ROUTLEDGE RESEARCH IN EARLY MODERN HISTORY

Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World c. 1410–1800

Edited by
Tracey A. Sowerby and Jan Hennings

ROUTLEDGE

Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World c. 1410–1800

Practices of Diplomacy in the Early Modern World offers a new contribution to the ongoing reassessment of early modern international relations and diplomatic history. Divided into three parts, it provides an examination of diplomatic culture from the Renaissance into the eighteenth century and presents the development of diplomatic practices as more complex, multifarious and globally interconnected than the traditional state-focussed, national paradigm allows.

The volume addresses three central and intertwined themes within early modern diplomacy: who and what could claim diplomatic agency and in what circumstances; the social and cultural contexts in which diplomacy was practised; and the role of material culture in diplomatic exchange. Together the chapters provide a broad geographical and chronological presentation of the development of diplomatic practices and, through a strong focus on the processes and significance of cultural exchanges between polities, demonstrate how it was possible for diplomats to negotiate the cultural codes of the courts to which they were sent.

This exciting collection brings together new and established scholars of diplomacy from different academic traditions. It will be essential reading for all students of diplomatic history.

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List of abbreviations

Archives/Repositories

BL	British Library
HHStA	Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna
TNA	The National Archives, UK

Journals

CH	Court Historian
DA	Dubrovnik Annals
EHR	English Historical Review
EJIR	European Journal of International Relations
EM	Early Music
HJ	Historical Journal
IHR	International History Review
JEMH	Journal of Early Modern History
JMedH	The Journal of Medieval History
JMEMS	Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies
JMH	The Journal of Modern History
MHJ	The Medieval History Journal
PP	Past and Present
RHD	Revue d'histoire diplomatique
SEER	Slavonic and East European Review
ZHF	Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung

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Introduction

Practices of diplomacy[1]

Jan Hennings and Tracey A. Sowerby

In October 1604, the English ambassador and governor of the Muscovy Company, Sir Thomas Smythe, presented the Russian tsar, Boris Godunov, with a 'greate present' from James VI/I: a heterogeneous collection of objects including magnificent silver gilt plate, a crystal cup, expensive cloth, and a 'charyott'.[2] The coach was a material intervention in an ongoing Anglo–Russian dialogue about the nature and extent of the English amity with the Ottoman Turks.[3] The coach was designed to suggest and persuade, just as successive ambassadors to Russia (Smythe included) had been instructed to assure the tsar that Elizabeth would not aid the sultan against him.[4] Its lavish decoration emphasized Anglo-Russian amity by including English royal heraldic beasts bearing the English arms, the Russian arms, and several double-headed eagles which alluded to Russian imperial status. Other features of the coach's iconography implied mutual aims and values, for instance through a depiction of St George—who held an elevated status in both countries—killing the dragon. Two large scenes of Russian military victories over turbaned Crimean Tatars suggested shared anti-Ottoman sentiment, while in the carved front panel a tsar led a triumphal procession. Cumulatively, the coach's decoration intimated English goodwill towards Russia's anti-Ottoman sentiment.[5] As visual rhetoric designed to shape the course of inter-princely relations, the coach may have been too successful: it appears to have sufficiently raised the tsar's hopes that James would join him in an offensive league that the tsar prepared to send an embassy to England to discuss furthering the Anglo–Russian alliance.[6] Yet James had no intention of agreeing to a military coalition against the Ottomans, for he wished to continue lucrative trading relations with both the Russians and the Turks.

Such displays have not traditionally occupied a central place in the history of international relations. Encounters like this have typically served as anecdotal evidence of the peculiarities of former times, or as a prelude (or in contrast) to more general trends in the emergence of the great power system, the rise of modern diplomacy, or the foreign policy of individual states.[7] Diplomatic practices such as these also drop out of sight when considering the classic readings of International Relations, from Gentili and Grotius to Pufendorf and de Vattel, in which scholars have traced the early modern

origins of the concepts which framed the interactions of states—mainly European and rarely beyond the western world—in war and peace.[8] The notion of the territorially bounded, sovereign state and its theoretical foundations in the distinguished tradition of political thought have profoundly shaped our understanding of diplomacy. As readers move through the pivotal moments in diplomatic history—the emergence of the resident ambassador in Renaissance Italy, the equality of states in the Westphalian legal order, and the transformation of the states-system into the post-1815 Concert of Europe—early modern foreign relations are usually held up against the measuring sticks of state sovereignty, a clearly defined distinction between foreign and domestic, the presence (or absence) of international law, a professional diplomatic corps, and all the ingredients that today make the stuff of international politics.

The present volume contributes to the ongoing reassessment of diplomatic history by leaving the bird's eye perspective and zooming in on the complex, multifarious, and interconnected practices of diplomacy in the early modern period. It acknowledges the significance of diplomatic history's pivotal moments, but it builds on the premise that sociocultural practices constituted political relationships, that they were not the consequence of foreign policy, international law, and political thought but their basis, and that a study of these practices reveals more about the nature of early modern diplomacy than the assumptions that underlie the traditional state-focussed, Eurocentric paradigm. The term 'diplomacy' can only serve as a makeshift expedient for want of a clear definition. Exactly where diplomacy began and where it ended in the complex layers of political exchanges in this period is difficult to establish: not every person involved in diplomatic business was a diplomat, and not every diplomat's main concern was diplomatic negotiation. Agreed parameters and formalized procedures of diplomatic representation would lend themselves to the purpose of defining the spectrum. But the defining dynamic in the history of foreign relations was precisely the absence (or merely slow and gradual emergence) of formalized and agreed rules. To restrict the choice of practices to a modern definition of diplomacy would thus sidestep key aspects in the evolution of diplomacy. Even the use of the very concept 'diplomacy' results in a compromise: the term itself did not emerge until the very end of the period that is the focus of this volume, as Christian Windler elaborates in his discussion of periodization in the afterword. Therefore, the aim of the editors and the authors of this book is not to offer a new—early modern—definition of diplomacy but to problematize the term in light of the practices that are not fully captured by the term's modern implications.[9]

For the scholar of diplomatic practice and its transformations, the success of an embassy, the centrality of a geopolitical region, or the wider contemporary significance of political exchanges is not always the primary determinant of historical relevance. This is true for any polity, but particularly so for diplomacy in regions far removed from the theatres of war and politics

that have dominated previous scholarship. Any diplomatic encounter holds significance if the sources reveal the ways in which relations between different political communities were conducted. What matters are the actions, behaviour, and status of diplomatic agents and the responses they triggered rather than the influence they exerted upon the big turns and trends in the history of international relations. Ultimately, the efforts of James VI/I, the Muscovy Company, and Boris Godunov to facilitate diplomatic relations, each pursuing their own political and commercial aims, did not shape the course of events in world history, or even advance an Anglo–Russian alliance. Yet their ceremonial interactions, visual appeals to rank and prestige, and the material culture surrounding their exchanges point to some of the core features of early modern diplomatic practice and the complex means by which rulers interacted with one another. This is not to suggest that in the process of re-focussing diplomatic history one should privilege the cultural, social, or symbolic over real-world outcomes in the realm of politics. On the contrary, the one is not understandable without the other, as many contributions to this volume demonstrate. As with any historiographical approach, our focus on diplomatic practice explores the 'Who?', 'When?', 'Where?', and 'What?', but it privileges the 'How?'.

The so-called New Diplomatic History has opened up important new perspectives on who influenced diplomatic relations.[10] By taking an actor-centred approach, scholars have elucidated individual diplomats' agency, tensions between their personal interests and those of their principal, and the personal and clientage networks upon which they depended.[11] Monarchs, courts, and ambassadors remain important, but they are no longer the diplomatic historian's sole preserve: scholars are increasingly examining the range of intermediaries and 'non-state' actors, such as translators, merchants, missionaries, and generals, who facilitated diplomatic relations.[12] Paralleling this insight has been a growing appreciation that groups such as *Hofdamen* (female courtiers) wielded considerably more political influence than previously thought and were integral to diplomatic information networks.[13] Traditionally, the rise of resident ambassadors in Renaissance Italy and the dominance of Louisquatorzian diplomatic culture in the age of baroque were the two poles around which much early modern diplomatic history revolved. Recent scholarship has been less concerned with strict periodization and has instead prioritised the continuities and adaptations of processes and practices across early modernity, a discussion that Christian Windler continues in the afterword to this volume. Similarly, while intra-European diplomacy still attracts much attention, increasing emphasis is being placed on European diplomacy with non-European powers and relations in Asian and African contexts.[14] Aiding this development is the recognition that studying diplomatic culture can elucidate inter- and intra-imperial dynamics.[15] Scholarship addressing early modern diplomacy has paid much attention to the written records that diplomats produced and the information networks they cultivated, revealing their lexical, rhetorical,

and archival techniques and the connectedness of diplomatic actors within transnational networks.[16] Another emerging concern is the ways in which religion complicated diplomatic relations. Moving beyond Heinz Schilling's notion of a post-Reformation confessionalization of inter-princely relations,[17] recent studies have explored the role of religion in forging links across territorial boundaries in common diplomatic endeavours and the complications of cross-confessional divides (and attempts to bridge them).[18] On the whole, recent diplomatic studies have experienced a cultural turn. In particular, this has involved acknowledging the importance of different modes of symbolic communication within diplomatic encounters: the ceremonies with which ambassadors were greeted, where in the palace they were met, and by whom, the gestures they used and witnessed in audiences, and the gifts their monarchs gave and received, were all important means by which political relations were mediated at court or in emerging formats of encounters such as peace congresses.[19] As well as the procedural implications of such practices, the material and visual qualities of the palatial environment or the presents given conveyed further layers of meaning.[20]

By examining many of these recent strands in diplomatic history and addressing other aspects of diplomatic culture across diverse geopolitical relationships, our volume addresses three key interlocking themes in early modern diplomatic history. Each of the volume's three parts brings one of these key themes to the fore, although all three concerns are closely interrelated and run throughout the articles across the entire book. Part I privileges discussions of who and what could claim diplomatic agency and status and in what circumstances. In Part II, the emphasis shifts from political structures and their representation to the level of individual actors, examining the embeddedness of social and cultural factors in diplomatic practices. Building on the insights into the uses of material culture in earlier chapters, Part III explores the role of material culture in diplomatic negotiations by focussing on the items and creatures which princes sent to other potentates. What follows here is an introduction to these themes to weave them into a dialogue between the individual contributions to this volume.

Today states are legally independent and equal. The question of who was sovereign in the early modern period elicits a less straightforward answer.[21] In fact, a response that takes account of early modern forms of statehood and diplomatic relations requires a slightly reformulated question: who could claim recognition as a sovereign and to what extent did sovereign status form both the prerequisite for, and limit to, political interaction? The boundaries of sovereignty are as fickle as the historiographical divisions drawn between (and within) empires, kingdoms, principalities, duchies, republics, city states, or even trading companies. Abraham de Wicquefort, author of an influential late seventeenth-century diplomatic manual, gives an important indication: 'There is not a more illustrious Mark of Sovereignty than the Right of sending and receiving Embassadors'.[22] However,

who exactly enjoyed the *ius legationis* in the highly fragmented and hierarchical world of princes remained a moot point for much of the early modern period.[23] This right, and with it, the participation in high-level diplomacy, was bound up with the social status of the senders and the performance of their honour in elaborate ceremonial receptions.[24] To claim sovereign dignity through the assertion of the *honores regii* (honours reserved for crowned heads), and the entitlement to diplomatic agency, was not a unilateral act of publicly displaying one's status, however: it depended as much on one's recognition by others, for instance through the treatment of one's ambassadors.[25] Even the rank of ambassador, who, unlike envoys or lower-ranking diplomats, directly represented his master's honour, was not a given, formalized category and acquired its meaning only through a set of mutual recognition practices.[26] These customs, which in the European context evolved through a long process of interaction and found a pronounced expression during the peace negotiations in Münster and Osnabrück in the 1640s, included the privilege of being addressed with the title 'excellency', the first visit by other representatives upon the arrival at a foreign court, and the right hand, or place of honour, during direct encounters.[27] The treaties that ended the Thirty Years' War did not formulate the principle of sovereignty despite the common belief that the Peace of Westphalia witnessed its formal inception.[28] The practices of direct interaction, however, allowed emerging polities to assert their independence through the acceptance of their ambassadors at the peace negotiations and helped to standardize and align the norms of diplomacy through peace congresses and more frequent exchanges between princely courts.

While such status relations formed the prerequisite for princes to send and receive diplomats who would negotiate treaties and assert their place in the international hierarchy, sovereign dignity and its associated practices did not mark the limits of diplomatic agency and latitude, especially in imperial contexts. Sovereignty did not simply emanate from the centre of empire to spread uniformly to every corner of the realm. Rather, the 'layered quality of imperial rule' was marked by 'delegated authority' and 'territorial variations'.[29] A range of political bodies sought and received trans-regional recognition in the early modern period: only fitfully and through continued interaction did a more defined diplomatic process gradually emerge. In complex polities such as the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire—the one steeped in residual political interdependencies, the other marked by the evolution of imperial expansion—the line between internal supplication and foreign relations is difficult, if impossible, to draw.

Duncan Hardy and Gábor Kármán evaluate the international status and practices of subordinate polities within these empires. Through an interrogation of fifteenth-century political culture in the south-west Holy Roman Empire, Hardy proposes a new model for understanding interactions between its 'state-like' members. His analysis of the careers of three political actors, and their overlapping networks, divorces diplomacy from the modern

notion of statehood and territorial *Herrschaft*. He sees diplomatic interaction as part of an 'associative political culture', a process of co-existing and intersecting political exchanges and alliances at regional, trans-regional, and transnational levels which defy the conventional categories of domestic politics and foreign relations. The distinction between internal and external affairs was similarly blurred in later fifteenth-century Spain following the marriage of Ferdinand II and Isabella I, which brought about a convergence of Castilian and Aragonese customs, as Germán Gamero Igea's examination of the Catholic Monarchs' gift-giving strategies reveals.

Status ambiguities and resulting strategies of self-representation are also at the heart of Gábor Kármán's study that concentrates on central Europe and the Ottoman empire in the seventeenth century. He demonstrates that rulers of Ottoman territories, such as the prince of Transylvania, a vassal to the sultan who ruled over his own land, or the beylerbey of Buda, who was a governor of an Ottoman province, used diplomatic ceremonial in order to claim relative independence and to negotiate between their conflicting roles as sovereign actors in international relations, on the one hand, and tributaries to the sultan, on the other. Given the rigidity associated with diplomatic rituals and the hierarchies they constitute, it is striking that the prince of Transylvania, as a subordinate ruler within the intra-imperial administration of the Ottoman empire, could reap a ceremonial distinction that would rank him among sovereign powers in inter-imperial relations. What may appear as a paradox in the strict legal understanding of statehood is in fact a central feature of early modern diplomacy: the ability of ceremonial practices to communicate and suspend the contradictions and ambiguities that emerged from complex, transnational political systems. Kármán's case studies of diplomatic protocol are an important reminder that intra-imperial dependencies did not exclude relatively independent political action and that a narrow focus on 'state sovereignty' as a precondition to diplomacy fails to recognize the complexity of early modern foreign relations.

For some political entities, such as the Ragusan Republic, ambiguity was also a source of diplomatic prowess. Diplomacy shaped identity and status in subtly different ways, as Lovro Kunčević shows in his study of the small city-state of Dubrovnik. Sandwiched between the Ottomans, Venice, and the Spanish Habsburgs with concurring and shifting loyalties to Muslim and Christian powers in the Mediterranean, it compensated for its military weakness not only by economic means. It also invested in literary productions, garnering prestige by re-envisioning Ragusa's position as both Ottoman tribute-payer and underdog to demonstrate their diplomatic dexterity and depict their precarious international position as a basis of their strength and to buttress Ragusan claims to sovereignty through literary discourse. Jaketa Palmotić's literary writings were intrinsically linked to Ragusa's status as an independent but lesser power caught between the Venetian Republic and Ottoman Empire. Diplomat-writers such as Palmotić created epics centred on shrewd diplomats. Their ambassadorial protagonists negotiated

momentous struggles between Christianity and Islam, God and the Devil. The Ragusan Republic emerged triumphant as the defender of Christendom while the ambassadors emerged as heroes blessed with superior diplomatic skill. Literary texts became a means through which Ragusa could simultaneously foster internal confidence, reinforce the domestic status of its patrician elites, and enhance its international reputation as a diplomatic player. Epic was a particularly useful vehicle for these efforts, as accounts of real embassies could be moulded into an epic framework with relative ease, while this genre resonated with the chivalric ethos of courtly culture and lent a degree of monumentality to the semi-fictionalized events it described. When contemplating the literary activities of diplomats in the 1580s, the civil lawyer and diplomatic theorist Alberico Gentili had hoped that ambassadors would channel their literary endeavours towards serving the state.[30] Kunčević's Ragusan authors did just that: the circumstances in which they turned to diplomatic tropes were politically contingent and their literary practices were intended to have domestic, as well as diplomatic, utility.

Representations of status were not only a source of recognition for whole political communities, monarchs, or those who represented them in their role of ambassadors. Individual actors left almost no opportunity unused to exploit their raised positions as foreign representatives and negotiators in order to collect prestige and shrewdly pursue their own social advantage. Niels May examines the ceremonial practices observed at the Westphalian peace congress from a new angle. He demonstrates in an actor-centred perspective that diplomats were as much concerned with buttressing and increasing their own social standing as with representing their master, even if this conflicted with their ambassadorial duties. While the negotiations that led to the Peace of 1648 helped to establish which political entities were considered to possess sovereignty and therefore the right to practise diplomacy, they simultaneously presented opportunities for European nobles to enhance their own positions at both domestic and international levels. The cases of Francis William of Wartenberg (bishop, ambassador, nobleman, and deputy of the prince-electors), Henri II d'Orléans (French ambassador and prince of the blood), and Fabio Chigi (mediator and nuncio) are a testament to the role variety in early modern diplomatic practice. Diplomats of the *type ancien*, as Hillard von Thiessen terms them, were not employed as professional government representatives with limited, formal loyalties to their master.[31] Consequently, they were not bound to the exclusive representation of a single sovereign but also followed their own status claims within the hierarchical order of the *société des princes*.[32] The discussion of the role of individual actors raises important questions about where the boundaries lay between personal and monarchical, internal and external, and how these tensions interacted with diplomatic processes. They suggest that our analyses of ceremonial need to be revised to reflect the multiple levels on which claims to social status were being made beyond the narrow focus on the representation of sovereignty.

An emphasis on individual actors and their shifting roles permits a reconsideration of the development of diplomacy practised between European courts in various normative systems, but it also offers important insights into the ways in which diplomatic representatives realised political agency and established relations in other cultural contexts by suspending ceremonial rules, posing as domestic actors, or blending into local forms of sociability. Highlighting the permeability of diplomatic activity, it becomes clear that, while the limits of diplomatic agency were marked by ceremonial accommodations, shrewd role-switching, familiarity with domestic political structures, and continued participation in local social interaction enhanced diplomats' ability to facilitate ongoing diplomatic relations beyond ritual expressions of sovereignty and the éclat of aristocratic representation. Turning away from the old juxtaposition of incompatible European and non-European diplomacies has never meant explaining away cultural difference or introducing the idea of a unified diplomatic sphere across profoundly different political structures. Cultural boundaries existed even if they were rarely fixed by the political borders that separated societies. The experience of cultural difference, often mixed with western political discourse, shaped diplomats' assumptions about their foreign hosts and provided the leitmotifs of alterity and exoticism that abound in the large corpus of early modern travel literature.[33] Diplomatic practices, however, were not necessarily separated by and contained within such boundaries.[34] As Christian Windler demonstrates in the afterword to this volume, diplomatic actors needed to show great flexibility in negotiating diverging norms across cultural borders in order to enable successful communication, as much as they needed to act as representatives of their own social values.[35]

This overlap of normative systems was a hallmark of diplomacy in the world that applied equally to the diplomatic activities of cultural brokers, non-state actors, and accredited diplomats and their social environments and networks, whether within Europe or without. Indeed we should not necessarily see 'European' in contradistinction to 'global'. Different parts of the pre-modern world were linked by interlocking and overlapping networks, which do not easily correlate with modern notions of nation states or even continents or sub-continents.[36] Diplomatic networks were no different. Although a volume such as this cannot claim to be geographically exhaustive, it can nonetheless contribute to broader debates about the early modern world. The perspective of the chapters in this volume, that is, the source materials they present, is predominantly European. But the chapters move beyond Eurocentric interpretations in that they offer the opportunity to compare and challenge received notions of progress, professionalism, state-building, great powers, modernization, and so on associated with the Eurocentric paradigm. By probing the boundaries between 'European' and 'non-European', which global approaches sometimes risk taking for granted, this volume shows that cultural encounter and the negotiation of norms rightly lie at the heart of diplomatic history, regardless of its geographic focus, rather than

being one of its subfields. In this sense, European diplomatic history, too, needs to question its Eurocentric heritage.

Recent studies of empire and trade have emphasized that Europe was less dominant in its relationship with non-European powers than previous generations of scholars had believed.[37] Cumulatively, the chapters in this volume illustrate that in diplomatic encounters the representatives of a given state had to adapt to the diplomatic culture of the host court to some degree: European powers and their diplomatic traditions did not dominate diplomatic relations *per se*. Rather, who was dominant within a relationship was determined in the process of verbal and symbolic negotiations and this was as true within Europe as without.

Guido van Meersbergen's study of the symbolic incorporation of a Dutch merchant-diplomat into Mughal India, and its practical benefits, is a case in point: it addresses two major issues that new approaches to diplomatic history are bringing to the forefront: cultural commensurability and the role of 'non-state' actors. By shifting the attention to the court of Aurangzeb in the 1660s van Meersbergen explores the roles that mercantile diplomats played in the relations between the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the Mughal Empire. Unencumbered by royal dignity, the envoy of the VOC, Dircq van Adrichem, had greater diplomatic latitude than royal ambassadors such as Sir Thomas Roe whose missions were mired in ritual complications and disputes about honour. As a representative of a trading company, Van Adrichem was ranked lower by the Mughal emperor than fully accredited diplomats from European monarchies. However, the relative lack of diplomatic recognition worked to the Dutch representative's advantage, as he felt no status pressure to place himself in the hierarchy of princely sovereigns. The resulting flexibility he could exercise in adopting local sociopolitical conventions and submitting to the symbols of imperial authority allowed the envoy to integrate himself into local patronage networks and establish continued diplomatic communications from within domestic political structures, and helped to maintain the VOC's position as a political power in south Asia with more diplomatic leeway than its European monarchical competitors.

The familiarity with the sociocultural codes of one's interlocutor, which was acquired through sustained exchanges (that were not directly associated with political negotiation), formed another important prerequisite for successful diplomacy. Nonetheless, despite an increasing stress on ambassadorial networks, important elements of diplomats' sociability remain poorly understood. David Do Paço's chapter contributes to discussions of cultural commensurability by demonstrating that a long and intermittent series of diplomatic contacts could result in much deeper sociability and entanglement between the diplomat and his host court than the narrow focus on political negotiation allows. Focussing on Ottoman delegations in eighteenth-century Vienna, Do Paço reveals how diplomats mastered the conventions of their hosts and became integrated into the social life of the

court and its urban surroundings rather than merely depending on intermediaries to bridge Austrian–Ottoman cultural differences. The Ottoman '*micropolis*' in the Imperial city established strong ties with its locality through creating patronage networks, drawing on the court's provisions for the day-to-day running of the embassy, or savouring official ceremonial occasions through informal but important business exchanges over coffee, chocolate, fruits, and jam. The political environment in which Ottoman and Austrian representatives interacted was only the 'tip of the iceberg': underneath, Do Paço reveals the bedrock of sociability practised between the Imperial court and Ottoman diplomats with their ties to trans-regional aristocratic elites, regional clienteles of administrators, merchants, as well as Austrian and Ottoman scholars. Do Paço's insights into the Ottomans' embeddedness in the social world of Vienna takes the discussion of cultural commensurability one step further: Ottoman ambassadors did not develop strategies of 'cross-cultural' diplomacy, that is, they did not interact across two separate, impermeable Christian and Muslim cultures, but acted out the social dynamics of their environment abroad.

Other groups come into sharper relief when focussing on the ways in which diplomats manipulated their roles or delegated diplomatic business to others when the representative burdens of their roles prevented them from action or access to political actors and information. As such, women were instrumental to many diplomatic relationships. Of course, elite women such as Catherine of Burgundy acted as political figures in their own right. But as Hardy shows, Catherine also facilitated Burgundian diplomacy in the Upper Rhine region, assisting Burgundian diplomats in the region and acting as an intermediary with various political entities for her brother and nephew, the dukes of Burgundy. She was as firmly entrenched in the 'associative political culture' of the Holy Roman Empire as the men. Catherine was not unique: female regents and queen mothers oversaw peace negotiations, royal consorts in interdynastic marriages informally represented their foreign relatives' interests, and royal women at all levels made their opinions on international affairs known by bestowing gifts or favours.[38] Certainly, senior female members of many European, Asian, and African royal households were perceived to have diplomatic influence, so much so that many were incorporated into international epistolary and gifting relationships and received splendid welcomes when visiting foreign territories.[39] Particular political circumstances could enhance the importance of *Hofdamen*; for instance they acquired greater diplomatic agency during the rule of a queen regnant or when access to male courtiers was restricted by royal edict.[40]

As permanent diplomacy spread and a growing number of diplomats were accompanied by their wives, the ambassadress emerged as a political actor of some note. Florian Kühnel's examination of the diplomatic careers of lady Montagu and lady Trumbull reveals that ambassadresses could be important assets to their husband's embassies. He proposes that as part of a 'working couple' these women actively cooperated with their spouses

in order to further the goals of the embassy. Ambassadresses helped with household affairs, from financial administration to the choice of house for the embassy; they hosted courtiers and other ambassadors (and their wives); and their behaviour could help to maintain the honour and dignity of the ambassador and by extension his prince. Their sex gave them access to female information and patronage networks that were difficult, sometimes impossible, for their husbands to infiltrate. In Constantinople, an ambassadress could visit the sultana and gain access to the networks of the harem, an important part of the Ottoman government, that were inaccessible to her husband. More generally, ambassadresses' practical contributions to the embassies reveal the importance of diplomatic sociability beyond the diplomat; they could elicit information from the *Hofdamen* that might not be circulating as widely among the men. But they could also take on more direct political roles, acting as mediators when their husbands fell out with other diplomats and furthering relations through conversations with the queen, king, or foreign ambassadors.

Truly appreciating the role of gender in diplomacy involves also acknowledging that the performance of femininity and masculinity was intertwined with princely competition for status and honour. Kings asserted their masculinity through their performance on the battlefield or at the tilts[41] and through the diplomatic gifts they gave. In particular, beasts and objects linked to militaristic activities or the hunt could reflect a king's masculine credentials every bit as much as the condition of his own calf muscles (which indicated his prowess at horsemanship). Equally, the fact that the ambassador extraordinary, who had been sent to Rome to announce the birth of the Dauphin, sponsored an opera to proclaim the virility of Louis XIII of France should be viewed as part of an ambassador's duty to represent and defend the king's person, including his masculinity, as Katharina Piechocki shows.

Gender also complicated and expedited diplomatic ceremonial. Ambassadresses ardently defended their position within the political hierarchy of courtly women, as did the courtiers with whom they socialised. Yet this concern to adhere strictly to precedence abated on occasions when the sexes intermingled when, as Kühnel demonstrates, an ambassadress might temporarily receive more elevated treatment, as male courtiers deferred to her in respect of her sex. As she did not possess 'representational character', an ambassadress could be accorded honours with no danger of any resultant impact on the hierarchy of princes. That gender could enable greater ceremonial flexibility than might otherwise be possible can also be seen in other ritual contexts such as palatial etiquette.[42]

In the early modern period, diplomatic representations were often staged as part of lavish entertainments, which did not merely serve to entertain diplomats after long and exhausting negotiations but provided both the space and the medium for political exchange. Various art forms were employed in the service of diplomacy. Timothy Hampton has argued that there was a

'diplomatic moment' during which the new diplomatic practices emerging in Renaissance Europe greatly influenced the structure and themes of European literature. While for many authors the impetus was aesthetic and grew out of their humanist concerns,[43] Kunčević's analysis of diplomacy in Ragusan epics demonstrates that a wide range of factors led authors to adopt diplomatic tropes, including the desire to use literary creations to achieve tangible diplomatic goals.

The 'diplomatic moment' that Hampton espied was not confined to literature: nascent art forms such as opera experienced one too. From Florence to the Forbidden City, sonorous expression suffused all manner of diplomatic interactions, so much so that George Macartney consulted an expert on Chinese music in 1792 in preparation for his infamous embassy.[44] More generally, musical ensembles accompanied a broader panoply of diplomatic events, as music was used to express status through its genre, the type of musicians and their number, as well as to entertain.[45] Opera was an intrinsically international art, as Katharina Piechocki's discussion of Ottaviano Castelli's *La Sincerità trionfante* (1639) illustrates.[46] The first 'French' opera was forged for the French embassy in Rome as a period of French dynastic crisis came to an end with the birth of the Dauphin. Operatic performances operated as diplomatic interventions because they were embedded in the social aspects of diplomacy. Ambassadors were expected to conduct themselves like courtiers and offer impressive spectacles to mark significant occasions. Princely magnificence could be conveyed through the novelty or skill of the musicians or even unusual staging, such as the concealed music to which visitors to the Rosenberg Castle were treated in Christian IV's reign.[47] Its relative novelty made opera more remarkable than other musical options and thus a suitable reflection of the French monarch's magnificence. Opera's combination of text, performance, and music provided a means of making political points outside of the direct interactions of princes and diplomats. This made it a suitable medium for exploring sensitive subjects, such as the former fertility problems of the French royal couple. Opera, like literature, could be used to forge identity, even reshape reputations: 'operatic poetics' could confront worries about the sterility of the king in ways that diplomats might not, and could move culpability for the lack of an heir to the throne from the king to his consort, thereby affirming the king's masculinity and answering international questions about the French succession.

As Giulia Galastro demonstrates in her study of diplomatic hospitality in Genoa, providing a soundscape was merely part of the broader sensory tactics at play in early modern diplomatic hospitality. Because the Republic could only engage in resident diplomacy with Spain, opportunities to welcome elite visitors to the city were particularly significant. Genoa exploited its geographic position to provide impressive vistas and complemented these with other visual extravaganzas. But practices of diplomatic hospitality comprised far more than joyous entries. The textiles that were so central to the republic's economy were pivotal to the sensuous visual displays that

Genoa produced using a 'cloth-clothing continuum'—covering important surfaces, furniture, and even people in coordinated fabrics. Genoa exploited the language of luxury and comfort that suffused dynastic court culture. Silks, satins, precious metals, jewels, and even beasts were high-status objects whose meaning was often translatable into other, even far distant, court cultures. Genoa utilized this material language as a persuasive mechanism to win the good favour of their guests and perhaps also to advertise their most important exports to individuals with important purchasing power. Their luxurious tactile and visual material hospitality was accompanied by olfactory delights that were intended to further enhance the sensory impact of diplomatic visits.

Ritual and notions of status and protocol were at play on many different levels in diplomatic sociability. Even the seating plans for dinner in an ambassador's residence had to take account of precedence, while social embeddedness involved adhering to and even developing local customs, from offering the traditional parting delicacies in Mughal India to the ritual of coffee in Austro–Ottoman relations. Textiles articulated status too: the type, colour, and plush of fabric could reflect where Genoa placed an important visitor in the international hierarchy. Similarly, the style and colour of the Doge's biretta or his robes announced the status that the republic accorded its visitors, as clearly as did ceremonial considerations such as the considered use of space or gesture. Galastro proposes that we should pay more attention to the language of things in early modern diplomacy. Her focus on textile and sensory 'things' adds to the growing scholarship addressing the political significance of non-verbal communication in diplomatic practice.[48] As this volume shows, while much diplomatic negotiation was achieved verbally, the ceremonial, visual, and material cultures of early modern courts were utilized to constitute, denote, and debate political relationships, and to complement and complicate the oral and written negotiations they surrounded. It can be useful to think about these as 'languages' within diplomacy that gave shape and meaning to the interactions between representatives of different rulers.

Isabella Lazzarini has proposed that diplomatic interactions in Renaissance Italy can be broadly conceptualised as falling into two broad discursive strategies: argument and emotion. 'Argument' can be understood as the rational discourse of a particular issue and its component parts, whether through personal or textual interactions. 'Emotion'—understood as the full range of 'affective reactions'—complicated and nuanced argumentative discourses, and could be as strategically motivated and performed as humanist oratory.[49] While this is a useful way of conceptualizing a specific form of diplomatic communication, there was a wider range of discrete and cross-fertilizing diplomatic languages at play than Lazzarini's 'rational' and 'emotional' ones. Space, ceremony, and material culture represented important modes of political interaction at early modern courts, albeit ones that interacted in complex ways. These were used to acknowledge status

and express favour, but also to make claims about a specific polity's position within the international hierarchy. Diplomatic gifts, in particular, illustrate the complex ways in which different modes of non-verbal communication might interact within early modern diplomatic practice. In the case of the 'Moscow coach', the very fact that it was a coach was a statement: its material form conveyed further information about the specific nature of the Anglo–Russian relationship, while the ceremonial circumstances in which it was given and received also contributed to the messages that were communicated between the English king and Russian tsar. All of which lent further meaning to the verbal and textual negotiations between the rulers and between Boris Godunov and Smythe.

In early modern diplomacy, not only humans carried agency. Objects and animals did too. Through the exchange of diplomatic gifts sovereigns recognized each other's legitimacy and claimed political status. Although they were only exchanged intermittently, gifts were an essential feature of early modern diplomacy across the globe, creating bonds of obligation and constructing notions of reciprocity and friendship even between far distant princes.[50] The Mamluks, Mughals, and Safavids, for instance, sent gifts to and received them from polities across Africa, Asia, and Europe.[51] In an age where princes rarely met, gifts could substitute for personal encounters between rulers.[52] The development of resident diplomacy in Renaissance Europe nuanced medieval gifting practices while the expansion of diplomatic contact experienced by most polities meant that gifts became even more important to their diplomatic relationships. Indeed, as Germán Gamero Igea discusses, gifting practices can offer us insights into the formative stages of resident diplomacy, as monarchs combined existing practices with new techniques. Ferdinand and Isabella, like their Iberian predecessors, became an effective 'working couple', sharing responsibilities and cooperating over foreign policy.[53] They divided diplomatic gift-giving between them into defined, if overlapping, spheres of responsibility based on two main factors: familial relationships and the pre-existing experience and resources that their countries possessed. The gifts they gave and received, and with whom they exchanged gifts, helped to distinguish between the two monarchies at the same time as it helped them forge a common framework for their diplomatic practice.

Diplomatic gifts were important tools of self-representation.[54] Ferdinand the Catholic sent European rulers items that were symbolic of his claims to Nasrid territory and war trophies that trumpeted his military victories over the Moors and enabled him to present himself as a champion of Christianity. Spoils of war were common diplomatic gifts in the Muslim world too, where they were used as a reminder, even a threat, of military might,[55] just as the VOC's gifts of miniature ships and palanquins symbolized their maritime power and delegated sovereignty. Felicity Heal's contribution focusses on a status symbol and expression of sovereign identity *par excellence*: noble beasts associated with military exploits and blood sports.[56] Rarely given

in isolation, animals and birds were an essential component of many gift packages from English monarchs, indeed their bodies were props for ostentatious metal and textile work. Exotic animals and rare birds both asserted royal magnificence and showcased the geographic range of a ruler's (or trading company's) diplomatic networks, even if their care could be as much a curse as a blessing. But as Heal demonstrates, the mechanisms of gifting were as important as the items given in constructing the relationship between sovereigns. The appropriate presentation of gifts and their proper receipt were important mediators of honour and friendship. Consequently, the public presentation of a gift was important to both donor and recipient. Indeed, as Frank Birkenholz's study of VOC gifts to Shah Abbas II and Aurangzeb also highlights, many rulers coincided the audience at which a gift was given with an important moment in the domestic ritual calendar. This enhanced the prestige of the gift while simultaneously garnering greater domestic and international benefits from its public display.

The function of diplomatic gifts is brought into sharp relief by Jan Hennings's analysis of what happened when diplomats deviated from established routine and gifting went awry. His analysis of Anglo–Russian relations in the early 1660s reveals that refusing a gift could be used as a strategy to parry ceremonial affronts. The earl of Carlisle rejected Tsar Aleksei's presents to his sovereign because he believed that the Russian court's conduct of his reception had dishonoured his master. His refusal functioned as a mechanism to restore Charles's status relative to the tsar's precisely because honour was conferred through the action of receiving as well as through giving. Using gifts to mediate the broader framework of honour was far from unique to Anglo–Russian relations: Charles de Ferriol, the French ambassador in Constantinople, withdrew his sovereign's presents over a perceived ceremonial slight during his welcome audience in 1700.[57] In certain circumstances the malleability of objects' meanings could be used to create mutually acceptable, but differing interpretations of the relationship.[58]

Hennings's chapter also explores the functions of gift-giving beyond the presentation of luxurious items of prestige, comparing the informal gift with more formalized exchanges of objects in trade and commerce. The tsar offered a carefully calculated quantity of hemp—an item that was more usually a trade commodity—as a gift to demonstrate his credit worthiness for a loan he was requesting at the time, while the English king pressured him with a reminder of the lucrative trade to be had with Russia through gifts of Cornish tin and pots of lead. Commerce and gifting, while often seen as distinct spheres of activity, were also intimately linked in the VOC's missions to Persia and India. The range of items given to Shah Abbas and Aurangzeb went beyond the usual 'scattergun' approach discussed by Heal. Birkenholz's detailed analysis of the items presented reveals the VOC's concern to showcase that their trading network extended across three continents.

Just as diplomats' participation in local ceremonies reveals how cultural assumptions met and mingled, so too can diplomatic gifting practices.

Hennings's study of Anglo-Russian ceremonies and gift exchange demonstrates that ceremonial disputes occurred not through cultural clashes, but because of a mutual understanding of how status was expressed. On the other hand, the Dutch merchant-diplomats discussed by Birkenholz adapted their gifting practices equally well to the demands of the courts of two tributary empires: their delegated sovereignty gave them the necessary flexibility to conform to the Mughal and Safavid emperors' interpretation of their gifts. The common elite language of beastly gifts that Heal espies in Europe (and to a lesser degree, beyond) was surely understood in non-European societies too, as horses, animals associated with blood sports, and exotic beasts enjoyed particular currency in the Mediterranean and Eurasian spheres.[59] Even the tropes surrounding the reception of the animals were similar, if marked by local nuances. When the Moghul Emperor Jahangir received a mastiff from James VI/I, he showed his appreciation for the beast by praising its courage and having a leopard brought out to fight it, just as a European monarch would have produced a bear.[60] Although many beasts and objects had meanings that translated across cultural boundaries, the same item could have different meanings in different contexts. While the gift of a robe of honour denoted vassalage in a Mamluk context, in some tributary empires such as the Safavid or Mughal it also bestowed patronage, while in some Ottoman contexts, as Kármán shows, it conferred protection.[61]

Ferdinand and Isabella at least drew no clear distinctions between European Christian rulers and Muslim African ones in their gifting strategies. The lines were still blurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when as Christina Brauner has argued, the crown and other gifts that European trading companies gave to the king of Allada indicated that they considered some African polities neither fully outside the European society of princes nor quite within it.[62] The upshot is that such ambiguities, and the ability of political agents to mediate norms and communicate across cultural boundaries, made diplomatic cultures more compatible than the apparent fundamental differences of their political and social systems, and attendant national historiographies, suggest. The long absence of one international diplomatic system supported by a clear concept of sovereignty and a unified understanding of diplomacy was not an obstacle in the evolution of international relations; it was one of its constitutive elements. By opening up a broad panorama of diplomatic practices in early modernity, this volume invites readers to draw comparisons across the individual chapters in order to probe the notion that European diplomacy worked in different ways from what happened in other parts of the world rather than discussing international politics through anachronistic cultural hierarchies or juxtaposing 'European' and 'global'. Of course, the emerging practices remained pluralistic, disparate, and specific to regions, but a comparative perspective on our collective efforts suggests that regional compartmentalization reflected in the academic division of the world into regions, and their inherent

periodizations, is likely to be more obstructive to a better understanding of early modern diplomatic practices and their commensurability. If Renaissance Italy or seventeenth-century Westphalia were to remain the linchpins in our conception of international relations—and those who did not participate in resident diplomacy or the peace congress were to be labelled as different or 'without diplomacy'—then the powerful tool of periodicity misses an important point: namely that resident ambassadors and the representatives in Münster and Osnabrück observed practices that are in principle commensurable with those employed elsewhere in the early modern world. It is by bringing together a range of approaches which are not ordinarily discussed together that a comparison of the differences, similarities, and entanglements between and within different regions speaks to what remains one of the core aims of the New Diplomatic History: to question the Eurocentric heritage. Therefore, this volume presents the state of the art of the discipline across different historiographical traditions as well as language boundaries. The New Diplomatic History is a burgeoning field in which different national historiographies have developed their own separate niches despite many obvious overlaps. Bringing these different national academic traditions together, as this volume does, highlights the benefits of sustained dialogue not only between disciplines but also between different trajectories of diplomatic history in different academies.

Notes

1 This volume is related to events organized under the AHRC international networking grant 'Textual ambassadors: cultures of diplomacy and literary writing in the early modern world' (AH/K001930/1).

2 A. Maskell, *Russian art and art objects in Russia* (London, 1884), p. 231; *Sir Thomas Smithes voiage and entertainment in Rushia* (London, 1605), E3r-4v. For a detailed description of the coach see J. Munby, 'The Moscow coach: "a rich chariot, one portion of the great present"', in O. Dmitrieva and T. Murdoch (eds.), *Treasures of the royal courts: Tudors, Stuarts and the Russian tsars* (London, 2013), pp. 163–5.

3 Hatfield House, Cecil Papers, 80/4.

4 TNA SP 91/1, fos. 134v, 196r-v.

5 *Sir Thomas Smithes voiage*, E3r-4v.

6 TNA SP 91/1, fos. 196r-8r, 207v-9r.

7 For a critical assessment of the classic approaches to diplomatic history, see H. M. Scott, 'Diplomatic culture in old regime Europe', in H. M. Scott and B. Simms (eds.), *Cultures of power in Europe during the long eighteenth century: essays in honour of T. C. W. Blanning* (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 58–60.

8 For a useful introduction and critical appraisal, see E. Keene, *International political thought: a historical introduction* (Cambridge, 2005). See also D. Armitage, *Foundations of modern international thought* (Cambridge, 2013) and J. Bartelson, *A genealogy of sovereignty* (Cambridge, 1995). For an insightful critique of the tradition of international legal thought, see M. Koskenniemi, 'International law and raison d'etat: rethinking the prehistory of international law', in *The Roman foundations of the law of nations: Alberico Gentili an the justice of empire*, ed. B. Kingsbury and B. Straumann (Oxford, 2010), pp. 297–339.

9 For an enlightening discussion of the equally problematic term 'transnational', see B. Yun-Casalilla, 'Transnational history: what lies behind the label. Some reflections from an early modernist's point of view', *Culture & History*, 3.2 (2014).

10 For a fuller discussion of the historiography see T. A. Sowerby, 'Early modern diplomatic history', *History Compass*, 14.9 (2016), 441–56. Earlier introductions include J. Watkins, 'Toward a new diplomatic history of medieval and early modern Europe', *JMEMS*, 38 (2008), 1–14; H. Kugeler, C. Sepp, and G. Wolf (eds.), *Internationale Beziehungen in der Frühen Neuzeit: Ansätze und Perspektiven* (Hamburg, 2006), pp. 9–35.

11 See for example H. von Thiessen and C. Windler (eds.), *Akteure der Aussenbeziehungen: Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel* (Cologne, 2010); J. DeSilva, and C. Fletcher (eds.), *Italian ambassadorial networks in early modern Europe,* a special issue of *JEMH*, 14.6 (2010), 505–611.

12 See for example C. Windler, 'La curie romaine et la cour safavide au XVIIe siècle: projets missionaires et diplomatie', in M. A. Visceglia (ed.), *Papato e politica internazionalenella prima etá moderna* (Rome, 2013), pp. 505–23; K. Boterbloem, *Moderniser of Russia: Andrei Vinius, 1641–1716* (Basingstoke, 2013); M. van Gelder and T. Krstić (eds.), *Cross-confessional diplomacy and diplomatic intermediaries in the early modern Mediterranean,* a special issue of *JEMH*, 19.2–3 (2015), 93–259; E. Rothschild, *The inner life of empires: an eighteenth-century history* (Oxford, 2011).

13 See for example A. Walthall (ed.), *Servants of the dynasty: palace women in world history* (London, 2008); J. Duindam, *Dynasties: a global history of power, 1300–1800* (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 87–155.

14 For example C. Y. Muslu, *The Ottomans and the Mamluks: imperial diplomacy and warfare in the Islamic world* (London, 2014); C. Brauner, *Kompanien, Könige und caboceers: interkulturelle Diplomatie an Gold- und Sklavenküste im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 2015); T. Osborne and J. P. Rubies (eds.), *Diplomacy and cultural translation in the early modern world,* a special issue of *JEMH*, 20.5 (2016), 313–428; C. Garnier and C. Vogel (eds.), *Interkulturelle Ritualpraxis in der Vormoderne: diplomatische Interaktion an den östlichen Grenzen der Fürstengesellschaft*, *ZHF Beiheft*, 52 (2016). See also references in next note.

15 S. Subrahmanyam, *Courtly encounters: translating courtliness and violence in early modern Eurasia* (Cambridge, 2012); N. Rothman, *Brokering empire: trans-imperial subjects between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca, NY, 2012); G. Barth-Scalmani, H. Rudolph, and C. Steppan (eds.), *Politische Kommunikation zwischen imperien: der diplomatische Aktionsraum Südost- und Osteuropa* (Innsbruck, 2013).

16 For example J.-P. A. Ghobrial, *The whispers of cities: information flows in Istanbul, London and Paris in the age of William Trumbull* (Oxford, 2014); I. Lazzarini, *Communication and conflict: Italian diplomacy in the early Renaissance, 1350–1520* (Oxford, 2015); P. M. Dover (ed.), *Secretaries and statecraft in the early modern world* (Edinburgh, 2016).

17 H. Schilling, *Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinteressen: internationale Beziehungen 1559–1660* (Paderborn, 2007).

18 M. Rohrschneider and A. Strohmeyer (eds.), *Wahrnehmungen des Fremden: Differenzerfahrungen von Diplomaten im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (Münster, 2007); D. Riches, *Protestant cosmopolitanism and diplomatic culture: Brandenburg-Swedish relations in the seventeenth century* (Leiden, 2013).

19 For example R. Kauz, J.-P. Niederkorn, and G. Rota (eds.), *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und dem Mittleren Osten in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Vienna, 2009); M. Köhler, *Strategie und Symbolik: Verhandeln auf dem Kongress von Nimwegen* (Cologne, 2011); P. Burschel and C. Vogel (eds.), *Die Audienz: ritualisierter*

Kulturkontakt in der Frühen Neuzeit (Cologne, 2014); N. F. May, *Zwischen fürstlicher Repräsentation und adliger Statuspolitik: das Kongresszeremoniell bei den westfälischen Friedensverhandlungen* (Ostfildern, 2016).

20 M. Häberlein and C. Jeggle (eds.), *Materielle Grundlagen der Diplomatie: Schenken, Sammeln und Verhandeln in Spätmittelalter und Früher Neuzeit* (Konstanz, 2013); T. A. Sowerby, '"A memorial and a pledge of faith": portraiture and early modern diplomatic culture', *EHR*, 129 (2014), 296–331; N. Ulm and L. R. Clark (eds.), 'The art of embassy: objects and images of early modern diplomacy', *JEMH*, 20.3 (2016), 3–139.

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22 A. Wicquefort, *The embassador and his functions*, trans. Mr Digby (Leicester 1997), p. 6. See A. Krischer, 'Souveränität als sozialer Status: zur Funktion des diplomatischen Zeremoniells in der Frühen Neuzeit', in Kauz, Niederkorn, and Rota (eds.), *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell*, pp. 1–32, for a discussion.

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24 Krischer, 'Souveränität als sozialer Status'.

25 B. Stollberg-Rilinger, 'Honores Regii: die Königswürde im zeremoniellen Zeichensystem der Frühen Neuzeit', in J. Kunisch (ed.), *Dreihundert Jahre preussische Königskrönung: eine Tagungsdokumentation* (Berlin, 2002), pp. 1–26.

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29 L. Benton, *A search for sovereignty: law and geography in European empires, 1400–1900* (Cambridge, 2010), p. 3. For an insightful discussion of 'composite sovereignty' see M. P. Romaniello, *The elusive empire: Kazan and the creation of Russia 1552–1671* (Madison, WI, 2012), esp. pp. 8–18.

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31 H. von Thiessen, 'Diplomatie vom *type ancien*: Überlegungen zu einem Idealtypus des frühneuzeitlichen Gesandtschaftswesens', in von Thiessen and Windler (eds.), *Akteure der Aussenbeziehungen*, pp. 471–503.

32 For the 'society of princes', see L. Bély, *La société des princes, XVIe–XVIIIe siècles* (Paris, 1999).

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34 See J. Hennings, *Russia and courtly Europe: ritual and the culture of diplomacy, 1648–1725* (Cambridge, 2016).

35 See also C. Windler, *La diplomatie comme expérience de l'Autre: consuls français au Maghreb (1700–1840)* (Geneva, 2002).

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37 Notably J. Darwin, *After Tamerlane: the rise and fall of global empires* (London, 2000); S. Suzuki,Y. Zhang, and J. Quirk (eds.), *International order in the early modern world: before the rise of the west* (London, 2014).
38 For example C. Bastian, E. Dade, H. von Thiessen, and C. Windler, *Das Geschlecht der Diplomatie: Geschlechterrollen in den Außenbeziehungen com Spätmittelalter bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 2014); G. Sluga and C. James (eds.), *Women, diplomacy and international politics since 1500* (London, 2016).
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Part I

Status and sovereignty beyond the state

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1 Burgundian clients in the south-western Holy Roman Empire, 1410–1477

Between international diplomacy and regional political culture[1]

Duncan Hardy

Introduction

The history of the Holy Roman Empire before the mid-sixteenth century provides a challenge to our established models of state formation and diplomacy.[2] Historians have long struggled to understand this enormous and fragmented polity populated by many smaller political entities. Generally the Empire of the late medieval and early modern periods has attracted quite negative judgements for its alleged failure to become a 'nation-state', or to conform to the supposedly normal pattern of European political development.[3] The models that have attempted to make sense of it have tended to apply concepts fashioned elsewhere and tried to fit them to the local evidence. For example, the patrimonies and powers of the Empire's autonomous princes, bishops, nobles, and cities have been understood as 'territorial states' or 'territorial lordships'—*Territorialstaaten*, *Landesherrschaften*—which constituted a kaleidoscopic expanse that filled central Europe.[4] These little states are thought to have been ruled primarily by princes and other noble lords,[5] but some 'city-states' and urban 'territories' have also received attention.[6] The corollary of this 'state-oriented' view of the Empire's political make-up is that, already by the late middle ages, these nascent territorial states possessed their own emerging sovereignty or *Landeshoheit*,[7] and conducted their own diplomacy and foreign policy, or *Außenpolitik*.[8]

There are a number of problems with this view of the Empire in the long fifteenth century as a mosaic of little territories. Far from being discrete states-in-the-making, all of the political powers in the Empire overlapped and depended on one another in structural ways which precluded totally independent courses of action, and prevented the development of uncontested jurisdictions, administrative organs, and sovereign conceptions of power which might allow for autonomous diplomatic activity.[9] Structures of tenure, like fiefs, or *Lehen*, and pledges, or *Pfandschaften*, were not arranged hierarchically in pyramids of power flowing downwards from sovereign princes, but held by interlocking networks of actors, including urban and clerical elites as well as princes and lesser nobles.[10] Underpinning the legitimacy of every member of the imperial elite, from the greatest of the prince-electors to the

Map 1.1 Territories of the House of Valois-Burgundy during the reign of Charles the Bold, 1465/67–1477. Wikipedia, Marco Zanoli.

smallest of the Imperial cities, was an overarching polity, the Holy Roman Empire itself, with its multipolar division of power between the monarchy and the various factions amongst the estates, and its much-used but relatively ineffective administrative organs, the imperial aulic and chamber courts (*Hofgericht* and *Kammergericht*) and the chancery.[11] The idea of the Empire as a unitary political framework continued to animate and inspire its inhabitants, as evinced by imperial themes in visual and material artefacts, as well as the abundant records of regular meetings of imperial elites and the countless imperial charters of privileges that survive in numerous archives from the late medieval and early modern centuries.[12] Against this background, the interaction between the overlapping powers in the Empire was not equivalent to the more clearly 'international' diplomacy between, for instance, the kings of England and France in the fifteenth century and beyond.[13] Although the most powerful imperial princes and cities maintained relations with external monarchs, their dealings with one another within the Empire's borders were of an altogether more interconnected and localized nature.

In fact, there is one school of thought, pioneered by Otto Brunner in the 1940s to 1960s, which asserts that there was no diplomacy whatsoever in the Holy Roman Empire, and in Christendom more generally, before the Reformation. Brunner railed against what he saw as the anachronistic use of concepts such as 'state' and 'sovereignty' by late medievalists.[14] The powers of Europe, and especially the powers within the Empire, exercised only 'lordship' (*Herrschaft*) over patrimonially- and communally-defined 'lands' (*Länder*) in Brunner's view.[15] Christian exercisers of *Herrschaft* did not conduct foreign policy with one another, because they were not foreign to one another—they were integrated within the legal-political framework of the *Land*, the Empire, and ultimately Christendom as a whole, in which only the pope could engage in anything approaching 'diplomacy'.[16] Instead, relations between powers were governed by customary states of friendship—*Freundschaft*, *amicitia*—or enmity—*Feindschaft*, *inimicitia*. Consequently, there were also no real wars in Christendom according to Brunner, only states of enmity that allowed for the feud, which was governed by strict legal norms.[17] This scheme assumes that all of the Empire was homogeneous and that its elites obeyed an immutable code of relations derived self-consciously from 'Germanic' and Christian values, which is rather unconvincing.[18]

This chapter proposes a middle way between these two extremes, namely that the Empire was a collection of proto-sovereign territorial states which conducted diplomacy like other European powers, or else that the imperial elites' complex interactions consisted of a unified aristocratic code of conduct. One avenue of exploration for making sense of political interaction between powers within the Holy Roman Empire in this period lies with the theme of this volume: culture, and more specifically, political culture. In recent decades the concept of 'political culture' has been applied fruitfully to many later medieval and early modern contexts. In the broadest sense, the study of political culture entails situating political processes within 'the "complex whole" of social organisation'.[19]

More specifically, Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger and other early modernists of the 'Münster school' of the 'cultural history of politics' have emphasized the value of socioanthropologically-inflected analysis of the interactions of power-wielders in pre-modern Europe as a means of decoding the political significance of certain actions and behaviours and identifying the (sometimes overlapping, sometimes competing) symbolic and material systems within which they were embedded.[20] By taking into account the practices that constituted the sociocultural norms of power-wielders in the Holy Roman Empire, it becomes possible to identify what was distinctive about its political structures and culture, and the ways in which interactions within the Empire differed from other modalities of political activity, including diplomacy between discrete polities.

It is possible to reconstruct the interactions of many political actors in the Holy Roman Empire, and the structures and norms which shaped these interactions, from the later medieval and early modern evidence. These primary sources, produced by the administrations of princes, bishops, towns, and others, display some striking shared patterns. These groups made use of the same documentary forms and formulae; discourses and practices of lordship; ritualized approaches to feuding and warfare; methods of mediation and arbitration at judicial diets; performative and symbolic modes of communication; and contractual associations such as alliances and leagues.[21] This last activity was particularly important, because associations provided a formal framework within which these other aspects of customary political interaction played out.[22] The archives of what was once the southern Holy Roman Empire are full of treaties of association, which, in addition to promising military support, regulated forms of negotiation (for example, by specifying who should arbitrate in any disputes that might arise between members of the association).[23] The most important and distinctive form of interaction and negotiation in the Empire was the constant use of assemblies and diets, or *Tage*, at which alliances would be considered, disputes would be discussed, feuds would be resolved, and arbitrational decisions would be rendered.[24] Quite often these *Tage* were arranged within the framework of an association, be it a local society of knights, a league of towns, or a large trans-regional peace-union (*Landfriede*). Sometimes *Tage* were not attended by princes, bishops, lords, or city mayors or guild masters in person, but by representatives called *Boten* or *Botschaften*, words which might be translated into English as 'messengers', 'envoys', 'negotiators', 'deputies', and even 'ambassadors', depending on the context.[25]

Viewed through the lens of political culture, these forms of interaction that characterized the Holy Roman Empire look neither like those of distinct kingdoms, nor like those of familial noble networks. This political culture, defined by contractual associations and institutionalized and ritualized negotiations, had many diplomacy-like features, but it was clearly different from the court-centric forms of diplomacy that were increasingly being practised by the proto-sovereign kingdoms and principalities of fifteenth-century Italy and western Europe. One way to explore the extent to which the political culture of the Empire differed from, or overlapped

with, developing forms of diplomacy elsewhere in Europe is to find practitioners of both forms of political interaction. Here the Upper Rhine region, which spanned the south-western lands of the Empire, provides some instructive examples. This area consisted of hundreds of overlapping powers, ranging from princes such as the Tyrolean line of dukes of Austria and the margraves of Baden, to bishops, such as those of Strasbourg and Basel, to Imperial cities, like the metropolises of Zurich and Strasbourg, as well as many far smaller autonomous towns on both banks of the Rhine and in Swabia.[26] The Upper Rhine was thoroughly integrated within the political networks and culture of the Upper German space which formed the core of the Holy Roman Empire. Yet it was also in close proximity to the expanding territories of the Valois (and later Habsburg) dukes of Burgundy, with whom the Upper Rhenish powers interacted with increasing regularity in the course of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. As we shall see, contact between imperial actors and Burgundy generally had 'international' characteristics under the four Valois dukes, Philip 'the Bold' (1363–1404), John 'the Fearless' (1404–1419), Philip 'the Good' (1419–1467), and Charles 'the Bold' (1467–1477).[27] This diplomatic contact tended to involve the formal appointment of ambassadors, the use of multilingual mediators, and the reliance of the Burgundian administration on local diplomatic agents, who might be promoted to official ambassadors in certain circumstances. The result was that some prominent Upper Rhenish figures doubled as Burgundian clients, working with Burgundian diplomats or even acting as ambassadors themselves, even as they engaged in customary forms of association and negotiation with their German-speaking neighbours. Three examples of these Burgundian clients-cum-local political actors will be examined in this chapter. It will then be possible to conclude with some brief reflections on what their careers might mean for our conceptions of diplomacy at this early and highly complex end of the early modern world.

Catherine of Burgundy, duchess of Austria-Tyrol (1378–1426)

The first prominent client of the Burgundian administration to be based in the south-western Empire was Catherine of Burgundy (born 1378), daughter of the first Valois duke of Burgundy, Philip the Bold. In 1385 she was betrothed in exchange for a dowry of 100,000 francs to a member of the Tyrolean line of the dukes of Austria, Leopold IV, and the couple married in 1393.[28] While his brothers ruled Tyrol itself, Leopold installed himself in the western lands of so-called *Vorderösterreich* ('Outer Austria'), consisting of scattered possessions along the Upper Rhine, primarily in the Sundgau in the southern extremity of Alsace. Leopold died in 1411, and Catherine—now a dowager duchess of Austria-Tyrol—was installed as regent in the county of Pfirt, or Ferrette in French, in the Sundgau. From around this date onwards Catherine regularly acted as a diplomat or on behalf of other diplomats in the service of her brother John the Fearless, and, after his assassination in

1419, her nephew Philip the Good. Catherine supplied financial support, local knowledge, and hospitality to a number of Burgundian ambassadors heading east or south to negotiate with German princes and cities or the powers of northern Italy. In 1411, for instance, the former Burgundian ambassador to Venice, Jean Sarrotte, was awarded properties worth 100 *écus d'or* in Courtrai as compensation for a lengthy journey he had just undertaken. On the way back from Venice he and his party were robbed and imprisoned by an Austrian nobleman, at which point Catherine intervened on his behalf and offered him refuge in her household.[29] After duke John had despatched an embassy to the Ecumenical Council of Constance (1414–1418) in 1415, led by the bishops of Arras and Beauvais, Catherine deployed her castellans to ferry information, finances, and provisions between Dijon and 'the ambassadors currently residing by order of my said lord at the Holy Council of Constance'.[30] In 1425, Margaret of Burgundy, duchess of Bavaria and sister of John the Fearless, wrote to Catherine in order to have her release some ducal ambassadors who had been captured by Rhenish noblemen on their way to the court of duke Amadeus VIII of Savoy.[31]

Burgundian administrative records from the 1410s show that John the Fearless also sent regular messengers to confer with Catherine, typically about 'certain matters urgently concerning my said lord the duke and the security of his lands of Burgundy'.[32] While the records do not divulge the detailed content of the discussions held by the duchess with these messengers, it is reasonable to infer that the expectation was that Catherine would use her position and connections in the Empire to fulfil John's security-oriented aims on his eastern frontier. Presumably for similar reasons, Catherine travelled to Dijon—the administrative centre of the southern Burgundian territories—on numerous occasions in the 1410s and 1420s to consult with the ducal personnel based there.[33] Catherine also acted as a kind of diplomat in her own right in her interactions with the cities on the Upper Rhine on behalf of her brother and nephew, notably with Basel, which was situated next to her own bases in the Sundgau. In part through Catherine's efforts as an intermediary, the dukes of Burgundy were able to benefit from commercial ties and loans from Basel, which was a major capital market and trading hub.[34] In this respect, Catherine's career represents a valuable case study in the role that noblewomen could play in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century diplomacy, a topic which has received relatively little attention.[35]

For their part, dukes John and Philip exploited the presence of a member of their dynasty in the south-western Empire as a means of pursuing an expansionistic military policy in this region. Several fortresses in Catherine's possession were garrisoned by soldiers from the two Burgundies (the duchy itself and the Franche-Comté), and already in 1409 the Burgundian marshal Jean de Vergy was ordered by John the Fearless to make troops available for defending his sister's position in Alsace.[36] This policy initially reinforced the diplomatic ties between the duke of Burgundy and Catherine's brother-in-law, duke Friedrich IV of Austria-Tyrol, who wrote triumphantly to his

subjects along the Rhine in September 1409 that military assistance against their Swiss enemies would soon be forthcoming from Burgundy, 'which is a great relief for us and for you'.[37] Via Catherine, John the Fearless and Philip the Good could also recruit mercenaries from the plentiful garrisons and battalions of Upper Germany. The Burgundian dukes sought to recruit German mercenaries in the 1410s during their struggle against the Armagnac faction in France, and again in the 1420s for their wars in France and the Low Countries.[38] Many of the Upper Rhenish noblemen introduced to the dukes by Catherine became chamberlains at the ducal court in the latter decade, and requested pensions from the Burgundian chancery.[39] The 1420s also saw extensive diplomatic correspondence between Catherine, as well as her retainers and allies, and Nicolas Rolin, the Burgundian chancellor, who, according to the chronicler Georges Chastellain, made 'all important decisions of war and peace'.[40]

In addition to these diplomatic activities, Catherine was an Upper Rhenish power in her own right, and in the course of her career as regent of the Austrian possessions in the Sundgau she was rapidly drawn into local political networks and practices. For example, the fact that Catherine was able to act as an intermediary between Basel and her brother and nephew owed much to her intensive links to this metropolis, which was situated only a few kilometres from Ensisheim and Belfort, her seats of power. Around 1409–1410 this contact was hostile, because of a feud which erupted between some of Catherine's noble retainers and Basel's municipal elite, but from 1411 onwards the duchess and the city government were close collaborators, and Catherine entered into an alliance with Basel in December of that year.[41] Thirteen years later, in April 1424, Catherine joined a league of Rhenish and Swabian cities and princes that arose in opposition to Margrave Bernhard I of Baden and Bishop Wilhelm of Strasbourg, apparently at the behest of the municipal council of Basel.[42] Catherine also regularly participated in local feuds, including a large-scale quarrel with Count Hans of Lupfen in 1411–1412, which won her many enemies: over thirty declarations of feud-enmity were sent to her in those years by various noblemen in the south-western Empire.[43] The dowager duchess was also, out of necessity, a regular user of the formats of arbitrational justice which were customary in the Upper German lands. For example, an arbitrational *Tag* in 1425 was attended by 'the resplendent high-born princess, Lady Catherine of Burgundy, duchess of Austria', whose dispute with two noblemen was settled in the traditional manner by the captains of an association of knights calling themselves the 'society of the Griffon'.[44] Catherine became so ensconced in the affairs of the Upper Rhenish elite that she eventually married one of her main allies within it, Lord Smassmann I of Rappoltstein, around the year 1415, soon after she had appointed him as her *Landvogt* or bailiff, to the fury of her brother the duke of Burgundy, who had not consented to the match.[45] This last episode in particular highlights the sometimes contradictory nature of Catherine's position. While it would be an exaggeration to suggest that

her duties and concerns as an imperial duchess and the interests of her Burgundian dynasty were opposed, there were several aspects of the political cultures of these two spheres—the latter more obviously 'diplomatic' than the former—which differed markedly. Similar trends can be detected in the careers of other Burgundian clients, including the two discussed below.

Margrave Wilhelm of Hochberg-Rötteln-Sausenberg (1406–1482)

Another figure who was firmly embedded in the political life of the south-western Holy Roman Empire but doubled as a diplomatic agent of Burgundy was Wilhelm, margrave of Hochberg (or Hachberg) and lord of Rötteln and Sausenberg, the heir of the patrimony of a cadet branch of the margravial house of Baden.[46] He acceded as the senior member of his family around the time of Catherine's death, and was similarly based along the Upper Rhine, his main lands and fortresses being in the Breisgau and the Black Forest. Hochberg came into the ambit of the Burgundian court of Philip the Good through his cousin, Count Hans/Jean of Freiburg-Neuchâtel, who had lands in both the Black Forest and in what is now the canton of Neuchâtel in Switzerland, with the latter being held in fief from noblemen in the duchy and county of Burgundy. Before acting in any official capacity for the duke of Burgundy, Hochberg was already undertaking missions of a diplomatic nature for both the Ecumenical Council of Basel (1431–1449) and Emperor Sigismund. By virtue of the proximity of his lands to the city of Basel and his prominence as a regional actor, Hochberg was appointed as one of the ecclesiastical council's 'ambasiatores et oratores solempnes' to the Hussites at Eger in April 1432, and he was simultaneously selected as its vice-*protector* and *vicarius*.[47] By January 1436 Sigismund had promoted him to the status of full *protector* of the council.[48] Already in December 1433, when Sigismund made his imperial entry into the city of Basel, Hochberg ('marchio de Rotlen') was one of the high-ranking noblemen deputed to greet him,[49] and when the emperor confirmed the margrave's privileges in April 1434, Hochberg was referred to as one of Sigismund's councillors ('unser Rate') in the charter.[50]

These elevated connections and offices must have made Hochberg seem like an attractive client for Philip the Good. The first clear sign that he carried out diplomatic duties for the Burgundian duke comes from the letters of credence distributed by Philip on behalf of his ambassadors at the Council of Basel on 1 September 1433. Most of these were prelates from northern France and the Low Countries, but Philip also accredited 'Guillelmum marchionem de Hochberg' and his cousin Count Hans of Freiburg-Neuchâtel—who were listed as ducal chamberlains—as ambassadors to the council.[51] Hochberg was also one of the 'ambaxiatores' empowered to negotiate with French prelates present at the council of Basel by a letter of procuration issued by Philip the Good in December 1434.[52] By all accounts Hochberg

participated in the heckling and prevarication which characterized the behaviour of the Burgundian delegation at Basel, apparently on the instruction of the duke of Burgundy himself, until the ambassadors were recalled following the council's election of (Anti-)Pope Felix V in 1439.[53] Following Philip's orders, Hochberg helped the bishops of Taranto and Padua—partisans of Eugenius IV and opponents of the council—to escape from prison in Basel in 1437.[54]

Hochberg was also employed by Philip as an envoy to Emperor Sigismund (of whom, it will be remembered, the margrave was a councillor). When a dispute arose between the duke and the emperor over the status of the duchy of Brabant within the Holy Roman Empire, 'Guillaume marquis de Hochberg le seigneur de Rinchelynge [sic]' and his cousin, the count of Freiburg-Neuchâtel, were appointed as ambassadors to Sigismund in a fruitless attempt to persuade him of the justice of Philip's cause.[55] After the death of Sigismund in 1437 and the election and coronation of Frederick III as king of the Romans in 1440/1442, Hochberg continued to act as an intermediary figure in negotiations between the imperial monarchy on the one hand and Philip the Good on the other.[56] According to a notarial record of a meeting between Philip and Frederick at Besançon in 1442, the margrave and the count of Freiburg-Neuchâtel worked as interpreters for the two rulers, translating the king's German statements into French for the benefit of the Burgundian duke.[57] Hochberg also led a delegation to the Burgundian Low Countries on behalf of duke Albrecht VI of Austria, Frederick's brother, in 1446–1447. His contacts at Philip's court, then in Brussels, enabled him to meet the chancellor, Rolin, and to make a case for improving relations between the duke and the Austrian dynasty. This delegation led ultimately to a treaty of alliance between the dukes of Austria and Philip.[58] If Hochberg was able to undertake this kind of mediation, it is surely because he was a regular fixture at the Burgundian court until his effective retirement in the mid- to late 1440s. Hochberg was frequently present in Philip's household at weddings and feasts organized or attended by the Burgundian duke, such as the marriage of Louis of Geneva, heir to the duchy of Savoy, and Anna of Cyprus at Chambéry in February 1434.[59] He drew a pension from the Burgundian treasury well into the 1450s.[60]

Yet to understand Margrave Wilhelm's career fully, it needs to be recognized that he, like Catherine of Burgundy, was deeply embedded in the regional political culture of the south-western Holy Roman Empire, even as he fulfilled lofty ambassadorial functions on behalf of Philip. Hochberg was married to Elisabeth, the heiress of the wealthy county of Montfort-Bregenz abutting Lake Constance, and his purported misuse of his wife's fortune led to multiple disputes that were channelled through cycles of feuding and arbitration at endless *Tage* with the local nobility.[61] Hochberg himself featured regularly on arbitrational committees to resolve disputes between local nobles and towns.[62] As a member and then a captain of the knightly Society of St George's Shield, Hochberg was positioned at the heart of a series of German

aristocratic networks that extended from Austria and eastern Swabia to the Vosges.[63] Hochberg's brother Otto was the bishop of Constance, while he himself came to hold a number of key offices on the Upper Rhine, including that of bailiff, or *Landvogt*, for the Outer Austrian territories in Alsace, the Sundgau, and the Breisgau, an appointment made by duke Friedrich IV of Austria-Tyrol in 1437.[64] In this capacity, the margrave orchestrated a controversial alliance between the city of Zurich and the Outer Austrian nobility, and he then became the *de facto* leader of the leagues which opposed the Swiss Confederates in the so-called 'Old Zurich War', in the early to mid-1440s.[65] Through a multitude *Pfandschaften*, surety contracts, and debts, Hochberg was also enmeshed in local credit networks.[66] All these regional activities were not unrelated to Hochberg's diplomatic service for Burgundy. Had he not been an instrumental member of the elite south-west German networks of the 1430s and 1440s, it is unlikely that Philip's administrators would have been as interested in employing him. However, there is also a distinction—albeit a blurry one—between the regionally-bounded practices Hochberg undertook on the Upper Rhine and in the Alpine sphere, where he engaged in customary modes of interaction typical of Upper German elites in this period, and his formal ambassadorial and mediatory functions as a Burgundian client. These functions, carried out in fora such as the Council of Basel and courtly encounters between Burgundian deputations and the imperial monarchs, were truly 'trans-regional' or even 'international' in character.

Peter von Hagenbach, *Landvogt* of Alsace (1420–1474)

Perhaps the most famous example of a fifteenth-century actor who straddled the fault line between Burgundian diplomacy and the distinctive political culture of the south-western Empire is Peter von Hagenbach, or 'Pierre de Hacquembac', as he was known to his Burgundian contemporaries.[67] Hagenbach's origins lay amongst the lesser nobility of the Sundgau, but he and his brother Stephan spent the mid-fifteenth century as mercenaries, messengers, and administrators in the service of Philip the Good and his son Charles the Bold.[68] This level of mobility was not uncommon for men of their status in these decades. The career of another Upper Rhenish nobleman, Hans von Hallwyl (1433–1504), demonstrates the many layers of connections that could be accrued: as a young man Hallwyl was employed by duke Albrecht VI of Austria, then served as a mercenary in Bohemia, after which he sealed a *Burgrecht*-alliance with the city of Bern, fought in the Burgundian Wars against Charles the Bold as a Confederate captain, and ended his life as a councillor of Louis XI of France.[69] Peter von Hagenbach's career in the service of the dukes of Burgundy involved military activity in France and the Low Countries in the 1450s to 1460s and a number of diplomatic errands in Liège and Lorraine. By the late 1460s, Hagenbach had been appointed as a master of the household ('maistre dostel ordinaire') at the Burgundian court.[70]

In 1469, Charles the Bold purchased as a *Pfandschaft* a scattered group of Outer Austrian lands and jurisdictions along the Upper Rhine, primarily in southern Alsace. These were acquired for 50,000 fl. from the impecunious duke Sigmund of Austria-Tyrol, who had recently lost a major war against the Swiss Confederates and been forced to pay reparations that exceeded his financial means.[71] Charles selected Peter von Hagenbach as his bailiff (*Landvogt* or *bailli*) to administer these territories on his behalf. Hagenbach's position was described in grandiloquent terms by the Burgundian chancery as that of 'Bailli de la vinconte Dauxois [et] dicelle conte de Ferratte' (a corrupted reference to the landgraviate of Alsace and the county of Pfirt).[72] However, in practice the Alsatian acquisitions were never integrated into the Burgundian composite polity with the same level of intensity or centralization as other regions in the Low Countries or ducal Burgundy and Franche-Comté.[73] Charles the Bold committed few resources to the Upper Rhine while he pursued expensive wars elsewhere and Hagenbach was left to hold the scattered possessions together through a combination of 'diplomacy' of the kind that characterized relations between princely powers and the customary conventions of political life in the south-western Empire.

Amongst his more overtly diplomatic activities, Hagenbach worked in 1470 with the Burgundian administration in Brussels to attempt to purchase the compliance of Bishop Johann V of Basel. When this failed, Hagenbach plotted (again, unsuccessfully) with the chancellor of Flanders, Anthoine Haneron of Bruges, to have Johann deposed and the episcopal dignity transferred to Haneron.[74] Haneron and Hagenbach undertook another joint diplomatic mission for Charles in the late summer of 1473, meeting with Emperor Frederick III's ambassadors at several locations along the Rhine in order to plan a conference between their respective lords to negotiate the marriage of Mary of Burgundy to Maximilian of Austria and the creation of a royal title for the duke of Burgundy.[75] Hagenbach then led an infelicitous 'ambaxaude pour mons^r de Bourgoigne' which attempted to persuade the magistrates of the city of Metz to grant entry to Charles the Bold's 10,000-strong entourage and military escort in order to meet Frederick there.[76] Following the two rulers' meeting at Trier in October 1473, Hagenbach arranged and mediated an encounter between a Bernese embassy sent on behalf of the Swiss Confederates and Charles the Bold at Ensisheim in early January 1474. The meeting was depicted in the official chronicle of Bern (Figure 1.1), which was completed a decade later. The tendentious, anti-Burgundian account of the chronicle's author, Diebold Schilling, claims that throughout the diplomatic encounter 'Hagenbach always remained nearer to his [duke Charles's] ear than everyone else, and told him negative things [about the Swiss]'.[77]

As *Landvogt* in Alsace, Hagenbach also interacted with his neighbours according to the norms of the south-western Empire's political culture, although he did so in the name of the duke of Burgundy. Hagenbach was soon feared and hated by many of these neighbours, especially the municipal governments, which represented him as a bloodthirsty tyrant.[78] The

truth of these accusations is difficult to determine, but what the sources do indicate is that, in his dealings with other actors, Hagenbach engaged in the customary methods of negotiation that characterized Upper Germany in this period. For instance, when a dispute arose between him and the town of Neuenburg in 1470 concerning jurisdictions in several villages, both he and his opponents entered into a feud, raiding settlements and abducting each other's subjects, then attempted to resolve matters before a mediatory committee.[79] In 1471 Hagenbach feuded with a knight from neighbouring Baden, Reinhard von Schauenberg, over a *Pfandschaft* in the castle of Ortemberg, which the Alsatian *Landvogt* was claiming on behalf of the duke of Burgundy. Schauenberg called his ally Count Palatine Friedrich into the dispute, and Hagenbach was temporarily kidnapped and held to ransom

Figure 1.1 Depiction of the meeting of Swiss Confederate ambassadors and duke Charles 'the Bold' of Burgundy at Ensisheim in January 1474, with Peter von Hagenbach standing to the left of the duke. Bern, Burgerbibliothek, Mss.h.h.I.3, fo. 186. Photo: Codices Electronici AG, www.e-codices.ch.

by these feud-enemies.[80] Hagenbach's interactions with the government of Mulhouse/Mülhausen, an autonomous but highly indebted Imperial city surrounded by the lands purchased by Charles the Bold in 1469, were similarly conventional. Between July 1469 and January 1474 Hagenbach was involved in frequent *Tag*-based discussions and arbitrations with Mulhouse and its allies, as well as various aristocratic stakeholders in the city's hinterland.[81] Hagenbach's aim seems to have been to try to satisfy Mulhouse's creditors, amongst whom were many new Burgundian subjects, and to persuade the city's government to acknowledge Burgundian jurisdiction in the area. In the end these negotiations provoked a hostile reaction amongst Mulhouse's supporters. Hagenbach's enmity with several Upper Rhenish powers at this point led to his downfall. In April 1474, the inhabitants of the town of Breisach rebelled with the assistance of a league of bishops and Imperial cities, as well as the Swiss Confederates and the duke of Austria, who had formed a grand anti-Burgundian coalition, funded in part by King Louis XI of France.[82] Hagenbach was put on trial by the league and publicly beheaded on 9 May 1474. Throughout the last five years of his life, Hagenbach's twin functions as an Upper Rhenish nobleman and officer and a Burgundian administrator and diplomat had been closely interrelated. The latter functions sometimes involved a broader cast of regional and 'international' actors than the former, so it is possible to posit a distinction of sorts between Burgundian 'foreign policy' and day-to-day political events in the south-western Empire in these years. However, the distinction was less well defined by the 1470s than it had been earlier in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

Conclusion

The careers of these three political actors suggest that multiple cultures of political interaction existed concurrently in the south-western Holy Roman Empire in the fifteenth century. Well-positioned individuals such as Catherine of Burgundy, Margrave Wilhelm of Hochberg, and Peter von Hagenbach were capable of navigating between the 'imperial' and 'ambassadorial' political cultures that conditioned the overlapping networks in which they operated. That is not to say that these political cultures were totally distinct from one another. Indeed, they became increasingly intertwined as the fifteenth century wore on. By the time of Hagenbach's execution, there was a growing convergence of the activities of Burgundian diplomats and the customary political culture of the south-western lands of the Holy Roman Empire. This convergence only intensified after the death of Charles the Bold at the battle of Nancy on 5 January 1477 and the Habsburg inheritance of the Burgundian territories.[83] This growing overlap suggests that 'diplomacy' in the fifteenth century cannot be treated as a hermetically sealed category, confined to those polities that had crossed the supposed threshold into 'modern statehood' and were thereby able to conduct their own foreign

policy. In this period, even political actors such as Catherine and Margrave Wilhelm, who ruled extremely dispersed territories and jurisdictions, and whose authority was anchored in multiple overlapping and contradictory spheres, could be involved in the highest theatres of diplomacy of their time. The fact that 'ambaxiatores' at international church councils or meetings of princely or royal envoys could simultaneously be entangled in local arbitrations suggests that we need to think of diplomacy as part of a spectrum of political interactions which operated concurrently at regional, trans-regional, and trans-national levels. The lens of political culture can help us to identify regional specificities, but ultimately these forms of interaction were all connected to some extent in this period.

At the same time, both the regional and the 'ambassadorial' modes of political interaction in this area of Europe were durable, even as they became increasingly intertwined. In the south-western Holy Roman Empire, Burgundian norms of international relations did not fully replace or merge with customary forms of negotiation, alliance-making, and conflict-resolution, even by the time of Hagenbach's career, and arguably long after it. Distinctively 'imperial' styles of political interaction, based on the formation of associations and negotiation at ad-hoc *Tage*, can clearly be detected in the sixteenth-century evidence, even as a well-defined sphere of international diplomacy, mediated via resident ambassadors, was establishing itself in Europe.[84] Indeed, as Niels May's contribution to this volume highlights, well into the mid-seventeenth century the Holy Roman Empire remained a sphere in which 'a plurality of norms' operated side-by-side, and individual diplomats fulfilled several different roles (some more 'internal' to their respective polities, others more obviously 'international') simultaneously.[85] Furthermore, the Empire was not the only region of early modern Europe to contain semi-autonomous political entities with ambiguous statuses and polyvalent diplomats, as the case of Ragusa, analysed below by Lovro Kunčević, attests.[86] There is an evident need for an alternative narrative and chronology of diplomatic history for central Europe, and it seems that 'political culture' might hold the key to making sense of the evidence of a plurality of overlapping modes of interaction in a new and more constructive way than the existing models of 'territorial statehood' or Brunnerian *Herrschaft*.

Notes

1 This chapter was made possible by funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (2011–2014), the Institute of Historical Research (2014–2015), and the Wiener-Anspach Foundation (2015–2016).

2 Some of the conceptual challenges presented by the Empire are surveyed in P. Moraw, 'Die Verwaltung des Königtums und des Reiches und ihre Rahmenbedingungen', in K. G. A. Jeserich, H. Pohl, and G.-C. von Unruh (eds.), *Deutsche Verwaltungsgeschichte. Band I. Vom Spätmittelalter bis zum Ende des Reiches* (Stuttgart, 1983), pp. 22–65.

3 The late twentieth-century historiographical judgements about 'Germany's' '*Staatsproblematik*' are epitomized by H. Angermeier, *Die Reichsreform 1410–1555: die Staatsproblematik in Deutschland zwischen Mittelalter und Gegenwart* (Munich, 1984); P. Moraw, *Von offener Verfassung zu gestalteter Verdichtung: das Reich im späten Mittelalter, 1250 bis 1490* (Berlin, 1985).

4 Michel Parisse summarizes this view in these terms: 'mapping the German Empire [sic] at the end of the middle ages has become an impossible task […] imperial Europe has become an illegible mosaic, a puzzle of differently sized pieces'. M. Parisse, *Allemagne et Empire au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 2002), pp. 216–17. On the alleged late medieval and early modern *Territorialstaaten*, see, amongst others, H. Patze (ed.), *Der deutsche Territorialstaat im 14. Jahrhundert*, 2 vols. (Sigmaringen, 1970–1971); H. Boockmann and H. Dormeier, *Konzilien, Kirchen- und Reichsreform 1410–1495* (Stuttgart, 2005), pp. 155–6. All translations mine unless otherwise stated.

5 See for instance K. Kroeschell, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, 13th edn, 3 vols. (Cologne, 2008), ii.181.

6 See for example the study of Strasbourg's 'territory', G. Wunder, *Das Straßburger Gebiet: ein Beitrag zur rechtlichen und politischen Geschichte des gesamten städtischen Territoriums vom 10. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1965). More generally, see T. Scott, *The city-state in Europe, 1000–1600: hinterland, territory, region* (Oxford, 2012).

7 E. Riedenauer (ed.), *Landeshoheit: Beiträge zur Entstehung, Ausformung und Typologie eines Verfassungselements des Römisch-Deutschen Reiches* (Munich, 1994).

8 On the so-called 'diplomacy' and 'foreign policy' between entities within the Empire see, for example D. Berg, M. Kintzinger, and P. Monnet (eds.), *Auswärtige Politik und internationale Beziehungen im Mittelalter (13.–16. Jahrhundert)* (Bochum, 2002); C. Zey and C. Märtl (eds.), *Aus der Frühzeit europäischer Diplomatie: zum geistlichen und weltlichen Gesandtschaftswesen vom 12. bis zum 15. Jahrhundert* (Zurich, 2008); C. Jörg and M. Jucker (eds.), *Spezialisierung und Professionalisierung: Träger und Foren städtischer Außenpolitik während des späten Mittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit* (Wiesbaden, 2010).

9 Aspects of the overly neat, centralized, and 'sovereign' conception of the constituent entities of the Holy Roman Empire are critiqued in E. Schubert, *Fürstliche Herrschaft und Territorium im späten Mittelalter*, 2nd edn (Munich, 2006). Imperial cities are a case in point, see A. Krischer, *Reichsstädte in der Fürstengesellschaft: politischer Zeichengebrauch in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Darmstadt, 2006).

10 On feudal tenure in the Empire, see K.-H. Spieß, *Das Lehnswesen in Deutschland im hohen und späten Mittelalter*, 3rd edn (Stuttgart, 2011); S. Patzold, *Das Lehnswesen* (Munich, 2012), ch. 4. On *Pfandschaften* see H.-G. Krause, 'Pfandherrschaft als verfassungsgeschichtliches Problem', *Der Staat*, 9 (1970), 387–404, 515–32.

11 Moraw, 'Die Verwaltung des Königtums und des Reiches'; B. Diestelkamp, *Vom einstufigen Gericht zur obersten Rechtsmittelinstanz: die deutsche Königsgerichtsbarkeit und die Verdichtung der Reichsverfassung im Spätmittelalter* (Cologne, 2014).

12 H. J. Cohn, 'The electors and imperial rule at the end of the fifteenth century', in S. MacLean and B. Weiler (eds.), *Representations of power in medieval Germany 800–1500* (Turnhout, 2006), pp. 295–318; L. Scales, 'The illuminated Reich: memory, crisis and the visibility of monarchy in late medieval Germany', in J. Coy, B. Marschke, and D. W. Sabean (eds.), *The Holy Roman Empire, reconsidered* (Oxford, 2010), pp. 73–92.

13 On Anglo–French diplomacy see, for example, I. Le Bis, 'La pratique de la diplomatie sous le règne de Charles VI: Ambassades et ambassadeurs français auprès

des Anglais (1380–1422)', *Positions des thèses de l'Ecole nationale des Chartes* (1987), pp. 147–9; P. Chaplais, *English diplomatic practice in the middle ages* (London, 2003); K. Plöger, *England and the Avignon Popes: the practice of diplomacy in late medieval Europe* (London, 2005).

14 O. Brunner, *Land und Herrschaft: Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte Österreichs im Mittelalter*, 5th edn (Vienna, 1965), pp. 16–17, 111–64, 440; see also O. Brunner, *Neue Wege der Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte*, 2nd edn (Göttingen, 1968).

15 Brunner, *Land und Herrschaft*, p. 180.

16 Ibid., passim., esp. pp. 34–6, 106–8, 141–5.

17 Ibid., pp. 17–110.

18 For instance, G. Algazi, *Herrengewalt und Gewalt der Herren im späten Mittelalter: Herrschaft, Gegenseitigkeit und Sprachgebrauch* (Frankfurt, 1996); Schubert, *Fürstliche Herrschaft*, pp. 60–2; H. Zmora, 'Values and violence: the morals of feuding in late medieval Germany', in J. B. Netterstrøm and B. Poulsen (eds.), *Feud in medieval and early modern Europe* (Aarhus, 2007), pp. 147–60; H. Zmora, *The feud in early modern Germany* (Cambridge, 2011).

19 C. Carpenter, 'Political culture, politics and cultural history', in L. Clark and C. Carpenter (eds.), *Political culture in late medieval Britain* (Woodbridge, 2004), pp. 1–20 (quotation at p. 2).

20 B. Stollberg-Rilinger, 'Einleitung: Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?', in B. Stollberg-Rilinger (ed.), *Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?* (Berlin, 2005), pp. 9–26, esp. pp. 10–13.

21 I have characterized these patterns as the key features of an 'associative political culture' that shaped the southern Holy Roman Empire between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries in D. Hardy, 'Reichsstädtische Bündnisse im Elsass als Beweise für eine "verbündende" politische Kultur am Oberrhein (ca. 1350–1500)', *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins*, 162 (2014), 95–128; D. Hardy, 'Associative political culture in the Holy Roman Empire: the Upper Rhine, *c*.1350–1500', D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford (2015). Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has offered a fundamental reinterpretation of the early modern Empire from the perspective of symbolic communication in *The emperor's old clothes: constitutional history and the symbolic language of the Holy Roman Empire*, trans. T. Dunlap (Oxford, 2015).

22 An important essay which sketched out the role of alliances and leagues in the Empire is P. Moraw, 'Die Funktion von Einungen und Bünden im spätmittelalterlichen Reich', in V. Press (ed.), *Alternativen zur Reichsverfassung in der Frühen Neuzeit?* (Munich, 1995), pp. 1–21. However, Moraw underestimated the quantity and significance of these formations, as I argued in Hardy, 'Associative political culture', 132–6.

23 Hardy, 'Associative political culture', chs. 6–7.

24 On *Tage* see H. Obenaus, *Recht und Verfassung der Gesellschaften mit St. Jörgenschild in Schwaben: Untersuchungen über Adel, Einung, Schiedsgericht und Fehde im fünfzehnten Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1961), pp. 93–140; S. Dusil, 'Jahr und Tag', in A. Cordes et al. (eds.), *Handwörterbuch zur Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte. Band 2*, 2nd edn (Berlin, 2011), pp. 1348–50; G. Annas, *Hoftag—Gemeiner Tag—Reichstag: Studien zur strukturellen Entwicklung deutscher Reichsversammlungen des späten Mittelalters (1349–1471)*, 2 vols. (Göttingen, 2004).

25 On late medieval *Boten* and *Botschaften*, as well as *Gesandten*, see R. C. Schwinges and K. Wriedt (eds.), *Gesandtschafts- und Botenwesen im spätmittelalterlichen Europa* (Ostfildern, 2003); A. Krischer, 'Das Gesandschaftswesen', esp. pp. 201–6.

26 For this sentence and those that follow see K. Krimm, *Baden und Habsburg um die Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts: fürstlicher Dienst und Reichsgewalt im*

späten Mittelalter (Stuttgart, 1976); K. Krimm and R. Brüning (eds.), *Zwischen Habsburg und Burgund: Der Oberrhein als europäische Landschaft im 15. Jahrhundert* (Ostfildern, 2003).

27 The definitive accounts of the reigns of these four dukes, and especially of their diplomatic activities, remain R. Vaughan, *Philip the Bold: the formation of the Burgundian state*, 2nd edn (Woodbridge, 2002); R. Vaughan, *John the Fearless: the growth of Burgundian power*, 2nd edn (Woodbridge, 2002); R. Vaughan, *Philip the Good: the apogee of Burgundy*, 2nd edn (Woodbridge, 2002); R. Vaughan, *Charles the Bold: the last Valois duke of Burgundy*, 2nd edn (Woodbridge, 2002).

28 Vaughan, *Philip the Bold*, pp. 81–92; J. Richard, 'Les relations dynastiques entre Bourgogne et Autriche de 1285 à l'avènement du duc Charles', in J.-M. Cauchies and H. Noflatscher (eds.), *Publication du Centre Européen d'Études Bourguignonnes (XIVe–XVIe s.). N° 46—2006. Rencontres d'Innsbruck (29 septembre au 2 octobre 2005). 'Pays bourguignons et autrichiens (XIVe-XVIe siècles): une confrontation institutionnelle et culturelle'* (Neuchâtel, 2006), pp. 5–12; U. Plancher, *Histoire Générale et Particulière de Bourgogne, avec des notes, des dissertations et les preuves justificatives*, 4 vols. (Dijon, 1739–81), iii.lxxvii, cxx–cxxi, clxvi–clxvii, clxix–clxx.

29 C. Mussely (ed.), *Inventaire des archives de la ville de Courtrai. Tome premier* (Courtrai, 1854), pp. 151–2.

30 L. Stouff, *Catherine de Bourgogne et la féodalité de l'Alsace autrichienne* (Paris, 1913), pp. 112–14, 120.

31 Ibid., pp. 176–8.

32 Ibid., pp. 104–9 (quotation on p. 105).

33 See her itinerary in Stouff, *Catherine de Bourgogne*, pp. 71–2.

34 See for example Staatsarchiv Basel-Stadt Städtische Urkunden 848; R. Wackernagel et al. (eds.), *Urkundenbuch der Stadt Basel*, 11 vols. (Basel, 1890–1910), vi.1–2, 169; Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, p. 294.

35 J. G. Russell, *Diplomats at work: three Renaissance studies* (Stroud, 1992), pp. 94–152, remains a foundational study of this topic.

36 Stouff, *Catherine de Bourgogne*, pp. 37–8.

37 Ibid., pp. 38–9.

38 Ibid., pp. 40–4.

39 K. Albrecht (ed.), *Rappoltsteinisches Urkundenbuch 759–1500. Quellen zur Geschichte der ehemaligen Herrschaft Rappoltstein im Elsass*, 5 vols. (Colmar, 1891–1899), iii.124–5, 135, 137–9, 159, 280–1.

40 Archives Départementales du Haut-Rhin E329, E525; Stouff, *Catherine de Bourgogne*, pp. 157. On Rolin's role in the Burgundain administration see Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, pp. 168–70 (quotation on p. 169).

41 *Urkundenbuch der Stadt Basel*, vi.52–5.

42 Ibid., vi.171–6. For the original league (founded in 1422) see X. Mossmann (ed.), *Cartulaire de Mulhouse*, 4 vols. (Strasbourg, 1883–1890), ii.17–26, 29–44.

43 Tiroler Landesarchiv [TL] Fridericiana 44/28, 44/31–40.

44 Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe [GK] 21/44.

45 L. Sittler, *Un seigneur alsacien de la fin du Moyen Age: Maximin ou Smassmann 1er de Ribaupierre 1398–1451* (Strasbourg, 1933), pp. 64–9.

46 For this paragraph see E. Bauer, *Négociations et campagnes de Rodolphe de Hochberg, Comte de Neuchâtel et Marquis de Rothelin, Gouverneur de Luxembourg, 1427(?)–1487* (Neuchâtel, 1928), pp. 1–19; K. Seith, 'Markgraf Wilhelm von Hachberg-Sausenberg', in *Markgräflicher Jahrbuch* (1962), pp. 91–9; J.-M. Moeglin, '"Welsches" et "allemands" dans l'espace bourguignon, germanique et suisse du XIIIe au XVe siècle', in Cauchies and Noflatscher, *Pays bourguignons et autrichiens*, pp. 45–75.

47 R. Fester, H. Witte, and A. Krieger (eds.), *Regesten der Markgrafen von Baden und Hachberg, 1050–1515*, 4 vols. (Innsbruck, 1892–1915) (*Regesten*), ii, nos. 1282–3, 1289.
48 Ibid., ii, no. 1387.
49 J. Haller et al. (eds.), *Concilium Basiliense: Studien und Quellen zur Geschichte des Concils von Basel*, 8 vols. (Basel, 1896–1936), ii.541.
50 J. D. Schöpflin (ed.), *Historia Zaringo-Badensis*, 7 vols. (Karlsruhe, 1763–1766), vi.186.
51 *Regesten*, ii, no. 1315 ; Plancher, *Histoire Générale*, iv.175.
52 Plancher, *Histoire Générale*, iv.cxliii.
53 See J. Toussaint, *Les relations diplomatiques de Philippe le Bon avec le Concile de Bâle (1431–1449)* (Louvain, 1942), pp. 60, 115, 136.
54 *Regesten*, ii, no. 1455.
55 J. Weizsäcker et al. (eds.), *Deutsche Reichstagsakten. Ältere Reihe*, 22 vols. (Munich/Gotha/Göttingen, 1876–2013), xi.421.
56 See P.-J. Heinig, *Kaiser Friedrich III. (1440–1493). Hof, Regierung und Politik* (Cologne, 1997), pp. 324–8.
57 Weizsäcker et al., *Deutsche Reichstagsakten*, xvii.41.
58 P.-J. Heinig, 'Akteure und Mediatoren burgundisch-österreichischer Beziehungen im 15. Jahrhundert', in Cauchies and Noflatscher, *Pays bourguignons et autrichiens*, pp. 115–44 (at pp. 119–24).
59 *Regesten*, ii, no. 1333.
60 Heinig, 'Akteure und Mediatoren', pp. 119–24.
61 See *Regesten*, ii, nos. 1252–4, 1319, 1457.
62 For example GK 69 von Offenburg U 76; *Regesten*, ii, nos. 1347–8, 1362, 1433.
63 On Hochberg's activities in the Society, see for example GK 46/1689; *Regesten*, ii, no. 1400.
64 GK 46/1702; *Regesten*, ii, no. 1449.
65 See D. Hardy, 'The 1444–5 expedition of the Dauphin Louis to the Upper Rhine in geopolitical perspective', *JMedH*, 38.3 (2012), 368–9, 374–5.
66 GK 21/166; *Regesten*, ii, nos. 1368, 1582–3.
67 As spelled by the chronicler Olivier de la Marche in H. Beaune and J. d'Arbaumont (eds.), *Mémoires d'Olivier de La Marche, maitre d'hôtel et capitaine des gardes de Charles le Téméraire*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1883–1888), iii.44.
68 Amongst the numerous publications concerning Hagenbach's life and career, this paragraph draws in particular on H. Brauer-Gramm, *Der Landvogt Peter von Hagenbach: die burgundische Herrschaft am Oberrhein 1469–1474* (Göttingen, 1957); G. Claerr-Stamm, *Pierre de Hagenbach: le destin tragique d'un chevalier sundgauvien au service de Charles le Téméraire* (Altkirch, 2004).
69 T. Frei, 'Hallwyl, Hans von', in *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz*, available at: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D19679.php (accessed 29 January 2017).
70 TL Urkundenreihe I/8232.
71 Vaughan, *Charles*, p. 86.
72 TL Urkundenreihe I/8232.
73 Vaughan, *Charles*, pp. 91–100.
74 TL Sigmundiana 01.80.11, 01.80.30.
75 Vaughan, *Charles*, p. 139.
76 L. Larchey (ed.), *Journal de Jehan Aubrion, bourgeois de Metz, avec sa continuation par Pierre Aubrion 1465–1512* (Metz, 1857), pp. 61–2.
77 G. Tobler (ed.), *Die Berner-Chronik des Diebold Schilling 1468–1484*, 2 vols. (Bern, 1897–1901), i.122. Compare with other accounts paraphrased in Vaughan, *Charles*, pp. 276–7.

78 See the annals of the Basel cleric Johannes Knebel in W. Vischer et al. (eds.), *Basler Chroniken*, 8 vols. (Leipzig/Basel, 1872–1945), ii–iii.
79 TL Sigmundiana 04b.049.1.
80 TL Sigmundiana 1.80.17–18, 1.80.21–2.
81 *Cartulaire de Mulhouse*, iii.352–3, 364, 373, 386–8, 392, 409, 410–12, 415, 422, 450–6, 458–9, 508–9; iv.17–18, 20–1, 22–5, 43–5, 50–1, 73–4, 95–100, 121–3, 137, 149–51.
82 The most recent account of these events is provided by C. Sieber-Lehmann, *Spätmittelalterlicher Nationalismus: die Burgunderkriege am Oberrhein und in der Eidgenossenschaft* (Göttingen, 1995), pp. 68–95.
83 See Vaughan, *Charles*, pp. 420–32.
84 This is borne out by the existence of the Swabian League and, later, the Schmalkaldic League, and the increasing resort to *Städtetage*, *Fürstentage*, and *Reichstage* as the imperial elites attempted to find multilateral solutions to their polity's problems of internal order and the new crises introduced by the Reformation. See for example H. Carl, *Der Schwäbische Bund, 1488–1534: Landfrieden und Genossenschaft im Übergang vom Spätmittelalter zur Reformation* (Leinfelden-Echterdingen, 2000); G. Haug-Moritz, *Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 1530–1541/42: eine Studie zu den genossenschaftlichen Strukturelementen der politischen Ordnung des Heiligen Römischen Reiches Deutscher Nation* (Leinfelden-Echterdingen, 2002).
85 See May, esp. pp. 82–3, 91–2, Chapter 4, this volume.
86 See Kunčević, Chapter 3, this volume, pp. 66–7, 70.

2 Transylvanian envoys at Buda

Provinces and tributaries in Ottoman international society[1]

Gábor Kármán

On 20 October 1635, István Szalánczy, the envoy of György Rákóczi I, prince of Transylvania (1630–1648), arrived at the fields outside Pest and was welcomed by the two chief gate-keepers (*kapici ağa*s) of the Ottoman governor (beylerbey) of Buda who came to greet him with a retinue of two to three hundred horsemen. The envoy was escorted across the Danube to his lodgings at Buda where he was met by the deputy (*kethüda*) of the beylerbey to arrange the ceremonial for his reception. The audience at the beylerbey's house on the castle hill of Buda took place some days later. Szalánczy was sent a horse with elegant trappings by the Ottoman governor, who also ordered all of his soldiers and the members of his court to be present at the welcoming ceremony.[2] The entire procedure resembled the welcoming of Habsburg ambassadors, save some quantitative differences, such as the number of horses that the beylerbey granted his guests. Such fine distinctions between the prestige attached to representatives of Transylvanian princes and those of Holy Roman Emperors demonstrated their relative places in the hierarchy of rulers. The beylerbey of Buda seems to have acknowledged György Rákóczi I's status as a *princeps* who ruled over a territory—a quality the beylerbey himself did not possess, having only functioned as a governor of the sultan with no claims to rulership over his province. In this context, the formula used by Prince Gábor Bethlen (1613–1629) in his message to the beylerbey of Buda, Kadizade Ali Pasha (1602–1604, 1605–1609, 1614–1616), is particularly striking: 'as it is required by decency, I wanted to kiss the hand and garments of His Lordship with great deference through my envoy, and I thank His Lordship's promise of goodwill with enormous gratitude'.[3] In European diplomatic protocol, kissing a ruler's hands was expected only towards the Holy Roman Emperor and clergymen of higher ranks.[4] In Ottoman diplomatic protocol, kissing the hands or the sleeves of the garment was an integral part of the audiences at the Sublime Porte: many diplomats arriving at Istanbul narrated with some indignation how they were expected to perform this ritual in front of the sultan.[5] In the case of lower-ranking Ottoman dignitaries, however, the practice is much



Map 2.1 Ottoman Hungary and the principality of Transylvania in the seventeenth century. Created by Béla Nagy.

less obvious and has not yet received scholarly attention. The question that arises is: how was it possible for the Transylvanian ruler, who was ceremonially acknowledged in Buda as a prince, to offer such an act of humility (or even of submission) to a person who lacked any claim to sovereignty?

As Niels May points out in his contribution to this volume, the sovereignty of the sender was not necessarily the only factor which influenced the ceremonial treatment of specific envoys. Whereas the questions of procedure related to various envoys at the Westphalian congress point to the influence of personal prestige upon ceremonial issues, this chapter highlights the importance of looking at contemporary political circumstances when interpreting specific gestures. Too often, single occurrences of a phenomenon are used to draw general conclusions about specific norms, especially in regions and periods that are poorly represented in the sources, as is—so it would seem—the ceremonial aspect of Transylvanian diplomacy. In reality, despite its relatively small size, the available source material holds uniquely rich potential for studies of the contacts between powerholders of different status within the Ottoman Empire. Princes of Transylvania were tributaries of the sultan. From an Ottoman perspective they were considered part of the empire, and their relationship generated the largest body of sources about the communication between an Ottoman provincial governor and a Christian tributary prince. This situation provides an excellent opportunity to raise important questions about the structure of the Ottoman Empire, especially the place of the tributary states in it. Seen for a long time as a monolithic entity, recent scholarship has reconceptualized the sultan's empire as a conglomerate of many territories enjoying varying degrees of autonomy. Even in the core provinces—those regions under direct Ottoman administration—local elites pursued their own agenda, and, in some cases, even overrode the authority of the imperial centre.[6]

The status of the Christian tributary states in this Ottoman system deserves special attention because they—as recent research has pointed out—had to find their place in more than one international society, that is, in international communities with a system of rules and hierarchies, which were accepted and followed by each member.[7] Princes of Transylvania had to act, and gain acknowledgement from their European peers as sovereign rulers, while concurrently accept being treated as the sultan's subjects by the Ottomans. The similarities between the audiences granted for Habsburg and for Transylvanian envoys at Buda therefore have to be an important aspect of this analysis: in order to understand fully the status of the Transylvanian princes in an Ottoman context, it is essential to compare an inter-state and an intra-state diplomatic ceremonial at such a provincial centre.

The study of diplomacy in these territories also offers an opportunity to question some well-established interpretations regarding Ottoman

diplomatic practices. Diplomatic practice in the empire's periphery exhibited some elements that are well known from diplomacy at the Sublime Porte, but without the ideological implications associated with them there. Whereas many of the gestures required in Istanbul are traditionally understood through the sultan's claims to universal rule, this interpretative framework does not apply to the case of provincial governors. This chapter focusses on specific ritual gestures—such as the act of granting kaftans—and offers a somewhat narrower interpretation than is conventional. The first section identifies the two protagonists' places in the Ottoman power system on the basis of their titulature and scope of authority, while the second analyses this issue through the general communicative framework through which they maintained contact with each other. Habsburg and Transylvanian envoys' audiences are compared in the third section, followed by a specific discussion of gift-giving and especially the question of interpreting the act of granting kaftans. The final section of the chapter returns to the gesture of kissing hands in order to interpret the cited formulation of Gábor Bethlen within the broader hierarchical and ceremonial framework of intra-imperial relations and in comparative dialogue with inter-state communication.

The beylerbey of Buda and the prince of Transylvania in the Ottoman hierarchy

The beylerbeys of Buda (Turkish: Budin) enjoyed a special rank among the provincial governors of the Ottoman Empire's north-eastern corner.[8] Since 1623 they held the title of vezir, usually reserved for the members of the sultan's council. Their province counted as a grand *eyalet*, because of the prestige Buda enjoyed as the former royal capital of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary that fell under pressure from the Ottomans in the early sixteenth century. Newly appointed beylerbeys had to pay double fees to the sultan's treasury compared to those of the neighbouring Temesvár (German: Temeschwar/Romanian: Timişoara), but in return they received rights of supervision over the other provinces in Ottoman Hungary and the Balkans. Consequently, Kadizade Ali Pasha regularly used a self-titulation in his letters between 1608 and 1616 that also included the names of provinces outside the Buda *eyalet*: 'We Ali Pasha, from the grace of the Holy God the serdar [that is, chief captain], caretaker and main locum-tenens in Buda of our mighty and invincible emperor's armies on this side of the sea, as well as in Bosnia, Temesvár, Eger, Kanizsa and in other castles.'[9]

As it made sense to deal with minor conflicts at a local level and only involve the Sublime Porte if no satisfactory resolution could be achieved, all Ottoman dignitaries in the border region had wide authority with regards to information gathering and borderland diplomacy.[10] The beylerbeys

of Buda, who were in regular contact with the highest office-holders in the kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg court, had wide competencies in this regard and might even start military action, such as besieging castles, without the consent of the Sublime Porte.[11] From the 1570s they also had the right, in the name of the sultans, to issue documents that bore the *tuğra*, the sultan's calligraphic seal.

Identifying the place of the Transylvanian princes in the Ottoman hierarchy is a much more complicated task. The frames of the country's status are well known: the princes of Transylvania had to pay yearly tribute to the sultan and fulfil military duties if requested. They were elected by the country's diet, but their rule had to be confirmed by the sultan.[12] In return, the Ottomans generally did not interfere with internal Transylvanian affairs. The polity was allowed to keep Ottoman garrisons and even civilian Muslims out of its territory. The princes could also enjoy a broad field of manoeuvring in their foreign policy. Sándor Papp has shown that the inauguration of the princes, at least before 1657, happened not only through an 'order' (*berat*), a document used for the appointment of lesser and higher Ottoman regional governors, but also with 'capitulations' (*ahdnames* of the *name* type), which were usually used for international treaties.[13] Nevertheless, through the sultanic letter of inauguration the princes became Ottoman dignitaries in the eyes of the Sublime Porte. Transylvanian diplomats, whenever it was in their interest to capitalize on their status during negotiations in Istanbul, were eager to mobilize the notion that Transylvania was 'a country of the Mighty Emperor [that is, the sultan]'. This interpretation of Transylvania's place in the empire was situational: in their diplomacy towards Christian Europe it regularly proved more useful to downplay their Ottoman connection.[14]

Surveying Ottoman terminology proves to be of little use when trying to identify the actual rank of Transylvanian princes in the Ottoman power hierarchies. The term *kiral* (king) was used for those rulers of Transylvania who at a certain point in their lives were pretenders of the throne of the kings of Hungary—such as John and John Sigismund Szapolyai. In the late sixteenth century, the term *voyvoda* appears in Ottoman sources to describe Transylvanian rulers, and its place is later taken by *hakim*, which had been used for various officials from local judges to monarchs. The actual content of these terms is questionable, as Ottomans were prone to adapt former ruler's titles for their own use, while changing their meaning, as happened with the term *bey*.[15] The surviving correspondence between the beylerbeys of Buda and the princes of Transylvania offers few further clues: the Ottoman Turkish originals use the same terminology.[16]

In any case, the correspondence offers no evidence that, from an Ottoman point of view, the beylerbeys would have been in any way superior to the rulers of Transylvania. Even the most detailed self-titulations, such as that of Kadizade Ali Pasha, lack any reference to the principality. Even in

the period after 1657, when the prestige of Transylvania suffered serious losses, the maximum an Ottoman dignitary from Buda allowed himself was to emphasize that 'Buda has always been the gate of Transylvania'.[17] At the Sublime Porte, Transylvanian envoys regularly reported that they had gone to the 'gates' of various dignitaries for their support. Thus the most probable interpretation of this formulation is that princes regularly asked for the assistance of the beylerbeys. Nevertheless, this does not suggest that the latter would have disposed of authority to supervise Transylvanian issues. And this was a point Transylvanian diplomacy was eager to make even in those situations when the princes had to rely on the beylerbeys' goodwill. In 1636, for instance, Nasuhpaşazade Hüseyn Pasha (1635–1637) was giving increasingly open support to a Transylvanian pretender, István Bethlen, who took refuge in Buda. The ruling prince, György Rákóczi I ordered the diplomats to 'speak so that it would not seem that the country wants the vezir as judge, rather as mediator'.[18]

János B. Szabó and Péter Erdősi's study of princely insignia reached similar conclusions: according to the Ottoman interpretation, Transylvanian rulers had the standing of a beylerbey with the rank of a vezir—just as the beylerbeys of Buda did.[19] Thus the prince was not in an inferior position to the beylerbey even from an Ottoman perspective. In this context their relationship should be seen as one between two sultanic dignitaries of equal standing, whose main goal was to cooperate efficiently in the service of the 'mighty emperor', as they often noted in their correspondence.

Maintaining contacts: communicative strategies and diplomatic status

The Holy Roman Empire, as Duncan Hardy discusses, provided many well-established fora for settling debates between its constitutive members who enjoyed some varying degrees of autonomy. The Ottoman Empire did not develop such institutions, but contact had to be maintained between the heads of different units. This section will assess whether the communicative methods used between the princes of Transylvania and the beylerbeys of Buda suggest a hierarchical difference between them.

The princes of Transylvania maintained a permanent representative at the Sublime Porte throughout the seventeenth century. Neither the nature, nor the frequency of the common issues shared between the princes and the beylerbeys of Buda motivated them to establish the same institution in their relationship. Rather the princes' envoys on temporary missions stayed longer at Buda whenever necessary. We know of two such examples. Tamás Borsos spent several months during 1624 at Sufi Mehmed Pasha's (1616–1617, 1621–1626 with interruptions) court in order to assist the beylerbey's negotiations with the Habsburg envoys—or, as this was more in the interest of his prince, Gábor Bethlen, to sabotage them. He managed

to arrange that the beylerbey arrest the Habsburg envoys by suggesting they were linked to some disorder near the border.[20] Between May and September 1644, István Szentpáli stayed in Buda because the Sublime Porte promised that Ottoman troops from the Hungarian provinces would support György Rákóczi's anti-Habsburg campaign. The Transylvanian envoy was supposed to manage the technicalities of the cooperation; in practice this meant that he constantly pressured the beylerbey and reported home desperately about Osman Pasha's suspicious negotiations with the opposing side.[21]

There are no examples of the beylerbeys of Buda adopting a similar solution towards Transylvania, despite clear signs of commonality in the specificities of the ad hoc missions they sent to the princes. The practice in Istanbul mirrored the obviously inferior position of the prince towards the sultan: most embassies went from the principality to the Sublime Porte. In the seventeenth century the sultan sent his messengers (*çavuş*es) to Transylvania only rarely, and then mostly to threaten. In contrast, the diplomatic exchange between Buda and Gyulafehérvár (Romanian: Alba Iulia), the princely capital, was relatively constant, not only in its frequency, but also in the prestige connected to the persons of the envoys. For less significant matters it sufficed to send a letter with a courier, but in order to negotiate one had to send someone of reputation: a *főember szolga*, a chief person who was also the prince's servant. The difference between the two types of envoys is well illustrated by Ferenc Sebesi's report from his 1655 mission. In accordance with his instructions, after delivering the prince's letter, Sebesi responded to each specific question of Sari Kenan Pasha (1653–1655) by saying that he did not have the credentials to negotiate: Prince György Rákóczi II (1648–1660 with interruptions) sent him only to visit the beylerbey to see if he was in good health. The pasha angrily commented that sending Sebesi without an oral message was 'as if someone would go to the Danube with an empty jug to bring water, and come back with an empty jug. I think he [the prince] would have also accomplished this through a courier.'[22]

Sometimes we can be sure that the beylerbey sending a specific person as his envoy was a conscious gesture to show how important the Transylvanian contacts for him were—such as in the case of Acem Hasan Pasha of Buda (1630–1631), who sent his son, Murad Pasha; or that of Musa Pasha (1631–1634, 1637–1638, 1640–1644), who sent his younger brother, Mahmud Aga to the prince in 1637.[23]

In a few instances it was not only the prince, but also the country that sent envoys to Buda. In Transylvanian diplomatic practice at the Sublime Porte, when it was important to show that the country was united on a certain issue, representatives of the three 'political nations' that constituted the principality's diet (the Hungarians, the Saxons and the Szeklers) joined the prince's diplomat. Both occasions when this solution was used

in the direction of Buda are connected to the activities of a pretender: the envoys were supposed to oppose Mózes Székely in 1633 and István Bethlen in 1636.[24]

In diplomatic exchanges between the princes and the beylerbeys the envoys greeting new beylerbeys upon their arrival played a prominent role. They were, as a rule, appointed in Istanbul.[25] Many of them had no prior experience with the Hungarian border region. It was in the princes' interests to win the benevolence of the beylerbeys before they arrived at their province and present their interpretation of relations with Transylvania before the local elites did, in case any conflict should arise in the future. Resident princely envoys in Istanbul tried to contact the beylerbey while he was still in the Ottoman capital; in some lucky cases they even handed over their ruler's gratulatory letter to him there, as it happened in the cases of Karakaş Mehmed Pasha in 1618, Gürcü Kenan Pasha in 1655, and Fazli Ahmed Pasha in 1656.[26] The princes also sent embassies to greet new beylerbeys at Belgrade, the last major stop on their route towards Buda, and deliver the traditional gift, a carriage drawn by four to six painted horses. This practice endured until the crisis of the late 1650s, when a quarter of the principality's territory came under direct Ottoman administration. The governors of the new *eyalet* of Várad (Romanian: Oradea) successfully established themselves as the first point of contact concerning Transylvanian issues—something that the beylerbeys of Temesvár, despite successive attempts and geographic advantage, never managed to do earlier.[27]

The princes were well aware that it was in their interests to maintain good relationships not only with newly appointed beylerbeys, but also with deposed ones: according to the Ottoman 'rotation principle', former beylerbeys could easily be reappointed later or gain higher positions in the central administration, and thus remain useful contacts. If the relationship between them was amicable, the princes at least sent letters to the beylerbeys who left office, but in May 1644, at the end of his third mandate Musa Pasha even received some gifts from the Transylvanian envoy—in private, upon the Ottoman dignitary's request.[28] The princes also tried to cultivate contacts with the lesser dignitaries of the beylerbey's household; they would at least visit his *kethüda* (that is, his major-domo and deputy in his absence) with their letters and minor gifts. One *kethüda*, Yahya, is known to have cooperated closely with a Transylvanian prince, Gábor Bethlen.[29]

At first glance the princes appear not only to have accepted the position assigned to them within Ottoman international society, but seem much more eager to maintain contacts than their counterparts. However, this impression may stem from the quick rotation of the beylerbeys: the princes had to seek their benevolence much more often because the postholder changed frequently. One beylerbey, Musa Pasha, sent letters of greeting to the prince from Istanbul in 1637 and in 1640 at the start of his second and

third mandates. He was already acquainted with György Rákóczi I and must have considered it useful to show that he wanted to continue being on good terms in this manner.[30] The elements of imbalance in the communication between the parties thus do not contradict their fundamental equality in the Ottoman system.

Audiences of the Transylvanian envoys at Buda

Further insights into the exact status of the Transylvanian princes vis-à-vis the beylerbeys of Buda can be gleaned from the ceremonies staged for welcoming the envoys of the principality. A comparison between the specific elements found there and those applied at the audiences for Habsburg ambassadors show striking similarities. This gives the impression that the beylerbeys regarded the princes as being of the same status as, but less prestigious than, foreign rulers.

The relative scarcity of evidence concerning the ceremonies that the beylerbeys staged for the prince's diplomats somewhat complicates the task. The descriptions of Habsburg embassies to the Sublime Porte always dedicate a long passage to the ceremonies at Buda, their first important Ottoman station. In contrast, Transylvanian diplomats focused almost exclusively on the specific questions they discussed with the beylerbeys. The unusually detailed narrative of István Szalánczy's 1635 embassy describes an extraordinary occasion, the greeting of a new beylerbey, Nasuhpaşazade Hüseyn Pasha, who had some years before (when he brought the *ahdname* for the prince from the Sublime Porte) sworn kinship with György Rákóczi I, a usual method of concluding political alliances in the Ottoman Empire. As a new beylerbey was of particular relevance for Transylvanian networks it may be that the ceremonies described do not reflect the general custom.[31] Nonetheless, the specific elements noted in this report, as well as passing remarks from others, show such strong similarities with the ceremonies for Habsburg ambassadors that it is possible to use imperial audiences to help complete the picture concerning Transylvanian audiences while discerning quantitative differences between them.

As in the case of Szalánczy, also at other occasions, the first ceremonies occurred before the Transylvanian envoys reached Buda. Ottoman office-holders waited for them outside the borders of Pest (the settlement on the opposite shore of the Danube) with a large retinue of several hundred horsemen.[32] This retinue accompanied the envoy to his lodgings in Buda where he received the beylerbey's gift of fruits and sweets, as did the Habsburg ambassadors, who arrived by boat. In Buda, as in Istanbul, the host took over the costs of both embassies' maintenance: a daily allowance (*tayin*) was granted.[33]

The beylerbey himself did not take part in the ceremonial entry of the Transylvanian embassy. It was important that the envoy should visit him

and not the other way around; thus the beylerbey's *kethüda* greeted even the most important Habsburg envoys.[34] Hence Szalánczy found it important to note in 1635 that Nasuhpaşazade Hüseyn Pasha attended his ceremonial entry, even if he did not make his presence official, and took part at the ceremony only incognito, 'in the shape of a common çavuş'.[35]

Transylvanian diplomats, similarly to Habsburg ones, had to request an audience with the beylerbey from the *kethüda*. It usually took place two or three days after their arrival. Szalánczy reported riding up the castle hill on a horse with elegant trappings sent by the beylerbey and being received in the Ottoman dignitary's council chamber.[36] A similar practice was used towards Habsburg diplomats who, however, experienced an even more respectful treatment: not only the ambassador, but also other prominent members of his retinue received horses from the beylerbey. According to Habsburg descriptions, Janissaries stood guard along the entire route to the castle hill. As Szalánczy noted that the beylerbey ordered all of his soldiers and the members of his court to be present at the welcoming ceremony, this was possibly a common feature too.[37]

The personal meeting with the beylerbey—which Transylvanian sources rarely describe in any detail—probably also followed a very similar pattern to the Habsburg embassies. They were seen by the beylerbey in the presence of his entire *divan* (his counselling body), who sat on benches by the wall and welcomed the envoy with loud exclamations of good wishes. The beylerbey arose from his chair, which was elevated on a platform, and took a few steps towards the envoy. They greeted each other, sat down, and, after the delivery of the letters, had a decent conversation over coffee and sherbet.[38]

Some Transylvanian envoys also noted that their audience took place in front of a larger public. In 1635 the beylerbey apparently summoned an '*arz-divan*', that is a council meeting with the purpose of hearing petitions, for the audience day.[39] Interpreting the audience as receiving petitions was characteristic for the Ottoman concept of diplomacy; the sultan also welcomed the envoys in the Chamber of Petitions (*arz odası*) in Istanbul.[40] We have scant information about the choreography applied in Buda, but it is clear that the Transylvanian envoys were also seated during the discussions. If diplomats were not invited to sit, they could be sure that it was a purposeful insult, as happened at the audience given to the Swedish envoys on their way home in 1658, when Gürcü Kenan Pasha (1655–1658, with an interruption) wanted to express that he held King Charles X Gustav responsible for György Rákóczi II's disobedience towards the sultan.[41]

Although Transylvanian envoys usually tried to speed up negotiations, specific political questions could only be discussed at the second meeting—similarly to the audiences with the grand viziers in Istanbul.[42] These were staged with much less emphasis on ceremony: while Szalánczy did receive

a horse and *çavuşlar*, sent for his journey to the castle, the soldiers did not stand guard, and in the audience room only an interpreter attended the two negotiating parties. For Szalánczy's last meeting in 1635, Nasuhpaşazade Hüseyn Pasha again summoned his entire divan, and bade farewell to the envoy, introducing him to the *aga* who accompanied the Transylvanian diplomat as the beylerbey's envoy on his journey back home. The Habsburg ambassadors also received such ceremonial farewell-audiences who then continued their journey to Istanbul by boat.[43]

The ceremonies staged for Transylvanian and Habsburg envoys at Buda clearly shared many similarities. In contrast, we have every reason to assume that when a *çavuş* from the governors of Temesvár or Kanizsa visited the beylerbey in Buda, he did not receive the ceremonial first audience, with the Janissaries lining his route. Protocol in Istanbul supports this assumption: here Transylvanian envoys usually did receive the same ceremonial treatment (with some reductions) that foreign rulers did—whereas we do not hear about *kethüdas* of Ottoman beylerbeys receiving ceremonial entries.[44] It seems that the difference between inter-state diplomacy towards the Habsburgs and intra-state diplomacy towards Transylvania lay not in Buda, but rather in how visiting dignitaries interpreted their treatment. Whereas Habsburg envoys took care to meticulously note each detail of their ceremonial reception at this first major Ottoman station, the Transylvanian envoys' neglecting to record the ceremonial part of their meeting with the beylerbeys suggests that the princes did not regard this relationship as an arena of symbolic competition.

Kaftans and other gifts

István Szalánczy was also given a kaftan by Nasuhpaşazade Hüseyn Pasha during his audience in 1635—apparently a 'fairly bad' one.[45] Exploring the practice of granting kaftans can help us to understand how the beylerbeys of Buda saw their own status in comparison to Transylvanian princes. Granting kaftans was an integral element of Ottoman diplomatic practice at the Sublime Porte—even if there it took place before the audience. Usually regarded as a gesture granting honour, it has more recently become commonplace to interpret the kaftan as indicating that the giver regarded the receiver as his vassal and through the act of receipt the latter implicitly accepted his subordination.[46] As the sultan claimed universal rule and viewed all other rulers as his subordinates, this interpretation could pertain to the practice at the Sublime Porte. Consequently, it is highly significant that the beylerbeys of Buda not only gave kaftans to the Transylvanian envoys, but also sent kaftans to the princes themselves and sometimes to their sons.[47]

We should, however, approach this hierarchical interpretation cautiously, as Habsburg ambassadors at Buda were also granted kaftans

during their audiences; the only difference was that these diplomats could expect garments of more noble materials than their Transylvanian colleagues by virtue of their ruler's higher status: in 1591 Friedrich Krekwitz and in 1608 Adam Herberstein were granted kaftans embroidered with gold, in 1616 Heřman Černín was given a silk kaftan embroidered with silver.[48] It is inconceivable that the beylerbey of Buda wanted to claim that not only the prince of Transylvania, but also the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire was his subordinate. The belief that every other monarch is the sultan's vassal excludes such a possibility: claiming authority over Habsburg rulers would have gone against the padishah's own claims—surely so many consecutive pashas would not have made such risky assertions. The fact that Transylvanian diplomats and princes also received kaftans also negates the possibility that the beylerbeys granted kaftans in the sultan's name, with the intention of expressing his superiority over the diplomat's master: what would have entitled the beylerbeys to express the sultan's authority over someone who, in their own perception, was the same ruler's dignitary with a rank equal to his own?

It is thus much more plausible that the act of granting kaftans in the Ottoman world did not refer to a vassal status, but rather functioned as a unilateral act in which the giver assured the receiver of his goodwill and promised him protection. This makes it easier to understand why Mürteza Pasha of Buda (1626–1630) sent kaftans to two German Protestant generals who were Prince Gábor Bethlen's military allies.[49] Equally it explains why the sultans showed their displeasure with Transylvanian princes by not sending any kaftans to them. In some cases, diplomats were given kaftans, but it was made explicit that the prince was not.[50] If the kaftans expressed vassalage, omitting to give them would have meant that the princes were freed from their bonds and obligations. It seems more likely that we should interpret the lack of granting kaftans as a sign that the princes no longer enjoyed the sultan's protection and had to face the consequences of his wrath—and this would explain the diplomats' despair.[51] The granting of kaftans can thus not be seen as a sign of the beylerbeys' superior position in relation to the princes.

We could also look for signs of superiority in the practice of gift-giving. Transylvanian diplomats used their first, ceremonial audience to give the beylerbey their prince's gifts.[52] This usually included five or six gilded cups, four to six hundred thalers, and other artefacts, among them clocks; but even Ottoman captives could count as presents.[53] In 1637 György Rákóczi I sent Musa Pasha a group of Ottoman soldiers his troops had captured the year before, during the failed Transylvanian campaign of the beylerbey's predecessor. In 1644, he again sent this special category of gift to the same beylerbey, this time captives from his anti-Habsburg campaign.[54]

Differences between the Transylvanian gift exchanges with the Sublime Porte and those with Buda reveal much about the status of the beylerbeys and princes. The beylerbeys did regularly send gifts to the princes, but the sultans never sent material gifts to the princes, as according to Ottoman ideology the padishah's gift was his grace of granting the audience and the protection symbolized by the kaftan.[55] The beylerbeys, however, regarded gifting as a useful means of facilitating cooperation both with higher dignitaries on the other side of the border and with the princes of Transylvania. Usually they sent a horse, but there were variations.[56] Mürteza Pasha sent a greyhound to Gábor Bethlen's wife, Catherine of Brandenburg. This was not a great success, for the prince noted with some irony that it 'had not enough luck yet to catch a single rabbit'.[57] Even if the beylerbey's presents were of a lower value than those of the princes, their very existence further proves that the equal standing of the beylerbey and the prince in the Ottoman hierarchies determined the ceremonial elements of relations between them.

Kissing the hands

If the symbolic elements of the relations between the Transylvanian princes and the beylerbeys of Buda point towards their similar status in Ottoman international society, how is it possible that Gábor Bethlen hinted at kissing the pasha's hands? Most envoys' reports share no information whether it was customary for the envoys of Transylvanian princes to kiss the beylerbey's hand (or his sleeves): they summarize the act with standard formulas, such as 'I greeted the pasha as Your Highness instructed me' or 'with the name of Your Highness'.[58] Only one envoy, Ferenc Sebesi, who had been on several missions to Buda in the 1650s, reported kissing the garments of the beylerbey. In 1655, he noted that 'I took farewell kissing the garment of the pasha' at the end of the first, ceremonial audience; whereas in 1658 he again performed the act, this time at the beginning of the meeting.[59] The phraseology Sebesi used and his lack of further explanation also suggests that he was describing the usual ritual.[60]

Although there were clearly many similarities between the ceremonial treatment of Habsburg and Transylvanian diplomats at Buda, no Habsburg ambassador ever reported kissing the beylerbey's hands. This was not an attempt to hide their embarrassment: the gesture, reserved in the European ceremonial world for the emperor, was clearly not part of the ceremonial order foreign ambassadors were expected to follow at the beylerbey's residence. Relations with the Ottoman Empire were important enough to make the rulers of Christian Europe accept that their diplomats would kiss the sultan's hand, but Buda was not the goal of the diplomats, only a station on their journey and one presided over by a non-sovereign governor.

Consequently Habsburg ambassadors would have found kissing the pashas' hands or garments unacceptable.

In Istanbul, too, Habsburg and Transylvanian diplomats were handled differently with regards to the act of kissing hands. Transylvanian envoys like those of another tributary state, Ragusa, kissed not only the sultan's hands, but also those of the most important office-holders of the empire during their audience at the grand vizier's divan. From a manuscript describing the order of the ceremonies of the Transylvanian envoys in Istanbul it appears that earlier it was expected that the diplomats kissed the hands of each dignitary in the divan, but after 1642 it was restricted to the grand vizier.[61] Similar gestures are unknown in the case of those envoys that came from countries that were, in practice, not dependents of the Sublime Porte. Sadly, we do not know whether the prince's envoys also kissed the hands of lesser beylerbeys, such as those of Temesvár and later Várad, or even of the governors (*sancakbey*s) of Szolnok, whose residence was on their way to Buda. Ragusan envoys did greet the *sancakbey*s of Hercegovina by kissing their hands, but this owed more to practical concerns than political hierarchies: these Ottoman dignitaries controlled the most important land trade route leading to Ragusa, thus were considerably more important for the city state than office-holders of similar rank in Ottoman Hungary were for Transylvania.[62]

The Transylvanian ruler's tributary status can explain the gesture of handkissing at the grand vizier's divan, but not in the case of Buda, for the princes and the beylerbeys had equal standing in the Ottoman system of hierarchies. A remark of Ferenc Sebesi helps to interpret this seemingly illogical situation. In 1655 he noted that 'I greeted the vezir upon our first meeting first with my own words [...] then with the words of the prince'.[63] This means that Transylvanian envoys greeted the beylerbeys not only in their capacity as a diplomat, but also in their own name. According to Ottoman ideology the inhabitants of the tributary states counted as *reaya*s, slaves of the sultan,[64] so it was natural that they owed due respect to a high-ranking office-holder of the 'mighty emperor'.[65] This also explains why the gesture was rarely mentioned: as the diplomat performed it not in the name of his ruler, but because of his personal status as the sultan's subject, it was not deemed to be a legitimate part of the report. Habsburg ambassadors enjoyed the status of a *müste'min* (protected foreigner), thus the gesture was not expected from them as individuals either.

This however still does not explain why Gábor Bethlen made it clear that the envoy should kiss the beylerbey's hand and sleeves in his name. The quote comes from Bethlen's instructions to the envoy. As we cannot be sure if the instructions were followed to the letter, we do not know if Kadizade Ali Pasha was actually confronted with the formulation. Moreover, these instructions were written in early July 1616, under quite

extraordinary circumstances. One of the goals of the mission was to convince the beylerbey, Bethlen's political adversary, who had been supporting a pretender from Hungary, György Homonnai Drugeth against him, to re-establish peaceful terms with the Transylvanian prince. Bethlen was on the verge of losing his throne, and it was at exactly this point that he had to hand over Lippa (Romanian: Lipova) to the Ottomans, even if this meant that he had to besiege the fortress to remove his own garrison. Compared to this loss of face, ceding some ceremonial ground may have seemed less important.[66]

Fortunately, it is exactly during Gábor Bethlen's rule that sources allow us to test whether the prince kissing the beylerbey's hand was the result of the contingent circumstances or the general custom. Few Transylvanian princes personally met a beylerbey from Buda, but Gábor Bethlen did. In 1626, during his anti-Habsburg campaign in Hungary he met the leader of the Ottoman auxiliary troops, Mürteza Pasha of Buda, to discuss operational strategy. The Ottoman chronicle, written for the glorification of Mürteza Pasha's activities, reports that when the beylerbey heard that Bethlen's troops were approaching his camp, he rode out a *fersah* (approximately six kilometres) with his officers to greet the prince in the field. This gesture is especially resonant in the light of the ceremonies at Buda, where the beylerbeys made it sure that they do not go out to greet the envoys, rather wait for them in their audience chambers. Somewhat later Bethlen reciprocated the gesture: he rode out to greet the beylerbey and escorted him to the Transylvanian camp.[67] These ceremonies lack any trace of a representation of hierarchical differences. Yet they surely lived up to the beylerbey's expectations, otherwise Mürteza Pasha would not have urged Gábor Bethlen to repeat their personal meeting several times in the following years.[68] The ceremonies of the personal meetings between the beylerbey of Buda and the prince of Transylvania thus provides further evidence that, in Ottoman international society—contrary to the European one—there was no hierarchical difference between the two dignitaries, who were regarded as equal-ranking office-holders of the Ottoman Empire.

Conclusion

What further conclusion can be drawn from this analysis beyond the issue of the beylerbeys' and princes' equal status in the Ottoman system of hierarchies? It is important to note that the ceremonies performed by Transylvanian envoys at the Sublime Porte remained ambiguous; ambiguity also marked their treatment in Buda. Although Transylvanian diplomats came from a territory that was regarded as part of the empire, they received a welcoming that resembles those given to representatives of foreign rulers in inter-state diplomacy. Apart from quantitative differences that show the

lower prestige of the prince of Transylvania relative to the Holy Roman Emperor, the only marker of intra-state diplomacy is the act of the envoy kissing the beylerbey's hand in his own name. Another significant difference between inter- and intra-state diplomacy is not the ceremonies themselves but diplomats' responses to them. Whereas Habsburg envoys took care to describe the ceremonial details of their welcome in their reports and journals, the Transylvanians hardly ever mentioned any. This stands in clear contrast to the practice followed by the very same diplomats at the Sublime Porte: their prince surely must have regarded the theatre of diplomacy at Buda relevant only in occasions when his diplomats were entrusted with looking for signs of the pronounced benevolence they expected from the beylerbey, as was the case of Nasuhpaşazade Hüseyn Pasha in 1635. Last but not least, Buda's relative irrelevance for Transylvanian ceremonial self-representation permitted Gábor Bethlen to comment safely on the kissing of the hands of Kadizade Ali Pasha as cited at the beginning of this chapter. Bethlen knew that if the gesture were to be communicated to the beylerbey at all, it would reach a limited public short of creating a precedent and that it could easily be revoked upon the appointment of a new Ottoman dignitary.

Apart from questions related to the status of tributaries in the Ottoman Empire, we could also see that ceremonial settings at Buda can function as useful historiographic research laboratories where elements of Ottoman diplomatic culture can be observed under unusual circumstances. Historians are more familiar with those ceremonies observed at the Sublime Porte where the sultan was in an obvious superior position compared to his negotiating partners. This study confirms some conclusions of the more recent literature, which shows that the Ottomans did not apply the doctrine of *character repraesentatius* according to which an ambassador directly represented his sovereign. At the Sublime Porte, each envoy was regarded only as an individual, who happened to bring messages from a foreign ruler, not as a representative of his sender.[69] Furthermore, studying diplomacy through the circumstances of provincial administration makes it possible to reinterpret the gesture of granting the kaftans, shifting the emphasis from seeing it as an expression of vassal status towards understanding it as a unilateral act of securing the donor's benevolence as well as the recipient's protection. Exploring Ottoman diplomacy in the empire's periphery where the sultan's ideological claims to universal rule were not as manifest as in the centre not only provides important insights into the status of tributary states within imperial frameworks, but also into the complex system of Ottoman international society as a whole.

Notes

1 An earlier, extended version of this chapter has appeared in Hungarian and German in, respectively, *Történelmi Szemle*, vol. 56, 2014, pp. 639–662 and Claudia Garnier and Christine Vogel (eds) *Interkulturelle Ritualpraxis in der*

Vormoderne: diplomatische Interaktion an den östlichen Grenze der Fürstengesellschaft, ZHF Beiheft, 52 (2016), 145–80. This English version has been created with permission from the original publishers of the Hungarian and German versions.

2 A. Beke and S. Barabás (eds.), *I. Rákóczy György és a Porta: Levelek és okiratok* (Budapest, 1888) [*IRG*], p. 167.

3 Á. Szilády and S. Szilágyi (eds.), *Török-magyarkori állam-okmánytár* (Pest, 1863–1916) [*TMÁO*], i.153. All translations are mine unless otherwise stated.

4 R. Frötschel, 'Mit Handkuss: die Hand als Gegenstand des Zeremoniells am Wiener Hof im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert', in I. Pangerl, M. Scheutz, and T. Winkelbauer (eds.), *Der Wiener Hof im Spiegel der Zeremonialprotokolle (1652–1800): eine Annäherung* (Innsbruck, 2007), pp. 337–56.

5 P. Brummett, 'A kiss is just a kiss: rituals of submission along the east–west divide', in M. Birchwood and M. Dimmock (eds.), *Cultural encounters between east and west, 1453–1699* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 2005), pp. 107–31; G. Kármán, 'Sovereignty and representation: tributary states in the seventeenth-century diplomatic system of the Ottoman Empire', in G. Kármán and L. Kunčević (eds.), *The European tributary states of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries* (Leiden, 2013), pp. 155–85.

6 G. Ágoston, 'A flexible empire: authority and its limits on the Ottoman frontiers', *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 9 (2003), 15–29; S. Papp, 'The system of autonomous Muslim and Christian communities, churches, and states in the Ottoman Empire', in Kármán and Kunčević (eds.), *European tributary states*, pp. 375–419; B. Sudár, 'Iskender and Gábor Bethlen: the pasha and the prince', in G. Kármán and R. G. Păun (eds.), *Europe and the 'Ottoman World': exchanges and conflicts (sixteenth to seventeenth centuries)* (Istanbul, 2013), pp. 141–69.

7 L. Kunčević, 'Janus-faced sovereignty: the international status of the Ragusan Republic in the early modern period', in Kármán and Kunčević (eds.), *European tributary states*, pp. 91–121; M. Wasiucionek, 'Die Simulation von Souveränität in der frühneuzeitlichen Diplomatie: die moldauische Gesandtschaft am polnischen Königshof im Jahr 1644', in P. Burschel and C. Vogel (eds.), *Die Audienz: ritualisierter Kulturkontakt in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Cologne, 2014), pp. 101–23.

8 L. Fekete, *Budapest a törökkorban* (Budapest, 1944), pp. 187–200; G. Dávid, 'A 16–17. századi oszmán közigazgatás működése: a beglerbégek és szandzsákbégek kiválasztása és kinevezése', in P. Fodor, G. Pálffy, and I. G. Tóth (eds.), *Tanulmányok Szakály Ferenc emlékére* (Budapest, 2002), 111–13; P. Fodor, 'Budai pasa', in P. Kőszeghy (ed.), *Magyar művelődéstörténeti lexikon. Középkor-kora újkor*, vol. 1, *Aachen—Bylica* (Budapest, 2003), pp. 470–3.

9 G. Bayerle (ed.), *The Hungarian letters of Ali Pasha of Buda 1604–1616* (Budapest, 1991), pp. 134–260.

10 G. Procházka-Eisl and C. Römer, 'Raub, Mord und Übergriffe an der habsburgisch-osmanischen Grenze: der diplomatische Alltag der Beglerbege von Buda abseits von Zeremonien,' in R. Kauz, G. Rota, and J. P. Niederkorn (eds.), *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im Mittleren Osten in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Vienna, 2009), pp. 251–64.

11 Beyerle (ed.), *Hungarian letters*; S. Takáts, F. Eckhart, and G. Szekfű (eds.), *A budai basák magyar nyelvű levelezése*, vol. 1, 1553–1589 (Budapest, 1915); *Ottoman diplomacy in Hungary: letters from the pashas of Buda 1590–1593*, ed. G. Bayerle (Bloomington, 1972); Gábor Várkonyi, 'Pálffy István érsekújvári főkapitány és a váci Muszta basa levelezése,' in A. Fundárková and G. Pálffy (eds.), *Pálfiovci v novoveku: Vzostup významného uhorséko šlachtického rodu* (Bratislava and Budapest, 2003), pp. 63–73; H. Tóth, 'Die Beziehung der Familie Batthyány zur

osmanischen Elite im ungarisch-osmanischen Grenzgebiet vom 16.–17. Jahrhundert,' in R. Born and S. Jagodzinski (ed.), *Türkenkriege und Adelskultur in Ostmitteleuropa vom 16.–18. Jahrhundert* (Ostfildern, 2014), pp. 165–77.

12 J. B. Szabó, '"Splendid isolation?" The military cooperation of the Principality of Transylvania with the Ottoman Empire (1571–1688) in the mirror of the Hungarian historiography's dilemmas', in Kármán and Kunčević (eds.), *European tributary states*, pp. 301–39.

13 S. Papp, 'The system', 404–12; S. Papp, *Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden der Osmanen für Ungarn und Siebenbürgen* (Vienna, 2003).

14 G. Kármán, 'The hardship of being an Ottoman tributary: Transylvania at the peace congress of Westphalia', in A. Strohmeyer and N. Spannenberger (eds.), *Frieden und Konfliktmanagement in interkulturellen Räumen: das Osmanische Reich und die Habsburgermonarchie in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Stuttgart, 2013), pp. 163–83. In some cases, as Gábor Bethlen found, it was wise to emphasize the Ottoman connection. See G. Almási, 'Bethlen és a törökösség kérdése a korabeli propagandában és politikában', in G. Kármán and K. Teszelszky (eds.), *Bethlen Gábor és Európa* (Budapest, 2013), pp. 315–23.

15 V. Panaite, *The Ottoman law of war and peace: the Ottoman Empire and tribute-payers* (Boulder, CO, 2000), pp. 340–2; Papp, *Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden*; G. Bayerle, *Pashas, begs, and effendis: a historical dictionary of titles and terms in the Ottoman Empire* (Istanbul, 1997), pp. 73, 19. For information concerning seventeenth-century terminology I am grateful to Sándor Papp.

16 G. Kármán, 'Ein Handkuss für den Pascha? Siebenbürgische Gesandte in Ofen', in C. Garnier and C. Vogel (eds.) *Interkulturelle Ritualpraxis in der Vormoderne: diplomatische Interaktion an den östlichen Grenzen der Fürstengesellschaft, ZHF, Beiheft* 52 (2016), 147–50.

17 *TMÁO*, iv.409. As a result of a civil war with incursions of both Ottoman and Habsburg armies onto Transylvanian soil after 1657, in the early 1660s the Principality re-emerged with a remarkably smaller territory, paying a much larger tribute, its ruler being confirmed with a *berat* instead of an *ahdname*, and being altogether a much less prominent player of east central European politics than before.

18 S. Szilágyi (ed.), *Erdélyi országgyűlési emlékek történeti bevezetésekkel*, 21 vols. (Budapest, 1875–1898) [*EOE*], xi.451.

19 J. B. Szabó, 'The insignia of the princes of Transylvania', in I. Gerelyes (ed.), *Turkish flowers: studies on Ottoman art in Hungary* (Budapest, 2005), pp. 131–42; J. B. Szabó and P. Erdősi, 'Ceremonies marking the transfer of power in the principality of Transylvania in east European context', *Majestas*, 11 (2003), 111–60.

20 *TMÁO*, i.422–4; S. Gergely, 'Adalék 'Bethlen Gábor és a Porta' czímű közleményhez: Első közlemény', *Történelmi Tár*, 5 (1882), 463; D. Angyal, 'Gabriel Bethlen', *Revue Historique*, 53 (1928), 51–5.

21 For a discussion of this mission see Kármán, 'Ein Handkuss'.

22 S. Szilágyi (ed.), *Okmánytár II. Rákóczy György diplomáciai összeköttetéseihez* (Budapest, 1874) (*Okmánytár*), p. 171.

23 S. Szilágyi (ed.), *Rozsnyay Dávid, az utolsó török deák történeti maradványai* (Budapest, 1867), p. 162; *IRG*, pp. 346–8. For the identification of the *aga*, see K. Szabó (ed.), *Erdélyi történelmi adatok*, 4 vols. (Kolozsvár, 1855–1862), iv.39.

24 *EOE*, ix.378, 451; S. Szilágyi (ed.), *Levelek és okiratok I. Rákóczy György keleti összeköttetései történetéhez* (Budapest, 1883) [*LÉO*], p. 170; G. Kraus, *Siebenbürgische Chronik des Schässburger Stadtschreibers Georg Krauss*, 2 vols. (Wien, 1862–1864), i.116; *TMÁO*, ii.323.

25 See Dávid, 'A 16–17. századi oszmán közigazgatás működése'.
26 T. Borsos, *Vásárhelytől a Fényes Portáig: Levelek, okiratok*, ed. László Kocziány (Bucharest, 1972), p. 147; S. Szilágyi (ed.), *Erdély és az északkeleti háború*, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1890–1891), i.560–1; *Okmánytár*, p. 373; *TMÁO*, ii.251–2. On the complexities of Ottoman diplomatic ranks see Kármán, 'Sovereignty'.
27 On the details, see Kármán, 'Ein Handkuss', 155–7.
28 *IRG*, p. 688.
29 See Kármán, 'Ein Handkuss', 157–8.
30 *IRG*, pp. 346–8; Szabó (ed.), *Erdélyi történelmi adatok*, iv.368.
31 *IRG*, pp. 164–78; J. B. Szabó and B. Sudár, '"Independens fejedelem az Portán kívül": II. Rákóczi György oszmán kapcsolatai: Esettanulmány az Erdélyi Fejedelemség és az Oszmán Birodalom viszonyának történetéhez: I. rész', *Századok*, 146 (2012), 1027–35.
32 *IRG*, p. 160; *LÉO*, p. 495.
33 V. Bíró, *Erdély követei a Portán* (Kolozsvár, 1921), pp. 111–12. *Zweite Gesandtschaftsreise des Grafen Hermann Czernin von Chudenic nach Constantinopel im Jahre 1644* (Neuhaus, 1879), p. 15.
34 F. Omichius, *Beschreibung einer Legation und Reise von Wien aus Ostereich auff Constantinopel Durch den Wolgebornen Herrn Herrn David Ungnadn* (Güstrow, 1582), Biiiv; *Beschreibung der Reisen des Reinhold Lubenau*, ed. Wilhelm Sahm (Königsberg, 1912–1914), p. 78; P. Taferner, *Curiose und eigentliche Beschreibung des […] Groß-Botschaffters Herrn Graffens Wolffgang von Oettingen Solenner Abreise von Wien […]* (Leipzig, 1700), pp. 28–9.
35 *IRG*, p. 160.
36 Fekete, *Budapest*, p. 85; *IRG*, p. 167.
37 *IRG*, p. 167; M. Brandstetter, 'Itinerarium oder Raisbeschreibung', in K. Nehring (ed.), *Adam Freiherrn zu Herbersteins Gesandtschaftsreise nach Konstantinopel: ein Beitrag zum Frieden von Zsitvatorok (1606)* (Munich, 1983), p. 81; A. Wenner, *Tagebuch der kaiserlichen Gesandtschaft nach Konstantinopel 1616–1618*, ed. K. Nehring (Munich, 1984), p. 12.
38 See note 1 above. See also B. Majláth (ed.), *A szőnyi béke okmánytára* (Budapest, 1885), pp. 172–3; S. Schweigger, *Zum Hofe des türkischen Sultans*, ed. H. Stein (Leipzig, 1986), p. 35; V. Vratislav z Mitrovic, *The adventures of Baron Wenceslas Wratislaw of Mitrowitz* (London, 1862), pp. 9–10. For a depiction of the ceremony see K. Teply, *Die kaiserliche Großbotschaft an Sultan Murad IV. im Jahre 1628: des Freiherrn Hans Ludwig von Kuefsteins Fahrt zur Hohen Pforte* (Vienna, 1976), pp. 115, 61–4. As Mürteza Pasha received Hans Ludwig von Kuefstein in a military camp, not in his castle, this shows an extraordinary occasion. For the relevance of having coffee together at Ottoman audiences, see David Do Paço, Chapter 9, this volume, p. 173.
39 *IRG*, p. 167.
40 G. Necipoğlu, *Architecture, ceremonial and power: the Topkapı Palace in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries* (New York; Cambridge, MA, 1991), pp. 96–110.
41 C. Rålamb, *Diarium under resa till Konstantinopel 1657–1658*, ed. C. Callmer (Stockholm, 1963), p. 199. Certainly Szalánczy believed it important to mention several times that he had been sitting during his negotiations with Nasuhpaşazade Hüseyn Pasha.
42 *TMÁO*, i.404; Kármán, 'Sovereignty', pp. 174–5.
43 *IRG*, pp. 173, 177; *Zweite Gesandtschaftsreise*, p. 19; Wenner, *Tagebuch*, p. 16.
44 Kármán, 'Sovereignty'.
45 *IRG*, p. 78.
46 H. Reindl-Kiel, 'East is east and west is west and sometimes the twain did meet: diplomatic gift exchange in the Ottoman Empire', in C. Imber, K. Kiyotaki, and

R. Murphey (eds.), *Frontiers of Ottoman studies: state, province, and the west*, 2 vols. (London, 2005), ii.118–21; R. Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman sovereignty: tradition, image and practice in the Ottoman imperial household, 1400–1800* (London and New York, 2008), p. 222.

47 *IRG*, p. 177; *LÉO*, p. 291; *EOE*, x.203.

48 Vratislav, *Adventures*, 10; Brandstetter, 'Itinerarium', p. 83; Wenner, *Tagebuch*, p. 13.

49 S. Szilágyi, 'Bethlen Gábor és a Porta: Második közlemény', *Történelmi Tár*, 4 (1881), 47.

50 See for instance J. Kemény, 'Önéletírása,' in János Kemény, *Önéletírása és válogatott levelei*, ed. Éva V. Windisch (Budapest, 1959), 141; HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 139. Fasc. 68. 1667 Jänner–Mai, fo. 37r.

51 Harriet Rudolph also recently suggested that kaftans symbolized the donor granting protection to the recipient, rather than vassalage. See H. Rudolph, 'The material culture of diplomacy: the impact of objects on the dynamics of Habsburg-Ottoman negotiations at the Sublime Porte (1530–1650)', in G. Barth-Scalmani, H. Rudolph, and C. Steppan (eds.), *Politische Kommunikation zwischen Imperien: der diplomatische Aktionsraum Südost- und Osteuropa* (Innsbruck, 2013), pp. 221–9.

52 See for instance *Okmánytár*, p. 170; *IRG*, pp. 168, 897.

53 *IRG*, p. 164; *EOE*, xii.124; *LÉO*, pp. 289–90; *TMÁO*, iii.65; *Okmánytár*, p. 170.

54 *LÉO*, p. 495; *IRG*, p. 688.

55 See Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman sovereignty*, pp. 175–205.

56 Kármán, 'Ein Handkuss,' 165, n. 66.

57 S. Gergely, 'Adalék 'Bethlen Gábor és a Porta' czímű közleményhez: Harmadik és befejező közlemény', *Történelmi Tár*, 6 (1883), 637.

58 For example F. Salamon, *Két magyar diplomata a tizenhetedik századból: Toldalagi Mihály, Tassi Gáspár* (Pest, 1867), p. 15; *IRG*, p. 167; *LÉO*, p. 805.

59 *Okmánytár*, p. 170; K. Ráth, 'Rédey Ferenc erdélyi fejedelem megbizottjának, Sebesi Ferencnek követsége 1658ban a budai vezérnél', *Győri Történelmi és Régészeti Füzetek*, 1 (1861), 4.

60 Although there were fluctuations in the relationship between Transylvania and the Ottoman authorities in the 1650s (see Szabó, Sudár, 'Independens fejedelem') these would not explain the gesture.

61 Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MNL OL) R 298 Mohács utáni gyűjtemény, Erdélyi iratok 1. d. 1. t. fo. 146r; *TMÁO*, iii.179. Kármán, 'Sovereignty', 180; K. Jakó, 'Rozsnyai Dávid portai "tanító írása",' *Levéltári Közlemények*, 84 (2013), 175; V. Miović, *Dubrovačka diplomacija u Istambulu* (Zagreb-Dubrovnik, 2003), p. 53. See also Kunčević, Chapter 3, this volume, pp. 65–79.

62 V. Miović, 'Beylerbey of Bosnia and Sancakbey of Herzegovina in the diplomacy of the Dubrovnik Republic', *DA*, 9 (2005), 45.

63 *Okmánytár*, 170.

64 Panaite, *Ottoman Law*, pp. 406–45; N. H. Biegman, *The Turco-Ragusan relationship according to the firmāns of Murād III (1575–1595) extant in the state archives of Dubrovnik* (The Hague, 1967), pp. 29–36; Kunčević, 'Janus-faced sovereignty', 94–8.

65 G. Dávid and P. Fodor, *'Ez az ügy fölöttébb fontos': A szultáni tanács Magyarországra vonatkozó rendeletei (1559–1560, 1564–1565)* (Budapest, 2009), pp. 20, 43, 177.

66 Sudár, 'Iskender', pp. 152–7.

67 N. Zahirović, *Murteza Pascha von Ofen zwischen Panegyrik und Historie: Eine literarisch-historische Analyse eines osmanischen Wesirspiegels von Nergisi (El-vaṣfü l-kāmil fī-aḥvāli l-vezīri l-'ādil)* (Frankfurt am Main, 2010), p. 159 (for the interpretation of the Ottoman Turkish text I am grateful to Nedim Zahirović);

L. Fekete (ed.), *Türkische Schriften aus dem Archive des Palatins Nikolaus Esterházy 1606–1645* (Budapest, 1932), p. 249.

68 Gábor Bethlen was less enthusiastic about the perspective and excused himself with references to his many other tasks, later to his illness, but obviously did not openly refuse the beylerbey, see Szilágyi, 'Bethlen Gábor', 50; Gergely, 'Harmadik és befejező közlemény,' 635–6; MNL OL E 190 Magyar kamara Archívuma: Archivum Rákóczi de Felsővadász, 3. d. nr. 676.

69 On the missing *character repraesentatitius* in Ottoman context, see S. Hanß, '*Udienza* und *Divan-ı Hümayun*: Venezianisch-osmanische Audienzen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts', in Burschel and Vogel (eds.), *die Audienz*, pp. 125–59; F. Kühnel, 'Ein Königreich für einen Botschafter: die Audienzen Thomas Bendishs in Konstantinopel während des Commonwealth', in Burschel and Vogel (eds.), *Die Audienz*, pp. 161–220.

3 The city whose 'ships sail on every wind'

Representations of diplomacy in the literature of early modern Ragusa (Dubrovnik)[1]

Lovro Kunčević

Introduction

Early modern Ragusa was a small republic surrounded by the vastly superior empires upon whose benignity depended not only its extensive trade but also its very survival. Such a precarious international position required shrewd and vigilant diplomacy, which balanced the great powers that surrounded Ragusa. Early modern Ragusans were aware of the complex diplomatic game their government played, and it became an important theme in the city's historiography and literature. This chapter addresses various references to diplomacy in the rich literary sources of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It explores a set of well-established *topoi* that described the republic's perilous international position, the diplomatic prudence of its patriciate, and the alleged importance of its diplomacy for the interests of the whole of Christendom.

The first part of this chapter introduces its protagonist, the Ragusan republic, outlining its international position and the importance of diplomacy for its survival. The second part reconstructs the development of *topoi* about diplomacy in Ragusan drama, poetry, and epics during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Finally, the third part analyses the political tendentiousness of such discourses on diplomacy, that is, the ways in which they were used to legitimize the specific political goals of the Ragusan republic.

The city in-between: the geopolitical position of the Ragusan republic

The crucial geopolitical feature of early modern Ragusa was that it lay in the borderlands of three major Mediterranean powers: the Ottoman Empire, which controlled the Balkan hinterland; the Venetian republic, which ruled the rest of Dalmatia; and the Spanish Habsburgs who ruled the opposite, south Italian shore of the Adriatic. In addition to its delicate position, Ragusa also lay at a strategic site in the economic sense. It was one of the key ports on the ancient maritime route between central Europe and the

Levant, connecting, for example, Venice and Istanbul. At the same time it was situated at a place where important thoroughfares from the Balkan interior connected with the Mediterranean.[2] Although this position brought many challenges, it also provided ample opportunities. Ragusa used them to achieve a political and economic significance that far surpassed its small size and limited resources. The republic turned into a key mediator between east and west—between the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe—and in the process became one of the richest cities in the early modern Mediterranean region.[3]

As a small urban republic, whose population oscillated from 30,000 to 60,000, early modern Ragusa survived by relying on the protection of more powerful states.[4] That is, it entered a series of political arrangements, which vacillated from acknowledging their nominal sovereignty to playing the vaguely submissive ally. The first among such patrons of Ragusa was the Hungarian-Croatian king who held nominal sovereignty over the city from the mid-fourteenth century until the 1520s. The second and far more formidable patron was the Ottoman Empire, which served as the protector of the republic from the mid-fifteenth until the early nineteenth century. In 1458, while still nominally acknowledging Hungarian rule, Ragusa made a treaty with the Ottomans promising an annual tribute and somewhat vaguely defined fidelity in return for protection and broad privileges in the vast market of the Empire.[5] Yet such close ties with the Sublime Porte did not prevent Ragusa from establishing cordial relations with Christian powers as well, especially with the Spanish Habsburgs and the Papacy.[6]

In sum, the small republic managed to create an impressive web of international patronage, ensuring that its independence and trading privileges were guaranteed by several great powers, even those antagonistic to each other (for instance, Spain and the Ottoman Empire). One could even say that Ragusa created a specific diplomatic system of checks and balances in which the pretensions of one powerful state were held in line by the interests of others. Thus, Ottoman pressure on the city was tempered by the fear of Ragusa surrendering to the Spanish, the Venetians were held at bay by the fear of Papal sanctions and Ottoman retaliation, while the pressures exerted by the papacy were softened by the threat of Ottoman reprisals. For instance, a typical argument of Ragusan diplomats in Rome was claiming that if the Pope's demands were to be fulfilled, the Ottoman 'infidel' would destroy their Christian republic. Similarly, during numerous conflicts with Venice, Ragusan diplomats in Istanbul claimed that the Venetians were attempting to conquer their city, a faithful Ottoman tributary that the sultan was obliged to protect.[7]

In order to maintain this international position Ragusa developed a specific diplomatic methodology, characterized by humble, even submissive rhetoric and avoidance of direct confrontation. Moreover, it repeatedly insisted on its neutrality in order to avoid being dragged into the many conflicts of its patrons. In its attempts to appease various great powers, Ragusa

also had to play a dangerous double game, spying for and sometimes even directly assisting several Mediterranean states that were traditionally hostile to each other.[8] Since such behaviour could not go unnoticed, Ragusa had to defend itself repeatedly against accusations, coming from both Christian and Ottoman camps, that it assisted the other side. The stakes of this diplomatic game were high, since only one mistake could have proven fatal: Ragusa simply could not afford the failure of diplomacy and the resort to a military option. Not only were its international partners overwhelmingly superior, but by the seventeenth century the city's once impressive fortifications were completely outdated. In sum, for the small republic the walls of words were far more important than the walls of stone.

The topoi regarding diplomacy in early modern Ragusan literature

The literature of early modern Ragusa, as its culture in general, was created under the profound influence of the patrician elite. The majority of Ragusan *literati* were either themselves patricians or at least closely connected to the patriciate, usually belonging to the secondary elite of the *cittadini*, influential non-nobles gathered in two prestigious confraternities. On the one hand, this resulted in the overwhelmingly apologetic tone of Ragusan literature, which often reproduced the same glorifying common places and rarely engaged in criticism or polemic. On the other hand, it resulted in the fact that a significant proportion of the *literati* had direct experience of diplomacy and some were truly well versed in it. As patricians, these writers participated in the governmental bodies that conducted the foreign policy of the city-state and a number of them had even had impressive careers as ambassadors of the republic.[9] These *literati* were instrumental in the creation of the 'myth of Ragusa': a glorifying image of the republic, which permeated its literature, historiography, and diplomatic self-representation. The main elements of this image were the ancient Roman origin of the city, its wise republican constitution, its faithfulness to Catholicism, and, finally, its great achievements in maintaining republican independence throughout the centuries.[10]

Within the narrative about the maintenance of independence, references to diplomacy were of crucial importance. They often began with the insistence on the perilous position of the small republic sandwiched between several great powers. A frequent metaphor of the city's literature was the image of Ragusa surrounded by two powerful and predatory states, the Venetian republic, usually represented as a lion, and the Ottoman Empire, usually represented as a dragon. A typical example is a verse from the seventeenth-century epic *Osman*, written by the patrician Ivan Gundulić, in which Ragusa is described as being caught 'between the mouth of the angry dragon and the claws of the ferocious lion'.[11]

Similar images were often followed by the glorification of the diplomatic skill of the Ragusan patriciate, which managed to ensure the survival and

prosperity of the republic despite such dangerous neighbours. Thus, the sixteenth-century dramatist Marin Držić, in a prologue to his play *Tirena*, wrote that the fame of the Ragusan patricians spreads all over the world, and that they are 'beloved' and 'cherished' by the lords of both east and west. He concluded his laudation with a suggestive metaphor: 'their ships sail on every wind'.[12] An even more elaborate description of Ragusan diplomatic skill is found in an early seventeenth-century poem in which another citizen, Pasko Primi, boasted about the achievements of his patrician lords. In his work the somewhat embarrassing multiple patronage of the republic—the fact that Ragusa had to rely on the protection of several major powers—was represented as a diplomatic feat. Primi proclaimed that Ragusan liberty would last forever:

> because in the east ready with arms stands/ the glorious house of Ottomans, which guards, protects and defends us./ But, behold the wonder, from the West also the sun rises to us and shines/ Phillip [of Spain] who rules the world covers us with his wing./ From the north the Roman Emperor gives us his complete devotion:/ as befits the honour and justice of our lords. / And above them all, as the head, the holy pastor [the pope] stands/ [...] in Christendom there is no Crown which does not defend this city of ours.[13]

Implied in all of the aforementioned references to diplomacy was the idea of the superiority of Ragusan wit, which enabled the small republic to persuade, even manipulate, vastly superior states. This diplomatic superiority was sometimes explicated, even accentuated, as in an early seventeenth-century pastoral play by the patrician dramatist Junije Palmotić, in which a character proclaims that to Ragusa: 'God gives this power/ to *tame* the grey eagle, / the mighty dragon, and the fierce lion.'[14] The grey eagle obviously symbolizes the Austrian Habsburgs, the dragon stands for the Ottomans, while the lion represents Venice—all the neighbouring powers are allegedly 'tamed' by the Ragusan diplomatic prudence.

That these *topoi* were well known also in neighbouring Venetian Dalmatia is confirmed by the sixteenth-century poet from the island of Hvar, Hanibal Lucić. One of the central motifs in his poem 'In praise of the city of Dubrovnik' is the wise diplomacy of the republic. Thus, Lucić writes that 'Ragusans are beloved and respected on all the sides of the world', and that 'the city of Dubrovnik wisely resides in peace,/ and all kinds of men, both those who have the cross/ and those who don't, cherish and welcome it'. The legendary diplomatic ability of Ragusa is even more explicitly stressed in the verses in which the poet addressed the republic: 'And many powerful rulers all strive,/ burning with arrogance to enslave you,/ but you are carefully watching from everywhere,/ not giving them an opportunity to harm you.'[15]

Besides such general references to Ragusan diplomatic prudence, some *literati* specifically addressed the most delicate of republic's political

relationships—its position as an Ottoman tribute payer. In accord with the overwhelmingly panegyric tone of Ragusan literature, the embarrassing patronage of the 'infidel' empire was sometimes represented as a great diplomatic feat. Thus, the influential Ragusan humanist and patrician, Ilija Crijević (Aelius L. Cerva), in one of his public speeches stressed: 'One should be profoundly grateful to God that this most foul beast [the Ottoman Empire] has advanced to here, since it is not so much held back by the mountains and chasms, as by the prudence and wisdom of our senate.'[16]

Some Ragusans, however, wrote about the Ottoman-Ragusan relationship in less celebratory tones. Most explicit was the sixteenth-century poet and Benedictine monk Mavro Vetranović, who described the republic's tributary position in terms of disillusioned pragmatism. In his poem entitled 'A Song to the Emperor's [sultan's] glory' (*Pjesanca slavi carevoj*), Vetranović stressed the divisions and hopeless bickering of Christian rulers, and then turned to Ragusa's relationship with the sultan:

> The weak city of Ragusa thus to him/ many years ago began to pay the tribute / and it serves him faithfully, was always faithful/ and prosperously and peacefully rests on its own. / And the Turks who know how much it is loved by the Emperor [the sultan]/ all bow to it, cherishing [it as] a precious asset.[17]

Although certainly not enthusiastic about Ragusa's close relationship with the Ottomans, Vetranović stressed that it was the only prudent course of action for a small republic abandoned by its fellow Christians. In a combination of pragmatism and deep piety, characteristic of his political reflections, Vetranović offered a piece of advice to his beloved city. Although quite surprising on its own, this advice sounds even more remarkable when one recalls it came from a Benedictine monk: 'leave pride and every other sin aside, / join with God and leaving everything else / serve and attend to the Ottoman dynasty'.[18]

The apotheosis of diplomacy: *Ragusa restored* by Jaketa Palmotić

The literary lauds of Ragusan diplomatic ability culminated in one seventeenth-century work which represents a true apotheosis of the republic's diplomacy and which will therefore be discussed in more detail. It is an extensive epic entitled *Ragusa restored* (in Croatian: *Dubrovnik ponovljen*), written during the 1670s by the patrician Jaketa Palmotić (Italian and Latin: Palmota) (1616–1680).[19] Palmotić was an experienced diplomat, having served as the republic's ambassador to Rome and Naples, and even three times at the Ottoman court. It is this last, third mission to the Ottoman Empire, from September 1667 to January 1669, that is the topic of his epic.

This mission took place in dramatic circumstances. In April 1667 Ragusa was hit by a catastrophic earthquake, followed by a devastating fire, which killed almost half of the population and reduced most of the city to smouldering ruins.[20] The aftermath of the catastrophe was characterized by massive plundering of the ruins and by painstaking re-establishment of the patrician authority. The barely consolidated government was soon shocked by a diplomatic crisis: the Ottoman request for the payment of the enormous sum of 150,000 thalers.[21] Due to his experience with the Ottoman court, Palmotić was appointed as the republic's ambassador, together with another patrician and poet, Nikolica Bunić.[22] Their mission was extremely demanding. Not only were they to decline the Ottoman demands for an unreasonable sum of money, but they were also to justify the fact that they brought the annual Ragusan tribute to the sultan with a significant delay. Despite unfavourable circumstances, the embassy was a resounding success. During the dramatic negotiations at the Ottoman court—which are extensively described in the epic—the two diplomats managed to mollify the Ottomans, dismiss their demands, and normalize the relationship between the republic and the Sublime Porte.[23]

Although Palmotić made himself the protagonist of the epic—an unconventional decision that has caused some authors to suggest that *Ragusa restored* should be read as an autobiography—this work is far from being blatant self-promotion.[24] Palmotić is very careful not to stress his ability and his achievements too openly, although reminding his compatriots of them is certainly among the goals of his writing.[25] The most obvious purpose of this epic, however, is similar to that of the contemporary Ragusan works about the earthquake. *Ragusa restored* is a fiercely patriotic text, which seeks to raise the morale of the deeply shaken population, especially the patricians, proclaiming (as its very title reveals) the certainty of the restoration of the republic. In his text Palmotić repeatedly stresses two factors that guarantee post-earthquake Dubrovnik a bright future: the first is the divine benevolence and protection the republic (still) enjoys; the second is the remarkable diplomatic ability of its patriciate.[26]

Although large parts of Palmotić's narrative—especially concerning diplomatic negotiations—are realistic and can be verified, this is by no means true for the entire epic. Palmotić added a metaphysical background to this diplomatic crisis, representing the conflict between the republic and the Ottoman empire as a consequence of a demonic plot to destroy Ragusa, the only stronghold of Catholic faith in the Balkans. In the fourth canto Palmotić made Satan himself rage in front of the forces of hell, after having understood that Ragusa was recovering from the earthquake. In his monologue the arch-demon fumes about that 'small city by the sea', which is the only place in the Balkans 'opposing the Turkish faith / through which I have raised / our power to the skies'.[27] The frustrated demons decide to destroy Ragusa by instigating an Ottoman attack on it, that is, by invoking the Ottomans' greed and manipulating them into demanding a huge amount of money which the city could not pay.[28]

As Palmotić insists, the stakes of this struggle were immensely high. If Ragusa were conquered by the Ottomans: 'with it will fall at once the entire welfare of Christendom, / [since] the world will be devoured by the arrogant dragon, / and that beast will expand into the west'.[29] In other words, Ragusan diplomats were defending not only their republic, but the common good of the entirety of Christendom. Palmotić repeatedly insists that, due to its strategic position on the western frontier of the Ottoman Empire, Ragusa performed a crucial function in holding back the Ottoman advance towards the rest of Christian Europe. The republic's important role in European–Ottoman relations is described through a series of suggestive metaphors. For instance, Ragusa is a 'firm rock [...] which breaks the great sea / of the evil Ottoman faithlessness'; it was put by God 'on the frontier / with the angry dragon / so that due to its virtue / it is a shield to all the Christians'; and it is 'a glorious barrier [...] / against the detested Ottoman waves / which have sunk the entire east'.[30]

Behind all these utterances is a specific Ragusan version of one important topos: that of 'the bulwark of Christianity' (*antemurale* or *propugnaculum Christianitatis*).[31] Representing one's country as the first line of defence of Christianity was common among the premodern states located on the frontier with Islam, but also Orthodox, heterodox, and pagan populations. The most famous examples are probably the Hungarian and Polish Kingdoms, but other states such as Aragon and Castile, Malta, Rhodes and Venice also used this topos in their diplomacy.[32] However, in the Ragusan tradition, which Palmotić follows, this role of bulwark was not represented in the usual martial terms—Ragusa was not a frontier community repelling the infidel on the battlefield. Unlike Hungary or Poland, Ragusa lacked an impressive record of military victories against the Ottomans. Quite to the contrary, for centuries it enjoyed a peaceful and profitable relationship with the 'infidel' empire, even paying tribute to the Sublime Porte. Therefore, it could not adopt the topos directly, with its inherent military connotations, but had to modify and rework it. The result was that the republic was traditionally represented as a kind of 'diplomatic bulwark', a community which defended the true faith by outwitting the Ottoman infidel, outsmarting him through diplomacy.[33]

Such a peculiar understanding of Ragusa's international role had important consequences for Palmotić's work, leading him beyond the conventions of the epic genre. Of course, in many regards he did follow the common places of baroque epics. Most obviously, the central theme of *Ragusa restored* is the great conflict between Christianity and Islam, represented through chivalric vocabulary, and influenced by divine and infernal forces.[34] Yet the tradition of Ragusa as a diplomatic bulwark made him adopt some unusual solutions regarding the protagonists and the type of heroism in which they were engaged. In *Ragusa restored*, the warriors are replaced by diplomats, martial skill by eloquence, and the battlefield by the audience chamber. Indeed, in many dramatic moments in his work, where

in other epics one would encounter scenes of battle, Palmotić narrates tense dialogues and negotiations between the Ragusan diplomats and Ottoman officials. In other words, *Ragusa restored* reflects a typically Ragusan shift of perspective: diplomacy has replaced war as the key space of heroism.[35]

This shift had significant consequences for Palmotić's work. As Timothy Hampton has pointed out, there is a certain tension between the chivalric logic of the epic and the pragmatic and dissimulating practices of diplomacy.[36] In a similar vein, P. Pavličić analysed the numerous unconventionalities caused by the fact that *Ragusa restored* attempts to present a non-epic matter in epic form. For instance, while the protagonists of epics are usually divinely appointed leaders and warriors, Palmotić's are politicians/diplomats who are not even fully independent actors, but follow the orders of the Ragusan senate. Moreover, the goals of the typical epic heroes are world-altering, while those of Palmotić's protagonists are somewhat limited and *par excellence* political: persuading the Ottomans to retract their requests for money. Also, in striving after his goal the classic epic hero does not have to resort to diplomatic tricks: he achieves his goals with strength, bravery, and divine aid, while dissimulation and speechcraft are exactly what Palmotić's heroes are best at.[37]

Obviously aware of such unconventional narrative features, Palmotić used a series of typically epic features in order to 'epicize' the text.[38] Yet he had no choice but to adopt the epic genre. Aiming for a broader domestic audience, he chose to write in Croatian, and that almost automatically determined the form of his work. At that time memoirs, diaries, and novels—more fitting genres for his subject matter—were not written in Croatian, nor did they seem dignified enough for his topic. Thus, the obvious choice when writing in Croatian was to follow the already established and highly influential tradition of the vernacular epics—and that resulted in quite a peculiar text.[39]

Palmotić uses one concept to designate the virtue characteristic of his diplomatic protagonists, a virtue which is the equivalent of military prowess or courage typical for the more standard epic heroes. It is the concept of *hitrina* which is semantically rich and hard to translate directly. In the Croatian vernacular of the early modern period, *hitrina*—and the related adjective *hitar*—had a broad range of meanings, from quickness and dexterity, to prudence, skilfulness, and wit, all the way to outright deceitfulness and trickery.[40] While Palmotić occasionally uses *hitrina* and *hitar* to designate mere physical quickness, in his work they more often designate the specific trait of the Ragusan diplomats: their ability to manipulate their interlocutors due to foresight, coolness, and skilful dissimulation.[41] Yet even in the instances when they clearly designated political prudence, *hitar/hitrina* retained some of their other meaning of quickness. That is, they designated the ability to not only react wisely, but also quickly, without hesitation, to the profoundly unpredictable circumstances of the diplomatic practice.[42]

Palmotić usually praises Ragusan diplomatic ability through the speech of his Ottoman characters, often in situations where they suddenly understand

they have been outsmarted and speak in a kind of shocked admiration. Thus, the sultan himself, after being swayed by Palmotić's persuasive oration, changed his mind again and stated: 'Oh, how the ambassadors deceived me / with their prudence (*hitrina*) / and blinded my reasoning / with their deceitful deed.'[43] On another occasion Palmotić has a wise Ottoman official counsel against attacking Dubrovnik with the following portrait of its ruling patriciate: 'Those are vigilant lords, / they are capable of much, they know much, / nobody can trick them / it is they who trick everyone else.'[44] Yet the true extent of Palmotić's glorification of Ragusan diplomacy becomes clear when one recalls that the driving force behind the Ottoman demands were Satan and his demons. What Ragusan diplomats did, according to Palmotić, was no less than outsmarting the forces of Hell themselves. After the ambassadors successfully changed the sultan's mind for the first time, persuading him not to demand the huge sum from the city, Palmotić describes Satan's immense frustration. He walked around Hell like a 'stabbed bull screaming and crying', beating the other demons, wounding his own jaws with his poisonous teeth, and raging so that it seemed he was to destroy Hell itself. Then he openly admitted: 'Thus the Ragusans/ have shamefully defeated me / and over my demons / triumphed with their prudence.'[45] This is probably the greatest conceivable laudation of diplomatic skill—to claim that infernal forces themselves were thwarted by the Ragusan *hitrina*.

Palmotić did qualify this remarkably bold, even hubristic conclusion, however. The frustrated Satan decided to renew his attack and sent a special demon, 'more terrifying than all the others'—the demon of Greed (*Lakomost*)—to once more incite the Ottomans against Ragusa.[46] The demon of Greed managed to manipulate the Ottomans to demand 300 bags of gold from the republic again, thus opening a new episode in the crisis. This enabled Palmotić to stress another key ideological point permeating his epic—the divine protection that the weakened and devastated republic still enjoyed—for at this point Palmotić made Saint Blaise, the patron-saint of Ragusa, intervene. The saint expelled the demons from the Ottoman court and appeared in a dream to the sultan himself, in a scene which, due to its strong anti-Islamic sentiment, sharply diverges from the rest of the epic. Namely, Palmotić describes Saint Blaise dragging the prophet Mohammad from Hell and beating him in front of the sultan, as well as threatening the Ottoman ruler with the destruction of his empire, if he continued to mistreat the Ragusans. Awed by this transcendental intervention, the horrified sultan finally gave up on his demands.[47] Thus, the great threat to the republic was removed both by the prudence of its diplomats but also by divine intervention.

Cui bono? The political utility of discourses on diplomacy in Ragusan literature

The persistence and coherence of the discourses on diplomacy suggests that Ragusan authors—usually members of the elite—had good reasons to

represent their republic's foreign policy in the aforementioned way. This, of course, begs the question: what were their reasons? Ragusan literature was doubtlessly partisan, sometimes even openly propagandistic, and thus it is necessary to ask: what were the goals behind such descriptions of the republic's diplomacy?

The first purpose of discourses on diplomacy was to legitimize the rule of the small and rigidly closed patrician elite over the republic. Literary references to diplomacy usually stressed the remarkable diplomatic skill of the patricians, indispensable for the survival of the small city-state surrounded by predatory great powers. It seems that the patriciate consciously cherished the sense of external danger and the fragility of the republic in order to foster cohesion and obedience among its subjects. That this was a conscious policy is confirmed by the work of the prominent patrician philosopher and politician, Nikola Gučetić (Gozze). In his commentary on Aristotle's Politics, published in 1591, Gučetić stressed that citizens who are afraid take greater care of the state and concluded: 'It is thus necessary to occasionally invoke in front of the citizens' eyes the great dangers, in which the city is, in order to restrain their licentious desires and incite obedience.'[48] This is exactly what was achieved by the literary assertions that Ragusa was caught between the 'dragon' and the 'lion', and that the diplomatic prudence of the patriciate was the only thing that kept it from falling into the enemy hands. Such assertions suggested that any attempt to change the extant order meant risking the destruction of the community. In sum, the patriciate certainly achieved some of the remarkable social obedience, characteristic of Ragusa, through the carefully cultivated sense of multiple external threats.[49]

Another, quite different political purpose that literary references to diplomacy served was justifying Ragusa's status as an Ottoman tribute-payer. Needless to say, in the early modern period maintaining close, even profitable, relations with the 'infidel' was politically embarrassing.[50] Therefore, in its diplomacy Ragusa developed a sophisticated rhetoric, which served to justify this relationship and deflect the accusations, usually coming from Venetians and other economic competitors, that the republic had betrayed its Christian religion for the sake of profits.[51] What one encounters in a number of literary references—such as the aforementioned examples from Crijević, and, especially, Palmotić—is actually an elaboration of this diplomatic rhetoric. Its basic claim was somewhat surprising: precisely by being an Ottoman tributary Ragusa did a praiseworthy and altruistic deed for the sake of the entirety of Christendom. By 'taming' the Ottoman dragon and holding that 'terrible beast' from the west through its remarkable diplomacy, Ragusa served as the bulwark of Christendom, defending western Europe from the 'infidel'. When presented in this light, the tributary relationship with the Ottoman Empire became a selfless sacrifice for the sake of other Christians. Of course, one important difference between such representations of Ragusa in diplomacy and in literature was the audience. While diplomacy was meant to justify Ragusan tributary status to foreign

rulers, literature, mostly written in the vernacular, was meant primarily for domestic audiences, among whom there was a lot of discontent regarding the relationship with the Ottomans.[52]

Finally, Ragusans used literary discourses on diplomacy to assert their claim to full sovereignty. Indeed, a number of early modern political writers, especially in the seventeenth century, began to doubt the authenticity of Ragusan sovereignty. In a world of large territorial monarchies and ever-clearer conceptions of international law, the status of Ragusa as an equal and independent international subject seemed dubious. Therefore, the cherished Ragusan liberty started to be described as *liberté fantastique*, *apparente libertà*, and *libertà falsa* or in other words, imagined, apparent, and false liberty.[53] Such doubts were a natural consequence of a specific tradition of political thought which Quentin Skinner has labelled 'neo-Roman' republicanism. At its centre was the concept of liberty, defined as the absence of dependence on the arbitrary will of another. That is, true liberty meant an absence of even the *possibility* that the independence of a subject would be interfered with in an arbitrary way.[54] And Ragusa was, indeed, blatantly dependent upon the goodwill of other, more powerful states which could command it and even abolish its independence, if they so desired. Representing Ragusa as a skilful manipulator of more powerful states mitigated this embarrassing fact. Claiming that Ragusa 'tamed' the great powers or that in Christendom there is 'no Crown which does not defend this city of ours', was a way of turning the compromising multiple patronage into a proof of diplomatic and political prudence. Despite appearances, Ragusa was its own master—a sovereign among sovereigns.

Notes

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2 For the location of Ragusa, see I. Rubić, 'Utjecaj pomorskih i kopnenih faktora na razvoj grada Dubrovnika', in *Dubrovačko pomorstvo: u spomen sto godina Nautičke škole u Dubrovniku* (Dubrovnik, 1952), pp. 309–22; A. Ničetić, *Povijest dubrovačke luke* (Dubrovnik, 1996), pp. 30, 34–5, 40, 86, 93.

3 For interesting comparative remarks regarding the wealth of the early modern Ragusa see V. Stipetić, 'Population and gross domestic product of Croatia (1500–1913) in light of Angus Maddison's book The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective', *DA*, 8 (2004), 162–7.

4 N. Vekarić, 'The population of the Dubrovnik Republic in the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries', *DA*, 2 (1998), 7–28.

5 Basic overviews of Ottoman–Ragusan relations are: I. Božić, *Dubrovnik i Turska u XIV i XV veku* (Belgrade, 1952); T. Popović, *Turska i Dubrovnik u XVI veku* (Belgrade, 1973). For an English summary see Robin Harris, *Dubrovnik: a history* (London, 2003), pp. 77–100, 105–10.

6 The standard overviews are J. Tadić, *Španija* i *Dubrovnik u XVI veku* (Belgrade, 1932); Đ. Körbler, 'Dubrovačka republika i zapadne evropske države: veze Dubrovnika s Napulem, Sicilijom, FrancuskomiŠpańolskom', *Rad JAZU*,

93 (1916), 165–252. See also Harris, *Dubrovnik*, pp. 101–5, 110–17; L. Kunčević, 'Janus-faced sovereignty: the international status of the Ragusan Republic in the early modern period', in G. Kármán and L. Kunčević (eds.), *The European tributary states of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries* (Leiden, 2013), pp. 91–122.

7 For several sixteenth- and seventeenth-century examples, see L. Kunčević, 'The rhetoric of the frontier of Christendom in the diplomacy of Renaissance Ragusa (Dubrovnik)', *DA*, 17 (2013), 61; L. Kunčević, 'Janus-faced sovereignty', p. 107; L. Kunčević, 'Dubrovačka slika Venecije i venecijanska slika Dubrovnika u ranom novom vijeku', *Anali zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Dubrovniku*, 50 (2012), 21–2, 32.

8 M. Polić-Bobić (ed.), *Tajna diplomacija u Dubrovniku u XVI stoljeću* (Zagreb, 2011); N. H. Biegman, 'Ragusan spying for the Ottoman Empire', *Belleten*, 27 (1963), 237–55; P. Preto, *I servizi segreti di Venezia* (Milano, 2004), passim, especially pp. 235–45. On Ragusan neutrality, see S. Krasić, 'Dubrovačka Republika i umijeće čuvanja neutralnosti u međunarodnim sukobima', in M. Granić, I. Sanader, S. Berković, and M. Andrlić (eds.), *Diplomacija Dubrovačke Republike, Zbornik Diplomatske akademije br. 3* (Zagreb, 1998), pp. 69–97; S. Anselmi, 'Motivazioni economiche della neutralita di Ragusa nell Cinquecento', in G. Benzoni (ed.), *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del Cinquecento alla luce di Lepanto* (Firenze, 1974), pp. 33–70. On the rhetoric and methodology of Ragusan diplomacy see Kunčević, 'Rhetoric of the frontier', 37–68.

9 The best example of a writer who was also an experienced diplomat is Jaketa Palmotić, whose work is extensively analysed below. Another good example is Nikolica Bunić (c. 1635–1678), author of a number of vernacular works in verse, who also served as ambassador on several important missions, including one that he undertook together with Palmotić. Lastly, the most influential among the baroque poets of Ragusa, Ivan Gundulić (1589–1638), author of the epic *Osman,* was a member of the Senate, a council specifically entrusted with conducting the foreign policy of the republic.

10 On the self-representation of early modern Ragusa see L. Kunčević, 'The myth of Ragusa: discourses on civic identity in an Adriatic city-state (1350–1600)', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Central European University (2012). Available at: https://www.academia.edu/14811338/The_Myth_of_Ragusa_Discourses_on_Civic_Identity_in_an_Adriatic_City-State_1350-1600_ (accessed 29 January 2017).

11 I. Gundulić, *Osman*, eds. S. P. Novak and A. Pavešković (Zagreb, 1991), p. 147. All the English translations of the texts in this article are mine.

12 M. Držić, *Djela*, ed. M. Rešetar (Zagreb, 1930), p. 70.

13 F. Kurelac (ed.), *Runje i pahuljice pjesni podrugljive i pastirske ponajveć dubrovačke* (Zagreb, 1866–1868), p. 62.

14 J. Palmotić, *Pavlimir* (Zagreb, 1995), p. 127. On Ragusa as the space of 'peaceful frontier' in *Pavlimir* see also I. Brković, 'Semantika prostora u dubrovačkoj književnosti 17. stoljeća', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Zagreb (2011), 133.

15 *Pjesme Petra Hektorovića i Hanibala Lucića*, ed. S. Žepić (Zagreb, 1874), pp. 262–3.

16 For the Latin original see S. Škunca, *Aelius Lampridius Cervinus poeta Ragusinus (saec. XV)* (Rome, 1971), pp. 182–3.

17 *Pjesme Mavra Vetranića Čavčića*, ed. V. Jagić and A. Kaznačić (Zagreb, 1871), p. 49.

18 Ibid. A penetrating analysis of this poem can be found in V. Foretić, 'Politički pogledi Mavra Vetranovića' in V. Foretić, *Studije i rasprave iz hrvatske povijesti* (Split, 2001), pp. 326–7.

19 *Ragusa restored* is an extensive text of 15,644 verses and 20 cantos. The 20th canto is unfinished, although it was clearly meant to be the ending of the work.

The epic has been published twice: J. Palmotić Gjonorić, *Dubrovnik ponovljen i Didone*, ed. Stjepan Skurla (Dubrovnik, 1878) (reprinted as J. Palmotić, Jaketa, *Dubrovnik ponovljen* (München, 1974)) and in a recent critical edition by Slavica Stojan (*Dubrovnik ponovljen Jakete Palmotića Dionorića*). For an overview of scholarship regarding this text, see S. Stojan, 'Književna povijest o Jaketi Palmotiću', in *Dubrovnik ponovljen Jakete Palmotića Dionorića*, pp. 205–26. For Palmotić's biography see S. Stojan 'Politička i književna biografija Jakete Palmotića', in *Dubrovnik ponovljen Jakete Palmotića Dionorića*, ed. Slavica Stojan (Zagreb-Dubrovnik, 2014), pp. 15–23; N. Vekarić, *Vlastela grada Dubrovnika, 4. Odabrane biografije (A-D)* (Zagreb-Dubrovnik, 2013), pp. 66–70; V. Lupis, 'O rodu Jakete Palmotića', in H. Mihanović-Salopek and V. B. Lupis, *Željezni duh*: *Prinos Jakete Palmotića Dionorića hrvatskoj književnoj baštini* (Zagreb-Dubrovnik, 2010), pp. 29–36; V. B. Lupis, 'Politički životopis Jakete Palmotića Dionorića', in Mihanović-Salopek and Lupis, *Željezni duh*, pp. 43–61.

20 For an English account of the earthquake see Harris, *Dubrovnik*, pp. 160–202; for the estimate of the casualties N. Vekarić, *Vlastela grada Dubrovnika, 1. Korijeni, struktura u razvoj dubrovačkog plemstva* (Zagreb-Dubrovnik, 2011), pp. 270–1.

21 This arbitrarily determined sum was requested under the thin pretext that the property of sultan's tribute-payers who died without heirs belonged to the Ottoman treasury. Yet the basic document regulating Ragusa's status, the sultan's *ahdname*, explicitly stated that the property of Ragusans who died on the Ottoman territory would not go to the imperial treasury. The best account of this crisis is V. Miović, *Dubrovačka diplomacija u Istambulu* (Zagreb-Dubrovnik, 2003), pp. 141–9.

22 This was Bunić's first diplomatic mission to Istanbul. For his biography, see M. Tatarin, *Fekiks. Život i djelo Nikolice Bunića* (Zagreb, 2004), pp. 9–28.

23 It is worth stressing that Palmotić also wrote a series of official diplomatic reports to the government, describing his mission. They have been published in J. Radonić (ed.), *Dubrovačka akta i povelje* (Beograd, 1939), vol. iii, 2.773–835. A comparison between these prose documents and the epic he wrote afterwards—two different genres describing the same event—would be immensely interesting, but it surpasses the scope of this chapter.

24 On *Ragusa restored* as an autobiography, see S. P. Novak, *Povijest hrvatske književnosti, I. Raspeta domovina* (Split, 2004), pp. 155–6; D. Dukić, *Sultanova djeca*, *Predodžbe Turaka u hrvatskoj književnosti ranog novovjekovlja* (Zadar-Zagreb, 2004), p. 146.

25 S. Stojan, 'Strukturna i sadržajna koncepcija Palmotićeva spjeva', in *Dubrovnik ponovljen Jakete Palmotića Dionorića*, pp. 98–9; S. Stojan, 'Zaključak', in *Dubrovnik ponovljen Jakete Palmotića Dionorića*, p. 232.

26 On *Ragusa restored* as a text intended to raise the morale and mobilize, see also Stojan, 'Strukturna i sadržajna koncepcija', p. 32; Brković, 'Semantika prostora', p. 210; H. Mihanović-Salopek, 'Jaketa Palmotić Dionorić između diplomatskih dužnosti i književnosti', in Mihanović-Salopek, Lupis, *Željezni duh*, pp. 71–2.

27 *Dubrovnik ponovljen Jakete Palmotića Dionorića*, 285.

28 By turning demons into true authors of the ploy against Ragusa, Palmotić, ever the diplomat, was able to, at least partially, exculpate the Ottoman patrons of the city: their malevolent and unjust demands were a consequence of demonic temptation. See Stojan, 'Strukturna i sadržajna koncepcija', pp. 66–7, 70, 72.

29 *Dubrovnik ponovljen Jakete Palmotića Dionorića*, p. 406.

30 For all these examples see ibid.

31 On the origin of this expression, see N. Berend, *At the gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims and 'pagans' in medieval Hungary c. 1000–c.1300* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 209–10.

32 Some of the numerous studies include N. Berend, 'Défense de la Chrétienité et naissance d'une identité: Hongrie, Pologne et péninsule Ibérique au Moyen Âge', *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, 58 (2003), 1009–27; A. Selart, 'Political rhetoric and the edges of Christianity: Livonia and its evil enemies in the fifteenth century', in G. Jaritz and J. Kreem (eds.), *The edges of the medieval world* (Budapest, 2009), pp. 55–69; P. W. Knoll, 'Poland as *Antemurale Christianitatis* in the late middle ages', *The Catholic Historical Review*, 60 (1974), 381–401; S. Graciotti, 'L'antemurale polacco in Italia tra Cinquecento e Seicento: il barocchizzarsi di un mito', in J. Ślaski (ed.), *Barocco fra Italia e Polonia* (Warsaw, 1977), pp. 303–24; J. J. Varga, 'Europa und "Die Vormauer des Christentum"', in B. Güthmuller and W. Kühlmann (eds.), *Europa und die Türken in der Renaissance* (Tübingen, 2000), pp. 55–63; F.-D. Liechtenhan, 'Le Russe, ennemi héréditaire de la chrétienté? La diffusion de l'image de Moscovie en Europe occidentale au XVIe et XVIIe siècles', *Revue Historique*, 285 (1991), 77–103.

33 For more on Ragusa as an *antemurale* see Kunčević, 'Rhetoric of the frontier', 37–68; Kunčević, 'Myth of Ragusa', pp. 170–4; Brković, 'Semantika prostora', 212–13.

34 A. Angyal, *Die Slawische Barockwelt* (Leipzig, 1961), pp. 228–63; P. Pavličić, 'Žanrovi hrvatske barokne književnosti', in A. Flaker and K. Pranjić (eds.), *Hrvatska književnost u evropskom kontekstu* (Zagreb, 1978), p. 247; Stojan, 'Strukturna i sadržajna koncepcija', p. 29. For an insightful analysis of the differences between *Ragusa restored* and the typical epic works of the period, see Z. Kravar, *Das Barock in der kroatischen Literatur* (Cologne, 1991), pp. 135–44.

35 Some examples of such dramatic 'battles of words' include *Dubrovnik ponovljen Jakete Palmotića Dionorića*, pp. 320–2; 381–404; 408–10; 412–15; 454–5; 467–70. *Ragusa restored* does contain some scenes of battle, but they are neither related to its protagonists nor crucial for the plot (*Dubrovnik ponovljen Jakete Palmotića Dionorića*, pp. 442–51). For insightful analysis of diplomacy in Palmotić's work see also Brković, 'Semantika prostora', 205–14.

36 For some examples, especially concerning Tasso, see T. Hampton, *Fictions of embassy: literature and diplomacy in early modern Europe* (Ithaca, 2009), pp. 92–6, 102, 107.

37 P. Pavličić, 'Čitanje spjeva *Dubrovnik ponovljen* Jakete Palmotića Dionorića', *Dubrovnik*, 14.2 (2003), passim, especially 51–2, 72–3. As Dukić stressed, Palmotić represents even the lies of his diplomatic protagonists 'as a heroic act, worth of epic glorification': Dukić, *Sultanova djeca*, p. 150.

38 Thus, Palmotić includes scenes of battle, the council of leaders, and the military parade. He also uses many typical motifs such as the description of a hunt, a feast, a storm at the sea, and a farewell of lovers. For such 'legitimizing' attempts by Palmotić see Pavličić, 'Čitanje', 79–84, 89–90.

39 On the selection of epic genre due to the influence of Croatian literary tradition see Kravar, *Das Barock*, p. 138; Pavličić, 'Čitanje', 88–90, 92–3.

40 *Rječnik hrvatskoga ili srpskoga jezika*, part III, ed. Pero Budmani (Zagreb, 1887–1891), p. 618 for *hitrina*; pp. 609–12 for the adjective *hitar*.

41 For *hitrina/hitar* meaning speed and dexterity, see *Dubrovnik ponovljen Jakete Palmotića Dionorića*, pp. 273, 293, 367, 370–1, 420, 423. For *hitrina/hitar* meaning deceit and prudence see *Rječnik hrvatskoga*, pp. 288–9, 323, 378, 403, 409.

42 On the concept of *hitrina* in *Ragusa restored* see the extensive analysis in Stojan, 'Strukturna i sadržajna koncepcija', pp. 124–30.

43 *Dubrovnik ponovljen Jakete Palmotića Dionorića*, p. 434.

44 Ibid., p. 325.

45 Ibid., pp. 428–9.

46 Ibid., pp. 428–32.

47 For this episode, see *Dubrovnik ponovljen Jakete Palmotića Dionorića*, pp. 471–9. An insightful analysis of the representations of St. Blaise in Ragusan literature more generally can be found in D. Fališevac, 'Politika simbola: Predodžba svetoga Vlaha u književnosti starog Dubrovnika', in V. Brešić (ed.), *Osmišljavanja, Zbornik u čast 80. rođendana akademika Miroslava Šicela* (Zagreb, 2006), pp. 43–60; for Palmotić's epic, pp. 51–8.

48 N. Vito di Gozzi, *Dello stato delle republiche* (Venetia, 1591), p. 269.

49 For other examples of the creation of a sense of outside threat in Ragusan texts and ceremonies see Kunčević, 'Dubrovačka slika Venecije', 22–3.

50 G. Poumarède, 'Justifier l'injustifiable: l'alliance turque au miroir de la chrétienté (XVIe–XVIIe siècles)', *RHD*, 3 (1997), 217–46.

51 Kunčević, 'Rhetoric of the frontier', 46–63.

52 For the anti-Ottoman tendencies in early modern Ragusa see V. Foretić, 'O Marinu Držiću', *Rad Jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti*, 13 (1965), 49–58; Z. Zlatar, *Our kingdom come the Counter-Reformation, the Republic of Dubrovnik, and the liberation of the Balkan slavs* (New York, 1992), pp. 261–97; Z. Zlatar, *Between the double eagle and the crescent: the Republic of Dubrovnik and the origins of the eastern question* (Boulder, 1992), pp. 55–74; N. Vekarić and S. Ćosić, 'The factions within the Ragusan patriciate (17th–18th Century)', *DA*, 7 (2003), 7–79, esp. 9–30.

53 Some examples in the works of seventeenth-century travel-writers are V. Jelavić, 'Doživljaji Francuza Poullet-a na putu kroz Dubrovnik i Bosnu (godine 1658)', *Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja u BiH*, 20 (1908), pp. 24–7; R. Samardžić, 'Nekoliko francuskih putopisaca XVII veka o Dalmaciji i Dubrovniku', *Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta*, VII–1 (1963), 376–7; P. Ricaut, *The present state of the Ottoman Empire, in three books containing the maxims of the Turkish politic, their religion, and military discipline* (London, 1668), p. 66.

54 Skinner has stated this thesis in many of his works. See for example Q. Skinner, *Liberty before liberalism* (Cambridge, 1998); Q. Skinner, 'A third concept of liberty', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 117 (2002), 237–68.

4 Staged sovereignty or aristocratic values?

Diplomatic ceremonial at the Westphalian peace negotiations (1643–1648)

Niels F. May

Introduction

Until recently, the peace conference of Westphalia (1643–1648), which ended the Thirty Years' War, was considered as a major turning point in the development of international relations. The three resulting treaties of Münster and Osnabrück have traditionally been closely related to the idea of sovereignty, secularization, particularism, and the establishment of 'modern' diplomacy. Thus, 1648 became the starting point for international relations *sensu stricto* in many interpretations.[1] But at the same time, the supposed ending of the sovereign state after the end of the Cold War has led many scholars to question the significance of Westphalia as a turning point for international relations.[2] Indeed, recent research has underlined the continuities within the seventeenth century and the 'modernity' of international relations towards the end of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.[3]

Almost all European powers sent representatives to the negotiations; only a few, such as England and Russia, did not. Indeed, over 190 different interest groups were represented at Münster and Osnabrück. These included diplomats from the monarchies of France, Spain, and Sweden; the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire; republics such as Venice and the Dutch Republic; and, not to mention, the German prince electors and other intermediate powers such as Savoy and the German Imperial cities.[4] The simultaneous presence of so many varied and disparate polities in one place is one of the reasons why it took five years to establish peace between the different powers. An assembly of this size, along with so many envoys, had only scant and imperfect examples to follow such as the Council of Trent (1545–1563) and the peace negotiations at Vervins (1598) and Cherasco (1631).[5] The representatives made occasional allusions to these cases during the negotiations,[6] but it was quite difficult to derive from these examples applicable patterns to resolve disputes over the form and procedure of the peace conference.

The importance of the Westphalian peace conference is not limited to the development of abstract considerations as a key characteristic of international relations, such as balance of power, sovereignty, or secularization

of external relations. It was also crucial on the level of diplomatic forms of interaction. As early as the 1680s, contemporary observers, often from the Holy Roman Empire, interpreted Münster and Osnabrück as a turning point in the development of diplomatic ceremonial.[7] This judgement, pre-eminently claimed by authors such as Johann Christian Lünig, Gottfried Stieve, and other key witnesses and systematizers of seventeenth century ceremonial, continues to serve as an important reference for scholars who seek to contextualize ceremonial issues.[8]

Indeed, the negotiations in Münster and Osnabrück were marked by almost ubiquitous quarrels about precedence, especially in the beginning. The divergent opinions regarding title, precedence, and other symbols of rank considerably decelerated the peace negotiations. Since it was the first time that so many different representatives from various European courts and countries had come together, it is not surprising that there was a pressing need to regulate their conflicting interests.[9] From the early sixteenth century, diplomatic encounters became more and more 'surrogate wars' where the diplomatic representatives were struggling for precedence instead of their kings; this was especially true of France and Spain.[10] Some of the solutions adopted in the Münster and Osnabrück conferences became very important in the long run for the development of diplomatic ceremonial. For example, the title 'Excellency', which was used to distinguish ambassadors from lower-ranking diplomats, is still in use in today's diplomatic protocol.

The quarrels concerning diplomatic ceremonial in the 1640s were more than just baroque vanities, because determining these symbolic codes also determined some of the political content of the negotiation. Without an agreement on the form of communication, negotiations concerning territories, amnesty, the withdrawal of troops, and so forth were not possible. Ceremonial was thus a political object in itself. Ceremonial was the only way to make one's personal rank visible within the hierarchy of princes. Indeed, personal standing in the international order was created through the ceremonial.[11]

The ways in which early modern people thought about status were quite different from nowadays and, as a result, can be quite difficult for us to understand. Historians often interpreted the ceremonial quarrels as a lack of rationality. Since the beginning of the twentieth century and particularly following Marc Bloch's ground-breaking study of 'the royal touch'—the powers claimed by medieval French and English kings to be able to cure scrofula—historians became more interested in the meaning of symbolic acts. After the Second World War, several historians, especially those close to Ernst Kantorowicz, analysed ceremonial behaviour in the French monarchy and demonstrated its centrality to the functioning of French politics. Since then, there has been a lively historical interest in symbolic interactions in state and interstate relationships, many of which have revolved around the core interests of different political actors and the representation

of power through ceremonies. Consequently, a perspective centred on the heads of government is predominant in the historiography.[12]

More recent studies of ceremonial have shown that status representation is about much more than merely reflecting power: it is also a way to create power and be recognized by one's peers as being powerful.[13] This performative dimension of symbolic communication is particularly useful in helping us to understand ceremonial quarrels in early modern Europe. Abraham de Wicquefort, author of one of the most influential books about the ambassador and his duties, stated in 1680 that the right to send representatives with the rank of an ambassador was one of the most noble marks of sovereignty.[14] He asserted that there was a link between the recognition of an ambassador as such when the diplomat was accorded the ceremonial due to ambassadors, and the recognition of his prince as sovereign. His interpretation fits well with interpretations of the Westphalian peace treaties as a cornerstone for the development of 'modern' international relations.[15] This also explains why ceremonial conflicts in international relations were most commonly interpreted as a struggle about the recognition of sovereignty, even before Wicquefort postulated the close relation between sovereignty and diplomatic ceremonial.

This interpretation is closely linked to the status of the 'ambassador' as both a persona that represented the king's interests and a person who participated in royal dignity, making dignity present in the absence of the sovereign. This conception of the ambassador resulted from the convergence between the function of the *nuntius* (as voice of the king or prince) and the *procurator* (as person acting in the name of the king or prince). Since the fifteenth century, it had become quite common to send 'ambassadors' with the three key functions of information gathering, negotiation, and representation within Italy. This form spread from Italy to Europe in the late fifteenth century and first half of the sixteenth century. Even if 'diplomacy' and international law were not unknown in the Middle Ages,[16] the new form of the ambassador as a mixture of the medieval forms changed the way in which states and polities interacted quite considerably.[17] The three key functions of intelligence, negotiation, and representation are also crucial for understanding the behaviour of the negotiators of the peace at Münster and Osnabrück. Here, representation was of special concern because the representative function of ambassadors frequently impeded negotiations or even threatened to derail the assembly as a whole. This chapter asks the question: were all struggles during the Westphalian peace negotiations conflicts regarding sovereignty?

Early modern ambassadors performed different roles and embodied different—sometimes competing—allegiances, whether personal, familial, princely and so on. Hillard von Thiessen underlined the importance of these various levels of social interactions that coalesced in the make-up of a foreign representative. He reminds diplomatic historians that personal status, family interests, and the representation of dynastic prestige were

intertwined in complex ways. The absence of structural differentiation between person and office and the resulting lack of 'modern' professionalism were a hallmark of early modern diplomacy and should not be seen as a deficiency.[18] Diplomats, then, should be understood as more than mere proxies of their monarchs; they were also individuals who had their own agendas and their own aims. In this chapter, this insight will be applied to diplomatic ceremonial. While handbooks of and for diplomats since the seventeenth century have underlined the ambassador's function as servant of his monarch or prince, the aim here is to analyse ceremonial quarrels from a point of view that privileges the diplomatic actor's perspective and his personal motivations.

This chapter therefore examines three important ceremonial quarrels at the beginning of the congress (1644–1645). The first section analyses the case of Fabio Chigi, nuncio of Pope Urban VIII/Innocent X; the second turns to the case of Henri II d'Orléans, duke of Longueville, who was the lead French ambassador; and the third part analyses the case of Francis William of Wartenberg, bishop and descendant of the Wittelsbach family. All three diplomats had a very high status within *ancien régime* society in addition to their role as representatives during the peace negotiations. They could therefore use the ceremonial system as a means to underline their status within different normative orders. Consequently, these three case studies highlight how the plurality of norms was used by individual diplomats during the Westphalian peace negotiations in order to obtain certain ceremonial honours beyond those that were concerned with their struggles to assert the precedence of their kings. As will be seen, a sovereign-centred interpretation neglects important aspects of early modern ceremonial. Indeed, as this chapter shows, taking an 'actor-centred' approach reveals that many diplomats claimed ceremonial rights as a means of defending their personal status within their polity's aristocratic hierarchy, regardless of any ceremonial honours they might have claimed as representatives of their absent prince.

Fabio Chigi: mediator and nuncio

In the hierarchy of princes in late medieval and early modern Europe, the pope, and by extension his representatives, had the highest position as far as most other rulers were concerned. Since the Reformation, Protestant powers had contested his position as the head of European Christendom, but the majority of European monarchs and republics still believed that the pope and his representatives should have the most honourable place and receive the highest signs of honour. The hierarchical order applied in the Sistine Chapel in Rome, fixed in 1504 and published in 1516,[19] served even in the seventeenth century as one of the most cited and—due to political changes—often contested ways to claim precedence.[20] Rome was—together with Venice—one of the major diplomatic centres in the sixteenth century and

so the ceremonial order used by the papacy had a wide impact within the (Catholic) European world. Even in the middle of the seventeenth century in Münster, the French ambassadors still considered Rome the example to follow.[21] But was this position of the Pope contested only by the Protestant powers? The Westphalian peace negotiations show a more complex case: in the middle of the seventeenth century, the position of the pope and his representatives was being questioned even by the Catholic powers. Fabio Chigi, who was born in 1599 in Siena and later became Pope Alexander VII, was deputized by Pope Urban VIII to defend papal interests and to mediate between the conflicting parties. At Münster, he was confronted with the ceremonial claims of the other Catholic powers.[22]

Since the 1630s, pope Urban VIII had tried to bring together the hostile parties of the ongoing war. He initiated the ultimately unsuccessful Congress of Cologne (1636). His representative, the cardinal Mario Ginetti, was sent to Germany and stayed there for four years waiting for the negotiations to begin. After Ginetti's return to Italy, Carlo Rossetti was named papal mediator for the negotiations in Münster but in the autumn of 1643, the French rejected him as persona non grata. Urban did not send Ginetti back as papal mediator, but rather sent his nuncio in Cologne, Fabio Chigi, instead. In contrast to Alvise Contarini, the other (Venetian) mediator, Chigi refused any contact with the representatives of non-Catholic powers. In contrast to his two predecessors, Rossetti and Ginetti, Chigi incorporated two different roles: on the one hand, the role of mediator, and on the other hand, the role of papal nuncio. While the role of mediator was only linked to the process of negotiation and a temporary status, the role of papal nuncio was linked to asserting papal interests, including defending the position of the papacy within the European Christian honour society. The coincidence of both positions in one man made it possible to attribute different ceremonial honours to Chigi. The other participants did not miss this occasion to underline their position vis-à-vis the papacy concerning ceremonial honours.

The efforts of the other diplomats to gain ceremonial ground over Chigi became particularly obvious at public events that offered the highest risk of ceremonial troubles during the negotiations, such as the entry of Chigi into Münster or the solemn opening of the congress. The disputes about precedence that such occasions provoked could seriously harm ongoing discussions as unclear hierarchies could interrupt peace talks and sometimes even make them impossible. The question of what would be the right treatment for Chigi on the occasion of his entry into Münster was thus anything but banal. Even before his arrival in the city, the Spanish diplomats had raised the issue of the dichotomy between Chigi's rank of mediator and the rank of the papal nuncio and the wide-reaching consequence this issue had for the ceremonial order. They claimed that Chigi should be treated only as a mediator and not as a nuncio in the ceremonial system 'especially because the apostolic nuncio was not sent to execute any papal or ecclesiastic action, but rather to act only as a peace

mediator'.[23] The imperial representatives, the count of Nassau and Isaak Volmar, had already written to Emperor Ferdinand III in autumn of 1643 to ask for the ceremonial for Chigi's entry. The Viennese court and its ambassadors in Münster were quite conscious of potential conflicts during the arrival of the pope's representative—even with the local clergy.[24] The coincidence of the sacral and the secular spheres within the person of the papal representative complicated the situation. While the ambassadors of kings and republics did spend a lot of time and money on representation during the public entries, the papal following was small and humble at Chigi's entry into Münster (spring 1644).[25] He explained to his friend Francesco Albizzi in Rome that the ambassadors were used to having entourages like those of kings, while he had only six priests and a coach with two horses.[26] Chigi was quite humble and said himself that he was only *legato* and was not competing with the royal ambassadors for ceremonial honours, but it seems that the other ambassadors were nonetheless afraid of the potential claims that he might make to receive superior treatment. Whether the representatives of the pope could still claim the highest position within the European hierarchy was more and more contested. Their pre-eminent position was no longer beyond doubt, even in Catholic quarters.

The tension between the ranks of papal nuncio (sacral) and mediator (secular) became fully evident during the opening of the official congress in April of 1644.[27] Initially, Chigi briefly wanted to mark his pre-eminent position amongst the different representatives and put up a canopy, or baldachin, in the church. The baldachin was a very strong symbol of an extremely high position[28] and was, therefore, a contested symbol.[29] Even viceroys and governors, who were more 'king-like' than the diplomatic representatives, could not maintain this symbol as a mark of their pre-eminent position and it was increasingly reserved for the use of the king and not his representatives. This symbol immediately engendered this contradiction in Münster: the French ambassadors were particularly insistent that Chigi should be treated only as a mediator and not as a nuncio during the church service that solemnly opened the peace negotiations. Chigi, who was not very attached to ceremonial in general, complied quickly. He agreed to disassemble the panoply and to put off his episcopal vestments (which articulated his status in the ecclesiastical hierarchy) during the opening church service. He figured amongst the other representatives only as an ambassador and mediator after the procession.

The events of the spring of 1644 show how key elements of the ceremonial that was used in Münster were influenced by the different roles that Chigi possessed. As nuncio and mediator, Chigi was in the advantageous position of having two alternative strategies that he could adopt in order to claim ceremonial honours or to defend potential compromises that might otherwise have harmed his and his pope's status. Even if some honours that would normally be due to papal nuncios were denied to him, he could

always claim that he was only a mediator at the peace conference, so it in no way derogated the pope's place in the international hierarchy. This parallelism of roles allowed Chigi to save face, on the one hand, and to maintain the position of the Pope, on the other. Yet when both the French and the Spanish ambassadors asked for Chigi to be treated solely as mediator and not as papal nuncio, they were asking for him to be treated in a way that questioned the pre-eminent role of the papacy within the European hierarchy of princes.

Chigi's case is also a good example of the ways in which ceremonial quarrels could be contained through an ambassador switching between his various roles. Representation could thus be abrogated in a way that was not harmful to the represented king, prince, or, in this case, Pope. The main question was how Chigi's position was perceived and what rank he was claiming for himself. Crucially, Chigi was far from being the only diplomat at the peace congress who possessed multiple claims to rank; many others were also able to use their parallel roles to provide flexibility and defend their master's honour in a similar way. Within ceremonial conflicts, the multilayered conceptions of societal order in early modern times could thus be exploited for very different ends. State-building and the recognition of sovereignty was often a central aspect within these quarrels, but they could also be used to avoid confrontations and make encounters possible.[30] The juxtaposition of different roles could equally well be used to reinforce the personal status of a diplomat, as we will see in the following example.

Longueville: French ambassador and prince of the blood?

The most controversial conflict at Münster concerned the leading French ambassador, Henri II d'Orléans, duke of Longueville. He was sent to Münster in 1645 after a harsh dispute within the French embassy between the diplomats Abel Servien and Claude de Mesme, Count d'Avaux, who were already present. Their divergent views on multiple political issues, from the position of the protestant powers to ceremonial niceties, provoked a serious slow-down of the negotiations. Consequently, the French court decided to send Longueville to Münster.[31] But this did not produce the desired acceleration of the peace talks. Even before his arrival, new problems became obvious because he claimed the title of 'Altesse', or 'Highness', during the congress.[32] Moreover, Longueville refused to talk directly to anyone who denied him this title. To fully understand his demand, it is necessary to have a closer look at the origins of Longueville, as well as the significance of the title 'Altesse', and the criteria it was necessary to fulfil to be given this title.

The Longueville family descended from John of Orleans, the illegitimate son of Louis I of France and Mariette d'Enghien. The family fought for a long time to become recognized as princes of the blood and thus legitimized. In 1571, Charles IX finally declared the duke of Longueville and his family princes of the blood. This declaration most probably remained contested

because it was renewed several times, so it is likely that the claims of the Longueville family repeatedly needed to be assured.[33] Henri de Longueville was notorious for his protests against royal power—he participated, for example, in the rebellion of duke d'Épernon in 1620. At the same time, he tried to underpin his position within French society through his marriages: first with Louise de Bourbon-Soissons and, secondly, with princess Anne-Geneviève de Bourbon-Condé, who was of the highest noble rank in the French kingdom.

This unsettled situation within French noble society is an important context for Longueville's claim to be treated as 'Altesse'. If he demanded this title during the Westphalian peace negotiations, it was due to his personal position and his wish to buttress his status as a potential heir to the French throne on an international level. A closer examination of the criteria which were necessary to claim the title 'Altesse' sharpens the focus. It can be difficult to trace the use of titles because the significance of many, such as 'Altesse', changed in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. The title 'Altesse'/'highness' was reserved for brothers of the French king. However, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, the title became more widely used. Practice at Rome, as is so often the case in ceremonial matters, was crucial. In 1622, Henry II of Bourbon, prince of Condé, claimed the title 'Altesse'.[34] He justified this claim with his rank as a 'prince of the blood' and, thus, as a potential heir of the French throne. Hereafter, the title was used in France for the 'prince(s) of the blood' and, thus, legitimated descendants of the French king. In demanding that he be given the title 'Altesse', Longueville was following in this tradition. The title, therefore, had nothing to do with his rank as ambassador of the French king, but everything to do with his rank within French aristocratic society. From this moment on, it became more and more common to use the title 'prince de sang' for potential heirs to the French throne. It is most likely that Longueville aimed to use the title to gain international recognition to show that he was a person of royal blood and, thus, a possible heir to the French throne.

The title accorded to ambassadors was—as with the title of 'Altesse'—subjected to multiple transformations in this formative period for the development of diplomatic practices. From the beginning of the seventeenth century, the title 'Excellency' became more and more common for ambassadors, but it was not fully acknowledged until the second half of the century. At the peace negotiations in Münster and Osnabrück, the matter of whether an ambassador should automatically be addressed as 'Excellency', regardless of the status of his sovereign, was still contested. Was an ambassador of, say, the French king to be referred to in the same way as an ambassador of a German prince or of a republic?[35] And should an ambassador who was a high-ranking aristocrat be given the same title as an ambassador who was not even noble? Should an ambassador who was of royal blood be treated in a different way than an ambassador who was only a merchant, despite the fact that they shared the rank of ambassador? This tension between

different social statuses and different systems of justifying signs of honour clashed on several occasions in Münster. Longueville, who was formally the principal French ambassador, provides a telling example with which to analyse these conflicting mechanisms. From the eighteenth century onwards, Longueville's claim to be styled 'Altesse' was also seen to raise the question of his recognition as sovereign over the princedom of Neufchatel. This interpretation underlines the changing criteria of why the title could be claimed by different actors and what was expressed about the status of actors within the ceremonial system. The important point here is that, in both interpretations, Longueville was claiming the title as a ceremonial honour that was due to his personal status and not to his rank as ambassador for the French king.

This was exactly why Fabio Chigi argued that Longueville should be refused the requested honours. Chigi argued that Longueville should be considered as a representative of the French king and should thus be treated as such and not as a duke of the French nobility.[36] The mediator pretended that an individual's rank as an ambassador and his rank within the hierarchy of nobility should be considered as separate things and, therefore, they did not influence one another. So here, Chigi wanted to see a separation of aristocratic personal status and ambassadorial status so that Longueville could not exploit the former.

The objections of Abel Servien, one of the lower-ranking French ambassadors, show how the French interpreted both the multiple roles that Longueville held and their relationship to each other. By quoting the example of the failed congress at Cologne in 1636, Servien demonstrated that the two different roles should not be thought of as exclusive: the cardinal of Lyon, brother of Richelieu, had been designated the French ambassador to the congress in Cologne. Servien underlined that the cardinal of Lyon should have been treated as 'his eminence', due to his status as cardinal, and not merely as 'his excellency', due to his position as an ambassador of the French king. He believed that the alternative roles persisted even when an individual represented a king as an ambassador.[37] This line of argument was particularly well chosen because Servien was making implicit allusion to the status of Chigi who, at least in the beginning of negotiations, had argued in the same manner.

Longueville could not obtain the title of 'Altesse' from all those participating in the congress. The German prince-electors were the first to give in. But, contrary to the arguments outlined above, the Bavarian representatives started to reason on another level. They justified the title through Longueville's status as first ambassador within the French embassy. D'Avaux and Servien were considered as second ambassadors after Longueville's arrival. The Bavarians argued that the existence of this hierarchy within the French delegation should be expressed by addressing Longueville as 'Altesse' and the other ambassadors as 'Excellency' for the sake of contrast.[38] The imperial ambassadors, however, refused to allow Longueville the use

of the title 'Altesse' in 1645. They used the argument that Longueville was expected as 'plenipotentarius Gallicus' ('French plenipotentiary') and not as a member of the French nobility. They also refuted the Bavarian arguments. Consequently, they treated Longueville as possessing full French power, as did d'Avaux and Servien, and addressed him as 'Excellency' as they believed that all three French ambassadors should be treated in the same way.[39]

The different stances taken towards Longueville's claim highlight that the juxtaposition of different roles was not only a possible means of avoiding ceremonial conflict but also a possible source of quarrels. The position of an ambassador within aristocratic society could be exploited for the status policies of specific nobles. And the two identities of the ambassador could interact in meaningful ways at international assemblies such as peace congresses. Due to the specific connection that the ambassador's representative function created between his person and that of his prince, an ambassador could exploit the king's status to enhance his personal status and vice versa.

Wartenberg: bishop, ambassador, nobleman, and deputy of the prince-electors

The case of Francis William of Wartenberg, who represented the prince elector of Cologne, Ferdinand, during the negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück, reveals a further aspect of how diplomatic ceremonial articulated representation between staged sovereignty and aristocratic values. Wartenberg was simultaneously bishop of Osnabrück, Minden, and Verden and he also carried the proxy votes of several other bishoprics, including Chur, Eichstädt, Augsburg, Regensburg, and Ellwangen. In addition to this, at the beginning of the negotiations he was representing the other prince-electors, as the admission of all German princes to the congress had not yet been agreed upon. The interplay between his overlapping political identities as a representative of an elector and his position as a prince of the Holy Roman Empire is particularly revealing for the use of different roles.

Wartenberg's position within the ceremonial order was unclear before the negotiations began. From the very beginning, he asked for special treatment,[40] but in contrast to the cases of Chigi and Longueville, almost all of the participants agreed that Wartenberg should have a special status within the ceremonial hierarchy. In a letter to Emperor Ferdinand III, the Imperial ambassadors underlined that they could treat Wartenberg as a prince of the Holy Roman Empire and according to his position within the society of German princes:

> may the electoral envoys rest assured that we ourselves treat the bishop of Osnabrück as a prince of the Holy Empire in private as we are willing to treat the other envoys according to their rank and quality with all due honor and respect.[41]

But things looked differently for the imperial diplomats regarding his status as a representative of the prince electors. In their minds, the prince electors should not be considered 'absolute' and, thus, independent of the German emperor, and this should be reflected in the ceremonial treatment of their representative. The prince electors, however, denied that sovereignty was an essential criterion to justify a certain ceremonial and based their argumentation quite sophistically on the honour they possessed as electors of the emperor.[42]

The French diplomats were also willing to give Wartenberg the ceremonial signs he asked for, but their justification was different: they particularly underlined his role representing the whole college of prince electors (*Kurfürstenkolleg*) and his noble origins.[43] Wartenberg was indeed related to the Bavarian Wittelsbach family and was a cousin of Maximilian I, duke of Bavaria. The French ambassadors reported to the French secretary of state for foreign affairs, Henri-Auguste de Loménie, count of Brienne, that they did not think that a nobleman should lose the ceremonial rights that were due to him by virtue of his aristocratic origins just because he also happened to be an ambassador. That is why they argued that Wartenberg should be treated according to his noble rank. At the same time, we can also observe the abrogation of diplomatic ceremonial in the case of the title used for Wartenberg. He was not addressed with the title 'excellence', which was normally used for ambassadors, but with the title 'grâce principale' by the French ambassadors.[44] This latter title referred to his status as a prince of the Holy Roman Empire and not to his status as ambassador of the elector of Cologne. As both the imperial and the French representatives underlined that Wartenberg as a person should be treated according to his personal rank, the rank of the prince he represented was not taken into account. His noble 'birth' was particularly stressed by his contemporaries in Münster.[45] Wartenberg's case is thus quite similar to that of Longueville. Both cases make clear that 'diplomatic' ceremonial, when understood solely as symbolic communication between representatives who are defending the status of their princes, reduces early modern ceremonial quarrels to a modern understanding of 'diplomats' and their function. But Longueville and Wartenberg did not claim ceremonial rights as ambassadors or as any kind of representation of their absent prince. Instead, they were defending their own status within aristocratic hierarchies in both France and the Holy Roman Empire respectively.

Wartenberg exploited the ceremonial position given to him as a member of the German nobility in order to support the claims of all other German prince electors to be treated in the same way. The other diplomats representing the electors later demanded that they receive the same ceremonial as Wartenberg without taking into account that the deference he received was granted to him as a person and not as a representative of a prince elector. All ceremonial honours were interpreted as signs of the honour due to Wartenberg's person. His case shows how the parallelism of different

normative grounds could not only influence the treatment of one person, but also of a whole group of people who shared at least one criterion for ceremonial treatment (in this case, being representatives of a prince elector).

Conclusion

Even for a representative of royal or princely claims, the juxtaposition of different roles did not cease to influence the ceremonial order. The cases of Longueville and Wartenberg show that a peace conference could be used as an arena to stake a claim to the recognition of a domestic status on an international level. This kind of role switching often harmed the negotiation but was supported by the French court. This suggests that we should understand the term 'diplomatic ceremonial' as not only encompassing the concepts of sovereignty that were discussed and displayed at Münster and Osnabrück, but also, and just as importantly, capturing the complexity of the claims to status that were being made on various social levels within the multi-layered quarrels at the peace congress. Viewing diplomats simply as substitutes of the princes also reduces diplomatic ceremonial to an instrument of the recognition of sovereignty within European foreign policy and risks narrowing ceremonial quarrels down to a specific modern conception of diplomacy. Neither the diplomats nor their courts considered them only as representatives with a purely diplomatic function. Even if ceremonial quarrels were already partly a struggle regarding the recognition of rulers as independent players on the international stage during the Westphalian peace negotiations, it is important to underline that *ancien regime* diplomats and their courts were aware of their different roles and that diplomats exploited them not only in negotiations, but also in ceremonial disputes.[46]

Giora Sternberg, who studied the ceremonial records of the French court, argued that ceremonial should not be seen from the centre and thus the power-keeping institutions, but from the perspective of the individual engaging in symbolic communication.[47] The three examples analysed here show that Sternberg's observation is also helpful when considering symbolic interaction on an international level. Diplomats were more than servants to their princes. They defended—at least in the mid-seventeenth century—their personal interests through diplomatic ceremonial, too. David Do Paço accurately postulates a social history of early modern diplomacy that investigates phenomena that correspond to understandings of interaction on a solely international level.[48] Only by integrating the personal status and the personal interests of diplomatic personnel in all their interactions can we fully understand the functioning and development of 'diplomatic ceremonial'. As the treatment of Wartenberg illustrates, this is particularly important because the international establishment of certain norms and habits was not just due to the status of the prince being represented, but the individual who was representing the prince. Without the integration of the close connection between the representation of princely interests and aristocratic

values into our analytical frameworks, an important key to understanding the dynamics of early modern ceremonial is missing.

The peace negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück were marked by disputes about sovereignty. But they were also, and perhaps even more importantly, characterized by numerous disputes which related to cases where an individual represented a prince and could claim noble rank and, sometimes, other functional ranks, such as a mediator, too. The juxtaposition of these different political identities in a single individual and the fact that they were exploited in manifold ways was one of the main reasons for the long-lasting quarrels at Westphalia and the duration of the peace negotiations. The fact that there was no clear hierarchy to which negotiators could turn in order to determine what the correct ceremonial treatment of such individuals should be, means that Münster and Osnabrück mark an important turning point in the development of an 'international diplomatic ceremonial' order.

Notes

1 See S. Schmidt, 'To order the minds of scholars: the discourse of the Peace of Westphalia in international relations literature', *International Studies Quarterly*, 55 (2011), 601–23.

2 For example, the volume of Q. Skinner and H. Kalmo (eds.), *Sovereignty in fragments: the past, present and future of a contested concept* (Cambridge 2010).

3 For example, J. Larkins, *From hierarchy to anarchy: territory and politics before Westphalia* (Basingstoke 2010); B. Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: class, geopolitics, and the making of modern international relations* (London, 2003).

4 F. Bosbach, *Die Kosten des Westfälischen Friedenskongresses: eine strukturgeschichtliche Untersuchung* (Münster, 1984), pp. 14–15.

5 For a detailed survey of possible examples and their impact on the peace negotiations, see N. F. May, *Zwischen fürstlicher Repräsentation und adliger Statuspolitik: das Kongresszeremoniell bei den westfälischen Friedensverhandlungen* (Ostfildern, 2016).

6 See, for example, for Vervins: *Acta Pacis Westphalicae*, ed. M. Braubach, K. Repgen and M. Lanzinner (Münster 1962–) [APW with an indication of the series and the volume], II B 1, no. 43, pp. 80–1. For Cherasco, for example: Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, CP Allemagne Suppl. 2, fo. 212r.

7 See M. Vec, *Zeremonialwissenschaft im Fürstenstaat: Studien zur juristischen und politischen Theorie absolutistischer Herrschaftsrepräsentation* (Frankfurt am Main, 1998), pp. 300–1.

8 For example: J. C. Lünig, *Theatrum Ceremoniale Historico-Politicum, oder historisch- und politischer Schau-Platz aller Ceremonien*, 2 vols. (Leipzig 1719–20), ii.7.

9 See the contribution of G. Kármán in this volume which shows that similar problems could also be found in other regions.

10 T. Osborne, 'The surrogate war between the Savoys and the Medici: sovereignty and precedence in early modern Italy', *IHR*, 29 (2007), 1–21; A. E. Imhof, *Der Friede von Vervins 1598* (Aarau, 1966), pp. 150–3.

11 A. Krischer, 'Souveränität als sozialer Status: zur Funktion des diplomatischen Zeremoniells in der Frühen Neuzeit', in R. Kauz, G. Rota, and J. P. Niederkorn (eds.), *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im Mittleren Osten in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Wien, 2009), pp. 1–32; B. Stollberg-Rilinger, 'Völkerrechtlicher Status und zeremonielle Praxis auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongreß', in M. Kintzinger, M.

Jucker, and R. C. Schwinges (eds.), *Rechtsformen internationaler Politik: Theorie, Norm und Praxis vom 12. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2011), pp. 147–64.

12 For a discussion of the older viewpoint, see G. Sternberg, *Status interaction during the reign of Louis XIV* (Oxford, 2014), pp. 4–12.

13 See footnote 11.

14 A. de Wicquefort, *L'ambassadeur et ses fonctions*, 2 vols. (Den Haag, 1680/81), i.2. On de Wicquefort, see S. Externbrink, 'Abraham de Wicquefort et ses traités sur l'ambasadeur (1676–1682)', in S. Andretta, S. Péquignot, and J.-C. Waquet (eds.), *De l'ambassadeur: les écrits relatifs à l'ambassadeur et à l'art de négocier du Moyen Âge au début du XIXe siècle* (Rome, 2015), pp. 405–30.

15 For example, the influential formulation of L. Gross, 'The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948', *The American Journal of International Law*, 42 (1948), p. 28: 'Westphalia, for better or worse, marks the end of an epoch and the opening of another. It represents the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world.'

16 M. Kintzinger, 'From the late Middle Ages to the Peace of Westphalia', in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of the history of international law* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 607–27.

17 I. Lazzarini, 'Renaissance diplomacy', in A. Gamberini, I. Lazzarini (eds.), *The Italian Renaissance state* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 430–1; I. Lazzarini, *Communication and conflict: Italian diplomacy in the early Renaissance, 1350–1520* (Oxford, 2015).

18 H. von Thiessen, *Diplomatie und Patronage: die spanisch-römischen Beziehungen 1605–1621 in akteurszentrierter Perspektive* (Epfendorf, 2010).

19 See M. Dykmans, *Œuvre de Patrizi Piccolomini ou le cérémonial papal de la première Renaissance* (Vatican City, 1980), i.33–42; P. Stenzig, *Botschafterzeremoniell am Papsthof der Renaissance: der Tractatus de oratoribus des Paris de Grassi—Edition und Kommentar*, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 2014); C. Fletcher, *Diplomacy in Renaissance Rome: the rise of the resident ambassador* (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 59–80.

20 E. Nys, 'Le règlement de rang du pape Jules II', *Revue de droit international et de legislation comparée*, 25 (1893), 513–19. The traditional order was (Nys, pp. 515–16): Holy Roman Emperor, king of the Romans, king of France, king of Spain, king of Aragon, king of Portugal, king of England (who disputed his position with the three aforementioned kings), king of Sicily (who disputed his place vis-à-vis the Portuguese king), king of Scotland and king of Hungary (who disputed between themselves), king of Navarre, king of Cyprus, king of Bohemia, king of Poland, king of Denmark.

21 *APW* II B 1, no. 18, p. 33 and *APW* II B 1, no. 117, p. 212.

22 For the general impact of the Reformation on foreign policy see D. Nexon, *The struggle for power in early modern Europe: religious conflict, dynastic empires and international change* (Princeton, 2009), esp. pp. 99–134.

23 J. G. Meiern (ed.), *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica oder Westphälische Friedens-Handlungen und Geschichte* (Hannover, 1734–1736), i.67–8.

24 See *APW* II A 1, pp. 119, 123–4, 146–8, 177.

25 [J. Leclerc], *Négociations secretes touchant la paix de Munster et d'Osnabrug* (Den Haag, 1725–26), i.243.

26 V. Kybal, I. della Rocchetta (eds.), *La nunziatura di Fabio Chigi (1640–1651)* (Rome, 1943), vol. 1, no. 49, p. 380.

27 See the account of this event in *APW* II A 1, no. 223, p. 340.

28 E. H. Kantorowicz, *The king's two bodies: a study in mediaeval political theology* (Princeton, 1957), pp. 76–7.

29 See D. Aznar, '"Un morceau de roi". La imagen del gobernador de provincial en la Francia barroca', in D. Aznar, G. Hanotin, and N. F. May (eds.), *À la place*

du roi: vice-rois, gouverneurs et ambassadeurs dans les monarchies française et espagnole (XVIe–XVIIIe siècle) (Madrid, 2014), p. 152; A. Cañeque, 'El simulacro del rey', in Aznar, Hanotin, May (eds.), *À la place du roi*, pp. 193–4.

30 See Hardy, Chapter 1, this volume.

31 A. Tischer, *Französische Diplomatie und Diplomaten auf dem Westfälischen Kongress: Außenpolitik unter Richelieu und Mazarin* (Münster, 1999), p. 100.

32 See N. F. May, 'Les querelles de titres: une vanité? L'attribution du titre d'Altesse au duc de Longueville lors des négociations de Münster: rang juridique et social', *RHD*, 123 (2009), 241–53.

33 See for example Institut de France, collection Godefroy, vol. 467, fo. 13r and Archives Nationales, Paris, serie O1 12, fo. 24r-v.

34 C. Bitsch, *Vie et carrière d'Henri II de Bourbon, prince de Condé (1588–1646): exemple de comportement et d'idées politiques au début du XVIIe siècle* (Paris, 2008), pp. 250–1.

35 See on this topic May, *Zwischen fürstlicher Repräsentation und adliger Statuspolitik*.

36 *APW* III C 3,1, p. 220.

37 See *APW* III C 2,1, pp. 389–40, and A. V. Hartmann, *Von Regensburg nach Hamburg: die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen dem französischen König und dem Kaiser vom Regensburger Vertrag (13. Oktober 1630) bis zum Hamburger Präliminarvertrag (25. Dezember 1641)* (Münster, 1998), pp. 290–7.

38 *APW* III C 3,1, p. 228.

39 *APW* II A 2, no. 186, p. 370.

40 K. Repgen, 'Wartenberg, Chigi und Knöringen im Jahre 1645: die Entstehung des Plans zum päpstlichen Protest gegen den Westfälischen Frieden als quellenkundliches und methodisches Problem', in K. Repgen, *Dreißigjähriger Krieg und Westfälischer Friede: Studien und Quellen, hg. von Franz Bosbach und Christoph Kampmann* (Paderborn, 1999), pp. 487–538.

41 *APW* II A 1, no. 229, p. 350. The formulation of 'society of princes' is from L. Bély, *La société des princes XVIe–XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1999).

42 See *APW* II A 1, no. 229, p. 353 and *APW* III C 2,1, pp. 112–13. The case is analysed in detail in May, *Zwischen fürstlicher Repräsentation und adliger Statuspolitik*. For a long term analysis, see A. Gotthard, *Säulen des Reiches: die Kurfürsten im frühneuzeitlichen Reichsverband* (Husum, 1999).

43 See *APW* II B 2, no. 28, pp. 97–8.

44 See G. Braun, 'Französisch und Italienisch als Sprachen der Diplomatie auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress', in A. Gerstenberg (ed.), *Verständigung und Diplomatie auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress: historische und sprachwissenschaftliche Zugänge* (Cologne, 2014), pp. 23–65, 59–60.

45 See *APW* III C 3, p. 57.

46 See H. von Thiessen, 'Diplomatie vom *type ancien*: Überlegungen zu einem Idealtypus des frühneuzeitlichen Gesandtschaftswesens', in H. von Thiessen and C. Windler (eds.), *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen: Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel* (Cologne, 2010), pp. 471–503.

47 Sternberg, 'Manipulating information in the Ancien Régime: ceremonial records, aristocratic strategies, and the limits of the state perspective', *JMH*, 85 (2013), 239–79.

48 See Do Paço, Chapter 9, this volume.

Part II

Familiarity, entertainment, and the roles of diplomatic actors

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5 Wondrous welcome

Materiality and the senses in diplomatic hospitality in sixteenth-century Genoa

Giulia Galastro

Introduction

When Jonathan Swift's hero Gulliver travelled to the grand academy of Lagado, he discovered a School of Languages, with three professors clamouring for an extreme form of material expression. They had

> a Scheme for entirely abolishing all Words whatsoever […] since Words are only Names for Things, it would be more convenient for all Men to carry about them such Things as were necessary to express the particular Business they are to discourse on.[1]

Swift clearly meant the members of the imaginary academy to be figures of fun: in order to have even simple conversations, they had to drag distended sacks of stuff around everywhere. The idea of communicating with things, though, is not a wholly ridiculous one, especially where dialogue takes place between interlocutors from different countries, as Swift goes on to acknowledge:

> Another great Advantage proposed by this Invention, was that it would serve as a Universal Language to be understood in all civilized Nations […] And thus Embassadors would be qualified to treat with foreign Princes or Ministers of State to whose Tongues they were utter Strangers.[2]

This chapter explores the idea of communication by non-verbal, sensory, and material means, of things as a *lingua franca* used between precisely the sort of diplomatic parties Swift imagined, in the early modern Italian republic of Genoa. Thing-speak might make quotidian conversation cumbersome, but it was curiously convenient in encounters with important international guests. The economic, sensory and symbolic significance of carefully chosen objects communicated messages to visitors who might not share a spoken language with their hosts. There were certain types of things—particularly textiles and scents—that could and indeed did transcend boundaries between European polities.

The language of things is not one which older diplomatic histories, such as Garrett Mattingly's canonical *Renaissance Diplomacy*, spoke. Mattingly saw the emergence of 'diplomacy in the modern style' as one of the supreme achievements of the Renaissance, and one which could only have come from the 'first purely secular states' in northern and central Italy.[3] The Republic of Genoa, which Mattingly called 'a commercial giant', was exactly the sort of state he had in mind.[4] Recent scholarship, however, has challenged Mattingly's model, showing that the development of diplomacy in the sixteenth century was intimately linked to cultural concerns.[5] An examination of Genoese diplomatic hospitality supports this: its organizers reached beyond the 'rational' to speak to the senses and the soul.

There is an increasing recognition of the importance of material culture in early modern society. Drawing on social anthropology, a multitude of studies on the classic trio of topics (housing, clothing, and food) have contributed much to our understanding of the details and texture of early modern life.[6] Indeed, following Richard Goldthwaite's description of Renaissance Italy as an 'empire of things', many have named acquisitiveness—or, as Renata Ago put it, a 'gusto for things'—as a defining characteristic of the period.[7] Recent studies have explored the impact of things on the diplomatic sphere, in particular objects of high status given as gifts.[8] The present chapter builds on this burgeoning body of scholarship by focussing on material things in early modern Genoa as a means of communication across the cultures that comingled there.

Genoa was a significant early modern commercial centre which Peter Burke described as the 'Cinderella of the Italian Renaissance'.[9] It was a relatively young republic, dating from 1528, when admiral Andrea Doria switched his allegiance from Francis I to Charles V. Whether his move 'liberated' Genoa from French oppression or made it a Habsburg lapdog, it remained, as Carlo Bitossi put it, 'A Republic in search of legitimation'.[10] One of the conditions of the relationship was that Genoa could have no resident ambassador save the Spanish one and the only permanent Genoese embassy was to Spain, a situation that continued until the 1620s. Thus dignitaries passing through the Republic presented crucial opportunities for Genoa to advance its position. Examining diplomatic hospitality reveals that it was a republic which sought validation via a politically sticky blend of monarchical metaphors and an international language of luxury.

This chapter will examine state hospitality by focussing on the visits to Genoa of three important personages. The Spanish Infante Philip, who passed through the Republic on his way to meet his father, the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, in 1548. The Valois princess Christine of Lorraine was the favourite granddaughter of Catherine de' Medici and the niece of Henri III of France. Following her proxy marriage to Grand duke Ferdinando I de' Medici in February 1589, she spent time in Genoa during April 1589 on her journey to her husband's court. Margaret of Austria's visit in 1599 was likewise part of a royal bride's progress to the court of her new husband: in

this case that of Philip III of Spain after the splendid occasion of her proxy marriage in Ferrara on 15 November 1598.[11]

The mechanics of hospitality

The English diplomat Henry Wotton famously called an ambassador 'an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country'. While much has been made of ambassadors 'lying' in the sense of telling lies, the more innocent option of the double meaning in Wotton's pun—lying as in lying on a bed—has been unjustly ignored.[12] This chapter seeks to redress the balance, for the bedrooms in which ambassadors and other important visitors (honest or otherwise) were sent to lie were the products of painstaking planning, in Genoa as elsewhere in the early modern world. Indeed, Wotton himself recognized this, and described a man's home as 'the theatre of his Hospitality, the seat of self-fruition', and accordingly deserving 'to be decently and delightfully adorned'.[13]

Hospitality, as Felicity Heal has eloquently demonstrated, was a fundamental early modern value, tracing its roots back to the gospels, which promised that 'not even a cup of cold water given in his name, shall [...] be left unrewarded'.[14] Many Genoese professed themselves eager to give much more than cups of cold water, especially to important foreign guests such as Count Scarampi, envoy of the duke of Mantua. The Republic promised to:

> provide for his every need so that he lacked for nothing, and offer him everything possible for his comfort and convenience [...] The Most Serene Senate hoped that he would deign to accept these attentions, and the furnished accommodation, on the basis that, though they might not be all that he deserved, they were at least presented with much love, and a prompt readiness to serve him.[15]

It is telling that 'quickness of spirit' in assenting to accommodate visitors was a common trope in Genoese accounts of their hospitality. The phrase points to the emotional labour involved, alongside the considerable physical and logistical effort.

As Wotton suggests, there was a link between being hospitable, and making a decorative effort for one's guest—putting together decent and delightful adornment. As Heal argued 'the social ritual of the great household, at its most effective when presented for a large audience, was a coded language, designed to articulate both power and magnanimity'.[16] In this 'coded language' of hospitality, textiles were a vital grammatical structure, speaking not just about the host and their household, but the whole of Genoa. The aim was to create a complete aesthetic scheme which cossetted the visitor after what were often long and arduous journeys, whilst also showing off the city and Genoese products (especially fabrics) to best advantage. As well as being a divinely-directed duty, being hospitable could also confer

considerable *contracambio*, or worldly rewards. To this end, cushions, curtains, and costume became important matters of state, with senators debating at length how to welcome and wow visitors.[17]

In the second half of the sixteenth century several important developments in Genoese hospitality occurred. The appointment of a designated master of ceremonies on an unofficial basis in the 1560s and as a salaried official from 1588 marked a shift in the organization of celebrations. Indeed, it may have been an instance of diplomatic hospitality (namely news of Christine of Lorraine's planned progress through Italy), which prompted the formalization of the appointment. Whatever its cause, this move signalled a sea-change in the recording of the ceremonies. Although this is a chapter on material things and the sensations they evoked, none of the objects involved survive: we only know of their existence through texts. For over twenty-five years father Geronimo Bordoni, Genoa's first master of ceremonies, diligently kept Genoa's first official book of ceremony, the *Libro Cerimoniale*. It is an invaluable source for examining diplomatic hospitality, as it records in detail

> everything which is done in the way of public ceremony, especially in the name of that which is the hosting and treatment of the Queen of Spain, the mother of the Queen, the Archdukes, the Princes and other personages of noted dignity, who come to this city.[18]

As Bordoni thus makes clear from the outset, chronicling state hospitality was the most important of his duties.

During this period, Genoa also produced the *Trattato delle cerimonie laiche* or *Treatise on lay ceremonies*. Dating from after 1570, it details, among other strictures, the correct precedence to follow when meeting princes and the dress that the Doge and the Senators should wear on such state occasions.[19] Whoever the author of the *Trattato* may have been, they were evidently a keen observer and chronicler of ceremonies in the city and elsewhere. Not only do they describe in detail events from decades before at which they were personally present, but much of the *Trattato* drew heavily (and unashamedly) on Venetian practice.[20] There are striking similarities in practice between Genoa and that other notable early modern Italian republic, Florence: the Florentine *Libro Cerimoniale* also shows a keen interest in foreign visits.[21] For both Genoa and Florence, these occasions appear as the zenith of ceremonial possibilities, and both cities increasingly streamlined and centralized their efforts towards putting on such spectacles during the latter half of the sixteenth century.[22]

Every aspect of this ceremonial hospitality was carefully calibrated to pay the visitor exactly as much respect as their status required. In theory, the material magnificence accorded a guest articulated his or her rank within the society of princes. The *Trattato* stipulated how far out of the city a delegation should venture to meet visiting dignitaries of different ranks, as well

as the composition of the welcoming party sent to greet them. It also stipulated the appropriate dress and accessories for such occasions, the colour, type and use of which varied depending on the status of the visitor. For instance the Doge was not to doff his biretta, his 'particular insignia', 'to any citizen or other lord, however great, either in public or in private'. This honour was exclusively reserved for 'natural princes [whose authority is] granted by their own laws', as opposed to those whose power was bestowed upon them by others, as the city wished to assert its autonomy and certainly did not wish to cede precedence to a power of inferior status. Even natural princes, however, might not always be accorded their full honour if they encountered the Doge 'while dressed *incognito*, or where their greatness might be or be presumed to be hidden'.[23] Clothing was constituent: if a prince did not dress according to his rank and chose to travel more anonymously, without ceremonial status (*incognito*) then he could not expect full ceremonies dues from the Doge or citizens of the republic.

Yet in Genoese hospitality, as at peace congresses or in ambassadorial audiences, ceremonial treatment was used to claim and negotiate, not merely articulate status. Difficulties arose when a visitor claimed to be of a higher rank than the Republic acknowledged. This was the case with two of Christine of Lorraine's relatives who accompanied her: Dorothée de Lorraine (1545–1621), 'Duchess' of Brunswick and 'Queen' Christina of Denmark (1521–1590), who prompted the author of the *Libro cerimoniale* to deliberate scathingly the difference between 'a real queen, who [...] resides in her kingdom in peaceful possession, and is considered as such by her people, and another who has never been the master of her state, neither been called a queen in her own dominion, like that of Denmark'.[24] With ceremonial protocols there could be quite a gap between neat strictures and messy realities that the master of ceremonies had to try to bridge.

Genoa also had a unique way of organizing accommodation for the visitors: the privilege and expense of housing important visitors was shared between the state and private citizens. Unlike monarchical regimes, with royal palaces designed with official hospitality in mind, the city of Genoa had no such obvious choice of building. In the first half of the sixteenth century, the Doria palace in the suburbs sometimes played host to important visitors.[25] From the 1570s onwards, however, the Republic used a unique ballot system—the so-called *Rolli*. Any noble with a suitably sizeable house could be selected at random. The winner of this lottery would then be responsible for accommodating the visitors.[26] For less eminent visitors the noble selected in the ballot might be expected to shoulder the hospitable responsibility single-handedly, but for important dignitaries, hospitality was very much a collaborative effort. The institution of the communal Wardrobe (*Guardaroba*) provided some of the textiles required; others were specially commissioned for the occasion; the rest were borrowed from other private citizens.[27] When the Spanish Infante Philip visited in the late 1540s, none of the grand palaces that would inspire Rubens had been built, but the second

half of the sixteenth century witnessed a considerable expansion in aristocratic palace building in the city.[28] This architectural evolution also made possible different modes of textile display, with enfilades of rooms whose furnishings complemented each other.

All the pomp might appear at odds with the efforts of the *Magistrato delle Pompe* (Genoese Sumptuary Magistracy) to restrict the consumption of just such ostentatious items as rich textiles, and, indeed, some contemporaries took issue with it. Andrea Spinola thought costly displays for foreign visitors were an immoral waste of the Republic's resources and that the Senate should provide modest accommodation for them at an inn, rather than lavishly furnishing private palaces for their use.[29] Spinola's views are consonant with the tone of Genoese sumptuary legislation. Yet the opposite position—that sumptuous display was not only permissible but necessary for the Republic's reputation—was the official one. It might seem paradoxical that private people were discouraged from ostentatious dress for their own purposes, but on state occasions, such as visits from foreign princes, dressing opulently was seen almost as a duty and chroniclers praised, rather than chastised, aristocratic spectators for their rich attire.

Spectacles for the senses: Genoese hospitality from sea to land

Genoa was one of the most important ports in the Mediterranean. Cradled between harbour and hills, the city was spectacular, especially when approached by sea—as seventeenth-century traveller Richard Lassels admiringly observed: 'It stands upon the side of a hill, and riseing by degrees, appears to those that upon it from the Sea, like an *Amphitheater*.'[30] This natural arena was the city's largest open space and its narrow streets provided few opportunities for the large-scale spectacles that other cities could stage. Those tasked with stage-managing state hospitality therefore made the most of this backdrop, and focussed much of their energies on the liminal space between land and sea. This was a long-standing practice, which had been used, for example, for the triumphal entry of Louis XII of France in 1502.[31] It perhaps reached its highpoint in an enormous floating 'piazza', built over several boats lashed together, the base of which was covered in painted canvases to make it look like a building and which was 'manipulated with much majesty by underwater cords' to celebrate the arrival of Christine of Lorraine.[32] All three visitors arrived in Genoa by sea. Sumptuous piazzas such as this materially demarcated their arrival in Genoa's political heartland, just as the arrival of a dignitary at the boundary of early modern cities would have been symbolically indicated.[33]

For Philip's visit in the winter of 1548, the organizers had gone to great efforts to construct a magnificent 'contrivance in the shape of a bridge, built on some boats and covered with rich rugs'.[34] An anonymous contemporary account of Philip's visit actually describes three bridges

> of almost a mile in length, which went all the way to the palace of the Lord Prince d'Oria [...] his Excellency dismounted on the middle one, which was made in the form of a pergola, and covered with the finest cloth, with large, prominent crystal windows, & the floor was covered with woollen cloth.[35]

Both descriptions emphasize the woollen floor covering. Similarly, Christine's piazza was covered in red cloth and came complete with velvet-wrapped chairs for the queen and her ladies.[36] Waterborne structures were often cushioned by tactile textiles: soft fabric underfoot made the structures soothing as well as spectacular, easing the visitor's first footsteps on Genoese territory. Attention to tactile details (on the part of both the organizers and the chroniclers) underlines the fact that these were multi-sensory extravaganzas, the impact of which went beyond the purely visual.

Many visitors were also greeted with a celebratory sonic assault. Specially commissioned music played and artillery salvoes rang out, leaving smoke so thick 'that one could scarcely make out the city and the mountains'.[37] At the end of his visit, Philip re-boarded his ship to the sound of 'the music of many instruments' and artillery fire.[38] As the galley bearing Christine of Lorraine approached, cannon shots sounded alongside a march played on drums and trumpets; as she drew closer to the bobbing 'piazza' where she was to disembark, 'all the artillery that was in the port' fired, and a specially-composed fanfare for fifes, cornets and trombones added to the soundscape.[39] A 'concert of soft melody' from string and wind instruments accompanied the passage of Margaret of Austria, Queen of Spain, through Genoa too.[40]

For all the careful orchestration of sensory delights and material marvels it was almost impossible to control every aspect of the visits. Natural elements such as the sea and the weather could ruin even the most careful plans. Arriving in the depths of winter, Philip was unable to disembark directly onto the bridge as planned due to rough seas.[41] Bad weather delayed the arrival of both Christine and Margaret in Genoa. This was a common problem: the unpredictability of sea travel meant it was never certain when guests might arrive, or indeed when they might be able to leave. Scheduling the completion of preparations for a visitor then became a tricky business. Prince Philip, for example, appears to have arrived earlier than anticipated and was politely asked not to leave the palace for eleven days while the decorative scheme for his arrival was hastily completed.[42] Knowing when to erect such temporary decorations was a perpetual problem: in the winter especially they could not go up too far in advance without risking becoming bedraggled, embarrassing the Republic rather than glorifying it. Large structures also obstructed Genoa's narrow streets, which did not easily accommodate such displays.

Waterborne displays, then, while certainly making the most of Genoa's splendid setting, were also partly born out of necessity. The narrowness of Genoa's medieval streets left few spaces suited to spectacle. Indeed on

occasion the city had to demolish buildings in order to create suitable vistas for their triumphal arches.[43] Where other cities could accommodate pitched sea-battles in flooded piazzas, Genoa barely had space for spectators—the hordes of people keen to observe visiting celebrities. For Charles V's entry to Genoa in 1529, they were banned from the streets and confined to windows and doorways to make his passage through the narrow Genoese *caruggi* easier.[44] No such measures were taken for Margaret's visit, when 'there were so many carriages and coaches […] in the narrow streets, and a huge crowd on all sides' that it took the Doge more than two hours to get through the throng to greet her.[45]

Hospitable textiles

The lack of suitable outdoor space within the city meant that once the visitors had landed, hospitable display was channelled onto the dress of those welcoming them as well as, increasingly, into interior spaces. Textiles therefore featured prominently in state hospitality. Genoa was internationally famous for its rich silk fabrics, velvet in particular. The city used these prized textiles as part of their symbolic capital: they adorned the bodies of the officials in the solemn welcome parties and distinguished between spectators and attendants. Costly cloth was also used extensively to decorate the interior spaces where the visitors would be lodged. These textiles appealed to the senses of sight and touch, but also communicated their high monetary value across cultures.

For Margaret's visit the city commissioned furnishings in gold brocade for four rooms of her lodging, while further rooms complete with beds, tables, chairs, benches, and canopies were furnished from the city Wardrobe and loans from the citizens.[46] During Christine's visit, Genoa's fine fabrics once again took centre stage. Giovanni Battista Doria's Palazzo was appointed as her residence 'as there is no house more comfortable, nor bigger'.[47] Doria assembled

> a most beautiful room, with a bed and a little table covered in velvet and crimson damask decorated from top to bottom with much embroidery with gold fringes, both very charming and beautiful […] In the rest of his house cloth of velvet and silk (belonging to him and to others) were everywhere, and it was so well equipped with beds, little tables, chairs, cushions, paintings, decorations above doors, and so sweetly scented that it could have housed a any great king, let alone a less important prince.[48]

The interior magnificence did not stop there: Christine was appointed two further rooms with canopied beds, one 'in gold and silver brocade, and the other in green silk woven with gold, and green damasks and a canopy of more cloth of gold, with some very charming roses on top', as well as a

luxurious crimson velvet chaise carried by velvet-clad porters.[49] There was a clear desire to coordinate textiles across different surfaces, internal and external, animate and inanimate. The porters, 'shaved like slaves, all very tall and of good proportions', were treated impersonally, as human bearers of material culture.[50]

One of the first sights all visitors saw upon arrival in Genoa was a cluster of men in official dress, gathered to welcome them. Questions of precedence were carefully weighed up, as the *Libro Cerimoniale* reveals: distinctions in the colour of the robes worn, and the number and composition of the welcome party all denoted different degrees of deference due to the incomer and were just as important as spatial markers of status such as how far out of the city the welcoming party ventured to meet their guests.[51] For instance, whether the Doge wore a gold, silver, crimson, scarlet, or violet dress depended upon the occasion and the status of the visitor. The form and colour of his biretta also differed according to the occasion, with a special gold one to be worn with a golden mantle, and a red one to accompany a red or violet mantle.[52] Genoa, then, used a sartorial language of colour and fabric to articulate the honour it accorded its visitors.

The *Trattato* sketched out an ancient lineage for Genoese ceremonial dress, claiming a pedigree which stretched back to ancient Greece and Rome via modern-day Venice and the Papal states and placed Genoa on an equal footing with these last two.[53] The aim was for state garments to appear inevitable, rather than innovative, and to justify Genoa's status and prestige by virtue of continuity and tradition. During princely visits, the heavy textiles used to make the Doge's robes and senatorial gowns were part of a continuum with the fabrics used to decorate the city—they tended to be of the same weight and quality as those used in furnishings. Official dress was not restricted to humans. For the arrival of Margaret, a mule was gloriously caparisoned in crimson velvet, and golden metalwork; the Doge's dress (a red robe with a gold-garnished hat) was described as similar to the mule, rather than the other way around, suggesting once more that the fabrics were envisioned as part of a broader, coordinated material communication.[54]

The master of ceremonies also appointed what was in effect an aristocratic chorus. Its members had small but significant parts to play in proceedings, and were generally depicted as a homogeneous unit rather than a collection of individuals. For example, 'four gentlewomen Matrons' were employed to 'look after the young gentlewomen' accompanying Margaret.[55] The clothing of decorative noblewomen such as these is repeatedly and approvingly mentioned by several different accounts of these visits. They would have shown off current fashions in contrast to the stately permanence of official dress. This decorative role was not restricted to women. Philip was met at Savona 'by twelve Genoese ambassadors, all men of great valour, accompanied by one hundred and fifty young Genoese gentlemen, all very lavishly attired with gold and silver embroidery, and beautiful hats and feathers on

their heads, with superb sword hilts'.[56] Both male and female fashions were on display. Once in the city, Philip was entertained while 'benches full of opulently and beautifully adorned gentlewomen' watched on. Spectators evidently dressed spectacularly and the nobility effectively became human decoration. Alongside the current fashions on display Philip was treated to allegorical allusions to past glories, in the form of classical costumes for 'a further sixty gentlewomen dressed as Roman matrons, with their heads and clothes laden with jewels in the ancient Roman style, interspersed with brides who left their golden locks loose on their shoulders at the back, after the fashion of the noble brides of Genoa who came to see the new Alexander the Great.[57] As with the dress of officials, these historical costumes implied a lineage for what was in fact a relatively new republic. They legitimized the state by seeming to root it in the classical past.

The decorative chorus could be employed for more than visual impact. A contingent of twenty-five of 'the most fragrant and rich gentlemen of the city' were ordered to wait on Christine daily, 'to whom was granted the right to wear swords, gold, jewels, and other clothes forbidden by sumptuary laws'.[58] This posse of sweetly-scented swains is not the only instance of olfactory opulence bestowed upon Christine. As has been seen, her bedroom was described as 'so fragrant, that it could have housed a great King, let alone a less important prince'.[59] Genoa appealed to all of the senses when trying to impress their guests. In the intimate spaces in which guests were housed, and the human props who attended them during their visits, sweet perfumes complemented the luxurious fabrics which provided visual and tactile experiences. At visitors' welcome and farewell entertainments, the city's military might was underscored by the smell of the artillery salvoes loosed in the guests' honour.

Liberal use of Genoa's most lucrative export—luxury fabric—in decorative schemes for VIP visitors can be seen as a sort of product placement. This advert worked particularly well on Christine of Lorraine, who indulged in some textile tourism, going on a fabric shopping expedition with her female companions 'in a sedan chair, with her face covered, accompanied by other local noblewomen (with no male company), buying velvet and other silk fabrics from the Tuscans, showing her liberality, and the delight she took in the city'.[60] Cloth was a particularly prized Genoese product—and she was headed for Florence, which had plenty of fine fabrics of its own. It reinforces the renown of Genoese velvet.

'*Qualche segno di buon contracambio*': 'some sign of reciprocal exchange'

Genoa hoped to advance its position, and to show itself to be more than just a vassal state of Spain, by demonstrating the classical virtue of liberality. Its hospitality should thus be seen as an instance of what Glenn Richardson succinctly termed 'competitive magnificence'.[61] For example, the year

of Philip's visit, 1548, was an important moment for Genoa. The republic had just narrowly avoided a civil war when, in the previous year, Gian Luigi Fieschi and his brothers had conspired to oust Andrea Doria and his allies from power. This had forced Doria to tweak election procedures to important political offices, which gave the pro-Habsburg elites control of politics.[62] Thus the Habsburg prince's visit came at a critical time, when shoring up relations with the Spanish was a political priority. The lengths Genoa went to for Philip make sense in this context. The visits might be important for domestic reasons too—Christine of Lorraine's visit, coming at the end of a particularly arduous winter, is explicitly recorded as producing 'public gladness'.[63]

The aims of diplomatic hospitality stretched further, however. As Christine of Lorraine took her departure, she thanked her hosts and promised to tell her husband the Grand duke of her excellent reception, in the hope of being able to show 'some sign of reciprocal exchange'.[64] Christine's vague promise of 'doing something nice in return' should be seen in the context of what Catherine Fletcher has described as a 'circular system of reciprocity in which every court (or republic) was expected to give appropriately, even if the return might not be direct or immediate'.[65] Through lavish hospitality Genoa sought to gain important friends whose friendships and intercessions might prove crucial in the future.

But what did 'some sign of reciprocal exchange' mean in practice? Sometimes, the object of all this hospitable attention did not repay it in quite the way the hosts had hoped. At the end of the entry for Christine's visit, the *Libro Cerimoniale* records the final flurry of salvoes, 'such as had never been fired for other princesses', which accompanied her departure. It then continues with undisguised disgruntlement that:

> all this despite the fact that neither at the sacred places nor in the palace had she left anything approaching a token of appreciation, but instead left a mere 600 *scudi* at Signor Gio. Battista's house to be distributed among his whole household

while the generals of the galleys only received a necklace apiece worth one thousand scudi. All of which was 'in stark contrast to the usual generosity of the French'.[66]

Christine's charisma and evident appreciation of the city were not enough. Like an irritated waiter pocketing a stingy tip, the record implies that, in this case at least, payment rather than promises was in order. Clearly cold hard cash as well as any more symbolic sort of gift exchange was expected: a concrete *contracambio*, especially after the unusually lavish provisions made for Christine. Bordoni, master of ceremonies, seems personally as well as professionally disappointed. A few months after Christine's ignominious departure, however, Bordoni received a more satisfactory recompense for his efforts: Cardinal de Joyeuse, leaving after a three month stay in Genoa, sent

him 'a beautiful silver cup, gilded and engraved, worth around 80 scudi', which the Cardinal wanted him to 'accept and enjoy' as it was given 'as a token [of gratitude] for the service I had done for him from the time when I sent him confectionary [onwards]'.[67] The Cardinal complied with the expectation that visitors would display their gratitude for the hospitality they had received through remuneration.

Beyond the senses

The organizers and recipients of Genoese state hospitality shared a common, transnational understanding of the splendid—but also of the sacred. Indeed, the two were often combined. As shall be seen, the multi-sensory sumptuousness that Genoese diplomatic hospitality involved also stretched to the sacred spaces which often formed part of a visitor's tour. Despite Mattingly's distinction between early modern diplomats from 'purely secular' states, and medieval ones who 'had no common name for themselves except Christians',[68] religious ceremonies and entertainments continued to play a strong role in early modern diplomacy. In Milan, for instance, diplomatic visitors were often taken to the cathedral and relics were processed with the visiting Danish king during his ceremonial entrance into the city.[69]

Sacred sites and objects were integrated into Genoese hospitality. Charles V worshipped in Genoa's Cathedral and paid homage to the relics held there in 1533.[70] Seeing the sacred sights was an integral part of both Christine and Margaret's stays in the city. Both women were in mourning at the time of their visits, so perhaps it was felt that activities provided for them should be sober rather than frivolous. Moreover the master of ceremonies was a priest, so ecclesiastical entertainment may well have been his area of expertise. In church, as outside it, material things and sensory experiences spoke to visitors across borders, referencing the shared languages of luxury and Christian idiom.

For Margaret, who was described as keener on 'devotions, and sanctuaries, than on all other pleasures', the cathedral was decked out with 'the greatest splendour and beauty possible'. The city used textiles associated with the most important moment of the liturgical calendar, decorating the cathedral with 'those velvets and gold brocades which are used for the Sepulchre in Holy Week, both sides of the choir and the columns, with two canopies […] the whole choir was […] completely covered in carpets'. Meanwhile the colours used reflected Magarathe's queenly status, for 'more than half of the church was decorated with red damask'. Within this decorative schema furniture lavishly decorated with rich textiles articulated status within Margarathe's entourage: 'under the canopy on the right was a bench to kneel on, covered with a layer of brocade and velvet, with two small women's chairs for kneeling, where her Majesty and her mother were'. Ritual canopies or baldaccini were widely used to articulate royalty, while the fabric-covered benches provided sensory stimulation.

Meanwhile, 'under the other [canopy] was the Archduke, with a similar, smaller kneeler, fitted out with six other velvet cushions, to give to those great Ladies, to lift them up', marking the lower status of these members of the party who were attending Mass.[71]

Christine of Lorraine asked to hear mass in the cathedral of San Lorenzo, and was particularly interested to see the *sacro catino*—a glittering green basin supposedly made of emerald, and believed to have been used by Jesus at the Last Supper. For her visit too, the church was arrayed in glorious fabric: a faldstool in crimson velvet, four cushions of gold brocade for Christine and her aunt, and red velvet cushions for the other important personages. Against a backdrop of organ music, the *catino* was reverentially brought out of the sacristy for her admiration. Christine was allowed not only to look at the precious object, but to hold it: the *Libro Cerimoniale* uses the word *palpare*—to explore and examine by touch, to stroke, to caress. Similarly, she both 'kissed with much devotion' a piece of the true cross, and 'touched it with both of her eyes', demonstrating her piety and respect for the sacred relics. It is striking that it is this intimate touching which elevated her from commoners. The Genoese citizens were afforded a brief glimpse of their own city's treasure, which apparently they had not seen for many years whereas Christine, a privileged outsider, was allowed to touch them. In contrast to the Platonic and Aristotelian elevation of sight as the noblest of the senses, and the disparaging view of the baseness of touch, it is touch that marked Christine out as special: even her gaze 'touches'.[72]

Conclusion

At her departure from Genoa, Christine spoke to the assembled company 'in French, saying that the favours and honours paid to her had been many, and the accommodation had been prepared so beautifully, that she felt treated like more than a queen'.[73] Her response reminds us about spoken language differences while also pointing to the shared, transnational language of courtesy and comfort. As we have seen, this language could also draw on Christian tropes and monarchical metaphors to assert Genoa's position within the world of princes. Therefore, the hospitality of republics could also draw upon the dramatic language of monarchies to do so.

Maria Ines Aliverti has argued that Genoa was worried about being left out of the 'society of princes'.[74] Republics were still slightly alien entities in the arena of early modern diplomacy. They had to assert their position through cultural, as much as political means, as Kunčević's study of Ragusa suggests.[75] The Republic of Genoa was a fairly recent and fragile creation that stitched together its authority with antiquity of questionable authenticity, and clad itself in customs borrowed from elsewhere. Events of diplomatic hospitality represented the apex of this self-fabrication. They were the means by which it articulated its identity both to its own citizens and to important outsiders. Poaching princely tropes, however, need not be proof

of an inferiority complex; pulling a monarchical mantle about itself was a savvy manoeuvre. There is, of course, an inherent tension in the idea of a 'regal republic', and a fact which was not lost on contemporaries.

Diplomatic hospitality can be seen as a form of collective self-fashioning. Richard Lassels, writing in the next century, praised the magnificence of Genoa: 'If ever I saw a Town with its Holy-day clothes alwayes on, it was *Genua*'.[76] Yet he also derided the collaborative aspect of Genoese hospitality by relating a story about the Queen of Spain (presumably Margaret of Austria) who 'passed from *Germany* into *Spain*, by the way of *Milan* and *Genoa*.' The Governor of Milan snobbishly forewarned her 'that she should see in *d'Oria*'s Pallace here many fine things, but all borrowed of the Townsmen'. Doria, having heard of the governor's comment, 'caused to be written over the great *Gates* of the *Pallace*, where the *Queen* was to enter and lodge, these words in *Spainish*, *By the Grace of God, and the King's favour, theres nothing here borrowed*'.[77] This anecdote certainly does not find echo in the *Libro Cerimoniale*, in which 'borrowing' does not carry negative or shameful connotations. Rather it articulates the provision of lavish textiles and furniture as a duty to the republic.[78] Most of the urban elites participated in some way. The decoration of the cathedral for Margarathe's visit, for instance, was done 'unimpeded by anyone in the city'.[79]

Indeed, the impressive displays of textiles relied on the citizens attending the spectacles in their own fine clothes. Although they were diplomatic events with international significance, diplomatic ceremonies could also have an important domestic impact on the fractured and fractious patriciate, as well as on the population at large who participated in and were cheered by the festivities. The chasm we carve today between cloth and clothing is not one that existed in the early modern period. Instead, these Genoese examples reveal a cloth–clothing continuum which produced a unified impression, a sense of continuity between, say, a stately set of bed-curtains and a stately senator enveloped in a similar fabric. The entire effect was orchestrated by the same people, and recorded for posterity in the same place, the *Libro Cerimoniale*. The aim was not to create something new and distinctively Genoese, but was instead, by cobbling together bits of existing ceremonies elsewhere, attempting to give the impression of something old-established: of inevitability, rather than innovation. Hospitality and ceremony helped republics and city states to negotiate their status in international society, not only in their execution, but also in their recording. Richard Trexler has suggested that Florence kept its book of ceremonies partly so that the republic would have a store of precedents which it could use to decide how to treat future visitors, but also because the act of recording added to the city's prestige.[80] Genoa's *Libro Cerimoniale* performed a similar function.

Diplomatic hospitality allows us to approach the image that Genoa sought to project to outsiders: a self-fabrication that involved a great deal of fabric. Costly cloth communicated across cultures. Though visitor and host may not have been able to converse without an interpreter, may indeed have been

'utter strangers' to each other's tongues, as Swift put it, both could 'read' the lustre on a piece of fine satin, could feel the perfect plush of velvet. Joseph Nye famously described the value of the 'soft power' of a country's culture.[81] As the Genoese Republic sought to advance its position by spectacular hospitality, perhaps the tactile silk damasks and velvets which it deployed to do so can be seen as 'the power of soft'.

Notes

1 J. Swift, *Gulliver's travels* (London, 1826), p. 46.
2 Ibid., pp. 47–8.
3 G. Mattingly, *Renaissance diplomacy* (London, 1955).
4 For details of Genoese economic supremacy at the time, see F. Braudel, *Perspectives of the world, civilization and capitalism, 15th–18th centuries*, vol. 3, trans. Sian Reynolds (Berkeley, 1984), pp. 157–74.
5 See for example D. Frigo (ed.), *Politics and diplomacy in early modern Italy: the structure of diplomatic practice, 1450–1800* (Cambridge, 1999); C. Fletcher, *Diplomacy in Renaissance Rome: the rise of the resident ambassador* (Cambridge, 2015).
6 See for example T. Hamling and C. Richardson (eds.), *Everyday objects: medieval and early modern material culture and its meanings* (Farnham, 2010); P. Findlen (ed.), *Early modern things* (New York, 2013).
7 R. Goldthwaite, 'The empire of things: consumer demand in Renaissance Italy', in F. Kent and P. Simons (eds.), *Patronage art and society in Renaissance Italy* (Oxford, 1987); R. Ago, *Gusto for things* (Chicago; London, 2013).
8 For example, F. Heal, *The power of gifts: gift-exchange in early modern England* (Oxford, 2014), pp. 149–79.
9 P. Burke, *Varieties of cultural history* (Oxford, 1997), p. 112. On Genoa's role as an important Mediterranean centre see T. A. Kirk, *Genoa and the sea: power and politics in an early modern maritime republic, 1559–1684* (London, 2005); C. Dauverd, *Imperial ambition in the early modern Mediterranean: Genoese merchants and the Spanish crown* (Cambridge, 2015).
10 C. Bitossi, 'A republic in search of legitimation', in J. R. Mulryne, H. Watanabe-O'Kelly, and M. Shewring (eds.), *Europa triumphans: court and civic festivals in early modern Europe*, 2 vols. (Aldershot, 2004), i.236–41.
11 This was in fact a double Habsburg marriage: Philip's sister Isabella married Albrecht, archduke of Austria.
12 This is perhaps because it is the one lost in Wotton's Latin version of the witticism ('*Legatus est vir bonus peregrè missus ad mentiendum Reipublicae causâ*'). See J. Bate, 'The Elizabethans in Italy', in J.-P. Maquerlot and M. Willems (eds.), *Travel and drama in Shakespeare's time* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 59.
13 H. Wotton, *The elements of architecture* (London, 1624), p. 82.
14 F. Heal, *Hospitality in early modern England* (Oxford, 1990), p. 6.
15 Archivio di Stato di Genova, Archivio Segreto 474, *Libro Cerimoniale Primo* (1588–1613) [*LCP*], fo. 51v.
16 Heal, *Hospitality*, p. 7.
17 *LCP*, fos. 24v-28v.
18 Ibid., fo. 1r.
19 For the date of the text see L. Volpicella, 'I libri dei cerimoniali della Repubblica di Genova', *Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria*, 49.2 (1921), 7.
20 On the Venetian influence, see for example the *Trattato delle Cerimonie Laiche Appartenenti alla Signoria di Genova*, transcribed in Volpicella, 'I Libri dei Cerimoniali', 104–5. Hereafter *TCL*.

21 R. C. Trexler (ed.), *The Libro Cerimoniale of the Florentine republic* (Geneva, 1978).
22 J. M. Saslow, *The Medici wedding of 1589: Florentine festival as theatrum mundi* (New Haven, 1996), p. 16.
23 *TCL*, 104, 108.
24 *LCP*, fo. 38v.
25 G. L. Gorse, 'An unpublished description of the Villa Doria in Genoa during Charles V's entry, 1533', *The Art Bulletin*, 68 (1986), 319–22.
26 G. L. Gorse, 'A classical stage for the old nobility: the Strada Nuova and sixteenth-century Genoa', *The Art Bulletin*, 79 (1997), 301.
27 For instance the opulent carpet that Francesco Fiesco lent for the visit of the Spanish cardinal Mendoza in 1588: *LCP*, fo. 27r.
28 E. Poleggi, *Strada nuova: una lottizzazione del Cinquecento a Genova* (Genova, 1972).
29 Bitossi, 'Republic in search of legitimation', p. 239.
30 R. Lassels, *Voyage or complete journey through Italy* (Paris, 1670), p. 83.
31 J. Auton, *Chroniques de Jean d'Auton*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1834–1835), iii.329–46.
32 *Ordinanza di tutto quello che si preparò per ricevere Madama Christierna Duchessa di Lorena* […] 1589, translated in Mulryne, Watanabe-O'Kelley, and Shrewing (eds.), *Europa triumphans*, i.301. Hereafter *Ordinanza*.
33 See for example J. Duindam, 'Palace, city, dominions: the spatial dimensions of Habsburg rule', in M. Fantoni, G. Gorse, and M. R. Smuts (eds.), *The politics of space: European courts c.1500–1700* (Rome, 2009), pp. 59–90.
34 J. C. Calvete de Estrella, *El felicissimo viaje d'el muy alto y muy poderoso Principe Don Phelippe*, translated in Mulryne, Watanabe-O'Kelley, Shrewing (eds.), *Europa triumphans*, i.281. All references are to this edition. Hereafter *EFV*.
35 *La partita da Barcellona dello illustrissimo principe & signore* (Rome, 1548), p. 3.
36 *Ordinanza*, p. 301.
37 *EFV*, p. 281.
38 *La partita*, p. 2.
39 *Ordinanza*, p. 301.
40 *LCP*, fos. 212r-213r.
41 *EFV*, p. 281.
42 Ibid., p. 289.
43 Nuti, L., 'The city and its image', in J. R. Mulryne, H. Watanabe-O'Kelly, and M. Shewring (eds.), *Europa triumphans: court and civic festivals in early modern Europe*, 2 vols. (Aldershot, 2004), i.243.
44 Ibid., i. 245.
45 *LCP*, fo. 213r-v.
46 Ibid., fo. 212r-v.
47 *Inventione di Giulio Pallavicino di scriver tutte le cose accadute alli tempi suoi (1583–1589)*, ed. E. Grendi (Genoa, 1974), p. 216.
48 *LCP*, fo. 41v.
49 Ibid., fo. 42r.
50 Ibid.
51 *TCL*, pp. 53–5.
52 Ibid., p. 104.
53 Ibid., p. 102.
54 *LCP*, fo. 213r.
55 Ibid., fo. 212r.
56 *La partita*, πiir.
57 Ibid., p. 4.
58 *LCP*, fo. 44v.

59 Ibid., fo. 41v.
60 Ibid., fo. 47r.
61 G. J. Richardson, 'Anglo-French political and cultural relations during the reign of Henry VIII', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London (1995), 312.
62 Bitossi, 'Republic in search of legitimation', p. 238.
63 *LCP*, fo. 43r.
64 Ibid., fo. 46v.
65 Fletcher, *Diplomacy in Renaissance Rome*, p. 154.
66 *LCP*, fo. 47v.
67 Quoted in Volpicella, 'I libri dei cerimoniali', 18.
68 Mattingly, *Renaissance diplomacy*, pp. 10, 16.
69 G. Lubkin, 'Strategic hospitality: foreign dignitaries at the court of Milan, 1466–1476', *IHR*, 8 (1986), 184–7.
70 Gorse, 'Unpublished description', 320.
71 *LCP*, fo. 214r.
72 Ibid., fo. 45v.
73 Ibid., fo. 45v.
74 M. I. Aliverti, 'Visits to Genoa: the printed sources', in Mulryne, Watanabe-O'Kelley, and Shrewing (eds.), *Europa triumphans*, i.239.
75 See Kunčević, Chapter 3, this volume, pp. 65–75.
76 Lassels, *Voyage*, p. 83.
77 Ibid., p. 93.
78 *LCP*, fos. 41v, 212r.
79 Ibid., fo. 214v.
80 Trexler (ed.), *The libro cerimoniale*, p. 11.
81 J. S. Nye, *Soft power: the means to success in world politics* (New York, 2004).

6 Sincerity, sterility, scandal

Eroticizing diplomacy in early seventeenth-century opera librettos at the French embassy in Rome

Katharina N. Piechocki

Introduction

Opera and diplomacy are rarely associated, and yet the emergence of opera as a new courtly genre in early seventeenth-century Italy cannot be adequately understood without the concomitant spread of diplomatic activity across Europe. As recent scholarship on the relation between music and diplomacy has shown, musically and theatrically staged ceremonial and courtly festivities have marked diplomatic events since the sixteenth century—from Italy to France and from Germany to Muscovy.[1] The power of music has been experienced, in early modern Europe, 'as both a metaphor for and a practice of international relations'.[2] Rather than a universal and apolitical experience, musical events, and opera in particular, have often taken on a specific political form and function depending on the context—often diplomatic in nature—in which they were performed.

One of the most powerful uses of music as a means of intercultural and diplomatic negotiation in early modern Europe was the creation of opera. Early opera allowed for the political message to be conveyed through the combined power of music, words, and performance. In the course of the seventeenth century, opera emerged as a musical, poetic, and theatrical strategy of intercultural diplomacy across the globe, from Europe to Asia and to the New World.[3] Perhaps this is not surprising: after all, the Greek etymology of the word 'diplomacy' and 'diploma'—with the meaning of 'double or duplicate'—encapsulates the closeness between the art of political negotiation and the art of theatrical performance.[4] From the first years of the seventeenth century, opera became a fruitful fulcrum in which the entangled arts of political, theatrical, and musical performance were orchestrated as effective and powerful courtly events.

The very first operas, *Euridice* (libretto by Ottavio Rinuccini, music by Jacopo Peri and Giulio Caccini) and *Il Rapimento di Cefalo* (libretto by Gabriello Chiabrera, music mostly by Giulio Caccini), were performed in the Florentine Pitti Palace and the Uffizi Palace, respectively, to celebrate the marriage between French king Henri IV and Maria de' Medici in 1600.[5] Before opera became more accessible to a larger audience with the opening

of public opera houses in Venice in 1637, opera performances were typically courtly celebrations geared toward a selected aristocratic audience—which could be large in number[6]—with the scope to mark specific diplomatic occasions such as births, marriages, and princely visits.[7] While *Euridice* and *Il Rapimento di Cefalo* celebrate marriage as a dynastic event, a less-known Roman opera from 1638 powerfully showcases the impact of a monarch's birth, future French king Louis XIV, for dynastic continuation as well as international diplomacy: *La Sincerità trionfante overo l'erculeo ardire* [Sincerity Triumphant or the Herculean Courage] by librettist Ottaviano Castelli (Spoleto, ?1602–1603, Rome, 1642) and composer Angelo Cecchini is a unique example of a court opera that highlights the diplomatic relations between Rome and Paris against the backdrop of a long-awaited princely birth.[8]

Following and extending Timothy Hampton's notion of 'diplomatic poetics'[9] to opera, this chapter will consider Castelli's libretto as a unique example of 'operatic poetics', which frames the rise of opera as a diplomatic genre in early seventeenth century. Created to celebrate the birth of the French Dauphin after more than twenty years of his parents', Louis XIII and Anne of Austria's, childless marriage, *La Sincerità trionfante* illustrates the intimate relationship between opera and diplomacy particularly powerfully. The opera marks not only a happy, but also a politically sensitive moment. It was performed in Italian on 23 November 1638 at the Palazzo del Ceuli in Rome,[10] the residence of François Annibal maréchal d'Estrées, marquis de Cœuvres,[11] who served, as the libretto's frontispiece indicates, as the 'Extraordinary Ambassador of His Most Christian Majesty [Louis III] to his Holiness our Pope Urban VIII'.[12]

According to the contemporary diplomatic report in the Roman 'Avvisi',

> a beautiful comedy composed in music on the occasion of the birth of the *Dauphin* of France was recited in the *Palazzo* of the very Christian Ambassador, Marshal of Couvres. It succeeded wonderfully for its changes of scenes, *intermedii* and rich costumes. It lasted four hours.[13]

La Sincerità trionfante was part of a larger cycle of festivities, hosted by the French ambassador and sponsored by the Barberini family, in particular Pope Urban VIII's nephew, Cardinal Antonio.[14] It included sumptuous allegorical machines and 6000 fireworks over the Tiber created by the renowned sculptor Gianlorenzo Bernini.[15] Louis XIII honoured Castelli, who already bore the prestigious diplomatic title of 'Master of the Posts of the King [Louis XIII]' [Maestro delle Poste del Re (Luigi XIII)],[16] with 'a gold medallion estimated at 200 *doppie* and the rank of "gentleman" in perpetuity'[17] for his literary—and diplomatic—work.

Written and performed to celebrate the continuation of the Bourbon dynasty, *La Sincerità trionfante* is as much a diplomatic intervention as it is an operatic innovation.[18] The opera is inextricably tied to the contemporary

political context, and the French–Italian diplomatic relations, in particular. The lengthy libretto unfolds over 194 pages and is preceded, in its second edition, by a complex paratextual apparatus that includes, among others, a series of encomiastic epigrams by (libertine) philosophers, politicians, poets, and scholars—including Gabriel Naudé, Pietro della Valle, Ibrāhīm al-Ḥāqilānī, Leo Allatius, and Loreto Vittori—honouring the French Dauphin as well as the librettist, Castelli. A careful reading of the libretto and the paratexts reveals that beyond the celebratory textual veil lies the diplomatically sensitive fear about the royal couple's potential sterility.

The discussion of Castelli's operatic poetics that follows focusses on three articulations of diplomacy inscribed in the libretto. First, the librettist's introduction of the allegorical figures of Sincerity and Simulation—who intervene not only as a poetic, but also as a diplomatic device—showcases the necessity of simulation and dissimulation in both theatrical and diplomatic discourse. As Timothy Hampton has pointed out, 'diplomacy itself is understood by legal theorists to depend on a "legal fiction" [...] This "fiction" consists, not in falsifying truth, but in provisionally "taking the false for the true"'.[19] By introducing Sincerity and Simulation, Castelli engages with the playful fluidity and performative porosity of truthful and false speech acts. Second, Castelli's choice of Hercules, the libretto's mythological protagonist, allows the poet to focus and elaborate on Louis XIII's body natural, transforming the actually feeble French king into a powerful guarantor of dynastic continuity. Here, the physically weak king is turned, poetically as well as diplomatically, into a potent and fertile hero capable of confirming the continuation of the Bourbon dynasty. The libretto thus serves as a new—and potentially subversive—space to address diplomatically sensitive topics such as the royal couple's lengthy childless marriage, which could not be addressed through traditional diplomatic channels. Third, the librettist creates a gendered political agenda by eliminating the queen from any political agency.[20] Writing for the French royal family and against the backdrop of the Salic Law—which excludes women from power, banning them from ever acceding to the throne—Castelli shifts the question of sterility from the king to the queen. Castelli, who was a physician as well as a diplomat and poet, creates with his libretto a medically informed discourse, in which the French Queen Anne of Austria, not the king, is wholly responsible for the royal couple's prolonged period of sterility. It is thus she who needs to be 'purged' in order to become a fertile and fully functional conduit for the continuation of the Bourbon dynasty.

By 1638, opera had emerged as a new genre in Italy as well as in central and eastern Europe, but it had not yet been introduced in France. Castelli aptly seized the opportunity to explore his poetic capital in Italy and to promote it in France with the help of Giulio Raimondo Mazzarino, future Cardinal Mazarin, with whom Castelli corresponded about his own and others' operatic projects.[21] While *La Sincerità trionfante* is dedicated to the 'most eminent and reverend sire, Cardinal Richelieu',[22] the founder of the *Académie*

Française (1635) and strong protector of poets and artists, it was the Italian Mazarin, Richelieu's successor and future chief minister of Louis XIV, who subsequently became a crucial promoter of opera in France. Between 1637 and 1639, Mazarin was in Rome and in the service of Cardinal Antonio,[23] who enthusiastically supported Castelli and his operatic work. In December 1638, Mazarin was preparing to permanently depart for Paris,[24] where he intended to introduce opera—perhaps precisely, as scholars surmise, with a performance of *La Sincerità trionfante*.[25] While political circumstances—such as the regency years of Anne of Austria, the Fronde, and a general hostility of the French aristocracy towards Mazarin's attempt to introduce Italian art to France, expressed in the satirical *Mazarinades*—deferred the introduction of Italian opera in France for many more years, *La Sincerità trionfante* remains a milestone in the emergence of French opera as a Franco–Italian diplomatic production. Indeed, because of its performance at the residence of the French ambassador in Rome, *La Sincerità trionfante* is sometimes considered the first 'French' opera.[26]

The diplomatic moment of operatic poetics

La Sincerità trionfante is a unique example of what Timothy Hampton has termed 'diplomatic poetics': 'a way of reading literature that would be attuned to the shadow of the Other at the edge of the national community, and a way of reading diplomacy that would take into account its fictional and linguistic dimension'.[27] More specifically, diplomacy and diplomatic poetics become meaningful as a linguistic 'practice' which uses language 'to mediate encounters'. Hampton terms this necessarily fragile moment of encounter 'the diplomatic moment'. The diplomatic moment, specific to literary genres and linguistic contexts, becomes 'the scene of negotiation' and 'a node at which texts reflect on their own ability to represent'. Diplomatic moments, then, 'help us understand how different genres frame and control that moment of uncertainty'.[28] While diplomatic poetics and the diplomatic moment have been analysed, among others in Hampton's own studies, in genres such as tragedy and epic, no such studies exist for early modern opera and the literary genre of the libretto.

La Sincerità trionfante explores diplomatic poetics and dynastic continuation as a fragile diplomatic moment in a particularly complex way. The libretto contains twenty-nine characters,[29] including three choruses, and several parallel plots. The main characters Hercules (Ercole), Courage (Ardire), Sincerity (Sincerità) and Simulation (Simulatione), are presented 'in chiave', as code names for contemporary political figures. As Castelli explains, 'these are allegorical figures, and they are introduced as a parallel to the heroic and glorious actions of the Gallic Hercules, Louis the Just [Louis XIII], and of Sacred Courage [Ardire], Armand Cardinal Richelieu'.[30] Divided into five acts, the main plot of the opera centres around the story of Libyan Hercules (Louis XIII), who, having traversed Europe with

the help of Courage (Cardinal Richelieu), reaches France and liberates the Celtiberian princess Galatea/Sincerity (Anne of Austria) from France's religious and political enemies (Simulation) as well as her alleged sterility. Pastoral subplots tell of the carnal loves and lustful desires of Nymphs, who manage, under the aegis of Simulation, to seduce Hercules as he journeys from Egypt/Libya to France. By disrupting Hercules's itinerary, the pastoral subplots transform his heroic journey into a subversive one. By emphasizing at length Hercules's encounters with nymphs, Castelli shifts the focus from Hercules's valiant deeds to his body natural and his sexual performance.[31] The opera ends with Hercules's arrival in Paris, his encounter with Galatea/Sincerity, and the birth of their son Galate/Louis XIV, celebrated with the explosion of festive fireworks to the tunes of a sensual *sarabande*.

The queen's pregnancy and the birth of the Dauphin are announced by the key diplomatic figure of a Nuncio. Castelli writes that

> one learns from the Nuncio of Fame, who announces the moments [*i momenti*] of pregnancy across the entire reign of France, not only that the act of birth is impending, but also that this will be the birth of the *Dauphin* of France.[32]

Although Hercules's journey from Libya to France, his encounter with Galatea in Paris, and the birth of their son Galate necessarily encompass a time span of at least nine months, Castelli insists that the plot extends 'within the boundary [*termine*] of a revolution of the sun, that is twenty-four hours'. The word 'term' or 'boundary' [*termine*], the Nuncio's central message, encapsulates several meanings. It refers to the classical catastrophe, the end of the plot, as well as to the due date of Anna of Austria's pregnancy. Through the pivotal diplomatic figure of the Nuncio, then, Castelli brings together the poetic and the diplomatic 'terms' of the opera. In the 'Dialogue on Dramatic Poetry', which precedes the libretto, one of the interlocutors states that 'poetry needs to have its own natural ending, just as natural things have their own [natural ending]'.[33] Poetry and diplomacy are here naturalized and coincide with the 'natural term' of the queen's pregnancy. The end of the opera, the birth of the Dauphin, thus brings together poetry, nature, and diplomacy under one single 'term' [terminus].

Despite its apparent length and thematic dispersion, the text's unity of action is guaranteed, Castelli argues, by the technique of 'double composition and texture' [*doppia composizione, e tessitura*], the co-presence of the text's literal and conceptual layer. While the multiple plotlines undermine the libretto's unity of action, the conceptual layer brings the manifold plots together under the umbrella of the opera's scope, telos. Castelli identifies the 'double composition' as the basis of every 'tragic composition',[34] and foregrounds the diplomatically significant event of the birth of Louis XIV as the end and purpose of *La Sincerità trionfante*.

The 'double composition' is not only a poetic, but also a diplomatic strategy. By using coded characters in reference to contemporary political and dynastic events, Castelli turns an allegorical speech into a *mise-en-abîme* of diplomatic speech. He reminds his readers and his audience that just as the actor performs in the guise of an allegorized figure while referencing an actual political player, so the diplomat aptly moves between two identities: between the poles of sincerity and dis/simulation as necessary components of diplomatic discourse and political success. The libretto thus deploys its subversive potential not only by marking, but also by critiquing diplomatic discourse.

In the libretto, Sincerity and Simulation appear—the former already in the opera's title—as allegorical figures. While Sincerity represents, 'in chiave', Anne of Austria and sincere, truthful speech, Simulation, under the fictitious name Orchista, denotes Sincerity's antagonist: Heresy and a double-tongued, false discourse.[35] From Cicero and Quintilian onward, simulation and dissimulation have been a crucial element of rhetorical speech. In *De Oratore*, Cicero argues that dissimulation, the 'urban' or sophisticated strategy of creating a difference between words and thoughts—often translated as 'irony'—commonly give pleasure.[36] For Quintilian, simulation and dissimulation are closely related, both are 'great sources of laughter'. While simulation 'amounts to faking an opinion of one's own', dissimulation is 'pretending not to understand what others mean'[37] and 'saying one thing and meaning another'.[38] Pushing the discrepancy between words and meanings further—and, in fact, inverting the duplicity of ironic speech—Castelli's libretto opens with a solo appearance of Simulation, 'enemy of Sincerity', who comes 'on stage with two faces, one of which she takes off in order not to be recognized'.[39]

At the beginning of the opera, Simulation/Orchista appears in a mask, double-faced. She takes the mask off as the plot unfolds and puts it back on as the performance comes to a close. The irony here is that Irony (or Simulation) appears under inverted commas: Simulation performs without a mask, a second face—thus disclosing her naked, unveiled face—while Sincerity appears in a regular theatrical costume, hence disguised. From its inception, the plot is designed as a *mise-en-scène* of Simulation's speech; the sincerity and truthfulness of the libretto's plot is veiled by the appearance of nude Simulation. Double-faced Simulation speaks falsely only beyond the stage and the opera's context, but keeps her simplicity and truthfulness in the course of the play's fiction. Castelli's introduction of Simulation thus epitomizes what Hampton defined as the fragile moment of diplomatic discourse, in which fiction consists 'not in falsifying truth, but in provisionally "taking the false for the true"'.[40] *La Sincerità trionfante* crystallizes as a chiastic as well as playful masterpiece of and on simulation, dissimulation, and sincere speech. As such, it is a self-referential device that serves as a *mise-en-abîme* of diplomatic speech while pointing to the art and power of acting in a new genre: opera. Castelli's play with simulation and sincerity,

programmatically announced already in the title, contains a subversive potential that places the librettist close to contemporary libertines, most importantly Torquato Accetto, who explore, in their own works, the different contours and manifold modes of dis/simulation.[41]

In his short treatise titled *Della dissimulazione onesta* [On Honest Dissimulation], published in Naples in 1641, Accetto investigates precisely what Castelli subsumes under the two allegorical figures of Simulation and Sincerity: the chiastic structure and paradoxical topic of honest dissimulation.[42] Accetto opens his treatise with a reference to Genesis 3:7 and a discussion of the nakedness of 'the first man':

> Since the first man opened his eyes and knew that he was naked, he sought to hide himself also from the sight of his Maker; this is why the effort of hiding was born almost with the world itself, [...] and it came to use by means of dissimulation.[43]

For Accetto, dissimulation emerges quasi contemporaneously with the creation of the world itself. It is as natural to human beings as it is necessary and unavoidable.[44] Human beings, Accetto suggests, are naturally prone to dissimulate. The same way humans cover their bodies, they, quite naturally, stage their speech as a disguised, performative—if not diplomatic—discourse. What does it mean, then, to 'unveil' dissimulation, as does Castelli's Simulation, and to appear on stage 'naturally', without the protective and dissimulating veil of staged speech? What is the relationship between naked speech and the body natural? The idea of an analogy between dissimulated/sincere speech and the veiled/naked body, while concretized in Accetto's treatise, is already contained, as the following pages will show, in Castelli's libretto.

Diplomacy and the king's body natural

Besides his successful activity as a librettist, Castelli was also a 'doctor of law and medicine'. *La Sincerità trionfante* is informed not only by his interest in poetics, but also his expertise in medicine. Castelli's medical preoccupations transpire particularly strongly in *La Sincerità trionfante*, a libretto driven by the dynastic questions of sterility, birth, and procreation. Brought together, these topics reveal the diplomatic and poetic concerns not only with the king's body politic, the politically charged symbolic representations of the prince, but also with the body natural, the monarch's effective fertility as the necessary basis for dynastic lineage. While both bodily stratifications are inscribed in—and essential to understand—the libretto, the latter is especially pertinent to the topic of diplomacy and dynastic continuation.

Jean-Marie Apostolidès, who discusses Kantorowicz's thesis on the 'King's two bodies' in the context of the reign of Louis XIV, argues that 'France has defined itself as a nation through the symbolical imaginary

of the king's body', created through representative arts such as 'painting, sculpture, ballet, opera, poetry and coins'.[45] Yet before such a process of symbolization can unfold, the king's body politic has to take as its point of departure the king's body natural. It is the body natural upon which dynastic continuity hinges and from which the process of symbolization and allegorization unfolds. Princely births and marriages, glorified in the guise of diplomatic and operatic events, are pivotal moments that celebrate the irreducible presence and impact of the body natural. Fanny Cosandey reminds us that the word 'constitution of the State' itself points to the origin of the state as the physicality of the royal body: 'In the semantics of old France, the constitution [...] is thought as "natural", in the measure that the theoreticians spin the organicistic metaphor of the body'.[46] The foundation of the State as a symbolic act was thus based on and derived from ontology and the king's body natural.[47]

In her recent analysis of the representation of the body of Vincenzo Gonzaga, duke of Mantua, Valeria Finucci has claimed that during the early modern period 'physical problems came to control and define not only [...] self-esteem and body image, but also [...] strategic alliances and political leanings'.[48] This is particularly true for *La Sincerità trionfante*, in which the king's body natural is poetically explored as the foundation for dynastic continuity and diplomatic discourse. The celebratory and delicate topic of *La Sincerità trionfante* pushes the boundaries of 'diplomatic poetics' and the fragility of the diplomatic moment further. On the one hand, the opera praises Louis XIII, who after being married to Anne of Austria for over twenty years finally fathers a son. On the other, the libretto thematizes a huge scandal: the threat of the royal couple's potential sterility and, as its consequence, the possibility of an end of the Bourbon dynasty. It is in its focus on the king's body natural and its capacity to falter and disrupt dynastic continuity that the subversive potential of the libretto is nested. Castelli's strategic move to associate Louis XIII with the strong male figure of Hercules illustrates the focus on and the anxiety about the body natural and its potential failure particularly powerfully.

The mythological figure of Hercules was frequently used in Europe from the fifteenth century on to represent powerful monarchs and dynasties.[49] With the rise of opera in the first years of the seventeenth century, Hercules became an even more popular and recurring figure—from Italy to France, and from Vienna to Hamburg. Hercules-themed operas were considered appropriate markers of dynastic events and diplomatic celebrations throughout the seventeenth century.[50] Hercules seemed a particularly felicitous hero to represent a strong and powerful monarch and guarantor of dynasties. In France, Hercules was promoted from the sixteenth century in its specific French version, as 'Hercule gaulois'.[51] French kings repeatedly used the myth of the Gallic Hercules, who distinguished himself for his capacity to lead large crowds through the power of rhetoric, aligned in the shape of a golden chain attached to his tongue. If the Gallic Hercules stood for

rhetoric, the arts and sciences, and a refined intellect, he did less so for his physical strength—for which he was celebrated in ancient Greek mythology.

In *La Sincerità trionfante*, Castelli distances himself from the rhetorically refined 'Hercule gaulois' and privileges the myth of the Libyan Hercules, son of the Egyptian god Osiris, instead. In his 'Argument' [Argomento], which precedes the libretto, Castelli lays out the myth of the Libyan Hercules, and traces his journey from Africa to 'Gaul', 'where he halt[s] at an island enclosed by the Seine'. Here, Hercules falls in love with Galatea, the daughter of the king of Gaul, Celte. As Castelli makes clear, Galatea, as the king's only child and daughter, is excluded from power. Hercules thus '[seeks] her as his consort and offer[s] to quell all the conflicts related to the succession to the throne with his arms'. Finally, 'out of this marriage', Castelli continues, is born Galate, 'who with his infinite valor conquer[s] the entire Occident, while his posterity, with no lesser virtue [… become] lords of the Orient. This is told by Diodorus Siculus'.[52]

While Castelli explicitly mentions Diodorus Siculus's first-century CE *Bibliotheca Historica* as his source, the myth of the Libyan Hercules was predominantly channelled in the Renaissance through the work of one of the greatest early modern Italian forgers of mythological dynasties: Annius of Viterbo, who uses the figure of the Libyan Hercules to flatter, in his forged *Antiquitates*, the rising house of Castile.[53] Annius invents a pre-Trojan pedigree for the Libyan Hercules, whom he calls 'Oron Libio', and identifies him as the son of the God Osiris.[54] In 1511–1512, the historiographer of the French king Louis XII, Belgian poet Jean Lemaire de Belges, adapted Annius' story of the Libyan Hercules for his mythological novel, *Illustration de Gaule et Singularité de Troie* [Illustrations of Gaul and Singularities of Troy]. This text appears to be the most immediate source for Castelli's reworking of the Libyan Hercules. Castelli significantly gendered the storyline to make it more compatible with the specific constraints of French dynastic politics and the Salic Law, in particular. While in Lemaire de Belges Osiris is avenged primarily by his wife and sister Isis/Ceres—and only assisted by Hercules—Castelli inverts this hierarchy and crudely eliminates any reference to female agency in the killing of Osiris and subsequent takeover of power. In *La Sincerità trionfante*, Osiris is avenged solely by Hercules/Louis XIII.

In a period of profound dynastic instability, Castelli conceived of a manly monarch, represented by the physical strength of Hercules, capable of guaranteeing dynastic continuity. Louis XIII's actual frail physique is here compensated by the figure of a sexually active Hercules, seduced by nymphs and Simulation/Orchista, who point to the importance of the king's irreducible body natural. Castelli thus powerfully inverts the physical features of Louis XIII, who, since his adolescence, was characterized by his weak body and took on sexually ambivalent roles on stage, even at his own wedding. It suffices to think of the *Ballet de Madame*, staged in 1615 for the occasion of the double union between France ('La Seine') and Spain ('Le Tage'): Louis XIII's own marriage with Anne of Austria and that of his sister, Elizabeth of

France, with future Spanish king Philipp IV. In the *Ballet*, Louis XIII, then fourteen years old, danced the role of a Hermaphrodite.[55]

Dynastic sex and gender politics referred to foundational myths with blurred origins. The notorious Salic Law, which forbade women to succeed to the throne, was almost unknown in France around 1450. At the turn of the sixteenth century, however, it became the basis for the political organization of the French kingdom. By this time, Fanny Cosandey and Robert Descimon contend, 'almost all fundamental principles of the French public right tend to go back to the Salic Law, which, in turn, acquires mythical origins'.[56] While Castelli's libretto thematizes, at first glance, the successful dynastic marriage between Sincerity (Anne of Austria) and Hercules (Louis XIII) with the final birth of Galate (the future king Louis XIV), it also puts an emphasis on the representation of Hercules/Louis XIII as a strong monarch and fertile guarantor of the powerful Bourbon dynasty. The operatic poetics of *La Sincerità trionfante* functions as a diplomatic strategy offering a privileged vantage point into gendered body politics. It shows that by creating the figure of the powerful monarch, Castelli not only veils the actual frail body natural of Louis XIII, but furthermore shifts the responsibility for the lengthy childless marriage of Louis XIII and Anne of Austria from the French king to his consort.[57]

According to seventeenth-century physicians writing within the framework of French Salic Law, Hercules was not only famous for being exceptionally strong and fertile, but also for his capacity to generate predominantly male offspring. In 1696, Nicolas Venette, Louis XIV' physician, wrote that 'Hercules, if we believe the poets, was so robust that he almost never generated children who were not male, and among the seventy-two he had, there was only one daughter'. The capacity to make children was considered an 'art'—from the ancients in Greece to seventeenth-century moderns in France. The Greek word for child, 'tekhnon', is intimately linked to 'art', 'techné'/technique. Venette writes that 'the *art* that teaches the secret of procreation cannot be overestimated, since it is often on *nature* that the happiness of kingdoms and the tranquillity of families depends'.[58] After the birth of Louis XIV, Hercules seemed a particularly programmatic and apt figure to represent the French king. Not only could Castelli refer to contemporary iconographic models such as Abraham Bosse's 1635 depiction of Louis XIII as Hercules. Also contemporary medical sources such as Venette's treatise underscored the manliness of the mythological figure of Hercules in his capacity to generate sons.

By conceiving of a libretto that investigates procreation and the birth—often considered 'miraculous'—of the Dauphin, Castelli had to deploy his entire *art* as a poet to artfully tackle a sensitive topic. Dynastic fertility and continuity, an issue no formal conversation or diplomatic negotiation could raise, became possible, at the brink of a fragile diplomatic moment, as a *mise-en-abîme* in a new operatic discourse. Castelli's libretto thus became a medium of diplomatic communication able to circumvent the rigid framework of formal diplomatic discourse.

At the same time that Castelli emphasized Louis XIII's herculean fertility, he downplayed the king's effective physical fragility and doubtful procreative capacity. Castelli was confronted with the delicate diplomatic and poetic task to demonstrate that, contrary to what the king's physicians, Héroard and Bouvard, attested, Louis XIII was in perfect health. One of the principal strategies to reinvigorate the king poetically was to dismiss any doubt and suspicion about his sterility. Castelli did so by displacing the question of sterility to the queen, Anne of Austria—a rather common strategy in early modernity. In Act II of *La Sincerità trionfante*, an intervening Oracle announces that Hercules will generate male progeny once Galatea will be 'purged' [*purgata*]: 'Once arrived with sacred Courage, o strong warrior,/You will fight, you will purge the *bella Diva*,/Whose bosom abounds with putrid humours:/Thence she will be fecund and ready for male birth.'[59]

By creating a causal chain between Anne of Austria's alleged, but never attested, 'sterility' and the necessary herculean 'purge', Castelli inverts the medical facts. According to Héroard and Bouvard, it was the king who had to be frequently 'purged' because of his poor health: 'In one single year, the king underwent 212 purges, 215 enemas, and forty-seven bloodlettings. In 1630, he is twenty-nine years old […] Nevertheless, the invalid is treated with bloodletting up to seven times. The king is dying'.[60] In a powerful poetic and diplomatic act, Castelli transforms the frail and frequently 'purged' king into a potent hero; from purged to purging; from passive to active; from a patient to a conqueror, who liberates Galatea from her putrid humours and the French territory from its heretical monsters. As the opera ends, Galatea's initial Celtic coldness gives way to Hercules's heat. The hero enters the city of Paris as fireworks explode over the Seine.[61]

The ascending vigour of Hercules culminates in his penetration of the *Île de la Cité* against the backdrop of a sensual sarabande, prepared and danced by a 'French master'. Known as a 'passionate dance', the sarabande was characterized by a 'gay and amorous' movement associated, according to Antoine Furetière, with 'lascivious postures and gestures'.[62] It is during the sarabande that the final purge of the female body takes place: the *telos* of the opera—the theatrical *catharsis* and concomitant birth of the Dauphin—is completed with the confirmation of the Bourbon dynasty.

Conclusion

If we are to believe Castelli's own words, *La Sincerità trionfante* was met with considerable enthusiasm: immediately after the performance, Cardinal Richelieu urged the librettist to send the libretto to him in Paris. In the second edition of *La Sincerità trionfante* Castelli emphasizes how his libretto benefitted from the tutelage of Cardinal Richelieu's protection:

> This Drama was so fortunate in the Theater, I believe because of the nobility of the matter represented, that the entire Roman Court wanted

> to see it in print. However, His Excellence Marshal de Couvré, did not want to print the libretto prior to sending it to His Eminence [Cardinal Richelieu] under whose most prudent judgment it has received those perfections that allow it to come to light.[63]

Contrary to the second edition of *La Sincerità trionfante*, Castelli's tone is significantly more modest in the first edition, published immediately after the birth of Louis XIV. Here, Castelli includes an apologetic letter to his readers:

> Take into consideration, o Reader, the shortness of time within which this Drama was composed, put into music, learned by heart, and represented—that is, from the notice of the birth of the Dauphin, which arrived in October, before which it was not possible to plot the fable. Within ca. two months and a half, not only did I have to create the fable, put it into verse, but also send it, piece by piece, to the composer [...] His Excellence, the Marshal, immediately ordered that I correct it in order to send it to France, where the most purged spirits of this century reside.[64]

Castelli offers two different evaluations of and reactions to his opera, making his readers wonder whether the diplomacy of his discourse—with all its articulations of 'duplicity' and 'doubleness'—does not continue beyond the libretto proper. Castelli's reference to the 'purged spirits' of France seems to encapsulate a double entendre: on the one hand, the reference is a compliment of the French *savants* and the prestige of French culture promoted by Cardinal Richelieu. On the other, it contains a subversive twist: the 'purged spirits' of France are also an ironic nod to the feeble and frequently purged body of the French king. While they epitomize refined culture, France's 'purged spirits' demand an active agent: perhaps the purging agent, Castelli seems to suggest, is none other than the new genre of the opera, channelled through the powerful operatic poetics of *La Sincerità trionfante*.

At the juncture of diplomacy and poetics, Castelli—a versed poet as well as an astute diplomatic figure— epitomizes the poetic and diplomatic power of the opera as a new genre. In the *mise-en-abîme* of a new operatic discourse, Castelli discloses new spaces that allow him to convey and channel delicate truths in unstable diplomatic moments. His artful manipulation of a new genre enables him to plot diplomatic negotiations without reverting to the rigid framework of traditional diplomatic channels. In a time of a 'new triumph of diplomatic culture' across Europe,[65] the rise of the opera—a courtly genre at first—diversified diplomatic discourse. What Castelli's *La Sincerità trionfante* showcases in a fine and unique way, is that diplomatic and operatic discourses could converge into new, powerful genres that outlasted unstable diplomatic moments.

Notes

1 See R. Ahrendt, M. Ferraguto, and D. Mahiet (eds.), *Music and diplomacy from the early modern Era to the present* (New York, 2014); J. R. Mulryne, M. I. Aliverti, and A. M. Testaverde (eds.), *Ceremonial entries in early modern Europe: the iconography of power* (Burlington, VT, 2015); J. R. Mulryne and E. Goldring (eds.), *Court festivals of the European Renaissance: art, politics and performance* (Burlington, VT, 2003); C. R. Jensen, 'Music for the tsar: a preliminary study of the music of the Muscovite court theater', *The Musical Quarterly*, 79.2 (1995), 368–401.

2 D. Mahiet, M. Ferraguto, and R. Ahrendt 'Introduction', in Ahrendt, Ferraguto, and Mahiet (eds.), *Music and diplomacy*, p. 2.

3 David R. M. Irving's essay on 'Lully in Siam' illustrates particularly powerfully how French opera performances were used for diplomatic means between France and Siam (Thailand)—and how, at times, a rigid, but different ceremonial and performative culture across countries could ultimately lead to diplomatic failure. See D. R. M. Irving, 'Lully in Siam: music and diplomacy in French–Siamese cultural exchanges, 1680–1690', *EM*, 40.3 (2012), 396. Louise Stein's work on the first opera performance in the New World, *La púrpura de la rosa*, shows how a libretto, written by Spanish poet Pedro Calderón de la Barca for the wedding of French King Louis XIV and the Spanish Infanta Maria Teresa in 1660, was transformed into a political and diplomatic tool in colonial Peru in 1701. See L. Stein, '*La música de dos orbes*: a context for the first opera of the Americas', *The Opera Quarterly*, 22.3–4 (2006), 433–58.

4 Early modern dictionaries such as the 1726 *Diccionario de Autoridades* of the Spanish royal Academy define 'diploma' as 'dispatch, letter, patent, privilege, bull, edict, or mandate authorized by the stamp and arms of the Prince, which is given to the party concerned or to the Public, the original remaining archived. It is a Greek word meaning Double or Duplicate.' Quoted in E. Le Guin, '*Tonadillas* and *diplomacia* in Enlightenment Madrid', *EM*, 40.3 (2012), 421.

5 For the relationship between opera, performance, and power see K. P. Aercke, *Gods of play: baroque festive performances as rhetorical discourse* (Albany, 1994); F. Decroisette, F. Graziani and J. Heuillon (eds.), *La naissance de l'Opéra: Euridice 1600–2000* (Paris, 2001); F. Hammond, *Music and spectacle in baroque Rome: Barberini patronage under Urban VIII* (New Haven, 1994); S. Mamone, *Firenze e Parigi, due capitali dello spettacolo per una regina, Maria de' Medici* (Cinisello Balsamo, 1987).

6 Tim Carter writes that '*Il rapimento* was reportedly staged before an audience of 3,000 gentlemen and 800 ladies'. In T. Carter, 'Rediscovering *Il rapimento di Cefalo*', *Journal of Seventeenth-Century Music*, 9.1 (2003). Available at: http://www.sscm-jscm.org/v9/no1/carter.html (accessed on 9 February 2016).

7 M. Murata, 'Why the first opera given in Paris wasn't Roman', *Cambridge Opera Journal*, 7.2 (1995), 87.

8 Angelo Cecchini was a *maestro di cappella* of Santa Maria della Consolazione in Rome before becoming a musician in the service of Paolo Giordano Orsini, duke of Bracciano. Unfortunately, none of his music is extant. See M. Murata, 'Cecchini, Angelo', *Grove music online*, *Oxford music online*. Available at: http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.article.05239 (accessed 20 July 2015).

9 T. Hampton, *Fictions of embassy: literature and diplomacy in early modern Europe* (Ithaca/London, 2009), p. 2.

10 In 1638, the French embassy was located in the Palazzo del Ceuli, about which little is known. See T. Amayden [Ameyden], *La storia delle famiglie romane*, ed. Carlo Augusto Bertini, 2 vols. (Rome, 1910–1914, reprint 1979), I.309–10. I thank Joseph Connors for this bibliographical information.

11 See R. di Ceglie, 'Dialogo sopra la Poesia Dramatica di Ottaviano Castelli', *Studi Secenteschi*, 38 (1997), 343.
12 O. Castelli, *La Sincerità trionfante* (Rome, 1640), frontispiece. All translations are mine unless otherwise stated.
13 I Rli Codex 364 (=1731), Avvisi di Roma, December 11, 1638, fo. 310. Quoted in Italian by M. Murata, *Operas for the Papal Court 1631–1668* (Ann Arbor, 1981), p. 207, n.79. My translation.
14 A. Ghislanzoni, *Luigi Rossi: biografia e analisi delle opere* (Milan, 1954), p. 63.
15 See Hammond, *Music and spectacle*; Murata, 'First opera'.
16 O. Castelli, *Poetica d'Aristotile tradotta dal greco nell' italiano da Ottaviano Castelli, Spoletino, Maestro delle Poste del Re Christianissimo Luigi XIII* (Rome, 1642), frontispiece.
17 Murata, 'First opera', 92.
18 There are two different editions of Castelli's libretto: O. Castelli, *La Sincerità trionfante overo l'erculeo ardire* (Ronciglione, 1639) and O. Castelli, *La Sincerità trionfante overo l'erculeo ardire* (Rome, 1640).
19 Hampton, *Fictions of embassy*, p. 11.
20 For a discussion of gendered diplomacy see Florian Kühnel, Chapter 7, this volume.
21 The correspondence is now preserved in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris. See L. Bianconi and M. Murata, 'Castelli, Ottaviano', *Grove Music Online*. Available at: http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/05125?q=castelli%2C+ottaviano&search=quick&pos=1&_start=1#firsthit (accessed 15 June 2015).
22 Castelli, *La Sincerità trionfante*, frontispiece.
23 B. Nestola, 'L'*Egisto* fantasma di Cavalli: nuova luce sulla rappresentazione parigina dell'*Egisto ovvero Chi soffre speri* di Mazzocchi e Marazzoli (1646)', *Recercare*, 19.1–2 (2007), 131.
24 Murata, 'First opera', p. 88.
25 Hammond, *Music and spectacle*, p. 231. See also F. A. D'Estrées, *Mémoires sur la régence de Marie de Médicis (1610–1616) et sur celle d'Anne D'Autriche (1643–1650)* (Paris, 1810), pp. 161–75.
26 Murata, 'First opera', p. 90.
27 Hampton, *Fictions of embassy*, pp. 2–3.
28 Hampton, 'The diplomatic moment: representing negotiation in early modern Europe', *MLQ*, 67.1 (2006), 82.
29 Thirty characters, including three choruses, in the first edition of 1639.
30 di Ceglie, 'Dialogo', p. 336.
31 In my distinction between body natural and body politic I follow the classic definition established by Ernst Kantorowicz, *The king's two bodies: a study in mediaeval political theology* (Princeton, 1997).
32 di Ceglie, 'Dialogo', p. 339.
33 Ibid.
34 Castelli, *Poetica d'Aristotile*, p. 29.
35 During the French religious wars, heresy and religious simulation was a common topic. Protestants were suspected by Catholics of concealing their true religious sympathies by outwardly performing Roman Catholic practices. It is to this religiously unstable situation that Castelli's libretto alludes.
36 Cicero, *De Oratore*, trans. H. Rackham and E. W. Sutton (Cambridge, MA, 2014), p. 402.
37 Quintilian, *The Orator's Education*, trans. D. A. Russell (Cambridge, MA, 2001), 6.3, p. 65.
38 Ibid., 9.1, p. 25.
39 Castelli, *La Sincerità trionfante* (1640), I, 1, 10.

40 Hampton, *Fictions of embassy*, p. 11.
41 Only one year before the publication of *La Sincerità trionfante*, René Descartes published his *Discours de la méthode* (1637), in which he theorizes—as the editor of Torquato Accetto's *Della dissimulazione onesta*, Salvatore Silvano Nigro, points out—'the necessity of dissimulating writing [*scrittura dissimulatrice*] after the condemnation, in 1633, of Galileo Galilei's writings and scientific ideas'. In S. S. Nigro, 'Usi della pazienza', in *Della dissimulazione onesta*, ed. S. S. Nigro (Turin, 1997), xiii.
42 T. Accetto, *Della dissimulazione onesta*, ed. S. S. Nigro (Turin, 1997).
43 Ibid., p. 9.
44 Accetto's framing of dissimulation dovetails with the Ciceronian credo that 'under the sting of circumstances which we regard as evil, concealment [*dissimulatio*] and forgetfulness [*oblivio*] is not within our control'. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, trans. J. E. King (Cambridge, MA, 2014), III, 35, p. 269.
45 J.-M. Apostolidès, *Le roi-machine: spectacle et politique au temps de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1981), p. 7.
46 F. Cosandey and R. Descimon, *L'absolutisme en France. Histoire et historiographie* (Paris, 2002), p. 67.
47 Michel Antoine has argued that 'when our ancestors talked about the constitution of the country, they made an assessment and even a sort of diagnostics. Their attitude was, in fact, the same as the one of physicians and alchemists, whose first step was to which of the four complexions that were recognized since Antiquity the individual belonged […]. The monarchic constitution of France was thus ontological in nature before being political'. M. Antoine, 'La monarchie absolue', in K. M. Baker (ed.), *The French Revolution and the creation of modern political culture*, vol. 1, *The political culture of the old regime* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 3–5. Quoted by Cosandey and Descimon, *L'absolutisme en France*, pp. 69–70.
48 V. Finucci, *The prince's body: Vincenzo Gonzaga and Renaissance medicine* (Cambridge, MA, 2015), p. 4.
49 One might think, in this regard, of Coluccio Salutati's *De laboribus Herculis* (1406) or Lilio Gregorio Giraldi's *Herculis vita* (1539).
50 Two examples illustrate this particularly well: Francesco Buti (libretto) and Francesco Cavalli's *Ercole amante* was written in 1660 and performed in 1662 to celebrate the marriage of Louis XIV and Maria Teresa, and Giovanni Andrea Moniglia (libretto) and Jacopo Melani's *Ercole in Tebe* was staged in Florence in 1661 at the occasion of the wedding celebrations of Cosimo III de' Medici and the Princess of Orléans, Margherita Luisa.
51 An excellent study of the Gallic Hercules is M.-R. Jung, *Hercule dans la littérature française du XVIe siècle. De l'Hercule courtois à l'Hercule baroque* (Genève, 1966).
52 Castelli, *La Sincerità trionfante* (1640), 'Argomento', pp. 53–4.
53 A. of Viterbo, *Commentaria super opera auctorum diversorum de antiquitatibus loquentium* (Rome, 1498).
54 It is from Lemaire de Belges' *Illustration* that Castelli imports, to a large extent, the story of Celte, 'the ninth King of Gaul', and his daughter Galatea. In Lemaire de Belges, as in Castelli, Galatea marries Hercules and gives birth to Galate(us). J. Lemaire de Belges, *Les Illustrations de Gaule et singularitez de Troye* (Paris, 1512).
55 M. Franco, 'Fragment of the sovereign as hermaphrodite: time, history, and the exception in *Le Ballet de Madame*', *Dance Research*, 25.2 (2007), 125.
56 Cosandey, Descimon, *L'absolutisme en France*, p. 58.

57 According to Kantorowicz, while the body politic and the body natural form 'one unit indivisible', the relationship between the two is hierarchical: 'doubt cannot arise concerning the superiority of the body politic over the body natural'. Kantorowicz, *King's two bodies*, p. 9.
58 N. Venette, *De la generation de l'homme, ou de l'amour conjugal* (Cologne, 1696), p. 508.
59 Castelli, *La Sincerità trionfante* (Ronciglione, 1639), II, 4, 42.
60 M.-M. Gricourt, *Héroard médecin de Louis XIII et son temps* (Bordeaux, 1941), p. 47.
61 Castelli, *La Sincerità trionfante*, 1639, V, 15, 148.
62 A. Furetière, 'Sarabande', quoted by P. Ranum, 'Audible rhetoric and mute rhetoric: the 17th-Century French sarabande', *EM*, 14.1 (1986), 22.
63 Castelli, *La Sincerità trionfante*, 'To Cardinal Richelieu', 1640, n.p.
64 Castelli, *La Sincerità trionfante*, 'To the Reader', 1639, n.p.
65 Hampton, *Fictions of embassy*, p. 2.

7 'Minister-like cleverness, understanding, and influence on affairs'

Ambassadresses in everyday business and courtly ceremonies at the turn of the eighteenth century*

Florian Kühnel

Introduction

According to the German lawyer Friedrich Karl von Moser, who in 1752 published a treatise on *The rights and duties of the female envoy*, the 'old prejudice in the world that men are best suited for the management of State affairs' was utterly wrong. In his eyes, many women had already proven their ability in 'using their mind and dexterity to initiate and maintain the progress of State affairs as if they had achieved mastery in the ministers' guild', and women were clearly able to demonstrate 'minister-like cleverness, understanding and influence on [state] affairs'. Indeed, 'the intrigues ladies took part in were even longer, more subtle and harder to disentangle' than those of their male counterparts.[1]

With this treatise Moser—who was probably influenced by his religious affiliation with the Moravians—challenged a notion that was widely propagated in early modern political theory.[2] Jean Bodin, for example, known for his misogynistic attitudes, demanded that women had to be at all costs 'kept far off from all magistracies, places of commaund, iudgements, publike assemblies, and councels'.[3] In Bodin's eyes it was 'an absurd and rediculous thing, for women to busie themselues in mens publike actions and affaires', because these 'are contrarie vnto their sexe'. While nature 'hath giuen vnto men wisedome, strength, courage, and power, to commaund', he stated, it has 'taken the same from women'. It therefore was their particular 'lacke of wisedome' that made women unsuitable for the political sphere.[4] Abraham de Wicquefort, author of a highly influential diplomatic manual, agreed with Bodin in principle and extended the notion to the ambassador's post: 'The word Legatus is Masculine, and the same Laws that prohibit Women the Exercise of publick Offices, debar'em also of this Employ, which Men of the greatest Ability have much ado to discharge worthily'.[5]

These early modern notions have, to some extent, shaped modern research, which has for a long time ignored the role of women in diplomatic relations. Instead, historians usually have focussed on the ambassadors and their political negotiations. While the 'political sphere' was typically considered to be a male domain, women were banished to the 'informal' 'private' and thus politically irrelevant sphere. More recent studies, however, emphasize that such modern dichotomies as public/private or political/personal do not capture the complexity of early modern courts.[6] In early modern court culture, formal and informal dimensions were intricately entangled and political influence depended greatly on personal relations. This was true for both sexes and women in many instances acted 'formally' while men acted 'informally'.[7] Yet, while 'female diplomacy' in the early modern period has begun to receive more attention—for instance with respect to rulers, mistresses, or ladies-in-waiting[8] —the diplomatic agency of ambassadors' wives has yet to be explored.[9]

Early modern diplomacy clearly depended to a large extent on the participation of women. In this regard, one could actually speak of a 'diplomatic working couple', to borrow a concept developed by Heide Wunder. According to Wunder, early modern households were economic and social joint ventures. Regardless of their social position, husband and wife managed their household together and both undertook fundamental tasks for common objectives.[10] For noble couples that meant that both exercised authority and power within their 'house'.[11] Yet, the domains within the same household were divided: in 1615 Gervase Markham had claimed that while the man's 'Office and imployments are ever for most part abroad', the 'office of our English House-wife' lay 'within the house'.[12] Although such a gendered separation was more a theoretical ideal, women were still mainly responsible for the household's management.[13]

The following section will focus on the particular role of ambassadresses within the 'diplomatic working couple', mainly focussing on the two ambassadresses Lady Elizabeth Trumbull[14] and Lady Mary Wortley Montagu.[15] Both followed their husbands in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries to represent England at different courts, such as Paris, Vienna, Florence, or Istanbul. It will therefore be possible to take a cross-cultural comparative perspective and to examine how 'female diplomacy' differed at these courts and how possible differences were perceived and interpreted. While Lady Trumbull's diplomatic activities can only be deduced indirectly through her husband's diaries and accounts,[16] Lady Montagu with her famous 'letters' left an astonishingly rich series of ego-documents.[17]

Everyday diplomatic business

Moser's treatise highlighted the general importance of ambassadresses for early modern diplomacy: it would be extremely advantageous for an ambassador to 'confer with his wife about occurring incidents', to which she,

due to her specific female 'agility of mind', could give him advice 'which he might not have found by himself'. 'Why should he not be allowed', Moser asks, 'to seek advice from the one who is his most trusted friend and his closest person in the world'?[18] But besides the advising function, Moser stated, the 'true profession' of an ambassadress lay within 'her own quarters', where she had to take care of the 'house's honours'. Here, her 'main obligation' was on the one hand to enable her husband to 'focus on his duties without restrictions' and on the other to take care of the 'honour of the character', that is to say the ambassador's representation of his monarch. Ambassadresses therefore had to make sure that 'glory, order, abundance and good institution of the ambassadorial household' were always 'sustained dignifiedly'.[19]

Moser's first point, enabling the ambassador to focus on his duties, referred to the traditional view of women as managers of the household. Following the classical discourse of oeconomy,[20] Moser therefore declared that it could be useful if an ambassadress was sent ahead of the mission to arrange the 'establishment of a new oeconomy in advance'.[21] This for example had been the case with Count Windisch-Graetz, who before travelling to the Congress of Cambrai sent his wife 'to view the palace rented by him and to dispose the oeconomy'.[22] But an ambassadress was also crucial to everyday household management, as Jean Hotman suggested: as an ambassador could not at all times 'haue an eye ouer' his servants, 'it shalbe the best way, if he can, to bring his wife with him, whose eie wil stoppe infinite abuses amongst his people, and disorders in his house'.[23] Writing almost a century later, Louis Rousseau de Chamoy saw the same advantage, even if he simultaneously warned ambassadors strongly about sharing any political information with their wives, as this, due to their 'penchant for talking too much', constituted a serious safety risk.[24]

The fundamental role of the ambassadress in the management and governance of the embassy household can also be seen in Trumbull's diaries. For example, the couple looked for appropriate accommodation together in Paris: 'After din[n]er my deare & I went to see a house in the Rue de Bac.' Apparently they liked it as they moved in shortly afterwards.[25] For this house Lady Trumbull then bought 'a copper for washing after the English fashion and other things of lumber'.[26] Furthermore, she also had a say in such important acquisitions as a representative carriage. The couple twice went together to the 'coach-makers' and 'brought velvet for the lining'.[27] Finally, ambassadresses could negotiate about their husbands' salary. Though in vain, after the revocation of Lord Winchilsea from his post in Istanbul, his wife tried to persuade the Levant Company to grant a greater farewell present than usual.[28]

Besides such administrative tasks, ambassadresses also played a decisive role in the everyday diplomatic life within the embassies. For example they often had access to the embassy chanceries and were engaged in diplomatic correspondence,[29] so that Viscount Torrington, English ambassador at Brussels between 1783 and 1792, could call his wife 'the soul of my office'.[30]

More importantly, ambassadresses sometimes participated in political negotiations that were conducted in the embassy. When, after Trumbull's arrival at Istanbul, a meeting took place to solve the conflict between himself, his predecessor Sir James Chandos, and the English factory, 'the obliging carriage of my blessed & wise wife, made us all unite in love & friends[hi]p'.[31]

Moser's second point related to the representation of ambassadorial honour within the diplomatic community. Receiving visits by other diplomats and visiting them in their embassies in return was part of an ambassador's day-to-day business. That he on many such occasions was accompanied by his wife however could be strategic. For, as Moser stated, ambassadors could use their wives to 'elicit secrets from other ministers'.[32] The omnipresence of diplomatic wives in the exchange of visits within the diplomatic community is also apparent from Trumbull's diaries, in which he reports many occasions of visiting other envoys together with his spouse. While in Paris, for example, the couple met several times with the Swedish envoy Nils Lillieroot, the Brandenburg envoy Ezechiel von Spanheim and his wife, the Venetian ambassador Girolamo Venier, the Danish envoy Henning Meyercrone, and the Imperial envoy Wenzel Ferdinand von Lobkowitz. Besides these diplomats, they met with other high-ranking people such as the Earl of Sandwich, James Oxenden and his wife, Charles II's former mistress Louise de Kéroualle, and a certain Marquis d'Hencour.[33] The same was true for Istanbul, where they met with the Dutch ambassador Jacob Colyer and his wife, the Dutch consul Daniel Jan de Hochepied and his wife, and the French ambassador Pierre Girardin.[34] Lady Montagu even complained about 'all my time having been taken up with receiving visits' in Istanbul.[35]

Ambassadresses also met with foreign envoys and their wives without their spouse being present. Following Moser it was a custom 'never called into question' that after the arrival of an ambassadress at a court all other envoys and their wives had to give her the 'first visit'.[36] Numerous entries in Trumbull's diaries indicate that his wife was enjoying a busy social life: 'My deare went to Mad[ame] Spanheims', 'dutchess o[f] Port[s]m[ou]th came to visit my wife', 'found wife at La[dy] Oxendens' are only a few examples of the many recorded visits.[37] But ambassadresses by no means only met with women in their husband's absence.[38] Trumbull reported that the 'Venet[ian] ambass[ado]r came to see my wife; I s[ai]d, I waited on him downe staires'.[39] Similarly Lady Montagu 'had the honour of being invited to dinner by several of the first people of quality' in Vienna.[40] She then met with the Spanish ministers 'Count Oropesa and General Puebla', 'Count Schlick, High Chancellor of Bohemia' and 'Count Tarrocco, who accompanies the amiable Prince of Portugal'. Additionally, she met with Prince Eugene of Savoy 'very often'.[41]

These meetings did not only take place in the seclusion of the embassy palaces. On many occasions, ambassadresses encountered court society at several courtly amusements. During her stay in Vienna, Lady Montagu for example reported being at the opera or the comedy on several occasions.[42] In almost the same manner, Trumbull mentioned that in Paris his

wife—sometimes together with him—attended many such events, including balls (often together with Lady Spanheim), the comedy, the opera, or the Jesuit theatre. Besides these outings, they also went to 'see the Gobelins' or to 'see some hangings at the Hotel Conti'. Apparently Elizabeth Trumbull attended religious events such as the Feast of Corpus Christi or a 'nun professe' independently of her husband. Finally, an important social activity, in which the couple took part together, was walking through the royal gardens. Several times they 'took aire' in the *Jardin des Tuileries*, the *Plaine de Grenelle*, or the *Bois de Vincennes*, often accompanied by other high-ranking nobles such as the envoys Lillieroot or Lobkowitz.[43] Far from being just the leisure activities of a bored noble elite, these festivities were an integral component of court culture. Early modern courts were face-to-face communities where communication took place 'among those present'[44] and where the European aristocracy through participation constituted itself as supra-regional leading elite.[45] Remarkably, Ottoman envoys that came to Europe also took part in the social and courtly life and thereby met with the wives of the local aristocracy.[46]

In this regard, a fundamental difference between western European courts and the Sublime Porte appears: neither in Istanbul nor in Edirne did a comparable courtly space of communication exist, where common festivals or amusements occurred.[47] Instead, social gatherings of the diplomatic community seem to have taken place only within the European embassies, apparently sometimes supplemented by visits of Ottoman subjects.[48] Inside the embassies women could meet with Ottoman officials without their husbands. When one morning in 1736 the *kapudan paşa* came into the French embassy the ambassador Louis-Sauveur de Villeneuve was still busy preparing his morning toilet. Nevertheless, the pasha entered the 'second hall' where he found Lady Villeneuve, 'alone and without a dragoman'. Obviously the pasha enjoyed the following meeting very well as he afterwards declared 'that the reception of the ambassadress was worth much more than that of the ambassador'.[49]

The only kind of courtly events that European diplomats were allowed to join in the Ottoman Empire, it seems, were processions of the monarch. In 1688 for instance, Sir and Lady Trumbull went to Sultan Suleiman II's procession to the mosque of Youb; so did Lady Montagu in 1717.[50] Despite the contrasting social traditions of diplomatic communities between western Europe and the Ottoman Empire, the everyday business within the embassy seems not have been very different. As part of the 'diplomatic working couple' ambassadresses managed the household together with their husbands and even engaged in diplomatic negotiations.

Status, sex and precedence

Despite regarding the management of the embassy household as the ambassadress' major priority, in the greater part of his treatise Moser dealt

with the status of ambassadresses according to international law. Apparently their status was never unquestioned: that the wives of ambassadors possessed a particular title had not been doubted since the peace congress of Westphalia, Moser stated, but their 'personal rights' had only spread gradually throughout European courts. However, he stated, the essential difference between male and female envoys was the fact that the latter lacked a 'character repraesentatitius'. Early modern ambassadors not only acted as diplomats, but acted symbolically 'as if' they actually were the prince: 'Ambassadors as by a kind of fiction are considered to represent those who sent them', as Hugo Grotius stated.[51] Ambassadresses by contrast were not able to fulfil this function, Moser stated. They were not equipped with credentials by their monarch and if they went to an audience, this could be seen as merely a 'visit' or a 'conversation'. 'This is a true contradiction: Being a female envoy, without having the character.'[52] Even the Marèchelle de Guébriant, who in 1645 was sent on a diplomatic mission to Poland and therefore could be considered a 'real ambassadress', in Moser's eyes was lacking the 'certain character', or representational quality, of an ambassador.[53]

Moser thus made clear that the prominent status of an ambassadress solely rested on the 'dignity of her husband'. In this regard he was following a classical position also formulated by Bodin: 'honor, dignitie, & nobilitie, dependeth wholly of men, and so of the husband, and not of the wife: which is so true by the receiued customes and laws of all people'.[54] In the same manner Wicquefort argued that special ambassadorial rights such as diplomatic immunity were transferred to the ambassadress from her husband, 'who is the Person that makes her enjoy the Protection of the Law of Nations, which is unacquainted with the Quality of Embassadress'.[55] For the lawyer Cornelius van Bynkershoek in turn, the diplomatic immunity of the ambassadors' wives came from the simple fact that they were members of the diplomatic suite.[56]

Remarkably, an insult to an ambassadress therefore did not necessarily affect her monarch. If the ambassador felt insulted 'only as a husband' the matter was regarded as a 'private concern'. But if he felt insulted 'as an ambassador' there was no doubt that 'his prince was directly offended' too.[57] This was always the case when the incident occurred in a diplomatic context. When, for example, Seigneur de Bonneuil, *introducteur des ambassadeurs* at Versailles, prohibited Lady Trumbull from sitting down during her audience, this was regarded as a clear insult to the ambassador and, by extension, the king. Bonneuil therefore had to calm the situation afterwards and issue an official apology to Trumbull.[58]

The dependence of the ambassadress' legal status on that of her husband found its equivalent in her ceremonial treatment. As Moser underlined, no formal rights existed for the ambassadress and her honourable treatment was 'not a duty, but a mere civility' that solely lay in the 'discretion of the sovereign'.[59] But in courtly practice the elaborate early modern system of diplomatic ranks, for instance ambassadors, residents, envoyés, or agents, were in

fact clearly reflected on the women's side.[60] While the wives of ambassadors received a 'proper audience' those of minor ranks 'only were presented to court'. An ambassadress was allowed to use 'the same equipage as her husband, with all the like sticking advantages' such as the number of horses drawing the carriage. And, keeping in line with a strict hierarchy, female envoys with higher ranks had precedence over those with minor ranks.[61] 'I am the envy of the whole town, having, by their own customs, the pas before them all', Lady Montagu boasted as she described the consequences of her husband's high status for her own ceremonial treatment in Vienna.[62]

Although the ambassadress' treatment stemmed from her husband's rank, she also enjoyed the appropriate privileges in his absence. According to Moser, even when travelling alone she enjoyed 'all rights of inviolability, honour und ceremonial according to the laws of nations and diplomacy'.[63] However, it remained unclear what form exactly the honourable treatment had to take. Although an ambassadress had no formal rights to be treated according to her husband's status, Moser stated that in most cases the host court granted her all appropriate honours, not least with the intention to flatter the envoy's home court.[64]

When socializing with each other, women scrupulously paid attention to the correct adherence of precedential rights. Unsurprisingly, this could lead to serious conflicts about ceremonial questions. During her stay in Ratisbon, for instance, Lady Montagu declared that the 'ladies' were in no way inferior to their husbands in participating in ceremonial quarrels.[65] From Vienna she amusedly reported one of these quarrels, in which two ladies in their coaches met late at night and, 'not being able to adjust the ceremonial of which should go back, sat there with equal gallantry till two in the morning'.[66]

All this only mattered in encounters between women. When an ambassadress was meeting with a man, the relevant category for her treatment was not her status, but her sex. According to Moser, ambassadresses enjoyed 'the rights of the fair sex' so that men always allowed them respect, even if they had a higher rank.[67] 'Embassadrixes have no share in the Character, and nothing is their due, but what cannot be refus'd to their Sex', Wicquefort asserted.[68] When, for example, William Trumbull met the Marchesa Bentivoglio on his mission to Florence in 1687, he took off his hat although as a representative of a sovereign monarch he enjoyed the right to keep it on.[69] When the Marchese thereupon asked him 'severall times' to put the hat back on, Trumbull refused the plea, insisting that he 'knew the respect due to ladies, & th[a]t if the k[ing] my m[aste]r were here he w[oul]d pay her the same civility'.[70] In early modern political ritual, a man allowing a woman to take a preferential place was thus a question of 'civility' and not one of status.

Ambassadresses at court in western Europe and Istanbul

Just as the ambassadress' status remained unclear throughout the early modern period, so did her ceremonial treatment: 'the European courts do

not have one way of thinking about the esteem of the female envoy', Moser declared.[71] In Vienna, Lady Montagu experienced this first-hand: 'If I should undertake to tell you all the particulars, in which the manners here differ from ours, I must write a whole quire of the dullest stuff that ever was read, or printed without being read'. She thus concluded that 'gallantry and good-breeding are as different, in different climates, as morality and religion'.[72]

The question of ceremonial treatment became relevant from the very beginning of a diplomatic mission. The officials of all towns that an ambassador passed through on his way to his destination were obliged to welcome him—and his wife.[73] Trumbull noted these kinds of interactions, for instance describing that after their arrival in France, the lieutenant-general of Normandy, Marquis de Beuvron, 'came to visit my wife, & invited us to din[n]er' the following day. In the same manner the governor of Livorno or the grand master of Malta welcomed and accommodated the couple during its stay.[74]

When arriving at his destination an ambassador normally had his 'solemn entry' into the residence without his wife.[75] Thus, when Lord and Lady Trumbull arrived in Paris, he left her behind at Pontoise and made his entry on his own, while she followed later in the afternoon.[76] The same apparently was true for Istanbul. When the new French ambassador to the Porte, Pierre Girardin, arrived on New Year's Eve 1685 'his lady came privatly a shoare, but he remain'd aboard till noon next day'.[77] A good insight into the modality of entering a court is provided by the report of Trumbull's embassy to Florence. To avoid 'any trouble' Trumbull decided that his wife should 'come in privately the same evening' as his own entry and not 'publickly the next night after'. She then came unnoticed in a coach with six horses to the grand duke's palace, where Cosimo welcomed her 'att the bottome of the private staires' and let her up to her apartment.[78] The ceremonial protocol did not allow a joint entry, because due to her sex an ambassadress may have been treated more favourably than her husband's status permitted. This bore the risk that observers might purposefully confuse the ambassador's status with the civilities paid to his wife.

After having taken residence in the palace, Lady Trumbull immediately undertook diplomatic tasks. She received the two sons of the grand duke, Ferdinando and Gian Gastone, for their inaugural visits in her 'antichamber'—without her husband being present. She partly even outdid her husband ceremonially. When Trumbull 'demanded a private aud[ienc]e of the g[ran]t dutchesse' she refused him telling him that she was expecting his wife to come, 'who went thither & was rec[eive]d *assez cavalirem[en]t* to musick & a banquet, where she met & discoursd with the young princesse'.[79]

Lady Trumbull also accompanied her husband to public performances and gatherings, thereby occupying a prominent, visible position. At a public dinner hosted by the grand duke, Cosimo led Lady Trumbull by the right hand during the 'ceremonie in going to dinner' and thus granted her 'the

place of hon[our]'. Trumbull at the same time went 'a little before the g[rand] d[uke], not to give him the middle place'. Apparently, this place was incompatible with Cosimo's status. Although her sex meant that Lady Trumbull could not compromise the duke's honour, her presence still complicated the situation and made necessary a ceremonial arrangement that would express the existing (male) hierarchy. The same pattern emerged in the seating order at the ducal table. If the dimensions of Trumbull's drawing are correct, Cosimo and Lady Trumbull sat very close together at one end of the table while the ambassador was placed with the two princes at the other end. That the ambassadress in this situation served as the grand duke's direct conversation partner clearly illustrates the important role she played during the mission.

Furthermore, through contact with a male ruler, ambassadresses could constitute a crucial element in broader political considerations. At least one fictitious story about the 'diplomatic working couple' Countess Adelaide Roffeni and her husband Charles Talbot, duke of Shrewsbury and English ambassador to France, articulated concerns about how women—and their bodies—could be strategically used to foster political interests.[80] The ambassadress here vehemently advanced Jacobite interests to the French king Louis XIV and tried to persuade him to intervene in the English line of succession. Although she described herself as 'Anna's great ambassadress' she unequivocally stated that the queen 'has no right the crown to wear'. She therefore begged the French monarch to provide a 'pow'rful fleet' and to 'baffle all the Hanoverian line': 'Now is your time to push for Britain's crown, / And fix king James the third upon the throne.' But as the anonymous author further suggested, the ambassadress' skills were not primarily diplomatic. For the only reason she was the main speaker was Louis's sensitivity to her feminine charms. After having finished her speech, the 'tyrant' was overcome with excitement and completely enamoured. The following night, Lady Shrewsbury consequently visited the king in his bedchamber and they 'spend their time in politicks—and play'. But again it was not her, but the ambassador who pulled the strings: 'With an ambitious pleasure', the text ends, he 'led her himself unto the royal bed'. Of course, the main



Figure 7.1 Seating order at the ducal table in Florence. BL Add. MS 52280, fo. 37r. © British Library Board, London.

purpose of this fictional story was to criticize Charles Talbot, who throughout his life was suspected of supporting Jacobitism,[81] by depicting him as a cuckold. Nevertheless, it illustrates that women in the early modern period were seen as able to play a strongly political role.

Occasions where the 'working couple' of ambassador and wife acted in unison remained rare, however. In most cases they acted separately, receiving courtly visits or having audiences with high-ranking nobles. For example, when Lady Montagu visited Vienna in 1716 she had the honour to meet both the empress and the emperor without her husband. On her 'first going to court' she initially met with Elisabeth Christine in a 'private audience' and 'according to ceremony' talked with her for half an hour. Subsequently Charles VI entered his wife's chamber and also talked with the ambassadress 'in a very obliging manner'.[82] When she visited Vienna for the second time she again had an audience with the empress and the emperor.[83] Whether Lady Trumbull met with monarchs other than the grand duke of Florence is not clear, but she did accompany her husband when he went to Windsor and Versailles.[84]

Although ambassadresses met with male as well as female courtiers,[85] their major task was evidently to maintain contact with the women at court. This was due to the fact that early modern courts were divided into two households, one of the monarch and one of his wife. While the first was exclusively male, the latter consisted to a large extent of female courtiers, such as maids of honour or ladies-in-waiting.[86] If the monarch was a woman, the inner circle of this female household could become an even more crucial factor of political power.[87] But no general rule regarding the gendering of the royal household's structure existed in Europe and it differed from court to court. Lady Montagu consequently expressed her surprise that only ladies were present during her audience with Empress Elisabeth Christine, as this was contrary to English custom. She also paid visits to the emperor's mother Eleonore Magdalene and the Empress Dowager Wilhelmine Amalia. When leaving, she visited Empress Elisabeth Christine again for her farewell audience.[88] During her following travels she often met with female rulers such as Christine Louise of Oettingen, the empress's mother, in Blankenburg or Anne Marie d'Orléans, the duchess of Savoy, in Turin.[89] A similar situation pertained during Lady Anne Fanshawe's time in Lisbon and Madrid or Lady Dorothea Juel's time in Stockholm.[90]

This picture changes fundamentally when turning to the Ottoman court. Here, since the late sixteenth century the institution of the 'imperial harem' had emerged: a sealed precinct inside the palace that housed the women and children of the royal household. No man but the sultan (and the black eunuchs) had access to this sphere. At the same time, the harem became one of the main political organs in the Ottoman Empire where women, very much in contrast to the western European world, held administrative offices and could legitimately exercise political power.[91] For the most part, this was due to the fact that the Ottoman political system was explicitly based on family

bonds and the bureaucratic elite came from and was educated within the imperial household.[92]

The head of the harem was the *valide sultan*, the mother of the reigning sultan, who supervised and guided its bureaucratic administration. She was the only harem member that, on official occasions, was allowed to appear outside the palace. In some cases, she even came in contact with male envoys. This was the case in 1690 when William and Elizabeth Trumbull went to see the current *valide sultan* and the future Sultan Ahmed at Hagia Sophia. As Trumbull remarked, they were received very courteously and even allowed to 'come in with o[u]r shoues on'.[93] Much earlier, in 1599 when Paul Pindar, the secretary of the English embassy, bestowed a royal gift from Queen Elizabeth I on Mehmed III's mother, Safiye allegedly developed a 'greate lyking' towards him and invited him for her 'private companye'. But this apparently went too far since the 'meetinge was croste'.[94]

The other high-ranking royal women did not have the opportunity to leave the palace. Still, as the imperial harem was a core of Ottoman government, the women living there had to build and maintain extensive networks to gather information.[95] One way of gaining information was to grant audiences to the wives of foreign envoys residing in Istanbul. Lady Trumbull for example went twice to an audience with the Sultana Ümmühan, an aunt of Mehmed IV.[96] Earlier English ambassadresses went to audiences with the *valide sultan*: for instance, Lady Anne Glover in 1607 and a few years later Lady Jane Wyche, who was summoned because the 'Sultanesse' 'had heard much of [her]'.[97]

In her letters, Lady Montagu reported several of her meetings with high-ranking Ottoman women. When staying with her husband in Edirne, she visited the 'widow of the captain-pasha' in her house, 'who refreshed me with coffee, sweetmeats, sherbet, &c. with all posible civility'.[98] During this time she also 'was invited to dine with the Grand-Vizier's lady', the 'Sultana Hafiten'. Normally she would have been granted a solemn audience, but 'to avoid any disputes about ceremony', she instead went 'incognito'. There, she allegedly enjoyed 'an entertainment which was never before given to any Christian'.[99] Contrary to western European custom,[100] she was only accompanied by women, namely a female servant and a Greek 'interpretess'.[101] But apparently she did not feel very comfortable during this meeting with her host's unfamiliar manners. When on the same evening she visited Fatima, the wife of the *kâhya*, the grand vizier's deputy, she felt 'another air than at the Grand-Vizier's'. This, she insisted, resulted from Fatima's exceedingly civilized manners, which in Lady Montagu's eyes would have even enabled her to 'be suddenly transported upon the most polite throne of Europe'.[102] About a year later she revisited the two women and again found Sultana Hafiten behaving like a stereotypical 'Turkish lady' that 'has lived secluded from the world' while her 'lovely friend, the fair Fatima' showed 'all the politeness and good-breeding of a court'.[103]

Because the 'female sphere' at the Porte was both sexually exclusive and a concentration of formal political power, ambassadresses here had a far greater importance than at western European courts. They had access to a precinct of government that was absolutely prohibited to their husbands, 'as it is no less than death for a man to be found in one of these places'.[104] If diplomats wanted to deal with the women of the sultan's household there were not many other options but through female envoys. Thus, ambassadresses in the Ottoman Empire served as indispensable diplomatic brokers as they enabled communication through channels that otherwise could not have been used.

In contrast, in western Europe the competences of the 'diplomatic working couple' within the communication processes at court were not as clearly assigned. Although ambassadresses here also primarily had to maintain contact with the female members of the royal households, they also communicated with the men of the court. In many respects, husband and wife therefore acted in the same diplomatic arenas. Transferring the findings from the Ottoman court to western Europe, the question occurs in what way women gained a particular agency when the court was more rigidly divided along gendered lines.[105] In this regard, it can be assumed that when access and influence were more gender-specific resources, ambassadresses maybe did not have a greater, but a more exclusive room for political manoeuvring that was different from that of their husbands.

Conclusion

Contrary to the view of women's 'lacke of wisdome' supported by Bodin and others, Moser certified 'minister-like cleverness' for numerous ambassadresses. As this chapter has demonstrated, ambassadors' wives did play a fundamental role in various aspects of early modern diplomacy. Within the embassy's household they participated in important decisions concerning the embassy and its facilities. Ambassadresses took part in diplomatic meetings within the embassy and negotiated with foreign officials in their husband's absence. They received other diplomats and visited them in return. An important task was to maintain contact with the wives of the diplomats residing at the residence. At western European courts this often happened in the context of festivals or other courtly amusements, while at the Porte it happened inside the embassy palaces.

But despite the fundamental role of ambassadresses in early modern diplomacy, their status in the law of nations remained precariously somewhere between formal recognition and arbitrarily granted privileges. In early modern theory, privileges were often mere civilities that lay at the discretion of the host sovereign, since women generally were not able to 'represent' a monarch in the sense of the ambassadorial 'as if' function. Thus, their status and privileges, such as diplomatic immunity, were derived from their husband's status, which could lead to uncertainties when they were acting

alone. However, in practice this often seems not to have caused any trouble as ambassadresses normally enjoyed the rights and ceremonial treatment according to their husband's status. Besides, the relevant category for their treatment in encounters with men was normally their sex and not their status, as a result of which men generally deferred to women.

At court ambassadresses acted together with their husbands as well as on their own. In both cases they could fulfil fundamental functions in the common strategy of the 'diplomatic working couple'. Their undefined status often allowed them to avoid the formalities that bound their husbands—and thus freed them to expedite diplomatic business by other means. An important field of activity was certainly the maintenance of a female network, especially in regard to the royal family. As has been demonstrated, this was nowhere more true than at the Ottoman court. Here, due to the strict division between male and female spheres, the ambassador and his wife always acted separately. Because ambassadresses at the Porte had access to an area of government that their husbands did not and thus served as diplomatic brokers, they were of far greater importance there than in western Europe.

Notes

* I am very thankful to Matthias Bähr, Anne MacKinney and Xenia von Tippelskirch for their comments and suggestions.

1 F. C. von Moser, 'Die Gesandtin nach ihren Rechten und Pflichten', in *Kleine Schriften, Zur Erläuterung des Staats- und Völcker-Rechts, wie auch des Hof- und Canzley-Ceremoniels* (Frankfurt, 1752), iii.310–1. In the same year an abridged French translation was published: *L'ambassadrice et ses droits* (Berlin, 1752). All quotations are my translations from the original German version.

2 However, the debate became more multifaceted during the Enlightenment. The Moravians did not question patriarchy, but they allowed women to hold offices and act in leading positions: B. P. Smaby, 'Female piety among eighteenth-century Moravians', *Pennsylvania History* 64 (1997), 151–67. On early modern notions regarding women's government see N. Z. Davis, 'Women in politics', in N. Z. Davis and A. Farge (eds.), *A history of women in the west, vol. III: Renaissance and Enlightenment paradoxes*, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA, 1994), 167–83; C. Fauré (ed.), *Political and historical encyclopedia of women* (New York, 2003), pp. 13–108; S. L. Jansen, *Debating women, politics, and power in early modern Europe* (New York, 2008).

3 Bodin, *The six bookes of a common-weale: out of the French and Latine copies, done into English, by Richard Knolles* (London, 1606), p. 405. On Bodin see C. Opitz, 'Female sovereignty and the subordination of women in the works of Martin Luther, Jean Calvin and Jean Bodin', in C. Fauré, *Encyclopedia, Political and historical encyclopedia of women* (New York, 2003) pp. 19–21.

4 Bodin, *The six bookes*, pp. 746–54.

5 I use the English translation: A. de Wicquefort, *The embassador and his functions*, trans. Mr Digby (London, 1716), p. 5.

6 J. Daybell, 'Introduction: rethinking women and politics in early modern England', in Daybell (ed.), *Women and politics in early modern England, 1450–1700* (Aldershot, 2004), pp. 1–20; D. Nolde, 'Was ist Diplomatie und wenn ja, wie viele? Herausforderungen und Perspektiven einer Geschlechtergeschichte der frühneuzeitlichen Diplomatie', *Historische Anthropologie*, 21 (2013), 179–98.

7 C. Bastian, E. Dade, and E. Ott, 'Weibliche Diplomatie? Frauen als außenpolitische Akteurinnen im 18. Jahrhundert', in C. Bastian, E. Dade, H. von Thiessen, and K. Keller (eds.), *Das Geschlecht der Diplomatie: Geschlechterrollen in den Außenbeziehungen vom Spätmittelalter bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 2014), pp. 103–14; J. Duindam, 'The politics of female households: afterthoughts', in N. Akkerman and B. Houben (eds.), *The politics of female households: ladies-in-waiting across early modern Europe* (Leiden, 2014), pp. 365–70.

8 See for example S. Frye and K. Robertson (eds.), *Maids and mistress, cousins and queens: women's alliances in early modern England* (Oxford, 1999); K. Keller, *Hofdamen. Amtsträgerinnen im Wiener Hofstaat des 17. Jahrhunderts* (Köln, 2005); C. Bastian, *Verhandeln in Briefen: Frauen in der höfischen Diplomatie des frühen 18. Jahrhunderts* (Köln, 2013).

9 Notable exceptions are C. James, 'Women and diplomacy in Renaissance Italy', in G. Sluga and C. James (eds.), *Women, diplomacy and international politics since 1500* (London, 2016), pp. 13–29; L. Oliván Santaliestra, 'Lady Anne Fanshawe, ambassadress of England at the court of Madrid (1664–1666)', in ibid., pp. 68–85.

10 H. Wunder, *He is the sun, she is the moon: women in early modern Germany* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 63–84. On the use of this concept in diplomatic history see R. Averkorn, 'Das Arbeitspaar als Regelfall: Hochadelige Frauen in den Außenbeziehungen iberischer Frontier-Gesellschaften des Spätmittelalters', in Bastian, Dade, von Thiessen, and Keller, *Das Geschlecht der Diplomatie*, pp. 15–32.

11 See B. J. Harris, *English aristocratic women, 1450–1550. Marriage and family, property and careers* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 61–87.

12 G. Markham, *The English house-wife, containing the inward and outward vertues which ought to be in a compleat woman* (London, 1683), pp. 1–2.

13 K. Harvey, *The little republic: masculinity and domestic authority in eighteenth-century Britain* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 27–43; M. Overton et al., *Production and consumption in English households: 1600–1750* (London, 2004), pp. 65–86; B. Lemire, *The business of everyday life: gender, practice and social politics in England, c. 1600–1900* (Manchester, 2005), pp. 187–226.

14 Elizabeth Trumbull married William Trumbull in 1670. He served as England's ambassador to France (1685/86) and the Ottoman Empire (1687–1691). See S. H. Mendelson and M. E. O'Connor, '"Thy passionately loving sister and faithfull friend": Anne Dormer's letters to her sister Lady Trumbull', in N. J. Miller and N. Yavneh (eds.), *Sibling relations and gender in the early modern world: sisters, brothers and others* (Aldershot, 2006), pp. 206–15; R. Clark, *Sir William Trumbull in Paris, 1685–1686* (Cambridge, 1938); J-P. A. Ghobrial, *The whispers of cities: information flows in Istanbul, London, and Paris in the age of William Trumbull* (Oxford, 2013).

15 Mary Montagu married Edward Wortley Montagu in 1712. Although Edward was appointed ambassador to the Ottoman Porte in 1716, changes in the politico–military situation between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires meant that their journey was interrupted. They travelled extensively throughout Europe before reaching Istanbul in the spring of 1717. See I. Grundy, *Lady Mary Wortley Montagu* (Oxford, 1999); idem., 'Montagu, Lady Mary Wortley [née Lady Mary Pierrepont] (bap. 1689, d. 1762)', *ODNB*.

16 BL Additional MS 52279 (*France and Constantinople*), 52280 (*Florence*), 34799 (*Constantinople*).

17 For the questions asked here, it is only of small importance that her published 'Turkish Embassy Letters' were a compiled and revised version of the original ones sent. P. Spedding, 'Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, manuscript publication and the vanity of popular applause', *Script & Print*, 33 (2009), 151–4.

18 Moser, 'Die Gesandtin', pp. 314–5, 152.

19 Ibid., p. 206. On the ambassadress' management of the ambassadorial household see also H. Jacobsen, *Luxury and power: the material world of the Stuart diplomat, 1660–1714* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 54–60.
20 Harvey, *The little republic*, p. 24.
21 Moser, 'Die Gesandtin', p. 154.
22 Ibid.
23 J. Hotman, *The Ambassador* (London, 1603), D5v–D6r.
24 L. Rousseau de Chamoy, *L'Idée du Parfait Ambassadeur* (Paris, 1912), p. 29.
25 *France and Constantinople*, fo. 18r. On the difficulties of finding suitable accommodation see Clark, *Trumbull in Paris*, 21.
26 Quoted after Jacobsen, *Luxury and power*, 54.
27 *France and Constantinople*, fos. 45r, 50r.
28 TNA, SP 105/113, fo. 90v.
29 Oliván Santaliestra, 'Anne Fanshawe'. At monarchical courts in Renaissance Italy for example, aristocratic women were educated in diplomatic skills and knowledge of protocol in preparation for their later life as consorts. See James, 'Women and diplomacy'. On the general involvement of officials' wives in early modern public administration see U. Ludwig, 'Verwaltung als häusliche Praxis', in A. Brendecke (ed.), *Praktiken der Frühen Neuzeit: Akteure—Handlungen—Artefakte* (Cologne, 2015), 188–98.
30 Quoted after D. B. Horn, *The British diplomatic service. 1689–1789* (Oxford, 1961), 40.
31 *Constantinople*, fo. 6v.
32 Moser, 'Die Gesandtin', p. 315.
33 *France and Constantinople*, fos. 14v, 32r, 49v, 51r, 59v, 66r, 67r, 69r.
34 Ibid., fos. 94v, 96r, 97v, 109v, 152v, 169r, 203r, 204v, 205v.
35 *The letters and works of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu*, ed. J. A. S. Wharncliffe, 2nd edn, 3 vols. (London, 1837) (*LLM*) II.21–7. Similar: ibid., I.392–5.
36 Moser, 'Die Gesandtin', pp. 201, 162.
37 *France and Constantinople*, fos. 22r, 37r, 39v, 43r, 45r, 64r, 66v.
38 Oliván Santaliestra, 'Anne Fanshawe', 75–9.
39 *France and Constantinople*, fo. 74r.
40 *LLM*, I.275–9.
41 Ibid., II.128–32; I.325–9.
42 *LLM*, I.284–8,301–5, 322–5.
43 *France and Constantinople*, fos. 20v, 27v, 28r, 37r, 41r, 47v, 50v, 51v, 53v, 55v, 56r, 57r, 57v, 60r, 63r, 64r, 65v, 66r, 66v, 71r, 73v.
44 On this concept, which is based on Niklas Luhmann's system theory, see R. Schlögl, 'Kommunikation und Vergesellschaftung unter Anwesenden: Formen des Sozialen und ihre Transformation in der Frühen Neuzeit', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 34 (2008), 155–224.
45 On early modern courtly festive culture see J. R. Mulryne, H. Watanabe-O'Kelly, and M. Shewring (eds.), *Europa triumphans: court and civic festivals in early modern Europe*, 2 vols. (Aldershot, 2004).
46 D. Do Paço, Chapter 9, this volume, p. 176.
47 P. Mansel, *Constantinople: city of the world's desire, 1453–1924* (London, 2006), p. 207.
48 Ibid., pp. 207–8; Ghobrial, *Whispers of cities*, pp. 79–80.
49 A. Vandal, *Une ambassade française en Orient sous Louis XV: La mission du marquis de Villeneuve 1728–1741* (Paris, 1887), pp. 251–2.
50 *Constantinople*, fo. 20v; *LLM*, I.368–70.
51 H. Grotius, *De juri belli ac pacis tres*, trans. Francis W. Kelsey (Oxford, 1925), p. 443. See also L. S. and M. Frey, *The history of diplomatic immunity* (Columbus, 1999), pp. 208–12; A. Krischer, 'Das Gesandtschaftswesen und das

vormoderne Völkerrecht', in M. Jucker, M. Kintzinger, and R. C. Schwinges (eds.), *Rechtsformen internationaler Politik: Theorie, Norm und Praxis vom 12. bis 18. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2011), pp. 197–239.

52 Moser, 'Die Gesandtin', pp. 140–3.

53 Ibid., pp. 143–8. On Guébriant's mission see A. Tischer, 'Eine französische Botschafterin in Polen 1645–1646: die Gesandtschaftsreise Renée de Guébriants zum Hofe Władisławs IV.', *L'Homme*, 12 (2001), 305–21.

54 Moser, 'Die Gesandtin', p. 140; Bodin, *six bookes*, p. 752.

55 Wicquefort, *The embassador*, p. 5.

56 C. van Bynkershoek, *De foro legatorum liber singularis: a monograph on the jurisdiction over ambassadors in both civil and criminal cases. English translation by Gordon J. Laing* (Oxford, 1946), pp. 74–8.

57 Moser, 'Die Gesandtin', pp. 294–5.

58 *France and Constantinople*, fo. 67v.

59 Moser, 'Die Gesandtin', pp. 214, 195–9.

60 See J. Black, *A history of diplomacy* (London, 2010), 71–3; Krischer, 'Das Gesandtschaftswesen', 201–27.

61 Moser, 'Die Gesandtin', pp. 164, 167, 203, 274.

62 *LLM*, I.298–301.

63 Moser, 'Die Gesandtin', p. 156.

64 Ibid., pp. 156–9.

65 *LLM*, I.272–5.

66 Ibid., 298–301.

67 Moser, 'Die Gesandtin', pp. 204–5, 274.

68 Wicquefort, *The embassador*, p. 184.

69 On this symbol of sovereignty see G. P. Marchal, 'Konfrontation mit fremden Normen symbolischer Repräsentation: die Abenteuer einer eidgenössischen Gesandtschaft am Hofe des Sonnenkönigs', in A. Hahn, G. Melville, and W. Röcke (eds.), *Norm und Krise von Kommunikation: Inszenierungen literarischer und sozialer Interaktion im Mittelalter* (Berlin, 2006), 193–206.

70 *Florence*, fos. 33v-4r.

71 Moser, 'Die Gesandtin', p. 149. It is not possible to provide a detailed account on the differences Moser gives. Like Wicquefort he considered that the French court gave greatest acknowledgement to female envoys. Some of his assumptions, however, appear erroneous, such as his claim that ambassadors' wives were not recognized or ceremonially received as 'ambassadrices' in Vienna, which Lady Montagu's accounts clearly contradicts. See ibid., pp. 149–51, 167–94; see also Wicquefort, *The embassador*, p. 183.

72 *LLM*, I.301–5, 294–8.

73 See for example C. Vogel, 'Gut ankommen: der Amtsantritt eines französischen Botschafters im Osmanischen Reich im späten 17. Jahrhundert', *Historische Anthropologie* 21 (2013), 165–8.

74 *France and Constantinople*, fos. 13v, 86r; *Florence*, fos. 28v-29v.

75 Although Moser mentions some exceptions from this rule: Moser, 'Die Gesandtin', p. 156.

76 *France and Constantinople*, fo. 14r.

77 BL, Stowe MS 220, fos. 96v-97r.

78 *Florence*, fos. 30v-38r.

79 Ibid.

80 'The British ambassadress's speech to the French king, soon after the peace of Utrecht', in *The new foundling hospital for wit. Being a collection of curious pieces in verses and prose. By several eminent persons*, 2nd part (London, 1769), pp. 74–6.

81 S. Handley, 'Talbot, Charles, duke of Shrewsbury (1660–1718)', *ODNB*.

82 *LLM*, I.288–93.
83 Ibid., pp. 325–9.
84 *France and Constantinople*, fos. 6v, 72v.
85 On the decisive importance of communication between ambassadors and female rulers (and mistresses) see Bastian, *Verhandeln in Briefen*.
86 See R. Kleinman, 'Social dynamics at the French court: the household of Anne of Austria', *French Historical Studies*, 16 (1990), 517–35; Harris, *English aristocratic women*, pp. 210–40; Keller, *Hofdamen*.
87 E. A. Brown, '"Companion me with my mistress": Cleopatra, Elizabeth I and their waiting women', in Frye and Robertson (eds.), *Maids and mistresses*, pp. 131–45.
88 *LLM*, I.288–93, 317–9.
89 Ibid., I.320–2; II.104–5.
90 Oliván Santaliestra, 'Anne Fanshawe'; P. Lindström and S. Norrhem, *Flattering Alliances: Scandinavia, diplomacy, and the Austrian–French balance of power, 1648–1740* (Lund, 2013), 173–4.
91 L. Peirce, *The imperial harem: women and sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York, 1993); G. Necipoğlu, *Architecture, ceremonial, and power: the Topkapi Palace in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries* (New York, 1991), 159–83; P. Pedani, 'Safiye's household and Venetian diplomacy', *Turcica*, 32 (2000), 9–32.
92 Peirce, *The imperial harem*, 7–9, 149; C. V. Findley, 'Patrimonial household organization and factional activity in the Ottoman ruling class, in O. Okyar and H. Inalcik (eds.), *Türkiye'nin sosyal ve ekonomik tarihi (1071–1920) = Social and Economic History of Turkey (1071–1920)* (Ankara, 1980), 227–35.
93 *France and Constantinople*, fo. 151v.
94 J. T. Bent (ed.), *Early voyages and travels in the Levant* (New York, 1964), p. 63.
95 Peirce, *Imperial harem*, pp. 143–9; Pedani, 'Safiye's household'.
96 *France and Constantinople*, fos. 133v, 157r. On this evidence John-Paul Ghobrial argued that Lady Trumbull and Sultana Ümmühan 'developed a relationship': Ghobrial, *Whispers of cities*, 119–20.
97 G. MacLean, *The rise of Oriental travel: English visitors to the Ottoman Empire, 1580–1720* (Basingstoke, 2004), 223–5.
98 *LLM*, II.11–20.
99 This topos was common in reports from the Ottoman Empire. See F. Kühnel, '"no Ambassadour heretofore ever having the like": die Übertretung der diplomatischen Rituale und die Stellung der Gesandten am osmanischen Hof', in Garnier and Vogel (eds.), *Interkulturelle Ritualpraxis in der Frühen Neuzeit*, pp. 95–122.
100 For instance when Lady Anne Fanshawe visited Queen Mariana of Austria in Madrid she was accompanied by a male interpreter. Oliván Santaliestra, 'Anne Fanshawe', 72.
101 *LLM*, II.3–11.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid., II.43–55.
104 Ibid., I.353–8.
105 In *Flattering Alliances*, pp. 175–6, Peter Lindström and Svante Norrhem for example assume that in the seventeenth century women at the Swedish court had a much greater impact than at the Danish court.

8 The Dutch merchant-diplomat in comparative perspective

Embassies to the court of Aurangzeb, 1660–1666

Guido van Meersbergen

Introduction

At daybreak on 13 August 1662, in the midst of northern India's monsoon season, the Dutch envoy Dircq van Adrichem (1629–1665) made his way to Delhi's Hall of Public Audience (*Diwan-i-Am* or *Am-Khas*) to appear before Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707), the reigning Mughal emperor. As the heavy rain, which had commenced the previous night, continued unabated, the envoy and his modest entourage faced the difficult task of reaching the imperial palace without soaking their clothes and spoiling the gifts they carried. Failing to appear at the appointed time would harm the interests of his employer, the Dutch East India Company (*Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* or VOC), hence Van Adrichem steered his horses, carts, and palanquins through Delhi's mud-covered streets. Having entered the Red Fort, the ambassador was brought to Iftikhar Khan, the imperial stable master (*Akhtah Begi*) on whom the Dutch relied for assistance. After about half an hour, news reached Van Adrichem that the bad weather compelled Aurangzeb to stay indoors. The monarch was still recovering from the illness that had struck him some months earlier.[1] This scenario repeated itself twice over the next month, so that it was not until mid-September that the envoy obtained the desired first audience, five weeks after arriving in Delhi.[2]

By analysing Van Adrichem's embassy to the court of Aurangzeb, this chapter sheds light on three interrelated aspects: cross-cultural diplomacy, the significance of merchants as interlocutors in early modern inter-state relations, and the VOC's place in the Mughal political landscape. The picture that emerges from Van Adrichem's embassy journal is not that of inter-state diplomacy based on reciprocal exchange. The diplomat made no attempt to assert his sovereign's right to be treated as an equal member in a society of princes as did, for example, the English ambassadors Sir Thomas Roe and Sir William Norris during their missions to the Mughal court.[3] As symbolized by the repeated deferral of the envoy's audience, the Dutch in Mughal India ranked low as diplomatic partners. Yet as armed merchants dwelling in Mughal domains they were familiar with imperial politics and culture in a way that royal ambassadors arriving from Europe were not. By examining

how Dutch missions were embedded in a larger configuration of social and political interactions at international, regional and local levels, the VOC's idiosyncratic position in Mughal India as inhabiting a grey area between minor foreign power and unorthodox domestic player becomes clear.

This chapter uses the term 'merchant-diplomat' to highlight the distinctive role of commercial agents in structuring exchanges between early modern polities, underscoring the significance of non-ambassadorial actors brought to light by the New Diplomatic History. The greater facility with which merchants could operate in diplomatic settings in the absence of, or unrestrained by, formalized inter-state relations and their accompanying protocol has been emphasized by a number of recent studies and was already recognized by contemporaries.[4] As Roe informed the East India Company (EIC) in 1616, a 'meaner agent' was likely to carry out diplomacy in Mughal India more effectively than he could himself without running the risk of compromising the honour of his sovereign.[5] The corporations the merchants served have also received new attention as diplomatic actors, either as state-like organizations acting by proxy, or as states in their own right.[6] As a recent argument has it, corporations such as the VOC 'proved more agile transnational interlocutors than the states who authorized them because of their ability to become willing tributaries to foreign states'.[7] Extending the gaze to Asia and fully integrating trading companies into the broad spectrum of state and non-state actors engaged in diplomatic exchange has clear potential for further enriching the inclusive perspectives on the transcultural 'co-production' of early modern diplomatic practices recently elaborated upon in the Mediterranean context.[8] The VOC's multifaceted diplomatic relations reveal how European merchant-diplomats adapted to, and were incorporated into, a set of distinct yet partially overlapping diplomatic networks, from posing as indigenized 'merchant-kings' in the Indonesian Archipelago to being subordinated as 'obedient servant[s]' in Tokugawa Japan.[9]

Van Adrichem's embassy reached Delhi in the midst of an extraordinary spell of diplomatic activity following the Mughal war of succession of 1657–1659. In the space of five years (1660–1665), envoys from Basra, Balkh, Bukhara, Kashgar, Persia, Mecca, Yemen, Hadhramaut, and Abyssinia made their appearance at Aurangzeb's court, while two French envoys arrived in 1666. This unique confluence of diplomatic missions invites us to compare Van Adrichem's conduct and reception to those of other foreign envoys. Dutch diplomatic materials have long been relatively neglected even by VOC historians, and until now Van Adrichem's mission remains primarily studied through the accounts of François Bernier, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, and Niccolao Manucci.[10] The analysis in this chapter rests on a contextual reading of Van Adrichem's embassy journal and related documentation, which will be examined alongside the accounts of the aforementioned travellers and the principal chronicle of Aurangzeb's reign, the *Maasir-i-Alamgiri* of Muhammad Saqi Must'ad Khan.[11] Seen through a comparative lens,

the various embassies to Aurangzeb's court provide an exceptional testing ground for hypotheses regarding early modern cross-cultural diplomacy.

A previous generation of scholarship envisaged Mughal–European diplomatic encounters as hampered by misunderstanding and semiotic disconnect, in short as characterized by cultural incommensurability.[12] The structuralist conception of culture as an internally coherent and closed-off system of signs, which underlies this interpretation, has been rejected by recent commentators.[13] Sanjay Subrahmanyam has cogently argued that the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal empires 'belonged to overlapping cultural zones', while early modern south Asian and European actors could create sufficient degrees of commensurability for cultural transfer to take place and relations to be mediated.[14] Van Adrichem's embassy substantiates the thesis of commensurability in Asian–European diplomatic exchange. Indeed, to analyse VOC diplomacy solely using the binary vocabulary of east–west encounters would be to miss the point that the Company's diplomatic profile was constituted through, and deeply embedded in, the various diplomatic circuits dotting the Indian Ocean space.

The Dutch merchant-diplomat in Mughal India

The VOC's presence in Mughal India originated in the early years of the seventeenth century and obtained a firmer footing during the latter half of Jahangir's reign (1605–1627). By the 1630s, Dutch trading operations were up and running throughout the western province of Gujarat and in the northern region around Agra, while the first inroads had been made further eastward in Bengal.[15] For the right to establish factories, the settlement of import and export duties, and legal protection in Mughal domains, the Company depended on agreements with local governors and the central government. On its part, the Mughal administration benefitted from increased tax income resulting from commercial expansion in its ports as well as from the influx of precious metals and foreign luxury goods. In addition, regulating relations with the various European 'merchant-warriors' was a means to curtail their predatory tendencies on the high seas and hence extend protection to Mughal subjects beyond the direct reach of the empire's military power.[16] This set of conditions formed the backdrop to all Mughal-Dutch diplomatic interactions. A crucial difference with Dutch diplomacy in north Africa and the Levant is that Dutch envoys in Mughal India and other parts of the Indian Ocean world acted on behalf of the VOC's governor-general in Batavia (modern-day Jakarta), not the States-General of the United Provinces.[17] Rather than aiming to establish bilateral treaties or contractual obligations—which would have been both foreign and offensive to the Mughal geopolitical outlook—the Dutch willingly posed as supplicants to the emperor soliciting his imperial commands (*farmans*).[18] Such edicts were addressed to Mughal officials and other local powerholders, and stipulated the privileges accorded to the 'Dutch nation' as a corporate

group living within the Mughal realm, an arrangement similar to the rights enjoyed by European communities in Ottoman lands as expressed in the Sultan's *ahdnames*.[19]

In practice, the durability and weight of the emperor's 'irrefutable commands' had various limitations.[20] The stipulations contained in a *farman* remained in force only until a new one superseded it. This circumstance led to considerable chagrin among European Company officials, although few commentators were as cynical as the English factors in Ahmadabad who sneered about 'this Kinges firmaunes that hee gives when hee is drunck and denyes when hee is sober'.[21] Since *farmans* expressed the will of the reigning monarch, they formally lost their validity as soon as a new ruler succeeded to the throne. The need to have up-to-date decrees at their disposal when dealing with local authorities following imperial successions or conquest is what induced the VOC to fit out the embassies led by Van Adrichem (1662), Joannes Bacherus (1689), and Joan Josua Ketelaar (1711–1713). Yet their diplomatic efforts did not stop there, as the degree to which magistrates complied with the provisions made in *farmans* varied considerably. Complaints about this state of affairs were a recurring theme in VOC as well as EIC correspondence, such as in 1635, when the provincial governor of Bengal denied the VOC free trade under his jurisdiction in spite of Shah Jahan's newly granted *farman*.[22] It was on account of their grievances with regard to being 'vexed' by lower-tier officials in their pursuit of profit that the bulk of VOC diplomacy in Mughal India was aimed at settling disputes that had originated at the local and provincial levels.

While having direct access to court was an important lever in negotiations with lower-level administrators, the Dutch played this trump card relatively sparingly because of the time and costs it required and their scepticism about the enforceability of imperial decrees. In December 1657, when rumours about Shah Jahan's indisposition had already reached the VOC's *Hoge Regering* (High Government) in Batavia, its members voiced their opinion that it was more profitable for the Company to win the favour of lesser magistrates than to lobby at the imperial court.[23] Indeed, when looking back on their commissioning of Van Adrichem in August 1662, Joan Maetsuycker and his Councillors wrote that they would have shunned a mission if it had not been for the Mughal succession, emphasizing that maintaining good working relations at the local level remained key: 'no matter how favourable the king's *farmans* obtained for the Company, ministers both high and low want to be acknowledged for obeying them'.[24] In Bengal in particular, the Mughal viceroy (*subahdar*, often carrying the honorific title of *nawab*) held such power that most political negotiations were conducted at the provincial level. In addition to periodic formal gift offerings at the provincial court, the Company's resident in Dhaka paid informal visits to the *subahdar* perhaps as often as once a week, while everyday dealings were entrusted to unofficial intermediaries such as Dutch surgeons in Mughal service.[25] One gets an impression of what provincial diplomacy might have looked like on

the imposing canvas of the VOC's factory in Hugli painted by Hendrik van Schuylenburgh (Figure 8.1). It is now increasingly becoming clear that the prominence of day-to-day informal diplomacy was due at least in part to the fact that many European traders and Mughal government officials were entangled in mutually-beneficial local alliances across cultural and institutional lines.[26]

The frequency of Dutch representations at the emperor's abode was certainly much less. It may be presumed that Tavernier's reference to 'deputations and presents' which the Dutch and English were 'obliged to make every year at court' reflected prescribed rather than actual practice.[27] When the *opperkoopman* (senior merchant) Jan Tack made his appearance in recently completed Shahjahanabad in 1648, he was told by his patron at court, Haqiqat Khan, that 'a king such as Shah Jahan merits more than one visit every three or four years', hinting at the VOC's sporadic attendance in years past.[28] The nobleman recommended that the Dutch should present the emperor with fine pieces of broadcloth annually, yet such regularity was never met. For the thirty years prior to Van Adrichem's mission, nine Dutch delegations to the Mughal court have been identified, namely those headed by Marcus Oldenburgh (1633), François Timmers (1635), Cornelis Weylandt (1642), Nicolaes Verburgh (1646), Jan Tack (1648, 1650, 1656, and 1660), and Johan Berckhout (1653).[29] It is evident that Tack, who also participated as right-hand man in the expeditions of Weylandt, Verburgh, and Van Adrichem, was a key figure in the VOC's diplomatic activity during

Figure 8.1 Hendrik van Schuylenburgh, The trading post of the Dutch East India Company in Hugli, Bengal (detail), 1665. Oil on canvas, 203cm × 316cm. Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.

his twenty-eight years in Agra. Van Adrichem's embassy was followed by a lull in Dutch diplomacy at the imperial court, which coincided with Tack's death in January 1663. During Aurangzeb's long reign, the VOC dispatched only two further missions led by a Dutch agent, in 1677 and 1689.[30]

What set Van Adrichem's *hofreis* or court journey apart from all previous VOC delegations was its stately character and elaborate degree of organization. Whereas seventeenth-century VOC diplomacy in the Mughal Empire was virtually always of an ad-hoc nature, carried out by one or two low-status envoys and coordinated by the Company's administration in India itself, Van Adrichem travelled to Delhi as the director of Dutch trade in Surat and at the head of an embassy commissioned directly from Batavia. Having awaited the arrival of the ships carrying Japanese lacquer, Arabian horses, and other gifts for the emperor, Van Adrichem commenced his journey from Surat to Delhi on 22 May 1662.[31]

To appreciate the role and status of the Dutch merchant-diplomats in Mughal India, Van Adrichem's courtly venture should be regarded in light of local Mughal-Dutch interactions. The Mughal war of succession had profound implications for the VOC in Gujarat and Bengal, as the crisis of imperial power at the centre produced fragmentation of authority locally. Whenever possible the VOC steered a course of neutrality, seeking to maintain the favour of powerholders nearby without exasperating the latter's rivals further afield. Yet because the Company possessed two highly sought-after assets—money and armaments—it proved impossible to remain entirely on the sidelines. The plunder of the Dutch factory in Dhaka in 1659 in retaliation for material support offered to one of the warring parties represents just one of the possible repercussions of the VOC's involvement as a commercial–political actor in the Mughal political landscape.[32]

Another concrete consequence was Aurangzeb's appeal to the Dutch for assistance in seizing his fugitive brother, Shah Shuja.[33] If this request was turned down politely on the pretext that capturing princes was no business for traders, there were other occasions on which the land-based empire did successfully co-opt the ambulant power of the merchant corporation. Such was the case with Aurangzeb's call for maritime assistance against the Portuguese town of Daman on the west-Indian coast, issued in 1660. The *Hoge Regering* decided to supply warships for the purpose and capitalized on the issue in the diplomatic letter delivered by Van Adrichem, although the scheme eventually failed to materialize.[34] As in the case of joint Mughal–Dutch operations that did come to pass—such as the modest naval support which the VOC supplied to *nawab* Shaista Khan in his campaign against Arakan (1665–1666)—Aurangzeb's request regarding Daman is probably best seen as an appeal to a subordinate political actor to assist in frontier policing.[35] Indeed, the available evidence suggests that members of the Mughal political elite viewed the various groups of armed European traders as minor political actors who represented a military potential to be restrained and if possible co-opted. The way Aurangzeb responded to the VOC's request for

reimbursement of costs incurred while preparing for the aborted campaign is indicative of the asymmetrical terms in which the diplomatic relationship was couched. The Dutch were told that the emperor recognized the service they rendered to him, but that they should regard it as compensation for the commercial favours they were liberally enjoying.[36] The ceremonial framing of the VOC as a semi-domesticated foreign tributary by the Mughal government, and the symbolic assumption of this role by the Dutch, comes clearly to the fore when reading Van Adrichem's mission against other diplomatic deputations to Aurangzeb's court during the same period.

Embassies to Aurangzeb's court (1660–1666)

After his first audience in Delhi was postponed for a second time, Van Adrichem turned to the young nobleman Sultan Muhammad to voice his discontent. Convinced that a speedier dispatch of his business should be possible, the Dutch envoy pointed out that he was well aware that Qasim Aqa, the ambassador from Basra on the Persian Gulf, had been promptly allowed to salute Aurangzeb and present his master's gifts. Moreover, Van Adrichem continued, the emperor had received Qasim Aqa with considerable honour and courtesy, even if Husain Pasha, the semi-autonomous Ottoman governor of Basra, 'could not contribute the least bit to the reputation of the Mughal crown, expansion of commerce in Surat, or the growth of the imperial treasury'.[37] Whilst betraying an obvious mercantile bias as well as a limited appreciation of the repute and legitimacy that accrued to Aurangzeb's reign through the public paying of respects by representatives from neighbouring Islamic regions, Van Adrichem's comparison of the treatment received by the Dutch party with that accorded to other diplomats at the Mughal court is worth pursuing. The fact that we possess an exceptional archival record regarding a variety of diplomatic missions taking place at roughly the same historical juncture offers a unique opportunity to analyse European merchant-diplomacy through a comparative and cross-cultural lens.

According to Bernier, who served as a physician at the Mughal court in the 1660s, 'little or no respect was paid' to Qasim Aqa, while Manucci, who had served as a gunner in Prince Dara Shukoh's army, recalled that the Basran embassy 'made no great stir'.[38] While the honours received by Qasim Aqa were modest indeed when seen in the light of the elaborate reception of Safavid ambassadors, the travellers' remarks should be read in context. The *Maasir-i-Alamgiri* of Muhammad Saqi Must'ad Khan, the principal chronicle of Aurangzeb's reign, states that Husain Pasha's envoy received an allowance of 4,000 rupees in Surat to facilitate his journey to Delhi, 5,000 rupees and a robe of honour (*khil'at* or *sarapa*) at his reception at court, as well as a further 12,000 rupees, a robe of honour, and a jewelled sword for his master upon his departure.[39] In contrast, Van Adrichem received no financial allowance from the Mughal ruler, nor was he escorted to court like most of his west and central Asian counterparts, although he was given

lodgings in Delhi and presented with several gifts. That the allegiance of a former Ottoman governor was of greater interest to Aurangzeb than the visit of a VOC envoy is demonstrated by the fact that, when Husain Pasha decided to migrate to Mughal India in 1669, he was escorted from Sirhind in the Punjab to Delhi, where he was graciously received in the *Ghusl-Khana* (Hall of Private Audience), offered a *lakh* (100,000) of rupees besides other gifts, and admitted into imperial service as a high-ranking officer.[40]

The latter example has been discussed by Subrahmanyam to illustrate the relative ease with which a figure like Husain Pasha could move between the Islamicate states of Eurasia without encountering evident problems in adjusting to local forms of courtly ceremony and imperial administration.[41] Although stemming from a cultural and diplomatic background that was evidently different from the Indo–Islamic point of view, as *firangis* ('Franks' or Europeans) the Dutch in India formed part of a clearly recognizable group within the seventeenth-century Mughal political landscape. Furthermore, as longer-term residents with everyday experience in dealing with the imperial administration from a position of relative weakness, Company envoys had a fair grasp of Mughal social and political etiquette and relatively few reservations about adapting to local conventions. Finally, as has been established for a number of different contexts, multiple structural commonalities and 'interconnected repertoires' existed between court cultures across Eurasia, enabling diplomatic actors to recognize and engage with (if not always fully appreciate) one another's ceremonial language and symbolic practices.[42] To assess the Dutch position within the diplomatic world of Mughal India, let us first turn towards this wider context.

Having seized the throne through a fratricidal war fought during his father's lifetime, Aurangzeb was keen to receive recognition of his accession through congratulatory embassies from neighbouring states.[43] The main diplomatic partners of the Mughal Empire during Shah Jahan's reign (r. 1628–1658) had been the Uzbek khanates of Bukhara and Balkh to the north and Safavid Iran to the northwest, in line with the empire's primary geopolitical interests.[44] Besides regular interactions with states on the Indian Subcontinent, principally the Deccan sultanates of Bijapur and Golconda, the Mughals also maintained intermittent diplomatic contacts with the Ottoman Sultan. During Aurangzeb's fifty-year-long reign, the only consistent factor in Mughal diplomacy was the relationship with the Uzbek states in central Asia, the ancestral domains of the Timurid dynasty and the location of Shah Jahan's failed campaigns of the 1640s. Diplomatic exchange with the more distant Ottomans was limited to one unreciprocated embassy sent from Istanbul in 1690, while official relations with Persia broke off in 1666, when Aurangzeb received an insulting letter from Shah Abbas II.[45] These circumstances make the wave of diplomatic missions attending Aurangzeb's court in the early 1660s all the more remarkable. The most feasible comparison of these embassies, based on the available sources, is at the level of scale, reviewing the degree of material support and honour they received

and the value of presents bestowed on them. These variables, which the *Maasir-i-Alamgiri* recorded for nearly all embassy parties, provide a fairly transparent yardstick by which to measure the relative importance that the imperial government attributed to its respective diplomatic relationships.

Little is known about the first foreign emissary to present himself at Aurangzeb's court, a man named Ibrahim Beg who was sent by the Uzbek ruler of Balkh, except that he died soon after his arrival in Delhi.[46] Upon departure, his companions were awarded robes of honour and 20,000 rupees in cash. This was many times less than the 150,000 rupees spent on Khushi Bey, the ambassador from Balkh who visited Delhi in 1667, although considerably more than the modest sums granted to a succession of envoys of the Sharif of Mecca on three different occasions between 1665 and 1674.[47] Nevertheless, the envoys from Mecca, like their counterparts from Yemen and Abyssinia, were publicly honoured on festive occasions such as Aurangzeb's lunar birthday and the celebration of the end of Ramadan.[48] Moreover, Mughal emperors regularly dispatched emissaries to the Arab Peninsula carrying large financial donations to the Holy Cities, amounting to as much as 660,000 rupees in 1662, when Aurangzeb successfully solicited the Sharif's recognition of his reign.[49] While the immediate geopolitical significance of diplomatic contacts with the minor states across the Arabian Sea was smaller than that of relations with his territorial rivals on India's northern and western frontiers, such largesse was of evident importance to Aurangzeb in establishing his public image as a benefactor of Islam.

Compared with their counterparts from the lesser khanate of Balkh, envoys from Bukhara received somewhat higher favours at Aurangzeb's court. Khwaja Ahmad, the envoy of Abdul Aziz Khan who arrived in November 1661, was met in the environs of Delhi by Saif Khan, court favourite and governor of the capital, and conducted into the *Am-Khas*, the splendid Hall of Public Audience constructed by Shah Jahan (Figure 8.2).[50] A total of 120,000 rupees was expended on Khwaja Ahmad's entertainment during his three-month stay, and in 1667 two *lakhs* were spent on his successor Rustam Bey. Aurangzeb also sent his own ambassadors in return, such as Mustafa Khan who was dispatched in June 1664 with presents worth 150,000 rupees for Abdul Aziz Khan and 100,000 rupees for Subhan Quli Khan, respectively.[51] In keeping with imperial protocol, the Uzbek ambassadors were ushered into the royal presence by an official appointed for the purpose. They were required to perform the Mughal act of obedience known as *taslim*; placing one's right hand on the ground and then raising it gently and placing it on one's head, a gesture expressing submission to imperial authority.[52] The diplomatic letter they carried was taken from their hands by an *amir* (high-ranking nobleman) who then delivered it to the emperor or read out its contents to him.[53] Only the Persian ambassador Budaq Beg is said to have been allowed to present his sovereign's letter directly to Aurangzeb, who reportedly raised it above his head as a particular mark of respect before consulting its contents.[54]



Figure 8.2 Untitled (Shah Jahan in durbar, holding a ruby in his right hand), c. 1650. BL Add.Or.3853 fo. 1 © British Library Board, London.

The welcome given to Budaq Beg was the grandest reception accorded to any ambassador to India during Aurangzeb's reign. From the moment he crossed the Safavid–Mughal border, provincial governors fêted the envoy. Outside Delhi he was warmly received by prominent courtiers who conducted him towards the *Am-Khas*.[55] As powerful political rivals sharing close cultural and historic ties, the Mughals and Safavids turned ambassadorial exchanges into conspicuous displays of opulence and refinement. Such diplomatic trials of strength often contained barely concealed attempts to attain symbolic precedence, such as when Shah Abbas II in his letter to Aurangzeb referred to the assistance that his ancestor Shah Tahmasp had given to the exiled Mughal emperor Humayun over a century earlier.[56] The large amounts of gifts, which both parties exchanged, were intended as expressions of their masters' power and prosperity.[57] In 1661,

the presents brought from Iran included sixty-six horses and a pearl weighing thirty-seven carats, representing a total value of 422,000 rupees. On his part, Aurangzeb bestowed an elaborate set of items worth 535,000 rupees on Budaq Beg, and two years later sent an embassy to Isfahan with presents worth as much as seven *lakhs*.[58]

Van Adrichem's embassy did not come close to these dimensions. As discussed in detail in Birkenholz's contribution, the Dutch presented Arabian horses, fine textiles, sword blades, birds of paradise, and an extensive variety of Japanese lacquer works and other rarities.[59] The combined value of gifts to Aurangzeb and a range of courtiers and officials nevertheless did not exceed 27,500 guilders, out of a total expenditure of some 63,500 guilders (or around 53,000 rupees) on the mission as a whole.[60] It is clear that the Dutch merchant-diplomats could not and would not compete on the level of royalty, which also would not have been expected from representatives of a minor political player with ambiguous sovereign credentials. All the same, the Company consciously selected its gifts in accordance with Mughal custom and elite tastes, demonstrating its understanding of local conventions while showcasing its distinctive character as a supplier of exotic luxury goods. Although relatively few in number and excluding cash sums, the gifts bestowed on Van Adrichem also unquestionably belonged to the classic Mughal repertoire; they included horses, jewelled daggers, and robes of honour.[61] A number of discrepancies notwithstanding—principally the lack of reciprocity in Mughal-Dutch diplomatic exchange—Van Adrichem's embassy therefore, to an important extent, resembled those of other political actors in the Indian Ocean world.

The question of commensurability

The profound differences between Van Adrichem's reception and that of Budaq Beg had less to do with cultural differences or the incommensurability of diplomatic traditions than with concrete interests of state. Once the merchant-diplomat obtained his impatiently awaited audience, his treatment followed standard Mughal practice and resembled that of other representatives of smaller powers, such as the Uzbeks. Nor did the Dutchman appear out of place or hesitant about the role he was expected to perform. Before coming to court, Van Adrichem had solicited letters of recommendation from Surat's governor Mustafa Khan and the governor of Ahmedabad, Makramat Khan.[62] In Delhi, the ambassador and his broker Kishan Das were closely advised by a small number of courtiers, principally the *ahadi* Sultan Muhammad and the *Akthah Begi* Iftikhar Khan. The latter served as liaison with *wazirs* Raja Raghunath and Fazil Khan, and he appears to have been put in charge of entertaining the embassy party.[63] Iftikhar Khan had aided VOC affairs as early as 1648, while his father, the late Asalat Khan, had been an important patron of the Dutch since the 1630s.[64] While Company agents could thus tap into an archive of past experiences, the

Mughal administration also drew upon a well-established prior frame of reference. Upon hearing of the arrival of the Dutch party, Fazil Khan first inquired after the late Joan Berckhout, before calling up Tack to clarify Van Adrichem's status in relation to his predecessors. Being satisfied that the current ambassador was commissioned directly by the *Hoge Regering*, Fazil Khan proceeded to arrange his reception accordingly.[65]

Van Adrichem obtained his first audience on 14 September 1662. Returning from a two-week retreat outside Delhi, the emperor announced that he would receive the envoy that evening when holding court in the *Ghusl-Khana*. Iftikhar Khan called the small Dutch company into the square in front of the audience hall and ensured that the horses and other gifts were lined up in the same place. Being instructed to enter, Van Adrichem, the merchant (*koopman*) Joan Elpen, and the secretary Fernandinus de Laver 'humbly offered the required obedience after this country's fashion', and presented the Persian and Dutch copies of Maetsuycker's letter to one of Aurangzeb's confidants, who conveyed them into the emperor's hands. Unlike the epistle carried by Budaq Beg, the VOC's letters were neither opened nor read in the presence of the ambassador. The diplomatic gifts having been shown from a distance, the three Dutchmen were dressed in honorific attire and once again went through the set procedures of expressing gratitude according to imperial protocol, before obtaining licence to depart.[66] Three more presentations of gifts followed over the following weeks, each time in the *Am-Khas*, before Van Adrichem was granted his departure audience on 22 October.

This final audience is most instructive about Van Adrichem's participation in two key Mughal ceremonies. Once Aurangzeb's appearance on the throne was announced by the sound of kettle-drums and other musical instruments, Van Adrichem joined the other attendees in the *Am-Khas* in doing reverence to the emperor before each took their appointed place. As the positioning in Mughal audience halls was spatially stratified according to rank, it is regrettable that Van Adrichem's secretary did not note down his exact spot. However, from a previous audience we know that the ambassador was made to stand in the section lined by a red wooden railing, preserved for medium to low-ranked *mansabdars* (office-holders), while he was only called up into the area within the silver fence that was the preserve of high-ranking nobles during the presentation of his gifts.[67] After informing the emperor about the VOC's request, Fazil Khan took Van Adrichem by the hand and led him to the place for the dressing in robes of honour. Clad in the *sarapa*, the envoy took position in the *Am-Khas* in front of the stairs facing the throne, 'four times bringing his hand from the earth to his head'.[68] This manner of saluting, in the words of Akbar's chief secretary Abul Fazl, signified that the person 'is ready to give himself as an offering'.[69] As the audience unfolded, Iftikhar Khan placed a jewelled dagger (*khanjar*) on Van Adrichem's head and the reins of a horse with a gilded saddle around his neck. Upon receiving each item the ambassador went through the routine of *taslim* four

times in succession, as he did a fourth time when the emperor turned his eyes towards him. Later that day, having received a *farman* from the hands of Fazil Khan, the three Dutch representatives once more performed the prescribed ritual.[70]

Of particular interest are the commentaries inserted by De Laver. The secretary emphasized how Aurangzeb had passed the *khanjar* 'from his own hands' to Iftikhar Khan, and pointed out that the emperor focussed his gaze intently on the envoy.[71] The extent to which the importance accorded to the VOC representative might have been inflated is of lesser relevance here than the fact that the Dutch measured the significance of the treatment they received by what they understood to be the standards of their hosts. In their ritual performance as in their written requests, they adhered to the language of submission to imperial authority, a compliant stance which was distinctive of (if not exclusive to) merchant-diplomats.[72] Like VOC envoys before and after them, Van Adrichem's embassy party displayed no misgivings about accepting robes of honour from the emperor and various nobles, regardless of the implications of authority and service connected with this symbolic act of incorporation.[73] They offered ceremonial offerings of gold and silver coins (*nazr*) to Aurangzeb, did reverence 'after the Moorish fashion' even when wearing European dress, and 'requested to enjoy the honour of presenting their humble service' to noblemen such as Muhammad Amin Khan, son of Mir Jumla.[74] The emperor's letter and *khil'at* sent to Batavia were received with highly elaborate public spectacle, while analogous references to humble supplication at the foot of Aurangzeb's throne are found in Maetsuycker's letter to the monarch and in the *farmans* issued in response. The emperor's reminder to Batavia that his *farmans* extended protection to Maetsuycker's delegates, as long as they comported themselves worthily in their offices, suggests that the reciprocal discourse about service functioned as a means to pacify the Dutch in exchange for commercial privileges.[75]

Further evidence of commensurability is found in a wide variety of situations, ranging from the adoption of social practices to the shared use of generic religious references. In their letter to Aurangzeb, the members of the *Hoge Regering* wrote that 'God Almighty' had called the monarch to the Mughal throne, and that they prayed that 'the Lord of Heaven and Earth' would abundantly bless both his person and his empire.[76] Agreeing with the dictum by the Sufi poet Amir Khusrau inscribed on the walls of the *Ghusl-Khana*, De Laver too described the palace at Shahjahanabad as an 'earthly paradise'.[77] No doubt aided by this compatible repertoire of commonplaces, the mediation of difference in Mughal–Dutch encounters took shape through interpersonal relations. Van Adrichem's diplomatic activity included meetings with some of the VOC's long-standing contacts, among others the aged Haqiqat Khan and the former governor of Surat, Raushan Zamir. When the latter visited the Dutch in their lodge in Delhi, they demonstrated their awareness of Mughal social etiquette by presenting him with the traditional parting treat of *pan* (a stimulant prepared of betel leaf with

areca nut) and rosewater.[78] Finally, non-ambassadorial actors played a key role in sustaining diplomatic networks. During Van Adrichem's embassy, a minor yet interesting part was reserved for the German surgeon Jacob Fredrik Baertsch. When the mission ended, Baertsch remained in Delhi to continue his treatment of the nobleman Hoshdar Khan, being expected to use the opportunity to sustain the Dutch lobby through the influence of his new patron.[79]

The final means to evaluate Van Adrichem's mission is to consider it alongside diplomatic representations made on behalf of other merchant corporations. The English East India Company (EIC) chose not to send a congratulatory embassy to Aurangzeb. Having awaited the outcome of the VOC's mission, the directors in London concluded that the gains from procuring new *farmans* were not likely to justify the expenses of a courtly venture.[80] Instead, the English aimed to renew existing privileges through local diplomacy, and in 1664 sent William Blake, the chief factor in Hugli, to *nawab* Shaista Khan's court in Rajmahal.[81] In contrast, a small French delegation did attend Aurangzeb's court, when François de la Boullaye le Gouz and Beber, representatives of the French crown and the *Compagnie des Indes Orientales* respectively, arrived in Agra in the summer of 1666. Tavernier, who gives the fullest account of this undertaking, describes how it was marred by a lack of familiarity with Mughal court customs and an unwillingness to adjust to foreign protocol. It was Boullaye's foolish insistence on delivering Louis XIV's letter personally to the emperor, the traveller argued, which nearly led to the failure of the mission.[82]

Tavernier's message was clear: European envoys in Mughal India needed to adjust to local conventions in order to succeed, a position underwritten by Bernier in 1668.[83] Both men effectively advocated a course of action, which VOC envoys such as Van Adrichem had long been practising. Deftly exploiting the greater range of diplomatic approaches available to them as representatives of an emergent Company-state centred on Batavia, the VOC's merchant-diplomats displayed accommodative stances which contrasted sharply with the more rigid and circumscribed diplomatic conduct of Boullaye's fellow royal ambassadors, Thomas Roe and William Norris.[84]

Conclusion

A focus on the merchant-diplomats representing the Dutch East India Company opens up a significantly different perspective on cross-cultural diplomacy in early modern Asia than the picture obtained from existing studies about the occasional royal ambassadors sent from other parts of Europe. Struggling to balance the EIC's interests with his duty to the crown, the Jacobean courtier Thomas Roe had felt notoriously uncomfortable about receiving robes of honour and refused to perform *taslim*.[85] Yet it was the incompatibility of two concepts of diplomatic honour that dogged the English envoy, not the complete inability to grasp the logics of a different cultural

system. By conceiving of VOC diplomacy in Asia as anchored in interactions within the Indian Ocean world, as this chapter has, one can move beyond the thesis of cultural incommensurability in Euro–Indian diplomatic exchange.

By approaching embassies not as one-off events but as moments in an ongoing diplomatic relationship, one can recognize how courtly encounters were rooted in a complex constellation of political relations at the local level. Van Adrichem and other VOC envoys were relatively familiar with Mughal social and political conventions, well connected through networks of imperial patronage, and willing to symbolically submit to imperial authority. Free from the burden of upholding the honour of a faraway monarch and representing a foreign yet familiar community which petitioned the emperor following established Mughal procedures, the VOC's merchant-diplomats were readily incorporated into an existing configuration of hierarchic relations on terms set by their powerful hosts. Seen from this angle, the foreign trading company often appears in the shape of a domestic actor, one that could be called upon to perform the duties of a vassal.

Like other non-ambassadorial actors—including the European surgeons and Indian brokers regularly employed by the VOC—merchants played a significant role in inter-state relations. A focus on the merchant-diplomat hence sheds additional light on the wide and flexible range of formal and informal means of dealing between early modern polities. In highlighting the Indian Ocean as a space for research on cross-cultural diplomacy, along the lines of analyses pioneered with regard to the Mediterranean, this chapter moreover contributes to the recent shift away from an exclusive focus on Christian Europe in investigating the development of early modern diplomacy, proposing to push it one step further by incorporating Asian encounters into this widening perspective.

So what does the comparison of a Dutch mission to Aurangzeb's court with its west and central Asian counterparts tell us? When seen against other envoys arriving in Delhi during the 1660s, it is evident that the treatment accorded to Van Adrichem by the Mughal court was modest. The envoy's reception was postponed up to three times, the Dutch party received hardly any material support during its stay in the capital, and when attending the *Am-Khas* its normal position was within the red wooden railing, not the silver-coloured fence. However, the way the Dutch were treated seems not to have differed *essentially* from that of other representatives of minor political actors. Van Adrichem's manner of presentation in the *Am-Khas*, his dressing in robes of honour, and the gifts bestowed upon him, all conformed closely to the conventions of Mughal court culture. The items which the Dutch chose to present did so too. Existing discrepancies appeared to have had more to do with geopolitical interests than with cultural incommensurability. Further examination of cross-cultural diplomacy will need to test this hypothesis, to start by comparing diplomatic encounters in Mughal India with those at the Ottoman, Safavid, and other Eurasian courts. Yet the case

analysed in this chapter suggests that in terms of adjusting to foreign customs, the differences of diplomatic approach between seventeenth-century merchant-diplomats such as Van Adrichem and royal ambassadors such as Roe may well have been more profound than those between the former and, say, representatives of Balkh or Basra.

Notes

1 D. van Adrichem, *Journaal van Dircq van Adrichem naar den Groot-Mogol Aurangzēb, 1662*, ed. A. J. Bernet Kempers (The Hague, 1941) [*JDVA*], pp. 130–1.
2 Ibid., pp. 144–8, 160–2. See also J. A. van der Chijs et al. (eds.), *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts-India*, 31 vols. (The Hague/Batavia, 1887–1931) [*DRB*], *1663*, pp. 294–306.
3 W. Foster (ed.), *The embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India, 1615–1619: as narrated in his journal and correspondence* (London, 1926), pp. 139–40; H. Das, S. C. Sarkar (eds.), *The Norris embassy to Aurangzib (1699–1702)* (Calcutta, 1959), pp. 272–3.
4 For other examples, see J. E. Wills Jr., *Embassies and illusions: Dutch and Portuguese envoys to K'ang-hsi, 1666–1687* (Cambridge, MA, 1984); L. Blussé, 'Peeking into the empires: Dutch embassies to the courts of China and Japan', *Itinerario*, 37.3 (2013), 13–29.
5 Foster, *Embassy*, p. 310.
6 For the latter, see P. J. Stern, *The company-state: corporate sovereignty and the early modern foundations of the British Empire in India* (Oxford, 2011). Also see Frank Birkenholz, Chapter 12, this volume.
7 W. A. Pettigrew, 'Corporate constitutionalism and the dialogue between the global and the local in seventeenth-century English history', *Itinerario*, 39.3 (2015), 490.
8 M. van Gelder and T. Krstíc, 'Introduction: Cross-confessional diplomacy and diplomatic intermediaries in the early modern Mediterranean', *JEMH*, 19.2–3 (2015), 103. 'Co-production' stresses the contributions made by a diverse range of actors to the wider development of diplomatic cultures.
9 L. Blussé, 'Queen among kings: diplomatic ritual in Batavia', in K. Grijns and P. J. M. Nas (eds.), *Jakarta-Batavia: socio-cultural essays* (Leiden, 2000), p. 31; A. Clulow, *The company and the Shogun: the Dutch encounter with Tokugawa Japan* (New York, 2014), p. 18.
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68 *JDVA*, p. 192.
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73 S. Gordon (ed.), *Robes of honour: khil'at in pre-colonial and colonial India* (New Delhi, 2003).
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77 Ibid., pp. 177. The famous inscription translates as: 'if there is a paradise on earth, it is this, it is this, it is this.'
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9 Trans-imperial familiarity

Ottoman ambassadors in eighteenth-century Vienna

David Do Paço

Over the past thirty years the history of Habsburg–Ottoman relations has seen a shift away from the traditional focus on war and peace.[1] Recent research has placed a special emphasis on the Oriental Academy in Vienna, established in 1754, which served as a central training venue for Austrian interpreters and diplomats and formed an important sociocultural link in the relations of the two empires. The mediation offered by interpreters produced a wealth of sources that offer important insights into Austro–Ottoman diplomacy, but the biases within these very same sources have impeded our understanding of the dynamics of Austro–Ottoman diplomatic contact and obscured the commensurability of the two diplomacies in question.[2] It has long been believed that without the cultural brokerage of interpreters, the two diplomatic systems remained incompatible. This chapter instead examines the direct relationship between representatives of the Imperial court and Ottoman delegations from a perspective in which interpreters' mediation holds a much less central position than has previously been attributed to it.[3] As shall be seen, throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, Ottoman ambassadors themselves engaged in forms of sociability that integrated them into the social fabric of Vienna both at court and in the city, enabling them to bond with the Imperial nobility, the Austrian administrators, and Ottoman merchants through the various receptions they organized and the visits they made. Intermediaries such as secretaries and interpreters did not necessarily facilitate these exchanges. Nevertheless, they witnessed and diligently recorded the process that melded the two seemingly incommensurable diplomatic systems into a sphere of mutual familiarity and sociability.

Rich materials document Ottoman embassies in Vienna. While the *sefâretnâme*-s (Ottoman mission reports), written by Turkish ambassadors, or their divan effendi (secretary to the legation), usually offer a basic description of Vienna and the court, focussing primarily on the ambassador's activities and diplomatic ceremonial, the journals of the Imperial interpreters of Oriental languages from the Viennese court provide important complementary and more encompassing information.[4] Between 1740 and 1748 the Imperial guard wrote short daily reports, but after 1748 the interpreter produced a memoir at the end of each Ottoman mission, describing day-by-day not only

the activity of the envoy but also that of his suite. The so-called *Journal* was progressively revised in line with the evolution of Austrian administrative practices and had come under the supervision of the Aulic Council of War by 1755, before it passed under the authority of the Chancellery of State. The *Journal* was used as a reference to fix ceremonial issues and to provide information about the daily life of the Ottoman delegation.[5] Moreover, the social proximity of Ottoman dignitaries to the court and the city is confirmed by the fact that the official gazettes, the *Wienerisches Diarium* and the *Wiener Zeitung* regularly informed the Viennese public about news and social activities in the Ottoman *Quartier* where delegations from the Sublime Porte resided. As the two 'worlds' met and mingled, both the interpreters' journals and the gazettes began to describe Ottoman embassies as a common presence in Vienna, rather than dwelling on cultural and religious differences.[6]

Recent works on the Mediterranean have reconsidered the scale and nature of Ottoman presence in Europe. Europeans were present in the Middle East, just as Ottomans could be found in many places in Europe. Maria Pia Pedani has demonstrated that Ottoman diplomacy was integrated into the economic and political life of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Venice, while Natalie Rothman has more recently put 'trans-imperial subjects' on the historical agenda, stressing the role of brokers, such as dragomans, in cross-cultural diplomacy. While this suggests a higher level of integration than was previously thought, it has also had the effect of downplaying the importance of the ambassadors themselves in diplomatic encounters and the ways that they shaped relations between the Ottomans and Europeans especially in the eighteenth century. Concurrently, Jocelyne Dakhlia, Wolfgang Kaiser, and Bernard Vincent have demonstrated that deep 'familiarity' between Europe and the Muslim world should no longer be limited to Muslim–European encounters in the east and that religion was merely one factor among many others accounting for the dynamics of the Muslim presence in early modern Europe.[7] The notion of 'familiarity' was introduced by diaspora studies and, according to Francesca Trivellato, refers to the knowledge cultural entities acquire about one another through both the circulation of information and the participation in shared practices. Familiarity encourages trust between merchants, or, here, between diplomatic agents. Familiarity can lead to the embedding of an exogenous actor, that is, his social integration in a formerly foreign environment. Familiarity can develop in a multi-stage process that may result in symbolic or even familial bonds.[8] The concept of familiarity, then, is not a way to stress the diplomatic commensurability of Christian and Muslim states, but it leaves open the possibility of analysing diplomacy—and more broadly the social bonding this involves—free from the constraining framework of defined cultural zones.

Indeed, the Viennese case calls for a reassessment of the cross-cultural paradigm, shifting the focus to the social dynamics of Ottoman diplomats' embeddedness in a specific sociocultural environment, diplomats who were different in religion, language, and culture. Vienna is a laboratory within

which to see the multiple forms of social bonding that diplomats, amongst others, promoted, enjoyed, and used to achieve their political goals. Moreover, the resulting relationships could also create tensions between Ottoman diplomats and merchants, as well as within an Ottoman embassy, due to the different degrees of familiarity that different members of the Ottoman *micropolis* developed as an inherent part of the larger city, thanks to their specific functions in the delegation. These relations highlight a type of familiarity that did not exclusively result from strategic bonding inherent in diplomatic activity. Diplomats melded with their new environment and developed a certain ability to master implicit codes and habits that allowed them to overcome the religious, linguistic, and cultural barriers and to balance the asymmetric relationship they had with their host.

This chapter will take a social approach to the Ottoman embassies. It will examine the different components of the Ottoman delegation (the ambassador, his suite, and the members of the Austrian administration that accompanied it) in Vienna in order to identify and examine the circles of socialization of its members: the Court, the city, the Ottoman *Quartier*. It moves beyond the traditional categories of diplomatic history by emphasizing the interdependency and sometimes even fusion of administrative, diplomatic, and commercial milieu in Austro–Ottoman relations. As such, this chapter traces the geography of diplomatic sociability in Vienna.

The Ottoman delegation in Vienna

Ottoman delegations were apparently different from other diplomatic representations in Vienna. They were made up of an unusually large suite and were not permanent. The *sefâretnâme*-s do not mention the staff of an embassy or the way in which an envoy managed it, or whether it was in fact the diplomat who managed day-to-day affairs. It is safe to say, however, that the lower level personnel managed and directed the ambassadorial *micropolis* in the Imperial *Residenz*. The journals of the interpreters of the Imperial court allow us to examine this complex Ottoman *micropolis* and its place in the Imperial and royal city of Vienna.

The ambassadors whom the sultan sent to the Holy Roman Emperor had typically served in the Ottoman administration before being appointed to the Imperial court at Vienna. Ahmed Resmî Effendi, for example, started his career as a secretary of the new *reisülküttab* (head of the Ottoman diplomacy), Mustafa Effendi. In 1747, he became his patron's official heir by marrying his daughter. The new sultan Osman III appointed him 'director of the Chancellery of the *waqfiyya*' (endowment deed). In 1748, Mustafa Hatti Effendi was, before his mission, 'secretary of several *chiaja*-s' (minister of war) and took part in negotiations during the Peace Congress of Belgrade in 1739. In 1755, El Hajj Halil Effendi was in charge of commercial matters in Istanbul, while in 1792 Ebu Bekr Rattib Effendi was a judge.[9]

There was, however, no set route through the Ottoman administration to a diplomatic post.

Character, appearance and social skills also played a role in the appointment of Ottoman ambassadors.[10] In 1774, the British diplomat Robert Murray Keith described how Süleyman Bey 'appeared with a very grave & decent Deportment' in an audience with the Chancellors,

> and without betraying any great Curiosity, he seemed very well pleased with the Civilities that were shewn him. He is about 70 years of Age & of a comely Figure, and as far as one can judge from sound and manner, he possesses a considerable Share of Eloquence in his own Language.[11]

Similar judgements acknowledging civility and knowledge were constantly repeated in gazettes and by external observers, suggesting that Ottoman ambassadors were coming to be viewed by European commentators as proper members of court society. In 1779, Philipp Cobenzl, vice-Chancellor in charge of Austrian foreign affairs, appreciated very well that 'the Turks are not those Turks that we used to think of in Vienna'; meanwhile the descriptions in administrative reports remained quite neutral.[12] Austrian administrators clearly did not judge their Ottoman colleagues differently from the way in which they would write about their Christian peers.

Questioning common prejudices about Ottoman Society in 1779, for example, Peter Herbert-Rathkeal, the *Internuncio* (Imperial representative) in Pera, astutely emphasized the importance of clientelism, social rank, and strategic familial alliances over cultural characteristics for a successful career in the Ottoman Empire.[13] Indeed, Mustafa Hatti Effendi married a woman from the sultan's harem, which was as valuable as his own experience in negotiations when it came to being appointed to a post in Vienna. In 1736, Resmî Effendi, entered the service of Mustafa Effendi, former ambassador to Vienna in 1732 and took part in the Belgrade peace negotiations in 1739. He also married Mustafa Effendi's daughter in 1747, and in 1745 he contributed, together with his father-in-law, to a report on the new emperor, Francis I.[14] If, as Hammer claimed, 'he had a better knowledge than any of his predecessors about the affairs of the country he visited [The Holy Roman Empire]', he obviously benefitted from strong alliances, too.[15]

A mission to Vienna was also an important step in the career of these individuals. From 1748, when an individual was nominated to serve as an ambassador, he was also appointed to a central position in Istanbul in order to have a high enough status to represent the Sultan abroad. Also in 1748, Mustafa Hatti Effendi was appointed *defterdar* (treasurer), and in 1755 and according to Hammer, El Haj Halil Effendi became 'Secretary of State, depositary of the cipher, and was allowed to wear the kaftan of honour in the presence of the sultan', while in 1740 Janibi Ali Pacha became beylerbey (governor) of Rumelia. A successful mission to Vienna was generously rewarded. In 1741, Janibi Ali took over the running of the Arsenal, and

Mustafa Hatti kept a position in Istanbul after the disgrace of his patron in 1752. As for Resmî Effendi, he had a brilliant diplomatic career. After his stay in Vienna, he represented the Sublime Porte in Berlin in 1767, and in 1774 he negotiated and signed the peace treaty of Küçük Kaynarca.[16]

Ottoman ambassadors to Vienna commanded a large and complex 'travelling' embassy. In 1740 Janibi Ali was reportedly followed by 500 persons, which complicated the journey to Vienna, especially through Hungary.[17] But diplomatic missions could also be much smaller. According to Hammer, in 1755, El Hajj Halil Effendi was accompanied by only fifty persons 'and not hundreds like his predecessor', Mustafa Hatti Effendi.[18] In 1774, the *Wienerisches Diarium* published a list of the members of Süleyman Bey's delegation, made up of sixty-nine members.[19] Only the diplomats with a specific function were actually listed. To this number the simple servants as well as the musicians or the janissaries (that appeared in the several interpreters' journals) have to be added. In the reign of Maria-Theresa, the average Ottoman embassy contained 300 people: its size was mostly determined by the specific need to sustain Ottoman courtly life abroad.

The *Wienerisches Diarium* divided the suite of Süleyman Bey into three groups according to the level of dignity of each member: high dignitaries, chamberlains, and servants. Each section of the embassy brought together agents with diverse tasks. Among the high dignitaries were very different officials such as the divan effendi and the coffee attendant. The suite could be divided into two functional categories as well: members with diplomatic duties (such as the divan effendi, *chiaia* (major-domo), treasurer, and interpreter) and members in charge of the everyday life of the embassy and its so-called *Quartier* such as the butler, chamberlain, imam, muezzin, squires, cooks, and food tasters. Among the latter, those working with food and provisions represented more than a third of the list of 1774: they had titles such as 'jams and sweets officer', 'pastry chef' or 'dishes and cellar officer'. Nevertheless, in their journals Imperial interpreters particularly singled out the *chiaia*, the divan effendi or alternatively the treasurer or the interpreter or the imam.[20]

In 1741 the *chiaia* was omnipresent and came first after the ambassador in the list of dignitaries, but after 1755 his position diminished in importance.[21] In 1774, Ibrahim Aga, Süleyman Bey's *chiaia*, was only at the fourth level of the embassy hierarchy; this reflected the pacification of the relationship between the two empires.[22] In 1755, the divan effendi became the strongman of the Ottoman embassy. He organized the *Quartier*, dealt with protocol and held the credentials during the official reception before the emperor. This position invested the divan effendi with special powers, not only symbolically but also practically in that he could restrict and regulate access to various people through protocol and, as the organizer of the *Quartier*, he acted as one of the main facilitators of sociability, and, by implication, political leverage. At some point the divan effendi was even able to dominate the negotiations and control the ambassador, so much so that

in 1792 Mustafa Bey was the main interlocutor of the Imperial interpreter Ignaz Stürmer and not Ebu Bekr Rattib Effendi.[23] Peter Herbert-Rathkeal's private correspondence paints Ebu Bekr Rattib first as his client and then as a protégé of the Cobenzl House, which was influential in Imperial foreign affairs. In this specific case, the divan effendi's control of the envoy was a way to regulate his sociability in Vienna.[24] The divan effendi was also able to force the Imperial court to deal with the Ottoman interpreter, by successfully questioning the integrity of the Imperial one.[25] Meanwhile, the treasurer appeared in the reports of the Imperial guard in 1741 and 1748, primarily as an intermediary between the *Quartier* and the Ottoman merchants in the city.[26] The journals of the Imperial interpreters focussing on court life avoided the activity of the Ottoman merchants, except the journal of 1755, due to the active support that El Hajj Halil Effendi gave them.

Apart from its internal organization, an Ottoman embassy was also embedded in a complex structure of services and networks that the Imperial court provided for foreign ambassadors. The *Quartier* was guarded by Imperial soldiers in order to protect—and to control—the Ottoman envoys. However, in 1748 members of the delegation were still allowed to move freely around the city, at least until an incident on 21 June of that year. On this day, the Ottoman imam wanted to visit the Stephansdom during a ceremony. He was stopped by a soldier but slapped the guard in the face in order to punish him for such presumptuousness. After that, as the Imperial interpreter Joseph Schwachheim noticed, 'the Turks who walk in the city were accompanied by soldiers with loaded weapons'.[27] The Ottoman diplomats accepted this on the whole, until February 1792 when Ebu Bekr Rattib Effendi addressed a formal complaint to the Court. He claimed that he wanted to:

> walk alone, as long as he was in Vienna, and without any Imperial and Royal officers around him, and the first of his men, because of their status, would be free to behave the same way, while men from the stable and the kitchen, especially, should at any time be accompanied by one or several men from the guard, for their safety and to show them the way.[28]

These words validated a functional division of the delegation—that established different degrees of familiarity with the city—between diplomats on the one hand, and people committed to the embassy's everyday business, on the other. Moreover, the Ottoman ambassador's protest complemented his mission to provide the sultan with an accurate description of Vienna: to do so he had to be able to move about incognito, that is, free from the protocol that constrained his actions.[29]

The Imperial interpreter could be another obstacle between diplomats and society. In 1783, Sebastiano Foscarini, the Venetian ambassador to Vienna, provided the Senate with a very clear example of the control exercised by the interpreter over the Moroccan ambassador, Mohamed Bin

Abdel Malik. During a dinner organized at the Liechtenstein Palace, Foscarini wanted to convince the ambassador to stay in Venice before returning to Tangier. However, the latter only spoke Arabic, and Foscarini could only talk with him through the Imperial interpreter Karl Bihn, who, in fact, never conveyed the invitation.[30] Just as ambassadors had their movements increasingly restricted by soldiers, so too the significance of the Imperial interpreter in dealing with Muslim states' delegations increased steadily in the second half of the century. In 1741 and 1748, the interpreters Joseph Schwachheim and Gaspar Mormartz showed up in the *Quartier* for only a couple of hours per day. In 1748, Schwachheim largely reported events that he did not witness. Until 1755, the interpreter accompanied the ambassador to all the official receptions and ceremonies, as well as to all his official and unofficial visits in town; this linked sociability and politics and stressed the private management of the public affairs by the Imperial ministers. He did not, however, permanently attend at the *Quartier*.[31]

Ottoman ambassadors were actually accessible, and not only to members of the Imperial administration. Their sociability was only partially controlled by the court, mostly by lack of will to contain them in their *Quartier*, but also because Turkish diplomats demonstrated mastery of the social codes and habits of their partners and were able to take part in the social life of the Imperial *Residenz*.[32]

Diplomatic ceremonial, Ottoman diplomats, and the social life of the Imperial *Residenz*

Both the ceremonial books and the interpreters' journals document official ceremonies. However, they provide historians with two different kinds of information.[33] Imperial ceremonial protocol restricted its focus to the Imperial audience, while the interpreter paid attention to the preparation of the audience, to possible negotiation over ceremonial rules, to the organization of the reception, and to the informal sociability that accompanied such an event. However, the gazettes, a different medium of court society, communicated such receptions to a wider public. The same event could hence generate three radically different descriptions that have to be compared.[34]

'One kiss and three deep bows' was a central element in the ceremonial of an audience with the emperor at the Imperial court.[35] Every ambassador introduced to the emperor was supposed to kiss the edge of his coat and bow before him on bended knees, according to Spanish etiquette. Such rules were controversial for Ottoman representatives. On 19 June 1748, the *Wienerisches Diarum* noticed that 'the ambassador laid a kiss on Her Majesty's imperial Robes and took care to do three bows in the Oriental way'.[36] This was an elegant way of stressing that protocol had not been entirely respected. Indeed, on 1 June, Schwachheim had already noticed that Mustafa Hatti 'agreed on proceeding on every point of the protocol except kissing

the robes'.[37] The ambassadorial *sefâretnâme* also confirmed to the sultan that his envoy kept on his turban, which excluded the possibility of carrying out the bows according to Spanish etiquette.[38]

As his turban was a sign of the ambassador's social standing embedded in religious symbolism, Ottoman representatives perceived the act of removing it as a humiliation. Schwachheim stressed that, according to the ambassador, 'what has been asked was too much and went against what a Muslim believes: he will not wear anything on his head except what the Porte asked'.[39] Throughout the century, this was a recurrent issue.[40] Still in 1792, Ignaz Stürmer even admitted that, despite his clear instructions, Ebu Bekr Rattib turned his back on the emperor and left the audience without proceeding to the expected kiss and bows. Such provocation could have entailed a violent diplomatic breakdown but the ambassador was, on the contrary, celebrated in Vienna as one of the most important Ottoman representatives that the *Residenz* ever hosted.[41] It appears that by the end of the eighteenth century, political communication could accommodate a breach of protocol, which, in previous times had, more often than not, resulted in a breakdown of diplomatic relations.

Actually, the Viennese court avoided and absorbed such symbolic conflicts. In 1748, Mustafa Hatti's 'Oriental bows' were to some extent allowed by the refit of the ceremonial room. The protocol of the same year indeed specified that 'a Turkish carpet covered the stage, where His Majesty stood, over it were put several little Persian carpets richly weaved with gold and silver'.[42] The 'orientalization' of the room, for the occasion, symbolically absorbed the 'Oriental' bows stressed in the gazette.[43] Moreover, since 1665, coffee ceremonies had played a significant role in official Austro–Ottoman receptions, allowing for informal exchanges. As much as possible, coffee breaks were shaped to please the Ottoman dignitaries. Coffee, brewed 'in the Turkish way', was served with a set of 'sweetnesses' such as chocolate, candied fruits, and jams. According to the interpreter Anton Seleskowitz, coffee breaks were a specific moment, allowing for informal but essential discussion of current commercial litigation involving Ottoman merchants, and for socialization between the Ottoman and Austrian diplomats.[44]

Diplomatic sociability cannot be restricted to official ceremonies.[45] The Imperial guard's reports and the interpreters' journals shed light on the involvement of the Ottoman diplomats in the everyday life of the *Residenz* and their acquaintances within the diplomatic sphere and the aristocracy and the limits of the mediation offered by the interpreters of Oriental languages.

Ottoman diplomats also frequently used informal meetings to extend their influence at court. In 1755, El Hajj Halil Effendi understood how useful hospitality could be for the good conduct of negotiations. Feeding guests was not only a demonstration of power and a social commitment but, according to the Imperial interpreter who described a dinner at the ambassador's palace, it was clearly a matter of seduction.[46] After his official audience before Francis I, El Hajj Halil Effendi invited the Imperial administrators who had

organized his reception to dinner. On a sheet of paper Seleskowitz discretely drew the table plan (Figure 9.1).[47]

This document was considered interesting enough, first, to be recorded among the official ceremonial acts related to Halil Effendi's ambassadorship and, second, to be reproduced by Pietro Correr, the Venetian ambassador, in his official dispatches to the Senate.[48] While the guests were placed around the table 'in descending order of importance', the Austrian



Figure 9.1 Table plan of the dinner at the residence of El Hajj Halil Effendi (1755). HHStA ÄZA 50–5, fo. 1r.

interpreter and his son were strategically positioned in order to be able to organize the discussion between the ambassador and his guests.

The only discussion, however, was about the food served and the way to eat according to Ottoman gastronomic practices. Still, according to Seleskowitz, this very specific moment of sociability had a major impact on Halil Effendi's reputation and consequently on the success of his mission. The overture was acknowledged, accepted, and even expected by his Austrian guests, who eventually offered him help both to adapt to protocol and to support his ambassadorial administration. The dinner to which Halil Effendi treated his guests committed them to providing support in return.[49] Thanks to the credit that he earned in the early days of his mission, he was able to support all of the claims and petitions of the Ottoman merchants in the city. His stay paved the way for the agreement of more favourable terms of trade for the Ottomans.[50]

The acquaintances of the Ottoman envoys were broader than the close circle of administrators with whom they dealt. The 1741 reports of the Imperial guard reveal how extensive the Ottoman social network actually was. Ottoman diplomats regularly met with ambassadors of different European states and of polities and princes within the Holy Roman Empire, such as the Palatinate, Saxony, and city of Cologne.[51] This was a critical moment, since in the wake of Charles VI's death in 1740, Frederick II of Prussia had entered Bohemia with the support of the Elector of Bavaria and challenged the authority of the Habsburgs in Germany. At the beginning of 1741 Charles-Theodore of Bavaria ran for the Imperial crown, while in Vienna the Elector of the Palatinate, his cousin, clearly solicited the support of the Ottoman ambassador. Indeed, revoking the treaty of Belgrade (1739) could have been a fatal move for Austrian safety opening up a military front in the Balkans. The House of Austria would have been caught in a vice-like grip between the Bavarian–Prussian coalition and the Ottoman army. As the British minister plenipotentiary Thomas Robinson put it: 'the Turks would suspend acknowledging the Queen [sic] till they should see what European Courts would do'.[52] However, the election of Maria Theresa as 'King' of Hungary in late January gradually normalized diplomatic life in Vienna.

Far from being isolated, the Ottoman ambassador was relatively well integrated into the diplomatic milieu of Vienna and its intelligence network. Robinson wrote:

> The Turks need not have recourse to the Princes of Moldavia and Walachia for constant informations of what is passing in Europe; there are other canals enough, and I know that the Swedes at the Porte have assured the Swedish Resident here that he may safely commit to the care of the Turkish Ambassador all that he has to write to them at Constantinople, and Monsr. Vincent will not be wanting, I suppose, to make use of so sure a canal.[53]

Conversely, the aristocracy was also familiar with the Ottoman entourage. Under Charles VI, the Austrian aristocracy was in charge of the social life of the court so much so that Vienna could have appeared as 'a court without an emperor' or at least 'an aristocratic *Residenz*'.[54] During the spring of 1741 members of the Austrian aristocracy visited the Ottoman *Quartier* to meet the *chiaia*, the treasurer and the ambassador himself. Among the twenty-one barons and the seventy-one higher status nobles who visited the Ottoman *Quartier* at least once between January and May 1741, the two princes Wenzel and Emmanuel of Liechtenstein did so most regularly. Between March and May they appeared, together or separately, no less than eighteen times, that is, for two or three meetings a week. Since 1719, the princes of Liechtenstein had been granted imperial immediacy, which set them above the aristocracy and directly below the emperor. In the absence of the emperor, they were the most important dignitaries of the Austrian monarchy until Maria Theresa returned from Hungary. They played a significant role in maintenance of the commitments undertaken by the Ottomans in Belgrade.[55]

Like other diplomats, Ottomans were part of Viennese aristocratic social life and sometimes it can be difficult to classify a meeting as either political or private. The upshot is that full integration in the social sphere of Vienna meant that the distinction between political and private blurred. To socialize privately was an important political vehicle, not only in Austro–Ottoman diplomacy. A third of the diplomats who visited the Ottoman *Quartier* in 1741 were accompanied by families, wives, and sometimes children. So, too, were the visits of Viennese aristocrats. The Ottoman ambassadors were not merely passive, they also met the aristocracy in their palaces or went riding or walking with its members. Riding actually played a major role in Austro–Ottoman social life; horses were key to diplomatic sociability as they associated entertainment with social distinction. Austrian aristocrats visited the Ottoman delegation riding Turkish horses. Sometimes, they asked the Ottomans to try their horses and the Ottomans did the same at the Spanish riding school, where they learned 'the German way of riding'.[56]

Nevertheless, the ambassadors' involvement in Viennese aristocratic social life generated tensions within the embassy. Jealousy and suspicion were ineluctable and regularly set the members of the delegation who had no relationship with the city against those who did. Viennese social life was costly; this could push Ottoman dignitaries to divert the money reserved for the payment of embassy staff to their own pockets in order to sustain their social position in the city.[57] In 1741, the Ottoman servants, especially the cooks and the grooms, went on strike because they had not been paid for months. This could paralyse the *Quartier* and even prevent the proper functioning of Ottoman diplomacy, which was partially based on the *Quartier*'s attractiveness. In such a case, the Imperial guard had to guarantee the safety of the Ottoman envoy and quell 'insurgencies' that could involve the janissaries before they spread to the city, as occurred in 1774.[58]

Diplomacy in the city

The activity of the Ottoman diplomats in Vienna reveals a specific social geography in the city. It moves the focus away from the court and pays more precise attention to the city's suburbs, first of all to Leopoldstadt where the *Quartier* was established, but also to the suburbs 'beyond the military Glacis',[59] where the nobility had their gardens, and which underwent intensive economic growth during the eighteenth century.

Several reasons can explain the location of the Ottoman *Quartier* in Leopoldstadt. First, it had to do with security. In 1740, the journey of the Ottoman delegation through Hungary caused much trouble and the alleged 'depravity with which the Turks behaved in some places along their route' was evoked to justify the specific security measures taken by the emperor in Vienna.[60] However, numerous housing options were available in Leopoldstadt, which justified the installation of this very same Ottoman delegation there.[61] Indeed, Leopoldstadt was part of the port area of Vienna where the numerous foreigners who visited the city stayed, due to the convenience of its inns.[62] In 1755, when the court offered the Turkish envoy the opportunity to move into the old city centre his divan effendi kindly refused and reaffirmed his master's wish to establish his *Quartier* in Leopoldstadt.[63]

El Haj Halil's secretary even indicated the very precise way of furnishing the Golden Leaves inn, where the ambassador was to live; his suggestions were relayed to the Chancellery of State by the Imperial interpreter. According to Seleskowitz's description this was simply a divan, recreated by the ambassador. Three rooms were particularly important: the first had to be suitable for visitors and furnished in the European way, the second was to be devoted to receptions and furnished in the Ottoman style, and finally the private rooms of the ambassador and the closest members of his suite.[64] The installation of the Ottoman delegation in Leopoldstadt may at first have been to keep it away from the city in order to avoid clashes with the local population, but it gradually entailed the appropriation of this very specific area by Turkish diplomacy.

Indeed, Leopoldstadt was not only a convenient neighbourhood for the delegation but it became, during the coregency (r. 1765–1780) and the personal reign of Joseph II (r. 1780–1790), the nobility's favourite area for recreation. Leopoldstadt offered the Ottoman diplomats many other opportunities to establish ties with the Austrian nobility and European representatives. By opening the Prater, the imperial hunting ground, to 'public delectation' in 1766, Joseph II increased the attractiveness of Leopoldstadt. The Prater was linked to the Augarten—the imperial pleasure garden, which was opened to all in 1775—by a promenade and the entrance to both offered *Lusthäuser*, coffeehouses or *traiteurs* for the convenience of walkers. In 1780, it was possible to bathe in the Augarten and, during the coregency, the aristocracy increased the number of concerts and parties in the Prater. In 1775, the Russian ambassador, prince Dmitri M. Golitsyn, even sponsored a new

Lusthaus in the Prater, which became a centre for aristocratic sociability and thereby a very attractive place for all the ambassadors.[65]

The Ottoman ambassadors did not remain secluded in Leopoldstadt. They crossed the city to visit the most eminent aristocratic gardens of the western suburbs such as the Belvedere gardens and Schönbrunn Palace. Some of them, such as the Schwarzenberg gardens, were considered unmissable venues because of their reputation for their beauty. But visiting gardens also indicated a social, and by implication political, interest in meeting with important persons. For instance, when Mustafa Hatti Effendi met baron Augustin Wöber in his garden in 1748 he encountered one of the most eminent members of the Aulic Council of War, the department in charge of diplomacy with the Ottomans until 1755.[66] In 1792, Ebu Bekr Rattib Effendi even stayed a couple of weeks in the Liechtenstein gardens in the Rossau giving him time to properly establish his *Quartier* in Leopoldstadt. Hosting him was part of the duties of Charles Liechtenstein, military captain of Vienna, as it had been for his family's clients, such as Count Oetting who set up Janibi Ali and Mustafa Hatti Effendi in his palace-garden in 1741 and 1748.[67]

More or less officially, Ottoman diplomats also travelled across the city to visit the places that symbolized the monarchy. In some respects, Ottoman ambassadors' visits were similar to those taking place during the Grand Tour.[68] For instance, they frequented the Hofburg, the Spanish riding school, and the Burgtheater.[69] From 1757, Ottomans also paid particular attention to academic buildings such as the university and, of course, the Oriental Academy.[70] The arsenal, the rooms of the Imperial treasure, the hospital, and the churches were less systematically visited. These excursions gave the Ottomans and Viennese the opportunity to acknowledge a mutual interest in each other. In 1774 and 1792, Ottoman envoys praised the skills of students in Oriental languages. In 1792, Ebu Bekr Rattib Effendi even offered the director of the Academy a poem that he had written himself and that was transcribed in Turkish as well as in Latin on the wall of the building.[71] In doing so he endorsed, contributed to, and legitimized the training of the students who would serve Austrian diplomacy with its 'oriental' partners and the building which served as the centre of Viennese orientalism in Europe. In fact Seleskowtiz had already stressed this transimperial knowledge in 1755. While El Haj Halil Effendi was visiting the Imperial Library the interpreter was a witness and not a bridge in the cultural exchange: 'Mister Van Swieten [the director of the Imperial Library] showed him some ancient Alcorans, and passed him Turkish, Persian and Arabic books that he carefully examined and he browsed enjoying everything, after that one brought coffee, chocolate, water, fresh fruit and marmalade'.[72] Here, despite the allegedly irreducible cultural difference between the Ottoman world and the Austrian monarchy, two men sharing the same cultural references enjoyed a common moment of sociability.

The passage through the city of the cortèges driving the Ottoman ambassadors to their official audiences (Figure 9.2) at the Hofburg (10) and the

Aulic Council of War (11) brought Ottoman diplomacy to another level of sociability: a symbolic one. The cortege always started from the Ottoman *Quartier* in Leopoldstadt (1). It crossed the Danube on the Schlachbrücke (2) in front of the docks (3) and entered into the city through Fishermen's gate (4), before proceeding along the Rotenturmstrasse (5), crossing the mercantile area (6) where the Ottoman merchants trading in Fleischmarkt resided (6). Merchants became increasingly involved in such ceremonies during the second half of the eighteenth century, occupying an increasingly important symbolic place. Absent in 1748, in 1792 they walked behind the ambassador's carriage. Once in front of the Stephansdom (7), the cortège turned to the right onto the Graben (8) and at its end turned left onto the Kohlmarkt (9) towards the Hofburg (10).[73] The cortège, on the scale of the city, repeated the journey of the Ottoman ambassador from Turkey to Vienna. He progressively crossed the neighbourhood of the community whose interests he represented to enter into the very deep heart of the Austrian Monarchy.[74]

In Leopoldstadt, Ottoman ambassadors were not only close to the nobility. They also mingled with Ottoman merchants residing in Vienna. According to Seleskowitz, Ottoman envoys were continuously in touch with tradesmen from Turkey and supported their requests to the Imperial administration. In 1755, El Hajj Halil Effendi met with merchants every day and, at some point, he was also personally involved in trade, just like the Austrian



Figure 9.2 Route of the procession of the Ottoman ambassador to the Imperial court (1748).

administrators. The latter rented flats and warehouses strategically located in Leopoldstadt or on the Fleischmarkt to Ottoman merchants. Some of them even delivered passports to the merchants and supported their complaints. For instance, in 1755 Osman Bassa finally obtained the release of 1132 bales of cotton that had been seized in Mehadia by working through the Ottoman envoys and the Imperial administration. As a sign of goodwill and understanding of the Muslim faith by the Austrian administration, the good news was delivered during the celebration of Ramadan.[75] Imperial diplomats also included some of these merchants in their own clienteles. Ottoman merchants and diplomats and Austrian administrators who were in Vienna formed a very active and attractive milieu.[76]

Moreover local merchants came to the *Quartier* trying to interest Ottoman dignitaries in their goods and, if possible, to initiate new trade with Istanbul. The Imperial guard's reports regularly mentioned their visits, especially those by goldsmiths and jewellers, who sought to interest the ambassadors in their wares in other ways too. On 4 June 1748, for example, Franz Paul von Kellersberg mentioned that 'a merchant with silver and gold flowers came to the ambassador'. On 26 June, Jacob Baumüller attested that 'the young count von Harrach and some merchants coming from the city' also visited Mustafa Hatti Effendi. This was an expression of the personal and private patronage that the administration extended to Ottoman merchants. Count Harrach was the head of the Aulic Council of War that had oversight of Austro–Ottoman trade during Prince Eugene's Presidency. Moreover, Harrach moved the Aulic Council of War into the House of the Teutonic Order, in the area of the city where flats and warehouses were devoted, amongst others, to the Ottoman merchants. A couple of days later, Baumüller noted that 'the Aulic Interpreter Schwachheim visited the ambassador today with a goldsmith and different sort of silver coffee pots and cups that he presented'. Mustafa Hatti Effendi was even invited by the bourgeoisie to visit the municipal gold and silver foundry of Saint Ulrich, in Leopoldstadt. The Ottoman diplomatic elite's increasing appreciation of Viennese luxury craftsmanship generated a new demand in Turkey and opened a new market supplied by the Ottoman merchants who imported products from Vienna.[77]

The administration hence played a significant role in Viennese marketing. After 1748, the Aulic Chamber was in charge of the management of Ottoman trade and promoted the activity of Viennese manufacturers. Ottoman diplomats were interested in Viennese production for both scientific and personal reasons. The paper factory of Schwechhat, the glass and mosaic factories, and the porcelain factory, above all, captured their attention.[78] In 1755, Count Rudolph Chotek, as president of the Aulic Chamber, organized a visit to the porcelain factory in the Rossau for the Ottoman delegation.[79] Their reception was punctuated by a presentation about, and demonstration of, the process of manufacturing, as well as a coffee ceremony, and the presentation of gifts. In 1773, while he was visiting the Holy Roman

Empire, the French General Guibert noted in his journal that the factory produced 'quite fine' porcelain and that a 'high quantity of cups and saucers [are] made for the Turks. One sells yearly some for 50 or 60 thousand florins, this is the only foreign market'.[80] The factory indeed oriented part of its production towards luxury Turkish artefacts such as coffee sets or narghile (hookah) pipes that were very valuable in Istanbul.[81] This was a keystone of economic relations in Austro–Ottoman diplomacy.

Conclusion

This case study places the history of Ottoman diplomacy in a framework that is broader than the conventional focus on political negotiation. Ottoman diplomats were deeply involved, at several levels, in the social life of the Imperial *Residenz* and its urban environment precisely to pursue diplomatic business. This multilevel interaction suggests that the focus should move away from a cross-cultural paradigm (that assumes two separate cultures interacting with each other) to consider instead the pragmatic social bonding of institutional agents, their integration into local networks, and their influence on both local social life and politics. Contrasting the three levels of familiarity—within the delegation, with the court, and with the city—suggests the need to appreciate the wider economic, social and political environment in which diplomats operated. The embeddedness of diplomatic agents was not only a matter of rational and strategic bonding, but also about mastering some very implicit sociocultural codes that political actors could only obtain through becoming familiar with the sociocultural environment of their interlocutors. The familiarity generated by such networks and the variety of direct interactions between ambassadors and members of the court also challenges the importance recent scholars have attributed to intermediaries, especially the dragomans, in eighteenth-century Austro–Ottoman encounters.

Particularly within Mediterranean studies, such intermediaries have been seen as crucial cultural agents whose experiences provided an important focal point for cross-cultural exchanges. By the eighteenth century, if not earlier, Ottoman ambassadors in central Europe were interacting with European society directly and did not rely as extensively on such intermediaries as their predecessors had done. Interpreters were increasingly relegated to being witnesses to, rather than key participants in, the diplomats' encounters with the Viennese court. Moreover, the Austro–Ottoman political milieu was only the tip of the iceberg. Its emergence was indicative of a more extensive regional integration supported by the emergence of clienteles comprised of administrators, diplomatic agents, merchants, and scholars from the Austrian Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire and structured by trans-regional aristocratic families. Such a conjunction of public and private interests makes a social approach to analyses of Ottoman–European relations essential.

Notes

1 See for example M. Kurz, M. Scheutz, K. Vocelka, and T. Winkelbauer (eds.), *Das Osmanische Reich und die Habsburgermonarchie in der Neuzeit* (Vienna, 2005); I. Feigl, V. Heuberger, M. Pittoni, and K. Tomenendal (eds.), *Auf den Spuren der Osmanen in der österreichischen Geschichte* (Frankfurt, 2002); P. S. Fichtner, *Terror and toleration: the Habsburg Empire confronts Islam, 1539–1850* (London, 2008); D. Do Paço, *L'Orient à Vienne au dix-huitième siècle* (Oxford, 2015).

2 K. Roider, 'The Oriental Academy in the *Theresienzeit*', *Topic* 34 (1980), 19–28; H. Pfusterschmid-Hardtenstein, 'Von der Orientalischen Akademie zur K. u. K. Konsularakademie. Eine Maria-Theresianische Institution und ihre Bedeutung für den Auswärtigen Dienst der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie', in A. Wandruszka and P. Urbanitsch (eds.), *Die Habsburger Monarchie 1848–1918: Die Habsburger Monarchie im System der internationalen Beziehungen* (Vienna, 1989), pp. 122–95; O. Rathkolb (ed.), *Von der Orientalischen zur Diplomatischen Akademie in Wien* (Innsbruck/Vienna, 2004).

3 A voice of dissent has been also expressed by Mathieu Grenet: 'the assumption that the bridging of the linguistic divide automatically made contact and understanding more direct needs to be tested against actual practices of cross-cultural communication' see M. Grenet, 'Muslim missions in early modern France, c.1610–c.1780: note for a social history of cross-cultural diplomacy', *JEMH*, 19 (2015), 223–44.

4 S. Yérasimos, 'Explorateurs de la modernité: les ambassadeurs ottomans en Europe', *Genèses. Sciences sociales et histoire*, 35 (1999), 65–82; S. Yérasimos, 'Le Turc à Vienne ou le regard inversé', in B. Rupp-Eisenreich and J. Stagl (eds.), *Kulturwissenschaft im Vielvölkerstaat: zur Geschichte der Ethnologie und verwandter Gebiete in Osterreich, ca. 1780–1918* (Vienna, 1995), pp. 28–37; V. H. Aksan, 'Ottoman political writing, 1768–1808', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25 (1993), 53–69; F. Hitzel, 'Sefâretnâme: comptes rendus des ambassadeurs ottomans en Europe', in L. Bély (ed.), *Turcs et turqueries, XVIe–XVIIIe siècles* (Paris, 2009), pp. 97–110.

5 Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Hof- Haus- und Staatsarchiv, Staatenabteilungen (HHStA), Türkei IV/2 (1748), IV/3 (1755), IV/5, (1748), IV/7 and 8 (1774), IV/9–11 (1792) and IV/13 (1741). For an analysis of the documents see Do Paço, *L'Orient à Vienne*, pp. 69–75.

6 For another model of commensurability see Guido van Meersbergen's chapter in this volume.

7 M. P. Pedani, *In nome del Gran Signore: inviati ottomani a Venezia dalla caduta di Constantinopoli alla guerra di Candia* (Venice, 1994); M. P. Pedani, *Venezia porta d'Oriente* (Bologna, 2010); N. Rothman, *Brokering empire: trans-imperial subjects between Venice and Istanbul* (Cornell, NY, 2011); J. Dakhlia and B. Vincent (eds.), *Les Musulmans dans l'histoire de l'Europe. Volume 1: Une intégration invisible* (Paris, 2011); J. Dakhlia and W. Kaiser (eds.), *Les Musulmans dans l'histoire de l'Europe. Volume 2: Contacts et échanges* (Paris, 2013).

8 F. Trivellato, *The familiarity of strangers : the Sephardic diaspora, Livorno, and cross-cultural trade in the early modern period* (New Haven, 2009).

9 *Wienerisches Diarium* (*WD*) 8 March 1748; 26 April 1755; 14 May 1774; J. Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de l'Empire ottoman de son origine jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris, 1835), xv.13, 159, 273, 290, xvi.26, 41, 115–16.

10 H. R. I. Kugeler, '"Le parfait Ambassadeur"': the theory and practice of diplomacy in the century following the Peace of Westphalia', D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford (2009).

11 TNA, SP 80/215, letter 40.

12 HHStA Türkei V/18, fo. 9r-v.

13 HHStA Türkei V/18, fo. 8r-v.
14 V. H. Aksan, *An Ottoman statesman in war and peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi 1700–1783* (Leiden, 1995), p. 26.
15 Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire*, xvi.28.
16 Ibid., xv.75, 234; Aksan, *Ottoman statesman*, pp. 163–9.
17 *Lettre historique et politique où l'on voit ce qui s'est passé de plus intéressant dans toutes les Cours pendant le mois de Juillet 1740* (Amsterdam, 1740), p. 77.
18 Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire*, xv.190.
19 *WD*, 11 May 1774.
20 For example HHStA Türkei IV/3, pp. 237, 297, 336; IV/9–11, 8 February; IV/13, 26, 28 January, 5 February.
21 HHStA Türkei IV/13, 'Specification dere Türkischen Silber Prasenten'.
22 *WD*, 11 May 1774.
23 HHStA Türkei IV/3, pp. 237, 297, 336; IV/9–11, 9 February. When the manuscript is unfoliated or unpaginated the day of the event is given.
24 HHStA Türkei V/19, fo. 13r.
25 HHStA Türkei IV/9–11, February 8.
26 HHStA Türkei IV/13, 26, 28 January, 5 February.
27 HHStA Türkei IV/2, pp. 234–7.
28 HHStA Türkei IV/9–11, 29 February.
29 Yérasimos, 'Explorateurs de la modernité'; J. M. Stein, 'An eighteenth-century Ottoman ambassador observes the west: Ebu Bekir Ratîb Efendi reports on the Habsburg system of roads and posts', *Archivium Ottomanicum* 10 (1985), 219–312.
30 Archivo di Stato di Venezia, Venice (ASV), Senato, Dispacci degli ambasciatori al Senato, Germania (Germania), filza 284, fos. 405r-407v.
31 HHStA Türkei IV/3.
32 In Vienna, Ottoman embassies, even if they were non-permanent, were no less familiar with the imperial domestic politics than the merchants of the Sublime Porte, contrary to the Dutch model developed in this volume by Guido van Meersbergen.
33 L. Auer, 'Diplomatisches Zeremoniell am Kaiserhof der Frühen Neuzeit: Perspektiven eines Forschungsthemas', in R. Kauz, G. Rota, and J. P. Niederkorn (eds.), *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im Mittleren Osten in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Vienna, 2009), pp. 33–54.
34 For the documentation of diplomatic ceremonial, private protocol, courtly entertainment and the role of different audiences, see J. Hennings, *Russia and courtly Europe: ritual and the culture of diplomacy, 1648–1725* (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 63–4, 160–201.
35 HHStA Türkei IV/3, pp. 202–6. See also J. C. Lünig, *Theatrum Ceremoniale Historico-Politicum*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1719/1720), i.520–616.
36 *WD*, 19 June 1748.
37 HHStA Türkei IV/2, p. 189.
38 A. I. Savaş (ed. and trans.), 'Der Gesandtschaftsbericht des Mustafa Hatti Efendi über die Gesandtschaftsreise nach Wien', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Vienna (1989), p. 166.
39 HHStA Türkei IV/2, p. 164.
40 HHStA Türkei IV/2, p. 186–8; IV/3, p. 207; IV/8, p. 120.
41 HHStA Türkei IV/9, 26 February.
42 HHStA Oberhofmeisteramt, Hofzeremonielldepartement, Zeremonialprotokolle, 21 (1748), pp. 333–4.
43 Again see Guido van Meersbergen's contribution in this volume. However, the resistance here of the Ottoman ambassadors to the Spanish etiquette to some extent highlights that the Ottomans were in a stronger position at the Viennese

Hof than the Dutch were at the Mughal court, for in Vienna the court adjusted its ceremonial to accommodate their guest.

44 HHStA Türkei IV/3, pp. 122–3; IV/2, pp. 159–60; IV/3, p. 310; IV/8, p. 99.
45 Pedani, *In nome del Gran Signore*, pp. 171–6; Do Paço, *L'Orient à Vienne*, pp. 227–41; Grenet, 'Muslim Missions'.
46 Dinner was handled here in a very different way than the very formal one described in this volume by Florian Kühnel for the sixteenth century.
47 HHStA Ält. Zerem. A., 50/VIII, fo. 1r.
48 ASV, Germania, filza 261, fo. 343r-v.
49 For a full description of the dinner see HHStA Türkei IV/3, pp. 233–9.
50 Do Paço, *L'Orient à Vienne*, pp. 180–3.
51 See for example HHStA Türkei IV/13, 15 and 27 January, 8, 12, 21, and 26 February, 2, 8, 13, 15, 22 and 27 March, 2, 6, 9, 11, 17 and 21 April, 8, 21 and 22 May.
52 TNA SP 80/144, 11 February 1741.
53 Ibid.
54 É. Hassler, *La Cour de Vienne 1680–1740: service de l'empereur et stratégies spatiales des élites nobiliaires dans la monarchie des Habsbourg* (Strasbourg, 2013).
55 For the Liechtensteins see HHStA Türkei IV/13, 9, 10, 17, 22, and 27 March, 3, 12, 15, 21, and 24 April, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14, 19, 23, and 24 May.
56 HHStA Türkei IV/13, 28 April, 5 and 9 May; IV/3, p. 312; IV/7–8, p. 260.
57 HHStA Türkei IV/13, 12–24 May.
58 HHStA Türkei IV/7–8, p. 345.
59 Ignaz De Luca, *Wiens gegenwärtiger Zustand unter Josephs Regierung* (Vienna, 1787), p. 396.
60 *Lettre historique*, p. 285.
61 Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire*, xv.20.
62 Do Paço, *L'Orient à Vienne*, pp. 250–61.
63 HHStA Türkei IV/3, pp. 123–4.
64 Ibid., pp. 124–5.
65 D. Do Paço, 'Aménagements urbains et reconfiguration d'une sociabilité aristocratique: les jardins viennois du XVIIIe siècle', *Lumières*, 21 (2013), 91–104.
66 A. von Arneth, *Geschichte Maria Theresia's*, 10 vols. (Vienna, 1870), iv.89.
67 HHStA Türkei IV/2, pp. 190–1; IV/7, pp. 242, 255, 363–8; IV/13, 28 June, 3 July, 1 August.
68 C. Bilim, 'Ebubekir Ratib Efendi, Nemçe Sefaretmanesi', *Belleten*, 54/209 (1990), 261–95.
69 HHStA Türkei IV/2, pp. 238–46; IV/3, pp. 269–78; IV/9–11, 29 February, 1 May.
70 HHStA Türkei IV/2, p. 256; IV/3, pp. 165, 296–9; IV/7–9, pp. 269–71; R. Bachofen von Echt (ed.), *Josef Freiherr von Hammer-Purgstall, Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben, 1774–1852* (Vienna/Leipzig, 1940), p. 26.
71 HHStA Türkei, IV/9, 22 March.
72 HHStA Türkei IV/3, pp. 298–9.
73 *WD*, 1 June 1748.
74 Do Paço, *L'Orient à Vienne*, pp. 249–62.
75 HHStA Türkei IV/2, additional piece X.
76 Do Paço, *L'Orient à Vienne*, pp. 163–85.
77 For example HHStA Türkei IV/13, 5 April, 7 May; IV/4, 4, 26 and 28 June, 9 July.
78 HHStA Türkei IV/9, 28 March, 4, 5, and 30 May.
79 More generally see M. Cassidy-Geiger (ed.), *Fragile diplomacy: Meissen porcelain for European courts, ca. 1710–1763* (Yale, 2007).
80 J.-A.-H. comte de Guibert, *Journal d'un voyage en Allemagne fait en 1773, par J. A. H. Guibert* (Paris, 1780), pp. 301–2.
81 HHStA Türkei IV/3, pp. 336–9.

Part III

Objects and beasts

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10 Presenting noble beasts

Gifts of animals in Tudor and Stuart diplomacy

Felicity Heal

Introduction

Jerome Horsey had one of the least desirable assignments in Elizabethan diplomacy, that of ambassador to the court of the tsars. He first visited Moscow in 1573, and had all too close experience of the violence and volatility of Tsar Ivan. Over the next decade he was witness to the failures of English embassy, the death of Ivan IV and the rise of Boris Godunov. In 1584 he was sent on a highly formal visit to explore the new political environment, a visit funded by the Muscovy Company, with active help from Elizabeth I's principal secretary Sir Francis Walsingham. It was recognized by now that successful diplomacy in this alien land had to pay unusual attention to gifts, so Horsey set about accumulating a remarkable rag-bag to ship to Muscovy. There were gilt halberds, pistols, armour, wines, clothing of scarlet, pearls, plate, medicines, virginals, and organs, the last with their musicians, and a medley of animals, lions, a bull and dogs. Remarkably, this all arrived safely at the court of the young tsar, and Horsey was able to provide a vivid narrative of the reception they were given.

He stayed in a 'withdrawinge chamber', dressed in the Russian style, while the emperor and empress viewed the animals out of a window of the palace. The procession was led by 'a goodly white bull all spotted with natural black dapples, his gorge hanging downe to his knees, washed with sope and sleeked over, with a greene velvet collar studded, and a red rope'. The beast was made to kneel before the monarch, and then rose looking understandably fierce. The bull was followed by twelve mastiffs, each with collars adorned with roses, and then two threatening lions drawn in a cage on a sledge. Only after the display of beasts did Horsey appear formally in court to present the rest of the gifts, which were duly admired, especially the musical instruments. For the avoidance of doubt, the ambassador had a list of all the gifts drawn up and given to the royal treasurer.[1]

Horsey's account of his gifting rituals is at once distinctive and characteristic of the exchanges orchestrated between sovereigns in the early modern period. The gestures of diplomacy were unusually complex in the rather unfamiliar environment of the Russian court, and prompted anxiety in the

donors that much of their material interest in trade could be lost in inadequate or mistaken moves. The Russians could certainly take offence at deficient gifting: in 1591 Elizabeth was informed that her presents did not suffice for full embassy and therefore the next ambassador to England will 'likewise abate of ours'. In 1618, the failed embassy of Sir Dudley Digges led to the return of the gifts he bore from James I. Carlisle's 1663 mission foundered so badly on conflicts about ceremony that it was the English ambassador who declined his departure gifts to uphold the honour of his sovereign.[2] Elsewhere gifts might be misread as tribute. When arrangements for a mission to Turkey were discussed in Elizabethan England, anxiety was expressed because the 'Grand signor' 'takethe all presentes of Chrystian prynces to be as tributes, and for suche are they regystred in hys Recordes'.[3] Excessive largesse might also be subject to misinterpretation: the Elizabethan Privy Council, worrying about the sultan, surmised that the greater the value of the present to the Turks 'the greater dutye and subiection he takethe hold of therebye'.[4] Seventeenth-century missions to the Mughal and the Persian courts had to maintain a fine balance between an acceptance that oriental rulers demanded tribute-like behaviour, and a representation of the standing and ingenuity of their own rulers displayed the abundance of their gifts.[5] The Levant Company and Elizabeth achieved something of this balance with the impressive gifts despatched to Constantinople in the 1580s and 1590s. They included jewels, gilt plate, cloth of gold, and an elaborate mechanical clock, culminating in an organ, with its organ maker, and a fine coach for the 'old' Sultana Safiye.[6]

The establishment of settled embassies, and the regularization of diplomatic procedure, might be thought to render these grand and difficult gestures less necessary in later Renaissance Europe. Treatises on diplomacy rarely addressed the nature or purpose of giving, except insofar as it concerned the rewards to ambassadors where, in the words of Maija Jansson, a 'measured reciprocity' gradually prevailed.[7] It is certainly true that by the seventeenth century not every arriving embassy had to be accompanied by a grand gift-giving ceremony.[8] But personal monarchy always required personal expressions of identity and honour and the sovereign gift remained an ideal way in which they could be marked. The diplomatic gift between monarchs or states continued to provide a multiplicity of signals, opening dialogue to seek political alliance or to initiate marriage negotiations, looking for trading advantage or simply enhancing the prestige of the giver. It represented the person of the monarch and, in a culture that had not fully separated the sign from the signifier, it could actually embody the nature and qualities of the ruler.

Since the sovereign gift remained influential in western Europe as well as beyond, it needed to be managed with considerable care. The gift bound the recipient to a return in a more immediate and focussed way than mere diplomatic communication: it engaged the honour of the donor and the recipient: the latter was placed under obligation and had to perform

appropriate gratitude.[9] Once a gift had opened a dialogue the counter-gift must follow in the form of a material response, while acknowledging the requests implicit in the initial offering. Diplomatic skill was also required because gifts between rulers were almost always presented at a distance. This often rendered their political messages less transparent or stable than their senders might have wished: the gestures could resemble a crude form of semaphore. Much of the success of offerings therefore depended upon the interpretative skills of agents and intermediaries such as ambassadors and also led to unusual focus on the performative aspects of giving, ideally the display of gifts in open court. The princely court provided the theatre in which the agent of the giver, and other observers such as rival ambassadors, could check that a proper response had been offered to the donor's generosity. The open court also offered the possibility of the proliferation of the benefit—either the giver could multiply presents to lesser men within the donor's circle or the receiving monarch could pass part of the offering to courtiers.[10]

When Frederick II of Denmark wrote to Elizabeth I offering a gift-exchange of horses for a carriage in 1582, he employed the Senecan trope that it was the mind of the giver, not the nature of the gift, which was of central importance. But he adapted Seneca: princes above all people, he claimed, considered the spirit of the gift; in consequence they were more pleased with presents than men of lesser rank.[11] This is nonsense: the need for parity between monarchs and states demanded that the nature of the things given was critical, and usually therefore involved much financial investment and ostentation. What this meant in practice varied. One way of achieving an impact was that described by Horsey in the Russian example: the scatter-effect of sending almost anything that might be construed as a precious commodity especially things identified with the sovereign from whom it was sent. Late sixteenth-century exchanges within the vast Habsburg dynasty often had this quality: in 1584, for example, Archduke Albrecht sent horses, mules, dogs, jewels, cloth, Asian seeds and a variety of other things from Lisbon to Vienna for the Emperor. In 1591 he sent Rudolph II another great haul including exotic animals, jewels and cloth.[12] The Medici were also given to this sort of extravaganza: the Florentine duke Ferdinando outdid most others when he celebrated James I's accession to the English crown by giving him two litters and a sedan chair, horses and mules, a lavish quantity of good Italian wine, jewellery, preserves, wheels of parmesan, and citrus fruits.[13] In 1614, in an attempt to bolster Anglo–Spanish accord, James I despatched to Madrid what John Chamberlain called 'a rabblement of presents' including horses, bulls and cattle, spaniels, greyhounds, 'stone-bowes, cross-bowes, curious peeces, truncks and many things els'.[14]

While a heap of things made a visually impressive gift, the essential requirement was that it enhance the reputation and honour both of the giver and receiver. In the early modern period this often meant an increasing emphasis on the novel and exotic. Newish categories for sovereign exchange included portraits, other types of artistic work, and mechanical devices.[15]

The Spanish Habsburgs, with their New World territories, and after 1580 their control of the Portuguese trading empire, had logical advantages in the use of rare animals and birds as gifts, despatching this visible expression of power throughout continental Europe.[16] Other rulers competed with those cornerstones of monarchical identity: noble animals for the chase, display, and war: horses, dogs and hawks. They were at once the traditional stuff of sovereign gifting, and were novelties in their turn, as selective breeding and imports from expanded trading contacts changed the quality of the offering that could be made.[17]

Giving noble animals

Animals suitable for riding, the hunting field, and racing remained central to royal gifting throughout most of the early modern period. The 'rabblements' of gifts rarely omitted live animals, especially horses. It has been said about diplomacy in seventeenth-century Spanish Italy that other presents between rulers might be dispensed with 'but never horses, mules or falcons'.[18] Ferdinando de' Medici gave close attention to the particular gifts to be offered to rulers, but to nothing more than the horses and other hunting gifts he sent to Philip II to feed his well-known obsession with the chase.[19] When Louis XIV provided a grand gift for Charles XII of Sweden in 1673 it was the twelve horses brilliantly equipped with rich saddles and harnesses that attracted most attention.[20] Sentient beasts remained in a different category to other gifts: they could enact the status of the donor more directly than the inanimate; they could display his or her wealth and power explicitly through the grand trappings that might be hung upon them, and less directly through the calibre of breeding. They could express intimacy with a male ruler as perhaps only jewels could with a female. Many a ruler, to quote a line from Alexander Barclay, more loved 'a horse or dogge than a man'.[21]

Exchange of noble animals such as these was not, of course, unique to sovereign transactions, but there were ways in which its quality, or quantity, could be marked out, so that the monarch could be identified as at least 'primus inter pares'. This was important, since giving to the monarch was a recognized method of working towards amity between states, which needed to be expressed in the form of horizontal and equal relationships.[22] Either the best and/or the most exotic could be given to the prince, or at the most only those closest to him or her were deemed worthy of such a benefit. In 1526, Cardinal Wolsey laid out both his gratitude for the quality of a French gift of mules to Henry VIII and the way in which the gift enhanced his own status. The royal mules were as 'fair, goodly, and well trained beasts as hath been seen', and richly accoutred. His own animals were as praiseworthy and fit to be 'a right honourable present to have been sent unto the Pope's holiness'.[23] When the duke of Buckingham was given a gift of 'six delicate horses' by the French in 1619, John Chamberlain had no doubt that these

were of royal status and saw it as evidence of the favourite's power, since the animals were 'a bounty and magnificence fitter to pass between great princes'.[24] The accoutrements that accompanied horses and hawks often served to underline the honourable nature of the gift: like mannequins the animals sported rich cloths, saddles and bridles indicative of the standing of the donor.[25]

To address the gift of animals is to consider only a sub-set of the sovereign gift, and one not necessarily possessing unique qualities. But the animate part of diplomatic giving was distinctive, and involved its own specific rewards and challenges for recipient and donor. The beasts and monarchs could be closely identified, the donor ensuring that the former provided pleasure and entertainment for the latter. And for performing giving there was nothing to compare with the appearance at the recipient's court of a string of animals and their human managers. Offering the best of the animals bred or captured in your realm to a fellow-sovereign was a highly effective means of underlining shared status. Horses in particular could be the 'gift that kept on giving', when the offering might include mares or stud to improve the recipient's breeding-stock in cultures in which they were the equivalent of both tanks and Ferraris in a modern context. Francesco Gonzaga II, marquess of Mantua, made no idle boast when he told a correspondent that his Barbary horses were desired 'by the very king of France, the Catholic king, the [kings of] England' and many others.[26] Here was a remarkably efficacious tool of international diplomacy.

Pleasuring monarchs

The formal rhetoric employed when presenting animals at early modern courts was that they were intended to 'give pleasure' to the princely recipients. The marquess of Mantua, sending horses to Henry VIII, spoke of the king's known 'delight' in such gifts.[27] When James V of Scotland wanted to send a return gift to Henry VIII in 1540, he asked the English ambassador what his uncle 'delighteth or taketh pleasure in'.[28] Francis I promised to give his 'brother of England' some 'high bounding and stirring horses' for the tilt and tournament on the eve of the Field of Cloth of Gold, as he clearly saw the animals as giving personal delight.[29] The horses exchanged on these and other occasions of Anglo–French dialogue offered amity between rulers. They were also the stuff of Renaissance competition, given an individual edge by Henry's and Francis's shared passion for the hunt and tournament. The English 'supply list' for the Cloth of Gold meeting in 1520 noted that the English must provide 'hobbies, palfreys, hounds, greyhounds, horns leashes and collars' for the French.[30] This was also an occasion for intense competition: Francis rode a Mantuan horse into the lists, and Henry so admired it that it was given him as a gift. In return he gave Francis his Neapolitan courser, but the Mantuan ambassador unhesitatingly labelled this as an inferior beast.[31] Horses and hounds were regularly despatched across the

Channel when England and France were at peace, and even Edward VI was sent thirteen horses and two mules at the conclusion of the 1551 treaty.[32]

After something of a hiatus under Elizabeth, animals were again in regular motion under James VI and I, another monarch in whom passion for hunting and racing met with desire for recognition on the international stage. When as James VI he attained his majority in Scotland, the French immediately sent him horses, reciprocated with hawks.[33] Elizabeth I, much slower to pleasure her cousin, finally parted with a few horses and hounds, noted rather contemptuously in an English memo as 'certain small pleasures for the king of Scotland'.[34] Offerings from abroad improved once James was in power in London. Philip III gave him four barbary horses 'trained to tilt at the ring' (1604), and then two jennets in 1606.[35] The king reciprocated: when the earl of Nottingham was sent to Spain to ratify the 1604 Treaty of London he went with horses and their accoutrements.[36] Not to be outdone the French gave nine magnificent riding horses, supported by a riding-master.[37] In less formal exchanges Anne of Denmark chose to give animals to fellow-sovereigns: she sent horses to her Danish mother in 1606 and sent geldings, greyhounds and beagles to the young Louis XIII.[38] Prince Henry favoured the Dauphin with a pair of horses.[39]

Exotic beasts were a somewhat different category of gift. They were given no doubt with the same broad objectives as hunting and riding animals: to provide pleasure to the recipients, to ensure that the status of the donor was displayed, to mark out the distinctive qualities of the sovereigns involved. They presented, often in heightened form, difficulties of transport and what must anachronistically be called animal welfare. The differences were more obvious. While the expansion of Europe made it increasingly possible for aristocrats, merchants and others to have small exotics such as monkeys and parrots, noble mammals were largely the prerogative of princes who could develop menageries. This made them ideal as ostentatious gifts, which gave their donors a competitive edge over the recipients who could not usually reciprocate in precise kind. Exotics also had the advantage to the donor in that they were, in the formal sense, priceless. Ambassadors and diplomatic observers spent much time in calculating the exact monetary worth of most gifts: but no price tag readily attached to a lion or elephant. And they served that desire for curiosity and delight which is such a feature of Renaissance courts. This is well-evoked in the letter of Thomas Scott of Pitgorno, a Scottish courtier, to Thomas Cromwell in 1537. Scott proposed that a lion intended for Henry VIII's menagerie should be diverted to James V since such pleasures were ungettable in Scotland and 'my Maister is ane zoung Prince delytand in sic thingis for his plesser'.[40]

Great beasts were an old feature of European diplomacy. The English crown began its accumulation through gifts as early as the beginning of the thirteenth century, and received some of its most famous offerings under Henry III, a polar bear from Haakam IV of Norway in 1251 and an elephant from Louis IX in 1255.[41] But exotics such as these became regular

gift tools in the early Renaissance, a process that initially owed most to the Portuguese, who from the time of Manuel I had their own royal menagerie and received gifts from their overseas empire. An important early example was the gift of four elephants by the king of Ceylon at the signing of the 1518 treaty. Four years before this Manuel had given Leo X another elephant and Brazilian parrots—the elephant became the subject of a famous painting by Raphael. The next year the rhino sent by the sultan of Gujarat failed to reach Leo, it was shipwrecked, but not before Albrecht Dürer had produced his famous illustration of it from reports he had received.[42] By the mid-century there was a significant growth in the dissemination of elephants and great cats with the Austrian Habsburgs as the most enthusiastic recipients of such presents for their menageries.[43]

Only two early modern British monarchs seem to have shown particular enthusiasm for gifts of exotic fauna: James I, who had a positive passion for beasts and took great pleasure in restocking the menagerie at the Tower of London, and his grandson Charles II who specialized in unusual birds and deer.[44] Diplomats quickly became aware of these interests, which explains why the Russian mission of 1662–1663 carried pelicans and a crane as well as the usual hawks.[45] Other English rulers accepted lions, leopards, camels, and cassowary as part of the logical, if sometimes trying, tribute of diplomacy. Henry VIII had lions and leopards in the Tower of London menagerie, and perhaps on occasions out of it: Cromwell's accounts for 1539 show payment for a collar of velvet 'for the strange beast my lord gave to the king'.[46] The king of Hungary produced camels, as well as Turkish horses and slaves in a gift of 1531.[47] Elizabeth I was sent further camels as part of a French offering in 1565, intended, as the Spanish ambassador bitchily remarked, that 'woman-like she should be flattered and pleased with the presents'.[48] And the lions sent to Muscovy in 1584 show Elizabeth reciprocating in kind. James received a lioness and a leopard from the duke of Savoy, and in 1623 five camels, as well as some other animals accompanied the king's prize—an elephant sent from Spain at the instance of the duke of Buckingham.[49]

The stories of two elephants provide specific examples of the complexities involved in offering exotic animals. In 1591 Henri IV of France acquired an elephant from the African coast. Since Elizabeth's military support was central to his struggle to secure the French throne, and since she had just despatched the earl of Essex, 200 horses, and the gift of a coach and fine horses to the king, reciprocation was required.[50] Henri was apparently informed that the Queen wanted to see the elephant, which had been landed at his key supply port of Dieppe. So, the elephant and its handler were duly shipped across the Channel.[51] There follows a convoluted story in which the United Provinces agent in London, Noel de Caron, became responsible for the animal, since it was merchants from the Provinces that had brought it to London. The elephant was expensive, hopes for displaying it in public for profit either in England or the Low Countries apparently came to little

before it disappeared from history.[52] But it is Elizabeth's apparent reaction that is of most interest: Henri was told that the queen was 'not content' with the fact that the elephant had been sent. The diplomatic signals had gone wrong and the unfortunate elephant as a result was accorded no honour, no royal entry.

The second elephant fared somewhat better: it was, to quote the duke of Buckingham, 'impudentlie begged' for James I from Philip IV when Buckingham and Prince Charles were in Madrid in 1623 negotiating for the Spanish match.[53] The elephant was sent to London, and was noted with malice by the Venetian ambassador: 'the King of Spain has made his majesty the present of an elephant: I do not know whether it comes as an earnest of the Infanta or instead of her'.[54] The Spanish elephant presented the Jacobean government with logistic problems and, according to Lord Treasurer Cranfield, cost the king 'as much as a garrison'.[55] More to our theme, however, is the sense that as a begged, not chosen, gift it was a personal matter between sovereigns. The elephant entered London at night with none of the public flourish of an 'official' gift, though it nevertheless 'could not', says Chamberlain, 'passe unseene'.[56] The summer of 1623, with Prince Charles and Buckingham still in Spain, was scarcely the moment to trumpet the Spanish match. In both cases the exotic bulk of the elephant proved something of an embarrassment: to Elizabeth because it served no purpose; to James because it was a very visible manifestation of the unpopular Spanish adventure.

Interpreting and presenting the gift

Ambassadors then, as now, were perhaps prone to over-interpretation in reading the impact of gestures between sovereigns. They were obviously right to believe, however, that all those horses, mules, hawks and exotics were sent with political purpose, beyond the mere obligation of displaying the largesse that should characterize a Renaissance prince. Ferdinando de' Medici's sentiment: 'we do not want to give presents except where one may receive favour and help' was generally held to be true.[57] Gifts were commonly interpreted, and intended, as overtures, or sweeteners towards good political relations. The mules delivered to Henry and Wolsey in 1526 were signals of French need for English support in the aftermath of the battle of Pavia.[58] Catherine de' Medici's camels of 1564 came at a time when she was anxious to establish better relations with Elizabeth, and to promote a marriage alliance.[59] Henri IV's vanishing elephant was intended to sustain the queen's support for his cause, and perhaps more explicitly to atone for his failure to meet her in person at Portsmouth in 1591.[60] Overtures for dynastic marriage were an obvious reason for a shower of gifts. Chamberlain, for example, spent energy analysing the state of marriage negotiations between Savoy and James I in 1613, based on the impact of gifts.[61]

The slow advance and retreat of negotiations for the Spanish match were marked by presents that attracted attention. In 1615 the Venetian ambassador

at the Spanish court read James I's gift of rare white falcons as somewhat perplexing evidence that both crowns intended to pursue their own interests while exchanging signs of cordiality with each other.[62] And, while the Spanish had to be wooed, the French had to be placated: at the very time that Prince Charles and Buckingham were in Madrid in 1623 James sent horses and dogs to Louis XIII, having them presented by his ambassador with declarations of England's commitment to peace. A few months later, as the Spanish match finally unravelled, Louis sent horses and huntsmen to London with the explicit purpose of signalling improved relations.[63]

Exchanges between England, France, and Spain were designed to demonstrate the parity of their monarchs. Other sovereign gifts might display the status claims of lesser powers, or provide a useful reminder of parts of Europe otherwise overlooked by the English. The dukes of Prussia regularly sent hawks to Henry VIII and Elizabeth, apparently with no expectation of return, and English officialdom duly noted the death of dukes, if not much about the affairs of Prussia.[64] Italian states were nearer to the political consciousness of the Henrician regime, and the duke of Urbino had sent a horse to the king early in his reign.[65] Horses and hawks from Ferrara were gratefully accepted until, in 1539, the bearers of hawks fell under suspicion of planning to poison the king because of their confederacy with France and the papacy.[66]

Henry VIII's dealings with Francesco Gonzaga, marquess of Mantua, were of a different order. In 1514 Francesco, who had some of the best breeding-stock of horses in Europe, sent Henry four good horses 'expressing his desire to serve the king'.[67] These were fraught days for the anti-French and Venetian Holy League, and both parties had an interest in maintaining the alliance.[68] Therefore Henry returned a counter-gift of certain horses, with their furnishings, which the marquess claimed gave him added consequence 'among his countrymen'.[69] But the marquess clearly trumped this when he returned twelve brood mares to the English king, promising in addition the pick of his stables if an agent was sent to Italy. His need of alliance was greater than Henry's, and Henry was the fortunate beneficiary of an unusually valuable gift. So eager was the latter to improve his horsemanship that he tried to persuade their groom Giovanni Ratto to stay in England.[70]

Rich gifts mattered to the development of proper amity between rulers, but presents normally had to be offered publicly, and their symbolic value could be even more significant than their costliness.[71] One of the most distinctive features of noble animals was that they lent themselves to performance before the court of the recipient sovereign: the process of giving could be dramatized more fully than in the mere offering of inanimate objects. When Giovanni Ratto brought the two gifts of Mantuan horses to London in 1514 Henry made their reception a public ritual. On the first occasion the king claimed that 'had the marquess given him a kingdom he could not have been more delighted', and went from one nobleman to another asking what they thought of the mares. Even the duc de Lonqueville, captured in the first

French war, was summoned and assured Henry that the French court did not have such valuable mares (though this was untrue). So enamoured was the king of a horse provided for the queen, which was demonstrated for her in the Spanish fashion, that he patted it and called it 'my minion'.[72] Henry rode his chosen steed, and assured Ratto that 'for years he had not received a more agreeable present'. The public display continued for several years, as the treasured Mantuan horses featured in the tournaments that were a regular feature of the early Henrician court.[73] The marquess continued to play deftly on the benefits of gift-horses: in 1516 he planned to send a very beautiful colt born on St George's Day, because that was the saint 'principally venerated in England'.[74]

More than a century later the Dutch sent a gift of horses to Charles I and Henrietta Maria and they were paraded in very similar ways before king and court, 'once harnessed and twice unharnessed'. The courtiers were again expected to perform gratitude: 'many lords, being present, also spent high praise on everything'.[75] This, of course, was the ruler turning the gift to his or her advantage. Even when things went wrong an opportunity for diplomatic gesture might be provided. Elizabeth's promised camels from the French were slow to arrive in 1565, and the queen promptly embarrassed the ambassador by telling his Spanish counterpart that 'I shall never see them' unless the two ambassadors went out together to receive them.[76] By Louis XIII's time the French were making no such mistakes. In January 1624 they upstaged the Spanish camels and elephant by sending a noble who was a specialist falconer accompanied by sixteen casts of hawks, a dozen horses and dogs. 'He made his entrie', says Chamberlain 'very magnificently with all his retinue in very goode order and with store of torch-light, which gave more luster to all this long shew'.[77] And James, though hobbling with gout, came out to meet them. The public presentation of gifts remained an issue into the Restoration, at least for the Russians. Hennings shows how the 1662–1663 embassy still insisted, during their negotiations with the master of ceremonies, Charles Cottrell, on the display of their offerings by riding through London on their horses. And Charles II performed, briefly, the role of royal gratitude for their live presents: Pepys was in the Banqueting Hall to witness the king take several hawks 'upon his fist, having a glove on, wrought with gold, given him for that purpose'.[78]

Resident ambassadors in London, as elsewhere, were often reluctant to believe that these shows achieved much. The Venetians, in particular, adhered to a hard-nosed view of princely manoeuvring. It was difficult to obligate individuals by means of presents, and how much more so princes and their states. When Ferdinand of Aragon sent Henry VIII an expensive gift of jewels and horses in 1515 the Venetians read it as seeking the English king's support of an invasion of France. The ambassador concluded bluntly that the support was refused, and took pleasure in adding Wolsey's cynical observation that, while the present might be worth 10,000 ducats, Henry deserved this sum for all that he had done for Spain.[79] In 1604 the

Venetian ambassador to France told his masters that the splendid mules sent by James I to Henri IV had done nothing to defuse suspicion about England's treaty with Spain.[80] Such scepticism could, of course, be applied to all sovereign giving, which was a necessary, but not sufficient, aspect of international exchange.

Animal gifts between James V and his neighbours[81]

Some of the themes developed above can be explored through a case study of Scotland. Sixteenth-century Scottish monarchs turned predictably first to France as their natural political allies and the Scottish treasurers' accounts for the reigns of James IV and James V contain a variety of references to rewards for horses brought from France, or hawks, hounds and even horses sent in the other direction. In 1526, for example, Robert Gib was rewarded for riding the great horse that came from the king of France, and in the next year James V's ministers paid to have it lavishly equipped.[82] The Scots in their turn tended to use hawks and hounds, more readily reared and trained at home than valuable horses, as their gift of choice. By the later 1530s a mature James V paid several times to send birds and dogs to France in part to revitalize the political alliance. The intensity of gift-giving increased after James's French marriages and as his relationship with his English uncle deteriorated. In 1540 a freight of five hackney horses and thirteen hawks was sent to Francis I, the duke of Guise, and the Dauphin, and in the following year more hawks, accompanied by their falconers, were despatched. It is important to note that in some of these cases it was James himself who initiated the gift-exchange: the thirteen hawks were passed to his ambassador, and twelve were presented by him to Francis.[83] The latter, placed under gift obligation, reciprocated with 'eight fair gyr falcons'.[84] The Scottish gift was a signal of James's need for political amity.

Gifts of hawks could also enable James to signal that he wished to maintain a balance with England. In 1535, at a time when he was disposed to a measure of rapprochement with his English uncle, he wrote to Henry proffering 'certain' hawks from Orkney and Shetland, and talking of the virtue of 'the confederation and mutuall ligue' between the monarchs.[85] The payments in the treasurers' books also suggest that he was careful to send gifts to Henry even when relations were not so cordial: most notably in 1541 when ten hawks were sent to England at almost the same moment as the thirteen to France, their formal gift qualities being underlined by expensive accoutrements.[86] The previous year a minor Border dispute about hawks was handled by James with the assurance to Henry that there were no pleasures like hawks in Scotland that were not at his disposal.[87]

Political considerations were not necessarily the only focus in James's gifting. He had both a personal and a strategic interest in horses that were good breeding stock and Henry, like most contemporary monarchs, normally banned their export. Sovereign gifts were exempt from normal constraints

and the cordial gift of 1535 apparently elicited the counter-offering of a barbary horse and three other great horses.[88] In 1539 James's servants identified a particular gelding owned by Lord Wharton, deputy warden of the West Marches, and sought it for their monarch. Wharton demurred and asked Henry's approval, which he gave, and promised other geldings.[89] This permitted Henry, at a low ebb in Anglo-Scottish relations after James's French marriage, to use gift horses as his tool for turning the Scots towards English interest again. Ralph Sadler was despatched north on this difficult diplomatic mission with six horses and geldings.[90]

The value of the English king's gift lay in the horse-flesh, but the importance of the offering was expressed through the form of its presentation. Sadler's detailed description of the occasion evokes the dramatic performance of horsemanship before the assembled Scottish court. The king stood at a window watching the horses put through their paces by the English groom, insisting to the lords surrounding him that they could see Henry 'did not forget him'. Sadler was required to provide a running commentary on the quality of the beasts, evoking the royal response 'I like them the better because they be of mine uncle's own brood'. James with a grand rhetorical gesture promised a return gift of anything he could get to pleasure his uncle 'betwixt this and the farthest part of Turkey'. James's control of the ritual was demonstrated both by an aside that the barbary would have been better had it been bigger, and by his demand that his nobles show that they were impressed by the gift. Sadler willingly cooperated because he felt the ceremony honoured his monarch, and because the king who had spoken fair and displayed gratitude would surely be more amenable to the political purpose of the visit—keeping the French interest at bay. However, the present could not of itself countervail other aspects of a largely unsuccessful mission. English errors, and the reality of the French alliance, doomed it. The gift that Francis I could offer was simply too great. In a subsequent discussion James said bluntly to Sadler that if the Scots lacked resource 'my good father the king of France … will not see me want anything'.[91] In this, and other cases, we should see the gift as part of the language of political exchange, not that element that necessarily secured alliances.

Conclusion

So, was the effort and cost expended, especially on animals, for sovereign gifts worth it? There are examples in which commentators believed that the gifts themselves were not fit for purpose. In 1605 Chamberlain condemned the gift sent to Spain with the earl of Nottingham when he ratified the Treaty of London—the horses were decked with unsuitable cloths of hot materials and, further, the very notion of sending such animals to Spain was 'as yf we sent trees to the wood', given that they went to a state full of fine horses. Chamberlain also believed that the 'rabblement' of animals and other things that James sent in 1614 missed its target, since John Finet, who accompanied

them, was given a very poor reward for his efforts.[92] Henri IV's elephant seems to have been equally mis-chosen, and could be contrasted with the success of his investiture with the Order of the Garter by Elizabeth in 1596.[93]

There was also a practical cost both to donor and recipient even when gifting of animals was appropriately handled. Shipping horses and hawks to the Continent was complex and costly. For gifts given to the English ambassadors, servants and trainers all had to be lavishly rewarded, a process that seems to have become more costly by the early seventeenth century than under the Tudors. James I was eager to rid himself of the Spanish keepers of his elephant, and the presenter of the camels: the former cost 20 shillings a week for a year, the latter was given a reward of £150.[94] The noble falconers of 1624 were even more of a problem. The latter cost the king over £700 in entertainment, and rewards of jewels and the royal portrait to the value of £1000.[95] The benefits, however, must have outweighed costs for both Henry VIII and James I, whose desire to perform as fully paid up members of the international monarchical club usually trumped financial concerns. In the right circumstances, when both donor and recipient were sufficiently invested in the exchange, it was difficult to trump those processions of horses, hawks and chained lions. When the Venetian ambassador in Madrid witnessed the presentation of Finet's 'rabblement' of animals in 1614, even he was impressed by the brave show of the horses with their gold trappings and the formidable hunting-dogs following them.[96]

Such spectacles were, perhaps, less pleasing to the English monarchy by the later seventeenth century. Parading animals through the streets of London could not easily be reconciled with the decorum necessary to a powerful ruler, especially after the civil war. Pepys witnessed the progress of the Russians through the city in 1663 and noted the huge crowd of citizens that turned out to see them.[97] The visit of the Moroccan ambassador twenty years later was accompanied by riotous scenes in which the gates to the court had to be closed against the mob. None of this, says Evelyn, conformed to the expectation of an ambassador used to regular and exact 'Publique occasions of their Country'.[98] Proper ritual might have prevailed, had Charles so desired, but it seems that by then the exotic animals presented were a butt of his humour: the king is alleged to have viewed the thirty ostriches offered, and said that he knew no fitter return for them than a flock of geese.[99] The time for parading noble beasts in Europe was ending: what survived was the impact of equine gifts on the bloodlines of the racers and hunters of later centuries.[100]

Notes

1 Horsey's narratives of his journeys to Muscovy in Samuel Purchas, *Purchas his pilgrimage, or relations of the world* (London, 1626), pp. 987–8. M. Jansson, 'Ambassadorial gifts', in O. Dimtrieva and N. Abramova (eds.), *Britannia and Muscovy: English silver at the court of the tsars* (Yale, 2006), pp. 198–205.

2 G. Tolstoy, *The first forty years of intercourse between England and Russia, 1553–1593* (St Petersburg, 1875), p. 401; O. Dmitrieva, 'From Whitehall to the Kremlin:

the diplomacy and political culture of the English and Russian courts', in O. Dmitrieva and T. Murdoch (eds.), *Tudors, Stuarts and the Russian tsars* (London, 2013), pp. 24–6; C. Oman, *The English silver in the Kremlin, 1557–1663* (London, 1961), pp. 33–4. See also Hennings's argument in this volume that describing the Russian court as barbarous could be an excuse for failed diplomacy pp. 243–8.

3 BL Lansdowne MS 112, fo. 109r: transcribed in S. A. Skilliter, *William Harborne and the trade with Turkey 1578–1582: A documentary study of the first Anglo–Ottoman Relations* (Oxford, 1977), pp. 191–2.

4 BL Lansdowne MS 112, fo. 109r.

5 See Birkenholz, Chapter 12, this volume.

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12 A. Pérez de Tudela and A. J. Gschwend, 'Luxury goods for royal collectors: exotica, princely gifts and royal animals exchanged between the Iberian courts and central Europe (1560–1612)', in H. von Helmut Truek and Sabine Haag (eds.), *Exotica: Portugals erstdeckungen in spiegel fürstlicher kunst—und wunderkammern der Renaissance* (Vienna, 2001), pp. 61, 74.

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17 A. Tanni, 'The renaissance studs of the Gonzaga of Mantua', in P. Edwards, K. A. E. Enenkel, E. Graham (eds.), *The horse as cultural icon: the real and symbolic horse in the early modern world* (Leiden, 2012), pp. 261–3.

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19 R. Mulcahy, *Philip II of Spain, patron of the arts* (Dublin, 2004), p. 87.

20 G. Walton, 'Ambassadorial gifts: an overview of published materials', *CH*, 14.2 (2009), 194.

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22 E. Roshchin, 'The concept of friendship: from princes to states', *EJIR*, 12.4 (2006), 603–5.

23 J. S. Brewer et al. (eds.), *Letters and papers, foreign and domestic, of the reign of Henry VIII* (*LP*), 21 vols. (London, 1864–1932), iv.i, 2197. References are to document number unless otherwise stated.
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26 E. Tobey, 'The *palio* horse in renaissance and early modern Italy', in K. Raber and T. J. Tucker (eds.), *The culture of the horse: status, discipline and identity in the early modern world* (Basingstoke, 1995), p. 74.
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28 A. Clifford (ed.), *The state papers and letters of Sir Ralph Sadler, knight-banneret*, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1809), I.40.
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30 *LP*, iii.i, 704. After the first Anglo–French war the ambassadors brought Henry five horses: *LP*, ii.ii, App.1. Charles V also sent horses—several jennets (small Spanish horses) in 1520, for example: *LP*, iii.ii, 600.
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32 W. K. Jordan (ed.), *The chronicle and political papers of King Edward VI* (Ithaca, 1966), p. 108.
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37 *CSPV*, xi.130.
38 *CSPV*, xi.394; *LJC*, ii.146.
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45 *Mercurius publicus 1663*, pp. 2–3. See also Hennings, Chapter 13, this volume, p. 239. The pelicans now in St James's Park are apparently the direct descendants of those from the Russian embassy.
46 *LP*, xiv.ii, 782, p. 341.
47 *LP*, viii, 105.
48 *CSPF,* ii.266; M. A. S. Hume (ed.), *Calendar of letters and state papers relating to English affairs, preserved principally in the archives of Simancas [CSPS]*, 4 vols. (London, 1892–1899), i.415.

49 *LJC*, i.316. The leopard was not confined to the Tower, and disgraced itself at Theobalds by attacking a rare red-deer calf.
50 *CSPV*, viii.555.
51 *List and analysis of state papers foreign of Elizabeth I: May 1592–June 1593,* analysis 512.
52 TNA SP 78/29, fo. 161r; SP 84/46, fo.116r; *List and analysis: July 1593–December 1594*, analysis 164.
53 J. Nichols, *The progresses, processions and magnificent festivities of King James I*, 4 vols. (London, 1828), iv.847.
54 *CSPV*, xviii.29.
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56 *LJC*, ii.507.
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83 *TA*, vii.391, 399–400; viii.24, 84.

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85 James V, *The letters of James V*, eds. R. K. Hannay and D. Hay (Edinburgh, 1954), p. 300.
86 *TA*, viii.24, 30.
87 *LP*, xv, 927.
88 *LP*, viii, 48. This was reported by the Imperial ambassador Chapuys, who added that rich garments were also part of the gift.
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90 Clifford (ed.), *Sadler*, i.21, 39–41.
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92 *LJC*, i.199, 563.
93 G. Richardson, '"Your most assured sister": Elizabeth I and the kings of France', in A. Whitelock and A. Hunt (eds.), *Tudor queenship: the reigns of Mary and Elizabeth* (Basingstoke, 2010), p. 198.
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96 *CSPV*, xiiii.196.
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11 Gift exchanges, self-representation, and the political use of objects during Ferdinand the Catholic's reign*

Germán Gamero Igea

Introduction

The dynastic union of Castile and Aragon under the Catholic Monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella, who married in 1469, had a profound impact on the evolution of the Iberian Peninsula in many different ways. They had to establish a new way of ruling the Trastámara lands that they inherited for the component parts of these territories had various rights and freedoms that had to be accommodated in both domestic and foreign policy. The situation was characterized by at least two different considerations: first, the pressing need to balance the interests of Castile (where Isabella was Queen regnant) and those of Ferdinand's kingdom of Aragon. Secondly, the marriage linked two kingdoms that had enjoyed a poor relationship, for the two territories had frequently engaged wars prior to Ferdinand and Isabella's marriage. A related issue was the need for the Catholic Monarchs to define Ferdinand's political position in Castile, the richer and more populated of the two territories. The marriage contract may have defined Ferdinand's position as that of king consort, but his ambitions extended beyond this role.[1]

Ferdinand the Catholic's position in the international arena was also complicated. He faced several problems in Aragon: the crown's control of Naples was not consolidated, Aragon was on bad terms with Genoa, and, above all, he was engaging in a war against France.[2] This required a large financial investment that the Crown of Aragon was not able to make after its civil war (1462–1472). Under these circumstances collaboration with Castile was necessary; indeed, it was probably one of Ferdinand's motivations for marrying Isabella.[3] But Castile had its own interests and problems. Therefore, the royal couple needed to find ways to collaborate. This included, whenever viable, sharing their diplomatic resources. Probably the best example in this regard is the fact that Iberian concerns (where Castile had the main responsibility) were given pre-eminence over wider European issues during the first part of the reign. Ending the war in Granada and finally completing the *Reconquista* was important to Isabella, who linked most of her international action to this war.[4] Moreover, when political circumstances necessitated that the monarchs turned to the Mediterranean, they

often treated these negotiations as an extension of the Muslim problem. On the other hand, Portugal was also a key concern and was treated as a crucial ally. It was considered a Castilian problem, negotiated by Castilians, if not by the queen herself, who regarded Portuguese affairs as family matters.[5] Consequently, it is hardly surprising that previous studies have primarily sought to understand how the Catholic Monarchs combined their interests when acting on an international level.[6]

Meanwhile, the Catholic Monarchs were not isolated from the development of new diplomatic practices elsewhere in Europe, particularly the adoption of resident diplomacy by an increasing number of Italian powers. The inauguration of a permanent embassy in Rome at the very beginning of their reign (1480) indicates this new reality.[7] But in this area the crown of Aragon had a clear advantage over Castile. Since the reigns of Alphonse V and John II, Aragonese kings had cultivated political, cultural, and even personal connections with Florence, Rome, and Naples, making it easier for Aragonese subjects to become the face of Spanish 'new diplomacy'.[8] Thus there was a need to combine Castilian interests with the system and expertise that Aragon had already developed. How did Castile adapt to these changes? And how did Ferdinand II facilitate this process?

To go some way towards answering these questions, this chapter will analyse diplomatic gift-giving during the reign of the Catholic Monarchs. Scholars are increasingly appreciating the important role that material culture and gifts played in early modern Spanish diplomacy.[9] Ferdinand and Isabella's use of gifts in their international relationships have received little attention. Their diplomatic gifting strategies drew upon medieval traditions that were established long before the introduction of resident diplomats and can offer important insights into how the monarchs adapted to the 'new diplomacy'. Indeed, exploring the Catholic Monarchs' gift-exchanges with other sovereigns and the gifts they gave to ambassadors can help us to better understand how the different traditions and innovations were mixed with respect to domestic and foreign relationships, Aragonese and Castilian practices and perspectives, and Christian contact with Muslim powers. First this chapter will explore how Ferdinand and Isabella organized their diplomacy, before turning to their gifting relationships within Europe. Finally, it will analyse how their gifting strategies related to the war in Granada and military campaigns in the north of Africa.

Dynastic union, diplomacy, and domestic ties

With the dynastic union of Castile and Aragon, the two rulers had to cooperate as equals for neither partner had imposed itself on the other. This created a new situation on many levels, not least as both rulers would have to negotiate not only with foreign rulers, but also with their own and each other's subjects. This was especially true in Ferdinand's case. For most of the time he lived in Castile as a result of the political and economic superiority

of that kingdom. The king appointed permanent procurators or vice-regents to govern Aragon in his absence; this could be seen as an extension, even the apex, of late medieval Aragonese practice.[10] His kingdoms ensured that they were represented at Ferdinand and Isabella's court by sending delegations. These 'ambassadors', as they were often termed, were specifically designated by the regional authorities, who also paid their salaries. While representatives of the *Generalitat* of Catalunya, *Generalitat* of Valenciana, and *Generalidad* of Aragon were frequently called ambassadors, those sent by Aragonese cities were more usually styled syndics.[11] Thus a distinction was made between the higher status of the regional governing bodies and the lower status of the cities. As they were subjects of the king, these supplicants were treated differently from the ambassadors sent by foreign rulers. In contrast to foreign diplomats they rarely received formal reception ceremonies or gifts, but they were often allowed to have a specific audience and were granted some ceremonial privileges. Furthermore, they could dress in the colours of a specific territory in an attempt to emphasize their character as regional delegates. For instance, the Catalan representative wore his local livery at the wedding feast of Prince John and Margaret of Austria in 1497.[12]

When it came to international relationships, the Catholic Kings respected the institutions of both kingdoms. The ambassadors they appointed were legates from both the king of Aragon and the queen of Castile, not joint emissaries from the kings of Spain, that is to say that each monarch would send his own representative. Gradually, however, as the way in which they ruled became more established, the Catholic Monarchs began to act in a more coordinated way and they increasingly entrusted their common problems to a single ambassador who represented them both. At first, building on the diplomatic work of Ferdinand's father, John II of Aragon, it was Aragonese subjects, such as Bishop Joan Margarit i Pau and Gonzálo Fernández de Heredia, who were employed in these roles.[13] But as Ferdinand consolidated his position in Castile, Castilians were increasingly appointed to represent the monarchs. In any case, the emerging dominance of Castilian-born ambassadors did not imply a greater connection with Isabella or with Castilian objectives. Indeed as Ferdinand's affinity in Castile grew in influence in the 1490s its members were given major responsibilities in government and also in the diplomatic arena. For example, Lorenzo Suárez de Figueroa, a Castilian who was particularly close to Ferdinand, served as ambassador in Rome from 1499. Francisco de Rojas, who was ambassador there from 1501, was also closely allied to the king.[14] These innovations were not assumed to be institutional changes in Castile's favour; they always depended on political necessities and the relationship between the two monarchs. Thus it is not surprising that after Isabella's death Philip I established his own ambassador, separating out the affairs of his wife's realm, Castile, from those of her father, who continued to rule Aragon. This simply reflected the fact that Ferdinand was now merely the former king consort of Castile. This proved to be a temporary interruption: once Ferdinand was established as regent

of Castile, after Philip's death, he once again adopted a system of combined representation for Castile and Aragon.

Political tensions inside the kingdom could affect the diplomatic practices of the Catholic Monarchs. One of the better examples of this was their dealings with Rome. The importance of this embassy for both the king and queen was reflected in the considerable financial investment they made in it and the fact that the best ambassadors were appointed to it. Moreover, it was here that the monarchs established their first permanent embassy. The Spanish expansion into the Muslim territories of Granada and north Africa when combined with Aragonese interests in Naples meant that Ferdinand and Isabella were extensively represented in Italy, especially in Rome. These concerns meant that, particularly during the reign of Sixtus IV, the Catholic Monarchs felt it necessary to be in regular contact with Rome. During the succession crisis, this had the added advantage that the Pope's acceptance of their representatives demonstrated that he accepted Isabella's legitimacy.[15] Even after a resident ambassador was appointed in 1480, other ambassadors were sent on special missions to help him negotiate specific matters.[16] The ambassadors at Rome represented both sovereigns, but it was quite usual for the king or the queen to send secret instructions to the ambassadors, trying to stress his or her own opinion about how negotiations should be conducted, which created problems for the diplomats.[17]

What happened at the papal court could be considered as representative of Ferdinand's general *modus operandi*. First, ambassadors to the Holy Roman Emperor, Venetian Doge and Florentine duke began to be appointed on a permanent basis. To achieve this goal, the Catholic Monarchs developed a financial system to fund their diplomatic expenses. In practice this meant that Castile met many of the costs of diplomacy, as reciprocal agreements were established which saw the host court cover the costs of lodging the ambassadors sent to it. In Spain, that meant the Castilian court bore the expense, for that was where both monarchs were most commonly found.[18] Both Castilian and Aragonese subjects were appointed to serve in these new resident posts. Whether Castilian or Aragonese, the men chosen were of a similar social status and were usually drawn from the middle level of the nobility—they were men such as Juan Margarit, Juan Rodriguez de Fonseca, and Iñigo López de Mendoza. Ferdinand used his role coordinating the ambassadors to bolster his position in his wife's kingdom. Only two territories were exceptions to this general pattern: Portugal and Naples. Portugal remained an exclusively Castilian sphere of interest. Naples, meanwhile, especially at the beginning of their reign, was considered an exclusively Aragonese matter. Ferdinand took the main responsibility for dealing with this realm and coordinating with Joan Ram Escrivá, his ambassador there.[19]

In this general context analysing gift-giving can help us to better understand how political disputes were solved (both inside and outside the Iberian realms) and how Ferdinand and Isabella represented themselves, and their

relationship, to the world. Furthermore, it offers insights into the informal ways in which both the king and queen increased their control. Thus gifts demonstrate both the links between the Catholic Monarchs and the respective strength of the affinities around each monarch.

Gift-giving at the intersection of internal and external relations

In many cases Ferdinand and Isabella tried to collaborate. Despite their differences of opinion on some issues they tried to reinforce their emotional ties by personal gifts to each other. Although it is difficult to quantify the intensity of this relationship, it is clear that they exchanged gifts regularly. On one occasion Ferdinand gave Isabella expensive glass tableware from Venice.[20] Royal tableware had an important role in royal courts and had traditionally been used to show the wealth and status of the rulers.[21] Ferdinand did not attend only to the table of his wife, however, in the gifts he presented to her. He also gave a large cross bearing Aragonese motifs to the Queen's chapel, and some tapestries that had belonged to his mother to the Queens chamber.[22] Isabella seems to have appreciated these gifts for in her will she ordered that they not be sold, but remain in the royal family's possession.[23] She also reciprocated, sending various valuable gifts to her husband such as rich shirts and slaves.[24] The presents given to mark royal weddings can be viewed as lying part way between domestic and diplomatic gift exchanges: while the bride or groom became a member of the royal family, interdynastic marriages were viewed as an essential tool in early modern diplomacy. When members of the family married, Isabella seemingly took the lead in arranging the gifts, such as when their daughter Princess Isabella married Alphonso V of Portugal in 1490. Equally, the gifts the monarchs bestowed on their new daughter-in-law Margaret of Austria, who married Prince John in 1497, came from the queen.[25]

Importantly, gift-giving could be utilized to reinforce broader political strategies. A good example of this is the gifts given by the queen to Juan de Albion, the ambassador responsible for negotiating the peace between the Catholic Monarchs and France in 1493.[26] As in the Roman case, it did not matter that Albion was Aragonese when pursuing the slightly different, but potentially complementary, interests of two monarchs: Isabella firmly desired peace with France while Ferdinand wanted to recover the Catalan counties of Roussillon and Cerdaña. The same could be said about Naples. In this case the queen assumed a secondary position, but Isabella reinforced her political ties with Ferdinand's sister Jeanne of Aragon, the Neapolitan queen, by gift-giving and paying the expenses of her court during the Italian Wars.[27] For instance in 1502, Isabella sent Jeanne valuable gifts on several occasions; these included a silver pot and a silver brazier.[28] In return Jeanne sent some valuable hats to both Ferdinand and Isabella, as well as special gifts, such as a rich book, just for the queen.[29] It is difficult to know the extent to which Ferdinand employed gifts similarly with regards to Castilian

polities and allies since most of the Aragonese accounts are no longer extant. But it is clear that Ferdinand rewarded Castilian nobles with gifts, especially at the beginning of the reign, for instance when they helped Ferdinand with the reception of embassies. By using Castilians in such diplomatic affairs, Ferdinand expressed the extent of his political ties to the country to both domestic and international audiences.[30]

Ferdinand and Isabella's gifting strategies also reveal important information about their consolidation of authority—both personally and with respect to their parties—and how this was perceived. Their individual aims, while sometimes divergent, were also often complementary. This is the case with the annual gift of a royal cup given to Andrés Cabrera, marquis of Moya, an important royal counsellor, as a sign of the monarchs' appreciation of his support during the civil war,[31] and the annual gift of royal clothes from Ferdinand to the marquis of Cadiz, one of Ferdinand's best captains in the war in Granada.[32] Ferdinand and Isabella also gave gifts as rewards to foreign ambassadors at their courts. Most commonly these were clothes, mules, and money; less frequently the Catholic Monarchs gave horses, or granted the licence to export horses, and tableware.[33] Tableware—especially cups—was appreciated both for its material characteristics and its significance in medieval European culture.[34] Clothing was valued not only as a gift, but also as a key signifier of distinction and political power.[35]

Isabella primarily took responsibility for gifts given to European kings and the ambassadors they sent to Spain, and the Castilian chancery met most, but not all of the costs.[36] For instance, Isabella was responsible for the tableware give to the Portuguese ambassadors at the beginning of the reign.[37] Ferdinand also sent select gifts to European royalty, including some horses to Louis XII.[38] Spanish horses were prized across the continent for their quality; their bloodstock linked both Europe and Africa, and also the Christian and Muslim heritage of the Iberian Peninsula.[39] The Catholic King gave several gifts of clothes to his sister when she was in the Iberian peninsula in the 1490s.[40] As with royal correspondence and the appointment of ambassadors, Isabella and Ferdinand took prime responsibility for the gifts sent to Portugal and Naples respectively.

Gifts could also be used to advance the position of family members overseas. Hence Ferdinand sent his daughter, Catherine of Aragon, one of Isabella's crowns in 1508. Catherine asked if she could use it in her coronation as queen consort of England, a gesture which would have heightened Catherine's status in England and symbolically linked Castile and England.[41] Ferdinand and Isabella also saw gifts as useful tools when trying to maintain relationships with the distant princes who were, or had been, married to their children. Evidence from Margaret of Austria's inventories suggests that Ferdinand and Isabella both sent their portraits to their daughter-in-law and that Ferdinand sent his own on another occasion.[42] They gifted their portraits to the parents of their children's future spouses too, for instance sending Henry VII their pictures after the conclusion of

the Treaty of Medino del Campo, which arranged for the marriage of Catherine of Aragon to Prince Arthur.[43] Ferdinand also cultivated links with his prospective military ally Henry VIII, sending him horses in 1509.[44] Again in 1515, Ferdinand sent a great gift to Henry VIII, comprising a jewelled collar, two richly caparisoned horses and an expensive sword. Ostensibly a ploy to persuade Henry to join Ferdinand in another campaign against France, Henry received the presents enthusiastically, but refused to commit to military action.[45]

Ferdinand used gifts to help reinforce his position after Isabella's death, particularly during the short reign of Philip the Fair and Juana. In these circumstances, it was essential that Ferdinand maintain good relations with France and Florence, not least as the Great Captain Gonzalo Fernandez de Córdoba had military control in Castile. Against this political backdrop, Ferdinand sent expensive gifts of silver tableware to the Florentine duke and the French king as a means of furthering his relationship with these rulers.[46] Although this situation was short-lived (Philip I died in 1507) it highlights the fragility of the Castilian Aragonese union.

Analysing the reception of gifts reveals further nuances within the royal couple's collaboration. Both sovereigns usually received their own gift, as was the case when they received major embassies from Muslim sovereigns.[47] But this was not always the case, especially when Spanish subjects were involved. For example the Great Captain, who was closest to the queen, sent gifts that he had personally been given by the Venetians, as gifts to the queen, not to both monarchs.[48] The Spanish ambassador in England also sent special gifts to the queen but seemingly not to the king.[49] Similarly, in 1497 Francisco de Rojas, ambassador in the Netherlands, sent the queen some devotional and rich books, but does not appear to have given any gifts to the king.[50] Indeed an analysis of the personal accounts of Isabella's closest minister, Pedro González de Mendoza, reveals a gift-giving process where Ferdinand was marginalized.[51] This internal dynamic was also clearly at play when Spanish ambassadors sent gifts home.

Ferdinand, however, was the main recipient of certain types of gifts, such as beasts and birds.[52] Ferrante, king of Naples, regularly sent hawks to the king.[53] The connection was so strong that the Neapolitan hawker could even be considered an informal diplomatic agent in Spain. Animals were especially prevalent as gifts in Ferdinand's Mediterranean relationships. For example the Catholic King received many hawks from the master of Rhodes in 1494.[54] The king of Cyprus sent Ferdinand an elephant which the Catholic Monarch showed in the *Cortes* (Parliament) of Toledo 1479.[55]

It is clearly difficult to separate fully diplomacy and domestic policy during the reigns of the Catholic Monarchs, since their 'composite monarchy' was a midpoint between domestic and international union.[56] Castile and Aragon shared diplomatic resources when it came to ambassadors and the giving of gifts; collaboration, diversification, or competition could be combined to achieve the monarchs' different, but not necessarily competing,

international goals. If Castile's economic resources were essential to the international relationships the monarchs cultivated, they were not always employed in a Castilian way. When Ferdinand's party gained power in Castile he influenced Castilian traditions, while his Aragonese subjects combined their efforts to face common Spanish problems in Europe.

Orientalism, holy war and diplomacy

The relationship between the Spanish kingdoms and the Muslim world was multifaceted and complicated. Although the Catholic Kings regarded the Muslims as enemies, the cohabitation of Muslims and Christians in the Iberian peninsula for hundreds of years had created deep cultural connections between them. Furthermore, in many territories such as Andalusia, Aragon, and especially Valencia, many Muslims were also subjects protected by the king and the nobility. The *Reconquista* had served to divert attention away from the internal tensions of the Christian kingdoms throughout the middle ages.[57] If the kings could mobilize all their political forces in the conquest of Granada, tensions among Castilian elites, and even between the nobility and the crown could be lessened. Ferdinand the Catholic was one of the greatest strategists in this regard.[58] Political tensions in Castile were at a high point at his accession, because of the civil war.[59] Internal divisions within the kingdom of Granada, meanwhile, encouraged the Castilian crown to intervene and facilitated the conquest of the realm.[60]

The Catholic Monarchs also used the war in Granada as a diplomatic resource for their European relationships. Traditionally, conceptualizing the *Reconquista* as a crusade reinforced the political ties between the Spanish kingdoms and with Europe.[61] The Catholic Monarchs undoubtedly capitalized on this traditional aspect of the war, and linked it to chivalric culture. Although European rulers did not participate in the last phase of the war, some nobles and warriors, such as Sir Edward Woodville and Marco de Pria, did come to the Iberian Peninsula to fight and received gifts from the queen in reward for their efforts.[62] Nevertheless the Catholic Monarchs used the *Reconquista* in their Mediterranean policy, linking it to the struggle against the Ottoman Turks, especially in light of the conquest of Otranto by Mehmet in 1480. This was particularly strong in Rome where religion and politics were intimately linked, so much so that Ferdinand appointed Segismondo Conti as a panegyricist there.[63] Here Aragonese and Castilian foreign policies coincided, for Italy was one of Ferdinand's priorities.[64]

The confluence of Christian and Moorish cultures led to the rise of orientalism in the Iberian Peninsula. Orientalizing gifts served to represent power. During the Middle Ages, Iberian sovereigns and many noblemen used references to Islamic culture as a means of self-representation which, in turn, influenced the developing use of material culture in diplomacy.[65] Of course, the symbols of their enemies proved a double-edged sword. The fact that the monarchs often represented themselves '*alla morisca*' could result

in accusations of being too closely allied with the Muslim world, as was the case with Peter I (r. 1350–1366) and especially Henry IV (r. 1454–1474).[66] Ferdinand and Isabella commonly received ambassadors in a Muslim surrounding, for instance wearing Islamic robes, surrounded by Arabic décor, or sitting in a Muslim manner. They also expressed thanks to their diplomatic interlocutors by entertaining them with specific games of *morisco* origin, such as the *juego de cañas*, even after the conquest of Granada.[67] Appropriating Moorish culture served to suggest Spanish superiority in the war against the infidel.

Gift-giving formed part of this process. Roser Salicrú has demonstrated that earlier Aragonese sovereigns tried to project an oriental image in their diplomatic gifting in Europe.[68] The Catholic Monarchs behaved similarly. For instance, they stressed their war in Granada through the use of golden pomegranates. The pomegranate implied a connection with the Nasrid kingdom, but it also held domestic symbolism as the emblem of Henry IV. By using it the king and queen aligned themselves with the previous king. One golden pomegranate was sent from Ferdinand to Isabella.[69] Two European kings also received them: the Portuguese king and the Holy Roman Emperor. Both rulers were linked to the Spanish monarchs through the marriage of their children. For some authors this gift not only symbolized the war against Islam but also stressed the strong connection between the sovereigns, like the seeds of a pomegranate.[70]

Loot taken in war was highly valued. During the Granada War, a high number of slaves were captured by the monarchs and subsequently given to various European rulers. Both Ferdinand and Isabella sent more than a hundred slaves to the pope and to Queen Jeanne of Aragon.[71] Thus the very gifts they gave communicated their military dominance over their Muslim foes. A couple of years later, when Ferdinand conquered the kingdom of Tlemecen, he sent a key to the capital city of the province to the Spanish Church dedicated to Santiago in Rome as a symbol of triumph.[72] This gift not only demonstrated the success of his armies and symbolized his control over the newly conquered territory, it also emphasized the piety that he presented as being a key motivation for his campaigns. Of course these relationships were reciprocal and the Pope also sent the Spanish monarchs some gifts related to the *Reconquista* in an effort to impose his spiritual leadership on this campaign and reward the Iberian kings for their efforts.[73] Papal gifts were marked by clear gendered differences. On two different occasions Ferdinand received a sword and a standard, items associated with war.[74] Papal swords were honorific objects, presented for service to the faith, often as rewards for war against the infidel. Isabella received items that had no direct associations with military endeavours: the golden rose, a traditional papal reward for exemplary piety, and a jewel, the so called *queen's mirror*. As a further demonstration of her piety, Isabella transformed the jewel into a reliquary.[75]

Gendered gifts and the importance of Ferdinand's prominent role in the Granada War can also be noted in some other contexts. Just like European

courts, Muslims rulers, such as the kings of Granada and Tunisia, also recognized Ferdinand and Isabella's authority by sending them embassies and gifts.[76] The few examples we have of gifts given from Muslim rulers to the Catholic kings highlight Ferdinand's dominant role in the Mediterranean arena, just as the gifts received from Christian princes did. Moreover, the Muslims powers sent some gifts, especially animals, exclusively to the king. For example Ferdinand received a horse from the king of Tunisia in 1482, who followed this with the present of some hawks in 1494.[77] The Tunisian king also sent gifts to key Castilian courtiers such as Pedro González de Mendoza, who received a valuable hyacinth, an exotic flower that was not native to Iberia, in 1486.[78] Indeed, the strong Aragonese presence in the Mediterranean meant that Ferdinand naturally took the lead in these diplomatic relationships.

When the war started it was more common that only Ferdinand was in Granada and it is not surprising that Muslim cities sent gifts only to him, and not to the queen, before they fell to Spanish forces, as Baza did in 1489.[79] Isabella gave some gifts to the Muslims powers, but they referred to Granada and not the north of Africa. For example, in 1484 she gave splendid fabrics to Morayma, queen of Granada, whose husband Boabdil was an ally between 1483 and 1490 and on another occasion she sent textiles to dress some of the Grenadan princes.[80] In both cases, Isabella attempted to utilize gifts to strengthen the ties between the two sovereigns. Ferdinand appears to have taken primary responsibility for embassies from north Africa. The Fez embassy of 1497 certainly received much more attention from Ferdinand than from Isabella. He not only gave clothes to the ambassadors but also mules, placing the gifts given to these Muslim ambassadors on an equal footing with those given to European diplomats.[81] Ferdinand continued this gifting strategy after Isabella died as he continued the war in north Africa. For instance the Algerian ambassador who came to Spain in 1512 received not only clothing gifts, but also lodging.[82] Ferdinand did not always meet Muslim rulers' expectations, however. For instance, Al-Ashraf Qansuh al-Ghawri, the Mamluk Sultan, considered that the entourage of the famous embassy of Peter Martyr was too small and he was affronted by the fact that no presents accompanied it.[83] This was in stark contrast to a long tradition of gift-giving in Mamluk–Spanish relations.[84]

In order to maintain their status, the Catholic Monarchs needed to combine existing practices with polemical messages when communicating with both Christian and Muslim powers. In their relations with the European, especially Italian, princes Ferdinand and Isabella emphasized that this was a holy war. In their dealings with their African allies such as Egypt, they described the Granada War as an internal war between the King and their subjects. The same happened when Ferdinand the Catholic continued the expansion into the north of Africa. It was presented to the Castilians as an expansion of the *Reconquista*, to his Aragonese subjects as necessary for his Mediterranean business, and to the European rulers as a defence against the Turks or even a recreation of the Roman Empire.

Conclusion

The gift-giving strategies of Ferdinand and Isabella reveal that the line between internal and external relations was often blurred during their reigns, as it was in other complex polities of the time.[85] The composite monarchy created by their marriage created a need for them to work with one another's countries and to balance the interests of both families and kingdoms. Gifts were an integral means by which they did so. The two monarchs increasingly worked together in their relationships with other royals even though they each had areas for which they took primary responsibility.

Ferdinand's diplomacy was a meeting point between tradition and necessity. He could not pursue his international policies without the cooperation of his wife and her affinity in Castile. In the realm of diplomatic gift-giving, as with diplomatic appointments, Castilian resources and Aragonese traditions were combined. Moreover, the gifting practices adopted by Ferdinand evolved out of existing medieval conventions, but were given new impetus by new diplomatic practices such as the use of resident ambassadors that the Catholic monarchs adopted at a fairly early date. Resident diplomacy demanded that gifts be given in new circumstances as well as in traditional ones and could potentially lead to a greater frequency of gifts too. While not all of the conventions of diplomatic gifting in an age of resident diplomacy were consolidated in Ferdinand and Isabella's reigns, their activities provided a template for future Spanish rulers. Moreover, Ferdinand was able to exploit the greater expertise of the Aragonese, for instance in building relationships across the Mediterranean, in order to enhance his (and Aragon's) position within the dynastic union.

While it seems possible to divide Europe and north Africa into two different spheres of Spanish diplomacy with regards to gift-giving, with Isabella initially taking the lead in Europe and Ferdinand primarily overseeing gifting relations with Muslim powers, there were continuities of practice across the two areas that suggest a coherent Spanish practice, albeit one in which the monarchical couple divided responsibility, just as they appear to have allocated areas of inter-dynastic gift-giving according to who had the closest familial ties to the recipient. The war in Granada was a key element determining their diplomatic gifting. The Catholic Monarchs used it to promote a pious image among European powers while simultaneously using it to establish a new basis for their relationship with the African sovereigns and to consolidate the secular relationships between the two Crowns and Muslim princes. The practice of giving, then, reveals the three hallmarks of Spanish diplomacy at the beginning of the early modern period: the convergence of internal and external relations in the composite monarchy, the transformations of Spanish foreign relations during the important transition from medieval conventions to the new requirements of resident diplomacy, and, finally, the united crowns' of Aragon and Castile continued involvement in Muslim–Christian relations. The study of the exchange of objects brings these features into sharp relief.

Notes

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2 See J. Vicens Vives, *Juan II de Aragón (1398–1479): monarquía y revolución en la España del siglo XV* (Barcelona, 1953).
3 Ibid., p. 313.
4 T. De Azcona, *Isabel la Católica: estudio crítico de su vida y su reinad* (Madrid, 1993), pp. 632–59, 883–93.
5 The queen's mother was Portuguese. See L. Suárez Fernández, *Los Reyes Católicos* (Barcelona, 2004), pp. 179–94, 277–81.
6 Recent work in this area includes M. A. Ochoa Brun, *Historia de la diplomacia Española* (Madrid, 2003); O. Villarroel, *El rey el Papa: política y diplomacia en los albores del Renacimiento (Castilla en el siglo XV)* (Madrid, 2009); S. Pequignot, 'Les instructions aux ambassadeurs des rois d'Aragon (XIIIe–XVe siècles). Jalons pour l'histoire de la fabrique d'une parole royale efficace', *Cahiers d'études hispaniques médiévales*, 31 (2008), 17–43; A. Fernández de Córdova Miralles, 'La política europea de Fernando Hispaniae Rex', in M. C. Morte García and J. A. Sesma Muñoz (eds.), *Fernando II de Aragón el rey que imaginó España y la abrió a Europa* (Zaragoza, 2015), pp. 63–80. J. Pérez, 'Diplomáticos y letrados en Roma al servicio de los Reyes Católicos. Francisco Vitale di Noya, Juan Ruiz de Medina y Francisco de Rojas', *Dicenda. Cuadernos de Filología Hispánica* 32 (2014), 113–54.
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12 J. Zurita, *Historia del rey Don Fernando el Católico. de las empresas y ligas de Italia* (Zaragoza, 2005), book 3, ch. 2.
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14 Ferdinand's party gained strength while the queen was still alive. For an overview see J. Martínez Millán, *La Corte de Carlos V* (Madrid, 2000), pp. 45–73.
15 For the legitimation process see A. I. Carrasco Manchado, *Isabel I de Castilla y la sombra de la legitimidad: propaganda y representación en el conflicto sucesorio* (Madrid, 2006).
16 A. Fernández de Córdova Miralles, *Alejandro VI y los Reyes Católicos: relaciones político-eclesiásticas (1492–1503)* (Rome, 2005), pp. 68–123.
17 Two issues in particular were the source of disagreements between the monarchs: nominations to bishoprics and which of the two rulers should be given pre-eminent status. For an overview of these problems see: T. De Azcona, *Isabel la Católica: estudio crítico de su vida y su reinado* (Madrid, 1964), and A. Fernández de Córdova Miralles, *Alejandro VI y los Reyes Católicos*.

18 See De Andrés Díaz, *El último decenio de Isabel la Católica a través de la tesorería de Alonso de Morales (1495–1516)* (Valladolid, 2004), pp. 76, 177, 231, 924. Aragonese subjects such as the Cordona family could still serve as economic intermediaries. See ibid., pp. 305, 362.
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21 See for example M. A. Pérez Samper, 'La mesa del rey: imagen y símbolo del poder', in *XV Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragón. El poder real en la Corona de Aragón* (Zaragoza, 1999), pp. 433–50.
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25 See ibid., i.312; Real Academia de la Historia [RAH], Colección Salazar y Castro, vol. A–9, fo. 165r; AGS, Cámara de Castilla, Cédulas, Book 4, p. 259. Isabella's presents to Margaret are listed in AGS, Real Patronato, Leg. 56, doc. 9.
26 De la Torre, *Cuentas de Gonzalo de Baeza*, ii.100.
27 See De Andrés Díaz, *El último decenio*, pp. 364, 491, 565, 601, 723, 734, 760, 874, 924, 981.
28 Ibid., p. 603.
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31 F. Navarrete et al. (eds.), *Colección de documentos inéditos para la Historia de España*, 112 vols. (Madrid, 1842–1895), xviii.298.
32 RAH, Colección Salazar y Castro, vol. M–61, fos. 144–8.
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35 G. Bartholeyns, 'Gouverner par le vêtemen. Naissance d'une obsession politique', in J. P. Genet and E. I. Mineo (eds.), *Marquer la prééminence sociale* (Paris, 2014), pp. 215–32; U. Rublack, *Dressing up: cultural identity in Renaissance Europe* (Oxford, 2010).
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43 See F. Hepburn, 'The portraiture of Prince Arthur and Katherine of Aragon', in S. J. Gunn and L. Monckton (eds.), *Arthur Tudor, Prince of Wales: life, death and commemoration* (Woodbridge, 2009), pp. 37–5.
44 Pascual de Gayangos (ed.), *Calendar of letters, despatches, state papers relating to the negotiations between England and Spain preserved in the archives at Vienna, Brussels Simancas and elsewhere*, 13 vols. (London, 1847–1910), ii no. 288.
45 Ibid., ii nos. 231, 238; R. Brown (ed.), *Calendar of state papers and manuscripts relating to English affairs, existing in the archives and collections of Venice and in other libraries in northern Italy*, 38 vols. (London, 1864–1947), ii no. 268.
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47 M. I. Del Val Valdivieso, 'La reina Isabel en las crónicas de Diego de Valera y Alonso de Palencia', in J. Valdeón Baruque (ed.), *Visión del reinado de Isabel la Católica* (Valladolid, 2004), p. 77.
48 E. Belenguer Cerbiá, *De la unión de coronas al imperio de Carlos V* (Madrid, 2001), p. 436.
49 AGS, Cámara de Castilla Cédulas, book 6, p. 163.
50 Yarza Luaces, 'Isabel la Católica', p. 236.
51 A. Franco Silva, 'La Cámara del Cardenal Mendoza. Lujo riqueza y poder de un príncipe de la Iglesia hispana del siglo XV', *Historia Instituciones, Documentos*, 29 (2012), 70.
52 For the importance of animals in European inter-princely gifting see Heal, Chapter 10, this volume.
53 ACA, Real Cancillería, vol. 3615, fos. 174–5, vol. 3616, fo. 84.
54 ACA, Real Cancillería, vol. 3611, fo. 146.
55 L. Suárez Fernández, *Los Trastámara y los Reyes Católicos* (Madrid, 1985), p. 244.
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57 On the *Reconquista* see F. García Fitz, *La Reconquista* (Granada, 2010).
58 L. Suárez, *Fernando el Católico* (Barcelona, 2004), pp. 169–86.
59 M. I. Del Val Valdivieso, 'La "farsa de Ávila" en las crónicas de la época', in G. del ser Quijano and I. M. Viso (eds.), *Espacios de poder y fromas sociales en la Edad Media: Estudios dedicados a Ángel Barrios* (Salamanca, 2007), pp. 355–67.
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61 See for example F. García Fitz, *Las Navas de Tolosa* (Madrid, 2005).
62 J. Edwards, *Isabel la Católica: poder y fama* (Madrid, 2004), p. 93; De la Torre, *Cuentas de Gonzalo de Baeza*, i.126. Several English and French soldiers were liberated in 1492 and given rich fabrics by the queen: ibid., ii.11, 13.
63 A. Fernández de Córdova Miralles, 'La emergencia de Fernando el Católico en la Curia papal: identidad y propaganda de un príncipe aragonés en el espacio italiano', in A. Egido and J. E. Laplana (eds.), *La imagen de Fernando el Católico en la Historia, la Literatura y el Arte* (Zaragoza, 2014), p. 62.
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73 There was a papal tradition of sending gifts to kings involved in the Reconquista, for instance those given to John II of Castile. See J. Ferrandis (ed.), *Datos documentales para la Historia del Arte español* (Madrid, 1963), iii.xxiii.

74 A. De la Torre, *Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicas*, 6 vols. (Barcelona, 1949–1965) i.39; J. Llampayas, *Fernando el Católico* (Madrid, 1941), p. 156.

75 F. A. Martín, 'Plateros italianos en España', in J. Rivas Carmona (ed.), *Estudios de Platería* (Murcia, 2003), p. 332.

76 Del Val Valdivieso, 'La reina Isabel', p. 77.

77 ACA, Real Cancillería, vol. 3606, fo. 144, vol. 3573, fo. 65.

78 This was later re-gifted to the Marquis of Moya. See Silva, 'La Cámara del Cardenal Mendoza', 84.

79 A. De Palencia, *Historia de la Guerra de Granada* (Granada, 1998), book IX.

80 De la Torre, *Cuentas de Gonzalo de Baeza*, i.47, 238.

81 ACA, Real Patrimonio, Maestre Racional, Albalaes Extraordinarios, vol. 876, fos. 115–16, 129–30, 140.

82 ACA, Real Patrimonio, Maestre Racional, Albalaes Extraordinarios, vol. 876, fos. 80–1. Maija Jansson has suggested that hospitality can be considered within the framework of gifts: M. Jansson, 'Measured reciprocity: English ambassadorial gift exchange in the 17th and 18th centuries', *JEMH*, 9 (2005), 348–70. A discussion of diplomatic hospitality is, sadly, beyond the scope of this chapter.

83 L. García y García, *Una embajada de los Reyes Católicos a Egipto* (Valladolid, 1947).

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85 See for instance Hardy, Chapter 1, this volume.

12 Merchant-kings and lords of the world

Diplomatic gift-exchange between the Dutch East India Company and the Safavid and Mughal empires in the seventeenth century

Frank Birkenholz

Introduction

On 20 March 1652, exactly fifty years after the inception of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), its ambassador Joan Cunaeus visited the *Ali Qapu* palace of the Safavid Shah Abbas II (r. 1642–1666).[1] Cunaeus presented the Shah with a set of diplomatic gifts, including goods of Asian and European origin, during an imposing audience ceremony. Abbas II also received a letter of credence from the Company's Governor-General in which he humbly petitioned the Shah to permit VOC merchants to trade in his empire. Approximately a decade later, on 14 September 1662, another VOC envoy, Dircq van Adrichem, appeared before the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707) in the Red Fort in a similar way.[2]

Cunaeus and Van Adrichem were two of many VOC representatives who established or maintained trade relations with several Asian rulers in the seventeenth century. The VOC has largely been studied as an enterprise engaged in pure commerce rather than diplomatic ventures.[3] Recently, historians have highlighted the Company's sovereign characteristics and have argued that it can best be described as a hybrid company-state.[4] Encounters between VOC officials and Asian rulers, such as Abbas II and Aurangzeb, then, were not only meetings between business partners, but also rendezvous between political and diplomatic actors who each tried to showcase their political stature and supremacy. Ultimately, however, the Company's pragmatic guiding principle was to let trade and profit prevail over politics. As a hybrid company-state it carried out its distinct 'hybrid diplomacy', such as in Cunaeus's and Van Adrichem's cases, with the final goal of reaping commercial benefits.

Ritual, gift-giving, and ceremony were integral to the establishment of relations between the Company and Safavid and Mughal rulers, and the ways in which they asserted their status. Their legitimating employment

of gift-exchange—for instance to convey messages about sovereignty and cultural identity—deserve more attention.[5] Both Cunaeus's and Van Adrichem's missions were written up during the embassies in journals and a variety of diplomatic sources, which offer insights into the importance of gift-exchange to VOC diplomacy and the ways in which the Company exercised its delegated hybrid sovereignty. Through studying these embassies from a comparative viewpoint, this chapter explores the legitimating function of ceremonial gift-exchange in mid-seventeenth-century diplomatic relations between the VOC and the Safavid and Mughal empires. The first part outlines why gift-exchange is an important angle through which to explore both the status of the VOC and Indo-European relations and then introduces the VOC as a political and diplomatic actor. The main part of this chapter reconstructs the political and representational connotations of the gifts exchanged between Cunaeus, Van Adrichem, and the Safavid and Mughal rulers. Studying the VOC's diplomatic policies, practices, and strategies regarding gift-giving showcases that it not only operated as a commercial enterprise, but conducted itself as a company-state, even in the regions where it did not exercise direct political influence such as the Safavid and Mughal empires.

Diplomatic gifts and sovereignty

An important aspect of the political cultures of the Safavid and Mughal empires was their ruler's claim to universal sovereignty.[6] Their monarchs represented themselves as lords of the world, all other rulers ranking below them. The Safavid Shahs derived their legitimacy from Persian, Turco-Mongol, and Twelver Shi'ism traditions, while the Mughal emperors drew from Turco-Mongol, Persian, Sunni, and Hindu cultures.[7] An essential part of symbolically legitimating their universal lordship was ceremonial gift-giving. Gift-exchange rituals created political bonds, legitimized authority, and defined the sociopolitical order.[8] Gifts, and their ceremonial context, conveyed messages about the political status of both giver and receiver and about the nature of their relationship.[9] As demonstrated by Jan Hennings's contribution to this volume, the gift's presentation and context were essential to the message.[10]

As supreme rulers of so-called tributary universal empires, the Safavid Shah and the Mughal emperor granted imperial decrees (*farmans*), such as trade agreements, as personal favours; these could be obtained, in part, by recognizing the rulers with gifts.[11] While dealing with them, VOC envoys were compelled to familiarize themselves with, and conform themselves to, foreign power structures and gift-exchange cultures to achieve trade relations. VOC representatives literally needed to bow into the dust before these lords of the world, as discussed by van Meersbergen.[12] At the same time, however, the forced conformity to court customs gave these envoys the opportunity to present the Company as powerful, rich, and reputable.

The VOC thus put great effort into endowing its representatives with diplomatic credentials and gifts to obtain its aims, while it also instructed them to accommodate themselves to local conventions. The VOC's hybrid nature permitted its envoys a degree of flexibility in courtly interactions in contrast to royal ambassadors who, as Hennings demonstrates for Anglo–Russian encounters, could not shift so easily between presenting themselves as plain merchants and posing as diplomats when required.[13]

The Company's authorization to conduct itself as a diplomatic actor was based on its founding charter, issued in 1602 by the Dutch States-General. In addition to granting the Company a monopoly over Asian trade, the States-General invested it with delegated sovereign powers, allowing it to wage wars, to build settlements, and to negotiate with Asian sovereigns.[14] The States-General were aware that the Company needed to rely on diplomacy over conquest if it was to trade with powerful Asian rulers. However, as these monarchs did not consider merchants prestigious, and because successful negotiations hinged on status, the Company realized it had to mirror the political and cultural characteristics of Asian societies.[15] Nevertheless, the Company occasionally flaunted its military might to powerful Asian monarchs, attempting to coerce them into granting trade privileges or lending them its assistance.[16]

The Company's relationship with the States-General was of a symbiotic nature.[17] Although the VOC possessed state-like qualities, it could only exert its sovereign powers in its charter domain and ultimately was subject to the supreme sovereignty of the Dutch Republic.[18] While it first relied on the States-General and the Princes of Orange to enhance its legitimacy and to endorse its trade by means of letters of credence, the Company developed its own legitimation strategies as it became more powerful. The Dutch founded a governmental centre on Java called Batavia from which the High Government, which consisted of the Governor-General and Council of the Indies, semi-independently supervised the VOC's Asian operations. Batavia functioned as a diplomatic capital, in which the Governor-General acted as a diplomatic figurehead.[19] By employing ceremonies and architecture, which incorporated European and Asian elements, the VOC carefully crafted an image of the Governor-General as a princely ruler who could symbolically communicate with Asian sovereigns.[20] Thus in the words of Jurrien van Goor, the Company was run as a trading firm, but acted as a kingdom—effectively making the leaders of the VOC merchant-kings.[21] These efforts facilitated the achieving of its diplomatic and commercial objectives, as Cunaeus's and Van Adrichem's cases will show.

The embassy of Joan Cunaeus to the Safavid court in 1651–1652

On 28 July 1651 the High Government, headed by Governor-General Carel Reyniersz (r. 1650–1653), appointed Joan Cunaeus as ambassador to

congratulate Shah Abbas II on his accession to the throne, to deliver letters and gifts from the Governor-General, and to obtain new trade agreements. Several developments in relations between the Company and the Safavid court in the 1640s necessitated this mission. In 1642, approximately two decades after the agreement of the first VOC-Safavid treaty of 1623, Shah Safi (r.1629–1642) died. His death meant that the Company, according to Safavid custom, was compelled to send an embassy to the new Shah to recognize his rule and renew its trade privileges (*farmans*). Because a diplomatic mission was an expensive affair, the VOC initially attempted to have local VOC officials handle negotiations. However, both parties disagreed about trading tolls and overdue payments. When the Safavids obstructed the local VOC director in 1645, the High Government sent in their war fleet and blockaded the Persian Gulf. The VOC aimed to force the Safavids to grant favourable treaties by demonstrating its maritime prowess. After a short standoff, both sides decided to resolve their disputes diplomatically. Between 1645 and 1651 the Company sent various envoys, without success.[22] The Safavids repeatedly demanded the visit of a high-status ambassador, which ultimately led to Cunaeus's embassy.[23]

Joan Cunaeus was the eldest scion of an influential Dutch regent family in the city of Leiden. He completed his legal studies at the University of Leiden. From 1644 to 1648 he occupied various offices within the Company's ranks such as judge-advocate of the VOC fleet and secretary to the Governor-General. In 1648 he entered the High Government as a member of the Extraordinary Council and in 1650 he acceded to the Ordinary Council. Albertus Hotz unfairly characterized Cunaeus as a minor VOC officer who had made barely any contribution to the Company or the Dutch homeland.[24] Cunaeus, who was not only a merchant, but also an experienced statesman, an educated jurist, and a prominent member of the VOC administration, was specifically chosen by the High Government as a full-fledged ambassador to represent the Company diplomatically, that is, with decorum, aided by letters and diplomatic gifts.

Cunaeus's letter of credence to the Shah and his ambassadorial instructions demonstrate that the High Government put great effort into showcasing his prominent position as VOC governor and ambassador to the Safavids, in order to garner respect. In the letter, Reyniersz presented himself as the Governor-General of the Dutch state in the east, who acted on behalf of the States-General and the Prince of Orange. Because of the involvement of the Prince of Orange and the States-General in VOC-Safavid relations in the 1620s, the Governor-General mentioned these actors to provide himself and Cunaeus with legitimacy. Nevertheless, the fact that the Governor-General issued the central document shows the VOC's role as a diplomatic actor. Drawing from the lexicon of diplomacy, Reyniersz accredited Cunaeus in his letter to Abbas II as a 'distinguished envoy', 'a specifically chosen ambassador', a 'noble gentleman', and a 'preeminent member of the High Government', absolutely qualified and endorsed to carry out his

mission.[25] This bestowal of status would also enhance the meaning of the Company's gifts to Abbas II.

In the instructions, the High Government notified Cunaeus that they had acquired a set of gifts for the Shah and Safavid officials, based on their knowledge about which goods were desired at the Safavid court. The High Government expressed the hope that the gifts would enhance the VOC's reputation as respectable among the Safavids and would contribute to a successful mission.[26] Cunaeus was ordered to deliver a letter of credence to the Shah, in which the Governor-General humbly congratulated Abbas II and asked him to grant the Company the favour of trading rights. In the letter, Reyniersz offered the Shah the gifts as an acknowledgement of his power. He did so by stating that he could not imagine that such a mighty ruler, blessed with an abundance of riches, could have any unfulfilled material wishes. If, however, he desired any particular exotic objects 'from any quarter of the world', the VOC would procure them for him.[27] All subservience aside, the letter highlighted the Dutch and VOC's global trading networks.

The High Government prepared the following set of gifts for the Shah: 2000 'Moorish' ducats, two pieces of scarlet cloth, a Japanese lacquer chest and desk, a Japanese folding screen, a big Venetian mirror with silver-inlaid frames, a sweet-scented drawer of amber wood, a box made of amber, five New Guinean birds of paradise, two honey birds, six Indian water clocks, the plumage of four birds, lengths of gold and silver lace, and a small ceremonial ship.[28]

By giving 2000 'Moorish' ducats the Company showed that it was familiar with the ancient Persian *nazr*-tradition. The *nazr* was a specific form of *piskash*, a term which applies to gifts from an inferior to a superior in both the Safavid and Mughal empires.[29] The VOC thus attempted to gain the Shah's favour by recognizing his supreme position, while simultaneously displaying its wealth, in accordance with the *nazr*-custom whereby petitioners had to offer the ruler tribute money when appearing before him seeking a favour. The VOC's High Government, which conceived of itself as a political actor—as showcased by Cunaeus's ambassadorial appointment, his letter of credence, and the gifts—approached Abbas II as a political power requesting trading privileges.

The set of east Asian gifts, such as the Japanese lacquer work and exotic birds, originated from regions where the Safavids lacked any presence. Due to their exclusive agreements with the Japanese, in the mid-seventeenth century only VOC officials and Chinese merchants were able to acquire and distribute Japanese lacquer work, which made them very desirable.[30] Paradise birds, honey birds, and the feathers of other exotic birds were shipped by the Company from south east Asia these were also highly esteemed at the Safavid court because of their rarity and market value.[31] The amber box in this array of gifts most probably was made from materials extracted in the Baltic Region, which was also appreciated by the Safavids. In 1681, a

Safavid Armenian attempted to establish trade relations with the Elector of Brandenburg in order to acquire amber.[32] Mirrors, such as the two Venetian examples offered, were similarly highly sought-after in Persia, because the Safavids lacked the knowledge to fabricate these themselves. Just like the clocks, automatons, and other instruments that were often presented by European envoys to Oriental monarchs, the mirrors symbolized the Republic's and VOC's technological dexterity.[33]

The travel report also mentions a 'pronkschip', a small seaworthy ceremonial ship with masts and sails constructed in Batavia, meant as a present for the Shah. Cunaeus's entourage included two sailors, who were tasked to assemble the ship in Isfahan and demonstrate it to the Shah.[34] This gift served as a stark reminder for the Shah that the Safavids were dependent on the Company for a stable Safavid economy. Without the Company the Shah would not be able to acquire silver or receive other Asian products such as Indonesian spices and Japanese lacquer work. The ship also emphasized that the Shah needed the VOC to keep the Persian Gulf and the Safavid coast safe and to use the fleet to transport pilgrims to Islamic holy shrines.[35] While Cunaeus's mission was intended to bring peace between the Safavids and the Company, the ship would remind the Shah of the VOC's military and economic power, discouraging him from interfering with the VOC's business. The ship's intended meaning can be distilled from Reyniersz's post-mission comments. He anticipated that the Safavids would pay the Company more respect out of fear for its maritime power, after it had defeated both the English and Portuguese right before the Shah's coasts.[36] VOC representatives often offered such ships to Asian rulers.[37] For instance, in 1691 VOC ambassador Joan van Leene presented the Safavid Shah Suleiman (r.1666–1694) with 'a gilded and painted model ship that was able to float on water'.[38]

All of these gifts were valuable commodities that were intended to curry favour with the Shah and to acknowledge his position as a universal ruler, while highlighting the utility of his relationship with the Dutch. While the gifts represented the Company's commerce, they were also meant to legitimize the VOC and the Dutch as overseers of a powerful sea-based empire, exercising political influence in Asia. Paired with the other presents, the ship, together with objects from around the globe, symbolized everything the Shah did not possess: namely a mighty fleet with access to every corner of the world. The VOC employed such symbols in order to represent itself as a hybrid company-state and to assert its sovereign dignity in south east Asia. Although Cunaeus respectfully had to seek the Shah's favour through submissive gestures and by offering tribute, he was able to show the lord of the world the Dutch global reach.

Cunaeus and his entourage arrived in Bandar Abbas on 24 December 1651. Cunaeus's reception there was painted by Jan Baptist Weenix. As can be seen in Figure 12.1, the painting shows Cunaeus on horseback wearing a golden *khil'at*, a robe of honour, speaking with the Safavid *shahbandar* (harbour master) while VOC ships with smoking cannons are lying at anchor in the Persian Gulf.[39]

Figure 12.1 Jan Baptist Weenix, The Dutch ambassador on his way to Isfahan, 1653–1659. Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.

On 1 January 1651 Cunaeus did indeed receive a *khil'at* (plural *khila'*) from Abbas II as a welcome gift.[40] The custom of offering *khila'* was part of an ancient institutionalized tradition of ceremonial gift-exchange which originated from central Asia, according to which a superior bestowed upon a subordinate a garment from his own wardrobe. Symbolically, the distribution of these robes established the superior status of the ruler, while at the same time according the receiver honour, also demonstrated by van Meersbergen in Van Adrichem's case.[41] By cloaking Cunaeus, Abbas II incorporated the VOC ambassador into his dominion and positioned himself as his august patron. The report proves that the VOC envoys perceived the clothing mostly as a symbol of honour, but they must have been aware that wearing it signified the Shah's supreme authority because of its ritualized reception and the fact that the robes were accompanied by letters, which asserted the Shah's supremacy.

Arriving in Isfahan on 27 February 1652, Cunaeus and his entourage, which he had assembled in Bandar Abbas to give his mission a dignified appearance, were finally invited to the *Ali Qapu* palace for an audience on 20 March. Both the Safavids and Mughals delayed audiences to emphasize that decision-making was their prerogative, to stall negotiations, and to buy time in order to prepare ceremonies.[42] On the day of the audience, all Safavid members of the imperial council, provincial governors, and army commanders were present at court to celebrate the *Nowruz*, the Persian New Year. The *Nowruz* was an ancient festivity with a pre-Islamic Zoroastrian origin. By celebrating the Persian New Year the Safavids positioned themselves as the worthy successors of the Persian Shahs of old.[43] During

the celebration, all Safavid officials were obliged to offer the Shah gifts commensurate with their rank as a sign of his overlordship. The Safavids ensured that Cunaeus was granted an audience during the New Year's festivities so he could witness the complete sociopolitical order of the empire in all its glory. Simultaneously the presence of the VOC embassy at the *Nowruz* and its offering of precious gifts strengthened the Shah's legitimacy in the eyes of his Safavid elite. The VOC entourage was aware of the political connotations of the festivities, as witnessed by a discussion in the journal about the cost of earlier New Year's gifts of Safavid officials to the Shah.[44]

At the beginning of the audience ceremony each individual gift was carried on a silver plate, displayed before the attendants and placed before the Shah's throne by Armenian merchants, according to Safavid customs.[45] Letting the merchants each bear one present maximized the visibility of the commodities. In Islamic courtly cultures such as those of the Safavid, Mughal, and Ottomans, the public display of gifts enlarged their symbolic political messages.[46] The manner of presenting and the placement of the gifts ensured that they were classified as *piskash*. Once the gifts were presented to the Safavids, Cunaeus and his staff appeared in the courtyard. Guided under both arms by Safavid officials, they were to prostrate themselves before Abbas II, symbolizing their subordination. Cunaeus was positioned on a chair before the Shah, which showed that the Safavids assessed the VOC ambassador as a nobleman. Subsequently the Safavid court secretary handed over the Persian credential letters and an inventory of the gifts to the Safavid Grand-Vizier in a pouch of gold cloth. The documents were then read aloud for all attending Safavids to hear.[47] This conveyed the message that the Shah was too illustrious to receive the letter from Cunaeus himself. The gold cloth showed that the VOC adapted itself to Safavid customs of diplomatic letter-exchange.

In contrast to their Ottoman and Mughal neighbours, the Safavid Shahs were known to converse openly, dine, and drink with their guests. Where Ottoman and Mughal sovereigns enhanced their status by assuming an unapproachable deity-like form, the Safavid Shahs justified their universal rulership by their visibility and dominant role during ceremonies.[48] Indeed, Cunaeus spoke with Abbas II about various kinds of wine, even ordering his assistant to bring the ruler seven bottles from the VOC lodge. The embassy's ambivalent attitude towards the supreme Shah is summed up in Speelman's evaluation of the Shah's questions on the topic as 'childish'.[49] Although the *Nowruz*-festivities also included a lavish banquet, the VOC legation was not permitted to stay for the meal. This stands in contrast to earlier and later VOC missions to the Safavid court, which were often invited to partake in these feasts as signs of courtesy. Nonetheless, the Shah sent seven dishes of baked sugar to the VOC lodgings, highlighting the relative degree of honour the Safavids granted the VOC embassy.[50] The absence of the VOC embassy during the dinner shows that Cunaeus did not fully secure the favour of the Shah, however. After the audience ceremony, Cunaeus entered into long and

cumbersome negotiations with the members of the imperial council. However, they failed to reach agreement about silk prices, toll costs, and overdue payments. Cunaeus, ascertaining that a slightly unfavourable agreement was better than no agreement at all, ended up accepting a treaty that was strongly in the Safavids' favour.[51]

On 12 May Cunaeus and his retinue all received *khila'* from Safavid officials in the name of the Shah, which marked the end of the negotiations, and were meant to honour the VOC embassy while simultaneously asserting the ruler's dominant position. In accordance with Safavid customs the gifts mirrored the retinue's hierarchy. Cunaeus, for example, received a *khila't*, a turban, a belt, a Persian knife, and a saddled horse. Dirk Sarcerius, second in rank, obtained a robe and a horse, while the rest acquired *khila'*.[52] All these gifts were meant as farewell presents and as a display of gratitude for conducting the negotiations. One day after receiving the imperial decrees from the Shah, the VOC entourage was invited to the palace for the farewell audience. Cunaeus and his entourage rode to the palace on the Shah's horses and all wore the Shah's *khila'* throughout the audience. Once more, the Safavids did not allow Cunaeus to stay for the main course, but only brought him appetizers, only showing him a portion of honour.[53] The Shah's reception of the gifts is not discussed by Speelman, other than that Abbas was very curious about the 'pronkschip' and wanted to receive it as soon as possible to entertain himself and his wives with it.[54]

In the end Cunaeus's embassy was not particularly successful. Although the Company put great effort into preparing an embassy and acquiring gifts for the Shah that showcased their power, Cunaeus was ultimately not able to realize favourable commercial treaties. Unable to truly resolve the conflicts about transactions and payments, Cunaeus returned to Batavia where his results were not greeted with enthusiasm by the High Government. Nevertheless, Cunaeus's embassy had managed to present the Company as a political actor to the Safavid court.

The embassy of Dircq van Adrichem to the Mughal court in 1662

A decade after Cunaeus's mission, the High Government, headed by Governor-General Joan Maetsuycker (r. 1653–1678) sent an embassy with similar aims to the Mughal court. As in Cunaeus' case, this delegation was initiated after the accession of a new monarch, the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb in 1658, which meant that the *farmans* had to be renewed.[55] After the smoke of the Mughal succession war cleared in 1661 and Aurangzeb had consolidated his rule, the VOC prepared an embassy. In addition to concluding commercial treaties, the envoys' task was also to respond to the Mughals' request for military assistance to defeat the Portuguese near Daman. Because the Mughals lacked a strong war fleet, the Company pragmatically offered maritime support, hoping this would ensure Mughal goodwill.[56]

As with Cunaeus's appointment, the High Government initially resolved to send a high-ranking official from Batavia as ambassador to visit the emperor and to offer him a diplomatic letter and gifts, with the aim of enhancing the prestige with which the Mughals viewed them. In Batavia, however, there appeared to be no capable person with sufficient knowledge of the trade, culture, and language of the Mughals. The High Government therefore decided that they would rather send an experienced lower-ranking official who was familiar with Mughal conventions than someone without the required expertise.[57] Ultimately Van Adrichem, a seasoned Hindi-speaking VOC official who was elected as provisional director of Surat's VOC factory, was appointed to represent the Company.[58]

Great effort was also put into the credential letter. The High Government asked the VOC personnel in Surat to translate a draft version into Persian and seal it, to give the Mughal emperor the illusion that the letter had been written in Batavia by Maetsuycker himself.[59] This showed that the Company adapted itself to Mughal epistolary customs and conducted itself as a political actor, in order to realize favourable trade agreements, as it had done during Cunaeus's mission in 1652. In the document, Maetsuycker titled himself as the Governor-General of the Dutch state of India, styling himself as a sovereign lord. In the letter, Maetsuycker accredited Van Adrichem as 'commander', which made him the highest-ranking VOC envoy yet, to be sent by the Company to the Mughals. Like Cunaeus, Van Adrichem was allowed an entourage to assist him and represent the Company with honour and dignity. Maetsuycker humbly congratulated Aurangzeb on his accession, requesting him to permit Van Adrichem to offer him gifts, and petitioning for the renewal of trade agreements. Van Adrichem was also instructed to request permission to sell Japanese copper and remission of the one per cent toll on trade. Maetsuycker promised Aurangzeb that the war-fleet would assist the Mughals in defeating the Portuguese in Daman, reminding the sovereign of the Company's maritime power.[60]

The High Government informed Van Adrichem that it had acquired a set of gifts for Aurangzeb, which they estimated to be worth 15,000 guilders. The VOC board admitted that this was a moderate amount for a ruler of Aurangzeb's stature, but it calculated that the other expenses for the mission, such as gifts for courtiers and travel expenditures, would be high. During the meeting the High Government stated that it was ready to spend more money for gifts for Aurangzeb if it might ensure more favourable trade agreements, but because the sovereign was more inclined to taking than giving they had decided that the present batch of gifts would be sufficient.[61]

The High Government acquired the following set of gifts for Aurangzeb, which shows similarities to the gifts Cunaeus offered Abbas II: three Arabian horses, a man's and a woman's palanquin made of Japanese lacquer, a throne for riding an elephant (*howdaj*), twenty-seven Japanese shields, nine pieces of red, gold and green cloth, two big mirrors, three pieces of velvet from the Republic, six curved daggers, and pistols and guns.[62]

Like the set of gifts that was offered by Cunaeus, Van Adrichem's gifts consisted of Asian and European objects, meant to display the Company's power, wealth, and legitimacy. Simultaneously, the wares were given to reflect Aurangzeb's political status as a world ruler, in an attempt to capture his favour. The High Government deliberately handpicked gifts that were appreciated by the Mughals. The lacquer work such as the thrones, shields, and palanquins were especially fit as imperial gifts, because of their explicit political connotations across Asia.[63] The Mughal rulers themselves used carriage thrones during ceremonies as symbols of their power and their legitimacy. The elephant throne was also suitable, because the Mughal emperors used elephants as war animals during military campaigns and ceremonies. These gifts, although manufactured in Japan, specifically symbolized the power of the Company. The VOC undoubtedly hoped that Aurangzeb would use the Japanese *howdaj* and the carriage thrones to show his international connections during ceremonies, which would also serve as a visual cementing of the Company's presence in Asia.

Van Adrichem arrived in the Mughal capital Shahjahanabad on 9 August 1662. As with Cunaeus's visit to Isfahan, Van Adrichem's audience was delayed. Members of the Mughal imperial council advised Van Adrichem that he should visit the court multiple times, spreading out the gift-giving; advice which the envoy followed.[64] Multiple audiences would enhance Mughal legitimacy, which the newly acceded Aurangzeb needed. The courtiers also recommended that Van Adrichem give Aurangzeb five Arabian horses, three pieces of red and three pieces of green cloth, Moorish cloth, three pieces of silk, nine curved daggers, a Venetian mirror, and the Governor-General's letter during the first audience ceremony. They also asked him to bring eighteen golden and a hundred silver rupees when handing over the letters. This sum of money was in line with the local *nazr*-tradition, as Cunaeus had done in 1652 while visiting Abbas II.[65]

Van Adrichem was finally received in the private audience hall at Aurangzeb's Red Fort on 14 September 1662.[66] Highlighting his status as a VOC ambassador and strengthening the Company's claims to legitimacy, Van Adrichem was carried in a palanquin to the palace, which was only permitted to higher-ranking Mughal officials. The VOC had adopted the use of palanquins and elephants during ceremonies in Batavia and during diplomatic missions to symbolize their standing as ambassadors.[67] The Company thus appropriated Asian status symbols to conduct itself as a powerful political player in Asia and to showcase its (delegated) sovereignty as a company-state.

As in Cunaeus's audience with Shah Abbas, various Mughal servants brought the gifts to the hall and placed them before Aurangzeb's throne. By constructing the presents as *piskash*, they highlighted the Mughal emperor's superior position. As in Cunaeus's ceremony, Van Adrichem was not allowed to personally hand over the credential letter and the *nazr* to Aurangzeb, nor was the letter opened and read by him.[68] Although by receiving and

touching the letter Aurangzeb acknowledged the VOC embassy, he simultaneously highlighted that he was too exalted to read the document directly. After presenting the gifts, Van Adrichem and his two VOC companions all received *khila'*, which the Mughal emperor utilized in the same way as his Safavid counterpart; they incorporated the VOC embassy under his supreme authority, while simultaneously honouring the embassy.[69] The VOC legation was aware of the implications, because they had arranged to appear at court in European clothing. The VOC entourage was obliged to express their gratitude to the emperor by performing four *taslims*, a unique form of prostration, specifically developed at the Mughal court.[70] This greeting was instituted to express their visitors' subservience to the Mughal ruler, as van Meersbergen demonstrates.[71] After this, Aurangzeb was carried in his palanquin to his private mosque in the palace to perform Muslim prayers; the VOC legation had to await his return before it was allowed to leave the palace.[72] This part of the ceremony highlighted Aurangzeb's position as a divinely appointed universal Islamic ruler to his Christian visitors.[73]

The second audience ceremony was held on 17 September 1662, at the Red Fort's public audience hall. Mughal courtiers and Van Adrichem arranged for the VOC ambassador to offer a large part of the Japanese lacquer works during this reception.[74] This second reception was part of a larger event, the *durbar*—the regular ceremonial gathering of the Mughal ruler, his household, the imperial council, and the Mughal army. At the *durbar* the Mughal emperor inspected his army and his officials presented him with state affairs. Much like Cunaeus's invitation to the Safavid court during the *Nowruz*, the Mughals consciously showcased the Mughal hierarchy to Van Adrichem and his entourage. At the same time the VOC envoys' ritualized visit and gift-giving was meant to display Aurangzeb's international links to his subjects. Because the lacquer wares were the most rare and precious in Van Adrichem's array of gifts, the Mughals planned to let Van Adrichem offer these when all members of the imperial household were present at court. Van Adrichem's visit and gift-giving thus served to display Aurangzeb's legitimacy to both the court and the VOC embassy itself.[75]

Compared with their Safavid counterparts, the Mughals were stricter in their court protocol and use of court space for articulating political messages. Less approachable than the Safavid Shah, the Mughal ruler showed himself to his subjects during the *durbar* as a deity, taking inspiration from Hindu rituals.[76] The Mughals made use of the Public Audience Hall to establish visitors' hierarchical rankings.[77] The hall was separated into three different parts, every section representing a different rank. During the *durbar* every attendee was ranked in a hierarchical manner before the emperor. The Mughal emperor and members of the imperial family were seated on an elevated balcony demarcated by a golden fence. The second section, closest to the ruler, was reserved for the highest of Mughal nobles and marked out by a silver fence. The last segment, most distant from the Mughal sovereign and delineated by a red fence, contained the lowest-ranking visitors.[78]

During the *durbar*, the VOC entourage was placed within the red fence, implying that the Mughals considered the VOC officials equal to low-ranking nobles. After performing the *taslims*, the VOC retinue was placed within the silver fence, while servants placed the *howdah*, a carriage throne, a palanquin, twenty-five lacquered shields, a chest, a drawer, four lacquered saddles, various lacquered boxes, and four lacquered dishes before Aurangzeb's throne. After the showcasing of the presents, the Mughals placed the VOC legation within the red fence again. By relocating the VOC envoys from the red fence to the silver fence during the presentation of the gifts, Aurangzeb showed his appreciation, but simultaneously established his superiority by residing within the golden fence. Likewise, the Mughal monarch concentrated the attention on the embassy and the rare objects the VOC officials offered him as tribute to the onlooking Mughal elite.[79]

When the ceremony ended, Van Adrichem visited the Mughal courtiers to request a renewal of the commercial treaties from the emperor. The council members, however, told Van Adrichem that he had to appear before the emperor several more times. The VOC embassy therefore witnessed two more *durbars* on 24 September and 8 October 1662, each of which resembled the first. At the second *durbar*, however, Van Adrichem was led through the Red Fort as a courtesy, but also as a way for the Mughals to show their power and wealth to the VOC envoy. Van Adrichem's secretary wrote that he was allowed to stand within the silver fence during the third *durbar*. With this gesture the Mughals showed their gratitude for the gifts already offered. During these audiences Van Adrichem gifted two Arabian horses, one red cloth, one green cloth, a lacquered palanquin, several Japanese boxes, a Venetian mirror, two Japanese shields, a Japanese drawer, two birds of paradise, and two honeybirds.[80] From the travel report it appears that Van Adrichem had offered more gifts to Aurangzeb than he was instructed to by the High Government. Van Adrichem added these extra wares to ensure a successful conclusion to his mission.

On 21 October 1662 two Mughal officials visited the ambassador's residence and delivered Aurangzeb's imperial decrees, in which he renewed the trade agreements and granted the revocation of the one per cent toll on trading. With the *farmans* delivered, Van Adrichem was invited for one last ceremony to express gratitude and take leave of the Mughal emperor. During the last *durbar*, which took place on 22 October 1662, Van Adrichem received, as a token of Aurangzeb's gratitude, a *khila't*, a golden dagger ornamented with rubies and diamonds, and golden reins for a horse.[81]

Van Adrichem was not the only VOC official who received gifts. The Mughals asked him to deliver a *khila't*, a silver dagger, a silver purse, and a horse with a silver saddle and golden reins to Governor-General Maetsuycker, along with a letter by Aurangzeb. With these gifts Aurangzeb expressed his thanks to Maetsuycker for his presents and for sending Van Adrichem, but simultaneously emphasized his superior status by presenting himself in his letter as a world ruler.

The *farmans*, Aurangzeb's letter, and the counter-gifts were a physical confirmation of the successful mission and the gifts that had helped the Company to achieve it. Whereas it had been disappointed by Cunaeus, the High Government was very content with Van Adrichem's results. It even organized a grand reception ceremony in which Aurangzeb's letter was received in Batavia. At the reception the Lord of Batavia showcased his successful negotiations with the Mughal emperor—legitimating the VOC's own rule on the Indonesian islands.[82] Aurangzeb himself seemed pleased with the gifts, especially the palanquins, since he provided the VOC with two small models of carriage thrones, requesting these to be handcrafted for him in Japan.[83]

Conclusion

Studying Cunaeus's and Van Adrichem's diplomatic missions from a comparative perspective, not only illuminates the legitimating and representational functions of gift-exchange between the VOC and the Safavids and Mughals in the seventeenth century, but also contributes to the ongoing debate on Eurasian cross-cultural encounters, symbolic communication, 'non-state' diplomatic actors, and the position of trading companies in early modern diplomacy. As representatives of a hybrid company-state, these two VOC envoys interacted with the Safavid and Mughals according to diplomatic practices, as showcased by their letters of credence, gift-exchange, and participation in ceremonies.

Cunaeus's accreditation as 'extraordinary ambassador' and Van Adrichem's appointment as 'commander' in their letters of credence and instructions demonstrate their mission's diplomatic aspects. The keystone to the Company's diplomatic strategy in the Safavid and Mughal realms was acquaintance with local courtly conventions and submissive participation in ceremonies, in which gift-giving played a prominent part. As the VOC's hosts, both Safavid and Mughal rulers implemented these practices as a part of their political agendas to represent themselves as universal sovereigns. Nevertheless, cultural accommodation enabled the VOC to articulate political statements by means of gifts.

The gifts offered by Cunaeus and Van Adrichem, on behalf of the Governor-General, not only highlighted the extensive trading network of the VOC and advertised its wares, but also asserted the Company's place as a political actor in the Indian Ocean. The gifts, accompanied by letters of credence in which the Governor-General of Batavia introduced himself as a sovereign lord of the Dutch state of India, and offered by their diplomatic representatives, make evident that the relations between the VOC and the Safavids and Mughals were of a political and diplomatic nature. Cunaeus's offering of an ornamented ceremonial ship embodied the Company's maritime and military prowess, while Van Adrichem's presentation of Japanese lacquered palanquins, and the fact that he was carried to the Mughal palace in a palanquin himself, showcased the Company as a potent player on the Eurasian stage.

The VOC was authorized by the States-General to conduct itself in its charter domain as a diplomatic actor since its beginnings. Nevertheless, the Company's claim to political power developed throughout the seventeenth century, partly because it had to gain recognition by foreign rulers in order to engage in trade. The development of the VOC's diplomacy was a process of 'learning by doing'. While the sources do not directly mention that the two embassies learned from each other, the VOC's reporting and archiving practices enabled it to use past diplomatic experiences to their benefits. Both reports show an awareness of its trading history in the Safavid and Mughal realms. While the Safavid and Mughals had similar political cultures, the Company made sure that their representatives were familiar with local contexts and assured that each embassy was adapted to local circumstances.

Cunaeus's and Van Adrichem's missions imply that power display was of crucial significance for trading company diplomacy, which served its ultimate aims of generating profit. The VOC was a true hybrid organization, whose officials could show their multifarious faces as merchant-diplomats and merchant-kings.

Notes

1 This article grows out of my 2014 MA-thesis submitted to the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen and supervised by Megan Williams and Raingard Esser. I am grateful to Megan Williams for her comments and suggestions.

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13 The failed gift

Ceremony and gift-giving in Anglo–Russian relations (1662–1664)

Jan Hennings

Introduction[1]

According to the common belief, gifts are given freely: 'Gifts are items whose ownership one places in the hands of others without recompense', as the eighteenth-century *Zedler Universal-Lexicon* once put it.[2] Gift-giving would be unthinkable without the gesture of voluntariness. In practice, however—as the pioneering study by the anthropologist Marcel Mauss asserted—the gift does not come without expectations: it initiates a reciprocal exchange which demands defined obligations on the part of the recipient.[3] Gift-giving embraces a paradox, namely the contradiction between the claimed voluntariness and informality of the disinterested gift on the one hand, and the implicit expectations of obligation on the other.[4] One can imagine the complications caused by this contradiction inherent in the gift as a part of the complex interplay of early modern diplomacy, commerce, and politics as described by other authors in this volume's section on objects and beasts.

Despite its permanent links to voluntariness and informality, gift exchange was subject to a substantial process of formalization and standardization. The 'informal was formalized' in order to maintain the fiction of voluntariness and simultaneously prevent, through more or less clearly defined standards, the potential conflicts which arose as a result of this practice.[5] Careful calculations determined in advance who would receive what, based on what one oneself had previously received, in order to preserve the balance of reciprocity, and therefore the claims to rank and honour.[6] This led to a process of formalization which has provided us with a wealth of objects and sources that document gift-giving.[7] However, an object reveals very little about itself or the meaning ascribed to it by both giver and recipient.[8] Gifts in themselves do not really allow for any statement to be made as to the effect they had on political relationships, what meaning they bore, how they functioned as a diplomatic language, or what they did as objects.[9] Gifts require context to reveal their function and their meaning as well as their particular roles in diplomacy. This chapter traces the interaction between the object given and its purpose and significance in very specific circumstances, using as examples the Russian embassy that Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (r. 1645–1676)

dispatched to London in 1662—led by three ambassadors, Petr Semenovich Prozorovskii, Ivan Afanas'evich Zheliabuzhskii, and Ivan Davydov—and the English embassy headed by Charles Howard, earl of Carlisle, sent to Moscow shortly thereafter by King Charles II (r. 1660–1685).[10]

The gifts exchanged in these Anglo–Russian encounters included hemp, potash, Cornish tin, lead, and an old used pistol. Such objects are probably not the first items that spring to mind when thinking of diplomatic gifts that are more usually associated with luxury items, precious textiles, or exotic animals. Thus, while the present chapter takes on some of the main themes developed in the first and third sections of this volume, it starts by shifting the attention away from courtly splendour to throw some light on the economic aspect of gift exchange by exploring the role of such unusual gifts as hemp and tin. To be sure, the two embassies in question also delivered objects and beasts comparable to those that the other contributions to this volume explore, for the symbolic exchange of gifts was inevitably integrated into the complex processes of status relationships, the negotiation of rank and honour and their public recognition. Therefore, the second case study returns to an examination of ceremonial and political communication. Both embassies failed to accomplish their goals. But a situation in which communication goes awry often says more about the function of the media of that communication than does the error-free flow of routine. This applies as much to consciously instigated conflicts as it does to severances based on misunderstandings. It is when something fails to function that its actual function becomes apparent.[11] The chapter follows this notion and concludes with a short discussion of what the failed gifts and the ceremonies that miscarried tell us about diplomatic practice in intercultural context.

The Russian Embassy to London of 1662/3

Following the Restoration of the Stuarts in 1660, Anglo–Russian diplomacy was dedicated to restoration, too. The tsar, who had severed all trade relations with England and banned English merchants from Moscow following the execution of Charles I in 1649, was interested in reviving the old connections with England. For his part, Charles II wanted to restore the old and lucrative trade privileges—mainly the exemption from customs duty—enjoyed by the Muscovy Company since the time of Ivan IV (r. 1533–1584), but which had been lost during the English Interregnum.[12]

The Russian court, in fact, had no intention of reinstating the trade privileges. Earlier unrest in Moscow, the demands of Russian merchants that trading rights of foreigners be curtailed, and the state's need for income from customs duty made the restoration of these privileges impossible.[13] Nevertheless, the tsar was hoping for financial support from Charles II in the war against Poland and sent the three ambassadors to London in order to congratulate the king on his accession to the throne and to seek reimbursement from the English court for a loan made by Aleksei in support of

Charles II in 1650 during the latter's exile. While Prozorovskii was there to represent Russia ceremonially and to negotiate the repayment of the debt, Zheliabuzhskii was given secret instructions to ask Charles to provide a loan to the sum of 10,000 pounds sterling. This sum was to be repaid by the Russian court not in cash, but with commodities such as hemp or potash, perennially sought-after goods which the English imported from Russia.[14] In this context, the Russian court already availed itself of the language of gift-giving for diplomatic and tactical reasons, as will become clear.

After the embassy's arrival on the southern bank of the Thames, in Gravesend, Charles Cottrell, the English master of ceremonies, was sent to the foreign guests in order to negotiate the ceremonial protocol for their solemn entry into the capital. One of the Russians' main demands was that the ambassadors' servants be permitted to ride openly on horses from the landing stage in London to their residence, so that the tsar's gifts to the king would be displayed publicly. After lengthy discussions, Cottrell gave his assent but emphasized that the king granted the tsar this unique symbol of honour out of a spirit of fraternal friendship.[15] Thus, because diplomatic gifts were matters of state, and as such were items of public interest, detailed descriptions of the objects were recorded by both western observers and by the Russian ambassadors as part of their embassy report, the *stateinyi spisok*.[16]

For instance, the diarists John Evelyn and Samuel Pepys noted the gifts and the ceremonial processions of the embassy, which they had witnessed personally.[17] The other diplomats resident at the English court also observed the ceremonial goings-on with great interest. The French ambassador, the comte de Cominges, had an intensive exchange with his sovereign, Louis XIV, in order to analyse what the preferential treatment of the Russians in English diplomatic ceremonial meant for the prestige of France.[18] The London-published *Mercurius Publicus* of January 1663 printed a list of the gifts, indicating who in the tsar's family intended which gifts to go to which members of the king's family in order to strengthen the fiction of friendly and familial relationships which were the basis for good personal, and hence diplomatic, relations.[19] Among the presents we find a menagerie of falcons, hawks, pelicans, martens, and Persian horses, which was not unusual, for noble beasts often completed the panoply of diplomatic gifts, as Felicity Heal shows in her contribution to this volume. Then there were precious materials such as velvet, sables and other furs, and carpets, as well as an unusually high quantity of 10,000 pood (*c.* 160 tonnes) of hemp—something we will shortly be examining more closely—which the Russian court kept in readiness for Charles II in Archangel.[20]

Years later, Johann Christian Lünig and Jean Rousset de Missy published detailed reports about the events surrounding the embassy and about the gifts, including the fact that the audience with the monarch lasted five hours because each gift was presented individually, and that, during the procession to the audience, the gifts were visible to all present as they were being

carried to the king by 150 men.[21] The gift, therefore, did not only create a relationship between giver and recipient. Of equal importance was the involvement of a third party that confirmed the diplomatic relationship between the courts by bearing witness to it. Gift exchange belonged to the arena in which polities constantly observed and evaluated others' and their own political relationships according to the standards of deference and status.[22]

Why, then, did the Russian embassy announce its intention of sending the 160 tonnes of hemp to England as a gift? After all, 160 tonnes represented more than half a shipload on the Archangel sea route. As a comparison: within the trade in the northern Baltic, which was carried out with smaller ships, this would have been of a magnitude of up to two shiploads.[23] In light of such quantities, the significance of the hemp seems to extend beyond the function of the standard diplomatic gift as a medium of honour and prestige. The hemp was hardly suitable as a status attribute. Nevertheless, the 160 tonnes of hemp were explicitly declared as a diplomatic present in both the Russian embassy documentation and the western accounts. Why was this the case?

The ambassadors had promised that the tsar would pay back the requested loan from the English court in economic goods, of hemp and potash. On the surface, the trade value of hemp served as a security to persuade the English court to approve the loan.[24] Yet as a gift, it was not placed in direct connection with trade relations. On the contrary, the ritual presentation of the hemp as a generous gift was clearly separated from any commercial relationship. The gift was therefore positioned outside the negotiation framework as a potential bargaining chip. The implicit, informal and seemingly non-binding gesture of gift-giving implied the creditworthiness of the Russian court—verified by the public present at a court that observed the ceremonies and evaluated them in its print media.[25]

The ambassador could have promised such a guarantee while negotiating the loan and discussing trade privileges, but instead the embassy conveyed the message within the extra-institutional framework of gift exchange, which substantiated the security of the credit and lent it the necessary plausibility. The diplomatic gift was situated on the border between contractual exchange as part of the economic market and the fiction of informality and voluntariness of the gift. Simultaneously it created a connection between the two domains in order to become diplomatically effective. Today, gifts and money represent two discrete spheres: that of the personal, voluntary domain, and that of the institutionalized market, of impersonal, contractual exchange, in the sense of the opposition of 'non-market exchange' and 'market exchange'.[26] The economy of giving clearly differs from the economy of the market and its institutions, from lending, borrowing, bartering, purchasing, and so on. It is as if gift-giving and commerce inevitably run in parallel, according to their own rules, without ever intersecting.[27] Prozorovskii's embassy provides an early modern counterpoint to this distinction by showing the extent to

which gifts could also become part of economic exchange, and vice versa. The following questions arise here: to what extent did the gift receive its function from its relation with the market and its institutions from which it was clearly separate? And why, given the clear overlaps between the two areas, was the mutual symbolic demarcation by the Russian embassy nevertheless necessary?

The Russian court required cash for the continuing war against Poland.[28] Instead of requesting a loan, the Russians could simply have offered to sell the hemp to the English for the price of the required money. In 1662, the Russian state monopolized major export goods and brought them together in Archangel for sale on the northern trade route because of galloping inflation and the ongoing wars. In total, the state purchased 199,153 pood of hemp from various regions and designated it for export via Archangel.[29] Consequently 160 tonnes represented 5 per cent of the total amount of hemp earmarked for export in 1662. The price listings in roubles for hemp fluctuated. According to Richard Hellie, one pood was worth one to two roubles during the first half of the 1660s, rising to 10 roubles at the height of inflation.[30] In 1662/3, 10,000 pood worth of the hemp could thus have been sold for up to 20,000 roubles, an amount which corresponds to the volume of the loan requested by Zheliabuzhskii. The voluntary gift was, therefore, a well-calculated one. The sum also placed the value of the gift of 1662/3 comparably close to the loan Aleksei had lent to Charles II during the latter's exile twelve years earlier, which Charles II was now obligated to repay with 20,000 roubles.[31]

The hemp was not only a symbolic gift. Its value tallied with the loan that Aleksei had once extended to the king when he was in need as well as with the credit that the tsar was now demanding for himself. This was not only a diplomatic gesture intended to show goodwill and imply the possibility of a trade relationship: in this quantity, it was unmistakeably a trade good. So why was this commodity presented as a voluntary gift rather than being sold to raise the money that the Russian court needed?

If the Russians had offered the hemp for sale to English merchants, then this would have indicated that both courts had already entered full-fledged trade negotiations. And herein lies the heart of the problem: the two courts had yet to agree the legal foundations for such trade relations. The institutional framework of the market was not yet in place, as there were fundamental conflicts of interest at the diplomatic level between Russia and England as far as the trade privileges of the Muscovy Company were concerned.[32] In this instance, diplomacy and commerce formed mutual obstacles to one another. The immediate resumption of trade through the sale of hemp would have pre-empted the diplomatic aims, and thus proved itself unattainable. Prozorovskii's embassy was merely to initiate the recommencement of trade relations through reciprocated deference and the promotion of the brotherly friendship between the two sovereigns;[33] the embassy did not yet possess any greater remit for negotiation than this, much to the disappointment of the English.[34]

The symbolism of the gift, however, made it possible to circumvent the obligations of economic exchange in order to promote its aims. To put it another way: through the ritual of gift exchange, the economic good was camouflaged as a diplomatic present so that the handing-over of the hemp could not be interpreted as the beginning of an officially sanctioned commercial relationship. Most of the gifts were in the form of precious materials, such as furs, which were distributed in accordance with the principle of reciprocal esteem. Yet, there were also those items that received their symbolic value through their practical application: this is where the hemp as a gift derived its function and meaning. The hemp conveyed the willingness of the Russian court to engage in trade without the tsar at this point having to define its legal foundations. It therefore becomes apparent here how the language of gifts could communicate political aims which could not yet be achieved diplomatically due to opposing interests and an inadequate basis for negotiation. Diplomatic gifts—through the fiction of voluntariness and informality—created an extra-institutional sphere of communication which allowed for greater flexibility in diplomatic relations.

In the case of Prozorovskii's embassy the conscious bringing-together of the two spheres of commodity and gift gave the diplomatic present its function. Although giving and commerce operated according to different rules, the gift did not necessarily exist in isolation from the institutions from which it differentiated itself through the fictions of voluntariness and informality. Indeed, it could create a link to the market in order to influence it. This subtle political manoeuvre through which the Russian court availed itself of the language of gifts failed, however, to achieve success for the ambassadors' mission because Prozorovskii's limited instructions meant that he had to decline the English court's request to enter into negotiations over the trade privileges. While Charles II accepted the hemp as a present, the English court, for its part, refused the tsar the requested loan but announced its intention to send an ambassador to Moscow in order facilitate trade with Russia.[35] The Muscovy Company also refused to support the tsar financially, even though such a loan and the prospect of repayment in hemp and potash—symbolically emphasized by the generous gift—would have created optimal conditions for the later resumption of successful trade relations. The reason given by the court was that the king found himself in a difficult financial situation following the Civil War and did not have sufficient money at his disposal with which to aid the tsar in his request.[36] Although the members of the Russian embassy received the obligatory parting presents, their value was minimal, as was the splendour of the farewell ceremonies, particularly when compared to the ceremonial effort that the court, hopeful for the restoration of the privileges, had invested in receiving the embassy.[37] Now the task of reinstating the trade privileges fell to the English ambassador, Charles Howard, earl of Carlisle, whom Charles II sent to Russia following Prozorovskii's departure.

The English Embassy to Moscow of 1663/1664

Carlisle was charged first with reciprocating the honours which the tsar had accorded to the king with his embassy to London, and second with pushing for the restoration of the trade privileges.[38] It must be said at the outset that Carlisle's embassy ended in a fiasco and brought about the failure of the diplomatic mission. Although the Muscovy Company continued to exist and a limited number of English merchants were allowed to resume their activities in Russia, they were unable to renew their privileges.[39]

The beginning of the journey, however, was filled with promise. Carlisle wrote in his report to London that Prozorovskii had made favourable comments about his stay in London, and that he had spoken kindly of Carlisle in order to announce in advance Carlisle's embassy to Moscow.[40] The *Posol'skii prikaz* (Muscovy's ambassadorial chancellery) immediately busied itself preparing the ambassador's reception.[41] The embassy was generously provisioned. Barrels of German beer, French wine and food were kept ready in great quantities.[42] Guy Miege, who travelled with Carlisle and composed an influential report on the basis of the ambassadorial papers, wrote that the ambassador 'had all manner of good Entertainment, which tasted very pleasant to us'. But the joy did not last long, 'for', according to Miege, he 'experienced the contrary in several places upon a very bad account'.[43] Miege was speaking of the diplomatic ritual, upon which Carlisle and the Russian court could not agree.

At the beginning of his reception in Moscow, the English earl suffered several ceremonial affronts, which led to a full-blown quarrel between him and his host, ultimately bringing the negotiations to a standstill. During this episode, gifts played an important role. Once the embassy had got underway from Archangel to Moscow, and the *Posol'skii prikaz* had instructed a number of *pristavy*, who accompanied the foreign visitors 'to safeguard the safety and honour of the ambassadors', 5 February 1664 was settled on for the ceremonial procession into the city of Moscow.[44] Carlisle and his companions dressed accordingly for the event and prepared the elaborate ceremonial procedure, with Miege never tiring to emphasize that the splendour of the English embassy was a sign of the greatness accorded to the ambassador's master.[45] They did so in vain, for the Russian official, who was to collect the embassy from their provisional quarters, arrived only with the onset of dusk so that the ceremony had to be postponed. When the procession took place the next day, the Englishman was subjected to a fresh insult. The *pristav* sent by the tsar rode towards the English ambassador to receive him in due style. During their first encounter, however, he stated that Carlisle would have to dismount from the sledge before the *pristav* in order to be standing on the ground when hearing the tsar's words which the latter would relay as the tsar's representative. The Englishman refused, saying that he represented the person of the king and could not dismount before the *pristav* himself had dismounted. The *pristav* in turn refused to do

so, as he, too, represented the person of his master. In order to prevent further delay to the procession into Moscow (delay was a clear sign of a loss of prestige), Carlisle suggested that they should both dismount simultaneously from their sledges. Yet, when Carlisle did move to dismount from the sledge, the *pristav* had his servant hold him hovering above the ground, with the tips of his toes barely touching the ground, until the Englishman had finally visibly put his feet on Russian soil.[46]

This procedure caused the diplomat to protest volubly once again. Sovereignty and rank in the pecking order of states were bound up with the ceremonial representation of a ruler.[47] Consequently, Carlisle demanded the restoration of his honour, and, with it, the recognition of his master's sovereign rights, through a legal regulation, namely through corporal punishment: through 'the blood of the Criminals'.[48] On this day, too, the ceremonial procession was delayed. Nevertheless, this time it was allowed to proceed by lighting large torches in the streets so that all observers present could witness the solemnity. The Russian court later justified itself by saying that many foreigners lived in Moscow and that it was vital that those spectators witness the splendour of the procession and convey news of it to their own courts, so that the world should know of the brotherly friendship between king and tsar.[49]

Part of the splendour was formed by the gifts, which were later carried into the Kremlin by 130 Moscow courtiers and merchants for the audience with Tsar Aleksei.[50] A large proportion of these are in the Kremlin's collection to this day.[51] They were exchanged between the two monarchs and members of their families and included gold and silver vessels, precious materials such as satin and damask, and hand weapons, amongst others.[52] Less refined products were also carried into the Kremlin such as large amounts of Cornish tin, a hundred pots of lead, as well as six cast metal cannons. As with Prozorovskii's embassy, commerce was also implied here through gift-giving without a direct trade relationship being established.

Particular attention was given to a 'gun' and a pair of 'Pistolets', for whose poor condition Carlisle first apologized before going on to emphasize that the gun had been used by the father of his master, Charles I, and that the pistols were those carried by Charles II during his triumphal entry into London on his return to the English throne.[53] Here, the gifts functioned as signifiers of Carlisle's intentions. The privileges enjoyed by the English had officially been repealed by the tsar because they would have been useful to the merchants and thus the enemies of the king, that is, to those who had beheaded the tsar's 'brother' and abolished the monarchy. With the gift of the pistols, the English court alluded to the continuation of the dynasty in the hope of returning to the status quo of the privileges before the Civil War. A jug and a bowl from the private collection of the Queen Mother, Henrietta Maria of France, also conveyed this message.[54]

The gifts were thus intended to support the position of the English court in the negotiations. Carlisle showed appreciation for the fact that the tsar

had acted out of solidarity with Charles I when he revoked the trade privileges of those English merchants who fought on the side of the parliamentarians during the Civil War. However, with the accession of Charles II to the throne, the continuity of the monarchy had been re-established and this therefore needed to find expression in the reinstatement of the privileges.[55]

Yet, while the gifts may have conveyed the message, they failed to deliver the desired results: the ceremonial affront offered to Carlisle, which was perceived as an attack on his king's sovereign dignity, as well as the demand for legal reparation, had already become part of the official negotiations, so that the negotiation of a new basis for trade seemed ever more hopeless. Andrew Marvell, the ambassadorial secretary, then traded blows by letter with the boyars until the altercation ended in a stalemate.[56]

Already before the negotiations, Carlisle had outlined the conditions for proceeding further. Following the ceremonial insults he had suffered upon his arrival in Moscow, 'friendly Negotiation' was only possible if the tsar gave him a written guarantee that reparation would be made for this affront.[57] The honour of the king had suffered. The Russian court promised that it would meet the ambassador's demands, but despite many placatory promises, Carlisle waited in vain for the restoration of his sovereign's dignity through the punishment of the *pristavy*. No progress could therefore be expected in the negotiations of Russian–English commercial interests. How can the connection between symbolic exchange, tangible politics, and commerce be explained here?

The reason for the complications lay in the fact that at the symbolic level, Anglo–Russian economic and political relations were inextricably linked to the personal relationship between Charles II and Aleksei. As the basis of the negotiations, it was necessary to reproduce their relative social status through the performance of ritual, that is, through the representation of mutual deference, as well as through the language of the gifts.[58] It was precisely this social action that failed. Through the disruption in ceremonial protocol, the equilibrium between the two rulers and their sovereign status had been called into question and with it the prospect of successful diplomatic relations. For this reason, ceremonial protocol itself became a reason for debate, and, in the exchange between embassy and court, took on greater importance than the negotiation of the privileges themselves. The three elements of Russian–English diplomacy—commerce, monarchical friendship, and courtly representation—came together in an inseparable act of political communication in which they were mutually dependent.

After the failure of his diplomatic mission, Carlisle's main concern remained the restoration of the honour of his king, as the Russian court had not settled the ceremonial dispute with legal action. The only option for restoring the equilibrium between the monarchs was to prepare a ritual counter-strike. Gifts proved a suitable medium for this task. In a final act of protest, Carlisle refused to accept the tsar's customary valedictory gifts. Until his departure, the English diplomat had left the solution to the conflict

in the hands of the Russian court, hoping for a legal punishment of those involved. Now, by refusing the gifts, he assumed for himself the responsibility of restoring the status of his sovereign.

Four days after the valedictory audience, Aleksei sent thirty men to deliver valuable sable furs to the ambassador and other members of the embassy. Carlisle sent the men straight back with the message that though he greatly valued the tsar's generosity, he could not accept it, as it placed too great an obligation upon him. Refusing gifts belongs as much to the basic vocabulary of gift-giving as does accepting them.[59] To reject valedictory gifts constituted a clear breach of diplomatic practice but as such served a specific political strategy.[60] Miege commented on these proceedings with the following words: '[The] Ambassador considering he had been neglected in all his affaires, would by no meanes admit of this obligation; but from a generous principle returned the Present, as having been otherwise so much disobliged'.[61] Upon enquiry from the astonished tsar, Carlisle explained that

> he looked upon his *Tzarskoy* Majesties Present as an effect of his great Generosity, but that the acceptance thereof would oblige him too far [...] and that in this case it was not proper for him to receive any favour from his *Tzarskoy* Majesty till he had first received the Justice he demanded.[62]

One could say that this is a rare case in which Mauss's fundamental anthropological assumptions concerning the contradiction between voluntariness and obligation are made explicit by the participants themselves. It is also important to emphasize that Carlisle spoke of a 'public refusal', thus presenting the rejection of the gifts to the European public. This proved to be a highly effective strategy, as evidenced by later comments that voice Carlisle's complaints.[63]

Carlisle's rejection of the valedictory gifts gets to the essence of an additional effect of gifts and links in with the authority-generating function of gift-giving. Unbalanced exchange is the beginning of asymmetrical reciprocity, and thus the starting point for the hierarchization of relationships and power formation.[64] In order to withdraw from this asymmetry, Carlisle used the rejection of the gifts as a symbolic 'emergency brake' through which the ceremonial degradation of the English king was to be prevented. Because the Russian court remained tardy in making official reparation through the legal punishment of the *pristavy*, the gift served as a vehicle for protecting the honour of the king. The rejection of the gifts, or deliberately causing their failure, was intended to restore the balance between king and tsar, but did so to the detriment of Anglo–Russian relations. A long letter of complaint concerning Carlisle's conduct followed and was presented to Charles II in London by a Russian emissary.[65]

The letter begins with criticism of Carlisle for not taking care of the actual business at hand and instead being too concerned with inciting disputes over

the ceremonial.[66] Shortly after his arrival in Moscow, Carlisle had come to a similar opinion in reverse, namely that the Russians were 'very troublesome and incorrigible in matters of Ceremony'.[67] This is an early indication that both Carlisle's embassy and the Russian court pursued similar strategies of mutual allocation of blame in matters of ceremony.

Failed ceremonies or failed communication?

Could these disputes be attributed to cultural misunderstandings, or were these altercations a sign of the commonalities between the respective diplomatic cultures? At the beginning of his stay in Moscow, Carlisle wrote in his report to the secretary of state about the ceremonial successes he had experienced despite the affront.[68] But in order to pre-empt the tsar's complaint before his return to London, Carlisle subsequently reported a different view of the matter to the king. He immediately accused the Russian court (the same court whose signs of deference he initially reported as his success) of being incapable of conducting negotiations in the manner that civilized states were wont to do among themselves, as if cultural differences were to blame for the failure of his mission.[69] In order to exonerate Carlisle of any misdemeanour or the breakdown of diplomatic communication, the author of his travel report sought to exclude Russia from the commonwealth of Christian rulers, setting out the entire spectrum of the known, Russia-specific discourse on barbarians, from the cultural drawing of boundaries between civilized and wild, and the stock themes of barbarism, through to accusations of stubbornness and arrogance.[70] Russia was declared to be exotic and culturally excluded in order to conceal the king's loss of honour in front of the European public and to absolve the ambassador of any responsibility in this affair. By ascribing to the tsar an outsider's position, outside of what Lucien Bély has called the '*société des princes*',[71] he could no longer be considered a donor or a threat to honour, despite Carlisle's initial claim of gain in prestige which he believed to have achieved at the beginning of his stay in Moscow.

This narrative strategy of the published travel report yielded the intended result, as later comments on his embassy attest. The author of an important contemporary diplomatic handbook, Abraham de Wicquefort, explained in connection with his description of diplomatic ceremonies at European courts:

> Whereas in the other Courts, the Masters of the Ceremonies [...] do all the Civilities imaginable to Embassadors, and do the Honours of the House in the name of their prince; the *Muscovite Pristave* does all he can to take the place of Honour. [...] There are several relations from those parts [...]: But it is not any where that their impertinence is more lively represented, than in what we have of the Journey the Earl of *Carlisle* took thither in the Year 1663.

Earlier in the passage, we read: 'If the *Turks* are cruel, insolent and proud; the *Muscovites* are rude, barbarous and brutish.'[72] After Wicquefort had created an associative proximity between the Muscovites and the Ottoman Turks, Voltaire later followed the same example by adding in the Persians: 'But on public days the court displayed all the splendor of a Persian monarch. The earl of Carlisle says he could see nothing but gold and precious stones on the robes of the Czar and his courtiers'.[73]

Such construals were embedded in the widespread discourse about Russia as a 'rude and barbarous kingdom'.[74] Such descriptions nurtured the image of an isolated Muscovy whose diplomatic culture was characterized by an anachronistic ritualism that tended to draw on obscure practices rather than adapt itself to the diplomacy of the western states-system.[75] As the above cases demonstrate, however, Prozorovskii's and Carlisle's failed gifts and ceremonial battles speak to the actors' ability to use and manipulate objects and ritual based on a shared understanding of their significance and can hardly be explained in terms of cultural difference, or by the 'impertinence' and 'arrogancy' of the Muscovites or the English. Carlisle's reception provides another enlightening insight concerning this matter. For the organization of Carlisle's reception in Moscow, the clerks in the *Posol'skii prikaz* studied excerpts of Prozorovksii's embassy report in order to give the same provisions to the English ambassador as Prozorovskii had received in England and to relate the diplomatic ceremonies in Moscow to the London precedent.[76] Carlisle's experiences in Moscow rested less on non-European (or, according to Voltaire, Persian) forms of ostentation but to a large extent on the ceremonies that the English court had negotiated with Prozorovskii in London.

Conclusion

It would indeed be tempting to place ceremonial disputes between Russians and Europeans in the arena of cultural conflict according to the excoticizing interpretations in early modern travel literature in order to emphasize the incompatibility of different diplomatic cultures. Yet, not every conflict- or failure in ceremony and gift-giving viewed through different stereotypes can be traced back to fundamental differences of norms and values, even if such quarrels took place between Europeans and perceived outsiders. Diplomatic ceremony was the result of a flexible, transcultural process of negotiation which governed the relations between dynastic courts.[77] What Christian Windler discerns in the afterword to this volume, what Guido van Meersbergen and Frank Birkenholz observe in the exchanges between the VOC and the Safavid and Mughal empires, and what David Do Paço describes for Ottoman–Habsburg relations also holds true for Russian foreign relations: diplomatic cultures were not—a priori—incompatible; the mingling of these cultures did not result in a cultural clash.[78] Although Russia participated much less frequently in the ceremonial confrontations between European

courts due to its lack of permanent embassies in the west until the reign of Peter I (r. 1682–1725), the tsars had a clear understanding of the impact of ritual exchanges. If demands for status resulted in conflicts this was not because the diplomats were unable to agree owing to cultural difference. On the contrary: they shared a knowledge concerning the symbolic rivalry in which they stood in relation to each other. Over the centuries, Russian monarchs, in recognition of their sovereign dignity, asserted their rank relative to other rulers and expressed this demand in an elaborate ceremonial.[79] This aspect seems even more important when one considers that the tsars had to partake in the evolution of diplomatic ritual in order to be able to assert and convey the demand for status to other princes in the first place.[80] In Prozorovskii's and Carlisle's embassies, then, the diplomatic failures brought about by ceremonial conflicts and disagreement over gifts were a sign of participation in a common cultural practice. Such quarrels arose from a shared knowledge of symbolic competition, from the need to safeguard status and the struggle for honour and glory, that is, from the inner logic of ritual practice itself.

Notes

1 I wish to thank Andreas Pečar, Petr Prudovskii and Felix Ringel for their comments on earlier drafts, and David Mossop for preparing an English translation. An expanded version of this chapter was originally published as J. Hennings, 'The failed gift: ceremony and gift-giving in Anglo-Russian relations (1662–1664)', in I. Neumann and H. Leira (eds.), *International Diplomacy*, 4 vols. (London, 2013), i.91–110.

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3 M. Mauss, *The gift: the form and reason for exchange in archaic societies*, trans. W. D. Hall (London, 2002).

4 A. Morrall, 'Introduction', *CH*, 14 (2009), 130.

5 On the relationship between 'formal' and 'informal', see B. Emich, 'Die Formalisierung des Informellen: der Fall Rom', in R. Butz and J. Hirschbiegel (eds.), *Informelle Strukturen bei Hof: Ergebnisse des gleichnamigen Kolloquiums auf der Moritzburg bei Dresden, 27. Bis 29. September 2007* (Münster, 2009), pp. 149–56.

6 See also M. Jansson, 'Measured reciprocity: English ambassadorial gift exchange in the 17th and 18th centuries', *JEMH*, 9.3–4 (2005), 348–70.

7 G. Walton, 'Ambassadorial gifts: an overview of published materials', *CH*, 14 (2009), 189–98; M. Cassidy-Geiger and J. Vötsch, 'Documents of court gifts collected by Johann von Besser (1654–1729)', *Studies in the Decorative Arts*, 15 (2007/08), 114–77. For Russia, see B. Shifman and G. Walton (eds.), *Gifts to the tsars, 1500–1700: treasures from the Kremlin* (New York, 2001), and N. Abramova and O. Dmitrieva (eds.), *Britannia & Muscovy: English silver at the court of the tsars* (New Haven, 2006).

8 G. Dressel, 'Gedanken zu einer historischen Anthropologie des Gebens', in G. Dressel and G. Hopf (eds.), *Von Geschenken und anderen Gaben: Annäherungen an eine historische Anthropologie des Gebens* (Frankfurt am Main, 2000), p. 22.

9 G. Algazi, 'Introduction: doing things with gifts', in G. Algazi, V. Groebner, and B. Jussen (eds.), *Negotiating the gift: pre-modern figurations of exchange* (Göttingen, 2003), p. 10. See also G. Althoff and M. A. Boitsov (eds.), *Na iazyke*

darov: pravila simvolicheskoi kommunikatsii v Evrope. 1000–1700 gg. (Moscow, 2016), which includes an extended Russian translation of the present article.

10 For a more detailed discussion of the two embassies' ceremonial contexts, see J. Hennings, *Russia and courtly Europe: ritual and the culture of diplomacy, 1648–1725* (Cambridge, 2016), ch. 3. On Anglo–Russian relations more generally, see P. Dukes, G. P. Herd, and J. Kotilaine, *Stuarts and Romanovs: the rise and fall of a special relationship* (Dundee, 2009); S. Konovalov, 'England and Russia: three embassies, 1662–1665', *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, 10 (1962), 60–104.

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Afterword

From social status to sovereignty—practices of foreign relations from the Renaissance to the *Sattelzeit*[1]

Christian Windler

> DIPLOMATIQUE. […] On appelle ainsi l'art de reconnoître les Diplômes authentiques. […] Il s'emploie aussi adjectivement.
>
> (*Dictionnaire de l'Académie française*, 1762)[2]

If one searched the editions of the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie française* of 1694, 1718 and 1740, one would fail to find terms such as 'diplomatique' or 'diplomatie'. Not until the fourth edition of 1762 does 'diplomatique' appear, where it is defined as the ability to establish the authenticity of documents. Only in the fifth edition of the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie française* of 1798 does the definition appear in the sense that is the subject of this volume: 'On dit de même, *Le Corps Diplomatique*, en parlant collectivement des Ministres étrangers qui résident auprès d'une Puissance.' It was also not until 1798 that the noun 'Diplomatie' was entered in the dictionary, with the following definition: 'Science des rapports, des intérêts de Puissance à Puissance.'[3] As in the French,[4] it was only in the late eighteenth century that the modern-day definitions of the term 'diplomatic' as relating to the practice of foreign relations as the object of specific skills—a 'science' even—became established in the other European languages as well, despite isolated evidence dating from the first half of the century. At the same time, a new noun was coined: 'diplomacy'. If one were to adhere to conceptual history, the 'practices of diplomacy in the early modern world' as understood by the editors, authors, and certainly too the readers of this volume, would have meant something very different to the people of that era.

While the relevance of the findings of conceptual history is undisputed in other contexts, they receive astonishingly little attention in the history of foreign relations and diplomacy.[5] And yet, it is precisely the history of the conceptual field of 'diplomacy' which highlights changes occurring only in the *Sattelzeit* around 1800—changes which first transformed the relations between various polities and their rulers into those already described by numerous early modern historians: into inter*national* relations, that is relations between communities which organized themselves into nations within

the framework of sovereign states.[6] In the context of the construction of a new international order after the Napoleonic wars, the Congress of Vienna confirmed those new rules of interaction which had in part already been formulated much earlier, but which became established only in the course of the Atlantic revolutions. In particular this included a ceremonial which replaced the estate-based hierarchies of the early modern European society of princes with the notion of the legal equality of sovereign states, and whose basic principles have endured up to the present day.[7]

Yet when the authors in this volume do make mention of 'diplomacy', they are referring to relational practices which contemporaries would not yet have described in terms which might substantively differentiate them from the practice of political relations within the respective polities. This for example relates to the exchange of gifts, which, depending on the circumstances, could also be interpreted as tributes, and the negotiation of ceremonial forms to determine social status and relationships of political dependency, but also to less formalized practices of sociability and hospitality. Whereas a lack of more suitable terminology may make it unavoidable to resort to the use of terms coined in a later period, the findings of conceptual history must nevertheless be taken into account when constructing 'diplomacy' as the object of research. Analogous to the deconstruction of the concept of 'absolutism' when investigating internal power relations, these findings also invite us to practise the history of foreign relations in the early modern period as an immersion in an alien world, which cannot suitably be analysed using the concepts of nineteenth- and twentieth-century political philosophy. In this regard, an investigation of the practices of foreign relations as conducted by the editors and authors of this volume can help to historicize key terms such as 'state' and 'international relations' appropriately. Furthermore, the volume serves as a challenge to replace modern conceptions of statehood and relations between states with concepts that are more in keeping with the contemporary political culture. For example, relations with and within polities such as the Holy Roman Empire, which Duncan Hardy investigates in this volume, are particularly suitable for recognizing the foreignness of such practices in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, practices which fall beyond the categories of state and nation. Recent research on the period also brings into question established narratives surrounding the birth of the resident ambassador in Renaissance Italy.[8] In both cases, it appears that diplomacy did not exist as a 'sealed category', as Duncan Hardy puts it in his contribution on the Holy Roman Empire or as Gabor Kármán demonstrates with regard to relations within the Ottoman Empire, namely between the beylerbey of Buda and the prince of Transylvania.

When, for example, the focus eventually moves beyond Europe to examine the relationships between the great empires of Asia and European actors, as it does in the contributions by Guido van Meersbergen and Frank Birkenholz, a level of variety which is already hard to grasp within Europe becomes significantly more complex. Here, however, non-European and

European cultures did not encounter one another as polar opposites in a 'clash of civilisations'. Rather, the practice of political relations between the different polities and within the polities in Europe and in Asia itself was also characterized by normative pluralism. Yet the so-called New Diplomatic History only partially takes into account what has, since the 1980s, become largely undisputed general knowledge in the history of internal power relations in Europe: namely the awareness that the modern legal definition of 'sovereignty' was only coined in the second half of the sixteenth century and thereafter established itself only gradually in the social practice of diplomacy as an ordering concept.

The task of a New Diplomatic History must therefore be to forego established definitions in investigating how norms were negotiated and rehearsed in social interactions. As the editors and contributors of the present volume show, it must move beyond essentializing culturalist stances and focus instead on the analysis of social practices. For example, instead of looking for homogeneous western discourses on the 'Orient', as Edward Said and his followers have done, the analysis of discursive strategies in the context of diplomatic interactions makes it possible to show how essentialist descriptions of the oriental 'other' were constructed through social interaction.[9] The same applies to the practices of diplomatic interaction: we should not take 'diplomacy' as a given fact, but look at the ways in which certain practices were constituted as 'diplomatic' before the term itself became common towards the end of the eighteenth century. We must therefore enquire into the extent to which contemporaries did in fact ascribe specific, that is to say 'diplomatic', characteristics to the practice of relations between polities so as to interpret such relations fundamentally differently from internal power relations.

In various forms, such an approach defines the new perspectives on the history of foreign relations, which have come to dominate international research on the early modern period in recent years. The contributions by a new generation of diplomatic historians, which have been collected in this anthology, exemplify a variety of these new perspectives. The following comments position the contributions in this volume within the particular context of new approaches in German-language research on the history of foreign relations and diplomacy. Their cut-off point is here provided by the systemic changes of the *Sattelzeit* around 1800.

In contrast to the nineteenth century, diplomacy in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe was not yet conducted, as André Krischer has highlighted, 'between states but between "sovereigns or people with status equal to that of a sovereign"; not within an abstract international system, but within the society of princes.'[10] In the early modern European *Ständegesellschaft* (the German term denotes the estates-based hierarchical social order), the status of kings, princes, and other diplomatic actors could as easily be defined by virtue of their social standing as on the basis of the concept of sovereignty drawn from the *ius gentium*.[11] This situation explains the special importance of ceremonial procedures of high symbolic value, which not

only served the purpose of representing the structures governing a specific set of relations but also helped produce them *in actu* and through communication among those present, as Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has pointed out in her work on the Holy Roman Empire.[12] Beyond the context of the Empire, her 'symbolic communication' approach (*symbolische Kommunikation*) proves particularly fruitful in the analysis of situations in which divergent systems of norms overlapped or clashed with one another, that is, not only in the foreign relations within Europe, where the emerging concept of sovereignty overlapped with the hierarchies that were typical of the Old Regime, but also in contexts where people and groups from widely divergent cultural backgrounds came into contact with each other.[13] Inspired by the writings of Erving Goffman[14] and Frederik Barth,[15] as well as the work of Italian and French practitioners of micro-history (*microstoria*),[16] I developed a somewhat similar approach to the production of diplomatic norms through social interaction while analysing an intercultural setting—the Maghreb of the eighteenth and the early decades of the nineteenth centuries.[17] As was the case there, the significance of objects as ceremonial items—also highlighted in Russian, Mughal, and Safavid contexts across this volume—often constituted and expressed relations with which the parties involved associated different meanings short of undermining their relationship due to potential misunderstandings.[18] Here the importance of gifts in diplomatic exchanges lay not least in the ambiguity of the statements associated with their selection and the ways and means of their presentation, which allowed all those involved to convey their own specific message without affronting their counterpart to an extent that would threaten the relationship.

In early modern Europe, the constitution of social status through ceremonial interaction was particularly important to those actors whose sovereignty was disputed or to those who tried to improve their status (and eventually managed to do so), such as the House of Savoy, for example.[19] While those princes who were unquestionably recognized as sovereigns could, in the eighteenth century at least, occasionally free themselves 'from the burden of rank symbolism' by skipping certain procedures of the established ceremonial, as Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has put it, 'the most precise status representations' nevertheless remained of the utmost importance in the Holy Roman Empire.[20] Hence the continued engagement of the free Imperial cities in foreign relations was inextricably linked to the continuity of the *Ständegesellschaft*; it was called into question along with the societal order underpinning it during the transitional period around 1800.[21]

The doubts surrounding the independent role of the free Imperial cities as actors in foreign relations arose in the *Sattelzeit* around 1800, when the relevance of state-based normative orders as opposed to competing social and religious norms was recognized in an increasing number of situations in western Europe. By contrast, it was normative pluralism rather than the dominance of a single normative order which was constitutive for the estate-based society of princes of the early modern period: the co-existence of social and religious

norms geared towards the common good which, depending on the precise situation in which the interaction occurred, could claim a more or less prominent status, and which provided greater scope for flexibility on the actors' part than the concepts of an integrated 'state system' or 'modern diplomacy' might suggest.[22] The competition between various normative orders in the sphere of foreign relations corresponded to the conditions in the internal constitution of the interacting polities. Here the claim to absolute authority of princely rule was opposed by the claims to status by kinship networks of the high nobility, by assemblies of estates and by municipalities, all of which were balanced out against one another in the communications among those present during everyday governance.

Like those who exercised power and influence within early modern political entities, the actors in foreign relations occupied multiple roles, and each of these roles was underpinned by a specific set of norms, including one's duties towards clients and patrons, friends and kin, as well as commitments to the 'public interest' and religious obligations. Envoys viewed themselves less as servants of the state and more as noblemen who served their prince. They not only executed their office by sometimes using their own resources, but in the context of an economy of gift-giving also owed services to their kin, patrons or clients, 'friends', and compatriots as well as to their prince. Until the eighteenth century, when a nobleman embarked on a diplomatic mission, his duty to the prince did not systematically and automatically trump these duties to family members or clients.[23]

The application of network analysis to the study of foreign relations has for the first time provided evidence of this interaction of different norms in the practical workings of early modern diplomacy. Bringing together analyses of 'domestic' and foreign relations, Wolfgang Reinhard showed that the differences were far less sharp than expected. Roman relations with the Genoese nobility, for example, were in many respects similar to those with the elites of towns within the Papal States.[24] In one of the studies inspired by Reinhard, Hillard von Thiessen has described the courts of Rome and Madrid as two poles of a single sociopolitical system both of which mutually provided the actors who participated in it with patronage resources.[25] In the present volume, David Do Paço follows a similar approach to relations between Vienna and Constantinople, as he bears out the significance of familiarity and sociability in foreign relations, analysing the integration of Ottoman ambassadors into Viennese social networks.

Scholarly interest in personal relations also helps to shed new light on the agency of women and other actors without formal office in the diplomatic practice of the early modern European society of princes. In the context of a diplomatic system that lacked any clear separation between the 'public' and the 'private' realms, secretaries of state, men who were formally in charge of an embassy, or any other diplomatic office holders were not the only diplomatic actors; in keeping with the role of women in court societies, female family members could play an important part as well. A gendered approach promises to

open up new perspectives not only on the agency of women, but also more generally on the specific practices of early modern court diplomacy.[26] While women played an important role in diplomacy, as Florian Kühnel shows in his contribution to this volume, the redefinition of diplomacy as a specific profession, distinct from the broader range of courtly activities, ultimately spelt the expulsion of women from diplomatic affairs, an exclusion that only ended in the course of the twentieth century when women were finally admitted to the diplomatic profession.[27]

In addition to the description of the network of ambassadors and other agents of foreign relations, the question arises as to the ways and means by which normative pluralism shaped the practice of negotiation in the early modern period. The plurality of social roles and the absence of a definitive hierarchy of normative orders could, of course, be an obstacle to princely service. More frequently, however, it was simply considered as a part of the normal workings of diplomacy and, as such, acknowledged by all those who participated in the system, from kings and princes to the diplomatic agents themselves. The envoys' multiple roles and ties could even be useful for the princely service.[28] As Matthias Köhler has shown, in the negotiations at the peace congress of Nijmegen, the possibility to interact not just as *ministres publics* but as friends in the context of peace talks also helped widen diplomats' scope for manoeuvre. Polite conversations between *honnêtes hommes* could, for instance, be used to consider the offers of the other side, as, in this case, the princes could not be held directly accountable for comments made by their envoys.[29] In similar ways, as Niels May points out in this volume, during the Westphalian peace negotiations envoys used the plurality of norms associated with their different roles in order to assert the precedence of their princes. This dual role as *ministre public* and *honnête homme* allowed envoys from the nobility to step sideways into a role without diplomatic *caractère* as the situation demanded. Under certain conditions, this option of role-switching could also make the involvement of a member of a religious order or of women in delicate negotiations seem appropriate. Due to their membership of a religious order or their gender, they could not be classed as the *alter ego* of a prince, whose rank was therefore not endangered by their actions. While gender norms prevented women from serving as ambassadors, the deference given to women at court could offer important opportunities for political action, as demonstrated by Florian Kühnel. Similar advantages were offered by the engagement of merchants at the courts of Asian empires, to whose ceremonial expectations representatives of European polities had to submit well into the eighteenth century and sometimes even beyond. In this context, the Dutch merchant Van Adrichem, studied by Guido van Meersbergen, did not attempt to assert his principal's right to be treated on an equal footing, but willingly posed as a supplicant within a ceremonial framing that treated the VOC as 'a semi-domesticated foreign tributary'.

Any analysis of foreign relations in terms of the fundamental inequality between patrons and clients begs the question of how these relations were

symbolically and performatively enacted, and to what extent this led to a clash between irreconcilable priorities. For instance, in what respects did the symbolic communication of a French envoy in Rome, in the Swiss Confederacy, or at a court in the Holy Roman Empire with the respective local elites change, depending on whether the latter introduced themselves to him as representatives of those who held power or as clients of the French crown? The same observation applies to the relations of VOC envoys to the Safavid and Mughal courts studied by Guido van Meersbergen and Frank Birkenholz: the envoys knew well that it could be more profitable to address lesser officials rather than to lobby the court.

Drawing on the findings of conceptual history as presented at the beginning of this afterword, I will conclude by addressing the issue of periodization, which is associated with the definition of a specific type of early modern diplomacy. Based on the results of the research done on personal networks in early modern diplomacy, Hillard von Thiessen has constructed an ideal type that he calls 'diplomacy of the *type ancien*'. In so doing, he challenges notions of a 'Westphalian system' of relations between sovereign states, which supposedly took shape sometime after the mid-1600s.[30] Some of the characteristics of the diplomat of the '*type ancien*' include the emphasis placed on an envoy's standing within the social hierarchy of the *Ständegesellschaft* as it related to the representation of his prince at a foreign court; the multiple, sometimes competing personal relations which made any neat separation between private and public all but impossible; as well as the importance that both envoys and princes attached to noble concepts of respectability and honour. Only during the *Sattelzeit* around 1800, von Thiessen argues, was there a decisive shift towards the professionalization of envoys and new forms of diplomatic interaction, a shift much more seismic than the comparatively slower transformations of diplomatic practice that had been underway since the sixteenth century.[31]

While the turn of the nineteenth century does indeed seem to have been a watershed between two different diplomatic systems—a system of relations based on social status and a system of inter*national* relations between sovereign states[32]—it might be appropriate to place more emphasis on the way new rationalities evolved out of the old system from the second half of the seventeenth century onward, and to draw attention to the many vestiges of the old system that survived well into the nineteenth century. Tilman Haug's recent study of the relations between the French court and the courts of the ecclesiastical prince-electors of the Holy Roman Empire during the latter half of the seventeenth century sheds new light on the concurrent consolidation of internal and external clientele networks and the introduction of more direct obligations toward the French secretaries of state and the French king for the envoys and other diplomatic actors. As was the case with internal relations, ties of clientage proved instrumental in strengthening royal authority in the crown's foreign relations without calling into question the personal nature of the king's dominion. Haug shows how the personal relations and

the norms underpinning the *Ständegesellschaft* had a direct bearing on how decisions in the field of foreign policy were made. However, he also points out how the impact of practices of interaction that were characteristic of networks based on personal bonds was limited by new discourses on the commonwealth.[33] In a similar vein, Nadir Weber has shown that as late as the eighteenth century, the Prussian monarchy—at least as far as the Principality of Neuchâtel (which had become part of the Prussian monarchy in 1707) was concerned—took a two-pronged approach to foreign relations. The official court diplomacy was complemented by a reliance on the relations that local actors from Neuchâtel working for the king of Prussia entertained, most notably with the French court, to which many local nobles had long-standing ties. These local agents served the king of Prussia, the Principality of Neuchâtel, and their families all at the same time. What emerges from Weber's book is the picture of a 'composite diplomacy' that was reflective of the nature of Prussia as a 'composite monarchy'. As a result of the limited financial resources the monarchy could draw on, the informal practices of local actors offered the local nobility new ways of exerting influence; yet at the same time, they proved conducive to the monarchy's interest in strengthening the king's control of the newly acquired territory. It was, in fact, only the profound transformations of the political space during the French Revolution that put an end to a system that had allowed the Prussian monarchs to integrate a peripheral territory at a relatively low cost.[34]

The focus on symbolic practices and on personal networks illustrates to what extent the foreign relations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries continued to be dominated by norms that were deeply rooted in the early modern *Ständegesellschaft*. Together with the works mentioned here, the contributions to this volume give us a far more complex understanding of the practices of early modern diplomacy within and beyond Europe than studies that are informed by an either implicit or explicit notion of a system of relations between (sovereign) states. They illustrate the social and cultural embeddedness of early modern diplomatic practice and give cause to question the assumption underpinning a history of 'international relations' in the early modern period: namely that the relations between two states were fundamentally different to internal power relations. Analyses of the plurality of roles and normative orders exemplify the advantages of new approaches to the history of diplomacy as social practice. For each of the envoys' multiple roles as office-holders, noblemen and heads of households, there was a particular corresponding set of normative parameters which could as easily converge as clash with each other.

Concerning the question of periodization, the contributions in this anthology provide more implicit than explicit answers. What is striking, however, is that unlike earlier works, they do not present the Peace of Westphalia as a particularly relevant epochal boundary. Indeed, Niels May shows that configuring 1648 as a watershed moment in the history of sovereignty ignores the fact that, during the peace negotiations, disputes relating to the status

within the *Ständegesellschaft* were at least as relevant as disputes about sovereignty. There remains the question as to the importance of the epochal boundary around 1800. Due to the chosen temporal scope of this volume, the question is not posed, but deserves further investigation using the approaches presented here. Drawing on existing research, it may be asserted that while the Peace of Westphalia marks a significant development in diplomatic history, its importance in the longue durée is paled by the structural changes around 1800. The fact that the maintenance of political foreign ties became the task of a 'diplomatic corps' that in conceptual terms was definitively separate is evidence of fundamental systemic changes. Only in the wake of the Atlantic revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century did the sociocultural transformations, which had been in the making since the Renaissance, reach such an extent that one can speak of a system of relations between sovereign states replacing a system based on the social estimation of the actors partaking in foreign relations. The changes that occurred during the *Sattelzeit* became most apparent in the fact that the old ceremonial procedures gradually lost importance, which in turn paved the way for the ceremonial reforms adopted at the Congress of Vienna, which sanctioned the principle of the equality of all sovereign states still in place today. At the same time, the normative conflicts deriving from envoys' multiple public and private roles were resolved in favour of a clearer commitment of envoys to their duties as public servants.

While the reform of the ceremonial became quickly accepted in European and Atlantic diplomatic exchanges, in other areas, such as the differentiation of envoys' public role, as well as in the internal working of the states, the normative conflicts of the early modern period persisted under different guises until well into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For example, my case study of a French consul general based in Tunis, Jacques-Philippe Devoize, has shown that even after the French Revolution, he still considered 'his' office as a 'family affair' with no neat separation between 'public service' and 'public interest' on the one hand and private interests on the other—an attitude that can be gleaned from the fact that he integrated the papers of 'his' consulate into his family archive upon his return to France. Drawing on a specific type of social and cultural capital, consular families fashioned themselves as a sort of 'state nobility' in ways that bore similarities to the strategies described by Pierre Bourdieu in his analysis of other French elite groups.[35] Until the First World War, noble ties retained huge importance in the higher ranks of diplomacy for the admission to the diplomatic corps in most European countries, even after the introduction of exams.[36] At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the rationalities of personal networks still compete with the norms of constitutional democracies; it would no doubt be a revealing endeavour to see how they influenced policies which contributed to the recent debt crisis in Mediterranean Europe, as well as to the strategies to manage this crisis, both at the national and the European level.

Notes

1 Parts of an earlier draft of this text were translated by Samuel Weber. The final translation was prepared and edited by David Mossop.
2 Dictionnaires d'autrefois. Available at: http://artflsrv02.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/dicos/pubdico1look.pl?strippedhw=diplomatique (accessed 29 May 2016).
3 Ibid.
4 See 'diploma, Urkunde', in W. von Wartburg, *Französisches etymologisches Wörterbuch: eine Darstellung des galloromanischen Wortschatzes*, vol. 3: *D-F* (Leipzig, 1934), p. 83.
5 See, however, H. M. Scott, 'Diplomatic culture in Old Regime Europe', in H. M. Scott and B. Simms (eds.), *Cultures of power in Europe during the long eighteenth century: essays in honour of T. C. W. Blanning* (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 58–60.
6 The term *Sattelzeit* ('saddle period') was introduced by intellectual historian Reinhart Koselleck and the editors of the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* to denominate a threshold period which shaped 'the transformations of the premodern usage of language to our usage'; see R. Koselleck, *The practice of conceptual history: timing history, spacing concepts*, trans. T. S. Presner et al. (Stanford, 2002), p. 5. For conceptual history and the notion of *Sattelzeit*, see also R. Koselleck, 'Einleitung', in O. Brunner, W. Conze and R. Koselleck (eds.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* 8 vols. (Stuttgart, 1972–1997), i.xiii–xxviii.
7 I am here adopting the term 'society of princes' (*société des princes*) as used by Lucien Bély (L. Bély, *La société des princes XVIe–XVIIIe siècles* [Paris, 2000]); however, I associate with it a farther-reaching rejection—not by Bély himself—of concepts which implicitly presuppose the existence of states as conceived of in nineteenth-century political philosophy.
8 See I. Lazzarini, *Communication and conflict: Italian diplomacy in the early Renaissance, 1350–1520* (Oxford, 2015), pp. 30–31, 217–18, 372, 549–50, 553.
9 See my remarks in C. Windler, *La diplomatie comme expérience de l'Autre: consuls français au Maghreb (1700–1840)* (Geneva, 2002), pp. 30–31, 217–18, 372, 549–50, 553.
10 A. Krischer, 'Das diplomatische Zeremoniell der Reichsstädte, oder: Was heißt Stadtfreiheit in der Fürstengesellschaft', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 284 (2007), 4. See also Hardy in the present volume.
11 See A. Krischer, *Reichsstädte in der Fürstengesellschaft: politischer Zeichengebrauch in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Darmstadt, 2006), pp. 25–6. See also Hardy and May in the present volume.
12 B. Stollberg-Rilinger, 'Zeremoniell als politisches Verfahren: Rangordnung und Rangstreit als Strukturmerkmale des frühneuzeitlichen Reichstags', in J. Kunisch (ed.), *Neue Studien zur frühneuzeitlichen Reichsgeschichte* (Berlin, 1997), pp. 91–132. See also B. Stollberg-Rilinger, 'Symbolische Kommunikation in der Vormoderne: Begriffe—Thesen—Forschungsperspektiven', *ZHF*, 31 (2004), 489–527; B. Stollberg-Rilinger, *The Emperor's old clothes: constitutional history and the symbolic language of the Holy Roman Empire* (Oxford, 2015).
13 As, for example, in the relations between VOC envoys and the Mughal and Safavid courts, Ottomans and Christian Europeans or English envoys at the tsar's court analysed in the contributions to this volume by Gábor Kármán, Florian Kühnel, Guido van Meersbergen, Frank Birkenholz, and Jan Hennings. See also C. Brauner, *Kompanien, Könige und caboceers: interkulturelle Diplomatie an Gold- und Sklavenküste im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 2015); P. Burschel and C. Vogel (eds.), *Die Audienz: ritualisierter Kulturkontakt in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Köln, 2014); C. Garnier and C. Vogel (eds.), *Interkulturelle Ritualpraxis in der Vormoderne: diplomatische Interaktion an den östlichen Grenzen der Fürstengesellschaft*, *ZHF Beiheft*, 52 (2016).

14 E. Goffman, *The presentation of self in everyday life* (New York, 1959); E. Goffman, *Relations in public: microstudies of the public order* (New York, 1972); E. Goffman, *Interaction ritual: essays on face-to-face behaviour*, 2nd edn (London, 1972).
15 F. Barth, *Process and form in social life: selected essays of Fredrik Barth* (London, 1981).
16 In particular B. Lepetit (ed.), *Les formes de l'expérience: une autre histoire sociale* (Paris, 1995); G. Levi, *L'eredità immateriale: carriera di un esorcista nel Piemonte del Seicento* (Turin, 1985); G. Levi, 'I pericoli del geertzismo', *Quaderni storici*, 20.58 (1985), 269–77; J. Revel (ed.), *Jeux d'échelles: la micro-analyse à l'expérience* (Paris, 1996).
17 Windler, *La diplomatie comme experience de l'Autre*, particularly parts 2–4.
18 See, in particular, the contributions by Frank Birkenholz and Jan Hennings.
19 On the ceremonial performances of the House of Savoy, see T. Osborne, 'The House of Savoy and the theatre of the world: performances of sovereignty in early-modern Rome', in M. Vester (ed.), *Sabaudian studies: political culture, dynasty, and territory, 1400–1700* (Kirksville, 2013), pp. 167–90.
20 See Stollberg-Rilinger, *Emperor's old clothes*, pp. 278–9.
21 A. Krischer, *Reichsstädte in der Fürstengesellschaft*, esp. pp. 311–26, 364–8, 375–9.
22 H. von Thiessen, 'Normenkonkurrenz: Handlungsspielräume, Rollen, normativer Wandel und normative Kontinuität vom späten Mittelalter bis zum Übergang zur Moderne', in A. Karsten and H. von Thiessen (eds.), *Normenkonkurrenz in historischer Perspektive* (Berlin, 2015), pp. 241–86.
23 On this point see the work of H. von Thiessen quoted in footnotes 21, 24 and 30 and, in this volume, the contribution of Niels May.
24 See a synthesis of the different projects on the Pontificate of Paul V in W. Reinhard, *Paul V. Borghese (1605–1621): mikropolitische Papstgeschichte* (Stuttgart, 2009).
25 H. von Thiessen, *Diplomatie und Patronage: die spanisch-römischen Beziehungen 1605–1621 in akteurszentrierter Perspektive* (Epfendorf, 2010).
26 Focussing on the court of Vienna, Katrin Keller has been one of the pioneers of the study of the role of women within early modern court politics. See K. Keller, *Hofdamen: Amtsträgerinnen im Wiener Hofstaat des 17. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna, 2005). See also Carolyn James, 'Women and diplomacy in Renaissance Italy', in G. Sluga and C. James (eds.), *Women, diplomacy and international politics since 1500* (London, 2015), pp. 13–29; C. Bastian, *Verhandeln in Briefen: Frauen in der höfischen Diplomatie des frühen 18. Jahrhunderts* (Cologne, 2013); E. K. Dade, *Madame de Pompadour: die Mätresse und die Diplomatie* (Cologne, 2010); C. Bastian, E. K. Dade, and E. Ott, 'Weibliche Diplomatie? Frauen als außenpolitische Akteurinnen im 18. Jahrhundert', in C. Bastian, E. K. Dade, H. von Thiessen, and C. Windler (eds.), *Das Geschlecht der Diplomatie: Geschlechterrollen in den Außenbeziehungen vom Spätmittelalter bis zur Gegenwart* (Cologne, 2014), pp. 103–14.
27 See the contributions by M. Herren, S. Schattenberg, S. Zala and U. Bentele in Bastian, Dade, von Thiessen, Windler (eds.), *Das Geschlecht der Diplomatie*, and those by H. McCarthy, M. Herren, and P. Nash in Sluga and James (eds.), *Women, diplomacy and international politics*.
28 For example, C. Fletcher and J. M. DeSilva (eds.) *Italian ambassadorial networks in early modern Europe,* a special issue of *JEMH*, 14.6 (2010), 505–611.
29 See M. Köhler, *Strategie und Symbolik: Verhandeln auf dem Kongress von Nimwegen* (Cologne, 2012), pp. 270–8.
30 This old perspective may for example be found in L. Gross, 'The Peace of Westphalia 1648–1948', *American Journal of International Law*, 42 (1948), 20–41;

A.-M. de Zayas, 'Westphalia, Peace of (1648)', in *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, ed. R. Bernhardt et al., vol. 7 (Amsterdam, 1984), pp. 537–9; G. M. Lyons and M. Mastanduno (eds.), *Beyond Westphalia? State sovereignty and international intervention* (Baltimore, 1995).

31 H. von Thiessen, 'Diplomatie vom *type ancien*: Überlegungen zu einem Idealtypus des frühneuzeitlichen Gesandtschaftswesens', in H. Von Thiessen and C. Windler (eds.), *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen: Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel* (Cologne, 2010), pp. 471–503.

32 See M. Belissa, *Repenser l'ordre européen (1795–1802): de la société des rois aux droits des nations* (Paris, 2006); L. Frey and M. Frey, '"The Reign of the Charlatans Is Over": the French revolutionary attack on diplomatic practice', *JMH*, 65 (1993), 706–44; M. Köhler, '*No Punctilios of Ceremony*? Völkerrechtliche Anerkennung, diplomatisches Zeremoniell und symbolische Kommunikation im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskonflikt', in von Thiessen and Windler (eds.), *Akteure der Außenbeziehungen*, pp. 427–43; Windler, *La diplomatie comme expérience de l'Autre*.

33 T. Haug, *Ungleiche Außenbeziehungen und grenzüberschreitende Patronage: die französische Krone und die geistlichen Kurfürsten (1648–1679)* (Cologne, 2015). See also D. Riches, *Protestant cosmopolitanism and diplomatic culture: Brandenburg-Swedish relations in the seventeenth century* (Leiden, 2013); S. Schick, 'Des liaisons avantageuses. Action des ministres, liens de dépendance et diplomatie anglaise dans le Saint-Empire romain germanique (années 1720–1750)', unpublished doctoral thesis, Université Paris I (2015).

34 N. Weber, *Lokale Interessen und große Strategie: das Fürstentum Neuchâtel und die politischen Beziehungen der Könige von Preußen (1707–1806)* (Cologne, 2015).

35 Windler, *La diplomatie comme expérience de l'Autre*, pp. 40, 46–68.

36 See T. G. Otte, '"Outdoor relief for the aristocracy"? European nobility and diplomacy, 1850–1914', in M. Mösslang and T. Riotte (eds.), *The diplomats' world: a cultural history of diplomacy, 1815–1914* (Oxford, 2008), pp. 23–57.

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