she followed her husband from one assignment to the other. She never managed to finish her journal revisions or to publish her novels "The Captain and the Colonel" and "Two Years of My Life". She died on November 22, 1886. Posthumously, Chesnut's journal and revisions resulted in a convoluted publication history. Her journal was first published in 1905 under the title *A Diary from Dixie* with several original parts omitted. Novelist Ben Ames Williams who edited the 1949 version took many liberties with Chesnut's style and story. Finally, in 1981, when the journal was published under the title *Mary Chesnut's Civil War* with the expert editing of C. Vann Woodward, it won the Pulitzer Prize for history.

Gender limitations

Before getting a closer look at Chesnut's text itself, it is necessary to set up the framework of the dominant ideologies that defined the boundaries of acceptable female behavior in the antebellum South. The primary ideology that governed white women's conduct was the 'cult of true womanhood'. Barbara Welter, a feminist historian, explains that:

> the attributes of True Womanhood, by which a woman judged herself and was judged by her husband, her neighbors and society, could be divided into four cardinal virtues – piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity . . . With them she was promised happiness and power.
>
> (Welter 1976: 21)

In addition to the above virtues, the cult of true womanhood was inextricably bound to the notions of delicacy and fragility. It was inconceivable for a plantation mistress to refer to her great strength, her extraordinary appetite, or her ability to bear excessive fatigue; those were positive attributes used for selling black female slaves at slave auctions, but did not apply to free, white females. A delicate constitution was an indicator of class as well as racial position (Carby 1987: 25). White women were expected to perform an ornamental function in society and to fulfill the role of a symbol of their husband's power and wealth. Yet, as historian Anne Firor Scott asserts in her work *The Southern Lady*, the majority of white women in the antebellum period could not incorporate all the attributes of true womanhood because of their many tasks in managing the plantation (1970: 36). They had to supervise slaves, a demanding and often frustrating task, as well as allocate duties among house servants, distribute weekly food rations, and provide them with clothing according to the standards of the plantation. Plantation mistresses were also responsible for the health of the plantation slaves and the delivery of all babies.

Formative was also the education with which a true woman ought to be raised. From an early age, women in the American South received an education relevant to knowing how to be proper Christians, worthy wives, loving mothers, and able housekeepers. The education was acquired within the home or in boarding schools. Regarding domestic education, mothers exclusively undertook the task, teaching girls "fancy stitching, dancing, and music" along with reading the Bible and learning how to be obedient housewives, devoted, modest, and willing to please without discontent (Collins 2003: 72). Writing and reading (outside the Bible) was not always included in the curriculum of a little lady. In fact, wealthy southern girls that possessed further education than just sewing and spinning were advised to conceal their intelligence for the cult of true womanhood included beauty rather than intelligence (Collins 2003: 73). Boarding schools placed emphasis on correct female behavior rather than intellectual development. According to Anne Firor Scott "in at least one school the girls wrote their

English compositions on such subjects as modesty, benevolence, and the evils of reading novels" (1970: 7).

Apart from the appropriate education that a southern lady was expected to receive, she had to possess piety as one of the most important aspects of her character. Submission to God constituted one of the first principles she was taught along with submission to the father, brother and, later, husband. In fact, "religion or piety was the core of woman's virtue, the source of her strength" (Welter 1976: 152). She was supposed to go to church every Sunday, engage herself in charity work, pray for her family and household, and do everything possible to follow the word of God throughout her whole life. Religion usually advised women to curb any personal ambitions and confirmed, just like society did, that they were inferior to man (Scott 1970: 13).

Furthermore, the cult of true womanhood dictated that all southern ladies live within the strict boundaries of their home and spend their time as women of leisure until they got married. Apart from the little education they received, these young women "spent a great deal of time worrying about their figures, which were supposed to be very slender and straight-backed" since the ideal of the times was to be fragile, fair, not particularly bright, and not interested in public affairs (Collins 2003: 72). Females in the American South did their best in order to be true southern belles, which would grant them the fulfillment of the ultimate goal of their lives that was no other than marriage. As the outside world was depicted as a dangerous and mysterious place, the southern belle was convinced that staying within the protective borders of her parental home at first and her husband's after marriage was something to be grateful for. From the point of her marriage and onwards the southern lady was deprived of her selfhood; her existence served to obey and please the demands and wishes of her husband. She was deferent to him and exclusively dependent on him for emotional and financial support. Moreover, she required the luxuries that his income could provide. As Susan M. Cruea notes, "the popular press perpetuated this notion through newspapers, pamphlets, and magazines, such as *Godey's Lady's Book*" (2005: 189).

Not all southern women were lucky enough to marry out of true love. Quite often the process of finding a mate did not necessarily follow the romantic prescription and it was common for the southern belle to marry the male that the family selected for her. If such were the case, the true woman ought to have the inner strength to endure her husband, regardless of whether she had feelings for him or not (Jones 1981: 23). Moreover, the sudden transition from the life of a carefree, sought-after belle to one that was filled with matronly responsibilities was sometimes overwhelming. A planter's wife had no choice but to be a good housekeeper, as a Virginia lady noted: "Her large family, the immense retinue of slaves who all had to be fed, clothed, nursed, not to mention the incessant and heavy demands of hospitality, made her the real burden-bearer of the community" (Scott 1970: 29). The plantation mistress was expected to be familiar with the skills of spinning, weaving, sewing, the care of the sick, and all the stages of food preparation from the sowing of the seed to the presentation of the final product on the table. Most importantly,

though, she had to serve as an administrator, supervising and managing the work of the slaves. In some cases, the new responsibilities that plantation mistresses undertook were so demanding that women found it really hard to cope with them.[1] Another Virginia woman wrote of her mother: "She often told us of her distress on realizing for the first time the responsibilities devolving upon the mistress of a large plantation, and the nights of sorrow and tears these thoughts had given her" (Scott 1970: 27).

Wifehood and motherhood were glorified within the discourse of the cult of true womanhood and the home was considered the sphere of all women's actions.[2] The primary concern of a woman's life was to acquire a husband and, then, to concentrate on the bearing and rearing of her children and the caring of the household (Carby 1987: 26). Overt sexuality had to be suppressed, and according to historian Barbara Berg the only passions white women were entitled to feel were "love of home, children and domestic duties" (1978: 84). However, as a result of the myth of true womanhood, white women were idealized and placed on a pedestal, which in turn estranged them from their husbands. Lillian Smith claims that the origin of southern womanhood lies in the "race-sex-sin spiral":

> The more trails the white men made to back-yard cabins, the higher he raised his white wife on her pedestal, when he returned to the big house. The higher the pedestal, the less he enjoyed her whom he put there, for statues after all are only nice things to look at. More and more numerous became the little trails of escape from the statuary and more and more intricately they began to weave in and out of southern life.
>
> (Smith 1961: 121)

By placing emphasis on the superiority of the white to the black woman, the white man felt less guilty about his sexual use of black female slaves. Moreover, slavery required that the wife should continue to be the passive, obedient, and beautiful symbol of her husband's wealth and power. By stipulating the function of the plantation mistress as an ornamental one, the southern aristocracy reinforced the absolute authority of the master. The southern lady was sometimes portrayed like a marble statue, eternally inspiring but always still, whose identity was inextricably bound to the identity of the South. She represented southern culture's idea of religious, moral, sexual, racial, and social perfection.

Dividing women along race lines

In their effort to enjoy both black and white women, men divided them by race, while by turning them against each other, kept them unable to oppose illicit male liaisons. Overt sexuality was directly connected to the image of the black woman, which made her the counter-image of the mid-nineteenth century ideal of the Victorian lady. Deborah Gray White argues that the origin of this stereotype of the female slave derives from the cultural differences between the Anglo-Saxons and the Africans: the idea that black women were exceptionally

sensual apparently originated in the first journeys of Englishmen to Africa to buy slaves (1985: 29). As they were unaccustomed to the requirements of a tropical climate, they mistook seminudity for lewdness. Polygamy was misinterpreted as a sign of hypersexuality and tribal dances as some kind of orgy (White 1985: 29). Thus, the perpetuation of the image of the lascivious black female with insatiable passions continued through the nineteenth century and presented the slave master as prey to this hypersexual being.

A result of the sexual liaisons between slave masters and female slaves was the increase in the birth rates and, thus, the labor force on the plantations. Yet, from the beginning of forced African immigration to the English colonies, the issue of interracial sexual interaction was problematic. The fate of the offspring of these liaisons created serious problems. At first, the colonists followed English custom by proclaiming that children inherited the status of their fathers; but later on, due to the high incidence of mulatto children and the difficulty of establishing paternity, planters solved these questions of illegitimacy with legislation which declared that slave offspring inherited the status of the mother. Though tracing descent through the maternal line was contrary to English common law, the British colonists invoked Roman custom to protect their property interest. So, every time a black woman gave birth, they acquired a new slave. Eventually, white America developed a unique position on racial classification: the drop of ink formation. Just as a single drop of black ink colors a whole glass of clear water, so – white America decreed – that one drop of black blood 'pollutes' a human being and thus renders him black. Sexual as well as social control, therefore, became extremely essential to slave owners' campaign to dominate their culture (Clinton 1982: 203).

Chesnut's feelings about black women constitute part of the central complexity of her text. Gwin has pointed out that "Chesnut sees miscegenation as the embodiment of the evil of slavery and of the double standard that allows the white southern male sexual freedom and marital infidelity while his wife and daughters are bound by the prohibitions of chastity" (1985: 103). In the following passage Chesnut clearly states her attack on slavery and stresses how oppressive the institution is for women:

> I wonder if it be a sin to think slavery a curse to any land . . . Men and women are punished when their masters and mistresses are brutes and not when they do wrong – and then we live surrounded by prostitutes. An abandoned woman is sent out of any decent house elsewhere. Who thinks any worse of a negro or mulatto woman for being a thing we can't name? God forgive us, but ours is a monstrous system and wrong and iniquity . . . Like the patriarchs of old our men live all in one house with their wives and their concubines, and the mulattoes one sees in every family exactly resemble the white children – and every lady tells you who is the father of all the mulatto children in everybody's household, but those in her own she seems to think drop from the clouds, or pretends so to think.
>
> (Woodward 1981: 29)

Unable to do anything about it, many southern white women feigned ignorance of extramarital, interracial relationships, at least those that occurred under their own roof. Chesnut expresses pity for the white women whose husbands are involved in liaisons with their slaves but has no sympathy for the female slaves who are their sexual victims. She believes that the real victims of such an immoral system are the virtuous white women who had to share their husbands and their homes with undignified slaves. She directs her bitterness against black women, the victims rather than their victimizers and does not discuss the fact that the patriarchs commit rape or that the slave women suffer. Clinton refers to this response on the part of southern white women as displacement of guilt: to escape their own implication in the institution of slavery they transferred the blame to the victims themselves, thus freeing themselves from personal responsibility (1982: 196). According to popular stereotypes black women were considered lascivious, so it was easy for slave owners to promote the construct of the 'lewd black female' among white women, who were not eager to seek a divorce on these grounds. The rhetoric about black women's 'animal sexuality' dehumanized, objectified, and devalued black women even more than their 'slave' status; as a result, wives were more comfortable turning against black women for their inherent characteristic of 'lewdness' and not against their husband, whose activities they could pretend to ignore. The racial construct also helped white women feel a righteous anger against black females and avoid the awareness that they compromised their moral standards by continuing to live with a husband who was a brute; they did not have to admit that their husband, too, and not only those of other women, was a rapist. In other words, the racial construct and the division between races were useful tools for both men and women: they both used it to keep up appearances of a decent life, a moral character, and a purity all around.

In another part of her diary under the date of August 26, 1861, she criticizes men for being hypocrites; they deceive and humiliate their wives and daughters who live under the same roof while at the same time they present themselves as models of virtue:

> What do you say to this? A magnate who runs a hideous black harem and its consequences under the same roof with his lovely white wife and his beautiful and accomplished daughters? He holds his head as high and poses as the model of all human virtues to these poor women whom God and the laws have given him. From the height of his awful majesty he scolds and thunders at them, as if he never did wrong in his life.
>
> (Woodward 1981: 168)

The ideology of the white male-dominated households permitted southern plantation owners to perpetuate the ideal of democratic political relations among free men in a society grounded in hierarchical relations. Southerners embraced a worldview that glorified the positive virtues of many forms of inequality. They viewed slaves as social and racial inferiors whose role in life was that of perpetual servants. Moreover, the interracial sexual activity that slave owners engaged

in had two major consequences: it prevented black men from protecting their women since slave men could not defend their wives from the sexual assault of white men; and, it suggested to plantation mistresses their inability to prescribe their own moral values on their husbands. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese claims that the peculiar combination of "hierarchically sanctioned male dominance in the household and bourgeois egalitarianism among men in the public sphere can best be described as paternalism. For paternalism invokes a specific metaphor of legitimate domination: the protective domination of the father over the family" (1988: 64). This did not guarantee the benevolence of those who exercised the domination. Paternalism placed men not only as the heads of their families, but also of their slaves. They assumed the role of father figures to the community as a whole, believing they treated the slave population as a benevolent father would. These father figures did not consider themselves ruthless masters but caring overseers who had the interests of their slaves at heart.

Chesnut seems to ignore the resentment or hatred slaves might feel toward their masters simply because they lack freedom and are considered articles of property. This is evident in her discussion of the two murders of plantation mistresses. In the entry of October 7, 1861, she refers to the murders of her cousin Betsy Witherspoon and of Mrs. Cunningham, both killed by their slaves (Woodward 1981: 210–11). While describing those murders, she exhibits a fear of house slaves mainly because of their proximity to their masters' quarters, but is unaware of the motives that might have led them to such violence. Referring to the mistresses who stay on the plantations and are at the mercy of their slaves, while their husbands fight in the war, she writes, "we ought to be grateful that any one of us is alive" (Woodward 1981: 211). But toward the end of this passage she consoles herself by expressing faith in her own slaves: "I would go down on the plantation tomorrow and stay there, if there were no white person in twenty miles. My Molly and half a dozen others that *I know* – and all the rest I believe – would keep me as safe as I should be in the Tower of London" (Woodward 1981: 212). Molly is the black slave that she trusts, for she had nurtured Chesnut when she was sick. Yet, in other passages in her text, it is clear that she cannot view her as a human being with a separate personality, but rather perceives her as subordinate to her own white personality. This is evident when Molly swears allegiance to her mistress, claiming that she had never left Chesnut for "no husband an' children in this world" (Woodward 1981: 829). Like many slave mistresses, Chesnut feels the protection she offers her slaves will be returned with loyalty, but quickly becomes ambivalent, especially after she is informed of the two murders.

In another part of her narrative, Chesnut asserts that northerners' descriptions of the status of slaves were based on gross exaggerations. She maintains that supposed instances of slave mothers killing their infants to keep them from being sold are inaccurate and not truthful. As a southern aristocrat, she believes that the inhumanity of slave owners portrayed in sentimental fiction is largely fictitious and based upon an ignorant view of confederate society. Referring to Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, she believed that Stowe did not understand the behavior of actual slaves or the complexity of the class interactions between masters and

their slaves, and that sentimentalism provided a mask for social inaction. Even though she was not an abolitionist, her thoughts on slavery, racial difference, and class struggle indicate that she was philosophically opposed to the institution. Her sympathy for the slave population is apparent in her attempt to teach black children to read and her opposition to the abusive punishment of plantation slaves. Nevertheless, she considered slavery part of the foundation of her world and was not willing to give up the privileges that the institution offered her.

Regarding motherhood, it is important to understand that it was experienced differently by white women and female slaves. In the eyes of the slaveholders, female slaves were regarded as breeders, rather than mothers, as the birth of children by female slaves increased the property of the master and added to the crop of new workers. By contrast, white women were expected to fulfill biological destiny and patriotic duty by embracing their role as mothers. Chestnut feels that she lacks an important part of the female experience when she refers to herself as "a childless wretch" (Woodward 1981: 32). Her frequent concern and discussion of childlessness reflect her inability to contribute to southern gender expectations. After marriage, southern society expected women to have frequent and many pregnancies that would last the entirety of their childbearing years. In the journal we get the sense that Chesnut tries to justify her childlessness. In one instance she writes:

> I did Mrs. Browne a kindness. I told those women that she was childless now, but that she had lost three children. I hated to leave her all alone. Women have such contempt for a childless wife. Now they will be all sympathy and kindness.
>
> (Woodward 1981: 28)

Julia Stern argues this incident may or may not be fictional, but its purpose is to help Chesnut explain her own lack of children (2010: 53). As the society in which she lived based female accomplishment on the number of children, she needed to uphold her own reputation and to show that women could be respectable without having children. She was well aware that motherhood confirmed a woman's place in the succession of generations and consolidated her ties to her husband. At another point in her text she writes that "women need maternity to bring out their best and true loveliness" (Woodward 1981: 105). This comment is apparently directed at white women since throughout her text she refers to black women's childbearing as a never-ending production of babies who depend on the whites for their sustenance. She appears to feel threatened by the fertility of slave women and embittered that she is not able to consummate her marriage. Her comment "They rapidly increase and never diminish in numbers" (Woodward 1981: 77) reveals her disappointment in the fact that those she considers less human can bear children while she cannot. She probably saw as highly ironic the fact that while slaves continued to propagate in large numbers, she and her husband would have no heirs to inherit the Chesnut estates and to carry on the family name. In a world where role definition played an important part, motherhood

was highly valued and society tended to equate a woman's usefulness with the number of children she produced.

As a member of a privileged class, Chesnut took slavery for granted and did not pay so much attention to it as a social system. In her diary she emphasizes the impact slavery has on white women and the shame miscegenation brings to them: the black woman stands as a symbol of sexuality with freedoms not allowed respectable white women. The suspected or real sexual attention paid to slave women by white men caused mistresses to feel jealousy and hostility. Like many women of her time and position she failed to see the intersections of gender and race with the power structures of the system in which she lived most of her life. Since plantation mistresses and black women were confined by the ideology of domesticity, they were trapped in their respective roles in a patriarchal system that contributed to a parallel oppression of both groups of women.

In Chesnut's autobiographical work what emerges is the ambivalence with which each side views the other. Black women felt resentment toward their mistresses because of their cruelty; white women vented their jealousy and spite on black women. Yet both groups of women were caught in a patriarchal system which rendered them subordinate to male authority. Women's voices were muted and the expression of their feelings was silenced by the male use of the ideological intersection between race and gender: neither black nor white women could voice their 'unhappiness' because of the conventions of the constructed identities that were imposed on them. White women were supposed to sound innocent and not speak of their awareness of men's sexual activity; black women could not complain to their mistresses because they would be held responsible for the illicit affair due to their presumed 'lewd' nature. In the face of common suffering sometimes these women crossed color lines to temporarily connect with each other. However, as Gwin asserts "those color lines blinded white women to the humanity of their black sisters and built in black women massive layers of hatred for those fair ladies who would not or could not see their suffering" (1985: 109).

Chesnut respected and conformed to genteel social protocols expected of plantation mistresses, but at the same time her journal analyzes critically the ethos of the men and women from all social classes that she interacted with during the years of the Civil War. She managed to find a language through which she could inscribe her femininity rhetorically, stylistically, and ultimately historically. She produced what Minrose Gwin calls a "radical" text by focusing on the encounter between "that traditional male domain of history – war" and traditionally female, private, and indoor activities (1985: 10). Unable to imagine a world without slavery in spite of her distaste for its consequences, Chesnut struggled with her own ineffectiveness and could only try to reassure herself that women were not responsible for slavery.

When gentlemen of her circle complimented Chesnut on her sunny disposition, she wrote in her journal: "Much they know of me – or my power to hide trouble, much trouble" (Woodward 1981: 29). The gaps, the silences, and the erasures of her diary indicate that its author could not or would not write down all the aspects of her female experience. Many sentences end in ellipses, pages are

cut and torn out, words are erased, and it is only through omissions that the reader might surmise recurring marital disharmony, nervous headaches, opium abuse, or feelings about her childlessness. Her father-in-law's sexual transgressions with slave women are hinted at in biblical references to Rachel and her progeny. On the last page of her diary, she testifies "No words can tell how unhappy I am" (Woodward 1981: 835).

The effect of the Civil War

When the Civil War broke out, southern women resisted their exclusion from the political conflict that pervaded their region. They knew that they had no place in the public sphere, but they wished to claim a space in the national crisis. Southern women's politics during the secession crisis was a politics of ambivalence: they were torn about their decision to support or oppose secession. As historian Drew Gilpin Faust asserts "women's political ambivalence in the secession crisis arose from a deeper source as well: their uncertainty about their relationship to politics altogether" (1996: 12). They admitted that they had no space in the public sphere, yet they wanted to do their patriotic duty by expressing their apprehension and concern about war. But war was a matter that belonged to men. Women remained at home, marginal, unable to participate in the events and experiencing feelings of uselessness and futility. Sarah Morgan[3] wrote in her diary (East 1991: 77), "The men who are worth something will die off in their prime; while we worthless women, of no value or importance to ourselves or the rest of the world will live on, useless trash in the creation".

The Civil War definitely had a catalytic effect on the lives of plantation mistresses. The absence of so many men to the battlefield had a strong impact on the structures of the South's society and economy. When the men departed for battle, white women on farms and plantations across the South had to assume the management of their slaves. As wartime circumstances encouraged slaves to seek their freedom, it became harder for plantation women to control them and to defend the southern way of life. White women's actions as slave mistresses were fundamental for the viability of the southern agricultural economy and the stability of the social order. Yet during the four years of the Civil War, women acquired a new sense of themselves, born out of necessity rather than opportunity: they realized that they could not depend on male protection anymore and they came to face the postwar world with a feeling of empowerment.

Plantation mistresses were called into participating in new kinds of activity. They assumed responsibility for maintaining and, if possible, increasing the food supply, for producing cotton and wool, and making clothing, flags, tents, and other items soldiers needed. The experience which they had gained in providing food and clothing for slaves was now channeled to feeding and clothing the army. Without the capacity of women to supply the army with clothing, medical aid, and extra food stocks, the South would not have been in a position to deal with the demands of battle as long as it did. The end of the war marked the beginning of a widening gap between the sexes and on the question of woman's

appropriate role. The image of the southern patriarch was shaken and cultural patterns began to change after southern armies had been defeated on the battlefield. When Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, it was clear that it supported the disenfranchisement of women by specifically defining citizenship rights as 'male'. Concerned over their political exclusion, women delegates met in New York City in 1866 and organized the American Equal Rights Association in order to push for suffrage for both blacks and women. Historian Mary Martha Thomas claims that "woman suffrage was held back in the South at least partly because women's rights had long been associated with the emancipation of slaves" (1992: 109). And further on she adds: "White southerners did not seriously consider enfranchising women until the demand for the vote was separated from the abolition movement" (109).

During the period of Reconstruction which followed after the end of the Civil War a new style of woman began to appear, the new woman. Women's lives were significantly altered by the abolition of slavery and the destruction of the plantation system. By the end of the nineteenth century a significant percentage of southern women from all social classes were gainfully employed. Many middle- and upper-class women entered the teaching profession: this movement of southern women into the classroom resulted in establishing teacher-training schools. As for black women, despite their desire to escape field work, they continued to labor in the cotton, tobacco, and rice fields because of the sharecropping system which became the dominant mode of agricultural production in the postwar South. Other black women were employed as domestics, washwomen, nursemaids, and seamstresses. Women's demand for change was clearly a prevalent theme after the end of the Civil War and the social upheaval that followed it.

Some southern women became involved in voluntary associations which contributed to their gaining knowledge of conditions outside the home and acquiring an interest in public affairs. However, women's clubs, even missionary societies, were regarded with suspicion by those who found those activities profoundly disturbing. As historian Marjorie Wheeler asserts: "They regarded the expansion of woman's role as another unfortunate consequence of the war and expected women to return to their traditional sphere as soon as possible" (1993: 10). It is no accident then that the women's suffrage movement in the South met with a lot of resistance and southern women had to wait until 1920 before they gained full enfranchisement.

Notes

1 There are several testimonials regarding the heavy load of responsibilities that plantation women had to undertake. One Virginia lady wrote to her son: "This is the first leisure moment I have had in a long time. I must take advantage of it. Thank God. I have almost gotten thro' Christmas. What a slave a holiday makes of a mistress! Indeed, she is always a slave, but doubly and trebly so at such times" (Blackford 1954: 7). Scott claims that a few plantation mistresses had well-trained slaves, and, as a result, their own duties were largely administrative. Mary Boykin Chesnut constitutes a good example of this category and her leisure was greater because she had no children.

2 The characteristics of 'true womanhood' were promoted through various sermons, books, and religious texts, all of which were written by men (Lindley 1996: 56), while they were also found in popular women's magazines, such as *Godey's Lady's Book*, whose editors were usually male (Matthews 1987: 42).
3 Sarah Morgan and Mary Chesnut wrote wartime diaries that have a great deal of characteristics in common. They differ, however, in that Morgan lacked Mary Chesnut's ambition and her love of politics, but also in their perception of slavery: Morgan mocks the idea of white cruelty to slaves and refers to an idyllic image of smiling black faces who are happy to serve their master.

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17 A "Society of Outsiders"

Virginia Woolf's feminist agenda in *A Room of One's Own* and *Three Guineas*

Katerina Kitsi-Mitakou

Heading toward women's suffrage

Women's contribution to the two great revolutions of the eighteenth century was crucial and diverse, but insufficiently rewarded. Although the French Revolution was ignited by the principles of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity", and although a large number of working class women and a smaller number of the educated elite played a decisive role in the establishment of democracy, the 1792 laws of the new French Republic did not grant women the political rights for which they had fought. In post-Revolution France, women activists were punished for their audacity and repositioned in the margins of society. In America, most white women's responsibilities during the Revolution were associated with the domestic sphere: as republican mothers, they were assigned a role in spiritual rather than actual battles, while at the end of the Revolution, they were not granted equal rights with men. Yet, although neither the French nor the American Revolutions gave women civic rights, they granted them the right to assemble and in doing so consider themselves as gendered individuals (Fraisse and Perrot 1995: 11).

Consequently, even when, in the long nineteenth century that followed, gender roles were more departmentalized than ever before – with women being caught permanently in the private sphere and men in the public one – women were aware of their right to be individuals (something the *Ancien Régime* had denied them). In all social strata, women invented ways of becoming active participants in society; middle- and upper-class women, on the one hand, exploited to the fullest the maternal role ascribed to them, using their power to shape the character of their children (if they were mothers) or their students (if they were governesses). Moreover, by engaging in acts of charity or philanthropic missions, they entered the public sphere and assumed posts of responsibility in hospitals, asylums, or military shelters. Working class women, on the other hand, participated in union meetings, promoted and filed petitions, and developed a class consciousness that later evolved into feminist consciousness. Seen in this light, the nineteenth century was a crux in the history of women and, towards its close, led to the birth of the New Woman and the first-wave feminist movement.

On the other side of the spectrum, male philosophers, like John Stuart Mill, questioned the supposed natural subordination of women and prepared the

ground for gender equality. In *The Subjection of Women* (1861, published 1869), Mill opposes the Darwinian assumption that natural selection favored man who "has ultimately become superior to woman" (*Descent of Man*, Chapter XIX, "Secondary Sexual Characters of Man" 1981: 328), and speaks of women not as the product of biology, but of education which trains them to be slaves. Mill was the first Member of Parliament to introduce the issue of female suffrage in his attempt to amend the 1867 Reform Bill. Although Mill's efforts were fruitless, the campaigns for equal rights continued throughout the second half of the nineteenth century and reached a climax in the early twentieth century with the founding of Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU) by the major political activist of the time and head of the suffragette movement in Britain, Emmeline Pankhurst.

Women's fights for the vote in Britain were long and strenuous and demanded immense sacrifices on their part. As the early twentieth-century suffragettes were sometimes involved in aggressive acts like stone-throwing, window-breaking, or even arson, they had to face the penalty of violent arrests and recurring imprisonments, which led to hunger strikes on their part and forced feeding, an extremely painful process that scarred them for life. When World War I broke, however, the riots came to an end as women took a more active part in public life, undertook traditionally male roles in the workforce, due to the shortage of men, and used the opportunity to prove their abilities. Consequently, when the war ended in 1918, the Representation of the People Act, issued in the same year, gave women over the age of thirty (who were either a member or married to a member of the Local Government Register) both the vote and the right to be elected into Parliament. About 8.4 million women gained the vote. Ten years later, in 1928, women received the vote on the same terms as men, as the right to vote was given to all women over twenty-one years of age, regardless of property ownership.

It is in this context that Virginia Woolf composed her first long feminist essay, *A Room of One's Own* (1929), and ten years later her book-length feminist-pacifist essay *Three Guineas* (1938). Both texts, focusing on women's absence from history and their exclusion from politics, are considered to be a turning point in feminist thought, despite having generated varied reactions by critics. In *A Room of One's Own*, Woolf underscores the constructedness of history as well as the fictionalization of women in the ideological discourse of patriarchy. She focuses on the family and the educational system as central control mechanisms, or "Ideological State Apparatuses" (as they have been termed by the French philosopher Louis Althusser), and highlights the importance of material means in establishing women as active agents in history. Her plan, however, to revise women's position is in a sense utopic, as it isolates gender from other crucial and intersecting categories, like class or race. In *Three Guineas*, Woolf returns to the question of women's exclusion, but in the political climate of increasing totalitarian regimes of the inter-war period, she is aware that gender exclusion cannot be examined irrespectively of all other forms of intolerance towards class, or towards racial and religious minorities. Patriarchy and fascism, she argues are two sides of

the same coin and, as such, must be opposed. Speaking, however, from the point of view of the special class to which she belongs, that of "the daughters of educated men", she finds it impossible to unite with men or with suffragettes in the fight against war. Therefore, in this essay I will show that, while Woolf's feminist agenda echoes many of the theses of the women's suffrage movement, she places little trust in women's right to vote and invests exclusively on the right of the daughters of educated men to be educated and to enter the professions.

A Room of One's Own

Truth in fiction

Woolf's long essay, *A Room of One's Own*, was based on a series of lectures she gave at Girton and Newham Colleges at Cambridge, the first women colleges established in 1869 and 1871 respectively. In October 1928, the year women gained electoral equality with men, Virginia Woolf was invited by Pernel Strachey to talk to the female students about "Women and Fiction". Stratchey was the principle of Newnham College and also a woman with a suffragist background and a friend of the Bloomsbury Group, a group of highly influential writers, artists, and philosophers, among whom Virginia Woolf was a leading figure. The essay, which was published a year later, begins with the concession that a discussion around women and fiction cannot be limited to a few passing remarks about famous women writers who had already entered the canon, like Frances Burney, Jane Austen, Elizabeth Gaskell, or George Eliot. What one needs to focus on, Woolf argues, is "women and the fiction written about them" (1987: 5); this phrase can easily be misinterpreted as meaning simply the way female characters are created in literature, but, if read within the context of the whole essay, refers to the way 'real' women are fictionalized in ideological discourses.

From Woolf's modernist perspective, "one cannot hope to tell the truth" about topics that are as controversial as questions about gender or sex; one can only express one's opinion and allow the audience to come to their own conclusions, "as they observe the limitations, the prejudices, the idiosyncrasies of the speaker" (1987: 6). Based on this principle, and embracing the view that fiction "is likely to contain more truth than fact", Woolf invents a character whom we are invited to call Mary Beton, Mary Seton, Mary Charmichael, or any other name we please, and who is partly real (Woolf's *doppelgänger* in some respects) and partly imaginary. Distrusting the actuality of the law that officially granted women equal rights to men, and overlooking the female suffrage and the first-wave feminist movement, Woolf wants to explore the complex repercussions of the law, or imagine alternative versions of reality, in her effort to comprehend the multifaceted aspects of truth, past and present.

In order to achieve this goal, she is aware she needs a more resourceful and versatile approach than pure documentation. Woolf's perception of truth and her method of approaching it in *A Room of One's Own* seems to be close to

postmodern theories formulated in the second half of the twentieth century that highlight the constructedness of history and the impossibility of accessing reality. More specifically, her text points forward to the 1970s and the work of the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser. Althusser, following the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, believes that in order to establish our reality we rely on language, which shapes us even before birth. Consequently, we are never able to perceive the "real conditions of existence" (1970: 162 ff); all we can do, Althusser claims,[1] is gain some awareness of the ways in which we are inscribed in ideology by complex processes of recognition. It is exactly these complex practices which position women inside or outside history that Woolf sets out to examine through Mary Seton, Beton, or however she calls her in this merging between her fictional world and Woolf's real one.

Education as an "Ideological State Apparatus"

It is important to note that Woolf's Mary adopts a number of personae that are all associated with education and literary pursuits in general: she is a female student, a scholar, a writer, a lecturer whose greatest desire is to cultivate her mind and express her thoughts unreservedly. The first time Mary experiences exclusion is when she realizes that she is barred from all the male sanctuaries of knowledge well-preserved in academic institutions: colleges, libraries, dining rooms, even the turf reserved for male fellows and scholars only. Her inspiration, exciting and important though it is, is blocked the moment her passage is barred by a college official (Beadle) who forbids her to step on the grass of a college. Her dream of conducting research on an important manuscript crumbles when she is told that "ladies are only admitted to the library if accompanied by a Fellow of the College or furnished with a letter of introduction" (1987: 9). She realizes that even her ideas are destined to be barren, stifled as they are by the plainness, scarcity, and mediocrity of the meals served in women's dining rooms. Mary's provoking conclusion in Part One of the essay: "One cannot think well, love well, sleep well, if one has not dined well", is not a trivial demand for gastronomic delights, but a groundbreaking political statement on the key role of education – all of its aspects – in shaping one's identity.

In order to grasp the political implications of the above statement, it is crucial to consider it through the prism of Althusser's influential essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes towards an Investigation". Having initially drawn the line between state power and state apparatus, Althusser further distinguishes between two state mechanisms, which he terms: "Repressive State Apparatus" and "Ideological State Apparatus". While the Repressive State Apparatus (like the Army and the Police) "functions massively and predominantly *by repression* (including physical repression)" and "secondarily by ideology", the Ideological State Apparatuses (like the Church, the School, the Family, etc.) "function massively and predominantly *by ideology*" and "secondarily by repression" (1971: 145). In the same essay, Althusser argues that until the establishment of the industrial bourgeoisie, the dominant Ideological

State Apparatus was the Church, which was paradoxically replaced in the nineteenth century not by the political Ideological State Apparatus, "i.e. the regime of parliamentary democracy combining universal suffrage and party struggle", but by the "Schools" (1971: 153). Although one would expect the school to provide an environment free of ideology, where teachers respect "the 'conscience' and 'freedom' of the children who are entrusted to them" and "open up for them the path to the freedom, morality and responsibility of adults by their own example, by knowledge, literature and their 'liberating' virtues" (1971: 156–7), this is rarely the case. Few teachers, Althusser claims, are aware that they are carriers of a dominant ideology, or make an effort to teach against it.

In this light, Woolf's references to all those apparently trivial practices related to the fictitious Oxbridge college she describes gain new momentum. Woolf does not simply acknowledge the educational mechanism, the university in her case study, as a central control mechanism, but discerns two of the fundamental characteristics of ideology according to Althusser's theory: materiality and "the interpellation of the subject". The materiality of ideology, he claims, is manifested in the small "rituals" in which ideological "practices" are inscribed (1971: 168). In our case, the materiality of the ideology of women's exclusion is made evident in all the routine procedures a female student/scholar should follow: keep off the turf, be escorted by a man in order to enter the library, participate in the dull dinner scene, and so on. More importantly, these rituals can only be successfully performed if Mary accepts the ideological position of an inferior woman/scholar/student assigned to her and allows herself to be a subject already shaped by that ideology. The individual is turned into a subject, Althusser argues, through the ritual of hailing or "interpellating", as he terms it, an indispensable aspect of ideology, as ideology cannot exist, unless the individual responds to the role assigned to him or her. As a result, according to Althusser, when we respond to the "everyday police (or other) hailing: 'Hey, you there!'", we do so because we take on a role given to us (1971: 174).

Likewise, in Mary's story, the college official's signaling makes no sense, unless Mary accepts the inferior position ascribed to her by patriarchal ideology and acknowledges herself as a woman who has fewer rights than men. Mary is unaware at first of the position in which ideology placed her, but gains gradual understanding of the part she is called to play, as she responds submissively to the officer's call and places herself on the 'right' path:

> I found myself walking with extreme rapidity across a grass plot. Instantly a man's figure rose to intercept me. Nor did I at first understand that the gesticulations of a curious-looking object, in a cut-away coat and evening shirt, were aimed at me. His face expressed horror and indignation. Instinct rather than reason came to my help; he was a Beadle; I was a woman. This was the turf; there was the path. Only the Fellows and Scholars are allowed here; the gravel is the place for me.
>
> (1987: 7–8)

The final sentence in the excerpt above signposts Mary's realization that she has no choice but to conform to a certain ideology; her ideas, in other words, very much like her steps, are/have always been artfully maneuvered by forces beyond her control. It is this basic realization that triggers a whole train of thought upon which the main argument of *A Room of One's Own* is constructed: women have been absent from history as writers, explorers, inventors, scientists, scholars, or politicians, because for 300 years in succession (at least this is the time span that Woolf's essay covers, 1987: 8), they have been acting as subjects passively responding to all the 'Hey, you there!' calls that the carriers of patriarchal ideology have been directing to them. Women's inertia, their passive acceptance of their suppression, has been so well inculcated in them that it is almost functioning like a gene carried from one generation to the next: "Anonymity", Woolf (1987: 49) writes, "runs in [women's] blood. The desire to be veiled still possesses them". Unlike men, women feel no urge to name, own, conquer, or subjugate the world around them (1987: 49), as they have been well trained to remain anonymous and submissive.

The personal is political

In Parts 2 and 3 of *A Room on One's Own*, Woolf makes her outstanding contribution to feminist studies, through the celebrated "looking-glass" metaphor and the famous invention of Shakespeare's sister. In these widely quoted passages by second- and third-wave feminists, Woolf draws attention to the magnitude of common family rituals in which women have to carry out a supposedly sacred mission, as she points out with a generous dose of irony. It is precisely Woolf's distinct ability to read the personal as political, her discussion of the impact of small-scale acts on world politics, that has led feminist scholars like Jane Marcus to characterize the *Room* as "the first modern text of feminist criticism" (1984: 79), despite the absence of any explicitly feminist discourse in the book.

In the looking glass metaphor, Woolf makes the simple but keen observation that women at home function as magnifying mirrors for men, projecting an image that is twice their actual size. This position, she observes, is demarcated by women's duty to deflate themselves at breakfast or at dinner, or at any other everyday occasion, in order to make men feel superior; in other words, they praise men's intellectual and physical strength and underline their own shortcomings. This is for Woolf the "drug" that "charges [men's] vitality and stimulates their nervous system" (1987: 36), or the motivating power that prompts 'civilization' in all its aggressive varieties:

> Without that power probably the earth would still be swamp and jungle. The glories of all our wars would be unknown. We should still be scratching the outlines of deer on the remains of mutton bones and bartering flints for sheep skins or whatever simple ornament took our unsophisticated taste. Supermen and Fingers of Destiny would never have existed. The Czar and the Kaiser would never have worn crowns or lost them. Whatever may be their use in

> civilized societies, mirrors are essential to all violent and heroic action. That is why Napoleon and Mussolini both insist so emphatically upon the inferiority of women, for if they were not inferior, they would cease to enlarge. (1987: 36)

Woolf is in line with Althusser in this passage, as she points towards the second most dominant Ideological State Apparatus: the family. For it is in this basic social unit that an individual is first constructed as a subject that has been "always-already" there; as even before birth, a child is "appointed as a subject in and by the specific familial ideological configuration in which it is 'expected' once it has been conceived" (Althusser 1971: 176). Both Woolf and Althusser attempt a grassroots approach to ideology, in the sense that they focus on family as the most elemental state unit. It is important to note, however, that there is one major difference in their perspectives: Althusser's theory is not focused on 'gendered' subjects, whereas Woolf's insightfulness and sensitivity to gender issues steer her towards examining the preordained position of *women* inside the family.

Woolf's emphasis on the political consequences of women's ascribed role within the family makes it evident that any escape from it is highly unfeasible. This, consequently, accounts for the reason women have been absent from history for centuries, as the section on Shakespeare's imaginary sister in Part 3 of *A Room of One's Own* confirms. Relying once again on the power of imagination to reveal the truth to us, and being skeptical towards official recordings of history that do not include any significant female writers or thinkers, Woolf embarks on an intriguing hypothesis: "Let me imagine, since facts are so hard to come by, what would have happened had Shakespeare had a wonderfully gifted sister, called Judith, let us say" (1987: 46). In the imaginary scenario Woolf constructs, Judith, even if she had been as "adventurous, imaginative, as agog to see the world" as her brother, would have been instructed to keep away from books and marry the son of a neighboring wool-stapler her father would have selected for her. She would never have had the chance to learn grammar, logic, or the classics, let alone seek her fortune in London, like her brother did. And even if she had been bold enough to disobey her father and take the same road to London, all doors there would have been closed to her. For the Elizabethan woman was not allowed to become an actress, write and publish her works, or seek shelter and dinner in a tavern, unless she were escorted by a man. And, so, Judith's "lust" for the art of theater, her "genius . . . for fiction" and her gift "for the tune of words" would have been crushed by the predetermined role and expectations she had to fulfill within her family based on women's exclusion from any public activity. "[C]aught and tangled in a woman's body", destined for reproduction and vulnerable to male violence, the talent of the Elizabethan poet, writer, or actress is stifled in Woolf's narrative even before her birth (1987: 47). Judith Shakespeare's story can only have a tragic end: she falls at the 'mercy' of an actor-manager and eventually kills herself, while carrying his illegitimate child.

Material webs

The materiality of ideology, for Althusser, is "*realized* in institutions, in their rituals and their practices" (1971: 184), as we saw above. It is crucial to note, though, that in Woolf's feminist view, the concept of materiality embraces even its literal meaning, the actual conditions in which women live and work, and the real poverty they have been experiencing "not for two hundred years merely, but from the beginning of time" (1987: 103). How could women ever possess wealth, Woolf questions, if their lives are a succession of childbirths and to attend college and pursue a career "would necessitate the suppression of families altogether" (1987: 22–3)? How could women ever inherit anything from their mothers, given that, even if they were able to earn money, "the law denied them the right to possess what money they earned" (1987: 23)? How could women writers spin their webs, if there are no solid corners to which they could be attached? Imaginative works, she reminds us "are not spun in mid-air by incorporeal creatures, but are the work of suffering human beings, and are attached to grossly material things, like health and money and the houses we live in" (1987: 41).

Although aware of the fact that she may be overemphasizing the significance of material things (1987: 101), Woolf still provides a material solution to women's exclusion in the "prosaic conclusion" of her essay: "it is necessary to have five hundred a year and a room with a lock on the door if you are to write fiction or poetry" (1987: 100). This piece of advice, if not read within the context of Part 6, which is the last section of *A Room of One's Own*, might sound like a ridiculously impossible proposal, to say the least, and could justify the characterization of Woolf's feminism as elitist and escapist. To claim that one should have secured five hundred pounds a year – presumably by inheriting it from a rich aunt, as Woolf did – could imply that gender can be isolated from other structures of power, such as class and economic status, which is, of course, absurd.

But, Woolf's argument is carried farther, as she sets one more condition for women's inclusion. A room and a stable income are not enough, unless women become aware of the subject position they have been assigned within the patriarchal structures they live. Woolf induces women to consider their share of responsibility in their exclusion from history; "you are", she provokingly addresses her listeners, "disgracefully ignorant" (1987: 106), if you don't take advantage of the beneficial changes that have taken place since the founding of colleges for women in 1866, the Married Women's Property Act in 1882, and women's suffrage in 1919. This "you" in the closing paragraphs, has notably broadened to include not only the Cambridge students attending her lecture, but all women, even those who could not be present, as she characteristically says, "for they were washing up the dishes or putting the children to bed" (1987: 108). What women should do, she suggests, is work hard in order to bring Judith Shakespeare, the dead poet, back to life, salvage, in other words, all that lost creativity and artistic power that women of the past were obliged to suppress. Although Woolf is not clear about what this entails, she is very explicit in stating that women must curb reproduction (they must go on bearing children, but "in twos and threes, not

in tens and twelves"), disentangle themselves from domesticity ("escape from the common-sitting room"), and take life in their own hands ("there is no arm to cling to, but . . . we go alone", 1987: 107–08). It is here perhaps where the popularity and strength of *A Room of One's Own* lie: in the ways female agency is imagined as a force that can restore to history all those women who had been unjustly and in some cases violently expelled from it.

However, to claim that Judith Shakespeare lives in all women and that all women have the potential to revive her, if they work hard, is an optimistic hypothesis that relies on worldwide sisterhood disregarding in this case other parameters of difference among women, more importantly class, economic status, and race. Even if Woolf's talk/essay opens up to embrace women who cannot afford to attend lectures, it is primarily targeted towards white middle-class women. It is difficult to imagine how a working-class woman who does not possess this steady income and private room can fit into Woolf's plan of reviving Shakespeare's sister. (The working-class woman played a decisive role in women's struggle for the vote, of course, but this is not what Woolf has in mind here, and her attitude towards female suffrage was a complicated matter, as we will see in the next section.) Even if male genius existed among the working classes, she argues, it could hardly ever blossom, much less female genius (1978: 48). It is likewise hard to overlook the racism of Woolf's heroine, as Jane Marcus has pointed out; while distancing herself from male imperial politics and praising women's desire for anonymity, Woolf's narrator exclaims that a woman "can pass even a very fine negress without wanting to make an Englishwoman of her" (1987: 50). Although this is only a passing remark in the essay, it provides enough evidence that in 1929, Woolf's perception of the category of 'woman' is not wide enough to include diversity in all its breadth. Since a large group of women do not fulfill the presuppositions of race and class that she indirectly sets in *A Room of One's Own*, Woolf's call for historical revisionism sounds like an invitation into a utopian fantasy.

Three Guineas

"Daughters of educated men"

In 1938, and under the dark shadow of the rise of fascism in Europe, Woolf returns to the issue of women's political exclusion with a more embracing attitude towards other categories, like race, class, and religion, in her book-length essay, entitled *Three Guineas*. In the new political climate of the 1930s, Woolf becomes aware that it is impossible to discuss gender outside the frame of war, nationalism, and totalitarianism. Although it had been a decade since Britain had granted universal suffrage to all adults over the age of twenty-one, and women's social role was beginning to change drastically, many of the rights that they had gained were jeopardized in the 1930s by the new rhetoric of patriotism that was spreading across Europe. Woolf was well informed that the need to empower the nation in countries like the newly founded Germany under the

rule of Adolph Hitler entailed women's return to traditional domestic roles. In contrast with the unparalleled freedom women had gained in the Weimar Republic (during its short life from 1919 to 1933), the Nazi doctrine confined women to the sole purpose of populating the nation and breeding docile citizens. As the threat of a World War II was imminent in Europe, the peril of women devolving into the status of 'the mothers of the nation' – having only limited access to education and prevented from pursuing a career or assuming posts in the political and academic spheres – was more real than ever before. Moreover, in the context of the movements of nationalism, anti-Semitism, scientific racism, and anti-Communism, which were growing to a threatening extent, Woolf is ready to acknowledge that gender exclusion intersects with other forms of discrimination and, consequently, attempts a reassessment of the utopian solution she offers in *A Room of One's Own*.

The essay's major input to feminist thought lies in the ways it relates the ideology of women's political exclusion with authoritarian ideologies. This thought is triggered, as Woolf explains in its very beginning, by the letter of an educated gentleman who has written to ask her opinion on how war can be prevented. *Three Guineas* is, in its epistolary form, the reply to this question, which, in brief, consists of three infinitesimal donations: a guinea[2] to support the building of a women's college, a guinea to promote women's employment in the professions, and, finally, a guinea given as a free gift and a sign of good trust to men. The essay is divided into three parts, each of which justifies the reasons why her guineas are bestowed on the specific purposes and states the conditions under which they will be given.

In an exaggerated tone Woolf declares herself to be the first woman "in the history of human correspondence" to be asked such a question (1982: 5), and although surprised, she is appreciative that she is at least given the chance to voice her opinion. In her effort to provide an honest response, Woolf feels obliged first to define her subject position, which remains unwaveringly throughout *Three Guineas* that of the "daughter of an educated man". This unusual status refers to a separate class of women, she explains, who oscillate between integration and rejection, as they seem to belong to the same houses and have the same privileges with educated men, but actually do not have either. In what Susan Feedman has interestingly called a parody of Marxist analysis, Woolf invests her pacifist feminist proposal for the prevention of war on this liminal 'class' of women, who both belong and do not belong in the educated class. To a large extent, Woolf's analysis of the position of the daughters of educated men recapitulates the fundamental thesis of *A Room of One's Own* that control of subjects is practiced basically through Ideological State Apparatuses like education and the family.

The daughters of educated men occupy fixed positions within the family and are expected to offer their services to their male kin unconditionally and generously at the expense of their own happiness. They are the ones who zealously look after invalid and old parents, slavishly cater for their husbands' mundane necessities, and kindly relinquish their claim to education in favor of their brothers. Throughout the centuries, the daughters of educated men have

been supporting men and laboring like slaves receiving zero payment, as Woolf poignantly observes:

> The world as it is at present is divided into two services; one the public and the other the private. In one world the sons of educated men work as civil servants, judges, soldiers and are paid for that work; in the other world, the daughters of educated men work as wives, mothers, daughters – but are they not paid for that work?[3] Is the work of a mother, of a wife, of a daughter, worth nothing to the nation in solid cash?
>
> (1982: 63)

Moreover, while these women have been practicing the profession for which there is neither name nor pay, bearing and raising children, managing the house, nursing the poor and the sick, and so on (1982: 89), their entrance to all other professions was barred, as their access to education was likewise limited and subject to male approval. What solution can they provide then to the prevention of war? The daughters of educated men, Woolf claims, are weaker than any other class, even that of working-class women, who can warn men that if they go to war, they will stop making munitions or helping in the production of goods (1982: 16). Their only means of support is this one guinea. This meager contribution, reflecting the overall impoverished state of women throughout the ages mentioned in *A Room of One's Own*, trusts in what Woolf thinks is the most subdued class of citizens and stresses that change will come only if the state invests on these women's education.

For this new women's college to have any impact on the prevention of war, its teaching goals and methods need to be seriously revised, Woolf explains. The world will not be transformed, unless competition and the old hierarchies stop being promoted and the college is an experimental and adventurous institution founded on the principles of "magnanimity" and "generosity". It should breed respect for liberty, "not the arts of dominating other people; not the arts of ruling, of killing, of acquiring land and capital"; it should teach "medicine, mathematics, music, painting and literature" and also "the arts of human intercourse"; its aim should not be to "segregate and specialize, but to combine" (1982: 39, 40). This depiction of the ideal college points at Woolf's conviction that the educational system, as an Ideological State Apparatus, can only cancel the prevailing ideologies of exclusion if it stops serving the Repressive State Apparatus, represented through the state, the army and the police.

Furthermore, Woolf adds, the war will not come to an end unless schools stop propagating soldiers, and women will not be integrated into public life unless discriminatory policies are completely eradicated. When Woolf donates her second guinea to the cause of helping women enter the professions, she sets one major condition: in pursuing a vocation, women "shall in no way hinder any other human being, whether man or woman, white or black, provided that he or she is qualified to enter that profession, from entering it; but shall do all in her power to help them" (1982: 77). Paradoxically, although the first guinea goes

for a college that will be built exclusively for the small class of the daughters of educated men, the second guinea donated is given on the more inclusive condition that all prejudices will be eradicated in aiding women enter the professions. She makes it perfectly clear that "all properly qualified people, of whatever sex, class or colour", must have equal opportunities, while, practicing their profession, must rid themselves of all forms of pride and nationality, like "religious pride, college pride, school pride, family pride, sex pride" (1982: 92, 93). The political ambience of the late 1930s, infected by the extreme nationalism of fascist ideology, the rapidly spreading theories of racial purity, and the mounting intolerance to non-dominant racial, religious, gender, and sexuality groups, force Woolf to deduce that patriarchy and fascism are common enemies. "The daughters of educated men", she writes to the gentleman who sent her the letter requesting for help,

> who were called, to their resentment, "feminists" were in fact the advance guard of your own movement. They were fighting the same enemy that you are fighting and for the same reasons. They were fighting the tyranny of the patriarchal state as you are fighting the tyranny of the Fascist state.
>
> (1982: 118)

"As a woman I have no country"

If men and women have been fighting the same foe, that is war, can the daughters and sons of educated men unite in a common cause? The wish to abolish war is a common denominator for both men and women, it seems, but their dissimilar status makes it impossible for them to join forces. In the third part of *Three Guineas*, Woolf absolutely refuses to subscribe to a society founded by men, in order to defend individual rights, resist dictatorship, and promote equality for all (1982: 98). In a very emblematic move, she offers a guinea to this society, to show that she agrees with its principles, but declares that she will remain outside it and join instead a society created by the daughters of educated men, which she calls the "Society of Outsiders". Her third guinea is granted freely this time on the 'unconditional condition' that she will not have to fight a joint evil, that is war, on the men's side, but will conduct her battle from the subject position that she occupied for centuries.

As men have always been "inside society", they have developed a different culture, education, and set of values from women, and, consequently, are fighting war with different means from those of women. Men, furthermore, are always protected by "their" country, while this same country treats women as slaves and denies them the right to protect themselves from discrimination and male oppression. Therefore, Woolf wonders why would a woman think of a country as "her" country, if it does not fund her education, pay her labor, or grant her the right to retain her citizenship when she marries a foreigner. While men may have every reason to want to fight for a country that provides for them, women have reasonable grounds to be indifferent to this country:

> Therefore if you insist upon fighting to protect me, or "our" country, let it be understood, soberly and rationally between us, that you are fighting to gratify a sex instinct which I cannot share; to procure benefits which I have not shared and probably will not share; but not to gratify my instincts, or to protect either myself or my country. "For," the outsider will say, "in fact, as a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the whole world."
>
> (1982: 125)

Woolf's final declaration has been interpreted not only as a repudiation of national location, but also as a call for global sisterhood. On these grounds, it has been criticized by feminist scholars like Adrianne Rich, who is firm about the importance of the politics of women's location, or Rosi Braidotti, who reads this statement as an elitist form of cosmopolitanism. In line with Rich, Braidotti argues that "generalizations about women should be replaced by cartographic accuracy, attention to and accountability for differences among women" (1994: 56). Furthermore, Jane Garrity describes it as an "exuberant embrace of the rhetoric of territorial expansionism" (2003: 15). Phrased as it is in such general terms, Woolf's pronouncement does seem to ignore the significance of one's subject position, pose universal sisterhood, or isolate gender bias from other forms of oppression. However, when read within the context of the whole essay, it becomes clear that it is more complex than it appears. Woolf adamantly insists in both *A Room of One's Own* and the *Three Guineas*, on the specific subject position she has been allocated as woman, but expands her premise in the latter making patriarchy overlap with fascism. Nevertheless, as we will show below, worldwide womanhood is not a concept Woolf embraces, given her emphasis on the particular class of women on which she lays her hopes for the end of war.

Unlike women, men are motivated to love their country and trust in public manifestations of order and supremacy. Moreover, men's devotion to ceremonies and public spectacle, their passion for "medals, ribbons, badges, hoods, gowns" (1982: 131), all those emblems that signal authority, power, and prestige, make it evident that they are not ready to renounce the old state of affairs and that their method of fighting war actually promotes warfare. The five photographs which are inserted in the book are in fact not pictures of the mutilated bodies of dead children, to which she refers in order to speak of the horror of war, but pictures of proud men in pompous poses and full regalia: a soldier, a group of royal heralds, male academics gathered at a procession in Cambridge, a judge, and an archbishop. With this, Woolf implies that it is not just in scenes of literal destruction and devastation that one may trace the gruesomeness of war, but in the very commonplace demonstrations of hierarchy that take place in all sectors of public life. Throughout *Three Guineas*, Woolf returns repeatedly to the pattern of male obsession with the display of rank as a malady that contaminates life and encourages war. The guinea she donates to the men's society is making a twofold statement: we (men and women), she asserts, are drawn together as we both hate war; at the same time, we are drawn apart, as we employ opposite tactics in struggling against war.

It is evident, then, that in this battle against fascism, which is also a battle against patriarchy, women will have to be voluntarily excluded from the public world. Remaining outside, Woolf declares, "we will experiment not with public means in public but with private means in private" (1982: 130), as women have been doing for the past centuries; and remaining outside does not mean to be submissive, as "to be passive is to be active" (1982: 136). Women's "Outsiders Society" will abolish all forms of state, religious, and military demonstrations and combat stratifications, functioning instead "without office, meetings, leaders or any hierarchy, without so much as a form to be filled up, or a secretary to be paid" (1982: 132). As Susan Stanford Friedman argues, this denunciation of hierarchy aligns Woolf with "an anarchist tradition that regards concentrations of power as corrupting, inevitably creating a system of hierarchies and exclusions" (2013: 35). Woolf, however, does not eliminate hierarchy altogether or public ceremony in this society of outsiders.

Woolf announces that there is one final mock-ceremony that has to be performed and that is the burning of the "vicious" and "corrupt" word "feminist", "that has done much harm in its day and is now obsolete" (1982: 117). This rage against the woman's movement has often puzzled critics, given Woolf's feminist outlook and the fact that many of the thoughts expressed both in *A Room of One's Own* and in *Three Guineas* coincide with fundamental tenets of the feminist agenda of first-wave feminism. As Sowon S. Park shows, feminists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries discussed ideas such as the need for women's financial independence, the importance of providing women with career and educational opportunities, or the degradation of women in militarist states (2005: 122–4). Both Virginia Woolf and her husband Leonard and their wider circle of the Bloomsbury Group were immersed in suffrage, and of course Woolf exhorts women to take advantage of their newly acquired right to vote in *A Room of One's Own*, as we have seen. She is, however, an ardent anti-suffragette. If the vote is won, but the war has not ended, then "'the woman's movement' has proved itself a failure", as all it achieved was to recycle the politics of war (1982: 51). In the strict order, militancy, spectacle, and violence that characterized the suffragettes' organized activities, Woolf sees a detrimental replication of male authoritative tactics. Consequently, her solution is first to exorcise parading and aggression through a parody of such ceremonies, and, then ensure that such militant feminists are excluded from her society. Although Woolf is not an anti-feminist, in her effort to eliminate hostility, she adopts both hierarchy and spectacle, as the daughters of the educated men keep the door shut to all other women.

To conclude, in *Three Guineas* Woolf shows that women's liberation from the tyranny of patriarchy depends on the world's liberation from the tyranny of the fascist state, which can only be attained if the daughters of educated men are allowed access to education and the professions. New colleges must be built for them, and they must be institutions that are experimental and free from old biases, vanities, and competition. Although both men and women are opposing a common foe, the war, they are not united in this struggle, since they

are fighting the enemy from different subject positions: men have been in the center of public life for centuries, while women have been excluded from it. It is imperative that the daughters of educated men, upon which not only the future of all women, but also the future of the world lies, dissociate themselves from both brothers and sisters who are engaged in a militant struggle. The Society of Outsiders that Woolf proposes is a society that advocates "exclusion" in a two-fold way: first, in the sense that it includes women who deliberately wish to remain outside men's society, and second, in the sense that it excludes the women who do not fulfill the basic condition of belonging to the class of the daughters of educated men. Woolf's feminist position in *A Room of Own's One* and *Three Guineas* leaves some loose ends, in the sense that women's struggle to gain visibility and political rights in men's society works in an additive way: they are white middle-class daughters, sisters, or wives of educated men *and* they claim the right to have equal rights with them without giving up their position of class, race, and intellectual superiority.

Notes

1 Several later thinkers, like Ernesto Laclau, Slavoj Zizek, and Fredric Jameson, built on Althusser's ideas.
2 A guinea was a coin minted in Great Britain between 1663 and 1814 and it was approximately one-pound sterling. The coin had an aristocratic nuance, as although it had been out of currency since 1816, it was still used in transactions related to luxury items, payment for horses, land, or art at the time *Three Guineas* was written.
3 The 'why' in the question, "but are they not paid for that work", is implied in the text.

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18 Gender equality law in Greece and the European Union

The trajectory from exclusion to inclusion

Anna-Maria Konsta

Introduction

Women have historically been considered as inferior to men and this inferiority has been a result of a consistent patriarchal political ideology. Traces of women's inferiority in society as a form of political ideology, which resulted in women's exclusion from political life can be found in every aspect of Western societies including the law. Greek culture has vacillated for centuries between ancient ideological influences about the weakness of female nature and the awareness of women's strengths, which have been revealed and acknowledged in the hardships of daily life throughout the many folds of Greek history. Law has contributed to a gradual change in the legal culture regarding women in the areas of education, political participation, work, and family. Legal culture as a concept of the sociology of law includes the values, ideologies, attitudes, perceptions, beliefs, and opinions people hold with regard to law and the legal system, and has recently widely been used as methodological tool in comparative legal research (Husa 2015; Siems 2014). The concept has been based on the concept of political culture. Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity (Verba and Almond 1963; Verba 1965).[1]

The first to propose a distinction between external and internal legal culture was Lawrence M. Friedman (1975). With 'external culture' he described the ideologies, opinions, appreciations, conceptions, and beliefs of the general population on positive law rules of the actual legal system. In contrast, with 'internal legal culture' he signifies the principle values, ideologies, knowledge of legal terminology and interpretations related to law of these members of the society who perform specialized legal tasks, for example lawyers, judges, law academics, and so on. In this essay, I will use the concepts of external and internal legal cultures to show how Greek political and legal culture has evolved in regard to gender equality.

Friedman relates legal culture to the legal system by maintaining that legal culture converts the interests of social force (power, influence) into demands,

or permits this conversion. Demands put pressure on the legal system and provoke the creation of legal acts. Thus, the legal system is perceived not as static, but dynamic, since it interacts with other systems and, predominantly, with the social system. Legal culture acts like a filter, which transforms interests into demands or makes this transformation possible (Friedman 1975: 193). In this respect, legal culture is the decisive factor that influences the legal system and, as such, is responsible for the functions of the system itself and, presumably, for the differentiation among legal systems. If we tried to define the relationship between culture and legal system, we could say that the moment culture penetrates the legal system and influences its functions, it becomes a 'legal culture'.

The idea of female inferiority has been motivated by political considerations, but as I will show in this essay, this ideology has influenced not only the political culture in modern Greece but the legal culture as well. The historical evolution of gender equality law in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Greece is a very good example of how law has shaped attitudes, beliefs, and political ideology towards the achievement of consensus in society concerning the political participation of women. Both Greece's collective political history and the life histories of certain members in Greek society, especially of those women who formed the Greek feminist movement, contributed to a great legal reform in the twentieth century. So, both external political events, such as Greece's European Union (EU) membership, for example, and internal political events, triggered by certain individuals in the country, have shaped gender equality law in Greece which was the result of both external and internal legal culture influences. The Greek legal culture has incorporated for centuries the ideology of women's exclusion. Greek women were by law excluded from political life on the basis of traditional biases until they were granted voting rights in national elections in 1952. Nevertheless, gender equality did not start taking root in the culture until the legal reform of the mid-1970s and, especially, after Greece joined the EU in 1981. An external legal influence triggered reforms in the country which were followed by a gradual transformation of its legal culture.

Therefore, in this essay I will argue that Greece followed an uncommon trajectory: whereas in matters of gender equality legal structures usually follow the demands of grassroots movements and social changes, in Greece the gender equality law led the way and preceded social transformation; thus, legal culture facilitated the trajectory from exclusion to inclusion for women in Greece. Law as an expedient of change shaped not only women's citizenship but also female identity. This transformation occurred initially at a slow pace in the nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth century Greece, and was accelerated after World War II, following the country's democratization. Major legal reforms took place in the field of gender equality, which often preceded society's readiness to accept them, such as the introduction of the 1946 Greek Civil Code and the entry of the country in the EU in the 1980s. In this context, the feminist movement in Greece played an important, and often underestimated, role in identifying the issues that were to be introduced in the legislative reforms. Therefore, law shaped women's subjectivities, which had to be transformed by

law and through law, in order for them to acquire the status of the so-called neutral, but inherently male, legal subject, stripped of emotion and essentially incapable of bridging the public and private divide.

The institutionalization of gender equality in Greece

The emancipation of Greek women followed in the footsteps of the emancipation of women in other European countries, but the very idea of female emancipation has its roots in the Enlightenment. Thinkers such as the English Lady Mary Wortley Montagu and the French Marquis de Condorcet were initially involved in the effort to include women in higher education. In 1789, women in general benefited from the pre-revolutionary climate that developed in France: by submitting their notebooks of complaints (*cahiers de doléances*) to the Estates General or the king's ministers, French women claimed a variety of rights. However, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen did not include the women, who were excluded from politics since the early years of the French Revolution (Riley 1989; Alexander 1994; Kravaritou 1991, 1996; Scott 1996; Simonton 1998).

At the same time, the first proto-feminist works appeared, starting with the French Olympe De Gouges and her *Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen* (1791) whose aim was to promote female suffrage. Olympe de Gouges in her Declaration demonstrated her deep humanistic convictions and her aversion to all forms of violence, oppression, and discrimination (Riley 1989; Alexander 1994; Kravaritou 1991, 1996; Scott 1996; Simonton, 1998). The British Mary Wollstonecraft in her treatise *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* stressed the importance of educating women and criticized the attitude of men who separated women from the human species. This work can be considered as the first feminist declaration, which laid the theoretical and moral framework for women's claims in the nineteenth century (Smith 1988; Riley 1989; Alexander 1994; Scott 1996). Mary Wollstonecraft in both *A Vindication of the Rights of Men* (1790) and *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792) used the concept of human dignity in order to describe the appropriate state of women and men in her preferred political system. The world in the nineteenth century was just beginning to perceive the unfair treatment of women. Nevertheless, the Napoleonic civil code of 1804, which served as a model code in continental Europe, did not take into account the feminist demands of the time. For example, it kept French women's rights on divorce and property limited, regardless of the revolutionary spirit which promoted equality (Smith 1988: 120–2).

However, in the nineteenth century a shift in the paradigm occurred. Women all over Europe did not acquire formal rights but gained in practice the possibility to go to school and be educated (Beeton 1986). In particular, schools for girls were founded in the Ottoman Empire, while secondary education schools for girls opened in Bulgaria and Serbia in 1857 (Dalakoura 2008). All religious communities established their own schools for girls. The Greek Orthodox community paid special attention to the idea of the nation, which was considered to be a broader

family. Women as mothers were educated in order to be able to prepare their sons to become the future leaders of the nation. The Greek Orthodox schools for girls in Constantinople were addressed to all social classes and especially to the underprivileged. In 1875, the Zappeion School of Constantinople for Greek girls was founded, which included both primary and secondary education (Dalakoura 2008). In the late nineteenth century, an organized feminist movement emerged in the West. The so-called suffragettes filled the streets of the United States and Britain seeking shorter working hours, the right to vote, and wage increases. In Greece, however, feminists faced many obstacles in promoting their ideas, as they had to battle against the centuries-old perceptions and attitudes of Greek society, which wanted women completely subservient to men and viewed them as capable only of running the household and raising the children. Greek women were mostly illiterate at the time and, therefore, unable to react and claim any political rights.

Kalliroi Parren (1861–1940), the first Greek feminist and journalist, released the first issue of the *Ladies' Gazette* (*Ephêmeris tôn Kyriôn*, 1887–1917), opening essentially a new era for the role of women in the country. The *Ladies' Gazette* could be considered as the first organized entry of women into journalism and charity work by a team of working women from the Ottoman diaspora (Dalakoura 2008). The *Ladies Gazette* systematically raised the demand for the education of women and participation in the country's workforce. Arguments for it, however, were drawn primarily from the areas of Greek tradition, charity, and nationalism: women needed to be educated to become worthy wives and mothers, in order to be able to educate and support their soldier-sons, who would fight for the realization of the Great Idea, that is, to liberate from Ottoman rule the lands that had been inhabited since ancient times by Greek populations and reconstitute greater Greece, encompassing Constantinople (at the time capital of the Ottoman Empire), Asia Minor, and a great part of Southern Balkans. The Great Idea most surely affected Greek women's emancipation by allowing them to be more actively involved in national politics and creating some tolerance within society regarding their prospects for education and work. As a result, it created the right social conditions for external legal culture to adjust more easily the legal reforms that followed.

During the early 1900s, working hours for both men and women in Greece ranged from twelve to fourteen hours per day. The working conditions of unskilled female workers were particularly deplorable, since women were overworked "without having the specific rights that [were] granted to workers in other countries" (Gaitanou-Gianniou 1931: 32). To remedy this situation, the prime minister of Greece, Eleftherios Venizelos, introduced a set of legislative reforms between 1910 and 1912. These laws aimed at regulating labor conditions in Greece, especially for working women and minors, providing them with health insurance and wage increases, while improving working conditions in general (Goulimi 1989). More specifically, after a 1910 law prohibiting women's employment in the metallurgical sector, Law No. 4049 of 1912 attempted to amend working conditions for women and children, providing for a working day of no

more than ten hours in industry, manufacture, quarries, and construction, while female employment was completely barred in the mining sector. The law also limited women's employment on Sundays in almost every sector (with the exception of transportation) and prohibited night shifts in most workplaces (except for transportation, restaurants, and hotels). Moreover, women were granted maternity leave, consisting of four weeks before and four weeks after labor.

These measures were revisited in the 1920s, after Greece signed and ratified the conventions agreed at the first international Labor Conference of the International Labour Organization (ILO) held in Washington, DC, in October 1919. Greece was the first country in the world to ratify ILO Convention number 1 on reduction of working time. This was an attempt by Venizelos to give proof of modernization efforts in the Greek state. Moreover, law 2274/1920 increased maternity leave from eight to twelve weeks (six before and six after giving birth), provided for compensation and free medical care during maternity leave, and guaranteed the woman's employment during childbearing. At the same time, law 2275/1920 prohibited night shifts for every female industrial worker. Nevertheless, there were numerous cases of women excluded from protective legislation, such as domestic servants who were often under-aged, and peasant women working in agriculture (Kyriakidou 2002: 492). Still these laws changed social attitudes toward women significantly and prepared society to grant them full political rights a few decades later.

The few feminist groups which were established in Greece during the early 1910s were in reality local chapters of international feminist organizations. Their activities ceased during World War I but were resumed after the termination of hostilities in 1918. The National Council of Greek Women (NCGW), the Lyceum of Greek Women (LGW), the League for Women's Rights (LWR), and the Socialist Women's Group (SWG) developed as the most important and influential interwar feminist groups (Kyriakidou 2002: 494). The NCGW, the Greek chapter of the International Council of Women (ICW), was founded in August 1908; it published the periodical *Ellinis*, through which it sought to improve the position of women and children by promoting gender consciousness, educational opportunities, and, eventually, full civil and political rights (Avdela and Psarra 1985). The LGW was founded in late 1910 by Kallirroi Parren and her closest women associates. According to its mission statement, the LGW aimed at creating a coalition among women for the "progress of their gender" and for the preservation and revival of Greek customs, traditions, and generally folk Greek culture, including folk dances, songs, and costumes (Kyriakidou 2002: 498; Mpompou-Protopapa 1993: 24–5; Avdela and Psarra 1985). The LWR and the SWG focused on the issue of protective legislation for women workers. The LWR was established as the Greek section of the International Women's Suffrage Alliance (IWSA) in January 1920 (Bosch and Kloosterman 1990: 1–10, 176) and its main objective appeared to be a "purely feminist struggle", which concerned all the reforms necessary to achieve gender equality in society and to improve the status of both "the Woman and the Child" (Avdela and Psarra 1985: 104; Kyriakidou 2002: 495).

Two prominent members of the LWR, Maria Desypri (later Svolou) and Anna Makropoulou, worked for the National Bureau of Employment and produced detailed reports and memoranda addressed to the ILO on the wages and the conditions of women workers, which served as valuable sources for the study of female employment in interwar Greece (Liakos 1993: 293–4; Kyriakidou 2002: 495). Avra Drakopoulou-Theodoropoulou (1880–1963) was LWR's longstanding president, while her husband, Spyros Theodoropoulos, a member of the Greek Parliament, concentrated his efforts on the implementation of the first Greek labor legislation (Moshou-Sakorrafou 1990: 152–4; Kyriakidou 2002: 495). The SWG was founded in October 1919 (Avdela and Psarra 1985: 48; Kyriakidou 2002: 495) by Athina Gaitanou-Gianniou (1886–1954). Gianniou, who worked as a schoolteacher, defined feminism as a social theory for gender equality on an economic, civil, social, and political level (Kyriakidou 2002: 495). During the interwar period, efforts to organize women workers in trade unions were generally unsuccessful. Among working women, however, schoolteachers were the first to join trade unions, and this is the reason why female teachers succeeded in earning salaries equal to those of their male counterparts earlier than other female workers (Kyriakidou 2002: 502; Avdela and Psarra 1985: 88–9).

One of the most prominent feminists of the interwar period was the lawyer Agni Roussopoulou. She was the head of the legal department of the NCGW and one of the most active members of the International Federation of Women Lawyers. She published articles in the feminist journals *Ellinis* (Greek Woman) and *O Agonas tis Gynaikas* (The Woman's Struggle) on social policy and labor legislation; the problems of immigration, criminal juvenile courts, social welfare, and local government issues; as well as the question of the legal status of women in the forthcoming Civil Code, the issue of dowry, and illegal adoptions. She was also a close associate of Alexandros Svolos, a prominent socialist lawyer and politician (Vallianatou 2010). In 1929, the twenty-eight-year old Agni Roussopoulou enrolled in the first competition for the recruitment of judges to the newly created Council of the State (Supreme Administrative Court), but was rejected by the selection board on the grounds that she was a woman. Roussopoulou filed an action for annulment before the court, citing the explanatory declaration of Article 6 of the Constitution of 1927 and the principle of equality, claiming that the word 'citizen' in this article, as well as in other articles, means the person having Greek nationality, regardless of sex and age. The explanatory declaration to Article 6 stated: "without exception men and women may be appointed to every public function and position". Yet in its Decision 42/1929, the Council of the State dismissed her action, arguing that the explanatory declaration does not establish the principle of equality. More specifically, on the basis of the wording of law 3713/1928, which established the Council of the State, regarding 1) the qualifications required for appointment to the Council, one of which is the completion of military service, which is compulsory only for Greek men, and 2) the spirit of other relevant laws, particularly those regulating the organization of the courts and the qualifications of judicial officials, it was deduced that in the positions of highly ranked civil servants, such as the Council of the State

judges, no woman may be appointed. At the time, the term 'civil servant' was understood primarily as masculine by public authorities. As a result, for certain prestigious public-service positions that came with high pay, they established various restrictions and prohibitions exactly for the purpose of preventing highly qualified women from seeking appointment to them, as was the case with Agni Rousopoulou (Avdela 1990).

The educational reform of 1929 provided for compulsory schooling of girls in primary education. During the 1920s, attendance of girls in secondary education increased, but high schools not only remained segregated by gender, but also had a different educational program for girls and boys. These differences in the educational program highlighted and strengthened traditional stereotypes, undermining legal and political efforts for gender equality (Avdela and Psarra 1985). Nevertheless, political efforts for gender equality continued, triggered by the pressure of the feminist movement, and as a result the Greek Constitution of 1927 provided for the first time the possibility that the government could adopt a law granting women political rights. On February 5, 1930, the Venizelos government issued a decree that granted women the right to vote but only in municipal elections, provided they were at least thirty years old and literate. This limited right to vote was not accompanied by the right to be elected. It should be noted, however, that at the time male citizens had full political rights, regardless of literacy competence. The efforts of Greek feminists during the interwar period to win the right to stand as a candidate in municipal elections ultimately failed in 1933, after only one court (the Court of First Instance at Serres) approved women as candidates in municipal elections (Pantelidou-Malouta 1989: 8–9).

The first Greek women to vote were the 242 individuals who participated in the local elections of Thessaloniki in December 1930. A few women voters were also able to vote in the local elections of Samos (March 1931) and Piraeus (February 1932) (Avdela and Psarra 1985: 70). At a nation-wide level, some 10,000 women out of about 340,000 eligible female voters voted in the local elections of February 1934 (Samiou 2013; Pantelidou-Malouta 1989: 8–9). However, in November 1935, the Kondylis government, in an attempt to reduce male unemployment, introduced a bill restricting women's employment in both public and private sectors. As a result, all feminist groups united to protest against the bill, arguing that "women's employment is not a luxury; it is an essential need . . . Thousands of families will suffer from the bill . . . Employees should be hired only on the basis of their qualifications" (Moshou-Sakorrafou 1990: 210–12; Kyriakidou 2002: 504). Greek women acquired full voting rights in 1949 with law 959/1949, which, however, restricted said rights up to the end of 1953 to women older than twenty-five years of age, while it prohibited women from becoming mayors or community presidents (Moshou-Sakorrafou 1990). This law was adopted in order for the country to conform with the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and especially with Article 2, which stipulates that "[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status".

The 1952 Greek Constitution did not grant full political rights to women directly, but opened the possibility for a future law to regulate the right for women to vote or stand as candidates in national elections. Full political rights were bestowed on women by law in 1952, when all women over the age of twenty-one were allowed both to vote without any restrictions and to be elected to public office. It is worth noting that this law was passed after the end of the Greek Civil War (1946–1949), at a time when the Greek government wished to create the image of a democratic society. Therefore, in July 1952, the Greek Parliament passed law 2159/1952 with a marginal majority, granting women equal political rights to men in national elections. Nevertheless, full political rights to women were granted 'from above', that is by state law, and were not the result of the Greek feminist movement efforts, as was the case with the 1930 law (Pantelidou-Malouta 1989: 9), when, despite their efforts to acquire equal political status to men, they managed to gain only limited political rights. By 1952, however, it was generally accepted across the political spectrum that sooner or later women would have to be granted these rights, in order for the country to conform to the international and European standards on the issue.

How the male-dominated Greek government viewed women at the time is vividly depicted in a flyer distributed to Greek women voters by the Ministry of Interior in 1953 (Greek Ministry of Interior 1953; Pantelidou-Malouta 1989: 9), where it was specifically stated that the principle of women's equality before the law is an international law which has been ratified by Greece, clarifying the specific nature of equality for women and advising female voters the following: "At your first political steps, do not forget that being a woman, you now take an exam on your maturity" (Greek Ministry of Interior, p. 6) and that "the country needs to include in our political morals, the sweetness, the gentleness, and the modesty which constitute the ornaments of Greek women" (Greek Ministry of Interior 1953: 9). Women were still seen as belonging only in the private sphere of family and, in order for them to transition smoothly into the public sphere of politics, it was thought they needed some help and encouragement by the Greek government. Sweetness, gentleness, and modesty were most probably seen as purely female characteristics, relevant to women's traditional role as caretakers.

In the 1952 national elections, women did not participate, ostensibly because their registration to the national electoral directories had not yet been completed, but, in reality, because the Greek Parliament had voted to suspend their rights for the upcoming November elections. This suspension of an acquired electoral right, intending to exclude women voters from specific elections, constitutes a world-wide novelty. In January 1953, however, there was a by-election in the city of Thessaloniki, where women participated for the first time in national elections. The significance of these elections was great, as they appointed the first female member to the Greek Parliament, Eleni Skoura. Greek women registered their desire to vote in great numbers for the very first time in the parliamentary elections of 1956, when the number of female registered voters doubled, but, in the end, the actual participation of women was quite low (Pantelidou-Malouta

1989: 10), most likely because gender roles and spheres of activity were still very distinct in Greece in the early 1950s.

Although in law since 1952, the first Greek Constitution that directly granted women political rights equal to men's was the 1975 Constitution, which was the first democratic constitution of the country after the collapse of a seven-year long dictatorship (1967–1974). The 1975 Greek Constitution enshrines the principle of equality before the law for both Greek men and women, stating that "[a]ll Greeks are equal before the law" (Art. 4, par. 1), and specifies that "Greek men and women have equal rights and equal obligations" (Art. 4, par. 2).[2] Moreover, it protects female voters with the provision that "[t]he law cannot abridge the right to vote except in cases where a minimum age has not been attained or in cases of legal incapacity or as a result of irrevocable criminal conviction for certain felonies" (Art. 51, par. 3); this stipulation resolves the problem of occasionally interpreting voting rights for women differently from the prescription of the law. Most importantly, the Constitution included an innovative provision regarding gender equality:

> Work constitutes a right and shall enjoy the protection of the State, which shall care for the creation of conditions of employment for all citizens and shall pursue the moral and material advancement of the rural and urban working population. All workers, irrespective of sex or other distinctions, shall be entitled to equal pay for work of equal value.
>
> (Art. 22, par. 1)

In this way, the Greek Constitution included a social right (the right to work), and provided for equality of pay for men and women, especially at a time when gender equality was being institutionalized in Europe. This was another reform 'from above', aimed at persuading the European institutions and governments that Greece would soon be ready to join the European Economic Community.

The 1975 Constitution provides for a formal equality for both sexes before the law. Formal equality, however, is not enough to achieve equality in practice. Substantive equality was achieved with the revision of the Greek Constitution in 2001, which states that, "[t]here is no discrimination on grounds of gender when positive measures are taken to promote equality between men and women" (Art. 116, par. 2), ensuring that "[t]he state shall take measures to eliminate inequalities existing in practice, especially those that favor men over women" (Art. 116, par. 3). Thus, a policy context for affirmative action was finally put in place in Greece. These two constitutional provisions have given rise to a number of policies promoting gender equality, but there are still gaps (Stratigaki 2007). Such policy developments have stemmed both from active feminist campaigning within the country and from the need to harmonize domestic legislation with European and international law on gender equality.

Greek membership of the EU in 1981 marked a turning-point in gender equality policies in the country, the most important of which was the Reform of Family Law in 1983. With the adoption of law 1329/83, Greek family law was

modernized and adapted to the constitutional requirements of gender equality. According to this law, the concept of patriarchal family was officially replaced by the family of equality. Some important elements of the new family structure include the following: it revoked the institution of dowry and replaced it with the stipulation that both spouses are obliged to contribute according to their strengths in addressing the needs of the family. It became mandatory for women to maintain their family surname after marriage; the compulsory nature of this law was changed in 2008 (article 28 of Law 3719/2018), making it possible for both spouses to add the husband's or wife's surname next to their own, creating a family surname. Moreover, it has enabled spouses to determine their children's surname, which can be the surname of one of the parents or the combined surname of both. It institutes the eighteenth year of age as the maturity age for both sexes and the year after which one can get married without parental consent. It stipulates that the upbringing and education of children must take place without any discrimination on the grounds of their sex. Children born out of wedlock were granted equal rights to those of children born within marriage, which has resulted to the legal empowerment of single mothers. Both spouses have the right to claim part of the property they acquired during their marriage and can agree to a system of common ownership. Finally, a very important legal reform introduced in 1983 was the modernization of divorce provisions and the institutionalization of divorce by mutual consent.

A number of National Plans for Equality have been developed and implemented in Greece since the reform of the family law. The latest National Action Plan on Gender Equality (2016–2020) plans to introduce several infrastructural changes, in its attempt to treat gender equality comprehensively and mainstream it throughout relevant ministries. Nevertheless, despite these steps forward, serious gaps still exist in gender equality in practice, especially in the private sector in the areas of hiring, promotion, and firing, and in the public sector in the area of taxation, where married women are still treated as subordinate to their husbands in the context of the administrative practice to be included in their husband's income declaration as a secondary name.

The historical evolution of gender equality law in Greece has shown that in most instances this law was adopted from above and that it was introduced by internal legal culture in most of cases in order to conform to international and European standards. The role of the implementation of EU legislation in the Greek legal order has been decisive in transforming external legal culture on gender equality.

The EU legal framework on gender equality as an expedient of change

As shown above, gender equality law was reformed in Greece after the country became a full member of the European Economic Community (EEC, currently the EU)[3] in 1981. At that time, Greece had to adapt its legal system to the very sophisticated EEC gender equality legislation, which had been gradually introduced since

the late 1950s. Thus, EU law served as an expedient for change in the case of Greek sex equality legislation that led to continuing legal reform, regardless of the society's readiness to accept it. This is a legal reform from above induced by internal legal culture that gradually had the effect of transforming external legal culture. In this section, the development of EU gender equality law is briefly presented, mainly focusing on primary and secondary legislation.[4]

Article 119 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC) of 1957[5] enshrined the principle of equal pay for work of equal value regardless of the gender of the employee, which was initially adopted to ensure free competition in the context of the common market, and avoid social dumping between a member state with more protective legislation on behalf of women and another with lower standards or no protective legislation at all (Barnard 1996). During the 1970s, the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community (ECJ)[6] granted direct effect[7] to Article 119 TEEC in *Defrenne II*,[8] while it later elevated the principle of gender equality into a fundamental right enjoying the protection of Community law in *Defrenne III*.[9]

Specifically, in the *Defrenne II* case, the applicant who was an air hostess working for the public airline company, Sabena, in Belgium, brought an action before the Labor Tribunal in Brussels for compensation for the loss she had incurred in terms of salary, allowance on termination of contract, and pension in comparison with male members of the crew performing identical duties. Ms. Defrenne invoked directly Article 119 TEEC, since there was no relevant national law provision. The Belgian appeal court referred the case to the ECJ asking for the interpretation of Article 119 TEEC, and the ECJ held that the equal pay provision of Article 119 had as its aims both economic and social functions, and as it forms part of the social objectives of the Community, the principle of equal pay for equal work would be binding not only upon member states but also, directly, upon private employers. So, an individual can rely on the EEC Treaty to enforce rights against another individual before the national courts.

Additionally, in the *Defrenne III* case the referring Belgian Court asked the ECJ whether Article 119 TEEC extends beyond equal pay and also includes equal working conditions for men and women; in particular, it asked whether the insertion into the contract of employment of an air hostess of a clause bringing the said contract to an end when she reaches the age of forty constitutes discrimination prohibited by Article 119 TEEC or by a principle of EEC law. It should be mentioned that such an age limit was not imposed upon male cabin attendants who were assumed to do the same work as women. The referring Court, also, asked the ECJ if that clause may have pecuniary consequences, in particular, as regards the allowance on termination of service and pension. The ECJ held that fundamental human rights form part of the general principles of community law. The elimination of discrimination based on sex forms part of those fundamental rights, and even though Article 119 TEEC is limited to the problem of pay discrimination between men and women, the principle of non-discrimination based on sex forms part of the Community legal system, and thus, it may subsequently

take the form of precise rules of law, which are directly applicable and which will guarantee the effective equality of men and women.

Subsequently, the Court interpreted the general principle of equality in its case law relating to maternity rights in the workplace.[10] Furthermore, by outlawing indirect discrimination,[11] the ECJ recognized the substantive content of the principle of equality and its collective dimension (Peters 1996; Mancini and O'Leary 1999). More specifically, the case law of the European Court on indirect discrimination is similar in many ways to the theory of disparate impact evolved in the USA, and has been, most probably, inspired by it (De Schutter 2006: 9–13).

On February 9, 1976, the EEC Council of Ministers adopted, on the level of secondary Community law, Directive 76/207 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment of men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training, promotion, and working conditions.[12] Article 2, par. 4, of the Directive states the following: "This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities which affect women's opportunities in the areas referred to in Article 1(1)". This is the first provision ever in Community law to cover positive action. The term 'positive action' is used for the first time in a Community act on the promotion of positive action for women (Recommendation 84/835/EEC).[13]

In terms of primary Community law, 'positive action' was first recognized in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.[14] The agreement on social policy, which was incorporated in a separate protocol annexed to the Treaty, encouraged the adoption of advantages for women to counteract other disadvantages:

> This Article shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for women to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in their professional careers.
>
> (Article 6, par. 3)

Other articles of the Maastricht Treaty regarding the establishment of the European Community (TEC) (Art. 2 and 3, par. 2) recognize for the first time in primary Community law the general principle of gender equality and the concept of gender mainstreaming, which involves the integration of a gender perspective horizontally into the preparation, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies, regulatory measures, and spending programs, with a view to promoting equality between women and men, and combating discrimination.[15]

By 1997, with the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam, EU law provided the following:

> With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific

> advantages in order to make it easier for the underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers.
>
> (Art. 141 par. 4 TEC, now TFEU, Art. 157, par. 4).[16]

The scope of Article 141 par. 4 TEC was clearly broader than that of Article 2 par. 4 of Directive 76/207. Positive action has since been regarded as a measure to be adopted in favor of the under-represented sex, as it can be taken on behalf of men as well as women. Also, the different formulation of the article and the reference to 'equality in practice' favor the interpretation that EU legislators no longer wish positive action to be an exception to the principle of equality but a means to its implementation.

Directive 2002/73,[17] adopted by the Council and the European Parliament, amended Directive 76/207 on the equal treatment of men and women in order to adapt it to the new perspective of Article 141 TEC. Specifically, in respect of positive action, the Directive provided in Article 2(8) that "Member States may maintain or adopt measures within the meaning of Article 141(4) of the Treaty with a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women".

The Amsterdam Treaty also introduced Article 13 of the TEC,[18] which allowed for the adoption of secondary EU law by the Council of the EU to combat discrimination on grounds of gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or beliefs, disability, age, or sexual orientation. The concepts of direct and indirect discrimination were further defined by two Directives, which were subsequently adopted on the legal basis of Article 13 of the TEC: the Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (2000/43/EC),[19] and the Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (2000/78/EC).[20] Direct discrimination exists when a person receives less favorable treatment than that received by another person in the same situation. Indirect discrimination exists when a provision, criterion, or practice that is at first sight neutral may in fact place persons in a disadvantaged position compared with other persons, unless the provision, criterion, or practice is objectively justified by a lawful purpose and the means used in pursuit of the said purpose are effective and necessary.[21]

Gender equality has a horizontal impact on the development of all EU policies (gender mainstreaming) and is accompanied by provisions on positive action, with a view to implementing equality between men and women, which will be real, not purely formal. A number of legislative acts have been adopted in the 2000s promoting gender equality on the basis of article 13 TEC (now 19 TFEU). In 2004, a Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services (2004/113/EC)[22] was adopted. Also, in 2006, a Directive on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation was adopted, which codified all previous gender equality directives concerning employment (Directive 2006/54/EC).[23] Finally, in 2010 a Directive on the application of equal treatment for self-employed women was adopted (Directive 2010/41/EU).[24]

On December 1, 2009, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights became legally binding on member states,[25] in accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which gives the Charter the same legal status as the Treaties. Chapter III of the Treaty is dedicated to equality, which is now explicitly recognized in primary EU law as a fundamental right. Article 21 of the Charter forbids "[a]ny discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation". In other words, what we see is an extension of the grounds of discrimination that are prohibited, beyond those cited in Article 19 of the TFEU, with the likelihood of further extension in future, given that the list of grounds of discrimination contained in Article 21 is only indicative. We are thus likely in the future to see a broader application of the principle of non-discrimination on different grounds. The Charter also states that "[t]he principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favor of the under-represented sex" (Article 23 par. 2), while it also requires that equality between men and women be ensured "in all areas" and, therefore, in both the public and private sphere (Article 23 par. 1). Both the first and second paragraphs of Article 23 apply "in all areas", meaning that positive action programs may extend beyond women's working lives into public life, including the balanced representation of women in political life (Kravaritou 2002: 45), or even further, into the private sphere, such as personal, family, and domestic life. In cases where men are the under-represented sex, it would be possible for positive action to be taken to support them. The fact that equality must be ensured "in all areas" means that men must be able to assume the social roles of women, just as women can assume roles traditionally undertaken by men. Of course, it must be remembered that any expansion of the scope of positive action in the context of EU law must take place within the limits of the Union's competences.[26]

As it becomes obvious from this brief presentation of EU primary and secondary legislation, the EU legal framework on gender equality is quite sophisticated and constitutes one of the most advanced legal systems in the world today as far as protection of women is concerned. Greece, as a full member of the EU, has been acquired to adjust its legal system to the requirements of the EU Directives and transpose them into the national legal order. Thus, starting in 1981, gender equality has been formally protected in the country.[27] Of course, full equality in practice for women is yet to be achieved, not only in Greece but all over the world. Nevertheless, legal reforms induced by EU membership in this area have greatly contributed to a gradual transformation of both the external and internal legal culture in the country. It can be concluded, therefore, that EU law has served as an expedient for change of the Greek legal culture.

Conclusion

The transformation that took place in the Greek legal culture concerning gender equality is the result of a trajectory from exclusion to inclusion; the process

started at a slow pace at the end of the nineteenth century, but accelerated rapidly after World War II and reached its peak after the entry of Greece into the EU in the early 1980s. Certain legislative reforms in the beginning of the twentieth century, which intended to modernize the Greek state, triggered the trajectory towards women's inclusion. This effort, in conjunction with the labor law that emerged in Greece in order for the country to meet international protection standards, ameliorated both women's political position and work conditions. Yet, this was a reform for women without the women, as the legal system left many grey areas in which women were completely unprotected, such as women workers in agriculture or domestic help.

Although these legislative reforms were imposed from above, they were subsequently supported by the Greek feminist movement, which sought to expand the acquired rights for women from socio-economic to political. Whereas, in the case of men, the institutionalization of political rights preceded the institutionalization of social rights, in the case of women the opposite occurred. Women played an important role in the legislative reform that took place in the 1920s and early 1930s through the newly formed Greek feminist movement. The first feminists in Greece were well-educated women, mainly brought up in the late nineteenth century Ottoman context that favored education for girls. In this sense, they constituted an elite among women. Their demands put pressure on the Greek government in the late 1920s, when the first legal reforms towards political equality took place. They formed a pressure group that reflected the concerns of an external legal culture on what gender equality law should be. Therefore, external legal culture intersected with internal legal culture at the right moment in the early 1920s in Greece to bring reform to Greek society in a peaceful manner, despite the long tradition of viewing the women as inferior in Greece and without the strife caused by the suffragettes in Europe.

In every society, law changes gradually, both to reflect social changes and to meet new social demands. The role of prominent, well-educated Greek feminists was crucial in this respect, because indirectly they managed (often through their politically involved husbands) to reach centers of power and affect the legislative process towards the adoption of increasingly more political rights for women. In the first half of the twentieth century, therefore, women were, indeed, given limited voting rights, but continued being unequal to men in many important ways. It becomes obvious, therefore, that the efforts of the Greek feminist movement were not enough to alter the male-dominated legal culture of the country on their own.

After World War II, the opposite process occurred in Greece. Law changed drastically but not because of internal forces such as the feminist movement, but because Greece had to meet the international standards of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this case, the reform was decided by an elite group of Greek politicians and, therefore, was triggered by the internal legal culture. Whenever legal reforms are triggered by the internal legal culture of a country, society needs time to adjust. Such was the case with the extension of

voting rights to Greek women, who, nevertheless, participated with very low numbers in the 1956 national elections. It took many decades for women to enter politics actively and even today quotas are used for women by political parties, in order to counter-balance the number of male and female candidates in both municipal and national elections.

After gaining membership of the EU, Greece undertook an obligation to implement all pre-existing and new EU legislation concerning gender equality. EU law on gender equality is one of the most sophisticated and protective legal regulations for women in the world. As Greece was trying to meet its standards, it went through a sweeping democratization process, taking bold steps and starting with the reform of its family law system, which had been discriminatory against women. As a result, Greece adopted in the 1980s a new, gender-neutral family law. Certain provisions of this law are still considered very advanced, such as women not changing their family name after marriage.

Greek gender equality law, responding to EU law, led the way for the social transformation of Greece. In a way, the internal legal culture of legal specialists influenced the external legal culture in this case. It is possible for a legal reform to change the mentality of the people, that is to say it is not only the external legal culture that can trigger reforms in a country. Internal legal culture, when it triggers legal reforms, may alter peoples' conceptions, beliefs, and ideas about law within a given society. The best example of this is the late twentieth century reform on gender equality in Greece that went hand in hand with the democratization process of the country. Society was still quite traditional but radical pro-gender equality reforms influenced by the EU framework managed to rapidly change mentalities. Only forty years after these reforms took place, institutions such as the dowry seem a distant tradition. Legal reform on socially sensitive matters such as gender equality normally follows societal change, but sometimes precedes it, as was the case in Greece, where legal culture acted as a filter or as a means of communication between the social system and the legal system. Whether external or internal, legal culture can trigger reforms of the legal system and can change society.

Notes

1 See also, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1968). New York: Macmillan, Vol. 12: 218.
2 All quotes are from the official English translation of the 1975 Constitution, available at <www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf>.
3 The term 'European Economic Community' (EEC) is used for historical reasons. The EEC was dissolved with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty; it is currently called 'European Union' and its laws are referred to as 'EU laws' instead of 'Community laws'. Later in this section the term 'EU' and 'EU law' will be used instead.
4 Primary EU law is mainly the provisions of the EU treaties and secondary legislation is the legal acts adopted by the EU institutions such as Directives.
5 This TEEC entered into force in 1958 – the term 'European Economic Community' is used for historical reasons.

6 The acronym EJC is used both for the 'Court of Justice of the European Communities' and for the 'Court of the European Union' to signify that in both cases it is the same Court, but had different names at different times.
7 The principle of direct effect of EU law practically means that an individual may invoke directly an EU law provision before his/her national court without waiting for this provision to be implemented by national legislation.
8 ECJ 8.4.1976, *Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena*, 43/75, ECR 1976, special Greek edition, p. 175.
9 ECJ 15.6.1978, *Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena*, 149/77, ECR 1978, special Greek edition, p. 419.
10 Cf. ECJ 12.7.1984, *Ulrich Hofmann v. Barmer Ersatzkass*, 184/83, ECR 1984: 3047.
11 The definition of the principle of indirect discrimination in EU gender equality law is the following: "[t]here is indirect discrimination where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary" (article 2b of Directive 2006/54/EC). See for example the following cases of indirect discrimination: ECJ 31.3.1981, *J.P. Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd.*, 96/80, ECR 1981: 911 and ECJ 13.5.1986, *Bilka – Kaufhaus GmbH v. Karin Weber von Hartz*, 170/84, ECR 1986: 1607.
12 EE L 39 of 14.2.1976, special Greek edition: chapter 5, vol. 2: 70.
13 EE L 331 of 19.12.1984.
14 The Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993.
15 For the definition, see <http://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/what-is-gender-mainstreaming>.
16 Under the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, which entered into force in 1999, Article 119 of the EEC Treaty was amended and became Article 141 of the consolidated version of the Treaty on the establishment of the European Community (TEC), and was reiterated in 2007 with the Treaty of Lisbon as Article 157 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Note that after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, article 141 was renumbered and it is now article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); its content, however, remains unchanged.
17 Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of September 23, 2002, amending Directive 76/207/EEC of the Council on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, EE L 269 of 5.10.2002: 15–20.
18 Article 13 of the TEC is now article 19 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU).
19 Directive 2000/43/EC of the Council of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, EE L 180 of 19.7.2000: 22–6.
20 Directive 2000/78/EC of the Council of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, EE L 303 of 2.12.2000: 16–22.
21 Art. 2, par. 2 of Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC respectively.
22 Directive 2004/113/EC of the Council of December 13, 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, EE L 373 of 21.12.2004: 37–43.
23 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 5, 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), EE L 204 of 26.7.2006: 23–36.
24 Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 7, 2010 on the application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women

engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC, EE L 180 of 15.07.2010.

25 With the exception of the United Kingdom and Poland, on the basis of Protocol 30, which was annexed to the Lisbon Treaty.

26 This is stipulated in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

27 For an extensive list of all Greek laws implementing gender equality law EU Directives, see the report by Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos (2017: 7–8).

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19 Gender, citizenship, and political inclusion/exclusion in the European Union

An intersectional approach

Birte Siim and Monika Mokre

Introduction

In contemporary political debates, the principles of gender equality and women's rights have become the dominant discourse apparently supported by all major political forces. In the European context, anti-discrimination according to ethnicity/race, religion, sexuality, gender, age, and handicap are part of the fundamental values inscribed in the Lisbon and Amsterdam Treaties. In addition, the free movement of European citizens across the borders, one of the European Union's (EU) four fundamental freedoms, is a barrier for discrimination according to nationality. In political debates gender equality is, however, frequently juxtaposed to cultural and religious claims of minorities, especially of Muslim groups. Interestingly, the populist right, historically rather devoted to conservative family values, uses the lack of gender equality in Muslim cultures as a central argument against migration to Europe. This argument has recently been taken up by liberals, including liberal feminists.

While this argumentation can, obviously, be used to legitimate the discrimination of minorities, it is, by contrast, also problematic for European women, since it takes its starting point from the belief that, in fact, gender equality and women's political inclusion, are more or less implemented in European majority societies. Nevertheless, such a belief contributes to legitimize women's exclusion and devaluate feminist claims for women's rights and political inclusion. In addition, it can prove detrimental for the possibility for minority women to make their own claims, since they may be reduced to victims of patriarchal oppression within a specific minority culture, while ethnic minority men are seen as perpetrators.

This chapter aims to contribute to the theory and research on gendering the political inclusion/exclusion from an intersectional point of view. It looks at different theoretical schools of thought on citizenship, the political inclusion/exclusion of women and minorities, and discusses the strength and weaknesses of the EU gender and anti-discrimination politics as well as their implementation in the Member States. Key questions are: Who are the agents? What are their claims? How do women and minorities communicate? What are the results? And how far does an intersectional approach further academic analysis as well as policy implementation in this field or, on the contrary, prove harmful for gender equality?

One hypothesis would be that, both in politics and in theory, different strands of activities/claims and thought have developed separately without much mutual influence (Siim and Mokre 2013). One of the implications is that it has been difficult to develop consistent theoretical perspectives, legislative activities, and official discourses on gender equality and anti-discrimination in diverse societies: with regard to political theories, approaches from the perspective of gender studies, migration studies, and citizenship studies have developed separately without much mutual recognition and inspiration. With regard to EU legislation, we have observed the separate introduction of women and anti-discrimination legislation taking place in different periods of time (Mokre and Borchorst 2013). The main argument of this essay is that these separations in politics and theory are mirrored in public discourses usually lacking an intersectional political perspective.

Intersectionality

The intersectionality approach was developed by feminist scholars in Europe and the US as a way to articulate intersections between inequality creating categories such as gender, class, and race/ethnicity, between the systems of capitalism, racism, and patriarchy, between multiple identities and group politics (Yuval-Davis 2011; Collins 2015). The term was first coined by black feminist scholar in the US, Kimberley Crenshaw (1989; 1991), whose influential work focused on race and gender as the major social categories, arguing that contemporary feminist and antiracist discourses in the US have failed to consider the intersections of racism and patriarchy (Crenshaw 1991). Her original intersectional approach explored structural and political dimensions of intersectionality, focusing on the intersections of race and gender and on the situation and rights of black women within the Civil Rights movement. Thus, the focus here is on multiply discriminated groups (Bose 2012).

In Europe, however, class has been a key category and the dimension of race has been primarily related to anti-Semitism and colonialism (Ferree 2009: 86; 2008: 237), hence, distinctive European power structures exist, which are different from the slavery and segregation in the US. Class struggles between the Left and the Right have been prevalent in Europe since the First World War, and relations between class and gender have been a key issue for feminist theorizing scholarship since the 1970s and 1980s, although they were not framed as intersectionality (Yuval-Davis 2011). Another significant factor is that struggles between native majorities and national minorities, as well as religious struggles between Catholics and Protestants, are part of Europe's historical legacies. Thus, European feminist approaches to intersectionality have different conceptualizations which do not focus mainly on intersections of gender, race, and marginal social groups, but on the interactions of social differences for all members of society, hence on the *dynamics* of intersectionality (Bose 2012). Here, scholars propose that social divisions express different axes of power to be explored at organizational, structural, and individual levels (Yuval-Davis 2011: 6–8). Social categories like

gender, race, and class, and their intersections are, thus, not prior to discursive and institutional structures but are constructed by them (Anthias 2013).

Myra Marx Ferree's comparative approach highlights the differences in the framings of equality and the politics of race, class, and gender in the US, Germany, and the expanding European Union (Ferree 2008). Comparing institutional frameworks for gender equality in the US and Europe, she argues that the US academic discourse and historical legacy privileges a metaphor of gender "being like race", since both represent a form of second-class citizenship. This contrasts with Western Europe, where the analogy 'gender being like class' has been employed both in academic discourse and by women making claims as a collective group. She also notes that, in the post-socialist states of Eastern Europe, the gender-class analogy is problematic because socialism and class struggles are associated with an authoritarian state (Ferree 2008: 244). Ferree's conceptualization here is based on an inter-categorical approach highlighting how different categories influence each other. Other forms of intersectional thought focus on intra-categorical dynamics, e.g. on the cross-cutting of gender by race and class (McCall 2010, quoted by Anthias 2013: 8). Yuval-Davis has argued for an intersectionality approach which combines the sensitivity and dynamism of the intra-categorical approach to cross-cutting differences with the more macro-economic perspective of the inter-categorical approach (2011: 6).

Intersectionality thinking has thus become a dynamic and fast-travelling theory, which has fostered creativity within and across disciplines and intersectionality as a field of study has become more heterogeneous (Collins 2015 6–7). Scholars thus have different conceptualizations and understandings of intersectionality and the concept often acquires different meanings by studies embedded in diverse contexts and when employed by different social actors placed in academia or as activists in civil society organizations.

This essay is concerned with political intersectionality employed as an analytical strategy to the gendering of European welfare states and citizenship able to encompass the interplay of various policies (that is, welfare, citizenship, migration, and asylum) on the selected groups (differentiated according to gender, class, ethnicity/race, and nationality/citizenship) (Mokre and Borchorst 2013; Siim and Borchorst 2017; Mokre and Siim forthcoming). It is interested mainly – but not exclusively – in the intra-categorical dynamics and the ways inequalities are constructed in political agency by policies and institutions. The empirical material is primarily focusing on the contemporary European context. Here, we see two contradictory developments: on the one hand, multiple discriminations are increasingly being acknowledged by political institutions and activists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the field are also developing an intersectional perspective. On the other hand, we can also observe competition and mistrust between feminist and anti-racist NGOs in a form of "oppression Olympics" (Hancock 2011). And, even more strikingly, we can observe the mobilization of feminist claims by nationalist rhetoric as a way to legitimate the exclusion of migrants and refugees, dubbed "femonationalism" by Sarah R. Farris (2012; 2017).

In the contemporary European context new conflicts are identified among citizens about how to handle migration/integration and about the inclusion/exclusion of refugees and migrant groups. This is followed by new forms of nationalism which have created growing tensions around citizenship and human rights, between and among national citizens, European citizens and third-country nationals. We can observe here how the dynamics of intersecting categories like race, class, and gender influence each other. Existing forms of racism are not only the outcome of racializing processes and the same holds true for gender and class. The production of specific ascriptions to race, gender, and class always co-produce the respectively other categories. As Anthias observes, "Social divisions can be mutually reinforcing . . . but they may also function to produce multiple and uneven social patterns and contradictory locations at particular conjunctures" (2013: 14).

Arguably the intersectional approach allows for a fresh perspective on studies of citizenship and the political inclusion/exclusion of women and marginalized groups in political theory hitherto lacking. Citizenship studies, such as above all the classical work by T. H. Marshall (1949/92) focus either on the inclusion/exclusion of the working class in society or on the lack of political rights of immigrants. In this vein, more recently, scholars have argued for the extension of citizenship rights to immigrants (Bauböck 2006; Isin 2009), since the exclusion of settled immigrants from access to political rights subjects part of the permanent population to legislation without representation (Bauböck 2006: 20). Scholars such as Engin Isin have drawn attention to contemporary changes in citizenship legislation, distinguishing between different citizen rights "blurring the boundaries between human and civil, political and social rights and the articulation of rights by (and to) cities, regions and across states" (Isin 2009: 367). However, this scholarship rarely addresses the issue of gender equality and women's rights.

Migration studies represent another strand of research on political exclusion. Scholars in migration theory usually give priority to universal principles of ethnic/racial equality over gender equality. One illustrative example is Hannah Arendt's seminal work on political exclusion, *The Origin of Totalitarianism* (1951), proposing "the right to have rights" as a basic human right. In this work, she analyzes the lack of legal rights for the growing groups of refugees, immigrants, and stateless people in Europe in the interwar period. In Arendt's approach the emphasis is anti-Semitism, the political exclusion, and oppression of the Jewish people, refugees, and national minorities in the European nation states but she does not deal with gender questions. Even Arendt's democratic theory developed in *The Human Condition* (1958/1998), which emphasizes the decisive divisions between the public and private arena, between the sphere of the *polis* and the sphere of the household and family, was not concerned with the political exclusion of women.

Feminist scholars, however, have studied the political exclusion of women, gender equality, and women's equal rights. One example is Carole Pateman who, in her seminal book *The Sexual Contract* (1988), analyzed the public/private divide, focusing on women's roles as mothers/carers as the main barrier for women's political inclusion. Another example is Anne Phillips, who in *The Politics of*

Presence (1998), considers mainly the barriers to women's inclusion in political institutions. While gender equality is often a non-negotiable principle in liberal feminist theory, another approach to gendering citizenship studies integrates the analysis of women's equal civil, political, and social rights with the political inclusion of marginalized social groups (Young 1990; Lister 1997; Siim 2000). One example is Iris M. Young's influential approach to democracy in *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (1990). Here she analyzes the common oppression of women and marginalized social groups and proposes a model for the inclusion and empowerment of these groups in democracy 'from below'. These critical studies of the equal rights of women and marginalized groups opened the door for the studies of multiple oppressions and discrimination, and for intersectionality studies of gender, citizenship, and national belongings (Yuval-Davis 2011; Siim 2013; Siim and Mokre 2013). However, theoretical approaches bringing together the different aspects of political inclusion/exclusion of women and marginalized social groups are still rare. Arguably, an intersectional approach would be able to overcome this problem in theory and research, and shed light on multiple discriminations, for example, of migrant and refugee women or of migrants as part of marginalized social classes.

European policies on gender, discrimination, migration, and asylum

This section gives an overview of the relations between the principle of gender equality and multiple discrimination in European legislation. It aims to discuss how the theory of gender equality has been interpreted in discourses and policies. It shows that in theory as well as in European policy-making, an encompassing view on different forms of discrimination has only slowly evolved and is still contested. Gender equality policies were part of European policy-making from the outset. The principle of equal pay for equal work of women and men was first enshrined in the Treaty of Rome of 1958 but had mainly a programmatic purpose; it was later followed by a directive on equal pay that had more direct national implications. The 1980s and 1990s brought to the political agenda issues of gender equality such as the reconciliation between work and family, gender and violence, and women's role in decision-making (Mokre and Borchorst 2013). However, policies addressing race and ethnicity were adopted relatively recently. Only during the 1990s, did a broader understanding of inequality reach the agenda. At this time race and ethnicity came to the fore, and in 1997 the issue of multiple discrimination was brought up in the Amsterdam Treaty. The Amsterdam Treaty also formed a watershed for migration policies, as it was with this Treaty that asylum and migration issues became an EU competence. The Treaty aimed at introducing a common asylum system (Art. 63) and common legal standards for third-country nationals in the EU (Art. 73). These different strands of legislation and policy-making have yet to be analyzed in a comprehensive way in order to understand their mutual influence (Mokre and Borchorst 2013).

Gender equality policies of the EC/EU

As mentioned above, equality between women and men became part of European Community-principles when the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' was enshrined in Article 119, in the Rome Treaty of 1957. For nearly two decades, no further gender specific legislation was issued nor was Article 119 further clarified; this only happened by the Equal Pay Directive (adopted in 1975). While the principle of equal pay was closely related to economic issues and could, therefore, be understood as part of EC economic policy, during the 1970s gender equality policies started to include other parts of women's (and men's) working life, especially the questions of pregnancy and parenthood. Within the EU institutions a consensus emerged that "encouraging women into the labour market constituted the best way in the medium term to increase the supply of workers" (Hoskyns 1996: 100). The European directives on equal treatment for men and women at work and in social security were negotiated and adopted between 1975 and 1978. This directive introduced the concept of positive action into EU legislation in 1978 – not as a recommendation but within a paragraph permitting such measures. This can be seen as a new phase in EU gender politics, from equal opportunities to positive action. The next step was the introduction of gender mainstreaming (Rees 1998, quoted by Kantola 2010).

In the realm of European integration, the term 'gender mainstreaming' (GM) first appeared in 1991, in the Third Action Programme on Equal Opportunities (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000: 435); in February 1996, GM became an official policy of the Commission (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000: 436). The term 'gender mainstreaming' has been contested and defined in many ways. In the most modest definitions, GM implies a focus on gender perspectives in every step of the policy process – design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation; by contrast, the more radical definitions include a transformative aim of achieving equality between women and men. With the Treaty of Amsterdam, equality of opportunities of men and women as well as GM as the strategy to reach this goal became part of EC primary law. In 2000, the Commission launched a Framework Strategy to include all policies and all parts of the Commission into the GM concept. Although, in political practice, GM usually consists of measures targeting women to promote gender equality, in principle it applies to both sexes. While GM has frequently been understood as the abolishment of specific measures for women in favor of the integration of gender issues into all policies, the European Commission applies and recommends a dual approach consisting of mainstreaming activities aimed at both sexes and specific actions for women (see, for example, European Commission 2006: 2).

Intersecting policies: equality and anti-discrimination

Up to the 1980s, gender equality was the only field which concerned EU anti-discrimination legislation. Since then, the question whether the EU should combat racism emerged – along with the increasing focus on this phenomenon

in Europe. In 1986, a joint declaration against racism and xenophobia was signed by the presidents of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council (Hoskyns 1996: 178), stating the following:

> In the 1980s, the Council's opposition hampered the Commission and Parliament's efforts to combat racial discrimination on the EU level . . . It was only in the 1990s when it became evident that racism might affect the functioning of the internal market that opposition in the Council started to wither. The rise in extreme right parties and racist violence in Europe as well as emerging EU policies creating a 'Fortress Europe' galvanised a cross-border EU lobby against racism . . . The lobby was pivotal in changing the views in the Council for the enactment of Article 13 in the Treaty of Amsterdam that provided a legal basis for action in the field of racial discrimination.
>
> (Kantola 2010: 173)

While this declaration was understood as a success for anti-racist EU policies, it was followed by failure to develop concrete political measures. Thus, similarly to the debates on Article 119 three decades earlier, doubts on the competences of the EC/EU with regard to racism were overcome by an emphasis on possible economic consequences. In this vein, Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam claims for EU-measures against discrimination "based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation". However, the reservations of some Member States against this new competence led to the claim for unanimity in the Council in decisions on the implementation of legislative measures based on Article 13; the European Parliament should only hold consultation rights. This procedural decision can be understood as an example of political solutions in multi-level-governance which, however, often prevent effective political action.

In 2000, two Directives regarding discrimination were issued: the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43) prohibits discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin within the labor market as well as in other aspects of social life (housing, healthcare, education, social protection, access to goods and services). The Employment Equality Directive (2000/78) prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, disability, age, and sexual orientation exclusively in employment and vocational training. Although this Directive is limited in its scope to employment and vocational training, it encompasses a wide range of forms of discrimination, while the Racial Equality Directive includes several parts of individual life but is limited to racial discrimination.

Also in 2000, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU was solemnly proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and the European Commission. For the first time in the history of European integration, the civic, political, economic, and social rights of European citizens were resumed in one document (Pollak 2006: 179). In its treatment of the right to non-discrimination, the Charter went further than the Treaty of Amsterdam. While in Article 13 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) "sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or

belief, disability, age or sexual orientation" are mentioned as grounds of discrimination, article 21 of the Charter prohibits "any discrimination on any grounds such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation".

Equality between men and women is prescribed in yet another article (23) also mentioning the possibility of positive action in order to reach gender equality. The Charter, furthermore, defines rights related to family protection and gender equality. The reconciliation of family/private life with work is an important aspect of the Charter; the Charter guarantees, inter alia, the "right to paid maternity leave and to parental leave". With the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, the Charter became part of primary EU law. Thus, the Charter can be seen as a milestone in European anti-discrimination legislation by enlarging its scope and giving it the status of fundamental rights. In this vein, the Charter forms the ending point of many debates about the competences of the EU in anti-discrimination matters.

Intersecting policies: asylum, migration, and discrimination

While discrimination of EU citizens is prohibited, one could argue that EU legislation, in fact, prescribes discrimination of non-EU-citizens (third-country nationals) who lack vital rights of citizens. Obviously, the differentiation between citizens and non-citizens is part of every citizenship concept and, thus, is frequently not understood as discrimination. But the usual neglect of this form of differentiation in research makes it even more urgent to consider it as a form of discrimination in an intersectional approach. Furthermore, EU citizenship has transformed the classical dichotomy of citizens and non-citizens to a trichotomy of national citizens, EU citizens, and third-country citizens (Bauböck 1997: 315). Thus, neither EU citizens nor third-country citizens enjoy the same political and social rights as national citizens. Especially the lack of social rights affects women in a specific way due to the gender income gap and care obligations.

At the same time, one has to mention that EU legislation has also aimed at improving the situation of third-country nationals and, thus, to reduce this special form of discrimination. Above all, the Treaty of Amsterdam tried to approximate the rights of long-term residents of third, non-EU countries to those of EU citizens living in a Member State of which they do not hold national citizenship – however, the directives meant to implement this intention have not really achieved this aim.[1] Thus, we find here a form of discrimination of third-country nationals that in the future should be included in intersectional analysis of the EU. With regard to gender policies, the unequal inclusion of national citizens, EU citizens, and third-country nationals in the social system is especially problematic for women due to the existing income gap between men and women and the fact that care and household work is still predominantly carried out by women.

A special (and especially vulnerable) group of third-country citizens are refugees and asylum seekers. While their rights are internationally regulated

by the "Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees" (Geneva Convention), the implementation of this convention in different nation states differs to a high degree, also within the EU – despite the fact that a common asylum system has formed part of the aims of the EU since the Treaty of Amsterdam. While vital dimensions of such a common asylum system have not been implemented, one part of it works relatively well, namely the so-called "Dublin regulation" stipulating the Member State's responsibility for processing the application of an asylum seeker; in most cases, this is the EU member state where the applicant entered the EU.[2] One of the implications is that asylum seekers in the EU do not have the right to choose the country where they apply for asylum while being subject to very different treatments in EU Member States. In political practice, this has led to a situation where living standards of asylum seekers, their chance to be accepted as refugees, and their risk of being deported depend to a very high degree on policies in the individual member states, but further research is needed to assess the different ways in which this situation affects men and women. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that 1) low levels of financial and social support for asylum seekers in some Member States affect especially women with children, and 2) different rules for family reunification have a special impact on women's chances to get to the EU as, frequently, male refugees enter the EU first and then try to bring their families in a less risky way.

At the same time, the Dublin Regulation leads to unequal distribution of asylum seekers across the EU Member States as it is, up to now, not accompanied by an internal EU resettlement policy and only a few Member States are located at the outer borders of the EU and even fewer likely to be reached by asylum seekers. Thus, one could argue that EU citizens in the Mediterranean Member States are discriminated against as their social and welfare systems are unequally burdened. Again, deteriorations of welfare systems affect women more than men.

A first conclusion from this discussion is that EU legislation with regard to gender has developed much earlier than legislation on anti-discrimination and migration, which was introduced as late as 1997 with the Treaty of Amsterdam. Since then, a more encompassing anti-discrimination policy has developed understanding discrimination due to gender as one of several forms of discrimination. However, the multiple-discrimination approach has, up to now, not led to intersectional policies but, rather, understands multiple discriminations as additive. At the same time, women's organizations have argued that their political influence has been weakened by this broader view on discrimination, since gender inequality has been framed as one inequality among many. Secondly, migration and asylum policies have never become part of anti-discrimination legislation, since third-country citizens do not have the same legal rights as EU citizens. Thus, the other side of EU citizenship is a hard demarcation against people from non-EU countries, that is, third-country nationals (Benhabib 2006 147). As Joppke observes, "[t]he friendly picture for EU aliens is counterpointed by a decidedly less friendly picture for non-EU aliens" (2001: 52).

This situation calls for a new form of intersectional approach as, arguably, all mentioned forms of discrimination interact with discrimination due to gender

and thus impact women in a special way. Migration policies as well as public discourse on migration play a specific role here as anti-migration discourses often use the argument of women's rights and gender equality as being part of 'European values' framing migration as a threat to these rights. Arguably this can be analyzed as a form of 'exclusionary intersectionality' a position that perceives tensions between (ethnic) diversity and (gender) equality as irresolvable and thus proposes a radical, one-dimensional solution – "either to reduce or abolish diversity – or abandon claims for equality" (Siim and Mokre 2013: 34). The next part of the chapter will investigate this field further, focusing on the interplay between EU discourses on asylum, migration, and gender equality since 2015.

Contemporary discourses on gender, ethnicity/race, and citizenship

Sara Farris has recently analysed the rise of femonationalism as a new form of nationalism that refers both to the exploitation of feminist themes in anti-Islam and anti-immigration campaigns as well as to the participation of certain feminists and femocrats – female officials advocating feminist policies – in the stigmatization of Muslim men under the banner of gender equality (2017: 4). The discussion is premised on two conceptual tools developed by critical race scholars 'the sexualization of racism' – emphasizing that racism relies on different ways of stereotyping Othered men and women – and 'the racialization of sexism' – the portrayal of sexism and patriarchy as the exclusive domain of the foreign 'other'. Farris' approach no doubt captures new elements in right-wing nationalist parties that conceive Muslim/non-Western migrant men as oppressors and women as victims to be rescued. Research demonstrates, however, that national differences in mainstream and right-wing party discourses and policies towards gender equality and immigration are still important (Lazaridis et al. 2016; Lazaridis and Campani 2016). Arguably, intersectionality is an alternative approach able to conceptualize new exclusionary forms of nationalism by exploring how multiple forms of inclusions/exclusions are embedded in national citizenship regimes and how claims for gender equality can lead to potentially racist discourses (Siim and Mokre 2013). When gender equality is not presented as a goal for all parts of European migration societies but only perceived as a 'European value' threatened by immigrants, this universal claim may lead to exclusion and discrimination – of migrant men as well as migrant women.

Scholars have started to debate the theories, discourses, and policies concerning gender equality, ethnicity, and religion, and one of the controversial questions is the intersection between women's and migrant minorities' claims for political rights. Immigrant women's citizenship rights have until recently been relatively invisible in both welfare and gender research or these women have been presented as passive, victimized, trapped in their cultures. One exception is Diane Sainsbury's comparative work on the interplay between welfare, immigration and gender policy regimes in the US, Germany, and Sweden (2006). Sainsbury argues that immigrants' social rights are affected by the exclusion from

welfare rights due to immigration regimes and that this regime dynamics can have both reinforcing and conflicting effects (Sainsbury 2006: 240). Sara Farris has shown that the possibility for Western women to combine family and career depends to a high degree on the care work of migrant women, so that gender equality in Western labor markets is built on the inequality of women of different origin (2012: 188–90). Integration programs for immigrant women re-enforce these dynamics by specifically training migrant women for care work.

Research has illustrated that the marginalization and discrimination of immigrant women of non-Western origin is a general problem in European countries (Rosenberger and Sauer 2012). However, growing inequalities between groups of women present particular challenges for Nordic egalitarianism and self-understanding as a model for gender equality (Siim and Skjeie 2008; Siim and Borchorst 2017). Here marginalization in the labor market has proved to be a special problem for vulnerable groups of women, such as immigrant women who combine low education with family obligations. This situation has been exploited by right-wing anti-immigration forces that have politicized the perceived cultural conflicts between the national majority and ethnic minorities, focusing especially on the lack of gender equality in the patriarchal culture of ethnic minority families (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007; Meret and Siim 2013).

The economic and political crisis and the growing number of refugees and immigrants arriving in Europe since 2015 have strengthened neoliberal and neo-nationalist forces across Europe and instigated a discourse focusing on the lack of gender equality in migrants' 'cultures'. While this discourse has for quite some time focused on the victimization of migrant women, it has recently changed towards constructing migrant men as a danger for both European and migrant women. One illustrative example is Germany. Here one may observe dramatic shifts in discourses on refugees and migrants during the year 2015. Before summer 2015, discourses on refugees were characterized by fear of an unmanageable increase of refugees in the EU dubbed 'the refugee crisis'. In late summer and early fall 2015, this discourse was replaced by the so-called 'welcome culture', emphasizing the desperate situation of (above all Syrian) refugees and the obligation of the EU to accept them and to provide acceptable living conditions. After the terror attack in Paris in November 2015 and the alleged sexual assaults of foreign citizens on New Year's Eve 2015/16 in Cologne, the discourse shifted again towards framing (male) refugees as a potential danger, especially for European women. Since then, this discourse has prevailed, legitimating legal and administrative changes impeding the entrance and stay of refugees in the EU. Additionally, requirements for integration have been increased leading to debates about banning the burqa in public space, requirements for tightening family unification, and the obligation for migrants to accept 'Western values'.

The discourse about 'saving' migrant women from the patriarchal culture of migrant men, in Spivak's words "white men are saving brown women from brown men" (1994: 92), has been complemented in this way by a discourse on the necessity of saving white women from brown men. Neither discourse challenges the still existing hegemony of white men in Western societies, but

legitimates an allegedly enlightened Western culture of far-reaching gender equality opposed to 'other cultures' oppressing women. Scholars find that this discourse may even be more powerful in the Scandinavian context, where gender equality is a key factor in national self-understandings. Here gender inequality among groups of migrants can easily be framed as a threat to national identity (Siim and Skjeie 2008; Meret and Siim 2013). Arguably, the failure to include immigrant minorities of non-Western origin as equal citizens represents a pressing social problem in contemporary Europe. In order to address this challenge, scholars have proposed a paradigmatic shift in gender and citizenship theories premised on transnational and intersectional approaches to inclusion/exclusion. (Yuval-Davis 2011; Fraser 2013).

Conclusion

The recent economic and political developments in EU have again placed citizenship at the centre of theoretical, political, and normative debates; as a result, Hannah Arendt's challenging claim about all human beings having the "right to have rights" and the right to live as part of an organized community have gained new meanings in contemporary Europe. This essay has shown that new kinds of inclusions/exclusions have emerged across Europe since immigrants and refugees, especially of Muslim religion, have increasingly become the foreign 'other' contrasted to the native 'us'. This has created complex intersections of nationality, gender, religion, and ethnicity/race, between women's rights, citizenship rights, and human rights which raise new challenges for intersectional theory, gender justice, and solidarity politics.

In contemporary Europe gender equality and women's rights have become strong normative principles embedded in EU policies and political inclusion of women is on the agenda in the EU and in most of the Member States. This contrasts with the anti-discrimination principles which do not give minorities the equal right to legal protection. European citizenship has transformed the classical dichotomy between citizens and non-citizens to a trichotomy of national citizens, EU citizens, and third-country nationals. This is a problem of political exclusion, since it leaves third-country nationals working and residing legally in EU countries without equal rights. Furthermore, the situation of refugees and asylum-seekers is extremely unequal under the present EU regulation. The lack of solidarity between EU countries in the distribution of refugees and asylum-seekers has created an untenable and unfair division between the EU countries in Northern Europe and countries in Southern and Eastern Europe obliged to receive refugees because of their outer borders.

As already discussed, the scholarly literature has had difficulties dealing with the new political and socio-economic challenges since it is still predominantly divided in gender, citizenship, and migration research. The intersectionality approach is one way to deal with these challenges, since it provides a means to analyze intersections between gender and other inequality creating categories, such as ethnicity/race, religion, and nationality. Our aim has been to examine

the intersections between gender and migration and to demonstrate that immigrant minorities tend to be victims of exclusionary intersectionality (Siim and Mokre 2013: 34).

Feminist scholars and activists have claimed with some plausibility that the recognition of multiple discriminations may weaken claims for gender equality as just one of several dimensions of anti-discrimination policies. Still, in contemporary European migration societies an encompassing understanding of different forms of discrimination and different claims for equality are necessary for meaningful academic research, enlightened public debates and inclusive policy-making. Without such an approach, the claim for gender equality can be (ab)used for exclusionary politics framing gender equality as a 'European cultural value' instead of a still unattained political goal, while the needs and demands of migrant women remain invisible to politics as well as academia.

Notes

1 See the Directive on nationals who are long-term residents (2003), Directive on freedom of movement of third-country nationals (2014).
2 Further legislative Acts are: 1) the EURODAC regulation obliging Member States to register fingerprints of asylum seekers in an EU database in order to implement the Dublin regulation, 2) the Reception Directive defining common living standards for asylum seekers, 3) the Qualification Directive defining common conditions for the right to asylum, 4) the Return Directive stipulating due to which reasons and under which conditions irregular migrants must return to their country of origin, and 5) the Directive on temporary protection if there is a mass influx of displaced people.

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