Violence, Kinship and the Early Chinese State

The Shang and their World

Roderick Campbell

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Situated between myth and history, the Shang have been hailed both as China's first historical dynasty and as one of the world's primary civilizations. This book is an up-to-date synthesis of the archaeological, palaeographic and transmitted textual evidence for the Shang polity at Anyang (ca. 1250–1050 BCE). Roderick Campbell argues that violence was *not* the antithesis of civilization at Shang Anyang, but rather its foundation in war and sacrifice. He explores the social economy of practices and beliefs that produced the ancestral order of the Shang polity. From the authority of posthumously deified kings, to the animalization of human sacrificial victims, the ancestral ritual complex structured the Shang world through its key institutions of war, sacrifice and burial. Mediated by hierarchical lineages, participation in these practices was basic to being Shang. This volume, which is based on the most up-to-date evidence, offers comprehensive and cutting-edge insight into the Chinese Bronze Age civilization.

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To my father,

What I am I owe to you. Though gone, you are with me still.

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Preface

In 1978, the great archaeologist of China K.C. Chang prefaced his monumental work *Shang Civilization* with the following three reasons for writing it: 1) a *synthetic* work of Shang history was needed; 2) archaeological discoveries of the previous decade had forced a reevaluation of the then current understanding of the Shang; 3) research on Shang civilization had reached a point of maturity such that world-comparative analysis could be undertaken. If this was true of the late seventies, it is even truer of the second decade of the twenty-first century. Not only have the decades since Chang wrote his opus seen an ever-increasing flood of archaeological work published in Chinese, but his call for a multi-disciplinary approach to the Shang has remained more of an ideal than a reality, despite some notable efforts[1] and the fact that the Chinese Bronze Age, although increasingly discussed in comparative contexts (e.g. Trigger 2003, Yoffee 2005), has generally been discussed by those whose primary research area is not the Shang. Now as then,

> Shang scholars have been traditionally trained within individual disciplines that focus on particular sources – texts, oracle bone inscriptions, bronze inscriptions, or archaeological data. All of these sources are important, but each discipline tends to emphasize only some particular aspect or aspects of the Shang civilization. There is need for a study that is to be based on all of these sources, resulting, it is hoped, in a more

[1] In a display of remarkable humility, Chang felt he could not fully undertake this task, "although I advocate a comprehensive – instead of a disciplinary – approach, I myself, like the rest of us, was trained within a single discipline – archaeology – and the book will undoubtedly reflect that fact" (1980: xiv). In addition to Chang's own work, Keightley (2000) and Thorp (2006), an inscription-based historian and art historian respectively, present attempts at more or less synthetic approaches.

> complete picture of the Shang history than can be achieved within each single discipline. (Chang 1980: XIII)

I would argue, however, that a truly multi-disciplinary approach should not only aim to gain "a more complete picture" through the combination of sources, but also generate and debate new ways of looking at the past through a combination of disciplines and bodies of theory. For, as Morris (2000: 27) writes, "we need different intellectual tools to analyze pottery than poetry, but we should analyze both correlatively, within the same cultural framework." That is to say, in using received texts, oracle-bones, bronze inscriptions and archaeological data, in addition to the methodological and theoretical issues associated with each source, the potential exists to put disparate disciplines into productive dialog. If social-cultural anthropology is classically based on ethnographic research and generally limited in its scope to the synchronic, or perhaps, in Braudellian terms, the short duration of individual time,[2] then history has been characterized by textual research, perhaps best symbolized by the archive. In terms of temporal scope historians have tended to focus on the medium and short durations of institutional and individual time (although obviously Braudel's own work is an exception to this) while archaeology takes material culture as its object, the excavation as its representative methodology, and, frequently, the long duration of centuries as its scope. If each discipline has its characteristic strengths, then each also has its particular weaknesses and blind spots. Social-cultural anthropology, despite its supposed rapprochement with history (Dirks et al. 1994), tends toward relativism and particularism, while historians, with some notable exceptions, generally do not concern themselves with material culture, or long-term processes. Archaeologists on the other hand, often "evade individual time by taking refuge in evolutionism or burying it in abstract theorizing" (Morris 2000: 5). What I am advocating, then, is a multi-disciplinary approach, synthesizing not only properly contextualized sources, but also bodies of theory, contributing not only a more comprehensive picture of Shang society, but also an approach to studying human societies through time. As Morris (2000: 28–29) states,

> it is asking a lot for one person to control so many fields, but … the whole premise of historical archaeology lies in combining approaches,

[2] This generalization obviously excludes work in the sub-field of historical anthropology by such anthropologists as Marsall Salhins, Michael Tausig, Michael Hertzfeld to name just a few. My point is rather that despite an at least superficial recognition of the importance of diachronic processes, most social-cultural anthropologists deal with the short-term and the local.

> potentially transforming both text-based historiography and archaeology. Our educational institutions may not encourage people to feel equally comfortable with Chaucer, abandoned fourteenth century villages, and Bourdieu; but that is no reason not to try.

This work then, is my attempt to combine oracle-bones, an abandoned eleventh-century (BCE) city and Bourdieu. My hope is that what is gained in synthetic juxtaposition and the perspective thus derived outweighs what is lost in lack of specialization.

Sources

This book combines two major contemporaneous sources of information concerning the Shang and, to a lesser extent, later textual sources of information. These major sources are inscriptions (mostly in the form of oracle-bones and bronze inscriptions) and archaeological data, ranging from survey results through excavations to technical studies of Shang period artifacts.

Inscriptions

By far the most abundant inscriptional materials for the Anyang period (ca. 1250–1050 BCE) are the oracle-bones.[3] Some 200,000 fragments have been found to date of which over 50,000 have been published (Keightley 1978a). The vast majority of these fragments of turtle plastron or cattle scapula are the remains of divinatory charges inscribed after royal divination[4] in which heat was applied to a prepared (chiseled or drilled) depression on the back of the bone to create a crack on the front surface which was then "read." Although a small number of Anyang period oracle-bones have been discovered in the Zhouyuan in Shaanxi province and at Daxingzhuang in Shandong province, the vast majority of the inscribed oracle-bones known from the period come from Anyang. As historical sources the oracle-bone inscriptions have many advantages as well as disadvantages. While their

[3] Since excellent English language introductions to the oracle-bone inscriptions are available (Keightley 1978a, 1997) I will only briefly note their importance and limitations as sources.

[4] A minority of the inscriptions are the divinatory records of high elites other than the king, notably the Huayuanzhuang inscriptions. In addition to divinatory charges, prognostications are sometimes recorded and, even more rarely, verifications. There are also a handful of examples of non-divinatory "trophy inscriptions" inscribed on deer, tiger or human skulls as well as inventory inscriptions on the margins of the oracle-bones.

sheer numbers make oracle-bones a rich source of information, the pithy and formulaic nature of their inscriptions frequently limits their usefulness. Perhaps their greatest limitation, however, lies in their context as royal or high elite divinatory inscriptions, representing an unknown subset of subjects divined about. Thus, they tell us something about those concerns of the highest stratum of society which custom and significance assigned a status worthy of record. This tradition of inscribing oracle-bones, moreover, changed over time, emerging quite suddenly with King Wu Ding[5] and gradually declining in the early Western Zhou period. At Anyang itself, there was a trend toward an increasingly narrow scope of divinatory inscriptions, with all topics except for war, ritual, hunting and routine fortune dropping from the later period divinations. Keightley (1997), for instance, lists seventeen divination topics: sacrifices and rituals, mobilizations, military campaigns, meteorological and celestial phenomena, agriculture, sickness, childbirth, disasters/distress/trouble, dreams, settlement building, orders, tribute payments, divine assistance/approval, requests to ancestral or nature powers, the night or the day, hunting expeditions and the ten-day week. Not only do most of these topics disappear by period V, but the nature of those that remain also changes. The simplest way to characterize the trend might be to say that ad-hoc divinations tend to be replaced with routine divinations concerned largely with generalized good fortune as opposed to the more specific concerns of period I inscriptions. The period I inscriptions then are not only the most plentiful (accounting for over half of the fragments published) but also in content and range are by far the richest source of information. In practical terms, this means that most oracle-bone derived descriptions of the Shang world are essentially depictions of King Wu Ding's reign as seen through the lens of the King's ritual concerns and divinatory practice and determined by the vagaries of preservation and discovery.

If the oracle-bone inscriptions are a limited source of historical information, Shang bronze inscriptions – cast (generally) on the inside of bronze ritual vessels or vessel lids – are even more so. Limited both in terms of the quantity of inscribed bronzes and the length of the inscriptions, these brief texts from the last reigns of the Anyang period generally record the receipt of a reward of cowry shells from the King or other elites to a lower ranking individual for some service rendered and the dedication of the vessel to an

[5] There has been some attempt to assign some of the oracle-bone inscriptions to the Kings before Wu Ding (e.g. Li and Peng 1996, Cao 2006), but these remain shrouded in controversy and, frankly, lack convincing evidence.

ancestor. As such, they can be useful sources of information on elite gifting and ancestor veneration as well as the names of people and places.

Archaeological Evidence

The archaeological evidence available for the Shang comes from a number of sources and also has a number of limitations. Perhaps the greatest issue is the nationalist, culture-historical, evolutionist and traditional historiographic frameworks and assumptions of most Chinese archaeological practice (von Falkenhausen 1993, Cohen 2001, Liu and Chen 2012, Campbell 2014a). In practical terms this means that Chinese Bronze Age archaeology has been largely a discourse of political and ethnic narratives written with formal ceramic typology. While the inappropriate conflation of potting styles with peoples and dynasties is easy enough to avoid when drawing conclusions from Chinese language archaeological works, it nevertheless means that the arduous task of tracing the tangled pathways of production, distribution and consumption of artifacts which might actually reveal something concrete about social, economic and even political relationships has not been undertaken. This, in effect, means that what we know about the culture history of Bronze Age China is largely, as Walter Taylor said about American archaeology more than sixty years ago,

> the ordering of cultural materials in temporal sequence together with an attempt to demonstrate their derivations and cross-cultural relationships … They have categorized events and items, tagged them, but not investigated them in their contexts or in their dynamic aspects. (Taylor 1948: 94)

This fact renders the concurrent use of multiple sources of information all the more important and the period before Anyang all the more inaccessible for its lack of texts. This is not to say that material culture has only a subsidiary role to play in the understanding of the Chinese Bronze Age, only that its full potential remains untapped and the assumptions and conclusions of much of the Chinese language archaeological literature (on which any broad scope study of Chinese archaeology must be based) must be critically evaluated.

Another glaring limitation found especially in older site reports is the lack of even a basic quantitative perspective. Thus, what appears in archaeological reports is frequently an unknown sample of what was excavated with the inclusion or exclusion of artifacts or features based on criteria that are

generally not discussed. When quantificational information is given, it frequently takes impressionistic forms such as "the most common vessel type was X," or the "red pottery was relatively abundant." The net effect of this quantificational vagueness is that for much of the archaeological record, statistical analysis is either impossible or highly problematic and further research based on published materials is frequently difficult.

Nevertheless, the sheer quantity of information that is available for the Shang capital at Anyang largely ameliorates the shortcomings of published Chinese archaeological sources. Excavated since the late 1920s, and not lacking its own problems (notably the increasing encroachment of development, the previous narrow focus on elite remains and the piecemeal nature of its excavations and their publication), Anyang is without a doubt the most extensively excavated site in China.[6] It is not only the site of the discovery of the vast majority of the inscribed oracle-bones, but over 15,000 Late Shang tombs have been excavated to date (Tang 2004) including the only uncontroversial "royal tombs" known for the Chinese Bronze Age. Although early excavations by the fledgling Academica Sinica destroyed much of the architecture in the palace-temple area and made its reconstruction all but impossible (although see Du 2005 for attempts), subsequent work on workshops and, more recently, residential areas, make Anyang a uniquely crucial site for the study of the Chinese Bronze Age in general, and Shang civilization in particular.

If published archaeological sources in China are often problematic for one reason or another, Chinese archaeological practice is nonetheless undergoing rapid changes and some of the new work being undertaken will undoubtedly greatly raise the quality of information available. One such case is the work that has been undertaken by the Anyang workstation under the directorship of Tang Jigen and in collaboration with Jing Zhicun. Taking advantage of his position as director of the workstation, Tang created a database of 2,000 Anyang period tombs, the quality of which is unprecedented. This database, and Tang's work based upon it (Tang 2004, 2005a) have been crucial sources of information for a number of analyses and arguments throughout this book. Additionally, over the last ten years, as a frequent visitor of the workstation and one-time resident of Anyang, I have benefitted greatly from the generosity of the archaeologists at the workstation – both for my privilege to work there and for our many hours

[6] This "excavation" includes tomb looting which probably began with the fall of the Shang, continued through Imperial times and is very much alive and well today.

of fruitful conversation. Archaeological practice in China is fast changing and the pace of discovery is breathtaking. Revisions, even total revisions, of our understanding of the archaeology of the Chinese Bronze Age are not only possible but likely in the decades to come.

Post-Shang Textual Sources

Although transmitted texts, most written many centuries after the Zhou conquest of the Shang, were important sources for K.C. Chang's major works on Shang civilization (Chang 1980, 1983) and fundamentally inform many Chinese scholars' interpretations of the period, I have only used them sparingly in this work and then only as secondary sources of information. My reasoning is that if history and archaeology are concerned with change as well as continuity then we cannot assume the continuity of Chinese tradition in advance, or, indeed, in the face of all we know concerning the dramatic changes that took place between the end of the second millennium and the end of the first millennium BCE. Nor, in the case of later, purportedly transmitted, records of Shang events, can we be sure of accuracy without the rare corroboration of contemporaneous sources (such as the oracle-bone corroboration of the much of the royal genealogy recorded in the *Shiji*). Moreover, given their preoccupation with elite political narrative and the dearth of information concerning the actual workings of contemporaneous society, transmitted texts are of limited utility for the present study.

The Argument

This book has many goals. Firstly it is intended as an updated and revisionist version of K.C. Chang's great synthetic work *Shang Civilization*. Secondly it is meant to be both case study and theoretical contribution to the anthropological archaeological debates concerning early complex polities. Finally, this study aims to impact the field of Early China studies – by providing not only a substantive re-interpretation of the Shang polity at Anyang based on up-to-date research, but also a call to Sinologists to re-examine some of their historiographic assumptions and theoretical positions (conscious or unconscious).

The argument begins with a presentation of the consensus view of the Shang, a deconstruction of its theoretical assumptions and the outlines of the "inter-ontic" approach that the rest of the book will substantiate.

More precisely, Chapter 1 is a critical appraisal of the consensus that sees the Shang polity as based on religious monopolies and its civilization on Bronze Age mentalities. I will instead argue that the categories and historical frameworks used to describe the Shang have imported unacknowledged Enlightenment and Modernist baggage which has obscured more than elucidated. Instead I will present a more anthropologically and historiographically nuanced approach combining contemporary theory on relational ontology, practice theory and social violence. I propose to study the relationships between practices of social violence, hierarchies of being and caring, and moral economies on the one hand, and between ontologies, socio-physical technologies, and historical institutions and developments on the other. Extending the general theoretical critique of Chapter 1, Chapter 2 moves to more specific problems with the uses of the concepts of "cities," "states" and "civilizations" in both anthropological archaeology and, especially, their deployment in the literature concerning ancient China.

In Chapter 3, in consonance with the critical approaches laid in Chapters 1 and 2, a sketch of Central Plains civilization and its neighbors over the second millennium BCE is drawn. Tracing out the developmental pathways of population centers, polities and the contemporaneous socio-political foci of burial, sacrifice and war, Chapter 3 provides a *longue durée* contextualization of the Great Settlement Shang, its polity and its civilization. In Chapter 4, the focus narrows from the second millennium BCE to the Great Settlement Shang and its polity – re-envisioned as a series of networks producing at once the bases for royal power, the patterning practices providing its justifications, and the nested and potentially contradictory boundaries of political identity. Expanding on my "networks and boundaries" approach to early complex polities (Campbell 2009), I outline Shang discursive hierarchies of authority, structuring practices of power and networks of capital. In the process of mapping out Shang networks of power and boundaries of identity, I give a preliminary reconstruction of the Anyang polity in space and an updated reanalysis of Keightley's (1983) famous "state-score" study.

Narrowing focus again, this time from the framework of the Shang polity to a crucial network of power, Chapter 5 analyzes the role of kinship in the production of authority. Taking up the widely accepted view that kinship is crucial to understanding Shang social and political organization, I question and unpack the term "kinship" itself, examining the ways in which genealogy, marriage, cohabitation and obligation were figured

in Anyang period Shang social practice. This position is taken explicitly against the use of reified notions of kinship as markers of particular social evolutionary stages found in much of the literature on Early Chinese polities. I compare influential accounts of Shang kinship organization by breaking it down into particular practices and institutions. Considering practical genealogy as a network of social power and genealogically based identity and co-residence as an element mutually constituting practices of war, marriage and burial, I argue that kinship-based groups were the basis of both Shang identity and socio-political action. Finally, I argue that given the importance of genealogical place, the practice of ancestor construction and veneration must count among the most central of Shang social, political and religious practices.

Having outlined the discursive, practical and material bases of Shang authority in Chapter 4, and discussed the most important basic organizing principle of Shang society in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 focuses on two of the most crucial Shang practices of authority: warfare and sacrifice. Based on inscription and archaeological evidence, I argue that warfare and sacrifice must both be seen as pacifying practices key to the maintenance of Shang civilizational and ontological order. I also demonstrate how changes in sacrifice and war over the Anyang period relate to larger social and political developments.

In Chapter 7, kinship, violence and authority are linked in a study of Shang burial practices. Through a comparison of the spatial layout of Shang tombs at Anyang – their diachronic context and cross-class homologies in grave goods – I argue that structural homologies exist between elite and common tombs, suggesting a shared ideology and practice of burial and wide but unequal participation in the ancestral-ritual complex. This participation both generated a common *habitus* and, at the same time, gave it a radically inegalitarian structure, which was not merely economic but existential, shaping local notions of the human with its hierarchy of being, instantiated in the frequent practice of retainer sacrifice as well as the large-scale immolation of captives in royal and high-elite burials and cemeteries.

In the final chapter the diverse studies presented in previous chapters are brought together into a holistic vision of Shang civilization. I argue that rather than the products of Bronze Age superstition and barbarity, Shang warfare, sacrifice and burial should be seen as technologies of pacification producing and maintaining the order of Shang civilization much as our own economic, military, social, political and scientific institutions are put

in the service of the imperfect production of stable domestic and world orders. Drawing on discussions in earlier chapters I provide an inter-ontic description of Shang society and civilization in terms of the constitution of being and world at the "Great Settlement Shang" through interrelated practices of kinship and violence.

Acknowledgments

This book has been a long time coming. It began as a problem discovered by accident while writing a paper for an undergraduate Chinese literature course on the *Shijing*. I was perplexed by the violence intimated in the earliest dynastic hymns, and the jarring sense that something was wrong with the narrative I had absorbed through the secondary literature. This was essentially the naïve Orientalist claim that ancient China lacked epic poetry because it was a civilization of harmony. In this narrative, ritual, music and self-cultivation were China's deep, mythopoetic foundations, not individual heroism, military prowess, or victory in agonistic contest. Given this, my first introduction to the Shang dynasty in K.C. Chang's *The Archaeology of Ancient China* came as shock – especially the existence of human sacrifice. How did a society that practiced the mass ritual killing of other human beings become a civilization that produced humanistic philosophers only a few centuries later? How could the Shang dynasty have existed a mere six centuries before Confucius? This suggested to me, even then, that there must be a problem somewhere in the grand narratives of ancient China, the story of civilization's development from superstitious violence to reason, or both. The fruit of the first stage of this intellectual journey – inspired by K.C. Chang and his "five doors to the Shang" holistic approach – is this book, embarrassingly twenty years on from my initial departure.

Given the lengthy gestation of this project, a true accounting of its intellectual debts is close to the sum total of those of my entire academic career to date – beyond enumeration, and perhaps even recall in some cases, but not without an abiding sense of gratitude. I have been one blessed with many opportunities and the support of a great number of mentors, colleagues and friends. However far I have managed to clamber up the

slope of academic research, I would have gotten nowhere without their many boosting hands.

I would like to begin with my first mentor, Daniel Bryant at the University of Victoria who encouraged my sudden desire to shift from Tang poetry to oracle-bones. At Taiwan University, Hsu Chin-Hsiung graciously allowed me to audit his oracle-bone seminar, giving me my first grounding in the subject. Professor Ken-ichi Takashima was instrumental in shaping my scholarly path during my three years as his student at the University of British Columbia. His seminars on bronze and bone inscriptions, and especially his rigorous, linguistic methodology gave me the foundation upon which all my paleographic work is built. Professor Takashima's subsequent and ongoing support has meant a great deal to me. I must also express gratitude to the late Edwin Pulleyblank for emerging from retirement to teach a seminar on Old Chinese reconstruction and serve on my master's committee. At UBC, Richard Pearson taught me my first course in East Asian Archaeology and encouraged me to pursue a PhD in that subject despite having no prior background.

At Harvard, Michael Puett's mentorship and unflagging encouragement was a constant source of support in my adjustment from an MA in paleography/ linguistics to a PhD program in history and archaeology. Michael's generosity and kindness will always serve me as a model, just as his seminars and office hour discussions provided me some of the most memorable and productive discussions of my three years at Harvard. Although I only really got to know Peter Bol in my last year at Harvard, his engaging insights and challenging questions about history are with me still.

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I would be remiss not to mention my gratitude toward Lee Yun-kun who was my first mentor in Chinese archaeology and who introduced me to all of my most important early contacts in this area, essentially setting up what

turned out to be a three-year stay in China. Parts of Chapter 7 are actually re-worked versions of papers written for Dr. Lee's courses and my debt to him cannot be overstated.

I would like to thank Professors Robert Orsi, formerly of Harvard's Committee for the Study of Religion, and Arthur Kleinman of Harvard's Socio-Cultural Anthropology wing for their generosity in letting me participate in their pro-seminars; the stimulating readings and discussions in these "bootcamp" courses laid the theoretical foundations upon which this book is built.

In my three years in China, I have accumulated too many debts of gratitude to enumerate here but there are a few names that must be mentioned. Firstly there is Tang Jigen, former director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of Archaeology (CASS, IA) workstation at Anyang. Not only has he been a great friend, but his generosity in numerous workstation visits allowed me to get a feel for the site around which this work is centered. Moreover, without Tang's dissertation, database and several unpublished papers, this book would have been immeasurably weaker. I would also like to thank another friend, Jiang Bo, then of CASS, IA, who took care of me in China, making sure I was invited to archaeological workshops and conferences, and helping set up my final year as a visiting student at the Institute of Archaeology. At Peking University, where I was a Harvard–Yenching exchange student for two years, I would firstly like to thank Professor Liu Xu for acting as my advisor. I learned much of what I know of Bronze Age China from him and the opportunities of visiting sites in Jiangxi with him and participating in the 2005 excavations at Zhougongmiao were definitely two highlights of my stay in China. I would also like to extend thanks to Professor Li Shuicheng for his friendship during fieldwork in Hunan and Sichuan and during my family's stay in China in general.

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Finally, I would like to thank my family for sticking with me through what turned out to be an extended journey full of international moves, school changes and financial hardships.

CHAPTER 1

Being, Society and World: Toward an Inter-Ontic Approach

Shang Civilization, Historiography and Early China

The Shang dynasty, especially the "Late Shang" (ca. 1250–1050 BCE), as seen through the palatial structures, monumental tombs, sacrificial pits and oracle-bone caches at Anyang, occupies a special place in Chinese history and archaeology. Not only was the "great settlement Shang," in its time, the cultural, economic and political center of North China, its conquest by the Zhou was the central event around which Zhou ideology and dynastic narrative was built. Just as the Western Zhou (ca. 1045–781 BCE) conquest of the Shang facilitated the borrowing of substantial elements of Shang elite culture, and catapulted the Zhou dynastic house into political hegemony over the North China Plain, so too justification of the conquest shaped both Zhou moral and political ideology, and the construction of their identity as both the heirs to the Shang and its morally justified conquerors. The Zhou dynasty, in turn, holds a crucial place in Chinese history both as a strategic term in later constructions of social memory, and as a formative period for many later intellectual, social, political and economic developments (see Li 2006, 2008, von Falkenhausen 2006, Shaughnessy 1991, 1999). Archaeologically, the late Shang period comes at the end of a long process of increasing regional interaction and the cyclical growth and fall of increasingly large centers, a process that was well underway by the fourth millennium BCE (Campbell 2014a, Liu and Chen 2012). The Shang polity at Anyang, then, was both heir to the Bronze Age traditions of second millennium BCE North China and the legator of the Zhou inheritance. It is, moreover, a period of liminal history for which the first limited and partially deciphered corpus of contemporaneous inscriptions is available, linking the earlier periods known only from the archaeological record to the Zhou (ca. 1050–256 BCE) and the rest of Chinese history.

The site of Yinxu at Anyang, the Shang dynasty and the oracle-bones also occupy a special place in the narrative of archaeology and history in twentieth-century China. The discovery of Yinxu by the recently formed Academia Sinica in 1928 not only demonstrated the historicity of the Shang dynasty at a moment when it was beginning to be doubted by Chinese and foreign scholars alike, but with its monumental burials, palatial foundations of rammed earth, caches of oracle-bone inscriptions, magnificent bronze vessels and large-scale human sacrifice it gave the Modern Chinese nation a powerful (if ambivalent) symbol of its past.

Interrupted by the Japanese invasion of North China in 1937, the ensuing Second World War and the civil war that followed it, excavations resumed at Anyang in the early 1950s and have continued more or less unabated to this day. In the intervening sixty-some years, not only have hundreds of Chinese Bronze Age sites been discovered and excavated (both in the Central Plains and elsewhere), but studies of the oracle-bones and bronze inscriptions by Chinese, Japanese and scholars of other nationalities have greatly advanced our knowledge of the period. Until relatively recently, however, the field of Chinese archaeology was basically closed to foreign archaeologists who had to make do with what they could glean from the pages of "the three big journals"[1] of Chinese archaeology. The double effect of this closure was theoretical and methodological isolation for Chinese archaeologists and a paucity of Western archaeologists trained in or knowledgeable about Chinese archaeology. This latter effect led in turn to the relative absence of China from Western archaeological discussion.[2]

A remarkable exception to this tendency was the work of K.C. Chang whose pioneering efforts to bring Western archaeology to China and Chinese archaeology to the West resulted in not only one of the first Sino–foreign archaeological collaborations in the PRC, but a heightened awareness on the part of Western scholars of the importance of China in discussions of world-comparative issues.[3] For Chang, not only was the Chinese Bronze Age important simply by merit of its being a formative stage in the longest continuous civilization in human history, but also for

[1] These are *Kaogu*, *Kaoguxuebao* and *Wenwu*.

[2] Thus, looking at major comparative works on the rise of civilization or social complexity in the eighties and nineties there is little on China in English. Interestingly, there seems to be a marked increase in the "exposure" of early Chinese polities in the first decade of the twenty-first century, with several experts in other areas of world archaeology writing chapters on the Chinese case. This is an exciting development and hopefully will play a role in a more mature understanding of ancient China in the West.

[3] Not to mention either directly training or inspiring the majority of the next two generations of Western archaeologists of China.

being an example of a line of historical development different than that of Mesopotamia and Western Civilization in general. Thus, the Chinese case offered a corrective to a Western-centered view of world history, a contribution to be ignored only at the peril of theorists of comparative socio-political development.

Another pioneer of Shang studies in the West is the epigrapher and historian David Keightley, whose work on the oracle-bone inscriptions led him to also argue that China took a different historical path than the West. For Keightley, the collectivism, optimism and this-worldly orientation of Chinese civilization contrasts sharply with the individualism, pessimism and other-worldly outlook of the Greeks (Keightley 1993). Moreover, while accepting a basically Weberian social evolutionary framework that sees bureaucratization and routinization as the key hallmarks of historical development, Keightley linked these processes fundamentally to religious and kinship structures embodied in the ancestral cult and its socio-political legitimating function (Keightley 1999a, 2000).

Despite differences in their views concerning the particular character of Shang society, polity, and religion and its Chinese historical and world comparative perspective, Keightley and Chang's views of the Shang share a common ground.

> The data lead to the conclusion that civilization evolved along with the dynasties because in China – as elsewhere – it was the manifestation of the accumulated wealth of a small segment of society, the dynasty. In our case we can demonstrate that this wealth was accumulated primarily through the exercise of political authority, and facilitated by several interrelated factors: kinship hierarchy, moral authority of the ruler, military power, exclusive access to gods and to ancestors (as through rituals, art, and the use of writing), and access to wealth itself. (Chang 1983: 8)

> The Shang polity was a patrimonial theocracy ruled by a lineage head, the king, "I, the one man," whose authority derived from his unique relationship to the ancestors, and who relied on the socioreligious ties of patriarchal authority and filiality to bind his dependents to the dynastic enterprise. (Keightley 1999a: 289–290)

Comparing these two statements, it is clear that despite differences deriving from the two authors' different foci, Chang on archaeology and later texts, and Keightley on contemporaneous inscriptions, there is significant agreement on basic issues. Thus, political order was based crucially on moral authority, kinship and a royal monopoly over access to the supernatural. Indeed, this common ground, with variations in the details, could be

said to be the consensus view of Shang sociopolitical authority today (see also Akatsuka 1977, Chen 1988, Itō and Takashima 1996) and the point of departure for studies ranging from iconography to political economy (e.g. Allan 1991, 2007, Underhill 2002, Liu and Chen 2003, Thorp 2006).

Nevertheless, what remains unexplained in the consensus view of Shang social-political authority are the actual mechanisms mediating between power, belief and social practices. How, for instance, was "exclusive access to gods and to ancestors" kept exclusive (or was it)? How was kinship constructed and "patriarchal authority and filiality" rendered "binding"? In what economy of power, access and obligation were Shang orientations, dispositions and values formed such that social orders were reproduced or contested? More generally, what is the relationship between "ideology" and "political economy"; between values, beliefs or mentality, on the one hand, and social, political and economic structures and processes on the other? How do these things change over time?

Interestingly, although both Chang and Keightley employ models of religious evolution in understanding the Shang and the developmental trajectory of Chinese history, not only do these differ, with Keightley drawing on Weber, and Chang ultimately on Eliade,[4] they take opposite positions with respect to neo-evolutionary typologies. Thus, Keightley (1999a) states that,

> The degree to which lineages were key elements in the state, so that political status was frequently based on kin status rather than assigned title, suggests that the Shang polity still shared some of the features of the complex chiefdoms that had appeared in the Late Neolithic. The large numbers of princes and other leaders about whose activities a king like Wu Ding divined suggests both a lack of routine administrative delegation and the great importance attached to such quasi-personal attention on the part of the king, who, in this regard, was still functioning like the "big man" of a prestate chiefdom. (289–290)

From this description of Shang political and social organization we can see two assumptions at play: that states are separated from chiefdoms in their replacement of kinship with formalized authority structures, and ad-hoc and charismatic administrative techniques are replaced with routine and

[4] Puett (2002). In fact Chang's most direct influence is probably the Mesoamericanist Peter Furst (1973–1974, 1976) whose definition of shamanism Chang quotes in several articles on the subject (Chang 1983, 1986, 1989a, 1989b). For a searing critique of the Shamanism hypothesis in Mesoamerica see Klein et al. (2002).

bureaucracy.[5] Nevertheless, despite apparently accepting the framework of neo-evolutionary theory, Keightley finds that the Anyang polity sits somewhat ambiguously in between chiefdom and state, sharing properties of both. Moreover, in the relationship between socio-political organization and "theology" Keightley finds that in the Shang case,

> it is in the logical relationships that Shang theology postulated as basic, and in the emotions associated with those relationships, that we find the characteristic elements which influenced the development of political culture in Zhou and later times. We find, in fact, a paradoxical situation: a Shang state permeated with a commitment to the ancestors, strongly religious in the totality of its demand; and yet we find that the commitment can be characterized as nonreligious, nonmysterious, and – because so explicitly goal directed – rational in its logic. (Keightley 1978b: 214)

Thus, not only was the Shang foundational for later Chinese civilization, but the specific logics and practices of ancestor worship influenced the form of later political practices. Moreover, although this "commitment" was "religious," its logic was not. In fact, "in Weberian terms … we can refer to the hierarchical, contractual, rational, routinized, mathematical, compartmentalized nature of Shang ancestor worship as bureaucratic"(Keightley 1978b: 216). The understanding of historical process implicit in this model then posits both historical or evolutionary stages and attendant mentalities, but mentalities that nevertheless have their own particularistic characteristics and histories. Thus, the bureaucratic orientation of Shang ancestor worship shaped later Zhou practices, while its semi-routinized nature indicates an "incipient state."

Chang, for his part, questioned both Weberian and neo-evolutionary assumptions then current in the historical and anthropological literature on early complex polities. After citing Flannery's (1972) definition of the state[6] Chang (1980) is moved to say,

[5] Actually, Keightley's remark that the Shang king's lack of "administrative delegation" was reminiscent of "the big-man of pre-state chiefdoms" mixes its neo-evolutionary typology. The big-man society (Sahlins 1963) was supposed to come before the chiefdom and its characteristics were not so much lack of delegation of authority or personal attention to details as the achieved as opposed to ascribed quality of status which, somewhat paradoxically (Yoffee 2005), is also a feature that neo-evolutionary theory assigns to status in states.

[6] Flannery's definition is as follows,

> The state is a type of very strong, unusually highly centralized government, with a professional ruling class, largely divorced from the bonds of kinship which characterize simpler societies. It is highly stratified and extremely diversified internally,

> In this view, a state society must possess two prerequisite features: replacement of blood bonds by territorial bonds in state organization, and legitimatized force. Applying these criteria to Shang, we find that the first is not applicable but the second is. Was the Shang a state society? … Is Shang a chiefdom then, and not a state? But it would be absurd to decide so, for Shang fits the definition of the state with regard to its legitimate use of force, its hierarchical ruling structure, and its social classes. In short, the Shang data pose some definitional problems in regard to its classification as chiefdom or state. (363–364)

For Chang, the typological trait-list that indicated the presence or absence of a state society was problematically based on the Western developmental path, as instantiated in the Mesopotamian case, and could not be accurately applied to the Chinese situation. As we will see later on in our discussion of theories of social complexity, the inherent limitations of this kind of trait list approach have led to its demise in the analysis of social-political development in general, but for present purposes what is interesting is Chang's influential solution to the problem of Western models and Chinese data.[7] On the level of political economy, Chang stated that unlike Mesopotamia, where trade and technological innovation were factors in the rise of civilization, in China, "the accumulation and concentration of wealth," the hallmark of civilization in Chang's view, was "accomplished

> with residential patterns often based on occupational specialization rather than blood or affinal relationship. The state attempts to maintain a monopoly of force, and is characterized by true law; almost any crime may be considered a crime against the state, in which case punishment is meted out by the state according to codified procedures, rather than being the responsibility of the offended party or his kin, as in simpler societies. While the individual citizens must forego violence, the state can wage war; it can also draft soldiers, levy taxes and exact tributes. (Flannery 1972: 403–404)

As will be discussed below such unilineal evolutionary definitions of *the* state are not much in favor in archaeology today, much less the political science or anthropological literature in which they originated.

7 The position of Western theory in Chinese studies is not only a sub-set of the perennial etic and emic translation issues of anthropology, or the recursive relationship between model and empirical data, but a central problematic of Chinese archaeology and Chinese studies in general. Nationalism, identity, cultural and scholarly traditions, politics, personal relationships, language and access weave a complicated web between Western archaeologists, China specialists, their Chinese colleagues and their subject matter, though with the accelerating pace of international collaboration and interaction, the nature of these dynamics is rapidly changing and the day when Chinese data, theory and theorists play a proportional role in comparative anthropological and historical discussion will hopefully soon be at hand.

more in the domain of politics than in the domain of technology and economics"(Chang 1989a: 160). Moreover, "the characteristic feature of the Chinese rise to civilization … is that ideology was one of the principal instruments whereby the society's economic relations were realigned" (Chang 1989a: 164) – an ideology that Chang saw as shamanistic (Chang 1983, 1989a, 1989b, 1999, 2005, etc.). Even more importantly, Chang linked shamanism and, thus, the orientation of Chinese civilization in general, to a more archaic, holistic relationship between nature and culture, a "world view, sometimes referred to as 'correlative cosmology,'" that is essentially "the substratum of the human view of the world found widely among primitive societies"(1989a: 162). Thus, unlike the West with its "qualitative break from the ancient substratum common to the lot of the rest of men," its "rupture" of "cosmic holism," and its "demarcation between man and his natural resources"(1989a: 166), ancient Chinese civilization was a civilization of continuity, "built on top and within" the "confines" of an essentially shamanistic world-view (1989a: 162).

The cultural essentialism and historical accuracy of this model have been critiqued in other places (Puett 2002) and the applicability of the term "shamanism" both to the Shang and as a universal type of "primitive" religion, has been questioned on both empirical and theoretical grounds. Nevertheless, the kernel of Chang's model has continued to be influential: that Shang political economy was more political than economic, and that the political was underwritten significantly by authority of ultimately religious origin. Looking at the specifics of the articulation of political economy and ideology in Chang's theory, there is an apparent connection between technology, economic development, society and ideology as Chang notes that "both productive technology and strategic trade had their turn in the next phase of Chinese civilization [the Eastern Zhou (650–221 BCE in Chang's periodization)] (Chang 1989a: 160). Thus, the Chinese Bronze Age (2000–650 BCE) is both a period when Chang felt the state first arose in China and a period lacking obvious development of productive forces or technology put to economic (as opposed to political or religious) purposes. While more recent research is increasingly demonstrating that this is not an accurate assessment of the social uses of technological development in second millennium BCE North China (Yuan and Campbell 2009, Campbell et al. 2011, Kejibu 2009, etc.), it could indeed be said that the civilization of the Central Plains in the second millennium BCE was built on the foundations of the third – but does that make it a "civilization of continuity" in Chang's sense? Chang's claim is apparently based on both an understanding of shamanism as a universal primitive religion (and thus

representative of a time before the "demarcation between man and his natural resources") and the assumption that technological innovation and economic development occurs in a process of "rupture" and increasing disenchantment of the world. Thus, the difference between China and the West lies in China's development of "state-level society" without "rupture" in its cosmological relationship with the natural world. Although socially and politically impacting economic and technological developments did occur later, it was the formation of the state within the bounds and on the basis of a shamanistic world-view that threw the switch of Chinese history for Chang.

For both Chang and Keightley then, religious practices and their underlying world-views or mentalities were crucial to understanding not only Shang civilization, but also the developmental path of later Chinese history. A crucial difference, however, is that Keightley saw religious and socio-political evolution as moving in holistic stages while Chang de-linked social complexity and world-view, while nonetheless seeing some world-views as more primeval than others.[8] This difference has been noted by Puett (2002) who divides works on Early Chinese cosmology into cultural-essentialist and evolutionist camps placing Chang in the former, and Keightley in the latter,

> Weber, as well as those who advocated a generally evolutionist framework, present cosmological models as part of an attempt to rationalize an existing magical, theistic, animistic worldview. Correlative cosmology was thus a shift toward rationality and naturalism, even if it unfortunately retained many of the earlier magical notions … The advocates of the cultural-essentialist model, on the other hand, hold that these cosmological texts are indicative of a set of underlying assumptions in early China. Figures as diverse as Granet, Mote, Chang, Graham and Hall and Ames hold that even if cosmological systems did not emerge until the third century BC, they are nonetheless representative of a general "Chinese" way of thinking … According to these interpretations, China and Greece (indeed, all of the West) are distinguished by radically different cosmologies – the Western tradition being defined in terms of (among other things) a disjunction between man and god, and the Chinese assuming an inherent correlation and linkage. (Puett 2002: 21)

[8] My interpretation of Chang's analysis of Early Chinese history is that different aspects of historical change need not occur at exactly the same rate although there is a general shape and direction of historical change.

Thus, Early Chinese intellectual history is generally either fit into a teleology that, in the West at least, culminates in the discovery of science and an increasingly "rational" interaction with the world, or it is contrasted with the West as being predicated on an enduring and fundamentally different kind of mind-set. The problem with the first tendency is that it generally amounts to little more than the backward projection of categories and modes of thought that ultimately derive from the Enlightenment onto all of human history. Setting magic, religion and science in a teleology that leads to increasing disenchantment of the world and a discovery of the universe as it "really is," these models forget that "science," "magic" and "religion" are the historically and culturally constructed categories of one tradition, framed within the boundaries of its ontology and prepackaged with historical trajectory. Equally problematic are cultural essentialist assumptions which tend to lock civilizations into particularistic historical streams which again beg the question of history and process, not to mention potentially reifying difference into cultural or civilizational incommensurability (e.g. Huntington 1997). Thus, whether ideology/world-view is characterized as civilizational or stadial, its relationship to specific social-historical practices, institutions and processes remains unexamined. Thus, human sacrifice, divination and ancestor worship tend to become either symptoms of a Bronze Age mentality or instantiations of a particularly "Chinese" view of the world, rather than as social practices recursively shaping and shaped by social actors, embedded in social fields and economies, and the products of local and trans-local processes.

Puett's (2002) solution to the problem of sailing between cultural essentialism and evolutionism is to advocate a "full historical study" that sees texts as "claims" and the project of which is "to reconstruct the contexts in which these claims were meaningful" (24). In a superficial sense, one could look at Puett's (2002) method as replacing a history of mentality and society with a history of ideas – instead of comparing epochs and general world-views Puett wants to examine particular texts in their specific contexts. But what do "text" and "context" mean here? For Puett, texts are to be understood as instantiating intellectual positions in the context of debates arising from underlying structural tensions. Thus, it is not so much the comparability of world-views (which thus do not need to be set in either linear or parallel orders of development) that is at stake for Puett, but rather that it is "by recognizing these tensions and concerns that one can compare the Chinese material with that found in other cultures facing similar political and cultural problems" (Puett 2002: 321). Furthermore, for Puett, "the interesting issues for comparative

studies are how and why the claims where made in each culture, and how and why various solutions came to be institutionalized" (322). Puett then, like Chang and Keightley, is arguing for a relationship between world-view and society, but sees the former as constituted of particular ideas responding to specific social-political issues. Nevertheless, while introducing a finer chronological and contextual framework for the investigation of Chinese intellectual history, some questions remain. What, for instance, is the linkage between "claim," "debate," "structural tensions" and the knowledge of social actors? How do "political and cultural problems" come to be figured intellectually? Thus, if the Qin establishment of empire created tensions around which debate swirled, was it the introduction of the novel concept of empire that created these tensions, or was it the restructuring of social and political life? If, as I suspect, Puett's answer would be both, then, from the social end of things, how are "tensions" produced, how are they experienced by social actors and how does this understanding and production of "cultural problems" articulate with institutions, practices and dispositions? I would argue that we need to flesh out the articulation between material conditions, practices and discourse to get to a more fully contextual approach. Indeed, to avoid the pitfalls of cultural essentialism and evolutionism even the ontological ground of analysis must come under historical scrutiny.

Inter-Ontic

Introduced by the linguistic anthropologist Kenneth Pike in 1954, the concepts of emic and etic have proven influential in anthropology, entering into common use and spreading to other disciplines. These concepts derive from the distinction in phonology between phonetics and phonemics, with the former denoting a system of possible sound distinctions produced in human languages while the latter denotes the distinctions actually made by speakers of a particular language. Thus, to borrow an example from Trigger (2003: 63), "in English 'pin' and 'bin' are two different words, while in Arabic *p* and *b* are interpreted as the same sound. In English 'king' and 'queen' are believed to begin with the same sound, although *k* is velar and *q* uvular. In Arabic, however, *kalb* signifies 'dog' and *qalb* 'heart.'" By analogy then, etic is usually understood to refer to a universally valid or scientific analytical framework for studying cultures and emic to the actual distinctions made and concepts used by the people of a particular society. Trigger's (2003) discussion of the term is fairly representative,

> In anthropology etic refers to analysis in terms of cross-culturally applicable scientific terms and emic to the study of the terminology and underlying concepts that have meaning for the people who belong to a particular society. (63)

One of the first objections that might be raised to the use of these terms is the issue of whether or not the analogy between phonology and culture is a strong one. This leads to the further question of what notion of culture is being deployed and how strictly analogous emic and etic are to phonemic and phonetic. If the underlying model of culture is language as in structuralism and its semiological off-shoots (especially if modeled on Saussaurian semiotics where meaning is predicated on distinctions) then emic and etic seem potentially useful – but if culture is seen as more than a system of semiotic distinctions, then there is an additional dimension of inquiry beyond simply the difference between our system of signifiers and theirs. Thus, if, as in Geertz's influential formulation, culture is a "model of reality" and a "model for reality," and "cultural patterns have an intrinsic double aspect: they give meaning, that is, objective conceptual form, to social and psychological reality both by shaping themselves to it and by shaping it to themselves" (Geertz 2000: 93) – then emic might productively be defined as the local "model" of reality and etic as the nomothetic categories into which the anthropologist translates it.[9] On the other hand, if, as Asad (1993) argues in his critique of Geertz's analysis of religion, "the formation of what we have here called 'symbols' (complexes, concepts) is conditioned by the social relations in which the growing child is involved – by the social activities that he or she is permitted or encouraged or obliged to undertake "(31), then semiotic systems cannot stand for culture if by the latter we wish to include "life ways," "social habits" or "traditions," and emic/etic distinctions may be of limited utility in the analysis of local worlds as products of social practices and power relations as opposed to representations of them.

In Trigger's and many other anthropologists use of the term, the distinction between etic and emic is not drawn between "our" concepts and

[9] It should be noted that Geertz himself eschews the terminology etic and emic, and his own "thick description" approach avoids the pitfalls implicit in positing a universally valid etic framework with which to understand the semiotic systems of others, instead arguing that ethnography is a fundamentally interpretive endeavor. For Geertz, what makes this interpretation more than projection is the isomorphism between social action and semiotic system suggested in the formulation of symbolic systems as systems of and for reality. In my view, however, the practical and social aspects of human action and meaning are underdeveloped in Geertz's model.

"theirs," but between scientific "experience-distant" and culturally specific "experience-near" ones. This then raises the question of whether or not there is such a thing as a set of "scientific" universally applicable terms that are not simply instantiations of the emic views of the scientist. If Kuhn is correct in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* in saying, "there is … no theory independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'; the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its 'real' counter part in nature seems to me illusive in principle" (Kuhn 1996: 209), then the possibility of a "scientific" vantage point from which to render human societies comprehensible that itself stands outside of history and society seems dubious on the face of it. The only understanding of a human science left to us then, is that of a complex of inter-related practices, techniques and values grounded in particular cultural embodiments – in effect, our own privileged, emic locus of truth production. This is not, however, an argument for idiosyncratic solipsism and even less for relativistic nihilism – rather it is a recognition of the relational nature of perception, historical or otherwise.

If culture is not necessarily like language and there is no ontologically privileged vantage point upon which to build universal analytical schemes, then on what grounds can a historical or anthropological analysis be based if it is to be more than anachronistic or culture-centric projection? My solution is two-fold. Following Merleau-Ponty's (2002) rejection of Cartesian mind/body, subject/object dichotomies and the idea that being is instead constituted by and constitutive of perceptual interactions with our environments, and Mauss (1973), Bourdieu (1977, 1990, 2000), Kleinman (1995), Csordas (1994) and others in seeing "being-in-the-world" in terms of a mutually constitutive dialectic between material and symbolic aspects of individual and world, I would claim that framing science as the analyst's local social embodiment does not rule out translation but grounds it in a trans-local dialectic that I would call inter-ontic. The inter-ontic then, is the inter-subjective writ large, that experience of the trans-local that is constituted through a simultaneous sense of experiential phenomena and the organ of experience itself. So just as the hand touching an object gains a tactile sense of that object and at the same time a sense of its own weight, softness, strength, etc. – a processual constitution of both the knower and the known – so too the sensitive anthropologist/historian constructs a sense of not only the world of study but through it also her own. With the concept of the inter-ontic, what I mean to emphasize is that while the categories and mental habits of one's local world must necessarily form the point of departure,

if the understanding of the past is to be more than projection, the very frameworks of historical analysis must be constructed in a *process* of inter-local hermeneutic endeavor.

The inter-ontic also serves to remind us that there can be no study of other times and places that bypasses translation; that experience of other local worlds is, by definition, inter-local/inter-historical. Moreover, in keeping with the critique of culture as language, I want to stretch the original phonological analogy to accommodate a notion of culture as not only a semiotic system located in the mind, but also orientations and durable dispositions shaping the body/self through its participation in nature-cultural collectives. As Latour (1993: 106) writes,

> If there is one thing we all do, it is surely that we construct both our human collectives and the nonhumans that surround them. In constituting their collectives, some mobilize ancestors, lions, fixed stars, and the coagulated blood of sacrifice; in constructing ours, we mobilize genetics, zoology, cosmology and haematology.

In other words, returning to the problematic of history and society in ancient China and beyond, I would like to move beyond the sense that ontology can be reduced to local misrepresentations of reality, and that what falls on the wrong side of our Enlightenment divide between science / truth / rationality / nature, on the one hand, and religion / superstition / irrationality / supernature, on the other, is merely the product of primitive thought or self-serving elite ideology. If we instead imagine the collectives of others to be just as much an entangled and entangling ball of concepts, people, things, practices and environments as our own, we will not only come to a more accurate understanding of the past but also a more realistic perspective on our own doings – shorn of the mentally lazy and historically unexamined use of habitual categories such as religion, rationality or the state. I am arguing then, for a willing suspension of disbelief; an analytical untangling of the socio-technical collectives of the past; an extraction from them local sets of meaningful categories and orientations-to-being-in-the-world; and finally a re-assembling of the past according to its own reconstructed ontologies.

Arising from this inter-ontic approach to society as process, and history as the ephemeral and enduring structures inscribed by and on bodies and worlds,[10] is the conviction that ancient societies like that of Shang Anyang,

[10] In saying this I am basically agreeing with Giddens' (1979) statement that "there simply are no logical or even methodological distinctions between the social sciences and history – appropriately conceived" (230).

are of more than antiquarian interest. They matter both for the legacy they left inscribed in the institutions and structures that, however transformed by subsequent developments, nonetheless bear the indelible marks of their history, and for their potential, as instantiations of possible ways of being-in-the-world, for a re-enchanting of history with a broadened and historicized knowledge of what it is to be "human."

CHAPTER 2

Cities, States and Civilizations

In what follows I will critically outline some trends in the English language archaeological literature on the topic of cities, states and civilizations and show how they relate to current understandings of the Chinese Bronze Age. It will be argued that these visions of Early Chinese political landscapes, material culture and civilization(s) are all more or less problematic theoretically as well as empirically. I will instead suggest a more empirically and theoretically robust account in keeping with the approach foreshadowed in the first chapter.

Archaic "states," "early civilizations" and ancient cities have been central topics of archaeology since the beginning of the discipline. They have also been key issues for the study of the Shang dynasty since the discoveries at Yinxu, near the modern city of Anyang, effectively ended doubts concerning the veracity of ancient textual references to the Shang dynasty.

Rising out of a rebirth of interest in social evolution in American cultural anthropology in the 1950s and 1960s, as seen in the work of White (White 1949, 1959) and Steward (e.g. Steward 1953, 1955) and elaborated in the work of Service (Service 1962, 1975), Sahlins (Service and Sahlins 1960, Sahlins 1968) and Fried (Fried 1967), the rise of "the state" or transition from "chiefdom to state" became a major concern of anthropological archaeology in the 1970s and 1980s.[1] Buoyed by confidence that archaeology (modeled on a positivist notion of natural science) could and should generate cross-culturally generalizable "laws of human behaviour," processual archaeologists set out to discover the laws of social-evolutionary change, usually in functionalist and adaptionist terms (Paynter 1989). Many studies focused on dividing societies into evolutionary stages defined by lists of

[1] For intellectual genealogies and critiques of neo-evolutionary theory in archaeology see Trigger (1989), Haas (2001), Yoffee (2005).

traits and much ink was spilled in debates concerning the stage to which particular societies should be assigned.[2] This led some archaeologists to complain that more effort was being spent on terminological debate than on actual studies of ancient societies, while others argued that the neo-evolutionist focus on societies as environmentally adaptive systems obscured and pre-empted the study of other aspects of ancient polities.

> Defining "types" of societies (e.g. bands, tribes, chiefdoms, states) establishing putative commonalities within a type, and postulating simple lines (or even a single line) of evolutionary development had led archaeologists to strip away most of what is interesting (such as belief systems) and important (such as the multifaceted struggle for power) in ancient societies and consigned those modern societies that are not states to the scrap-heap of history. (Yoffee 2005: 6)

Indeed, if there is one issue which archaeologists working on archaic states or early civilizations today can agree on, it is that they are now interested more in how specific ancient societies worked than the origins of generalized categories such as "the state" or what typological box a given society should be fit into. As Richards and Van Buren put it in *Order, Legitimacy, and Wealth in Ancient States*,

> Research on the origin of the state has declined precipitously over the last two decades. As models of the development of social complexity themselves became more complex, the notion propelling such research – that the causes of social evolution could be clearly identified – lost its attraction. (Richards and Van Buren 2000: 7)

However, if research on the origin of the ancient state and causes of social evolution has declined, comparative research on ancient polities, their political economies, their cities, their ideologies and the civilizational and regional networks in which they were embedded have exploded in recent years. Research has shifted from "what is it?" to "how does it work?" along with an increased appreciation for the complexity and variety of ancient polities. As Feinman and Marcus state in the preface to *Archaic States*,

> One of the most challenging problems that faces contemporary archaeology concerns the operation and diversity of ancient states. Because archaeologists, historians, and other social scientists have tended to

[2] As we saw earlier, Keightley and K.C. Chang contributed their expertise on the Shang to these debates, Chang more centrally as an archaeologist and major figure in archaeological theory and Keightley more peripherally as a historian with an interest in anthropological theory.

> focus on the rise and decline of early polities, questions concerning how archaic states worked (or broke down) have been given less attention … Furthermore, can we evaluate general explanations of state origins if we do not apprehend the full range of variation in how states operated? (Feinman and Marcus 1998: xiii)

Moreover, most of this recent work has been premised on the idea that the history and working of particular polities is relevant to understanding them and that comparison must be based on more than "decontextualized traits" (Trigger 2003: x). Nevertheless, this apparent consensus masks a great variety of approaches to the study of the "functional contexts" (Trigger 2003: x) or "how archaic states worked." In what follows I will discuss some of the literature of the last twenty years concerning the study of ancient complex polities, its respective strengths and limitations, as well as my own approach.

In his monumental work *Understanding Early Civilizations*, Bruce Trigger sets out to perform an encyclopedic functional comparison of seven early civilizations, stating that,

> Each early civilization was the result of individual historical processes that produced distinctive material and institutional expressions. Such complex entities cannot usefully be defined by establishing a nomothetic set of specific attributes that each of them must possess. A useful characterization of early civilizations must instead be framed in terms of the general sorts of social, economic, and political institutions and the associated types of knowledge and beliefs that were *required* for societies of that degree of complexity to function … Technology, settlement patterns, art and architecture can be understood only in terms of the roles they played in materially supporting such institutions, facilitating social interaction, and promoting the ideological objectives of various segments of society. Cross-cultural regularities in beliefs and values must be interpreted in relation to *the social conditions that produced* them. (Trigger 2003: 44) (italics added)

In this statement we can see not only the recent shift to historical explanation and rejection of attribute lists in early state analysis, but an emphasis on institutions and function as well as an association of beliefs to both institutional types and degrees of social complexity. Thus, rather than attempt to derive social complexity from technological change, settlement patterns, art or architecture as many archaeologists and historians have done in the past (and some, as we will see, still do), Trigger insists on an integrated understanding of social conditions and institutions. While

this is a promising direction, it is also clear that for Trigger (true to his Marxist perspective), the relationship between belief, agency and behavior is determined by "social conditions" and "degree of complexity"

What this means historically is made clear in Trigger's discussion of religion in early civilizations,

> In early civilizations as in earlier small-scale societies, the natural, supernatural, and social realms were not categorically distinguished. Nature was believed to be impregnated with supernatural powers that possessed human-like intelligence and motivations. This was not an analytical failure but reflected a particular ontological position … What they did not perceive was that the non-human world, both animate and inanimate, operated on fundamentally different principles … The religious beliefs of early civilizations were therefore products of a different set of analytical categories from those that scientists in modern societies use. (442)

While Trigger's historical archaeological approach to the study of ancient societies may appear superficially similar to the one I am advocating, the differences are instructive. For Trigger there is one true ontology, that of modern science, and while he recognizes that the practices and beliefs of ancient societies are the products of other "ontological positions," these are based on confusions of the categories of nature and culture. Thus, the issue for Trigger is not how particular ways of being-in-the-world constitute and are constituted in local social-physical collectives, but whether or not the people of previous societies were able to distinguish accurately between nature and culture (as we do), and whether or not they had come to the realization that the "non-human world … operated on fundamentally different principles," (as we have). Thus his recognition of difference is only at the level of mental representation – or the misrepresentation of reality by ancient peoples even while the institutions of their respective societies unwittingly performed the roles "required for societies of that degree of complexity to function." There are two fundamental problems with this understanding of history, the first being the idea that certain levels of socio-political complexity require or produce certain ideas, social forms and institutions. This notion is premised on social-evolutionary assumptions and begins with a shape and direction of history even while its actual mechanisms remain mysterious. The second is the assumption that our analytical categories of religion, nature, supernature, society, economy, etc., are in fact context-independent ways of parsing the world – finding real fault lines in objective reality (even if more primitive societies confuse their boundaries) – as opposed to historically derived ways of seeing the world.

What I am instead advocating is the investigation of the relations between specific institutions, technologies, social practices and ideas – and how they develop in interaction over time, giving rise to, and being predicated on, fundamentally different modes of being in, and acting on, the world. If we do not derive our analytical categories from divisions observed in the phenomenon under study, then we risk imposing distinctions where they do not exist and projecting our own unexamined assumptions onto times and places alien to them.

Thus, for example, although defining "class" as "a cross-cultural label for the major hierarchical divisions found in early civilizations," Trigger then goes on to say that, "'Early civilization' can thus be summarily defined as the earliest and simplest form of *class-based* society"(46) and that "class displaced kinship and ethnicity as the main organizing principle of society," while "religious concepts replaced kinship as a medium for social and political discourse"(48). This implies that either kinship and ethnicity can't be hierarchical, or that despite the generality of his definition of class, its major hierarchical divisions *must* be based on something other than kinship and ethnicity. True to his Marxist assumptions and despite disclaimers, class is implicitly understood in economic terms, as seen when Trigger makes the sweeping claim that in early civilizations "power was based primarily on the control of agricultural surpluses"(47).[3] Moreover, the utility of decontextualized notions such as "religious concepts" free of discussions of particular practices, values or institutions, is slight, nor is it clear how they replace "kinship" as a medium of discourse in societies like that of the Shang where ancestor veneration is the primary expression of religiosity (not to mention a key medium of social status, political power, and environmental domestication).[4] In the end, the rigid ontological distinctions between "religion" and "science," "kinship" and "class," "economy," "cognitive aspects" and "sociopolitical organization" in Trigger's analysis have more to do with mid-twentieth-century functionalist sociology than the categories of ancient societies, and do not build analysis from the perspective

[3] Interestingly, however, Trigger's discussion of class in the Shang case is entirely in terms of kinship, although he later states that, "Chinese rulers eventually succeeded in replacing a delegational state organization built around lineage structures with a bureaucratic form of administration, but this transformation required more than a millennium" (216). The accuracy of this statement notwithstanding, its implications are that although there is local variation in institutions and organization, historical process nonetheless proceeds implacably, in universal stages and in terms of universal categories.

[4] See Puett (2002) for the argument that Shang ritual revolved around the attempt to domesticate the dead and the powers of nature by "ancestralizing" them.

of local nature-cultural collectives. For Trigger, understanding civilizations "in their own terms" means an encyclopedic descriptive comparison *within* pre-given categories and stages derived from a synthesis of Marx, Weber and Jaspers, begging, rather than attempting to investigate, the question of historical process.

Another approach to early complex polities, once dominant and still wielding often unacknowledged influence, is based around an analysis of social complexity in terms of centralization and control – in its most extreme form viewing states as specialized, hierarchical systems of control or information processing.[5] Thus Flannery (1998: 16) writes,

> At the peak of their power, archaic states were centralized systems with an administrative hierarchy in which commands traveled downward while tribute and information on output traveled upward.

In this formulation states appear as (ideally) centralized information processing systems, with the awareness that centralization was often ephemeral or cyclical as in Marcus' "Dynamic Model" where archaic polities cycle between periods of centralization and decentralization. Moreover, in Marcus' model, archaic states existed only during episodes of centralization before collapsing into competing "autonomous provinces." Behind these models then, is a conception of archaic states as "large-scale inegalitarian structures" (Marcus 1998: 94) the central problematic of which is the maintenance of centralized control.[6] Thus, for Marcus and Feinman (1998),

> archaic states were societies with (minimally) two class-endogamous strata (a professional ruling class and a commoner class) and a government that was both highly centralized and internally specialized. Ancient states were regarded as having more power than the rank societies that

[5] This line of analysis derives ultimately from Weber (through the mediation of Talcott Parsons) and his famous definition of the state as a government that possesses a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a specific territory. Interestingly, however, Weber also wrote that "the concept of the state has only in modern times reached its full development " (Weber 1964: 156), suggesting that, from a Weberian point of view at least, much of the discussion of early states is proceeding from anachronistic assumptions.

[6] Thus, for Marcus, the "segmentary state" is an "oxymoron" and the decentralized "valleys" of the centralization-decentralization cycle are not city-states: states are defined in terms of centralization so decentralized polities must be something else. A similar logic runs through most of the papers in Grinin et al. (2004) with early state "alternatives and analogues" coined to deal with the "evolutionary alternative to the development of the rigid supra-communal political structures" (9) of states. Cohen's (1981) definition of states as "antifission institutions" is probably the most extreme expression of this line of thought.

> preceded them, particularly in the areas of waging war, exacting tribute, controlling information, drafting soldiers, and regulating manpower and labor. (4–5)

Despite the attempted caution and studied vagueness of this definition,[7] there is a sense of "ancient states" as centralized, specialized, unitary entities (with agency no less!) which "exact," "control" and "regulate" – distinguished from the societies that went before (and presumably those that would come) only in the scale and intensity in which they are able to exercise control over their populations, seemingly locking human history into a trajectory, the logical endpoint of which, ought to land us somewhere between Kafka's *The Trial* and Orwell's *1984*.

The limitations of the centralization/control systems approach have been insightfully discussed in Blanton's (1998) programmatic article on "corporate political economy."

> By emphasizing change in the decision-making functions of government, other important dimensions of sociocultural change that impinge on governing institutions are inadequately addressed in systems analysis. It barely acknowledges the evolution of commercial institutions and their potentially important political implications (Blanton 1996; Eisenstadt 1969: 47). Domestic institutions are largely excluded from analytical consideration, even though aspects of social change relating to fertility, migration, gender relations, production, and consumption, among others, are to a great degree situated in the behavior of households. Urbanism is treated largely as an epiphenomenal outcome of state formation (e.g. Wright 1977). I also view as problematic the assumption that political centralization is the central process in the evolution of states. (138)

In this statement, Blanton takes control systems theory to task for ignoring other vital dimensions of socio-cultural change in its reduction of social evolution to centralization and control, noting that commerce, domestic institutions and urbanism are also vital to the understanding of socio-political change. Moreover, the key insight of Blanton's paper is that decentralization is not mere "adaptive failure" but results from "the development of specific cultural practices put into place to constrain or limit the unregulated exercise of state power" (139). Thus, cultural practices and values are important factors in socio-political change. More precisely,

[7] In Feinman's own chapter in *Archaic States* he quotes North (1986: 248) as saying "the long path of historical research is (already) strewn with the bones of theories of the state" and states that "No effort has been made here to advance a new theory of the state" (Feinman 1998: 133).

> the state is not necessarily the kind of highly integrated information processing subsystem the systems theorists would have us believe. Instead, the formal, functional, and dynamic properties of the state are outcomes of the often conflictive interaction of social actors with separate agendas, both within and outside the official structure of the decision-making institution. These social actors attempt to exert power in order to influence the state, its form, policies and activities. (140)

In this statement, Blanton partially unpacks the reified and monolithic "state" of the systems theorists, moving part way toward a Giddensian agency-centered analysis of society. Thus, although the properties of states are the products of the interaction of social actors, nevertheless, in the next sentence we are told that the state is in a kind of oppositional relationship to social actors who attempt to influence it and what it does. Even more problematically, the corporate political economy that is the focus of Blanton's critique of control systems models is set up in contrast to an exclusionary "network" political economy, rather than being seen as an analytic element of any political economy. Thus, corporate power is conceived of as being like "Mann's (1986: 22–23) concept of 'ideological power'" where ideological power "is based on the promulgation of norms that are 'shared understandings of how people should act morally in their relations with each other' (22)" (151) – apparently predicated on the assumption that the promulgation of norms and shared understandings of moral actions can only serve "egalitarian" ends.[8] In the end, despite the utility of understanding that power is not necessarily employed in the service of centralization, that polities are produced out of the network effects of political actors, and recognizing that framing social evolution in terms of control is limiting, Blanton's model is still predicated on a functionalist[9]

[8] Strangely, Blanton separates "ideology" ("cognitive codes that mystify exclusionary power" [150]) from a "corporate cognitive code" although the only apparent difference is whether the values and practices they are instantiated in are for or against exclusionary power. One can't help but infer from this division that "morality" is on the side of egalitarianism in Blanton's scheme and that hierarchy is in some sense unnatural and must therefore be "mystified." Confucius would obviously disagree.

[9] By this I mean that the corporate political economy is framed entirely in institutional terms despite frequent references to agency and social actors. Thus, Blanton's five main elements of corporate political economies in archaic states are, "assembly government," "corporate regulation of sources of power," "reflexive communication," "ritual sanctification of corporate cognitive code and ritualization of political communication" and "semiautonomy of lower subsystems" (154). Although these are interesting and potentially productive avenues of research, I would argue that the analysis of societies as systems and subsystems (whether exclusive or communal in nature) is limiting and potentially problematic with

and exclusively political analysis, reversing, but not entirely abandoning, the terms of the control systems approach. Moreover, as Yoffee (2005: 178–179) puts it,

> Lacking in the exposition of the corporate-network model is an explanation of why one strategy became dominant, or what the mechanisms were for change from one strategy to another.

Instead I would argue that power, conceived of as various forms of capital (economic, social, coercive, symbolic, etc.), must be understood in terms of the particular social economy in which it circulates and its relationship to the practices in which it is instantiated if we wish to understand how societies are constituted in time and space. Thus, to foreshadow a little, at the Great Settlement Shang the acquisition of a particular form of capital, like captives, depended on participation in a particular social field (inter-group violence) and occupying a social position such that successful participation entitled one to a share of the spoils. The transformation of captives into social energy, as prestige through their possession, as labor through their enslavement, or as ancestral blessing through their sacrifice, in turn depended on the articulation of a social economy with particular institutions, technologies and hierarchies. The practice of war and of taking captives for ancestral sacrifice was both predicated on and reinforced a hierarchy of being while at the same time creating the real potential for rival claims to hegemony – as seen in the eventual Zhou conquest of the Shang – as well as the potential for radical reversal of individual status. Thus, the same institutions of war and sacrifice could support a more, or a less, centralized state of affairs depending on the ability of agents to monopolize existing sources of power.[10]

Another influential approach is the Order, Legitimacy, Wealth (OLW) model outlined in Baines and Yoffee (1998, 2000), discussed critically by various authors in Richards and Van Buren (2000) and expanded upon in Yoffee (2005) and Li (2008). In this model, especially as expounded in Yoffee (2005), the evolution of states is linked to the civilizations in which they were embedded and the cities that were their earliest arenas. Moreover, unlike the approaches described above, a central place is given to the establishment of symbolic order.

its implicit misassignations of agency to institutions (Giddens 1982: 10) and implications of boundedness.

[10] In a sense then, Blanton's infrastructural corporate/exclusionary power amounts to how the local moral economy is orientated to hierarchy – cast in dichotomous, functionalist terms.

> States emerged as part of the process in which … differentiated and stratified social groups were recombined under new kinds of centralized leadership. New ideologies were created that insisted that such leadership was not only possible, but the only possibility. The earliest states were made natural, that is, legitimized, through central symbols, expensively supported and maintained by inner elites who constituted the cultural and administrative core of the state. Ideologies of statecraft also set the rules for how leaders and would-be leaders must guard these symbols and perpetuate the knowledge of how to maintain, display, and reproduce them … I explore the evolution of cities as central arenas in which these processes of differentiation, integration, and social struggle occurred. (Yoffee 2005: 42)

In this statement we can see a central concern for how new ideologies (order) were symbolically legitimized (legitimacy) by "inner elites" who harnessed the resources of the state (wealth) in the support of their symbolic order (civilization). Thus, leaders and "inner-elites" are claimed to be the producers and maintainers of the order that defines civilizations[11] and cities were the crucibles of these new social orders[12] as "the collecting basins in which the long-term trends toward social differentiation and stratification crystallized"(Yoffee 2005: 60). An even clearer statement concerning the pivotal role of elites in creating the symbolic order that defines and maintains early civilizations can be seen in Baines and Yoffee (2000: 16), where they state,

> The conclusion seems inescapable that the principal focus of high culture was the very elites themselves, at whose behest it was created and for whom it was sustained, and the great gods. The inner elites made themselves into the focus and repository of civilizational meanings in such

[11] Thus, Baines and Yoffee (2000) state, "It is this definition of order in an ancient differentiated and stratified society with a specialized governmental center that makes a civilization. Order circumscribes a dominant way of meaning and becomes axiomatic in the socialization of members of society" (15).

[12] Yoffee (2005: 61) states that,

> The growth of cities is revolutionary, in the sense used by V. Gordon Childe and others: cities were not simply accretions on a stable rural base, and states were not thus "pyramidal," a higher level of specialized governmental institutions stacked on previous, stable social formations. In the evolution of states and civilizations, the landscapes of social life changed utterly. Cities and city-states were the products of long-term evolutionary trends, and the identities of people as citizens and their participation in local networks of social, economic, and political interactions were redefined in cities. (61)

> a way that the rest of society was excluded from the development and maintenance of those meanings … Central symbols may have implicitly or explicitly addressed all of society and intermediate groups may have mediated them more widely, but the gulf between the inner elite and the rest remained profound and the elite's small size was accepted as being natural in the order of things. (16)

To my mind there are several serious issues with the OLW model and the influential relationship it proposes exists between cities, states and civilizations. The first objection is that ideology is cast completely in semiotic terms with legitimation occurring through symbols, created and maintained by the elites, but without analysis of the concrete practices and processes of socialization that make symbols more than empty signifiers and ideological discourse more than empty words. The second objection arises from the first and that is the exclusive focus on inner elites as the only social actors with agency in the realm of cultural production.[13] As Brumfiel (2000: 138) notes, hegemonic concepts are, by definition, key sites of struggle and competition,

> The categories and forms of high culture can be used to orient and motivate key social segments, and these same categories and forms can be appropriated by non-elite segments of society to legitimate their claims from below … High culture is typically as concerned with political and economic issues as it is with abstract cosmology.

Thus, symbolic capital is only one form of capital and though disparities in its possession may be great, games of prestige and esteem are played by all.[14] Indeed, it is the possibility of participation and the potential for a positive outcome (however slight) that gives social actors their investment in the game (Bourdieu 2000).

[13] Li (2008) expands Yoffee's analysis to "middle elites" in Anyang period Shandong, but entirely within the OLW paradigm, meaning that their agency is presented as merely derivative and never seriously challenging or destabilizing the order of the metropolitan elites. The idea of a single, top-down source of civilization is also the orthodox perspective of Chinese history transmitted through over two millennia of dynastic histories. This elite Hua-Xia centrism powerfully and perniciously pervades Chinese archaeological interpretation to this day. Ironically, it anachronistically derives from the historical ideology of early imperial elites.

[14] Even in the extreme case of slavery Patterson (1982) writes that, "there is absolutely no evidence from the long and dismal annals of slavery to suggest that any group of slaves ever internalized the conception of degradation held by their masters. To be dishonored – and to sense, however acutely, such dishonor – is not to lose the quintessential human urge to participate and to want a place" (97).

In addition to having too semiotic a notion of social order and its legitimation, and affording too much agency to inner elites and not enough to the rest of society, Yoffee's (2005) focus on cities as the crucibles of civilization does not, in my opinion, give due consideration the disparate nature of early urban spaces and thus the potentially different kinds of socio-physical environments they provide. Thus, while it is valuable to recognize that the concentration of people made possible in urban spaces creates intensified social interaction[15] (see also M. Smith 2003), the nature of those interactions is related to the practices in which they are situated, the nature-cultural environment they mutually constitute, and the social economy they recursively structure. Thus, I agree with Monica Smith (2003) who states that "the city form represents the physical manifestation of social transformations"(16)[16] and that "group investments in authority have an impact on the physical layout of the city as well as on members' social identity and economic success" (17) and take this to mean that it is not only urban spaces that shape social practice but also the reverse, and thus urban form cannot be productively discussed without also discussing the social practices and institutions that make the city (see also Lefebvre 1991, A. Smith 2003).

Typologies

When it comes to urban centers, polities and high cultural production, it will probably not come as a surprise that Marcus, Trigger and Yoffee

[15] Yoffee's discussion of cities and civilization is reminiscent of Durkheim (1984),

> Civilization is itself the necessary consequence of the changes which are produced in the volume and in the density of societies. If science, art, and economic activity develop, it is in accordance with a necessity which is imposed upon men. It is because, for them, there is no other way of living in the new conditions in which they have been placed. From the time that the number of individuals among whom social relations are established begins to increase, they can maintain themselves only by greater specialization, harder work, and intensification of their faculties. (336–337)

While this "Boyle's Law" of human society points to what is certainly one salient aspect of social complexity, the actual institutions, practices, relationships and environment in which increased social interaction takes place surely plays a role the nature and extent of "specialization" and "intensification."

[16] It should be noted, however, "social transformations" and architectural change do not necessarily share the same temporality. Thus the dialectic between what Lefebvre calls dominated vs. appropriated space, or the power struggle between the imposition of a built environment by those in power and the appropriation of the same for different purposes by others. I would argue that this phenomenon is also partially a manifestation of temporal disjuncture – between for instance, stone structures that lasts for centuries, and human lives measured in decades.

all make different claims about their natures and relationships. Yoffee (2005) links cities, states and civilizations in the following way: cities act as social crucibles for the development of new symbolic and social orders (civilization) which spread beyond the confines of a single city to create civilizational zones broader than the political zones created by the urban leadership, which usually only includes their city and the immediate hinterland (city-states). Marcus (1998), whose focus is squarely on the state and political control, understands the term "civilization" to be the cultural sphere associated with a state (see also Marcus and Feinman 1998: 4) and, as is typical for control systems models, does not include cities in her discussion. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, she sees the state as existing only during periods of territorial control over a large area.[17] Trigger (2003), on the other hand, distinguishes between early states and early civilizations, putting them in developmental order with early civilizations coming after early states (2003: 46–48). Somewhat confusingly, he also uses civilization in the sense of a cultural sphere (Trigger 2003: 60) and associates two types of states with early civilizations: the city-state and the territorial state. These two types are distinguished basically in terms of inter-polity relations with city states being embedded in networks of small, competing polities, and territorial states being the result of early states which managed to territorially expand and to consolidate territorial gains into lasting political organizations (92). From these different political configurations a whole series of other differences are derived: territorial states 1) were larger, 2) had less populous and concentrated cities, 3) produced larger surpluses for the elites (function of scale), had a more centralized control over the economy (necessity of scale?) and produced less dislocation or transformation in agricultural life (111–112). City-states on the other hand, due to the proximity of other competing polities, were forced to concentrate their populations in highly urban environments, and could be quite small (generally 5,000 to 20,000 people, with a territory as small as 10 km in diameter [Trigger 2003: 104]).

Comparing these three positions from the point of view of complex polity typologies, they boil down to diametrically opposed opinions concerning "city-states" and "territorial states": Marcus does not think that early city-states are states,[18] Yoffee considers city-states to be near universal[19] and

[17] States are also crucially associated with a four-tier settlement hierarchy for Marcus.

[18] Or more accurately, Marcus wants to abandon the term "city-state" altogether, considering what Yoffee and Trigger would call city-states to be the break-away remnants of states (Trigger's "territorial states") as mentioned earlier.

[19] Egypt is considered an exception by Yoffee (2005).

Trigger claims that both types exist. But can the city-state/territorial state dichotomy really cover the diversity of ancient social political formations (Cowgill 2004: 542, Campbell 2009)? Is Aztec Tenochtitlan really analogous to Mesopotamian Ur or Uruk, as Trigger implies in terming both of them "city-states," or second millennium BCE North China home to a collection of city-states as Yoffee claims? Taking Marcus' approach, the Shang polity at Anyang would have to be large, unitary, possess a highly centralized and specialized governing apparatus and a four-tier settlement hierarchy or it is not a state. But what does whether or not these characteristics can be identified for the Shang really tell us about the actual practices, institutions, social economies, and local worlds of people in the second half of the second millennium BCE North China – in short, "how Shang society worked"? This is not an argument for historical particularism, but rather that by a systematic examination of the specific institutions, practices and economies of social control, and the actual rather than assumed relationships between the nature of urban spaces, elite symbolic economies and their role in the constitution of social order, we can move toward a better understanding of political, economic, social and cultural aspects of ancient societies. Thus, I am in total agreement with the recent shift to investigating "what societies do" rather than "what they are," and to a "functional comparative" approach, so long as "functional" doesn't mean functionalist and teleological, and "societies" are understood in terms of the mutually constituting relationships between agents, practices, things and ontologies.

Thus far I have critically assessed several approaches to the study of ancient polities that have emerged in the wake of neo-evolutionism in American anthropological archaeology. The move from origins to how ancient polities worked and away from totalizing stochastic models are all welcome developments, as are the multi-scalar, multi-faceted approaches that link the analysis of ancient polities with their urban forms and cultural production. Cities are tangible, archaeologically recoverable things, polities are the outcomes of agentive individuals and both are embedded in cultural production that leaves its traces in time and space. And yet, while the increasing recognition of the diversity of ancient polities, the importance of particular historical contexts and the inclusion of ideology as an important research topic are all welcome developments, some issues remain for these influential approaches. First of all, despite the recent disavowal of typological exercises in the literature, the tendency to reduce variation into types and then attempt to match them to particular historical situations remains in most of the approaches outlined above (Campbell 2009). This has the unfortunate tendency of "cutting off the toes" of variety

to fit universal "shoes." Even more fundamentally for the approach I am advocating, all of these models make strong claims about the nature of ancient polities or even history. Thus Trigger (2003) links historical ideas and behaviors to socio-political evolutionary stages and reads ancient polities through a functionalist application of universalized twentieth-century categories. Control systems theorists essentially take a historical model that was developed to describe early twentieth-century nation states, focus on one aspect of it (control), and assume its universal validity at a certain stage of development. The dual-processual model admits the importance of political cultures to political forms and their development over time, but sets them in dichotomous terms leading, once again, to reductionist typologies. The Order, Legitimacy, Wealth approach, while departing from the evolutionism and materialism of older models, nonetheless generalizes the authors' understanding of ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt into universal claims about cities, inner elites and high cultural order. A relational approach that takes seriously the ontologies of others as an integral aspect of their nature-cultural collectives cannot begin with strong universal categorical and historiographic assumptions drawn uncritically from one particular tradition (or even seven). Instead, and with A. Smith (2003, 2011), Routledge (2014) and others, I would argue for an approach that sees ancient polities as the recursive products of people, practices, things and ideas. When we speak of the Shang for instance, and realize that the term can usefully refer to a dynasty, a polity, a civilization, an archaeological culture and an urban center, it is clear that we are dealing with a complex, heterogeneous and multi-scalar phenomenon – a vast settlement, a collective identity, a network of ordering practices and things.

Chinese Bronze Age "States": Territorial versus City

Perhaps unsurprisingly, much of the recent English-language discussion of Chinese Bronze Age social complexity has unfortunately revolved around the issue of whether, or at what point, Bronze Age Chinese polities were territorial or city-states. Thus, for Trigger (1999, 2003), the Shang appears to be more like territorial states such as Egypt and the Inka than a city-state like those of Mesopotamia or even the hegemonic city state of the Aztecs. Trigger's (2003) argument is based on a number of factors that he sees as distinguishing territorial states from city-states such as the use of multiple simultaneous capitals, the peripatetic life of the Shang king, the use of the term "king" *wang* 王 only for the Shang ruler, the creation of "garrison settlements" among non-Shang peoples, and the focus of high cultural

activities such as oracle-bone divination and bronze casting at Anyang. In Trigger (1999), the dispersed nature of Anyang, the lack of agricultural intensity and the fact that late Shang kings were recorded as frequently visiting the settlements (*yi*) of local rulers are also marshaled as evidence in favor of the territorial state hypothesis. At the bottom of Trigger's distinction between city-state and territorial state seems to be the issue of whether or not the polity is conceived of as an urban center or a territory. Thus, the use of multiple capitals indicates that the polity does not exist in a single locus, constant movement implies a territory, and the sole right to be called king (*wang*) among the various rulers suggests a relationship of at least hegemony. The garrisoning of frontiers again suggests territory, while the unequal distribution of prestige goods and elite activities suggests center-periphery rather than competing centers. In Trigger's analysis, settlement nucleation or "hyper-nucleation" is typical of city-states which have to defend their populations against rival city-states, frequently located nearby, while intensification of agriculture occurs in response to competition and the need to concentrate agricultural activity near the city. The criterion of frequent visits to the centers of other leaders also makes more sense if they are lower order administrative centers of the same state rather than enemy or contingently allied polities.

While Trigger (2003) raises some interesting points, there are problems with both the empirical specifics and the theoretical basis of his proposals. The idea that the Anyang polity had multiple simultaneous capitals is not currently in favor in Chinese archaeological circles and was based on a combination of out-of-date paleographic studies[20] and second-hand

[20] Trigger cites Keightley (1983) as stating that Shangqiu was the administrative capital while Anyang was the cult and burial center, Chang (1980) and Cheng (1960) as claiming the ritual center was at Shangqiu, and Vandermeersch (1977) as claiming that there was an important center at Yi in western Henan (Trigger 1999: 53). Unfortunately, no large Anyang period center has been discovered at Shangqiu, and K.C. Chang's hypothesis that the Shang originated in the East has not been supported archaeologically (although in all fairness, Yellow River flooding has buried the area in up to 10 m of alluvium [Jing and Rapp 1995, Zhang and Zhang 1997, Cohen 2001]). Moreover, in more recent work (Keightley 2000: 57–58) states:

> Whether the Late Shang conceived of the principle settlement of their domain as a capital, rather than a cult center, and whether, throughout the Late Shang period, that settlement was at modern Xiaotun rather than near modern Shangqiu 商丘, in the eastern Henan panhandle, is not yet entirely clear. On the basis of the evidence presently available, however, I believe that the Da yi Shang 大邑商, "the great settlement Shang" … that appears in the inscriptions was at Xiaotun [Anyang].

Indeed, from the point of view of the oracle-bone inscriptions, of the 509 times the word Shang商 appears, only eight examples involve Qiu Shang 丘商, all of these referring to the locations of ritual. Compared to other sites mentioned in the oracle-bones, Qiu

inferences from much later textual sources.[21] The garrisoning of frontiers with agricultural settlers is based on Chang (1980: 254–256), which in turn is a lengthy citation of Zhang's (1973) speculative interpretation of Shang–periphery relations.[22] Likewise the claim that only the Shang king could use the term *wang* is weakened by the fact that we have little or no translatable

Shang does not seem to be a very important place. Nor is the location of Qiu Shang unanimously equated with present-day Shangqiu in eastern Henan (see Zheng Jiexiang (1994) for the opinion that it was located near modern Puyang 濮阳). From the point of view of archaeological sites, ceramic cultures and material remains, Institute of Archaeology (2003: 305) takes the opinion that Anyang was the capital of the Shang polity, stating that Yinxu far exceeds other contemporaneous Shang sites in "scale and standard," and, unlike the Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei period that seems to have two main centers of ceramic tradition, in the Anyang period, Yinxu-type cultural remains are by far the most plentiful, forming the kernel of Anyang period metropolitan ceramic cultural types. While this assessment would be on firmer ground if it had been based on systematic regional site surveys, it nonetheless represents a synthesis of the archaeological evidence currently available.

[21] However, it should be noted that the Western Zhou apparently had two simultaneous capitals, one (Chengzhou) near modern-day Luoyang and the other near Xian (Zhongzhou) and the Early Shang site of Shixianggou Yanshi has been interpreted as a second capital of the Shang (Zhou 1999) although this is by no means the consensus view and Zhou's arguments are entirely based on texts and commentaries dating from 1,000 to 2,000 years after the period in question. Likewise, the archaeology of the Western Zhou capitals is anything but clear and what we know of them is largely based on later textual information and scattered references in Western Zhou Bronze inscriptions.

[22] Zhang's paper is problematic on a number of grounds including the assertion that bordering polities were comparatively backward agriculturally (despite a total lack of archaeobotanical and zooarchaeological work to substantiate this), and the speculation that the Shang set up agricultural settlements in neighbouring polities (who were supposedly agriculturally backward) as part of a general strategy of annexation. Nevertheless, there is a period I inscription that suggests a practice of opening fields in bordering and perhaps enemy territory. (The number after the oracle-bone inscription refers to its number in the *heji*. "Cracked" below refers to the oracular cracking of the bone.)

癸巳卜，宁，貞令眾人[illegible]入祥方𤰈田. (6)

Cracked on Guisi day, Bing divining: (we should) order the masses to X enter Yang fang and open fields.

The untranslated graph X ([illegible]) in the above inscription appears as a combination of *fu* 斧 (axe) and *yu* 聿 (writing brush) (JGWZGL: 685)  , but the meaning is unclear. *Yang* 祥 generally appears as an enemy of the Shang and there are two inscriptions (1118 and 1119) that divine about the capture and sacrifice of the *Yang* ruler. The problem with extrapolating from this one partially deciphered inscription is that a number of possible political scenarios might explain why the Shang were opening fields in Yang, not

textual evidence from the rival polities of the Shang. Moreover, Trigger's claim that the Shang lacked agricultural intensification is based on K.C. Chang's observation (1980, 1983) that agricultural tools and techniques had not changed since the Neolithic. As we will discuss below, new research has made this understanding untenable.

While Trigger's other points have more merit, I view the assumption that early states are either "Egypt-like" (territorial) or "Mesopotamia-like" (city-states) to be problematic.[23] If we set aside Trigger's categories and his empirically unfounded assertions, what remains is that the Anyang core formed a high cultural metropol (as well as a gigantic population cluster), and that the imagined community[24] that was formed around the Shang polity was not immovably tied to a single urban center or location. Rather than shoehorning the Shang polity at Anyang into the "territorial state" box, however, I would prefer to build an understanding of the relationship between land, urban center, and people from the specifics of Shang evidence.

Unlike Trigger, Yoffee (2005) and Yates (1997), view the Shang polity at Anyang as a city-state. Yoffee (2005), applying his "urban elite" model with its focus on urban centers and elite symbols to China, (based largely on a counter-narrative reading of Liu and Chen 2003) notes that, "increasing amounts of trade, warfare (especially over access to resources), and migration in the third millennium BCE led to the formation of new material symbols that were shared by previously distinct cultures"(96). He also notes (citing Chang 1983) that the "simplifying" work of political control was accomplished in the Shang through the monopolization of ritual bronze vessels, and thus, of divine access. Moreover, based on Keightley's (1979–1980) claim that the territory of the Anyang polity was full of non-Shang "holes," Yoffee states, "I interpret the number of cities claiming to be the Shang capital over a relatively short period of time and which were in competition as

to mention the possibility that the undeciphered graph might be crucially important to understanding the meaning of the inscription. A more straightforward explanation might be that fields were being opened in Yang after the Yang Fang had been defeated as part of a policy of incorporation (as opposed to the creeping agricultural annexation of backwards but unconquered bordering peoples that Zhang proposes).

[23] Trigger (2003: 93, 94) himself notes that the history of this distinction between city-states and territorial states derives from Childe's (1928, 1934) contrasting of Egypt and Mesopotamia, extended and expanded in Frankfort (1956) and Maisels (1990).

[24] As Anderson (1991: 6) puts it,

> In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.

a Shang network of city-states"(98). In addition, Yoffee states, "new research has shown that many cities and small states existed, sometimes independently, at other times under the hegemony of neighbors, during much of the second millennium BCE and into the Zhou dynasty of the first millennium"(96).[25] But what is a "state" for Yoffee, or a "city" for that matter? Do the existence of rival polities and dynamic political arrangements automatically imply city-states? Moreover, the claim that "China" had become a single high cultural sphere with a common set of symbols by the third millennium BCE is an untenable projection of early imperial historiography conflated with nationalist teleology. What, for example, could "China" refer to in this context? Does the circulation of certain prestige or ritual objects necessarily mean a common set of practices and understandings of those objects? As I will argue below, things are not so simple. Keightley's (1979–1980) conclusion that the Shang state was "gruyere, filled with non-Shang holes" is based on a study with problematic assumptions, while, as argued above concerning Yoffee's OLW model, the creation and control of symbols cannot in itself account for social or political hierarchy, let alone political control without also taking into account the practices, institutions and social economy in which these symbols were embedded.

Yates (1997) takes the opposite path to Yoffee, proceeding from specifics to the tentative conclusion that the concept of the "city-state" is "illuminating for the case of ancient China"(58). Yates bases this judgment on an "emic" approach stating that, "In the Shang, all walled settlements were called *yi*, suggesting that they did not differentiate between settlements, no matter what their size or function"(82). Moreover, borrowing Tambiah's "galactic polity" model (1977, 1985), Yates notes that, "a significant element of this model is the centrality of ritual to the political process and the principle of ritual replication of the center in the creation of the hierarchy of settlements or settlements clusters" (83). Thus, according to Yates, settlements (*yi* 邑) were hierarchically arranged in terms of their ritual function and "the position of the in the hierarchy was signified by the type of religious buildings that were constructed inside"(83). Indeed, the entire universe was ordered in a nested hierarchy,

> In the Chinese case, this is represented by the way in which all space, human and divine, secular and sacred, is incorporated into a system of nested hierarchies, boxes within boxes, compartmentalized and separated,

[25] This new research is apparently Yoffee's reinterpretation of Liu and Chen (2003), which, in fact, argues the opposite position – that for most of the second millennium BCE the Central Plains and much of its periphery was under the control of a centralized dynastic state.

> yet each one being a template of the system as a whole … The universe is therefore an organic whole … and humans are not categorically distinct from deities, nor are the dead in a state of alterity with respect to the living. This mode of thinking encourages inclusion, not exclusion, and emphasizes relationships, not individuation. (83)

While I find Yates' characterization, in these terms, of an enduring "Chinese" cosmology problematic,[26] that the particular way in which Bronze Age Central Plains communities were imagined is relevant to discussing their structure is a valuable insight. Indeed, though Yates provisionally accepts a city-state model for ancient China, his characterization of Early China in terms of a network of settlements arranged hierarchically on the basis of ritual position differs both from Yoffee's notion of city-states as individual urban centers of high-culture surrounded by rural hinterland and rival polities, and Trigger's concept of city-states as networks of concentrated and competing urban sites of essentially the same political and religious status. Nevertheless, there are issues with Yates' account as well. *Yi* settlements were not necessarily walled (indeed no walled sites are known from North China during the Anyang period), there was, in fact, a distinction between "*yi*" and "*da yi*" ("settlements" and "great settlements") and the fundamental political unit seen in the Shang oracle-bones is the *fang* 方 (side, direction) which seems to denote a political collectivity and its oppositional position with respect to the king. In addition, while Yates' claim about religious buildings marking place in a hierarchy is possible, it is not supported with any evidence from the Shang.[27] Moreover, an "emic" understanding of the Shang polity does not go far enough if it is not also based on the historicized practices and technologies that dynamically produce the bases for local orientations and understandings of the world.

Liu and Chen (2003)[28] for their part, take a processual and neo-evolutionary approach, and come to the conclusion that the earlier Erlitou and Erligang polities resemble most closely Trigger's model of the

[26] This characterization fits neatly into Puett's (2002) "cultural essentialist" camp of Early Chinese scholarship mentioned earlier. Its assumption of an enduring organic model of the Chinese universe is convincingly historicized and deconstructed in Puett (1998, 2001, 2002) as the product of particular (and contested) lines of thought that became orthodox only in the Eastern Han.

[27] The oracle-bone inscriptions show that rituals occurred in many places, but do not allow us to reconstruct a ritual hierarchy. While Anyang does appear to have been the major center of ritual for the Shang polity, there has not been sufficient archaeological work on outlying settlements to verify Yates' claim that they occupied a place in a ritual hierarchy.

[28] See also Liu and Chen (2000, 2001, 2012) and Liu (1996, 2003, 2005) for arguments along the same lines.

territorial state. The essence of Liu and Chen's argument is to argue that "states" developed in China earlier than some (Western) scholars previously believed and that this development was predicated on the acquisition of key resources.

> We argue that the earliest states in China may have developed long before the late Shang dynasty, and that political organization during the Erlitou and early Shang periods may not have been the same as that of the late Shang and Zhou dynasties. Furthermore, the development of early states in China was closely related to particular geographical configurations, the distribution and transportation of key resources, and belief systems. (24)

Moreover, Liu and Chen define the state in terms highly reminiscent of Marcus and Feinman's (1998) system approach outlined above, which states that,

> A state is defined in this study as a society with a minimum of two strata, a professional ruling class and a commoner class. The ruling class is characterized by a centralized decision-making process, which is both externally specialized, with regard to the local processes which it regulates, and internally specialized in that the central process is divisible into separate activities which can be performed in different places at different times … Furthermore, a state-level social organization often develops a four- or more tiered regional settlement hierarchy, which implies three or more levels of administrative hierarchy. (34)

Thus, Liu and Chen define "states" in terms of administrative function and control, archaeologically identifiable as a four-tier settlement hierarchy. Thus, because Erlitou 二里头 is large (300 ha) and sits at the top of a four-tier settlement hierarchy[29] (the rank-size curve of which is strongly primate[30]), and demonstrates a "polarization between rich and poor

[29] Comparing Liu and Chen's (2003) settlement hierarchy histogram for the Yi-Luo River area in Erlitou times with that for Taosi in Longshan times as seen in Liu (1996), they look quite similar although the Taosi settlement hierarchy is said to be three-tier while that of Erlitou is said to be four-tier. Indeed, the Erlitou settlement hierarchy looks a lot more like early Taosi both in terms of site sizes (Taosi and Erlitou are roughly the same size) and shape of curve than it does like Erligang. Interestingly, Liu and Chen (2003) do not mention Taosi in their discussion of the preceding Longshan period, making for an apparently great contrast between Erlitou and what came before in terms of settlement size and hierarchy.

[30] Liu and Chen (2003) claim that a primate curve demonstrates a high degree of political and economic control (31) although in a note they state that "primate distributions *may* have been characteristic of systems in which economic competition is minimized and/or system boundary maintenance is the primary function of the primate center (Johnson

burials,"[31] it is a "state." Moreover, the development and expansion of the Erlitou and Erligang polities was based on the control of key resources such as copper, tin and salt. However, as argued earlier, a control systems approach, while informing about one aspect of ancient societies, does not really tell us very much about them as societies, if by that term we wish to include the networks of objects, practices, institutions and meaning that participate in both the production of historical change and enduring traditions. In addition, even from the vantage point of control-systems theory, there are some issues with Liu and Chen's analysis, for, as Flannery (1998) states,

> It should be noted that "administrative hierarchy" and "settlement hierarchies" are not synonyms. The former refers to the number of tiers of administrators in the system, which may not be archaeologically detectable in societies without written texts. The latter refers to the number

1981; 1987: 108–109)"[italics added] (150). Johnson (1980), however, notes that "the system integration that facilitates a rank-size distribution cannot be measured on an absolute scale of development but must be considered relatively in the context of the history of a specific system under analysis" (243). Thus, strong primate curves do not in themselves say anything about absolute integration, only that vertical integration (between the center and periphery) is relatively greater than horizontal integration (between settlements on the periphery). Assuming that inferring relationships between rank-size and "integration" is a valid approach in the first place (and this approach has many critics, see for example, Crumley 1976, Szymanski and Agnew 1981, A. Smith 2003), this would mean that small settlements became more integrated with the center (Erlitou) than with each other in the Yi-Luo River area between the Longshan and Erlitou periods (patterns seen previously in other areas in the Longshan period). One obvious problem with the assumptions behind this model is that administrative, economic, cultural or religious center hierarchies do not necessarily correspond, nor do they necessarily correspond to a hierarchy of size. Moreover, it is not obvious what "integration" might mean without reference to particular relationships. The nature of a particular settlement is surely at least as important as its size to an understanding of settlement pattern and "integration." Perhaps the most devastating critique of rank-size and settlement hierarchy analysis are Smith's (2003) arguments that "in their tendency to find regularity in settlement distribution, locational approaches have the effect of an ex post facto legitimation of political authority, dismissing the vagaries of power, domination, and hegemony under the banner of a naïve contractarianism," and " location theory assumes the primacy of economic factors in decision making. To suggest that analysis can then prove the primacy of economic factors in locational choices is merely to restate the preliminary assumptions of the model" (43).

[31] This claim is actually somewhat tendentious considering the fact that only "medium and small burials have been found to date" (Liu and Chen 2003: 60). Despite the fact that some of these medium-sized burials are associated with elite architecture, it is widely assumed, based on the size of the largest Longshan burials, that there must be even larger burials at Erlitou that have not yet been found. However, as Cao (2004) argues, the so-called medium sized burials at Erlitou may actually be large burials by Erlitou cultural standards. Thus, the claim that Erlitou burials show an increased polarity between rich and poor graves compared to the Longshan period is false if Taosi is used as the point of comparison.

> of tiers of community sizes (which may be detectable through the use of histograms …) and to the administrative institutions present in each tier (only some of which are detectable through the excavation of public buildings and residences). (16)

Thus, far from the claim that four levels of settlement hierarchy "implies three or more levels of administrative hierarchy," the actual relationship between sites needs to be investigated through excavation, "site size alone is not sufficient information: we must also excavate sites at the upper three tiers of the hierarchy to recover the buildings that reflect state institutions" (Flannery 1998: 55). Given that Liu and Chen's analysis is based on regional settlement survey alone (and for regions beyond the Yi-Luo River valleys, not even systematic full coverage surveys), their conclusions about political structure are premature.

Putting aside the issue of whether Erlitou was a "state" or not, and getting to the issue of how early Chinese polities "worked," Liu and Chen take an entirely political-economic approach. Focusing on sites such as Dongxiafeng and Yuanqu in southern Shanxi and Panlongcheng in Hubei they come to the conclusion that the Erlitou state colonized these regions to obtain (among other things) salt and copper, the latter crucial for making bronze vessels which by Erlitou phase III had become the focus of the elite economy. For the Erligang, the story is similar but on a much larger scale, with expansion occurring in all directions,[32]

> The changes which took place in southern Shanxi, eastern Shaanxi, western Shandong, and the middle Yangze River valley were the result of the wholesale expansion of material culture, rather than of trade or gradual cultural diffusion. This implies population migration and colonization from the core area to the periphery. (Liu and Chen 2003: 127)

Thus, despite the fact that we "know little about the exact sphere of pottery redistribution around each regional centre due to the lack of systematic ceramic analysis" (Liu and Chen 2003: 127), the expansion of Erlitou and Erligang ceramic types is unambiguously related to population movement and direct political control (see also Liu 2005: 6). Absent in this account

[32] This makes a purely resource oriented explanation of expansion a bit hard to understand. Indeed, although Liu and Chen (2003) call their approach "political economic," it is more or less a purely "economic" analysis of the agency of a reified Erlitou "state" – a kind of Exxon model of early state formation where early polities behave as centralized, hierarchical resource-extraction organizations. Political or military factors that may have shaped the agency of Early Bronze Age actors are entirely absent from their discussion – perhaps because there is very little evidence.

of a monolithic state and a passive periphery is any indication that there were other political actors on the second millennium North China stage, a consideration that some of the Erligang regional centers may have been politically and/or culturally independent, or that the mechanisms by which raw materials and finished goods circulated may have involved more than a "tributary economy."[33] For Liu and Chen,

> Two types of centre–periphery relationships can be observed. First, in the regions relatively close to the center, the material culture was completely or primarily dominated by the Erligang style. Examples of regional centers belonging to this category include Donxiafeng and Yuanqu in southern Shanxi, Donglongshan and Laoniupo in eastern Shaanxi, Panlongcheng in Hubei, the Wucheng area in Jiangxi, Daxingzhuang in western Shandong, and several sites in southwestern Shandong. Most of these regional centres were located at nodes of major transportation routes near key resources, metal and salt. The second category of centre–periphery relationship occurred in regions further away from the core area, where Erligang material influence was considerably less dominant, occurring as isolated artifacts, individual burials, or small settlements … Although these regions had great potential in terms of resource procurement (e.g. the copper ores in the Yin Mountains and in Tongling, Anhui), or possessed important communication routes leading to resources in other more distant regions (e.g. Chenggu and the Li river region), the territory of Erligang state itself may have extended only to regions that were occupied by settlement systems belonging to the first category. (130)

In this statement not only is Wucheng, which most Chinese archaeologists consider to be a separate archaeological culture, claimed to be Erligang culture (e.g. Institute of Archaeology 2003), but there is an assumption that

[33] Liu and Chen state that,

> The operation of the tributary system in prestige-goods production and distribution is illustrated by the modified "tributary model" … These models illustrate a close relationship between the settlement or administrative hierarchy and the political-economic structure for the production and redistribution of prestige goods during the Erlitou and Erligang periods … While the raw materials and exotic goods (tribute) move upward from the settlements on the lowest regional level to the primary center, the finished prestige products (redistribution) move downward reaching the lowest regional centres but not the lowest tier of the settlement hierarchy. (136–137)

This is one possibility, but neither trade nor gift exchanges are considered, and in any case, the data on which they base these conclusions are insufficient to say much about political–economic relations. Liu (2005) mentions the existence of other polities and other means of exchange, but ultimately still incorporates everything into a "tributary" economic mode – at least until the Middle-Shang "collapse."

political authority and material cultural remains are co-extensive. Thus, where Erligang ceramic types are found in abundance, so too the Erligang state must have been (see also H. Wang 2014).

Equally problematic is the equation of the control over the production and distribution of bronze vessels with degree of "political centralization, and thus the nature of political structure of the states"(133). This formulation conflates a particular type of craft production with political-economic centralization (see also Bagley 1999). Thus, we are told that, "a high degree of political-economic centralization is confirmed by the large size of major centers and by the highly specialized craft productions carried out in them"(134). This, in turn, is linked to "the tributary mode of production" and "tributary systems through which vital raw materials and prestige goods circulated" (135). Given that the political relationships between centers is at best uncertain in the Erlitou and Erligang periods, that virtually no information exists on rural sites, and that the output of the bronze industry at Anyang far eclipsed anything previously known in both technical difficulty and quantity despite apparently having no direct control over ore sources (or at least the southern ones that supposedly motivated the Yangtze incursion), it seems likely that the indirect acquisition of resources could have supplied earlier North China polities just as well. Indeed, Underhill and Fang (2004: 136) note that the territorial state versus city-state type political economy models for Shang China, "probably represent a false dichotomy, since little regional-scale data currently are available for northern China during the Shang period" (136). In short, while Liu and Chen's (2000, 2001, 2003) pioneering work on resource flows and early Central Plains polities opens up a crucial topic, we still know next to nothing concrete about second millennium BCE economic organization in North China. Gifting, barter, loans and trade were also certainly elements of the Central Plains Bronze Age political economy in addition to one-sided extractions, but their relative importance in particular contexts is unclear at this stage of research.

Interestingly, Liu and Chen's (2003) contention that the Erlitou and Erligang-centered polities were territorial states while the Anyang-centered polity was more like a city-state is very reminiscent of Marcus' "Dynamic Model" where "states" begin as highly centralized and integrated administrative systems and then collapse into competing principalities, (or in the Shang case, *fang* 方), and, as noted earlier, is a variation on the old control systems model. Thus, unlike Trigger's focus on the on the conception of the polity as embodied in a territory or an urban center, Liu and Chen's notion of territorial state in fact derives from their

neo-evolutionary model. Since "the state" is by definition an expansive and highly centralized institution at the top of a four-place settlement hierarchy, it is naturally more like Trigger's territorial model than his city-state model, and in this model it is only when centralized control breaks down that city-state-like polities can appear. While Liu and Chen's (2003) model of state formation based on expansion and strategic resource extraction foregrounds the importance of political economy, what is not well understood, and as I have argued, cannot simply be deduced from theory, are the actual mechanisms of expansion, the specifics of exchange, the particular relationships of power (both internal and external to the polity), and the social fields in and through which power is negotiated and exchange effected.

China in the Second Millennium BCE: Civilization and Material Culture

Although there is a tendency among Chinese archaeologists to interpret material culture in direct political terms, the above discussion of civilizations as a cultural sphere within which polities are embedded, suggests another line of analysis of material cultural distributions. Minimally, the observation that the civilizational/cultural sphere is not necessarily, or even usually, co-extensive with the boundaries of the polity (Baines and Yoffee 1998, Feinman and Marcus 1998, Yoffee 2005) opens up the possibility of understandings of material culture and its distribution other than direct political-economic ones. Robert Bagley (1999) and Sarah Allan (2007) have both written important accounts of civilization and culture in Bronze Age China from material cultural evidence. The differences in method and conclusions of these two authors are, moreover, instructive, and with Liu and Chen (2003, 2012)'s account above, they essentially map out the entire field between them.

In his chapter on Shang Archaeology in the *Cambridge History of Ancient China*, art historian Robert Bagley (1999) launches a polemical attack on traditional Chinese historiography and its pernicious influence on Shang archaeology stating that,

> since the Shang dynasty was represented by later writers as the paramount cultural and political power of its time, sites and finds distant from the Shang court have been assigned either to political subordinates of the Shang king or to inferiors vaguely imagined as barbarians … Shang archaeology has operated on the premise that traditional history provides

> an adequate account of the past and that all archaeological discoveries should find a natural place within that account.
>
> Yet as archaeological finds multiply, it becomes increasingly evident that the centrality and cultural unity which are the essence of the traditional model [of ancient China] are nowhere to be seen in the archaeological record of the time of the Anyang kings. By that time, the last two or three centuries of the second millennium B.C., civilization had long since spread to a very large area, and the evidence for civilized societies geographically remote and culturally different from Anyang is now abundant. Rationalizations that would attach the whole of a large and diverse archaeological record to a royal house attested at one city in north China have come to look arbitrary and improbable. (124)

In this statement Bagley claims that the polity at Anyang was not the political and cultural superpower that later Chinese historians made it out to be and that the archaeological record largely contradicts this traditional account which nonetheless still guides archaeological research in China. Instead, Bagley sees China as being home to a variety of "civilizations" by the end of the second millennium BCE (the Anyang period). Key to Bagley's argument then, and to his understanding of this period, is his notion of "civilization." For Bagley, due to the scale, complexity and cultural value accorded to the bronze industry in China during this period, civilization can be equated with bronze casting.

> The Bronze Age of China is set apart from all others by the enormous quantities of metal it has left us … Mining and casting on this scale presuppose an investment in labor and organization that makes them a clear symptom of the emergence of stratified societies. If the term "Bronze Age" is applied in China to the earliest societies that supported large metal industries, it labels exactly the stage of development that we would want to call civilized. In other words, whether or not it played any causal role, bronze in China supplies an unambiguous index of social complexity. (137)

Thus, for Bagley, not only is bronze casting a direct measure of social complexity in Bronze Age China, but bronze vessels,

> have an individuality that sensitively registers in differences of time and place; cultural differences and interactions can be read from their types, decoration, and assemblages. Because they served political or religious functions for elites, they reflect the activities of the highest strata of society; unlike the pottery on which archaeology normally depends, they

> supply information that can be interpreted in terms somewhat resembling those of narrative history. (139)

While it is tempting to argue that this formulation is an art historian's-eye-view of material culture,[34] Bagley's insight is useful in stressing the unique importance of bronze casting in second millennium BCE China and the kinds of information potentially gleaned from its study. Nevertheless, there are some obvious problems with Bagley's equation of bronze casting with "civilization," not the least of which is that his use of the term "civilization" remains a concept vaguely defined in terms of "stratification" – conflating social complexity with a particular form of craft specialization. Moreover, similarly to Baines and Yoffee (1998) and Yoffee (2005), civilization is equated with elite culture, while history is conceived in terms of the "activities of the highest strata of society."[35] Thus, Bagley's account is largely a culture-historical narrative of the rise and spread of bronze piece-mold casting in China.

In brief, Bagley's narrative is roughly that though small-scale metallurgy may have been introduced from the West via the Qijia and Siba cultures,[36] large-scale bronze casting first arose at Erlitou. The heir to the Erlitou bronze casting was Erligang, which expanded and developed this technology – spreading it over a wide area. Moreover, since the bronze vessels of this period are

> indistinguishable from Zhengzhou counterparts no matter where they are found, they argue that the dispersion of the Erligang civilization was not a gradual process but a sharply defined event. It seems difficult to imagine any mechanism other than conquest that could spread a uniform

[34] Indeed, from a traditional cultural-historical archaeological point of view Bagley's privileging of bronze vessels at the expense of ceramics is almost blasphemy. Nor is the privileged status of ceramics in archaeology without reason – unlike bronze vessels, ceramics break easily and have relatively short use-lives, thus making it possible to correlate seriation with stratigraphy and absolute dating methods. Bronze vessels on the other hand, travel well and last long, making their sourcing and dating matters of purely formal stylistic analysis (except where formal features can be correlated with casting mold fragments at foundry sites, but even this only allows one to date the casting of the vessel accurately, not its deposition).

[35] As argued with Yoffee's (2005) urban elite model of civilization, an exclusive focus on the activities of elites can neither account for the social practices that maintain the social order and shape the local worlds of elites and non-elites alike nor for the dynamic relations of power in which elite status is constituted.

[36] Bagley does not use the term "Siba culture," but instead cites the Siba site at Huoshaogou 火烧沟, Yumen 玉门 in Gansu province. See Li (2005) for a more recent account of Early Chinese metallurgy.

> inventory of bronze artifacts and a complex technology in a short space of time over so large an area. (170)

Thus, although working with a very different model, Bagley comes to similar conclusions to Liu and Chen (2003) concerning the Erligang expansion: that the spread of Erligang material culture (especially bronze vessels) was the result of conquest and population movement. Also, as with Liu and Chen (2003), the "transitional period"[37] that follows Erligang witnesses a retraction of the "Erligang state" and a corresponding rise of "local bronze-using cultures, and presumably of local powers, in regions which before the arrival of the Erligang civilization probably had no knowledge of metallurgy" (171). As I will argue below, this chronology and culture history does not entirely accord with more recent syntheses of Chinese archaeological material (Institute of Archaeology 2003, Campbell 2014a), complicating both Bagley (1999) and Liu and Chen's (2003) center–periphery account of mid-second millennium BCE China.[38]

As one of the world's leading authorities on Chinese bronze vessels and their casting, perhaps the strongest, most interesting, and yet problematic aspect of Bagley's account is the manner by which he arrives at cultural and political difference, as his analysis of the Xin'gan tomb exemplifies.[39]

[37] Liu and Chen (2003) call this post-Erligang, pre-Anyang period "Middle Shang" in accordance with current conventions in Chinese archaeology. Bagley, on the other hand, objects to labeling anything "Shang" that precedes Anyang, noting that the king list reconstructed from the oracle-bones and later historical texts may be nothing more than propaganda. Yoffee (2005), basing himself on an analogy with the fictitious Mesopotamian king lists has similar reservations about the traditionally held unitary and dynastic nature of the Shang.

[38] Moreover, focusing on bronze vessels as he does, Bagley ironically ends up perpetuating a Central Plains-centric bias. Had he also included proto-porcelain, lacquer, shell inlay, etc. in his culture history of elite goods (Bagley actually states that "no useful picture would emerge from a survey of architecture or lacquer or jade" (139)), he might have arrived at a less Central Plains centered view. For instance, provenience studies (Chen et al. 1999) have suggested that the widely dispersed hardware or proto-porcelain originated at Wucheng and was a development of southern origin.

[39] Actually the nature of this site is somewhat controversial. While the excavators forcefully insist that the Xin'gan find is a tomb (Jiangxi Institute et al. 1997), other Chinese archaeologists (including some at the Jiangxi Institute of Archaeology which was ultimately responsible for the excavation of the site) suspect that it was a horde or sacrificial pit. The fact that the site is located in a sand deposit (making it very hard to define features) compounds the problems created by the nature of the site's discovery. According to a source in the Jiangxi Institute of Archaeology, despite the report's claim that the site was discovered on September 20, 1989, this is actually when it was reported to authorities – only after a second batch of bronze vessels had been discovered and carted home by villagers (days after the original accidental discovery of bronze vessels by villagers quarrying sand). All of the bronze vessels dug up and carried off by local people were then supposedly

Associated with Wucheng ceramic tradition (Campbell 2014a), the bronze vessels of this site unambiguously demonstrate non-Shang civilization and together with the walled site of Wucheng itself, "are clearly the remains of a local power" (Bagley 1999: 174). Describing the bronzes at Xin'gan Bagley writes,

> Motifs, styles, and unusual artifact types all advertise the local character of the Xin'gan find, but perhaps the most revealing idiosyncrasy is the composition of the assemblage as a whole. The only tomb of comparable wealth yet discovered, the Anyang tomb of Fu Hao, cannot be much different in date, but its inventory is very different. It contained only 11 pieces of pottery; the Xin'gan tomb contained 356, perhaps because the high quality of the local ware gave it unusual prestige. Fu Hao's tomb had many more jades, 755 items as compared with 150 from Xin'gan, and more bronze vessels, 195 as against 50 from Xin'gan. Differences of quantity probably mean only that Fu Hao was richer than the occupant of the Xin'gan tomb; differences of type are more interesting. Of the 195 vessels in Fu Hao's tomb, 105 belong to the types *jia*, *jue* and *gu*. These types are invariable features of northern burials, but they are missing entirely from the Xin'gan assemblage, where instead 37 of the 50 vessels were *ding* and *li*. The absence of the types most essential to northern funerary ritual, the predominance of ding and li, and the presence of four large bells can only mean that the occupant of the Xin'gan tomb was not a northerner. (174)

Thus, not only style and form differentiate the artifacts found in this tomb from those found contemporaneously in the Central Plains, but also ratio of bronze to ceramic vessels,[40] relative numbers of different types of grave goods and number of different types of bronze vessels. With this, Bagley effectively demonstrates not only difference in regional style, but also difference in mortuary practices[41] and presumably ritual practices in

handed over (one imagines reluctantly) to the Jiangxi Institute of Archaeology. Thus, the site was partially disturbed and looted before excavation. In addition, no skeletal remains or tomb furniture were preserved, making the claim that it was a tomb hard to verify. On the other hand, the excavators claimed to be able to see discolorations in the sand that suggested decomposed grave furniture and twenty-four tooth fragments were reported discovered in three locations. Subsequent analysis suggested that they were from three separate individuals (Jiangxi Institute et al. 1997: 234–237) and it was inferred that they were sacrificial victims or death attendants (this distinction will be discussed in later chapters).

[40] As Bagley suggests, it may be that ceramic vessels and especially proto-porcelain vessels served as prestige objects at Wucheng (although they are not unknown in the north). According to the excavation report (Jiangxi Institute et al. 1997), 20 percent of the 139 reconstructable vessels were "hard-ware" (stoneware) or proto-porcelain.

[41] *Jue*, *gu* and *jia* are all beverage preparing and serving vessels, while *ding* and *li* are cooking vessels. Thus, whether they were actually used during the funeral or whether they were

general.[42] What is not demonstrated in this analysis is the political relationship between the Central Plains polity(ies) and those of northern Jiangxi. Material cultural difference or similarity cannot be directly equated with political relationships as seen in the Indus case, where a more or less common material culture is spread over a vast region which is nevertheless not generally believed to be a single political entity (Possehl 1998), or the Inka case where a great deal of material cultural diversity exists within the bounds of a single integrated polity (Malpass 1993, Mosley 2001).

On the issue of Bronze Age Chinese cultural diversity and Central Plains power Allan (2007: 489) takes a position diametrically opposed to Bagley (1999). She argues that

> an elite culture, which first crystallized in the early second millennium BCE centered at Erlitou, Yanshi, Henan Province, established a cultural hegemony over the entire Chinese continental region by the end of the Shang dynasty. This elite culture was associated with a particular set of religious practices, centered on ancestral offerings. Key to its formation was the association of bronze with ritual performance.

Thus, unlike Bagley, Allan claims that Erlitou and Erligang bronze culture was dispersed as a package that included not only the knowledge of bronze casting and vessel forms, but the religious practices they were associated with. Developing her concept of "cultural hegemony," Allan draws on Watson's (1997) studies of the McDonald's franchise in Asia to claim that Central Plains bronze vessels functioned as a kind of social capital, "by acquiring bronze ritual vessels, people could worship their own ancestors in a manner that emulated the elite culture of the Central Plains"(471). Moreover, this spread of cultural hegemony was predicated on a regional imbalance in "wealth and political power," rather than implying "political reach" (471). Unlike Bagley (1999) and Liu and Chen (2003) then, Allan de-links the spread of bronze casting technology and bronze vessels from political control, a move that is echoed by Sherrat's (2004) discussion of "world systems theory" in Mesopotamia and the "Uruk expansion,"

> The fact that "colonial" expansion in the last few hundred years has involved the projection of power over long distances, with industrial societies taking

placed in the tomb as offerings, or for the use of the dead (see Hayashi (1993) for the argument that Shang and Zhou bronze vessels were placed in tombs so the dead could continue ancestral sacrifice), different functional types suggests different use.

[42] This is assuming that this mortuary assemblage is also representative of non-mortuary ritual assemblages and that this site is indeed a tomb as opposed to a horde.

> over by force territories often occupied only by hunter-gathers, gives a false perspective to colonial processes in the past when "colonies" were often relatively small-scale trade missions, set up in the interstices between indigenous centers of power and owing to their transformative effects to catalysis as much as conquest … Instead the transmission of lifestyles and ideologies seems to have been an important aspect of the process, reflected, for instance, in the spread of Uruk pottery assemblages … and the food habits they imply – as much Coca-Cola-ization as colonization in its more recent sense. (Sherrat 2004: 94)

This raises the important issue of the social economic[43] processes that lie behind the distribution of styles, forms, technologies, practices and beliefs associated with bronze vessels in China and with material culture in general. Does the rapid spread of a particular technology and its products, however important to the social economy of its place of origin, necessarily imply conquest and political integration? As I have argued above, this hypothesis is predicated on problematic assumptions such as the equation of social-political complexity with craft specialization,[44] a conflation of (high) cultural networks with political networks, and the reduction of possible strategies of political integration to conquest and colonization.

Also unlike Bagley, and this time more problematically, Allan claims that despite the fact that "the people who used these vessels may not have shared many of the beliefs of the Shang, and they may not have understood the ancestral offering rites in precisely the same way " (Allan 2007: 471),

[43] By "social economic" I mean the interpenetrating networks of what are normally considered "economic," "political," "cultural" and "social" practices and fields. In this case, through what local and translocal social networks were bronze vessels circulated, their meaning constructed and or contested, and the practices with which they were associated constituted?

[44] Naturally this is not to say that some level of cooperation or coercion and scale of organization cannot be inferred from complex industries like piece-mold bronze casting, only that this should not be the only criterion for "civilization" in Bronze Age China, and that the precise level and nature of social-political organization capable of sustaining such industries is far from clear. As can be seen in the megaliths of the European Neolithic (see Renfrew 1973) or the massive public architecture of the Peruvian coast (see Mosely 2001), the mobilization of labor on a large scale can occur in societies that are not generally considered to be highly complex or hierarchical. While it could be argued that it is the complex organization necessary for Chinese Bronze casting rather than merely the scale of labor mobilized that sets this form of craft specialization apart and makes it a good indicator of social complexity, to my knowledge no one has actually quantified this or demonstrated the link between particular socio-political formations and particular forms of craft specialization. Rather than be taken as synecdotally representing the whole of social organization, bronze production should be seen as a particular social field intermeshed with other social fields, interacting with but not determining them.

> Nevertheless, bronzes were not simply prestige goods. Vessels have a function and ownership implies use; that is, that the owners of the vessels performed rites with them, and in doing so emulated the offering rites first associated with a culture based in the Central Plains. (Allan 2007: 466)

Thus, while Bagley sees different assemblages as evidence of different ritual, Allan, sees bronze vessels as evidence for the transmission of a suite of cultural practices predicated on a regional politics of symbolic capital irregardless of assemblage or context. The problem with Allan's hypothesis, however, is that it begs the question of regional power and assumes in advance the nature of the social-economic networks in which bronze vessels and their casting technology circulated. Thus, because the Central Plains polity(ies) were powerful and admired, local elites attempted not only to emulate the material forms of their symbolic capital, but also to gain a share of their "wealth, power and cachet" (Allan 2007: 470) through emulating their entire package of practices. While more or less wholesale cultural emulation is one possibility for translocal interaction, it fails to account for both cultural translation and redeployment of strategic symbols in local settings. Moreover, not only does the empirical evidence of bronze vessels occurring in different depositional contexts and assemblages in different regions suggest that the common set of practices and meanings that Allan proposes did not exist over the "entire Chinese continental region," but countless examples from other times and places demonstrate that no matter what the power differential, translocal contact and interaction do not occur without translation or negotiation, and that cultural forms that originated in one context may take on radically different form in another (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993).[45]

Narratives of the Chinese Bronze Age

From the discussion above we can see that there are several competing narratives of the Chinese Bronze Age with different perspectives on the importance and relationship between urban centers, polities and civilization. Liu and Chen (2003), for their part, see an expansive, resource hungry,

[45] Actually, my reading of Watson (1997) is that despite the particular organizational nature of McDonald's as a franchise (and thus formally predicated on near or exact replication in chain stores), it nonetheless comes to represent something quite different in East Asian contexts. Thus, rather than seeing the formal similarity of McDonald's stores around the world as culturally significant and an example of cultural emulation, I read Watson's study as an example of how something that is organizationally predicated on homogeneity can nonetheless be culturally transmuted in different settings.

"state" centered at Erlitou and succeeded by an even more expansive and powerful "state" at Zhengzhou. Both polities conquered and colonized vast areas of North and Central China in efforts to acquire resources for their elite craft industries. The Middle Shang period saw internal fighting and collapse and a reconstituted polity at Late Shang Anyang that was only a shadow of the former glory of the Zhengzhou "state." In this control systems narrative, cities play little role except as elite centers of production and control. Civilization and legitimation are likewise underdeveloped concepts in this model. Despite following Chang (1980, 1983) in the idea that rulership was founded on a monopolization of religious power, it figures as little more than the ultimate rationale for the acquisition of metal in Liu and Chen's (2003, 2012) account. High culture, then, is associated with a political integrating mechanism – the state controlled access to status and its symbols – so there was logically a close relationship between the appearance of elite material culture and the state. The periphery, moreover, appears basically as a resource-rich stage on which the Central Plains states played out their internal drama of expansion, in-fighting and partial restoration. While this narrative is based on recent archaeological research, especially focusing on resource procurement and settlement hierarchy, it reproduces almost precisely the traditional historical narrative of the Xia and Shang dynasties (see Appendix B, Table B.1). I would argue this is both a product of the traditional historiographic and pots-equal-people assumptions of most of the Chinese archaeological literature on which they are forced to rely, and, on their own control-systems model – which *assumes* a high degree of top-down administrative organization, colonization and direct control of resources for states.

Bagley (1999) on the other hand, perhaps the most vehement opponent of traditional historical influences on Chinese Bronze Age developmental narrative, prefers a more cautious assessment of Erlitou's social evolutionary status and political influence, but sees Zhengzhou as a large, expansionary, conquest polity. Ironically, in attempting to deflate the myth of an Anyang superpower, Bagley ends up with a position similar to Liu and Chen's (2003) narrative, at least in terms of a large Zhengzhou "state," a transitional period and then a smaller, weaker Anyang polity.[46]

[46] As Bagley (1999:156–157) puts it himself,

> urban societies arose in the middle Yellow River region during the first half of the second millennium B.C. About 1500 B.C. a major state formed there and expanded outward to rule … large territories. By about 1300 B.C. that state had retreated, perhaps under pressure from newer powers that had formed on its borders. For the next

One crucial difference, however, is that Bagley rejects the dynastic narrative implicit in Liu and Chen's (2003) account (and indeed, that of most archaeologists working in China) preferring to see Erligang/Zhengzhou civilization and Shang/Anyang civilization as separate entities (despite obvious material cultural continuities) and arguing for the idea of multiple "civilizations" in the second millennium BCE East Asian Mainland (at least by Anyang times). In Bagley's narrative, the anthropological literature on social complexity is gestured to but not engaged, casually deploying terms like "stratified" and "state," while civilization, rather than being linked with political order through legitimation, is indexed by piece-mold casting and its imputed complex organization. Urban centers do not play a role in this account at all, save as the potential sites of bronze casting.

Allan (2007), for her part, reconstructs a Shang cultural hegemony, seeing the Central Plains, from Erlitou to Anyang as exerting a powerful cultural influence resulting in widespread dissemination and emulation of Central Plains elite assemblages and practices. This is perhaps closest to the concept of civilization as a high cultural sphere found in Baines and Yoffee (1998) and demonstrates the limitations of totalizing and monocentric models of cultural production. The natures of Early Chinese polities are not really addressed in Allan's account other than as sources of prestige, nor are urban centers figured in the production and perpetuation of high culture.

Part of the issue complicating understanding of North China in the second millennium BCE, are the various ways in which the term "civilization" is being understood (Campbell 2013a). In English, the term has three basic referents: a cultural totality (e.g. "Western Civilization"), a stage of socio-political evolution (e.g. "the rise of civilization") and a normative sense of proper conduct and order (e.g. "civilized behavior"). The three senses are, moreover, all inter-related: the first derives from a post-Enlightenment division of Culture from Nature, the second its Western ethno-historiographic myth of origin, and the last its hierarchical, normative perspective (Campbell 2014b). If we wish to disentangle "civilization" from its Western historical baggage, however, we need to consider the possible alternative ways in which normativity, nature-culture collectives

> few centuries thereafter, civilized China was a network of interacting powers, among them the dynasty that ruled at Anyang.

In this statement we can also see Bagley's attempt to de-link the archaeological record from the traditional historical one, and the Zhengzhou polity from the Anyang one.

and history might coalesce. If we, instead of looking for benchmarks or indexes of some chimerical universal socio-political stage, recognize that every human society has its normative practices and, its technologies and its symbols, then we can open up a less tendentious investigation into the relationships between culture, identity, socio-political organization and their ordering practices.

CHAPTER 3

Central Plains Civilization from Erlitou to Anyang

The Erlitou Period (ca. 1800–1600 BCE)

If we are to set the Shang polity at Anyang within its long-term, large-scale context we must first trace out a sketch of the North Chinese Bronze Age – the rise and decline of population centers, the dynamics of socio-political organization and the changing socio-technic traditions related to them. The center stage of this narrative is the middle Yellow River valley and its surrounding lands – the scene opens with the rise of Erlitou to the status of contemporaneous mega-center sometime in the eighteenth or seventeenth century BCE (Campbell 2014a).[1] The reason for beginning here is not that Erlitou is identified with the first dynasty (Xia) by most Chinese archaeologists, for the traditional textual accounts upon which our knowledge of the Xia are based are not only of dubious authenticity, but they tell us nothing useful in terms of the organization of contemporaneous urban spaces, polities or practices. The reason for starting at this time and place is rather that Erlitou is clearly the headwaters of the Central Plains Bronze Tradition. By Erlitou phase II, ca. 1700–1650 or 1800–1700 BCE, this regional center on the Luo river near modern Luoyang, would become the largest urban center in East Asia (300 ha) (Figure 3.1). Yet it is not the site size of Erlitou that distinguishes it from what went before, for there are now at least half-dozen sites known

[1] There is much controversy concerning the early dates of Erlitou with the most recent radio-carbon dates putting Erlitou I at no earlier than 1750 BCE (Qiu et al. 2006). The older dates of circa 1900 or 1850 BCE are preferred by other scholars (Liu and Chen 2003, 2012, Shelach-Lavi 2015). Part of the controversy revolves around uncertainties in the calibration curve for this period and the recent argument that the Xinzhai culture should be considered contemporaneous with at least the early phases of Erlitou rather than a precursor to Erlitou culture (L. Zhang 2012).

FIGURE 3.1 Erlitou Site Map (after Xu et al. [2004] 2005: 24, fig. 1)

from the mid-third millennium BCE onward of similar if not greater size.[2] Indeed, Erlitou could be seen as the last of the great mainland East Asian Neolithic centers were it not for the first evidence of relatively large-scale multi-component bronze casting. Erlitou is thus significant as the beginning of the Central Plains Bronze Tradition – a key techno-cultural complex that would flourish for over a thousand years, and, for many scholars, define the period. Yet, despite the fascination that the bronze vessels of this tradition hold for collectors and art historians, it is important to remember that they were just one material component of a larger suite

[2] Sites such as Taosi, Zhoujiazhuang, Liangchengzhen, Yaowangcheng, Liangzhu, Shimao, Baodun, Shijiahe and so on (see Liu and Chen 2012, Campbell 2014a, Shelach-Lavi 2015).



FIGURE 3.2 Erlitou Courtyard 2 (after Institute of Archaeology 2003: 67, fig. 2–4)

of symbolically charged and socio-politically important practices. Other key features of the Central Plains Metropolitan Tradition found at Erlitou include its large courtyard structures and walled "palace-temple" area, its ritual remains and its lavish tombs full of cinnabar, jade, lacquer, turquoise and fine ceramics – in addition to a few bronze vessels and weapons. Its relatively large-scale workshops are also important, for though the mega-center as primary production locus does not necessarily begin at Erlitou, we have clearer evidence of it at Erlitou than at any earlier East Asian site (Figures 3.2 and 3.3). All of these key features, from pre-eminent site size



FIGURE 3.3 Erlitou Elite Material Culture (left to right, top to bottom): turquoise inlaid bronze plaques; jade artifacts (1–3 *zhang*; 4,5 *ge*; 6,7,9, 15 *yue*-axes; 8, 10, 13, 14 *dao*-blades; 11, 12 "handle-shaped" artifacts); bronze vessels (1, 2 *jue*; 3, 6 *jia*; 4 *ding*; 5 *xiu*); bronze weapons (1, 2 *ge*; 3 axe; 4–6 knives) (after Institute of Archaeology 2003: 104–106; fig. 2–11, 2–12, 2–9, 2–10)

to elite material cultural traditions and large-scale production are aspects of later Central Plains Tradition mega-centers, such as Anyang, as well. At the same time, however, there is evidence of change as new elements were incorporated into the assemblage of spaces, objects and practices; as old elements were rearranged or lost; and as the scale and nature of the centers, their interactions and their practices transformed.

Looking at Erlitou in dynamic regional context, it is clear that it functioned as a kind of magnet – pulling in people, resources and interactions. For not only did Erlitou become more culturally homogeneous over time (Campbell 2014a, Institute of Archaeology 2003), but the regions surrounding Erlitou show population decline in the Erlitou period while the Luoyang basin (which includes Erlitou) shows dramatic increase both the number and aggregate size of settlements (Jaang forthcoming). At Erlitou itself, there is not only a concentration of people but also a disproportionate aggregation of wealth to a degree not seen at other contemporaneous sites. While such regional concentrations of population or wealth were not unprecedented in mainland East Asia, the particular

manifestation of this concentration of social energy took on a new form even while many of its particular components had earlier and/or distant origins. If we were to follow Baines and Yoffee's (1998) lead and look for concentrations of wealth related to new elite ideologies underpinning new political forms and their high cultural orders, then at Erlitou the material manifestations of such concentrations appear to be found in large, rammed earth courtyard structures, their walled enclosure, sacrificial pits, elite-oriented production and burials. The burials especially are telling, with their drinking and feasting sets of labor-intensive or rare materials such as bronze, lacquer or fine white ceramics. Jade and bronze weapons link violence and authority while jade discs and turquoise plaques suggest perhaps ritual paraphernalia or ceremonial ornamentation. Cowries and cinnabar point to long-range interaction, and collectively, along with the other grave goods, signify the importance accorded to lavishly equipping at least some of the population for the next world. Beyond this evidence for mortuary hierarchy, sacrifice and large-scale architecture, however, how are we to understand the particulars of how Erlitou worked or the nature of its practices? If these things cannot simply be derived from theory, as I have argued above, then what options remain?

One potential strategy would be to work backward from better-known periods using direct historical analogy, while another might be to trace the origins of Erlitou practices, or, putting them together to work simultaneously forward and backward in time and outwards in space. If Erlitou clearly stands at the headwaters of the Central Plains Metropolitan Tradition, the most obvious (and most treacherous) path to its interpretation is as an earlier and simpler version of later Chinese capitals. This path leads to an unfortunate tendency to smuggle in the anachronistic and dynastic elite-centric biases of the transmitted textual tradition (Thorp 1991, Bagley 1999). One manifestation of this phenomenon is the assumption of cultural superiority and one-way influence – Erlitou as locus of civilization, invention and influence – whereas a more accurate understanding of Erlitou might be as a cultural vortex: pulling in and transforming regional traditions and socio-cultural complexes into new, synthetic forms. Thus, while mortuary hierarchies with rich burials at the apex were widespread features of major centers in the previous millennium in mainland East Asia, a focus on elaborate and costly drinking and feasting vessels in burials was a fourth and third millennium BCE east coast tradition which had taken on a wide distribution by Erlitou times (Underhill 2002). The presence of Erlitou-type drinking vessels in Gansu, Liaoning and Sichuan, suggests a wide-ranging elite material cultural horizon (and perhaps elite interaction), but (contra

Liu and Chen 2003) not a mono-centered one and even less a politically centralized one (Shelach 1996b, 1999, Campbell 2014a, Shelach-Lavi 2015). Bronze working likewise was not pioneered at Erlitou but took on a new significance there when it was employed in the production of elite feasting vessels. At the same time, the development of the technology harnessed and transformed the knowledge and skills of an advanced ceramics industry while multi-component bronze casting provided affordances for formal and stylistic development unique to bronze, entailing and entangling complex networks of mining, charcoal making, smelting, transporting, melting, mold making, casting and finishing. Unlike elite ceramics, however, Erlitou bronze vessels are limited in distribution to Erlitou itself and relatively rare. This fact, combined with their small size, suggests that their role in political economy as presented in some accounts may be overstated. Other bronze traditions include that of the Qijia in the West and the Seima-turbino bronzes of the eastern Steppe, the latter of which circulated over a wide area from Central Asia to the Central Plains (Shelach 2009, Jaang 2015). Lacquer, much in evidence in Erlitou tombs despite preservation biases, was a technology likely developed in the Yangtze area and perhaps produced there as well, and it too likely had wide distribution, though surviving remains from contemporaneous sites are rare. The high-fired stoneware and proto-porcelain found at Erlitou was originally developed in the Yangtze area as well, and at least some of it produced there, perhaps made by the successors of the great Liangzhu and Shijiahe centers that once flourished in the area (Flad and Chen 2013). Cinnabar, spread across the chambers of high-status Erlitou tombs, appears to be another tradition that derived from elsewhere, but in this case passed down from the Taosi tradition (Fang 2015). While the jade discs and axes found at Erlitou were common to a large distribution of third millennium BCE mainland East Asian traditions, the peculiar jade blades known as *zhang* 璋, prominent in Erlitou jade assemblages, were derived from the earlier mega-center Shimao at the edge of the Ordos (Jaang 2015). At the same time, the turquoise inlay plaques for which Erlitou is famous, are a tradition shared with the Qijia culture of Gansu in the west. Turquoise inlay may very well have been a western tradition from the beginning (Jaang 2011). Thus, rather than see Erlitou as a beacon of civilization in a sea of barbaric darkness, it would be more accurate to understand this, and other centers, as hubs of interaction bringing together people, things and ideas near and far and forging them into new synthetic forms. In terms of interaction, Erlitou elite material culture can be divided into things with relatively local distribution such as bronzes vessels, rammed earth courtyard structures, fine white

ceramics and the use of cinnabar in tombs, and other features such as ceramic drinking sets, jades and elaborate burials which had a much wider distribution.

From the perspective of the ceramic assemblages upon which the regional Erlitou period archaeological cultures are ultimately based, the present state of information makes it extremely difficult to do more than speculate about the social practices, attitudes and networks of exchange in which they were produced, exchanged and consumed. Nevertheless, on current evidence, it appears that kilns were common features of residential sites, kiln sizes were small, and everyday ceramics were probably locally made (Campbell 2014a). If this is indeed the case, then large-scale distribution networks can be discounted as a factor in producing similarities in ceramics over large areas. In other words, the spread of Erlitou-type ceramic assemblages ought to have had something to do with the movement of people. At the same time, variants of the Erlitou tradition retain local characteristics and similarity to Erlitou tends to fall away with distance from the center (Map 3.1, Campbell 2014a). To the extent this is correct, it suggests, rather than population replacement, an increased interaction within a sphere centered on Erlitou decreasing in intensity with distance. The social processes that produced these effects may have included marriages, economic exchange, military alliance, conquest, colonization or combinations of the above. At the same time, ceramic traditions and their variants tend to show associations with their neighbors in all directions – suggesting that the social interactions mirrored in ceramic tradition distributions were probably local in scale, while in general ceramic tradition boundaries appear to be soft.[3] Although data from burials, houses and lithic industries are fragmentary at best, regional traditions appear to hold sway,[4] but not always co-extensive with ceramic traditions and seeming to have even less to do with putative political entities. An even larger material cultural distribution sphere can be seen with the Northern Complex bronze tradition, its mirrors, knives, axes and earrings distributed from Liaoning to Gansu, from Zhukaigou to Erlitou (Shelach 1999, Campbell 2014a, Jaang 2015). This phenomenon bespeaks even wider ranging contacts than any other material cultural tradition, but its widespread diffusion in a variety of cultural contexts is even

[3] This again complicates the simple model of an expansionist state, coextensive with the distribution of reified ceramic boundaries seen in Liu and Chen (2003) and many other Chinese language treatments of the subject (e.g. Institute of Archaeology 2003)

[4] Witness the "kiln-cave" houses at Dongxiafeng, absent from Erlitou but common to Shanxi and Shaanxi from Neolithic times to the present.



MAP 3.1 Erlitou Period Ceramic Traditions

less likely to be explained by a single political master-narrative, suggesting rather a myriad of interactions over centuries.

As for Erlitou period networks of social and economic exchange and their relationship to political organization and the circulation of social power, the data presently available for Erlitou is far from sufficient to do much more than speculate. Although small-scale bronze metallurgy was likely taking place in many places in northern and western China including the Central Plains area, and all of these sites would have had to procure copper, lead and tin from somewhere, we neither have data on contemporaneous mining sites nor evidence for the routes by which metals reached the various large and small-scale workshops,[5] much less the social mechanisms of exchange or how they were politically structured. The same could be said of cinnabar, lacquer, turquoise and cowry shells as well as other materials for elite cultural production that have not

[5] Liu and Chen's (2003) hypothesis concerning Erlitou's control of mining sites in the Zhongtiao mountains remains an intriguing possibility, but essentially without any direct evidence.

preserved (silks, costly foods, rare woods, etc.). Even less is known about the non-elite economy, although based on work on stone tool production at Huizui, Chen (2005) suggests that the production and distribution of subsistence goods were "more likely to have been organized in decentralized patterns"(9) than as part of a centralized state economy.

The political organization of the polity centered at Erlitou is unclear. Erlitou sat atop a settlement hierarchy of unknown size[6] and no other sites of Erlitou's magnitude are known for the period (except perhaps Sanxingdui). Its ceramic tradition was widespread, but the mechanisms of this spread are probably only indirectly related to political activity. The degree of centralization, mechanisms of political control and social organization can only be guessed at, or extrapolated through comparison with later periods, a comparison made justifiable in so far (and only in so far) as many of its elite cultural forms appear to be ancestral to those of Zhengzhou and Anyang – from architecture to symbols of status and implements of ritual.[7]

Seen in regional context, if Erlitou had its civilizational sphere, it was not alone. In Sichuan during this period, networks of walled sites were undergoing a still poorly understood process of consolidation that resulted in the huge walled center at Sanxingdui with its distinctive material culture and architectural styles that apparently nonetheless shared at least some direct or indirect contact with Erlitou elite traditions (Xu 2008, Flad and Chen 2013, Campbell 2014a). In the west and north-west quite different societies with different organization and material cultural assemblages existed in the Qijia and Zhukaigou tradition areas of Gansu and Inner Mongolia (Map 3.1) (Shelach-Lavi 2015, Campbell 2014a). To the north-east, the still poorly understood traditions of Luwangfen-songyao and Xiaqiyuan were located in what would later be core areas of the Shang polity at Anyang, while in the east the Yueshi traditions continued to display material culture different from that at Erlitou[8] even while showing some common interaction (Campbell 2014a). Inner Mongolia and Liaoning in the far

[6] Only limited areas around Erlitou and adjacent drainages have undergone systematic survey. The settlement pattern beyond these areas can only be constructed from unsystematic surveys at present.

[7] As will be discussed below and in later chapters, however, the form and, especially, scale of these elite practices undergo great change over this period.

[8] In fact, many Chinese scholars associate the Yueshi with the Dong Yi of Zhou and Han texts, supposedly intractable enemies of the Xia polity (assumed to be Erlitou). While Cohen (2001) has deconstructed this traditional historical equation of the Yueshi with Erlitou, neither material cultural nor received textual evidence suggests that societies in modern Shandong province, Eastern Henan or Northern Jiangsu and Anhui were within a Central Plains cultural orbit during the Erlitou period.

north-west likewise were home to very different societies from that found at Erlitou, displaying different architectural techniques, settlement structures, cultural practices and elite assemblages (Shelach 2009, Campbell 2014a). The Erlitou period was one of multiple overlapping cultural spheres of influence – a major one, on the western edge of the Central Plains, being centered on Erlitou itself.

Nevertheless, tracing out the lines of interaction and influence on its own does not get us very far in terms of understanding how Erlitou's particular concentrations of social energy articulated with power and legitimation, social practice and normative order. For if Underhill (2002) has cogently argued that the long east coast tradition of burying ritual drinking sets with the dead has something to do with status competition, and this is still true for its Central Plains Metropolitan Tradition descendants, there are a myriad ways in which mortuary capital, status and political power might be articulated within that framework. Looking to later times, and anticipating our discussion of Anyang, it could be argued that the Erlitou version of the Central Plains Metropolitan Tradition, in sharing many basic material features with Anyang, should operate on similar principles. If K.C. Chang was correct in claiming that the entire "Chinese Bronze Age" can be taken as an epoch (Chang 1983), then we might expect that the enclosures and courtyard structures housed kings and officials, were the settings of their sacrifices and the point of departure for their military campaigns. In the rich tombs were the hallowed royal or at least princely ancestors with their ritual vessels and paraphernalia for continued hierarchical feasting and hosting in the next life. This is one possibility – one in which essentially nothing changed over a thousand years but the froth of politics atop the deep and steady currents of Bronze Age Chinese civilization. Against this model I would posit the sequential great settlements as sociotechnological nexuses, forges of new identities and practices – drawing in heterogeneous populations, disparate technological and cultural elements and synthesizing them into novel forms. I will argue that even as the particulars of ancient sovereignties faded, new forms of leadership were framed in terms of a selective collective memory of traditional rulers. The Central Plains polities were not the only actors on the second millennium BCE stage and the various political entities and their interactions were surely as complex as they are obscure to us. The "Central Plains Metropolitan Tradition," moreover, is a large-scale generalization concerning similarity and continuity – understanding it as a reified civilization, or, still more concretely, as the material manifestation of a high elite ideology, dissolves on closer inspection. The second millennium BCE was a time of dramatic



FIGURE 3.4 Erligang Period Zhengzhou (after Yuan and Zeng 2004: 60, fig. 1)

change, and North China was a politically, culturally and linguistically heterogeneous place.

The Erligang Period (ca. 1600–1400 BCE)

The Erligang period gets its name from the site of Erligang, in the modern city of Zhengzhou. Subsequent excavation revealed that Erligang was merely part of a much larger walled center – the so-called Zhengzhou Shangcheng (hereafter shortened to "Zhengzhou"). Zhengzhou included both inner and outer walls delimiting areas of about 290 ha and roughly 13 km² (Yuan and Zeng 2004, 2005) respectively,[9] dwarfing all other known sites for this or any earlier period of Chinese pre-history (Figure 3.4). Its unprecedented size combined

[9] Henan Province (2001) states that the Erligang period site was 25km². The earlier over-estimation may be due to an extrapolation that included what turned out to be ancient lake bed to the east.

with a 37 ha "palace-temple" area with its rammed earth foundations, some in excess of 2000 m² (Institute of Archaeology 2003), bronze casting remains and elite burials have lead to the consensus view, in China at least, that the Zhengzhou site was a "capital" of the Early Shang dynasty. Unfortunately, the site is buried under the modern city of Zhengzhou, limiting our knowledge of it and forcing scholars to look to contemporaneous Central Plains Metropolitan Tradition sites such as Yanshi Shangcheng or Panglongcheng for elite architectural or mortuary analogies.

If many of the material cultural aspects of Shang elite culture had their antecedents at Erlitou, the Erligang period saw a quantum leap in their development. From settlement size to distribution of sites, in terms of the quantity, quality and distribution of elite craft production as well as evidence of long-distance exchange, Erligang was unprecedented (Steinke 2013, Campbell 2014a, Shelach and Jaffe 2014). The mega-center at Zhengzhou was not just the largest site in East Asia in its time, it was approximately five times the size of Erlitou. From the perspective of production as well, Zhengzhou yields evidence for at least two bronze workshops as well as specialized ceramics workshops (Henan Province 2001, Campbell 2014a), the former producing at least some bronze vessels larger than the aggregate of all bronzes known from Erlitou (Bagley 1999). The labor invested in the rammed earth walls and palace-temple structures at Zhengzhou likewise dwarf the expenditure on the walls and structures of Erlitou – suggesting that not only had the scale of society dramatically changed, but so too the resources that could be called upon (Shelach and Jaffe 2014).

The transition between the Erlitou and Erligang periods was, however, culturally seamless. Already, in Erlitou phase IV and increasingly toward the end of that phase, Erligang-type ceramics were found in the Erlitou assemblage (Campbell 2014a). Six kilometers away and roughly contemporary with the second half of Erlitou phase IV, the large walled site of Yanshi Shangcheng was built, and in the Zhengzhou area, the even larger walled site of Zhengzhou Shangcheng was in the early stages of construction. The "Erlitou expansion" was thus not followed by a retraction of Central Plains Metropolitan material culture but rather it was incorporated into an even larger "Erligang expansion" (Maps 3.1 and 3.2). The bronze vessel casting unique to Erlitou was taken up and expanded on in Zhengzhou and Yanshi and likely other sites such as Panlongcheng as well (Zhang 2013). The bronze and stone weapon types found at Erlitou continued to form the core of the Erligang arsenal and the use of bronze and jade weapons or artifacts derived from weapons as symbols of status or tools of ritual continued to be elaborated. The Erlitou jade assemblage in general remained the core



MAP 3.2 Erligang Period Ceramic Traditions

of the Erligang jade assemblage with some types, such as the "handle-shaped" artifact, increasing in quantity throughout the period while others, such as *zhang* blades apparently fell out of the metropolitan repertoire. Architecturally, the Erlitou enclosed courtyard style rammed earth platform palace-temple and circumscribed palace-temple area at the center of the settlement formed the basis of Erligang, and indeed, later imperial Chinese architecture (Thorp 1991).

The Erligang period is also characterized by some new developments, however, such as the appearance of Erligang ceramic tradition sites surrounded by rectangular rammed earth walls oriented to 10–20° east of north, distributed from Hubei to southern Shanxi. In fact, the change in the orientation of major architecture from approximately 5° west of north at Erlitou to the 10–20° east of north in the Shang period is viewed by many scholars as evidence confirming the received textual record of dynastic change.[10] Others (Sun 2009, Liu and Chen 2003) have noted that the

[10] The orientation of major architecture again changes with the Zhou.

presence of walled Shang sites on the periphery tend to correspond to areas of strategic resources (such as copper and tin: Panlongcheng, Dongxiafeng, and salt: Yuanqu), but military and political objectives may have been just as important (Tong 2003). These scholars also see the presence of these walled sites and the Erligang expansion in general as evidence for the direct control of a huge territory by a centralized state. While the presence of walled Central Plains Metropolitan-type sites over a large area suggests a common elite cultural sphere, even while the unparalleled scale of Zhengzhou suggests a cultural and political center, the actual relationships between sites and the mechanisms of putative control remain unknown (Campbell 2014a, Shelach-Lavi 2015). If the analogy to the Anyang period can be made, lacking the infrastructure of later Qin-Han type imperial control, political relationships even within the Shang cultural sphere were likely indirect, mutable, and based on ritually reinforced kinship hierarchy, alliance and sporadic rather than routine mechanisms of coercion. It is also likely that, as with the Western Zhou, which set up local rulers in strategic areas after the conquest of the Shang, the political, economic and cultural relationships between sites changed over the course of their occupation, each site and each region having its own local historical trajectory related to, but not necessarily determined by, the fate of the cultural and political core.

Looking at the Erligang expansion from the point of view of ceramic traditions (Map 3.2), (Campbell 2014a), several issues immediately present themselves. The first is the relationship between ceramic production and distribution. If, as we tentatively proposed for Erlitou times,[11] production is mostly[12] small-scale and distribution limited, then ceramic tradition changes can be more closely linked with the movement of people. However, given that ceramic tradition and variant boundaries also tend to be soft in the Erligang period (Campbell 2014a), whatever social or demographic changes are reflected in the Erligang expansion generally do not appear to involve wholesale population replacement. Rather, as in the case of Panlongcheng, which appears to be an Erligang colony and where there is a mixing of Erligang and local ceramic traditions, both Erligang and local

[11] While there is some evidence for more specialized ceramic production and possibly greater distribution, the general picture (albeit based on scant evidence) seems to be that of local production and consumption.

[12] This may not be as true for the area around the Zhengzhou center with its ceramic workshops as other areas, but currently very little is known about the distribution mechanisms of Erligang period ceramics.

populations may have co-existed (Campbell 2014a).[13] The second issue is the nature and developmental history of the Erligang ceramic traditions and their relationship to the issue of ethnogenesis. If Zhengzhou ceramics show evidence of multiple traditions whose variety gradually and synthetically changed into uniformity over the generations of the site's occupation, its seems likely that political identity and culture, rather than the unchanging property of a pre-formed "Shang" ethnic group who occupied the Xiaqiyuan tradition area during Erlitou times (Institute of Archaeology 2003), was something that continued to evolve within and in interaction with the great settlement at Zhengzhou – even as the great center brought together people in hitherto unprecedented numbers and densities, forging new identities, social forms and ways of life (Campbell 2014a).

The cultural sphere of influence centered on the Zhengzhou polity, though expansive, was neither homogeneous nor singular. In Sichuan, the Sanxingdui tradition flourished, while further down the Yangtze local societies responded to Central Plains cultural and perhaps political intrusion with a variety of responses, exporting northward their characteristic stoneware and proto-porcelains even as they absorbed bronze casting techniques and perhaps other cultural forms (Campbell 2014a). To the west, north and north-west in Western Shaanxi and Gansu, Inner Mongolia and Northern Shanxi provinces, local traditions, though showing increasing interaction with the Central Plains cultural world, nevertheless preserved material cultural traditions (including bronze-casting) and likely social organization and lifeways different from those of the Zhengzhou core. In Liaoning and Inner Mongolia in the north-east, the Lower Xiajiadian tradition area was still home to societies living in networks of stone fortified sites, who shared certain cultural forms with other sites across a broad expanse of the north and north-west (Shelach 2009), while in the east the Yueshi areas, while showing increased contact with the Erligang cultural sphere, was nonetheless distinct (Campbell 2014a, Institute of Archaeology 2003). Although in its time the great settlement at Zhengzhou may have stood at the center of the largest sphere of political, economic and cultural influence in contemporary East Asia, the elites at Zhengzhou nevertheless inhabited a complex cultural landscape, with multiple and multidirectional networks of resources, goods and knowledge. What is more, without the blanks filled in by neo-evolutionary state theory or anachronistic projections from later

[13] This might have taken the form of a Zhengzhou elite ruling over a local population (Bagley 1999), and/or close economic, social and political ties to sites in the north that saw a variety of forms of interaction from marriage to trade and possibly war.

China, the particulars of Erligang period institutions and interactions are all but unknown.

The Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei Period (ca. 1400–1250 BCE)

The Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei period is the least well-known phase of the Central Plains Tradition. Understood by some scholars as a transitional or intermediary period, it saw the demise of the Zhengzhou center and the rise of a new central site near Anyang (Huanbei). While in the sense that there seems to have been a shift of the metropolitan area north and east, the Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei period is indeed one of transition; nevertheless, in terms of material cultural distribution and continuity from the Erligang period, it cannot be considered an intermediate period in the sense of a collapse or disintegration of the Central Plains Metropolitan horizon.[14] Rather, the Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei period is the one in which Central Plains Metropolitan Tradition material culture reached its greatest distribution. While it is unclear exactly where the primate mega-center was in Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei phase 1, while Zhengzhou was already well into decline, the site of Huanbei shows itself to be, in both its size and its monumental architecture, a center of royal proportions, even if its occupation was short. Nor do elite traditions such as bronze casting seem to have declined during this period – rather they show a wider distribution than ever before, while vessel types and techniques continued to be innovated. Although evidence for diverging Shang-based local bronze casting traditions appears in a number of places during this period – such as the Sichuan basin, the upper Han river valley, and the middle reaches of the Yangtze, (Campbell 2014a) they are associated with societies whose material culture and practices had never been part the Central Plains Metropolitan cultural sphere. Rather than evidence for the collapse of a centralized and monopolized system of bronze vessel production and distribution (as per Liu and Chen 2003, Bagley 1999), it could more plausibly

[14] In Willey and Phillips' (1958: 33) classic formulation, a horizon is "*a primarily spatial continuity represented by cultural traits and assemblages whose nature and mode of occurrence permit the assumption of a broad and rapid spread*" (italics in original). While Bagley (1999) apparently has this or a similar definition in mind when he talks of an Erligang horizon but claims there was none for Anyang, his assertion is based on bronze vessels alone and an overly narrow interpretation of the term. As Willey and Phillips go on to clarify, "it is recognized that horizons based on cultural criteria unsupported by independent dating may have considerable temporal depth " (33). Indeed, horizons may last centuries, as in the Middle Horizon of Peruvian archaeology (Mosely 2001).

be argued that the trajectory of bronze vessel casting from Erlitou through to the Middle Shang was of an expanding horizon of metallurgical knowledge and artifacts[15] as cultural demand broadened and craftsmen found new patrons.

If the exact nature of the political landscape is unclear for the Erligang period, it is doubly unclear for the Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei period. The southern Shanxi area seems to have suffered a population decline along with the Zhengzhou-Luoyang region (Institute of Archaeology 2003, Campbell 2014a). Panlongcheng flourished a few generations beyond the demise of Zhengzhou and then too was largely abandoned although its ceramic tradition continued to expand and flourish through the Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei period (Campbell 2014a). The Middle Yangtze area in general seems to have experienced increasingly intense interactions during this period and the Wucheng site in Jiangxi reached its apogee (Campbell 2014a, Flad and Chen 2013). Sanxingdui was also at the height of its material cultural influence and there seems to have been interaction between the Upper and Middle Yangtze regions during this period (Campbell 2014a, Flad and Chen 2013). In the north and west, from the Zhouyuan in Shaanxi Province to central Shanxi and Hebei, Central Plains Tradition material culture continued to expand its distribution – though the mechanisms through which this took place are far from clear and likely varied from region to region (Map 3.3).[16] The east also shows expanded influence as Central Plains Metropolitan ceramics and evidence for Central Plains-style elites increasingly appeared in Shandong (Campbell 2014a). Rather than understanding the Erligang political landscape in terms of a centralized "state" collapse of which precipitated the fall of all of its secondary centers, the continued health of many parts of the Central Plains Tradition world in the Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei period

[15] Indeed, history is littered with examples of strategic technologies (whether economic or military) spreading beyond their original centers of invention despite the best efforts of their inventors at secrecy and control (Hittite iron, Chinese porcelain, and atomic weapons are just a few examples that spring to mind). Indeed the analogy to early imperial Chinese monopolies is not only anachronistic, but ill-considered – the Han iron monopoly was temporary, partial and ultimately impractical (Wagner 2001, Lam 2014).

[16] If analogy to the Anyang period can be made, it may be that new polities were set up by metropolitan elites in some of these areas, or by elites in adjacent areas that shared common traditions with the metropolitan area. Or it may be that local elites adopted elements of Central Plains elite culture, even while trade, marriage, alliance and conflict provided opportunities for ordinary individuals and artifacts to travel between regions. While it is obvious that there is intensive contact throughout an ever-wider area in this period, the political implications of this fact are much less clear.



MAP 3.3 Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei Period Ceramic Traditions

bespeaks their relative independence of the fate of the great settlement at Zhengzhou. Moreover, given the paucity of systematic regional survey, the ongoing destruction of exposed sites and the difficulty of finding those buried under the Yellow River flood plain, it is important to remember that we actually know relatively little about regional settlement structure for any part of the second millennium BCE. It is more than likely that important sites of this period await discovery or have been lost forever.

The Anyang Period (ca. 1250–1050 BCE)

The Anyang Period is named for the site of Anyang or Yinxu, on the outskirts of the modern city of Anyang, in northern Henan. Excavated since 1928 with a few brief interruptions, Anyang is the longest and most intensively excavated Bronze Age site in China. The site of Anyang, apparently the capital of the last Shang kings, reached approximately 30 km² at its zenith (Institute of Archaeology 2003) with a "palace-temple" precinct nearly 70 ha in area. The royal tombs at Xibeigang, north of the palace-temple

TABLE 3.1 *Comparison of Major Sites 1800–1050 BCE*[a]

Center	Size	Circumscribed Palace-Temple Area	Largest Structure	Bronze Casting
ERLITOU	300 ha	11 ha	9,000 m²	1 location
Yanshi Shangcheng	200 ha	4.5 ha	9,000 m²	2 (?) locations
ZHENGZHOU	290 ha (inner walls);1,300 ha (outer walls)	37 ha	2,000 m²	2 locations
Panlongcheng	75 ha	None	6,000 m²	?
Xiaoshuangqiao	150 ha	None	500 m²	1 location
HUANBEI	470 ha	20+ ha	**16,000 m²**	?
ANYANG	**3,000 ha**	**70 ha**	5,000 m²(?)	**5–6 locations**

[a] Metropolitan centers are written in capital letters and the largest size/quantity in each category is given in bold script.

complex across the Huan River, exceed in size any prior or contemporaneous known tombs in Eastern Eurasia, while the largest unlooted tomb found at Anyang, that of King Wu Ding's consort Fu Hao, far exceeds any other tomb found in China of this or any earlier period in richness. Thus, despite the widespread notion that Anyang and its polity was a diminished and decentralized successor to a mighty Zhengzhou state/empire[17] (e.g. Bagley 1999, Liu and Chen 2003, Yoffee 2005, Wang 2014), in a number of measures Anyang was unsurpassed, even as evidence for a more centralized predecessor in the Erligang period is more an artifact of tendentious historical and theoretical projection than actual evidence (Campbell 2013a, 2014a, Shelach and Jaffe 2014, Shelach 2015) (Table 3.1).

The Anyang period saw the rise of "the Great Settlement Shang" at Yinxu, a site that, though lacking a wall, was roughly twice the size of the Zhengzhou mega-center. It sat at the center of a metropolitan tradition

[17] Yoffee (2005) includes a table comparing site sizes of early urban spaces based on older estimates and has Zhengzhou listed as 25 m² (metropolitan area). This older estimate is apparently based on the faulty assumption that there was extensive occupation beyond the outer wall (his map on page 71 is also based on this assumption). Note that the figures for Anyang are off by an even larger margin. Yoffee lists Anyang as 19 km² apparently based on personal communication with Liu Li and Yates (1997). More recent estimation of the size of the Anyang site put it at over 30 km², over twice the size of Zhengzhou's recent site-size estimate.



MAP 3.4 Anyang Period Ceramic Traditions

of ceramic production, bronze casting, ritual practices and architecture of unprecedented homogeneity and distribution (Map 3.4), Institute of Archaeology 2003, Campbell 2014a). The site of Yinxu, Anyang, was not only larger than any previous site in China (and perhaps the world) but was also a hundred times bigger than the next largest known contemporaneous site (Daxingzhuang) (Figure 3.5). In addition it contained the richest burials, largest foundry sites and palace-temple area of any known contemporaneous or earlier center in East Asia (Campbell 2014a). While it is true that there is a much fuller range of data from Anyang than any other second millennium BCE Chinese site, it is also true that Anyang period metropolitan style bronze vessels far outnumber excavated or collected Erligang or Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei bronzes, suggesting that bronze vessel production at Anyang reached unprecedented levels. Anyang elite crafts also show new levels of technical virtuosity, while workshops in the Great Settlement Shang attained sizes and levels of organization never before seen in the Central Plains (Campbell et al. 2011, Campbell 2014a). In addition to a road network seen at earlier sites such as Erlitou, recent work has also uncovered a canal linking the major industrial zones with the Huan River

FIGURE 3.5 Handan Sacrificial Pit (after Huang 2004: 12, fig. 1)

(Jing et al. 2013). Whatever the political narrative from Erligang to Anyang may have been, it apparently involved neither collapse nor devolution.

Nevertheless, while Anyang and its metropolitan variant distribution (as opposed to regional variants) were both of unparalleled size, the Anyang period saw the retreat of Central Plains Tradition ceramic tradition variants on all fronts except the east (Map 3.4) (Institute of Archaeology 2003, Campbell 2014a). Given the sudden appearance of the chariot and the encroachment of northern complex influences in the north-west and north, along with the early period oracle-bone inscriptions that indicate troubled northern and western borders (Xia 2005b), the reduced distribution of Shang tradition ceramics in those directions may have had less to do with the internal weakness of the Shang polity centered at Anyang than with external factors. The situation in the south after the demise of the widespread Panlongcheng variant by the end of the Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei period appears to be one of multiple, interacting regional

traditions with no one center of cultural or political gravity. One might say that the Panlongcheng horizon gave way to a southern intermediate period with continued interaction and exchange (Campbell 2014a, Flad and Chen 2013). In the west, Shang ceramic tradition influences continued to ebb even while some contact was apparently maintained between the elites of Anyang and at least some of those of the Wei River valley as evidenced in the earliest of the Zhouyuan oracle-bones (Cao 2002). This again suggests that political relationships and elite material culture circulated in networks different from those responsible for producing ceramic traditions. Moreover, a shrinkage in the distribution of Anyang period Central Plains Tradition ceramic distribution should be no more considered an unambiguous sign of a weakened "state" and decentralized political situation than the Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei period maximum a sign of a strong, centralized and expansionist polity. The Anyang period ebb of Central Plains ceramic tradition distribution in the south, west and north may be partially related to the movement of the metropolitan area (and its attendant population nucleation) north and east, followed on by population movement and military pressure from the north and west.

In contrast to ceramic traditions, Shang metropolitan-style bronze vessels continued to circulate widely even while local casting traditions flourished on the peripheries of the Anyang period Shang world. If Bagley can claim, in reference to bronze casting, that there was "no Late Shang horizon," it nonetheless remains true that the distribution of metropolitan-style bronze artifacts was no less extensive in the Anyang period than it was in the Erligang. The difference, rather, resides in the fact that some areas on the periphery of the Shang material cultural world now had their own indigenous bronze casting industries, derived though they were from Erligang and Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei sources.

There is, moreover, evidence of continued contact and long-distance exchange networks linking Yinxu with its non-Shang tradition neighbors. Firstly, if Yinxu was the site of an unprecedented bronze industry, not only casting more, but larger and thicker walled vessels than at any time previously, where did it obtain its metals? The Yangtze area and Shandong are both possible sources for copper, while lead isotope studies have suggested that Anyang shared a lead source with the bronze industries of Zhengzhou, Wucheng, Panlongcheng and Sanxingdui (Jin et al. 1994, 1995, 1998), while tin may have been procured from Yunnan or Jiangxi (Shen 1985, Jin 1990). Some of the jade found in Yinxu tombs is claimed by some scholars to be nephrite from Hetian in Xinjiang (Zhang 1982, Shen 1991) and, if true, would constitute an exchange network thousands of kilometers long. Even longer exchange routes have been suggested for cowry shells, which, based

on their modern distribution, may have originated in the Indian Ocean (Li 2003b, Peng and Zhu 1995). Proto-porcelain and stamped and glazed hard-ware are also generally thought to be imported from the south, with Wucheng a possible site of production (Chen et al. 1999). Lacquer and shell inlay may also have been the objects of exchange (Fang 2005), not to mention the undoubtedly numerous things that left no trace in the archaeological record. Nevertheless, while it is apparent that the Anyang period was one of long-range regional exchange, the nature of the networks, their participants and facilitators or even the routes remain all but unknown.

If, by most criteria, Anyang looks like a further development of the Central Plains mega-center – larger; with more sophisticated, specialized and intensive craft industries; a more expansive place-temple area; bigger, richer tombs; sacrificial deposits well beyond anything seen before in China – it also displays several new features: the horse and chariot, writing, canals, a sprawling layout more like a cluster of villages around a palace-temple core than a classical Chinese city. In some cases, such as site layout – the differences may be more apparent than real: very little work has been done on residential areas or site structure beyond walls and palace-temples at earlier sites. Was Zhengzhou, despite the concentric walls evoking later Chinese cities, actually just a cluster of lineage settlements within and around its walls? We simply do not know. Other aspects of Anyang's difference, such as the scale and elaboration of its tombs, sacrificial offerings and divinatory practices suggest that the focus or even the nature of the polity and its key practices of authority changed radically between Erlitou and Anyang (Campbell 2013a). The increasing scale and organization of production is perhaps a less punctuated process, but the difference between Erlitou and Anyang is staggering nonetheless. Finally, it would be amiss to ignore or downplay the novel elements seen at Anyang – writing and the horse and chariot. While some have argued for writing before Anyang on the assumption that a true script takes centuries to develop, that "states" require writing for record-keeping purposes, and/or, that various sets of symbols found at earlier sites are actually writing (Li et al. 2003, Bagley 2004, Dematte 1999, 2010, etc.), at present there is no compelling evidence for writing in China before Anyang (as opposed to non-linguistic signs) and several lines of evidence against it (or at least for its recent invention), such as its extremely limited distribution in the Anyang period, the fact that writing systems can, in fact, be invented rapidly (Smith 2008), and the fluidity of graphic composition in the early periods of the oracle-bone script. Given the importance of writing to later Chinese culture – symbolically, as well as politically and practically, its invention at Anyang is a matter of no small significance in separating this period from what came before. The

horse and chariot likewise were of great significance – not only supplying elites with new symbols of status but also ushering in new modes of warfare and tying the Central Plains Metropolitan tradition to larger trends in Eurasia (Anthony 2007). The royal hunt, a tradition of great longevity in Eurasia (Allsen 2006), also appears for the first time with the chariot in China – as elsewhere – evidenced by the large numbers of wild taxa discovered in the palace-temple area at Anyang (De Chardin and Young 1936, Young and Liu 1949) and the hunting inscriptions of the oracle-bones.[18] Given the importance of this practice for royal symbolism and authority, its introduction in the Anyang period marks another significant break with the past.

War and Sacrifice in the Second Millennium BCE

As we have seen above, one aspect of the Central Plains Metropolitan tradition and its focus on social energy is war and sacrifice. The oft-quoted Zuo Zhuan passage that, "the great affairs of the state are war and sacrifice" (Cheng Gong 13), is often used to interpret much earlier polities than those of the mid-first millennium BCE that were its context. Indeed, a staple of Chinese archaeological narrative is the growth and increasing intensity of inter-community violence attending socio-political development beginning in the Neolithic and culminating in unification of the Chinese world by the first Emperor of the Qin. This narrative is based on both the seeming inevitability of hindsight and an evolutionism that sees human societies moving from peaceful egalitarian communities to state societies characterized by hierarchy, inequality and warfare. In much of the Neo-evolutionary literature, the inter-community violence of pre-state societies is typically seen as "ritualized," less deadly and less intense than in state societies (e.g. Keegan 1993). Keeley's influential *War Before Civilization* (1996), however, has cast doubt upon this evolutionary narrative even as scholars such as Wrangham and Peterson (1996) have argued, based on primate behavior, that inter-group violence is older than the human species. Assuming that collective conflict is a potential aspect of all human societies, the issue then becomes one of the form of its practice and the relationship between it and other social institutions and organization in

[18] While it could be argued that a lack of written evidence of large-scale elite hunting before Anyang is not evidence of absence, the palace-temple areas at sites like Erlitou and Yanshi Shangcheng have been relatively thoroughly investigated and nothing like the faunal assemblage excavated from the Anyang palace-temple area has ever been found.

general. Unfortunately, Chinese archaeology, with its mixture of traditional historiographical and evolutionary approaches, has been content with confirming its assumptions concerning warfare and social evolution with what scattered evidence comes to light in the course of mapping archaeological cultures and determining their chronology. As a result very little systematic information concerning inter-community violence in China exists before the first inscriptional sources in the Anyang period.

One work that has attempted to systematically study warfare and social complexity from Neolithic to Imperial times is Underhill (2006). The evidence for warfare in China before texts basically derives from four sources: scattered examples of "irregular" burial and bodies displaying signs of a violent death, the appearance of walled sites, specialized weapons and the occurrence of ceremonial weapons or artifacts derived from weapons in tombs. Based on these lines of evidence, Underhill (2006) argues that despite the claims of scholars such as Chen (1997),[19] there is no physical evidence for intensive warfare during the Longshan period (ca. 2600–1900 BCE),

> Rather, warfare increased in frequency, intensity, and scale after states developed. It is also clear that the relationship between leadership in warfare and high sociopolitical status became more pronounced over time during the early Bronze Age. (254)

Given that inter-group conflicts of one sort or another have probably always been part of human social life, the real question concerns the particular relationships between practices of inter-community violence and social-political orders over time. Indeed, as Underhill herself notes, most if not all of the material features of Bronze Age inter-community violence can be found in the preceding Longshan period, from victims of social violence, to walled settlements, specialized weapon types[20] and symbolic weapons as grave goods(Underhill 2006).[21]

[19] Not to mention expectations based on other parts of the world such as in Earle (1997), Haas (1990). Underhill, is, in effect arguing that conquest warfare played no role in the increasing scale of polities in the Longshan period. But rather that it was only after "states" formed that conquest warfare becomes an important political practice.

[20] Actually Underhill claims there is only one specialized weapon type (as opposed to tool that could be used as a weapon): the *ya-zhang* 牙璋 and that this might be more ritual than useful. On the other hand, You (2002: 61) notes that Longshan stone and jade *ge* dagger-axes 戈 have been found (the former at the Qiyuan Miaodian 齐源苗点site and the latter at the Shenmu Shimao 神木石峁 site.

[21] On symbolic weapons in Longshan tombs Underhill (2006) notes that, "the fact that some of these symbolic weapons are made of the prestigious and labor-intensive material jade

Looking at Underhill's four lines of evidence over the area and span of the second millennium BCE Central Plains Metropolitan Tradition, however, several issues emerge. The first concerns the appearance of "fortifications" and the problem of explaining why they appear in the Longshan and Erligang periods but not apparently at Erlitou, Anyang or other Anyang period sites despite the claims that the period saw continually increasing intensification, scale, and duration of warfare. The reality of the situation is probably much more complicated than the appearance and disappearance of walled sites, however, potentially involving such issues as the nature and function of walls, the possibility that walled sites existed during Erlitou[22] and Anyang times that have not yet been found, and the potentially changing nature and technology of inter-community conflict.[23] Skeletal remains are a potentially useful source of evidence, but unfortunately bioarchaeology is only at an early stage of development in China. While there are scattered examples of human remains showing evidence of trauma, irregular burials and increasingly common examples of human sacrifice throughout this period, no one has yet systematically examined skeletal material from Neolithic and Bronze Age sites with the goal of studying the distribution and nature of physical trauma over populations through time. Instead, as (Arkush 2006) notes for archaeologists in general, "much of the evidence for war that archaeologists draw upon is not in fact the direct result of violence" but rather "a second-order body of material culture that alludes to and represents warfare." These representations of warfare "provide less information about the frequency and intensity of war itself than they do about the place it held in cosmology and ritual, in elite propaganda, in gender roles, and in social group identities" (287–288). This is certainly true of the North China case where weapons and symbolic artifacts derived from them seem to be associated with status (of some sort) from at least Longshan times. Given that these are representations

suggests an emerging ideology linking warfare, relatively high status for males, and ritual during the Longshan period" (261).

[22] There is, in fact at least one Erlitou period walled site, at Dashigu 大师姑, (51 ha, 20 km west of Zhengzhou and dating from Erlitou II–IV [Zhengzhou Institute 2004, Liu 2005]) but not Erlitou itself or most of the other contemporaneous Erlitou tradition sites.

[23] We can only speculate on what changes the sudden appearance of chariots in the Anyang period wrought upon the practice of war (Bagley 1999). Shaughnessy (1988) argues that Shang chariots were probably more symbols of status than functional battlefield equipment, but oracle-bone inscriptions record their use in hunting (*heji* 10405), suggesting that we may be underestimating the abilities of Shang people. As Bagley (1999) suggests they may have primarily functioned as mobile archery platforms. Until reconstruction experiments are performed, however, these positions are all more or less speculative.

of violence (or rather symbols derived from weapons utilized in mortuary practice), the question remains as to what exactly these representations say about mortuary practice, violence and authority in the societies in which they are found. Moreover, there is the issue of the comparability of the burial practices of different times and places. To give one example from the third millennium BCE, the 300 ha Taosi 陶寺 site in southern Shanxi province has yielded both rammed earth walls (fortifications?) and some exceedingly rich tombs (for the period) (Shanxi Team 1980, 1983). Although the cemetery has yet to be fully published, what has been published shows some interesting differences from later Erlitou mortuary practices. Firstly, ceramics were quite rare and grave good assemblages were dominated by stone artifacts with stone arrowheads, *yue*-axes[24] and knives accounting for 1/3 to over 1/2 of the grave goods. At Erlitou, mortuary customs appear to be quite different, and burial assemblages were centered around serving vessels (particularly drinking vessels in elite tombs). Looking at the 39 tombs published in the Erlitou site report (Institute of Archaeology 1999), of the 16 graves from phases I-II and a total of 110 grave goods, only 1 could be considered a weapon (a bone arrow head) or less than 1 percent of the grave goods. In phases III–IV, the 23 tombs yielded 85 grave goods of which 12 could be considered weapons (or artifacts derived from weapon forms) or 14 percent. Does this mean that warfare was more important in Taosi society than that of later Erlitou (and in the face of the claim that weapons are increasingly associated with status throughout the period), or does it simply reflect a difference in mortuary practice? Without wider, and more nuanced, investigations at these two sites, we will never know. Another issue is the relationship between the richness or size of the burial and the number of weapons contained within. At Taosi, there does not appear to be a clear correlation between burial size and richness and weapons as a percentage of grave goods,[25] while at Erlitou, weapons only tend to appear in the richer burials. Thus, if we can make the generalization that weapons were frequently part of the burial assemblages of elites in both

[24] These axes were originally interpreted as shovels until the remains of a wooden haft was found in M1364 (Shanxi Team 1983).

[25] That is to say that at Taosi, if there were grave goods at all, they were likely to include weapons, so it would be accurate to say there is a relationship between tomb size and presence or absence of weapons, only not a correlation between tomb size and weapons as a percentage of grave goods. Moreover, the largest tomb yet reported, M3015, contained some 178 grave goods, 111 of which were stone arrowheads. If we group the arrowheads into tens, then the grave contained 19 artifacts that could be considered weapons out of a total of 78 grave goods, or 24.4 percent, which is on the low side for Taosi burials with grave goods.

Longshan and Erlitou times, it is not necessarily the case that they served the same function or represented the same things in different societies. Compounding these issues is the fact that with the exception of Anyang, burial data from the Longshan to the Anyang period tends to be unsystematically published and fragmentary, making comparison between samples exceedingly difficult. Since from late Erlitou through to Anyang times there tends to be a relationship between richness of burial and percentage of grave goods that are weapons, comparing cemeteries with different percentages of elite graves can give radically different results. There is, moreover, great variation in the type of grave goods even within graves of the same class at the same site (see Chapter 6) making it necessary to have a large sample of elite graves to compare, not to mention an even larger sample of graves of all types in order to contextualize the results. At present, these conditions cannot be met. Nevertheless, if we compare the well-published rich tombs containing bronze or jade artifacts[26] several suggestive broad patterns can be seen.

From Table 3.2 we can see that weapons as percentage of grave goods appear to stay more or less constant from Erlitou through the Anyang period although grave goods in general increase in number, and thus weapons become more frequent in absolute, but not relative, terms. It is worth noting, however, that while it is difficult to contextualize the mortuary data before the Anyang period due to the incompleteness of the sample, Xiqu-8 is a very ordinary cemetery in the greater context of Anyang. The fact that half of its graves (see Table 3.4) contain bronze or jade artifacts and surpasses all previous groups of tombs in number of grave goods (except Panlongcheng Lijiazui where only the richest tombs were published) and tomb size suggests both that there was a trend to greater funerary elaboration and richness over time, and that bronze weapons, once found only in higher status burials were finding their way into (relatively) smaller and poorer graves in the Anyang period. Looking at the sample of elite

[26] Here we are making the simplifying assumption that from Erlitou to Anyang bronze and jade yielding tombs are roughly comparable in status and that unlike Taosi, form a more or less continuous mortuary tradition. Nevertheless, we should make the important caveat that bronze production increases throughout this period and thus presumably becomes available to a lower and lower stratum of society. Thus a tomb with bronze in it at Erlitou is not necessarily of the same relative status (within the mortuary population) as a tomb from Anyang with bronze in it. Thus, a more complete picture of Erlitou and Erligang burials is still necessary to be sure of comparability in relative tomb status (within the mortuary population).

TABLE 3.2 *Weapons in Bronze or Jade Equipped Tombs Over Time*

Site/Period[a]	Number of Tombs with Bronze or Jade Artifacts[b]	Weapons as % of Grave Goods	Ratio of Jade/stone to Bronze Weapons	Mean Number of Grave Goods	Mean Tomb Size
Erlitou	7	23%	4:1	6.14	2.98 m²
Erligang	19	13%	2.3:1	11.5	1.79 m²
Panlongcheng	31	14%	1:2.5	14.26	2.76 m²
Anyang Xiqu-8	28	18%	1:2.5	13.6	3.27 m²

[a] The information for these sites comes from the following sources, Erlitou (Institute of Archaeology 1999); Erligang (Henan Province 2001); Panlongcheng (Hubei Institute 2001); Anyang Xiqu-8 (Anyang Team 1979a).

[b] This total is of unlooted tombs with bronze or jade artifacts.

TABLE 3.3 *Weapons in Elite Tombs Over Time*

Tomb[a]	Weapons as % of Grave Goods	Number of Grave Goods	Size of Tomb	Ratio of Jade/stone to Bronze Weapons	Period
Taosi M3015	24%	78	7.5 m²	1:0	Longshan
Erlitou VIKM3	25%	16	2.9 m²	1:1	Erlitou
Panlongcheng PLZM2	26%	77	11.8 m²	1:3	Erligang
Fu Hao (AXTM5)	11%[b]	1678	22.4 m²	1:2.4	Anyang
GJZ M160	74%	434	13 m²	1:35	Anyang
HYZ M54	>30%	600+	16.6 m²	?	Anyang

[a] The information for these tombs comes from the following sources, Taosi M3015 (Shanxi Team 1983); Erlitou V1KM3 (Institute of Archaeology 1999); Panlongcheng PLZM2 (Hubei Institute 2001); Fu Hao (AXTM5) (Institute of Archaeology 1980); GJZ M160 (Institute of Archaeology 1998); HYZ M54 (He 2006b, Anyang Team 2004a).

[b] This is counting the 7,000 cowry shells as 700 grave goods (somewhat arbitrarily counting small artifacts such as cowries and arrowheads in groups of ten). If cowry shells are completely excluded from the grave goods count then Fu Hao's weapons as percentage of grave goods rise to about 19 percent.

TABLE 3.4. *Weapons in Tombs Over Time*

Site/Period	Total Number of Tombs[a]	Tombs with Bronze or Jade	% Bronze and Jade Tombs with Weapons	Total Tombs with Weapons[b]
Erlitou	39	12 (31%)	58%	7 (18%)
Erligang	121	19 (16%)	53%	10 (8%)
Panglongcheng	38	31 (82%)	61%	19 (50%)
Yinxu Xiqu-8	55	28 (54%)	65%	17 (31%)

[a] This refers to the total number of tombs in the report, and can vary from everything that was excavated to only those tombs the excavators thought interesting enough to merit publication. In the Erlitou case, only thirty-nine tombs out of hundreds were fully published and clearly do not represent a random sample. The Erligang tombs are scattered around Zhengzhou and seem to include a more representative sample of what has been excavated. Anyang Xiqu-8, on the other hand, is a "lineage" cemetery that includes everything from ordinary to elite tombs (although the largest tombs have been looted).

[b] The first percentage is the percentage of the total tombs with weapons, the second of those with grave goods and the final of those with bronze or jade artifacts.

graves from Taosi to Anyang (Table 3.3), a similar pattern can be seen in so far as weapons as percentage of grave goods remains fairly constant on average (although with much individual variation in the Anyang period), while the size and richness of tombs increases over time. One distinctive development, however, is the appearance of weapon hordes in tombs in the Anyang period with some elite tombs (e.g. M160 and M54) containing enough weapons to outfit a small army (see Table 3.3). While it is tempting to directly interpret Shang military practices from these tombs (i.e. elites owned arsenals with which they armed their followers), tombs are, of course, not simply mortuary representations of life.

Nevertheless, weapons or symbols derived from them formed an important part of elite (and, over time, increasingly non-elite) burial assemblages complementing an assemblage core of vessels for serving and consuming food and drink. In Table 3.4, we can see the changes in the number of tombs with weapons over time. With the same important caveats mentioned above concerning the comparability of samples of widely varying quality, the data suggests that while weapons tended to be a part of assemblages in tombs with bronze and jade artifacts to a fairly unvarying extent throughout the second millennium BCE, a comparison of graves from Erligang and the "lineage" cemetery Xiqu-8 at Anyang suggests

that tombs were better furnished at Anyang with fewer tombs with no grave goods and a much larger percentage of the mortuary population equipped with "elite" goods such as bronze and jade artifacts.

From this evidence it is difficult to claim that weapons and elite status became increasingly intertwined during the period between the Longshan and the Anyang period – rather, status and violence appear symbolically intertwined from the third millennium BCE (at least in some regions) and the apparent increase in weapons in tombs over time is actually an artifact of an increase in the richness of burials in general. Nevertheless, it does seem that a wider and lower stratum of the burial community joined their ancestors equipped with what would have been markers of elite status in earlier times. Whether this trend is simply the outcome of increased technological and productive capacity or represents underlying changes in mortuary practice or even wider social organization will require a more fine-grained mortuary analysis and be taken up below.

In summary, aside from the observation that by the Anyang period there had long been an at least symbolic link between violence and status, not much can be said about pre-Anyang warfare in terms of its social and political roles, its intensity, or its scale. Nevertheless, in so far as the Shang kings at Anyang were the inheritors of a package of elite cultural traditions traceable to at least Erlitou, warfare may have played an analogous social-political role in Erlitou and Erligang societies. At the same time, specialized weapons appear in increasing numbers over the period, even as societies appear to increase in both scale and productive (destructive?) capacity. There may also have been changes in the practice of warfare as seen in the appearance of walled sites in the Erligang period and their disappearance in the Anyang period, which also saw the introduction of the chariot. Nevertheless, it would seem that violence and authority had a long history before the kings at Anyang.

Human Sacrifice

The remains of possible sacrificial activities have been found over a large expanse of mainland East Asia from at least the third millennium BCE. Huang (2004: 11) notes that headless bodies, multiple burials or animals and people buried together are frequently found together in Dawenkou 大汶口, Longshan 龍山 and Qijia 齊家 middens. However, as Huang himself notes, without greater context it is impossible to be sure that these midden burials were the remains of sacrificial activities as opposed to some other category of irregular burial or instance of social violence. Perhaps the

FIGURE 3.6 Hougang Sacrificial Pit, First Layer (HGH10) (after Institute of Archaeology 1994: plate 17, 3)

most famous example of a pre-Bronze Age potential sacrificial pit is from the Hebei Longshan site of Handan Jiangou 邯郸涧沟. Two "ash-pits" at the site contained a layer of human remains. The first instance contained ten adult males and children thrown helter-skelter, one on top of the other, into a shallow (0.6^ m deep) pit, some showing signs of cranial trauma. The second pit contained five bodies of all ages and sexes, again limbs akimbo, bodies piled on top of one another, some decapitated, others possibly buried alive (Peking University 1959). That these individuals did not receive typical burials, and that at least some of them met violent deaths, is beyond doubt. What is less clear is whether these were victims of sacrifice or massacre – perhaps following a successful attack by an enemy group – or some other phenomenon. Nevertheless, the presence of animal remains mixed in with the human remains is reminiscent of later sacrificial practices while the circular pit and the treatment of the victims at least superficially resembles round sacrificial pits in the lineage cemeteries at Anyang, Dasikongcun 大司空村 and Hougang 后冈 (see Figure 3.6).

By the second millennium BCE, sacrificial grounds associated with rammed earth structures were in evidence at central sites such as Erlitou and Yanshi Shangcheng. However, while Erlitou has irregular midden burials that include bodies decapitated, apparently bound, or buried with animal remains (Institute of Archaeology 1999), it is not until the Erligang period that we see, at Yanshi Shangcheng, orderly groups of sacrificial pits

including human, cattle, sheep/goats, pigs, dogs and even fish and grain offerings (Institute of Archaeology 2002). The sacrificial offerings are often in layers and the human victims include individuals dismembered, cut in half, as well as buried whole. At Zhengzhou, while there are many ash-pit burials and apparently at least one sacrificial area, the overall picture is fragmentary at best.[27] Sacrificial pits have also been found at the Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei period site of Xiaoshuangqiao but nothing remotely on the scale of sacrificial remains found at Anyang.[28] On present evidence then, it appears that over the third and second millennia BCE in the Central Plains, the interment of human sacrificial victims in pits developed in scale and organization. Anyang period practices of beheading, dismembering, cutting in half, burying alive and possibly burning all seem to have predecessors at least as early as Erligang times, and the Anyang sacrificial assemblage of human, cattle, sheep/goat, pig and dog can already be seen in the palace-temple area sacrificial ground at Yanshi Shangcheng. Nevertheless, while sacrificial pits associated with possible ancestral temples have been found prior to the Anyang period, as yet nothing like the sacrificial remains at the royal cemetery at Xibeigang has been discovered. If anything, the round or oval pits with multiple layers of sacrificial victims found at Yanshi Shangcheng and Zhengzhou more closely resemble the sacrificial pits found in Anyang lineage cemeteries such as Hougang than the large-scale, ordered rows of sacrificial pits sometimes containing dozens of victims each seen at the Xiaotun Palace-Temple area and the royal cemetery at Xibeigang. Whatever the relationship between paramount authority and sacrifice in the Erligang or Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei period, nothing to that point prepares one for the monumental scale of the sacrificial economy of Anyang.

The death attendants found in some Anyang tombs (see Chapter 6) also have antecedents in Mainland East Asian Neolithic and Early Bronze Age societies such as the Dawenkou tradition on the east coast, Liangzhu on the lower Yangtze and the Qijia tradition in Gansu. In the Qijia case, the death attendants are invariably female and the principal internee male,

[27] To give two examples, a pig, cattle and human sacrificial pit has been discovered at Nanguanwai 南关外 (e.g. pit C9.1H111) and a sacrificial ground 100 m north east of the palace-temple area contained 2 burning pits, 8 dog pits and 14 human pits containing a total of 14 people and more than 100 dogs (Henan Province 2001: 483–516; Huang 2004: 48). Nevertheless, on present, admittedly fragmentary, evidence the sacrificial remains at Zhengzhou show neither the scale nor the organization of the sacrificial activities that took place at Anyang.

[28] Some 18 pits with dogs and cattle and 6 with human remains have been found at the site (Henan Province 1996).

suggesting perhaps that wives or concubines were sometimes killed and buried with their husbands. In the Qijia case, this phenomenon appears to have been relatively common (12–14 percent of burials).[29] In comparison, death attendants occur in only about 2–6 percent of Dawenkou burials[30] and potential death attendants are even less frequent in Liangzhu burials (Huang 2004). Nevertheless, the issue of whether or not the secondary tomb occupant(s) were put to death at the time of the principal occupant's funeral and the issue of interpreting the different cultural contexts of what seem, on the surface, to be similar practices complicates any diachronic discussion of pre-Shang "death attendants."

Interestingly, there is a dearth of death attendants in the early Central Plains Metropolitan Tradition – none have been discovered so far at Erlitou and very few during Erligang and Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei times.[31] While this is in part due to the comparative scarcity of burials discovered compared to the Anyang period, as well as, given the relationship between tomb size and death attendants, the absence of any tombs comparable with those found in the royal cemetery at Xibeigang, there also appears to be a general increase in the number of death attendants in large tombs during the Anyang period.[32]

Burial Traditions in the Central Plains

If the Central Plains Metropolitan Tradition is characterized by war, sacrifice and sumptuous burial, we have already seen that while weapons as

[29] Specifically 14 percent of the burials at Wuwei Niangniantai 武威娘娘台 and 12 percent of the burials at Qinweijia秦魏家 – too many to be accounted for by a coincidental simultaneous natural death of husband and wife (Gansu Museum 1960, 1978; Gansu Team 1975).

[30] Many of these may not actually be cases of death attendants but rather secondary burials or later additions to the original tomb. For arguments that some of the burials do not contain death attendants see Huang 2004: 35–38. Huang, however, does not base his analysis entirely on archaeological criteria (such as evidence for later burial) but also includes factors such as the sexes of the skeletons, the richness of the burial and whether or not the relationship between the tomb occupants could be inferred to be husband and wife, apparently operating under the assumptions that only rich tombs should have death attendants and that wives could not be killed for burial with their husbands.

[31] For the Early Shang period Yuanqu 垣曲 M16 (Museum of History et al. 1996; Institute of Archaeology 2003: 245) had one death attendant and Panlongcheng Lijiazui M2 had three (Hubei Institute 2001: 152–157). For the Middle Shang period Zhengzhou Baijiazhuang 白家庄 M3 had one death attendant (Henan Province 2001: 581–584; Institute of Archaeology 2003: 280).

[32] For instance, Fu Hao's tomb had as many as sixteen death attendants (some were likely sacrifices rather than death attendants) while Guojiazhuang 郭家庄 M160 had four death attendants.

TABLE 3.5 *Mean Tomb Area Over Time*

	Erlitou (ELT)	Zhengzhou (EG)	Taixi (XSQ–HB)	Anyang (AY)[a]
Mean Tomb Area	1.19	1.17	1.61	2.51
Maximum Tomb Area	6 m²	4 m²	6 m²	26 m²
Standard Deviation	0.98	0.71	1.16	1.61
Number of Cases	45	67	112	1,364

[a] The Anyang sample excludes the royal cemetery on the assumption that there are no high elite tombs in the Erlitou, Zhengzhou or Taixi samples.

grave furnishings remained a constant in elite tombs, there was a huge increase in human sacrifice and the use of death attendants at Anyang. In addition, there was an increase in mean tomb size and elaboration over time, with a dramatic rise in the Anyang period (see Table 3.5), with the addition of ramps, wooden or lacquer burial chambers, and the increasing use of death attendants. Burial good assemblages and cemetery organization also appear to undergo massive change between Erlitou and Anyang. Comparing tombs with published dimensions from Erlitou, Zhengzhou, the Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei period site of Taixi, and a collection of Anyang lineage cemeteries,[33] we can see not only a jump in the size of the largest lineage cemetery tombs at Anyang but also in the average tomb size.

To understand these developments more fully, however, we must also take into consideration grave goods, and the wider contexts of the cemeteries in each period from Erlitou to Anyang.

Erlitou Burials

In terms of cemetery organization, graves at Erlitou appear to be scattered around the site with no discrete burial areas. Beyond this simple characterization it is difficult to say much about the spatial contexts of the vast majority of Erlitou tombs since only a small portion of the tombs excavated have been published and even less work has been done on small-scale

[33] See Chapter 6 for discussion of sample.

TABLE 3.6 *Tomb Types at Erlitou*

Tomb Type	Erlitou Site Report	Subsequent Excavations[a]
Large	10 (9%)	9
Small with Grave Goods	41 (36%)	37+
Small without Grave Goods	21(18%)	2+
Midden	43 (37%)	?

[a] These were the excavations in 1980, 1981–1983, 1984, 1987 (Du and Xu 2005: 668–723).

structures, such as ordinary residences at the site. As mentioned earlier, the larger, richer tombs are more completely published and are often associated with the "palatial" structures such as the series of elite tombs discovered in 2001 in the courtyard of "palace" 3 (Erlitou Team 2005a).

According to Institute of Archaeology (2003), 300–400 tombs have been excavated at Erlitou of which around 50 have been fully published. Table 3.6 summarizes the published information available.

Given that no published tallies exist of Erlitou tombs and their basic statistics for more than a small and biased sample of the total number of graves excavated to date, any conclusions drawn concerning Erlitou mortuary patterns are necessarily tentative. Nevertheless, based on what data is available, at least 40 percent of the recovered mortuary population were buried in rectangular tombs with grave goods. The remainder lacked tomb offerings or even a proper grave. While the lower ranked tombs are almost certainly under-reported, the fact that only a minority of Erlitou burials have grave goods at all, suggests the hierarchical nature of their mortuary practices.

In much of the Chinese archaeological literature, based on explicit or implicit analogy with sumptuary regulations found later Chinese ritual texts, Central Plains Tradition tombs are put into tomb classes with a presumed relationship to the living status of the deceased. Empirically speaking, the question remains, "are there actually clear burial classes at Erlitou, and if so, what are they based on?" One criterion already noted is tomb size as well as the widely noted relationship between tomb size and the quantity and quality of grave goods. Based on a study of the grave goods from the thirty-seven tombs for which statistics were given in the Erlitou site report plus the fifteen tombs published from the 1980–1987 excavations, grave furniture (i.e. coffins, tomb chambers), jade, bronze or lacquer artifacts



FIGURE 3.7 Erlitou Tombs: Area vs. Differentiation

all showed moderate correlations with tomb size (Appendix C, Table C.1), while turquoise and cowry shells showed no correlation, cinnabar a weak correlation, and ceramic vessels a negative correlation. Aggregating all of the most strongly correlated variables (coffins, bronze, jade and lacquer artifacts) into a single standardized z-score in order to quantify mortuary difference and correlate it to tomb size, it was found that while there was a moderately strong and significant correlation (Figure 3.7), there was nonetheless a great deal of variation in the expression of Erlitou mortuary differentiation.

In general terms, at Erlitou there seemed to be a continuum of mortuary elaboration rather than a rigid division between grades of mortuary treatment even while certain categories of grave goods (such as bronze and jade artifacts) were more typically part of richer assemblages or interred in larger tombs. Other types of artifacts (e.g. ceramics vessels, especially non-drinking vessels) were more abundant in smaller tombs. These facts suggest that while there was a basic divide between tombs with chiefly ceramic grave goods and those with bronze, jade and lacquer artifacts, mortuary distinction was gradual rather than categorical and vessels for food and/or drink where a common denominator for those Erlitou tombs that

had grave goods. Nevertheless, despite a lack of clear burial classes, the fact that only a minority of known Erlitou burials contained grave goods of any kind suggest that not only was mortuary ritual at Erlitou hierarchical, but also relatively underdeveloped or at least not focused on non-perishable tomb offerings for the majority of the population.

Erligang Burials at Zhengzhou

As mentioned above, no designated cemeteries have been discovered at Zhengzhou, with burials dispersed throughout the site. As with Erlitou, no "royal" burials have been discovered (or, in fact, any tombs on the scale of the largest contemporaneous tombs at Panlongcheng). According to Henan (2001) Erligang tombs at Zhengzhou can be divided into midden burials and rectangular pit tombs just as at Erlitou, with the latter having the same three basic distinctions, those without grave goods, those with chiefly ceramic vessels as grave goods and those with bronze artifacts. The numbers of tombs of each type are tabulated in Table 3.7.

Given the small size of the sample, as with Erlitou, we have no choice but to combine the data into a single sample, while noting that there appears to be an overall trend toward more bronze in tombs over time. It also appears that the percentage of rectangular tombs without grave goods increased compared to Erlitou, although with no figures for midden burials the

TABLE 3.7 *Zhengzhou Erligang Burials*

Phase	Midden	No Grave Goods	Ceramics	Bronze	Totals
I (Lower Erligang I)	0	0	3 (100%)	0	3
II (Lower Erligang II)	?[a]	17 (52%)	13 (39%)	3 (9%)	33
III (Upper Erligang I)	?	51 (57%)	22 (25%)	16[b] (18%)	89
IV (Upper Erligang II)	?	0	1 (33%)	2 (67%)	3
Totals	?	68 (53%)	39 (30%)	21 (16%)	128

[a] Henan (2001: 572) notes that there are midden burials as well but gives no figures.

[b] Henan (2001: 574) states that thirty Lower Erligang II tombs with bronze artifacts were discovered but only sixteen were properly excavated or not completely destroyed by subsequent activity at the site.

total percentage of burials without grave goods is uncertain. As at Erlitou there were significant and moderately strong correlations between tomb size and tomb furniture, jade and bronze artifacts. Though an important part of elite Erlitou assemblages, lacquer artifacts were rare in Erligang tombs. Moreover, unlike Erlitou, there is no significant negative correlation between tomb area and ceramic vessels. These facts indicate some differences in the mortuary practice between Erlitou and Zhengzhou. Thus, while vessels for food and drink still formed a common element of grave equipment, mortuary elaboration at Zhengzhou was beginning to be expressed in terms of tools, weapons and sacrificial offerings (dogs) in addition to the previous distinctions in terms of bronze and jade implements (Appendix C, Table C.2).

Calculating the z-scores of an aggregate of variables with relatively strong positive correlations with tomb area (furniture, dog sacrifices, stone and bone weapons and tools, bronze and jade artifacts) as a measure of mortuary differentiation and making a scatter plot of their distribution with respect to tomb area, we arrive at Figure 3.9. In this plot we can see that while there is a certain range of tomb size with the minimum ZDIFF1 values, those tombs that show higher values of ZDIFF1 show a very strong



FIGURE 3.8 Zhengzhou Tombs: Status Area vs. Differentiation



FIGURE 3.9 Taixi Tombs: Area vs. Differentiation

correlation between tomb size and mortuary difference (0.01 sig., r = 0.91). The remainder (with the lowest differentiation scores), are tombs with primarily ceramics or no grave goods at all and suggest that the basic distinction between tombs equipped only with ceramics and those with bronze or jade artifacts is a valid one. Compared with Figure 3.8, it is again apparent that the expression of mortuary differentiation is less variable at Zhengzhou than at Erlitou (and more sensitive to tomb size). As with Erlitou, however, the lack of grave goods for the majority of the burials suggests mortuary hierarchy, and, at the same time, comparative underdevelopment as even basic (archaeologically visible) mortuary ritual was reserved for a minority.

Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei Burials at Taixi

Gaocheng Taixi is a relatively small but well-published site of the Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei period (Hebei 1985). This means that in some important ways it is not comparable with the metropolitan centers especially Erlitou where the richest tombs in the sample are possibly the highest stratum of elite tombs for the period. With this caveat in mind, the relatively complete Taixi sample offers some interesting points of comparison.

TABLE 3.8 *Taixi Burials*[a]

Phase	Midden	No Grave Goods	Mainly Ceramics	Mainly Bronze	Total
I	?	?	13 (76%)[b]	4 (24%)	17
II	?	?	38 (78%)	11 (22%)	49
Total	3+[c] (3%)	33[d] (32%)	51 (50%)	15 (15%)	102

[a] Only undisturbed, unlooted tombs were considered here.
[b] Because the tombs without grave goods could not be dated, the percentages for phase I and II are only for tombs with grave goods. The percentages for the total row is for all tombs, not just those with grave goods.
[c] The Taixi report (Hebei 1985: 37) states that human remains were found in "ash-pits" H3, H19 and H23. Four more pits had human remains (H82, H83, H76 and H104) but they are apparently sacrificial pits associated with building F2 (Hebei 1985: 35).
[d] Tombs with no grave goods could not be dated.

Mortuary remains at the Taixi site (Hebei 1985), like Erlitou and Zhengzhou, appear to be scattered around the site, generally located in the spaces between or surrounding houses and often interspersed with middens. The general picture suggests that there was no rigid distinction between residential and mortuary space at the site. The burials themselves can again be divided into middens and rectangular pit tombs with the latter again divided into those without grave goods, those with principally ceramic vessels and those with bronze artifacts. Table 3.8 presents the results.

Compared to earlier periods, the most striking thing about the Taixi tombs is the relative lack of midden burials and decrease in the number of tombs without grave goods. Compared with Zhengzhou, the most striking differences are the appearance of human death attendants, and the relatively strong positive correlation of ceramic vessels with tomb size (Appendix C, Table C.3). The nature of the ceramic sets also changed with single *li*-tripods being the most common vessel type, making up 33 percent of the ceramics found in the tombs with *gu* and *jue* drinking sets completely missing from the mortuary ceramic inventory (Hebei 1985).

Combining standardized scores for those variables most strongly correlated with tomb size (furniture, waist pits, dog sacrifices, death attendants, bronze artifacts and ceramic vessels) into single variable expressing vertical mortuary differentiation (ZDIFF1) an even stronger correlation with tomb size was obtained (sig. 0.01, r = 0.83). Figure 3.10 expresses its relationship to tomb size as a scatter plot.



FIGURE 3.10 Anyang Tombs: Volume vs. Differentiation

Comparing the figures above with that for Erlitou and Zhengzhou, it is immediately apparent that the shape of the distribution is quite different than those of Erlitou or Zhengzhou, with Taixi showing a more even and continuous distribution of mortuary differentiation. Combined with the observation that there are proportionately fewer tombs with no grave goods and that the bifurcation of ceramic versus bronze equipped tombs appears to have become blurred at Taixi by Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei times (if there ever was such a mortuary distinction in southern Hebei), the Taixi tomb data appears to represent a less inegalitarian, more widely participated in, but nonetheless stratified mortuary ritual.

Anyang Burials in Long-Term Perspective

Unlike the earlier examples of Erlitou, and Zhengzhou where the burial data is sparse and extremely uneven, at Anyang over 15,000 tombs have been excavated since the 1930s, ranging from midden burials to four-ramped, monumental royal tombs (Campbell 2014a). At Anyang there is evidence for coherent burial areas, most conspicuously the royal cemetery

TABLE 3.9 *Tomb Types: Erlitou to Anyang*

Period/Site	Midden	No Grave Goods	Ceramics	Bronze/ Jade
ELT/Erlitou	37%	18%	36%	9%
ES/ Zhengzhou	?	53%	30%	16%
Taixi	3%	32%	50%	15%
Anyang	< 2%	12%	70%	17%

at Xibeigang, but other clusters of burials also appear in what many authors argue are lineage cemeteries (Anyang Team 1979, Zhu 1991, Tang 1998, 2004). Ramped tombs also make their first appearance at Anyang, elaborating on the earlier pit tombs with one, two or four ramps. Because the largest tombs are putatively missing from the Erlitou and Zhengzhou samples and the Taixi site is not a metropolitan center comparable to the others, only data from the lineage cemeteries Xiqu 西区(XQ1–8) (Anyang Team 1979), Guojiazhuang 郭家庄 (GJZ)(Institute of Archaeology 1998) and Liujiazhuang 刘家庄 (ALN)(Tang 2004) will be used for the Anyang sample. Dividing the sample into the categories of midden, pit-tombs lacking grave goods, with predominantly ceramic, and with bronze and/or jade artifacts, we can see that compared to earlier periods there appears to be an increase in the number of tombs with grave goods generally, though the percentage of tombs with bronze and jade artifacts appear to only marginally increase after Erligang[34] (see Table 3.9).

Ignoring, for the moment, the interesting developments between phases at Anyang (Table 3.10) and combining them as a single data set, correlations between a number of tomb variables were calculated. The variables with the strongest correlations with tomb size[35] for Anyang were tomb furniture (inner and/or outer coffins), stone or bone weapons, ceramic vessels, jade and bronze artifacts and death attendants (Appendix C, Table C.4). Compared to Taixi,

[34] This is partially due to the sudden decrease in the number of tombs with bronze artifacts in Anyang phase IV as well as the fact that the Erlitou and Zhengzhou samples are likely biased in favor of bronze equipped tombs whereas the largest tombs in the Anyang lineage cemeteries have all been looted (see note 50).

[35] I have chosen to use tomb volume rather than area in the Anyang case because it is a more accurate indicator of effort expended in the construction of the tomb than area. In the Erlitou, Zhengzhou and Taixi cases, tomb depth was either not available or unreliable due to damage to the stratum in which the tomb was located caused by later activity.

TABLE 3.10 *Anyang Burials: Lineage Cemeteries*[a]

Phase	Midden Burials	Tombs Without Grave Goods	Tombs With Mainly Ceramics	Tombs With Bronze	Tombs With Ramps	Total
I	?	0	8 (100%)	0	0	8 (1%)
II	?	0	60 (65%)	33 (35%)	0	93 (10%)
III	?	1 (<1%)	152 (73%)	54 (26%)	1 (<1%)	208 (22%)
IV	?	6 (16%)	319 (85%)	47 (12%)	5 (1%)	377 (36%)
Phase Unknown	?	110 (43%)	119 (47%)	25 (10%)	0	254 (27%)
Total	< 20[b]	117 (12%)	658 (70%)	159 (17%)	6 (1%)	940 (100%)

[a] The total number of tombs in this sample is 1,365 of which 940 were unlooted and undisturbed. It should be noted that all of the ramped tombs and most of the larger tombs in this sample were looted, skewing the sample toward smaller, poorer tombs. Thus, of the 37 tombs with volume > 30 m^3 in the sample, only 5 were undisturbed.

[b] Actually, no midden burials were reported for any of these cemeteries. The figure given is based on Tang's (2004: 100–101) estimation that less than 200 ash-pit burials have been discovered at Anyang. Given that over 10,000 tombs have been excavated to date, a proportional number of ash pit burials for this sample of roughly 1,000 tombs would be under 20.

the lack of strong correlation between tomb size and waist pit is likely a reflection of the increased frequency of waist pits at Anyang, making them a general tomb feature rather than a mark of distinction. Combining the z-scores of these variables into a single variable (ZDIFF), a variable with a stronger correlation with tomb size ($r = 0.75$, sig. 0.01) than any single variable alone was obtained. Plotting this variable against tomb volume (see Figure 3.11) we can see that compared to Taixi, the distribution of the scatter displays a much greater disparity between the largest tombs in the sample and their nearest neighbors. On the other hand, unlike Zhengzhou and Erlitou, but similar to Taixi, the distribution at the lower end of the difference measure takes the form of a cluster rather than a line. This suggests that the tombs lowest on the scale of mortuary difference at Anyang form a continuum with tombs higher in that hierarchy rather than simply being excluded from mortuary ritual altogether. Nevertheless, of the four sites under discussion, Anyang also shows the most variability in the expression of hierarchical mortuary differentiation after Erlitou, perhaps an expression of the increasing variety of things that could be included in an Anyang burial.



FIGURE 3.11 Comparison of Mortuary Hierarchy Through Time

Note: It should be noted that the disproportionate number of large tombs published for Erlitou means that the top part of the histogram is skewed. On the other hand, the largest tombs are missing from the Anyang sample (due to their being looted).

Summarizing the developments in Central Plains Bronze Age mortuary ritual from Erlitou to Anyang, tombs increased in size, structural elaboration (waist pits, ramps, coffins, tomb chambers, sacrificial victims/companions), and total number of grave goods, even as increasing proportions of the recovered burial population participated in a common, if hierarchical, mortuary practice. The nature of assemblages also changed over time with the increasing use of sacrificial victims or death attendants, and more widespread use of bronze and jade artifacts. Looking at a final comparative measure of change, a standardized variable of mortuary hierarchy (DIFF2) was calculated based on the previous measures combined with a z-score for tomb size (Figure 3.12).

These figures graphically display the changing shape of mortuary distinction showing both the trend toward the practice of a common basic burial form by the vast majority of the burial population even as the relative distinction between the richest and poorest in mortuary capital reached its apogee at Anyang.

In an influential paper Cannon (1989) noted that systems of mortuary distinction often operate cyclically over time with former prestige goods

becoming commonplace and new forms of distinction invented. Some such trends can be seen in Central Plains Tradition mortuary distinctions. Ceramic drinking vessels, such as *gu* and *jue*, formerly a minimum marker of distinction at Erlitou, became basic to assemblages at Anyang. Waist pits and dog sacrifices, introduced in Erligang times, became common Anyang period tomb elaborations even while human death attendants appeared and took their place as markers of distinction. Single coffins too became increasingly common by Anyang times and were replaced by inner and outer coffins as markers of distinction.[36] Thus, even as an increasing majority of the mortuary population was buried with what in earlier times were markers of distinction, so new forms of distinction were created as ever greater quantities of economic, symbolic and sacrificial capital were invested in the arena of ancestor construction. What is more, the development of mortuary distinction in Central Plains Bronze Age sites between Erlitou and Anyang was dramatic as the following series of representative tombs of each class from each period set to the same scale graphically illustrate (Figure 3.12).

The Great Settlement Shang and its Ancestors

Looking back across the centuries that preceded the Great Settlement Shang and out to its wider world, Anyang was heir to a package of metropolitan traditions first seen at Erlitou, and, like Erlitou, was the centripetal mega-center of a far-flung web of material cultural influences, resource flows and people. Looking more closely, however, both the characteristics of the Central Plains mega-centers and their tradition changed dramatically from Erlitou to Anyang. The ancestral-ritual complex at the heart of the tradition – with its massive investment of social energy into ritual bronzes and jades, palace-temples, war, sacrifice, divination and burial – was something only fully developed at Anyang. Indeed, although there is evidence for all of these things at Erlitou, the unprecedented increase in resources spent on sacrifice and burial with the rise of the Great Settlement Shang is so dramatic as to constitute a break. So too the scale of the settlement and its production – Anyang was ten times the size of Erlitou and

[36] The list could be increased to include tomb size, the appearance of ramps with their number correlated to tomb size and presumably status, the increasingly common use of bronze (and increasingly large bronze vessels) and so on. Bronze weapons in particular show an interesting trend toward elaboration with *ge* dagger-axes and *mao*-spears becoming relatively common and appearing in small tombs while large axes, large *dao*-polearms and more exotic weapons become markers of higher distinction.



FIGURE 3.12 Central Plains Bronze Age Burials Over Time

Top Left: Erlitou Burials (same scale): (left) small burial without grave goods (VI M4) (after Institute of Archaeology 1999: 245, fig. 157); (middle) small burial with ceramic grave goods (IV M17) (after Institute of Archaeology 1999: 244, fig. 155); (right) medium burial with large jade blades (V M3) (after Erlitou Team 2005b: 663, fig. 6); Middle Left: Erligang Burials (same sale): (left) tomb without grave goods (Nanguanwai C5T89) (after Henan Province 2001: 594, fig. 409); (middle) tomb with ceramic vessels (Renmin gongyuan C7M45) (after Henan Province 2001: 588, fig. 400); (right) tomb with bronze grave goods (MGM2) (after Henan Province 2001: 575, fig. 388); Bottom Left: Gaocheng Taixi Burials: (left) burial with ceramic vessels (M24); (right) burial with bronze artifacts (M85) (after Hebei Province 1985: 102, 155, figs. 59, 93); Right: Anyang Lineage Cemetery Burials (same scale): (left) burial without grave goods (PNM104) (after Institute of Archaeology 1987a: 208, fig. 162); (middle) burial with ceramic vessels (XQM429); (right) single-ramped tomb (XQ93) (after Anyang Team 1979a: 49, 54, figs. 30, 40)

the dozens of tons of production waste recovered from Anyang are orders of magnitude beyond analogous assemblages recovered from previous sites. This then raises the question of the nature of the Central Plains Metropolitan centers that came before – if Erlitou could be seen as the last of the great Longshan centers, then the Erligang period sees the rise of a settlement and perhaps a polity on a truly novel scale. Nevertheless, while the walls of Zhengzhou Shangcheng and the distribution of metropolitan

tradition ceramics, bronze and walled sites is impressive, the nature of this apparently large and expansionist polity is by no means clear. If the closest historical analogies (i.e. Western Zhou) are any guide, a relatively rapid militaristic expansion might have been followed by the setting up of a kin-based network of polities which became increasingly independent over time. On the other hand, and with the caveat that our reconstruction of Erligang elite culture comes mostly from sites such as Yanshi Shangcheng and Panlongcheng rather than Zhengzhou itself, without evidence for the fully fledged ancestral-ritual complex seen in Anyang and Western Zhou times, the nature of Erligang authority or indeed its political geography is far from clear (Campbell 2013a). Indeed, it is not until the poorly understood Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei period that we begin to see a more widely participatory mortuary cult, and more systematic and developed sacrificial and divinatory practices, and not until Anyang that they become developed on a monumental scale.

The notion that the Central Plains Metropolitan Tradition grew organically from seeds sown at Erlitou is far too simplistic. Given the explosive growth of the Central Plains Megacenters, their culturally heterogeneous early layers and gradual homogenization over time, the role of each great settlement itself must be considered in shaping the nature of its wider social, political, economic and cultural networks – and the traditions they passed on. For just as each mega-center was located in and bore the cultural traces of different regional traditions, so too each center and its polity shaped subsequent collective memory and provided future rulers with models, however distorted, to adopt or avoid within a continually developing tradition of authority. The generative role of the Central Plains mega-centers, then, at very least complicates the traditional historiographic narrative of sequential dynasties – for even if Zhengzhou and Anyang were both capitals of the Shang dynasty as most Chinese archaeologists believe, each was the locus of its own syncretic centripetal network, its own processes of ethnogenesis, its own version of the evolving Central Plains Tradition. Seen from the perspective of culture history and social-political development, the dynastic account of traditional historiography is of minor relevance. Erlitou, Zhengzhou and Anyang, though sharing a common tradition, were very different places.

Indeed, contrary to the popular idea that Anyang was a small, weak and decentralized successor polity to the mighty Erligang "state" or "empire" (Liu and Chen 2012, Bagley 1999, Wang 2014) – in part arising from simplistic correlations of material culture and political territory, and in

part from an overly credulous reading of the traditional historiographic narrative – Anyang was, by most measures, unsurpassed with the largest palace-temple area, the greatest scale of production and the largest site size of any contemporaneous or earlier Central Plains Metropolitan center – indeed, it may have been the largest population center in the world in its time. The Great Settlement Shang then, though inheriting the traditions of palatial rammed earth courtyard structures, sacrifice, divination, ritual feasting, war and sumptuous hierarchical burial from earlier Central Plains Metropolitan centers, developed these practices into an ancestral-ritual complex of unprecedented participation, scale and complexity. In addition, the package of horse, chariot, chariot warfare and the royal hunt – adopted through as-yet-unclear channels from the north – became a central and enduring socio-technological component of elite practices of authority. Writing began and oracle-bone divination developed into a complex practice of authority unlike anything seen before in East Asia. Together these practices and institutions formed the very core of the polity at Anyang, patterning durable dispositions, providing power with its justifications and Shang civilization its characteristic form.

CHAPTER 4

The Great Settlement Shang and its Polity: Networks, Boundaries and the Social Economy

In Chapter 2 some prominent approaches to early complex polities and civilizations were critiqued, especially as they have been applied to ancient China. One of the greatest common issues with current approaches to early complex polities in China is an absence of the discussion of "authority" as a historical problem. In other words, how are the effects of power produced such that they are received as legitimate, how are durable dispositions inculcated such that hegemonic discourses are experienced as natural, and how are networks of nature-cultural things entangled with *habitus*, legitimacy and power? More specifically, cast in these terms, what was the nature of the polity centered at Anyang and how did it work?

Whether the influence is acknowledged or merely implicit, there is perhaps no theorist more important than Max Weber in the discussion of ancient "states" in general, or in China specifically. For Weber, the features that mark "political" organizations off from other corporate groups are territory and a leadership whose authority is based ultimately on the legitimate threat and use of physical force.[1] Central to this and many subsequent discussions of politics are the issues of power and authority. While power is usually cast in broad and often negative terms, authority is generally understood as power legitimized.[2] Thus, A. Smith (2003: 104–105) describes the

[1] "Imperatively co-ordinated corporate groups will be called 'political' if and in so far as the enforcement of its order is carried out continually within a given territorial area by the application and threat of physical force on the part of the administrative staff" (Weber 1964: 154).

[2] In Weber's terms, "A corporate group, the members of which are by virtue of their membership subjected to the legitimate exercise of imperative control, that is to 'authority' will be called an 'imperatively coordinated group" (1964: 153). Thus, for Weber, authority is not the exclusive property of political groups. Imperatively co-ordinated corporate groups where authority was not backed by threat or exercise of violence or that lacked territory would not be considered political groups.

"political" in terms of "a flexible set of relationships that organize practices of domination, governance, and legitimation. In other words, what is at issue in an examination of politics in early complex polities is the constitution of *authority*" [italics added]. For Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1990, 1998, 2000) power can be understood in terms of various forms of "capital" which, when accumulated or employed within the accepted rules of social fields are legitimate. Depending on historical context, economic, social, military, cultural, etc. capital can be transformed into symbolic capital[3] – status, honor, worthiness, face, etc. In this formulation the constitution of authority becomes recast in terms of the operation of what might be called "the social economy" – as various forms of capital are circulated, exchanged and spent. Through the mediation of social fields, the circulation of capital (social, economic, coercive, etc.) produces the effects of power while its transformation into symbolic capital creates authoritative agents.

In a sense then, the *legitimate* accumulation and use of different forms of capital amounts to the constitution and exercise of authority.[4] Moreover, if we understand capital as the media of power which, in turn, is understood as a "generalized means" (Parsons 1968, Mann 1986) for both doing and being, then capital not only functions negatively and relationally as the ability to realize interests, or shape the conditions of being and doing at the expense of others (even if this is misrecognized), but also positively and socio-physically as the capacity to be and act in the world in accordance with the interests of others. In this broad sense then, authority refers to the property of agents or institutions derived from the legitimate acquisition and use of any form of capital, not simply legitimatized coercive power over others, and becomes a moral and technological as well as political issue, while capital itself becomes the basic structural element of social-physical being-in-the-world.[5]

3 Giddens' notion of "resources" is similar to Bourdieu's concept of "capital."

> Resources are drawn upon by actors in the production of interaction, but are constituted as structures of domination. Resources are the media whereby power is employed in the routine course of social action; but they are at the same time structural elements of social systems, reconstituted in social interaction. (Giddens 1982: 38–39)

In other words power is resources/capital in (inter)action, even while its exercise reconstitutes (or reproduces) these structural elements.

4 Bourdieu (1998: 40) actually rewrites Weber's definition of the state in terms of the "monopoly of the legitimate use of force" as a "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and *symbolic* violence."

5 While I would question the historical utility of Bourdieu's (1998: 41) reified category of "state," his insight that "the state is the culmination of a process of concentration of

Returning to the question of the specifically "political" aspects of social life or the existence of an institution or collection of institutions that might be usefully called a polity, the general understanding of "authority" outlined above may be a little too broad. For A. Smith (2003) "the analytical importance of explicitly *political* authority lies in its presumptive claim to be the authority of last resort" [italics in original]. And thus, "the central question for the study of early complex polities is … an inquiry into how, in varying sociocultural formations, an authoritative political apparatus came to gain varying degrees of ascendancy over all other social relations." While not endorsing the implicit teleology of this statement and what may be an excessively unitary understanding of "authority of last resort,"[6] Smith's formulation does draw attention to the existence of hierarchies of authority in social relations and the ascendancy of particular social fields (or networks of social fields) and their privileged agents that seems an inescapable aspect of all but the most egalitarian societies.

In a sense, an understanding of the "political" as the "authority of last resort" echoes Weber's claim that political authority has an ultimate basis in the threat or exercise of legitimate force. Legitimate physical force, or misrecognized violence, grants the wielder the ability to make direct interventions on the social-physical body of others through corporal punishment, forced relocation, confinement or even death. As the ultimate expression of the negative aspect of power, violence, when legitimized through practice and discourse becomes, in effect, the symbolic capital of final recourse – the sovereign exercise of existential power over others.

There are a few complications to this picture of political authority, however. First is the fact violence is never perfectly legitimized, nor monopolized – physical violence leaves bodies traumatized and creates unintended effects.[7] Moreover, violence is ultimately alienating and the routine practice of physical violence tends both to be directed at populations

different species of capital: capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, and symbolic capital," seems very useful. Seen as a gradient rather than a teleological endpoint, the notion that various forms of capital are, or may become, more or less concentrated in the hands of a small number of institutions or groups seems a productive way of looking at socio-political development over time.

6 It is not clear that final authority is always vested in a single "apparatus" or that the assertion of the political nature of authority of last resort does not ultimately derive from a naturalization of the experience of nation states.

7 Thus Patterson (1982) talks of the psychic resistance of slaves and their yearning for dignity amidst degradation, while Kleinman et al. (1997) discuss the ways that social violence destroys communities and damages subjectivities. Gidden's (1982) notion of "the dialectic

that have been socially marginalized, dehumanized or demonized and to create such groups. Thus the authorized violence wielded against slaves, enemies, outcasts and criminals, through its legitimation (and only to the extent that it is seen as legitimate) acts as both the sign and symptom of their reduced place in local hierarchies of being and caring.[8] Violence then, can be an effective, if volatile, means of creating and maintaining social boundaries and statuses, even while its legitimation and naturalization are crucial to the creation of stable social orders over time.

Another, subtler, but nonetheless crucial, point is that polities are virtual entities – the product of the network effects of circulating power (Abrams 1988) experienced as a kind of transcendent agency – whether imagined as a collective entity, an earthy manifestation of divine will or an external instrument of oppression (Routledge 2014). Thus the historical problem of polities and their social economies of authority must include the fact that they invariably produce a polity concept – an entity that transcends the individual, commands loyalties and authorizes power. Investigating this virtual, transcendent entity then, this network effect of a historically specific alchemy of power and legitimation is of crucial interest to unpacking the Shang polity and getting closer to its true nature.

A final complication is the fact that the social economy of power and authority on which the transcendent polity is based is itself the product of a nature-cultural network of people, things and ideas (Latour 1993), grounded in, and generative of, a historically specific ontology. Thus rather than imagine some archaic version of the Modern secular state as the Shang "authority of last resort" (as is implicitly the case in much of the literature), for the polity centered at the Great Settlement Shang, the authority of last resort was the high god Di, and the notion of the Shang itself was produced through the collective effects of numinous bronze vessels, tombs, sacrifice, administration, war, divinized ancestors, ancestralized nature, and so on.

If power has many sources and violence in the broad sense is an effective creator and maintainer of social boundaries, then the investigation of the sources of capital, their legitimization and creation of social,

of control" is relevant here as well, when he states, "by the dialectic of control I mean the capability of the weak, in the regularized relations of autonomy and dependence that constitute social systems, to turn their weakness back against the powerful" (39).

[8] Both Patterson's (1982) analysis of slavery as social death and Agamben's (1998) argument about the potential reduction of the citizen to "bare," killable life as the crucial basis of sovereign power are relevant here. However, instead of dichotomizing the socially living/socially dead or citizen/bare-life, I would argue that it is more productive to see social economies of violence as creating gradated hierarchies of being (Campbell 2014b).

even existential distinctions is surely a promising approach. Following, but modifying, Mann (1986), I understand social formations in terms of networks of capital/power produced through fields of social practice, in turn embedded in, and interacting with, overlapping boundaries of identity (Campbell 2009). Thus, looking at the Shang polity in Mann's terms, the Shang king's military network might involve the forces under his direct control, those at the command of his subordinates, those of his allies, and all the resources that he might be able to muster to attain a particular goal. The extent of this network might thus reach beyond the borders of the king's own lands, crossing perhaps cultural, linguistic and ethnic boundaries. From a Bourdieuian point of view, however, this "military network" is a collection of inter-related social fields, and the *habitus* of the social agents involved (the soldiers, the subordinate leaders, the king, allies and even enemies) is also (even primarily) formed in social fields not directly related to war (such as the lineage and the home). Given this, the capital that the king and his subordinates drew upon in the functioning of their "military network" is inseparably connected to the social economy of authority and local hierarchies of being in general. At the same time, from the perspective of social identity and its distinctions, not only is identity and social place deployed in the exercise of authority and the legitimation of inter-community violence, but the acquisition of resources across boundaries of identity, *habitus* and competing discursive claims involves the creation of social fields of translation and negotiation, thus complicating the easy identification of Shang material culture with the Shang polity often seen in the Chinese archaeological literature.

The Structure of Shang Authority

As outlined in the discussion above, from a broad perspective, authority/symbolic capital is generated through the *legitimate* acquisition and use of resources of any form.[9] But where does this legitimacy come from? It could

[9] Thus, authority/symbolic capital adheres to those who habitually and legitimately command any form of capital as an inter-subjective residue, but also arises from and gains its particular features as a structural property of specific social fields. It should be clear by now that I am not really talking about authority in the restricted sense of command and obedience (e.g. Wrong 1988), for there are, after all, many ways of ordering/ demanding/ asking/desiring and many ways of obeying/ complying/ providing/ anticipating/ collaborating. The crucial issue, as I see it, in political organization is not so much in the logistical details of command-obedience but rather how some agents come to command so many more resources and how this inequality becomes normalized such that those

be argued that an important aspect of legitimacy is structural, or a property of the social fields that agents mutually constitute through their practice. Moreover, agency and opportunity within social fields are not generally equally distributed. This being so, the relative structural positions of social agents within social fields in particular, and local worlds in general, is a crucially important one. What are the conditions of a social agent's action in the world and what structures those conditions? The Anyang period oracle-bones, as divinatory records concerned with the agency of the Shang King, can shed some light upon the structure of authority in at least the upper echelons of the hierarchy of power.

As many scholars have noted before, at the pinnacle of the Shang hierarchy of authority was the high god Di 帝, followed by the powers of the land and high ancestors, and then a descending hierarchy of ancestral spirits in order of generational seniority down to the living king[10] (Kaizuka

resources begin to appear as natural extensions of particular agents and/or institutions. In other words, I see the basic question as revolving around how hierarchies of being and doing are formed through the structuring elements of symbolic capital/authority. It is, of course, nevertheless true that different forms of capital are converted into symbolic capital at different rates and with differing ease in different social fields. It is also possible that in some situations certain forms of capital may not be easily transformed into symbolic capital at all (such as in the case of a rising merchant class attempting to buy their way into an existing aristocracy), but this ultimately is a crisis of legitimation (i.e. wealth from trade may be portrayed as less legitimate than that accruing from landholding) and an indication of a contradiction between discourses on power and legitimacy and the material and practical bases of capital. A crucial set of questions then, concern the structuring conditions under which different forms of capital circulate, are converted into one another, may be operationalized and ultimately legitimized.

[10] The nature of this authority, nevertheless, seems to change over time: Di more or less disappears from oracle-bone divinations after period II, divination inscriptions become restricted in content and the sacrificial schedule becomes increasingly regular and standardized (see Chang 1987 for a study of the standardization of the ritual cycle, Keightley (1983, 1988) for a discussion of changes in divinatory practice). Keightley (1983, 1999a) interprets this shift as a trend toward "rationalization" in the dual Weberian sense: bureaucratic systematization and streamlining, and a movement from irrationality toward reason. I have already critiqued this viewpoint theoretically, and will have more to say in succeeding chapters as I layout an alternative vision of the mid-Anyang period "ritual revolution." Itō (Itō and Takashima 1996) offers another interesting interpretation of these ritual and divinatory changes seeing them in terms of anthropomorphization or ancestralization of the spirits from uncontrollable hostile powers to ancestors (see also Puett 2002).

> beginning in Period I, the worship of the feared spirits of the dead slowly evolved into that of protective and beneficent ancestors. After Period II, when the sacrificial rituals became fixed and systematic, the services to the spirits of the dead gradually developed into a clearer form of ancestor worship. (Itō and Takashima 1996: 45)

1952, Shima 1958, Hu 1959, Akatsuka 1977, Chen 1988, Itō and Takashima 1996, Keightley 1999a, 2000, etc.).

(1) 貞: 翌癸卯帝其令風. (672 obverse)

Tested: this coming Gui Mao day Di may order wind.[11]

(2) 丙寅卜, 爭貞: 今十一月帝令雨. (5658 obverse)

Bin Yan day cracked, Zheng tested: this eleventh moon Di will order rain.

(3) 貞: 不隹帝令乍我囚. (6746)

Tested: It is not Di's orders (that are) creating my difficulties.

(4) 貞: 隹帝𢀛我年. (10124)

Tested: It is Di who curses our harvest.

(5) 己卯卜, 爭貞: 王乍邑, 帝若. 我从之唐. (14200)

Ji Mao day cracked, Zheng tested: If the King makes a settlement, Di will approve. We ought to follow this (at) Tang.

(6) 丙辰卜,㱿貞: 帝隹其冬茲邑. (14209)

Bing Chen day tested, Ke tested: it may be ending this settlement that Di does.

(7) 貞: 方𢦏征隹帝令乍我囚. 三月. (39912)

Tested: As for the Fang's harming of the expedition, it is (the result of) Di's commands that create our difficulties. Third month

(8a). 貞: 王叀沚或比伐巴方, 帝受我㞢 (6473A)

Tested: It is Zhi Guo whom the King should meet to attack the Ba Fang. (For if the King does,) Di will grant us aid.

While not endorsing the Frazerian assumptions underlying Itō's account of the evolution of Shang beliefs from magical superstition to more mature "ancestor worship," the insight that there is a logic of ancestralization operational in Shang royal ritual is a valuable one which will be taken up below and in later chapters.

[11] The number after the oracle-bone inscription refers to its number in the *heji*. "Cracked" refers to the oracular cracking of the bone, while "tested" refers to the testing of the divinatory charge that follows (see Keightley 1997).

(8b) 王勿隹沚𢦏比伐巴方，帝不我其受出(6473B)

It is not Zhi Guo whom the king should join with to attack the Ba fang. (For if the King does,) Di will perhaps not grant us aid.

Here we can see Di's authority over not only the weather (rain, drought, winds, etc.) and the harvests, but also over the building of settlements, the waging of war, and the general fortunes of the dynasty. Indeed, at the pinnacle of the Shang hierarchy of being, Di was the "authority of last resort."[12] Moreover, Di's authority extended over the most fundamental aspects of the King's action in the world, affecting the subsistence, defense and continued existence of his community. Nor was Di alone in exercising authority over the Shang world – spirits such as He 河 (the Yellow River), Yue 岳[13] (mountain spirit), Tu or She 土 (earth spirit) and royal ancestors were also hierarchically arranged between Di and the living king,[14] cursing, assisting, commanding the elements, granting harvest and causing sickness.

Unlike Di, however, to whom no sacrifice was directly offered in the oracle-bone inscriptions,[15] the relationship between the spirits and ancestors, on the one hand, and the living, on the other, was mediated through ritual practices broadly directed at mollifying or beseeching (Liu 2004) as can be seen in the examples below.

(9) 貞:𠂤方出, 隹黃尹𡆥我(6083)

Tested: As for the Gong Fang's coming out (to attack), it is Huang Yin[16] who curses us.

[12] Or, at least, Di is the authority of last resort in King Wu Ding's scheme of things as seen through the lens of the oracle-bone inscriptions.

[13] Some authors (e.g. Keightley 1999a, Ito and Takashima 1996) transcribe the graph 𡶷 as a compound of *yang* 羊 and *shan* 山 (with the 羊 element over the 山 element) and give it the modern pronunciation *Xiang* (?) or *Yang* (Keightley 2000). Nevertheless, the consensus is that it referred to a mountain deity whatever the graphic reconstruction.

[14] See both Itō's (Itō and Takashima 1996) argument about the ancestralization of the spirits and Keightley's (2000) discussion of the royal community and its bases of authority.

[15] A bronze inscription from the reign of the last Shang King, (二祀X其卣, YZJWJC 5412) perhaps indicates otherwise. Whether this is really an exception, and if so, whether this is a Shang precedent to the Zhou King's direct relationship to Heaven remains to be seen.

[16] Most scholars understand Huang Yin to refer to Yi Yin (see JGWZGL: 2532–2537), a person transmitted texts claim (see Appendix B) was an important advisor to the first dynastic Shang King, Cheng Tang (known posthumously as Shang Jia). In any case, Huang Yin is the occasional recipient of sacrifice in period 1 oracle-bone inscriptions but does not appear to be part of the royal ancestral line as reconstructed from the Zouji.

(10) 癸未卜,㞢庚匕伐, 廿, 其三十㞢.𢆶. (22136)

Cracked on Gui Wei day, exorcise Ancestress Geng (on behalf of someone) (offering) decapitates,[17] 20, (and) perhaps thirty captives. (Use) this.

(11) 丁卯卜, 旅貞: 王賓小丁劌眔父丁, 彳伐羌五. (22560)

Cracked on Ding Mao day, Lu tested: The King should host Xiao Ding, *gui*-cutting and Father Ding, offering up decapitates, *qiang*-captives, five.

(12) 貞: 于河告舌方 (6133)

Tested: to the River announce the Gong Fang[18]

(13) 丁巳卜, 宀貞: 奏于王亥十南，卯十牛、三南，告其比望正下危. (6527)

Cracked on Ding Si, diviner Bin tested: (We should conduct a) *liao*-burning sacrifice to Wanghai (offering) ten juvenile animals[19] *mao*-split ten cattle and three juvenile animals to announce (that the King) will join with Wang and mount an expedition against Xia Wei.

Here we can see a whole panoply of legendary deceased ministers, ancestresses, ancestors, nature spirits and pre-dynastic lords being divined about, warded against, hosted, reported to and given sacrifice. Like living superiors, their intentions and goodwill were sought even while defensive or mollifying measures were taken when relations took a turn for the worse.

Generally the spirits and ancestors direction of the King's affairs took the indirect form of curses or assistance, but, rarely, it took the direct form of commands as in the examples below where royal ancestors called upon the King to attack a renegade prince.

(14) □申卜, 㱿貞: 大丁乎王辜（敦）衜. (6887)

X Shen day cracked, Ke tested: Da Ding calls upon the King to press (an attack against) Bu.[20]

[17] The term "decapitates" refers to those who will be decapitated. Takashima translates *fa* 伐 similarly with the Latinate "*decapituri*" (Itō and Takashima 1996, vol. 1: 208).

[18] The Gong Fang were a major Shang enemy in period I and II and the full context is likely to be announcing a Gong Fang attack or invasion to the River whose divine aid is sought.

[19] The type of animal was presumably contextually understood (perhaps calves).

[20] We know from other examples that there is a Zi Bu 子衜 or Prince/Lineage Leader Bu who received an exorcism against Elder Brother Ding (presumably from the king).

(15) 乙未卜, 殼貞: 大甲乎王辜（敦）衒. 十月. (39925)

Yi Wei day cracked, Ke tested: Da Jia calls upon the King to press (an attack against) Bu.

Taken together these examples show, as Keightley (2000) has argued,

> The living and the dead were thus engaged in a communal, ritually structured conversation in which, just as the king's allies and officers made reports to him, the Shang king made reports to his ancestors, conveying to them, on the one hand, information about such matters as sickness, enemy movements, floods, and rituals, and, on the other hand, sacrificial sustenance in the form of animal[21] victims. (101)

Through sacrifices to the spirits and ancestors, and "announcing," "exorcising" and reciprocal hierarchical "hosting," the Shang King and other social agents participated in the creation and maintenance of a world-encompassing structure of authority and its concomitant hierarchy of being stretching from Di down through the lowliest entities (see Figure 4.1). Moreover, in conceiving of the royal ancestors in terms of a paramount generational hierarchy mediating between the high god Di and the King, the Shang King perpetuated a "theodicy of his own privilege" (Bourdieu 2000: 241), inscribing the Shang world with the terms of his social order, while attempting to entrain (Routledge 2014) the ultimate source of symbolic capital in the form of ancestral authority and its traditional practices. The King's central place in the Shang landscape of authority was further bolstered by sacrifice to the four quarters of the world, and to local powers of the land as the King and his agents moved through it, even as the "great settlement Shang" apparently formed the political, economic and religious center of Anyang period North China. Indeed, the dramatic development and elaboration of mortuary rites, four-quarters symbolism, sacrifice, and divination – all apparently innovations dating to

丁巳卜，于兄丁知子衒。(3202)

Ding Si cracked, against Elder Brother Ding (perform) an exorcism (on behalf of) Zi Bu

There are also examples of a Bu leading an expedition against the king (6882) and a series of inscriptions about inflicting damage upon, capturing or having damage inflicted by Bu at Bei 悖.

[21] It is telling that Keightley specifies "animal" victims here when in fact the sacrificial pits at Anyang are preponderantly full of human victims, and even from the oracle-bone inscriptions dating to Wu Ding – the inscriptions from which Keightley's generalizations derive – humans outnumber animal victims. This treatment is symptomatic of scholarship on the Shang – human sacrifice sits uneasily with most narratives of Early China.



FIGURE 4.1 The Shang Kings' Structure of Authority

the reign of Wu Ding – could be seen as an attempt to reorganize the polity and its structures of authority around the ancestral cult, elaborating its traditional practices and entraining them to a new royal ideology linking the numinous land, powerful dead, pacifying violence, kinship and kingship together in a novel and radically hierarchical form.

Analogously to the King's relationship with the royal ancestors and the powers of the land, subordinates of the King negotiated their relationship in terms of tribute, gifts, reports, service and requests for aid, receiving in return assistance, rewards, legitimacy and, if they incurred his displeasure, punishment.

(16) 貞: 書來牛. (9525)

Tested: Shu will bring cattle.

(17) … 沚或告曰： 土方征于我東鼎，〔戕〕二邑.吾方亦犇我西鼎田. (6057)

Guo of Zhi reporting said: "The Tu Fang have mounted an expedition into my eastern districts, [harming] two settlements. The Gong Fang also raided the fields of my western districts."

(18) 丁巳卜,宁貞: 賚于王亥十南, 卯十牛, 三南, 告其比望正下危. (6257)

Cracked on Dingsi day, Bin tested: (we should) conduct a *liao*-burning sacrifice to Wanghai[22] (using) ten juvenile animals, *mao*-splitting ten cattle and three juvenile animals (calves?), to announce (that we) will join with Wang to mount a campaign against Xia Wei.

(19) 丁酉卜, 宁貞: 令甫取元白殳, 及. (6)

Ding You cracked, Bin tested: (We should) order Fu to take Shu, chief of Yuan, (for if we do, Fu will) capture (Shu).

Practices of Authority

Status in the Shang structure of authority was not simply maintained by disembodied notions of ancestral hierarchy and claims to privileged status – rather the discursive order was (re)produced and negotiated through a social economy that channeled and transformed a multitude of networks of capital and practice. In addition to sacrifice and divination, elite hunting, offering tribute, bestowing rewards, the disposal of land and people and ultimately coercion (not to mention the affective states of awe, gratitude, loyalty and terror so engendered) figured prominently in the social economy of Shang authority and the orientations to being-in-the-world it produced.

As the primary medium for understanding the will of the ancestors and powers of the land, and thus for rendering an otherwise unknowable world legible, divinatory practices figure large in the constitution of Shang structures of truth and power. Moreover, although the oracle-bone records at Anyang are not necessarily the first use of the Chinese writing system, they do represent the most conspicuous use of writing in the period.[23] While

[22] Wanghai 王亥 was a predynastic ancestral spirit.

[23] The other major extant medium of writing was bronze vessels, but bronze inscriptions (other than "clan insignia") from the Shang are both relatively rare and short compared to Western Zhou bronzes. There are also a few examples of non-divinatory inscriptions

this is not the place to debate the first uses of writing in China, the extant evidence indicates that use of writing in the Anyang period was mostly restricted to the King and other high elites'[24] practices of ancestral communication, commemoration and veneration.[25] Uninscribed oracle-bones and plastrons were also used in divination, and in general, the heat-produced cracking of scapula for divination was a practice both geographically widespread and of great longevity (Flad 2006), while the simultaneous use of other forms of divinatory practice less visible in the archaeological record cannot be ruled out. What is clear, however, is that divinatory practices of the Shang royal diviners at Anyang, with their careful and systematized sawing, boring and chiseling of plastrons and scapula represent both a developmental and contemporary pinnacle of pyromantic elaboration and sophistication, at the same time as oracle-bone divination reached unprecedented popularity with large quantities of uninscribed oracle-bones found widely scattered over the entirety of the Great Settlement Shang and

on human, tiger and deer bone, records of bone and shell contribution and processing inscribed on the oracle-bones as well as the odd artifact with an ancestral dedication or gifting record written on it. The likelihood of writing on perishable materials like bamboo slips is also great though this does not guarantee that this medium of writing was prior to the oracle-bone inscriptions as opposed to contemporaneous.

24 The evidence that writing was restricted in the Anyang period mostly consists of the near absence of evidence of writing outside the Anyang core. Some of the Zhouyuan oracle-bones (see below) as well as a few inscribed examples found recently at Daxingzhuang in Shandong (Shandong University et al. 2003) demonstrate that the use of the Shang script was not limited to the Anyang core, but the number of non-Anyang inscriptions that can be dated to the Anyang period is miniscule by comparison to the inscriptions found at Anyang. Another line of evidence supporting the hypothesis that writing was mostly restricted to the Anyang core is the fact that many early Western Zhou scribes or *zuoce* 作冊 seen in bronze inscriptions use day names in their ancestral titles and "clan insignia" – features that many scholars interpret to mean they were ethnically Shang. While I have reservations concerning assigning hard boundaries to Shang "ethnicity" or the certainty of its identification in individual cases, the use of Anyang-type ancestor appellations minimally indicates the individual in question followed Shang elite practices in this respect. The use of "clan insignia," moreover, is a practice that began in the Anyang period and continued into the Western Zhou, although the use of clan insignia generally did not occur in the bronzes of the Zhou royal family or their close allies, and, along with other putative Shang features, finally disappeared in the Mid-Western Zhou "ritual revolution" (Rawson 1999).

25 By this I mean that writing is closely implicated in Anyang period Shang and Western Zhou elite practices of social memory. If the ritual practices of the Shang elites were concerned with negotiating and maintaining a place in the landscape of authority, then ancestor veneration, as the central aspect of this practice, necessarily implies a diachronic dimension. Moreover, the commemorative aspects of both late Anyang period bronze inscriptions and non-divinatory inscriptions such as human skull fragments and tiger bones suggest a concern with achievement in the eyes of the ancestors and descendants.

in Central Plains settlements beyond. In terms of media, the trend from pig, sheep and deer scapula to exclusive use of cattle and turtle over the course of the Central Plains Bronze Age mirrors a trend toward more status-affirming animals that Yuan and Flad (2005) have noted in sacrificial victims in general. Moreover, Keightley's (1978a) oracle-bone inscription research on the origin of bone used for royal divination suggests that turtle plastrons were more frequently sent in as tribute than cattle or cattle scapula, and that, despite his hypothesis of local turtle farming, "Shang plastromancy depended in part upon imported shells for its raw material"(12). More recent zooarchaeological work has failed to turn up evidence of turtle bones other than plastron and carapace fragments, however, suggesting that turtles were not likely raised or caught locally in any numbers. Moreover, not only were the raw materials of royal divination acquired from distant or expensive sources, but the oracle-bone inscriptions suggest that the preparation of scapulas and plastrons was frequently performed by the royal consorts themselves, while the King often acted as diviner. All of these factors point to both the importance accorded oracle-bone divination by the royal court at Anyang, and to the distinction or marked status of royal divination among contemporary divinatory practices.

As mentioned above, sacrifice was a key practice in the negotiation of place within the Shang structure of authority. The topic of sacrifice will be discussed more fully in Chapter 6, but for present purposes it will suffice to note that the media of sacrifice, from the ritual vessels and jade artifacts to the sacrificial victims themselves, show marked qualitative and quantitative range, and were the focus of both status competition and sumptuary regulation. Moreover, the material resources and labor expended on sacrifice and related activities make it central to the Shang economy even as its discursive importance made it a key practice of authority. Thus, while the hundreds of captives and large livestock that could be expended on a single occasion of royal sacrifice, and the bronze vessels from a single Shang royal consort's tomb (estimated to have required eight metric tones of ore [Chang 1983]) represented huge investments of resources, at the same time, they also made monumentally tangible the Shang King's authority in commanding those resources. The social economic importance of Shang sacrifice then, was two-fold: manifested, on the one hand, through the King's pacifying work of bringing the world into accordance with Shang civilizational order, and, on the other, the acquisition and control of the resources needed to maintain the practices of authority upon which that order was based.

Another elite practice related to the constitution of authority was that of hunting. In his study of sanctioned violence in the Eastern Zhou, Lewis argued that hunting and warfare were not clearly separable in Early China (Lewis 1990), while (Keightley 2000) noted that a successful royal hunt was at once a triumph over potentially hostile animal forces, a demonstration of "the approval of the Powers as the king moved through the land," and a verification of the King's territorial claims and dominance over local leaders, even as participation in the royal hunt conferred prestige on those so chosen. Fiskesjö (2001), moreover, has argued that the royal hunt was a "key lever of state formation," a symbolically central practice of domestication presenting the Shang kings as "both attentive arbiters and violent conquerors of the dangerous wilderness surrounding their society" (157). While Fiskesjö's (2001) argument that the hunt was the sole prerogative of the Shang and Western Zhou "hunter-kings," arrogated by local lords only in the Eastern Zhou (771–256 BCE) period is not entirely accurate,[26] the attention given to hunting in the oracle-bone inscriptions

[26] While the oracle-bone inscriptions were overwhelmingly concerned with the activities of the king there are a few inscriptions where the king is said to "join with" (比) local lords in the hunt, a word that Lin Yun (1982) suggests means something like "ally with" and argues indicates an independent political status.

…王其比盂, 犬, 𠂤, 田𢦏, 亡〔𢦏〕. (27907)

…The King should perhaps join with Yu, Quan and Cha in hunting at X, (for if he does) there will be no [harm].

Yu, Quan and Cha were all Shang allies located in the West while 𢦏 was a hunting ground located near Yu. If my interpretation is correct, then the king was divining about the auspiciousness of meeting with the lord of Quan, the leader of Cha and the nearby Bo of Yu at 𢦏 for a hunt. In addition, Huayuanzhuang oracle-bone inscriptions give even more direct evidence of non-royal hunting as in huadong 234 and 247 shown below:

辛未卜， 卑。子固曰：其卑。用。三麑。 (huadong 234)

amply demonstrates its importance as a royal activity even as the following example gives a sense of its scale.

(20) 戊午卜, 㱿貞: 我獸𢿱,𠬝. 之日獸, 允𠬝. 〔隻〕虎一、鹿四十, 狐〔二〕百六十四、麑百五十九. (10198)

Wu Wu day cracked, Ke Divined: We (should) hunt at Gui, (for if we do, we will) capture (game). On this day (the King) hunted, and indeed captured (game). (We) [caught] tiger, one; deer, forty; "foxes," [two] hundred and sixty four; "antler-less deer" one hundred and fifty nine.[27]

Moreover, in addition to animals, human beings were also occasionally the object of Shang hunts, as in the following period 1 example.

(21) 己卯卜，爭貞: 今者令麑田, 從戔至于龜, 隻羌. 王固曰:嬉. (199)

Ji Mao cracked, Zheng tested: Today (the King should) order Ni to take to the field, from X reaching to Gui, (for if he does, Ni will) catch *qiang*. The King inspecting the cracks said: there will be trouble.

In this inscription, capturing *qiang*-captives (presumably for sacrifice) was the objective of the "hunt" the King ordered Ni to undertake, supporting Lewis' contention that elite hunts and war were not clearly separable, or,

Cracked on Xinwei day, (We will) catch (something). The Zi examining the cracks says: (We will) perhaps catch (something). Use. (Indeed, we caught) three "antler-less deer."

丁亥卜，子往田亡巷。(huadong 247)

Cracked on Dinghai day, If the Zi goes forth to hunt there will be no harm.

This evidence suggest that hunting was an elite activity in general and not the King's sole prerogative. This does not undermine the argument that hunting was a practice of authority, however, as will be argued below and in later chapters, the Anyang period Shang hierarchy and bases of authority were essentially segmentary with the king functioning as a lineage leader of lineage leaders. There is also an obvious difference in the scale of the Huadong example and example (20).

[27] The tentative translations of animal types are based on Fiskesjö (2001), but, as he points out, many of these translations can only be considered educated guesses. The unlikely number of "foxes" caught shows the difficulties of oracle-bone taxonomy. Their number

at least, were considered to be practices of a similar kind. While large-scale military actions were not generally cast in terms of the hunt, examples such as example (21) suggest that at least some forms of inter-community violence could be seen in such terms, and that as practices of pacification predicated on legitimized violence, based on and (re)producing hierarchies of being and boundaries of social identity, hunting and war shared more than a metaphorical relationship. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, it is likely that the royal hunt was part of a set of pan-Eurasian practices associated with the chariot. If this is so, then the adoption of this techno-cultural complex involved much more than a vehicle of questionable military impact (Shaughnessy 1988), but was rather an entangling of traditions with novel things and practices creating powerful new institutions of pacification and authority.

As mentioned above, the flow of gifts, booty and tribute structured relations between ruler and subordinates in a manner analogous to the sacrifice offered to the spirits and ancestors. Just as with sacrifice then, in offering tribute, a subordinate both displayed his or her loyalty in contributing to a superior's resources and acknowledged and participated in the superior's claim to status. In the oracle-bones, the verbs *ru* 入 (*na*納) "contribute," *lai* 來 "cause to come," *yi* 以 "to bring" and *qi*乞 "requisition/request" are all used to record tribute sent in or divined about, most frequently taking the form of plastrons, with cattle, captives (usually *qiang*-captives 羌), and horses also appearing, and, more rarely, exotic animals such as monkeys and elephants (see Appendix A). Moreover, if we include services as well as goods, or actions on the king's behalf, then the two services that appear most prominently in the oracle-bones are war and sacrifice.

(22) 己卯, 貞: 令㠯以眔伐龍, 𢦏. (31972)

Ji Mao day, tested: (we should) order Cha to bring the multitude to attack Long, (for if we do, he will) harm (them).

(23) 甲午卜，㱿貞: 乎㚔先钔賚于河. (177)

Cracked on Jiawu day, Ke tested: call upon Qin(?) to first perform an exorcism/lustration (with) a *liao*-burning sacrifice to the River.

Thus, the "tributary economy" reflected in the oracle-bone inscriptions was an economy of war, sacrifice and divination. While the notation recording origin written on oracle-bone margins certainly reflects the particular bias of the sources, divinations about the arrival of cattle and captives show that

at least in period I, they were commodities important enough to the king to divine about. There were, of course, a host of other important resources (such as metals), which must have either been a matter delegated to subordinates and thus not an immediate concern of the king, or, were part of a routine economy that required no royal divination. This also suggests that the oracle-bone inscriptions, by their nature as divinatory texts, are not good sources of information about tribute in the usual sense of routine, asymmetrical flows of goods. They do testify, nevertheless, to the paramount importance of the ancestral ritual complex – already manifest in the archaeological record – and provide clues about the circulation of economic, social and symbolic capital required for its provisioning.

The harvest was another matter of crucial importance and a most vital part of the King's overall network of material resources, but agriculture is generally not divined about in terms of tribute, only whether or not such and such a place will have abundant harvest. While this concern indicates the importance accorded to this aspect of Shang economic life and the king's role as divine mediator in assuring it, grain was probably not the subject of long-distance transportation,[28] nor seen in terms of contingent political action or elite gifting. In other words, the movement of grain, like other ordinary resources, probably took a routine form that did not require divination, or at least the King's attention.

If "tribute," broadly conceived, is an upwardly directed offering of goods or services, there is also evidence for the downward flow of rewards and services in contemporaneous inscriptions. The most prominent source of evidence is probably the short bronze inscriptions that began to appear near the end of the Anyang period. These inscriptions generally record the receipt of reward from the king or some other patron. The rewards are generally for services performed on behalf of the patron and take the form of a gift of cowry shells, which may have served as a more or less general means of exchange.[29]

suggests the animals in question are likely not even carnivores, but rather some kind of R-selected (fast breeding) animal.

[28] The evidence for this tentative claim is both an absence of positive evidence and that in the Zhou, grain was generally not shipped long distances (except in times of famine), but rather circulated in a domestic economy. This conclusion is further suggested by the correlation of high harvest inscriptions with "Shang," "we," "our colonies" on the one hand, and on the other, with places that do not seem to have much if any political agency (see discussion below).

[29] Li (2003b) argues against the view widely held by Chinese scholars that cowries were "money," by showing that although there is some evidence for cowries serving as a standard of value in the Western Zhou they were not without intrinsic worth, and thus, not true

(24) 王商乍冊般貝 (作冊般甗 Zuoce Ban Yan)

The King awarded Scribe Ban cowry shells

There is also one instance of the Shang king granting the harvest or "yields" of a place to a subordinate for a span of five years as reward for services rendered.

(25) 王易小臣告[illegible] (禹)積五年. (小臣告方鼎 Xiaochen Yue Fangding)

The King awarded lesser retainer Yue(?) five years of the yields of Yu.

The oracle-bones also record a different kind of service rendered to some favored subordinates on the part of the king. These take the form of divinations on behalf of a subordinate, frequently concerning illness, and other misfortune as well as their treatment or prevention through "exorcisms" and ancestral sacrifice.

(26) 甲申卜，禦雀父乙一羌、一宰. (413)

Cracked on Jiashen day, (we should) perform an exorcism, on Que's behalf, of Father Yi (using) one *qiang*-captive and one specially-reared sheep.

The granting of gifts, rewards or privileges to subordinates is, on the one hand, a technique for aligning the interests of subordinates with gift-giving superiors, even while the practice of rewarding embeds the participants in a hierarchically structured social field. Thus, in a local world where illness and misfortune were seen in terms of the baleful influence of ancestors and the powers of the land, the king's ritual intercession on the behalf of a subordinate not only provided the recipient with powerful protection, but embedded him or her in relationships of dependency and obligation.

The above example of the disposal of yields or "accumulation" of a place is a striking example of the Shang king's ability to dispose of land or its produce, at least in some cases. The special relationship with Di through the royal ancestors, the four quarter symbolism and ritual all suggest a discursive claim of universal dominion, while the enormous size of Anyang, its industries and its ritual economy makes tangible its pre-eminence. It

money. While Li is certainly correct in arguing against a naïve understanding of cowries as money, mediums of exchange run a spectrum from resources of barter to completely abstract, liquid and standardized tokens of value. By Li's definition, however, silver dollars would not count as money since they also have intrinsic value aside from their arbitrarily designated value. In the case of cowries in the Shang, it might be more accurate to say that their degree of liquidity, the source of their value (arbitrary or functional) and their function as standard of value are not clear on present evidence.

is likely that the later claims of the Western Zhou kings, who supposedly inherited their mandate from the Shang, to "broadly possess the four quarters"[30] and that "there is no land which is not the king's land" had their origins in Shang conceptions of royal sovereignty. The Shang king's divinations about building settlements and opening of fields in borderlands also indicate expansive authoritative claims and practices, even while the constant shifting of alliances and internecine warfare against enemy polities displays the practical limitations of those claims.

In addition to disposal of land, the Shang kings also commanded the organization of people, setting up colonies, levying troops and labor, and assigning leaders to particular places.

(27) 貞: 作大邑于唐土 (40353)

Tested: (We should) make a great settlement in the lands of Tang.

(28) 癸□〔卜〕, □貞: □令受𤰈〔田〕于先厌. 十二月. (9486)

[Cracked on] Gui … day, … tested: … (should order) Shou to open [fields] in Lord Xian's (lands). Twelfth month.

(29) 辛酉,貞: 王令𢦏以子方奠于并. (33278)

Xinyou day, tested: the King ordered X to bring Zi Fang to colonize/settle[31] at Bing.

(30) …〔王〕大令眔人曰：協田，其〔受〕年. 十一月. (1) … [the King] greatly ordered the multitudes saying: work together in the fields and we will receive harvest. Eleventh month.

(31) [丙午卜,㱿貞: 登]人,三千乎伐舌方，受〔屮屮〕. (6174)

[Cracked on Bingwu day, Ke tested: levy] people, three thousand and call upon them to attack the Gong Fang, (for if we do we will) receive [divine aid].

(32) 辛亥卜,爭貞:共眔人, 立大史于西奠, 𢍰.□月. (24)

Cracked on Xinhai day, levy the multitude (in order to) set up a major official in the western colony, Shu(?) … month.

The practical experience of authority then, at least within certain logistical limits, was that the land, its resources and the very bodies of its inhabitants

[30] This is a common phrase in the Western Zhou bronze inscriptions in the context of describing the accomplishments of the first Zhou kings.

[31] This reading of dian 奠 is based on Qiu (1993).

were subject to the claims of the king (and ultimately the numinous powers of the land) who wielded this authority indirectly through subordinates and local leaders. On the local level, as will be argued in the next chapter, authority was structured in terms of kinship and for the ordinary clan members, loyalty was directly to their lineage head and only indirectly to the king. Thus, the basic unit of social action in the Anyang period was the kinship group, and the direct recipients of the king's orders, rewards and punishment were the lineage heads or their higher order conglomerations.

A final source of social power and practice of authority in the late Shang was that of coercion, running the gamut of social practices from the punishment of disobedient subordinates or rebel lords to military action against pernicious external polities. In a sense, however, and to the extent that the Shang king laid discursive claim to the four quarters, there were no real external enemies, only military/political agents culturally, and/or practically beyond the reach of the king's ability to punish, tame and ultimately bring into the order of "civilization." At the same time, and in contrast to the king's expansive claims, the material resources of coercive action were dispersed across the landscape with each local leader in control of his or her own forces. In practice, the disparity between the king's discursive claims and the distribution of coercive capital was mediated by the king's direct authority over his closest subordinates and more indirect authority over more geographically or politically distant allies.[32]

(33) 癸亥卜,宁貞: 令倉厌夆征壴. (6)

Gui Hai day cracked, Bin divined: (we should) order Lord Xi of Cang to campaign against Zhu.

(34) 癸丑卜,亘貞: 王重望乘比伐下危. (811)

Gui Chou day cracked, Yuan divined: It is Cheng of Wang that the king should join to attack Xia Wei.

For political agents beyond the king's routine direct or indirect control (or in Mann's terms, routine political and military networks) the king could and did mount punitive expeditions to bring them into order.[33]

[32] As seen in the use of the verb *ling* 令 "to order" as opposed *bi* 比 "to join with" in cases where the king was divining about military action (Lin 1982, Keightley 1997)

[33] Indeed the moral economy of royal violence can even be seen in some of the terminology for mounting military expeditions such as *zheng* 征, homophonous and probably a cognate of the word *zheng* 正 "correct" and *zhi* 値, a cognate of the adjective *zhi* 直 "straight" and perhaps translatable as "to straighten" (an enemy), not unlike the colloquial English expression, "I'll straighten him out."

Indeed, the limits of the Shang king's network of coercive capital, the intensity and regularity of its operation, as well as the reliability and stability of its links are crucial to understanding the practical geography of the Shang king's coercive power. Moreover, as will be argued in more detail in Chapter 6, the place of practices of collective violence in the overall social economy of Anyang period Shang authority was not merely that of a direct socio-physical intervention of last resort, but also a central technique of pacification key to the maintenance of the Shang world order. Not only do the oracle-bone inscriptions yield an image of endemic warfare and the large-scale sacrifice of war captives, but also of the king as commander of troops and punisher of enemy polities even as *yue*-axes,[34] banners, chariots and ritual jade blades derived from weapons served as key symbols of authority. Thus, collective violence and the processes of its legitimization were central to both the defense and expansion of the king's authority, and the constitution of social identity and hierarchy.

Summarizing the above discussion, authority in the world of the Great Settlement Shang was structured hierarchically with Di, the spirits of the land and the royal ancestors organized in descending order. The Shang king's position with respect to subordinate lineage heads and local leaders was structurally analogous to Di's even while fitting into the overall generational hierarchy of the deified ancestors. Practically, position in the overarching structure of authority was negotiated through sacrifice and divination such that service to the ancestors through offerings, success in war and ritual communication bolstered the king's personal claim to authority and stood at the center of the Shang symbolic economy. Thus, hunting, the flow of tribute and rewards, the king's movements through the landscape, the creation of settlements, colonies, the opening of fields, and the ceaseless raids, punitive expeditions and defenses, set in a political landscape of shifting alliances and more or less permanent enemies, can all be seen as aspects of a continual program of pacification aimed at producing and maintaining the Shang civilizational order. Seen in these terms, the king's interactions with other political agents, and the networks of capital on which their interactions were based, were all part of a massive social economy of sacrifice and war.

[34] Indeed, in an influential article, Lin Yun (1998 [1965]) has argued that the oracle-bone graph for "king," *wang* 王 derives from that for *yue*-axe 鉞 (tipped on its side): 太 ⟵ 𠦪.

Networks of Capital

If Shang discursive structures of authority and orientations toward them were (re)produced through participation in, and the material and affective consequences of, practices of authority like the ones outlined above, then there is still the issue of the networks of capital that facilitated and set the limits of those practices. Nor are these networks merely flows of material resources, but also of people, knowledge, things, technologies, etc., the circulation of which was embedded in local social fields of exchange within or across boundaries of identity, allegiance and value.

In the case of divination, as noted above, both qualitative and quantitative distinctions marked off royal and high elite scapulamancy / plastromancy from other, less august divinatory practices and non-elite oracle-bones. These distinctions involved both specialized esoteric knowledge, specialist functionaries and relatively costly materials. While the particulars of how divinatory knowledge was passed on are not well-understood (but see Smith 2008, Flad 2006), we do know that both the king and royal consorts were involved in the divination process, while many diviners bore the names of places (Rao 1959) and may have been elites or specialists drawn from around the Shang world.[35] However, the raw materials of divination – cattle scapula and turtle plastrons and carapaces – came through economic networks that will be discussed below.

While ritual or sacrificial practices may well have involved specialists, as some have argued (Chang 1980, 1983, 1989b), the oracle-bone inscriptions exclusively record the participation of the king, his consorts and other high elites. This may suggest that like divinatory practices (and likely writing), knowledge and the performance of ritual was an important aspect of Shang elite education. Moreover, given that Shang ritual was focused on ancestors or ancestralized nature spirits, not to mention the hierarchical, lineage-based nature of its authority, the ritual assistants required by the monumental size of some royal sacrificial events could very well have been drawn from junior lineage members – each playing their role for the collective good of the lineage. In addition to people, the resources of ritual – both sacrificial offerings, and ritual accouterments like bronze vessels and jade artifacts – had to be acquired from various sources. In the case of offerings: livestock, captives, alcohol, grain and perhaps other foodstuffs all flowed into the great settlement Shang to feed

[35] One example is the period 1 diviner Yuan 亘 who bears the same name as a rebellious period 1 political entity.

its royal and non-royal sacrifices.[36] The implements of sacrifice, especially bronze vessels, were produced in the foundries of the great settlement, involving huge social economic webs of miners, smelters, woodcutters, charcoal makers, ceramic mold crafters, bronze casters and so on (Bagley 1999, Li 2003a, Campbell 2013b). Nevertheless, the virtual silence on the subject of bronze casting (or any other industry for that matter) in the oracle-bone inscriptions suggests that it was not a matter that concerned the king directly.[37] As noted in Chapter 3, it is likely that at least some of the metals that reached Yinxu came from afar, although the mechanisms that brought them there, can at present, only be speculated upon. Jade production is even less clear both in terms of sources of material and location of workshops.[38] Ritual implements, as artifacts of numinous power, were, moreover, obtainable in ways beside manufacture, notably gifting and seizure in war as evidenced in Shang elite tombs.[39] To a certain extent then, the flows of resources that supported sacrificial practices intersected other practices of authority such as gift-giving and war, as well as more routine forms of exchange or appropriation. While there is scattered evidence for elite gifting of such artifacts as bronze vessels or jade blades, and bronze inscriptions record gifts of cowry shells, the oracle-bone inscriptions supply a more robust, if incomplete source of evidence for understanding the social-economic networks of the Great Settlement Shang.

As noted above, there are both divinatory and non-divinatory (inventory) inscriptions concerning the flow of some resources to the court. The inventory inscriptions refer to plastrons and scapula, and frequently record from where or whom they came. The divinatory inscriptions reference instances in which the Shang king divined about whether or not a place or person would bring in some desired gift or resource.

[36] The scale of these resources is mutely testified by both the sacrificial pits in the royal cemetery (see Chapter 6) and the scale of the assemblages of worked cattle bone unearthed in bone-working sites like Tiesanlu (Campbell et al. 2011, Li et al. 2011, Anyang Team 2015).

[37] Not that it was unimportant to the king, but rather that it was likely someone else's responsibility (see also Li Yung-ti 2005).

[38] In fact, it is likely that jade artifacts and materials circulated in a number of different networks. Old jades were collected (see Bagley 1999), new jade artifacts were carved from raw materials of a variety of sources, possibly at a number of locations, while broken or chipped jades were reworked into new artifacts (see Institute of Archaeology 2005 for numerous examples).

[39] Fu Hao's tomb (xmtM5) (Institute of Archaeology 1980) is a good example of this with a number of bronze vessels bearing names or insignia other than her own and a jade *ge* dagger-axe the inscription on which indicated it was given in tribute.

In order to systematically reconstruct the resource flows evidenced in the oracle-bones, the twenty-one most frequently named contributors to the Shang court, what they contributed and their affiliations with the Shang polity were tabulated and analyzed together by means of a k-means cluster analysis (see Appendix A, Figures A.1 and A.2). This analysis shows that while a wide range of goods were sent in by place/actors with high Shang affiliation, *qiang*-captives and cattle are the most common resources delivered by place/actors with low or negative Shang affiliation. Plastrons and scapula, on the other hand, which were not generally divined about, but rather recorded as inventory, are clearly much more typically sent in by place/actors with high Shang affiliation (see also Hu 1944a). That is to say, the few routine flows of resources evidenced in the oracle-bones tend to come from place/actors with high Shang affiliation scores. At the same time while divinations concerning tribute or gifts are much more frequently associated with place/actors of high Shang affiliation (who, moreover, tend to be military agents), they can also be associated with allied or enemy polities as well. In the latter case, cattle and captives – the resources of royal sacrifice – are by far the most common tribute item.

Analyzing the verbs used in tributary inscriptions, and along with political affiliation scores (Appendix A), it seems that once again the place/actors with a high degree of affiliation were involved in a wide range of contributory activities, while a more restricted set of verbs was used for low affiliation agents. Thus the verb "contribute" (*ru/na* 入/納) is only associated with highly affiliated actors (and usually in the context of routine, inventory inscriptions), while "requisition" (*qi* 乞) or "cause them to come" (*lai* 來) is associated only with high and moderately affiliated agents. The verb "bring" (*yi* 以), on the other hand was the only verb used for divinations concerning agents with low affiliation scores, although it was not unique to that group. Combined with the analyses above, these findings suggest that not only can the royal political economy be divided into routine, Shang affiliated networks and contingent, politically less affiliated networks, but that the verb "contribute" (*ru/na*入/納), sometimes found on inscriptions on jade or stone artifacts may also signal a more routine, less contingent and long-distance practice than the classic Chinese tributary system it is generally thought to reference.

Another important basic economic network is that which supplied the Shang polity with grain, especially the Great Settlement Shang. Indeed, given the size of the site, and a population that most estimates put in the hundreds of thousands, provisioning would have been no small concern. While a systematic archaeology of Shang agriculture awaits future research,

the king's divinations concerning harvest constitute an available, if partial, line of evidence concerning political economic networks. Tabulating the place/actors for which there are at least three divinations and comparing their affiliation, alignment and political agency, several interesting patterns emerge (see Appendix A). The most obvious is the overwhelming preponderance of self-referential royal divinations concerning the harvest. The next four place/actors below the King/Shang in harvest divinations are, respectively, a royal consort who is ordered to lead agricultural activities (example (35)), a Zi prince (Zi Fu 子甫) and his dominion (𡆥), and dian 奠, which is a collective term for colonies set up by the Shang court – usually after conquest (Qiu 1993).[40] In addition, all but four place/agents have very high Shang affiliation scores and all but three should be considered Shang, suggesting that for the most part, places/agents of royal agricultural concern were firmly part of the King's direct networks of authority. Another interesting fact to emerge is that the Shang kings (or at least Wu Ding) appear to order certain agents to undertake agricultural activity at certain places as in the following examples.

(35) 庚辰卜, 王: 甫往乘, 受年. 一月. (20649)

Cracked on Gengcheng day, the King (tested): Fu should go and plant wheat, (for if he does, we will) receive harvest. First month.

(36) 辛丑卜,㱿貞: 婦姘乎黍〔于〕丘商,〔受年〕. (6530)

Cracked on Xinchou day, Ke tested: (It is) Consort Jin/Xin we should call upon to plant millet [at] Qiu Shang, (for if we do, we will [receive harvest]).

Thus, the majority of proper nouns occurring most frequently on harvest divinations either refer to the King himself, his close subordinates, or places that are securely affiliated with the Shang polity core. Of the four exceptions with relatively low affiliation scores, two – Shu 丮 and Bei 悖 – were sites of temporary conflict, and the harvest divinations presumably

[40] Other collective terms that were not included in Appendix A, Table A.2 are the northern (北), eastern (東), western (西) and southern (南) lands (土) or fields (田), with fourteen, eight, eleven and nine divinations respectively. There is controversy over whether these are internal (i.e. "our" northern, western, etc. lands) or external (i.e. the northern, western, etc. lands beyond the core Shang territory). In fact, the examples themselves are ambiguous and the interpretations rely upon whether the author in question believes the Shang polity was limited in extent or covered most of North China (e.g. Keightely 1983, Chen 1988, Zheng 1994).

pre- or post-dated the military action taken there. The other two exceptions, Wei 㠱 and Cha 𠂤, were both important military allies or subordinates of the Shang court[41] located in the west, either each with their own *dian*-colonies (奠) or they themselves were *dian*-colonies placed by the Shang kings and ruled over by subordinate lords.

(37) …壬辰亦屮來自〔西〕, [𠂤乎告曰:吾方〕征我奠, 戕四〔邑〕. (584 reverse)

… on Renchen day also it (trouble) came from [the west], [Cha called out announcing that: the Gong Fang] mounted an expedition against my colony(ies), inflicting damage on four [settlements].

Taken together this suggests that royal concern for harvest was focused on Shang lands and lands of the king's close subordinates or allies. This, in turn, fits well with the hypothesized existence of relatively routine core Shang economic networks,[42] not to mention the ritual protections that the king could exercise on behalf of favored subordinates.

Whether routine or contingent, appropriations of land, labor and resources were important royal practices of authority in themselves, as well as supporting other endeavors. In addition to the contributions of the king's subordinates and allies noted above, the Shang king also acquired various kinds of resources through "taking" (取) or "levying" (共, 登) them.

[41] Although 㠱 ended up fighting against the Shang (6985) and was apparently the target of Shang attack (6964, 6986, 6987) later in Wu Ding's reign, it was also, for a time at least, a close ally that reported to the Shang court.

癸未卜，永貞：旬亡囚. 七日己丑，㠱友化乎告曰：吾方征于我奠、豐. 七月. (6068)

Cracked on Guiwei day, Yong tested: the week will be without trouble. Seven days (later) on Jichou day, Wei You Hua called out, announcing that: the Gong Fang mounted an expedition against my colony, Feng. Seventh month.

[42] There are, however, some rare examples that complicate this picture, such as

□□〔卜〕，宦貞: 我才〔南〕奠，从龍受年. (9770)

Cracked on … day, Zhong(?) tested: (When) we are in the [southern] colony(ies), we will receive harvest from Long.

From Appendix A, Table A.4, it is apparent that Long 龍 also appears as an enemy (see also example (22) above) and, for most of the oracle-bones inscriptions was, at best, a peripheral political entity of uncertain alignment. Nevertheless, the inscription above records the receipt of harvest from Long through the southern colonies/colony. Whether this tribute would have been transferred to the capital or used locally is unknown. It may be that when we think of the Shang tributary economy we need to think of networks with multiple consumption nodes, but the evidence for this model is, unfortunately, extremely thin.

The verb *qu* 取, "take/get" in the oracle-bone inscriptions has at least two distinct senses of relevance to Shang political-economic networks.[43] The first involves taking or getting people or resources from various places, frequently involving the king divining about ordering someone to take something from some place and bring it, as in the examples below.

(38) 戊午卜,宂貞: 乎取牛百, 以. 王固〔曰〕: 吉. 以, 其至. (93 reverse)

Cracked on Wuwu day cracked, Bin divined: call upon (someone contextually understood) to take cattle, one hundred, and bring them (to court). The King prognosticating [said]: auspicious. (Someone contextually understood) is bringing them, they will arrive.

(39) 己巳卜, 雀取馬以. (8984)[44]

Cracked on Jisi day, (as for) the horses Que took, (he will) bring (them).

The mere fact that the outcome of calling upon someone to take/get something and bring it requires divination suggests the contingent nature of this form of acquisition, as does the frequent pairing with the verb *yi* 以, which, we have noted above, is often associated with contingent flows of resources. Examining the political agents the Shang king divined about calling upon or ordering to take/get things, unsurprisingly they tended to be strongly affiliated with the Shang such as General Ban 師般 (twenty-five examples), 𠂤 (fifteen), Gu 鼓 (four) and Que 雀 (four). The places where things are taken also tend to be securely within the Shang orbit, including places of the same name as the political actors named above,

[43] This graph is also used to represent a word denoting a ritual of some kind as in the example below. Guo Moruo claimed that it was a loan for *you* 槱 which in later times as fire-building rite JGWZGL: 649.

辛巳卜，取岳，比雨. 不比. 三月. (20398)

Cracked on Xin Si day, (if we) perform the *qu/you* ritual to Yue (it will) rain. （It will） not rain. Third month.

[44] This is actually the tenth divinatory charge in a series of divinations most of which deal with the issue of whether and what (elephants, monkeys, etc.) Que will be bringing, underlining the uncertain nature of this type of appropriation as well as the fact that "taking/getting" is not necessarily always at the behest of the king (presumably if the King had ordered him to get something there would be no need to divine about what Que was bringing). The alternative reading, that the King was divining about what it would be auspicious for Que to bring and thus orchestrating the entire scenario, is made impossible by the use of the non-controllable negative *bu* 不 (such as in *heji* 8984: 4), which demonstrates that what is being divined is what Que *will* bring, not what he *ought* to bring. See Takashima (1973) for an analysis of controllable and non-controllable negatives in the oracle-bone inscriptions.

as well as Cha 𠂤 (three examples), Yi 雝 (four), 𠂤 (three), and Dian 奠 (three).[45] The things taken/appropriated range from soldiers to sheep, but the most common categories were people (fifty-six examples), cattle (nineteen), horses (ten) and sheep/goats (seven) respectively. That these were contingent appropriations within the king's network of political authority can be seen in the nature of the human appropriations such as herdsmen[46] (芻 *chu*), retainers (臣 *chen*), women (女 nü) and archers (射 *she*) as in the examples below.

(40) 乎取射. (5756)

Call upon (someone understood) to take/get archers

(41) 戊申卜，宄，令𠂤取析[47]芻.（118）

Wu Shen day cracked, Bin (tested): order X to take/get Xi herdsmen(?)

(42) 乙亥卜，般取多臣… (622)

Yi Hai day cracked, (We should order) Ban to take/get many retainers …

The other relevant sense of the verb *qu* 取 (take/get) is more aggressive and is related to coercive action such as in the examples below.

45 The first of these is an important ally, the second an important Shang hunting and agricultural place, the third a *hou*-lord 侯 and subordinate to the Shang king and the fourth possibly has multiple referents as it frequently means something like "colony" (Qiu 1993).

46 The standard translations for this word include "to cut grass" extended to mean "grass cutter" > "herdsman." There are, however some problematic examples such as,

貞: 執雝芻. (122)

Tested: shackle herdsmen of Yong.

癸丑卜, 爭貞: 旬亡囚. 王固曰:屮𢦏, 屮 . 甲寅, 允屮來嬉. 左告曰: 屮豺芻自益, 十人屮二. (137)

Gui Chou day cracked, Zheng tested: the week will have no misfortune. The King Prognosticating said: there is harm, there was a dream(?). On Jia Yan day, indeed, trouble came. Zuo made an announcement saying: there are Zhi(?) herdsmen from Yi, ten men and two.

In both examples heji 122 and 137, the "herdsmen" in question are problematic for some reason, necessitating their capture in the first example, and as sources of trouble in the second. Why the herdsman of a closely affiliated place like Yong would be shackled, or the coming of a dozen herdsmen considered trouble is hard to explain – at least in political terms. There are, moreover, examples of *mu chu* 牧芻 or "herding *chu*" (e.g. 409), *gong chu* 弓芻 or "bow *chu*" (e.g. 685, 948) and *wu chu* 武芻 or "martial *chu*" (456), suggesting that perhaps *chu* 芻 had a more general meaning than "herdsman."

47 See Appendix A, Table A.4.

(43) 丁酉卜,宂貞: 令甫取元白殳, 及. (6)[48]

Ding You day cracked, Bing tested: (we should) order Fu to take *bo*-lord Shu of Yuan, (for if we do, we will) capture (him).

(44) … 彭龍 … 取汁邑. (7073)

… Peng and Long … take thirty settlements.

(45) 貞: 乎比奠取杯、叀、畐三邑. (7074)

Tested: call upon (someone) to meet Dian and take the three settlements of Pi, Yong(?), and Bi.

Obviously, one method of expanding resource networks was to "take" new settlements or their leaders (who might themselves serve as sacrificial capital), which could then be the source of contingent or routine exactions. The *qu* 取 "take/get" inscriptions thus reveal at least two separate, contingent networks of resources. The first network was largely "personnel-appropriations" and concerned moving resources around areas firmly under the routine authority of the Shang king. The other network of capital involved the contingency of military or coercive force and the "taking" of settlements, leaders, and, presumably, some or all of the resources formerly in their possession.

A series of terms contextually overlapping with *qu* 取 "taking/getting" in both the places where it occurred and the kinds of things appropriated are the "levying" verbs *gong* 共 "gather," *deng* 登 "raise" and 冒(𠙵).[49] The focus of levying was, like "taking/getting," mostly personnel, but the context

[48] It should be noted that not all instances of "taking" leaders can be seen as aggressive. Sometimes the sense of the inscription is more along the lines of "getting" so-and-so as in the example below.

壬戌卜, 㱿貞: 取犬乎网鹿于麇。(10976)

Ren Xu day cracked, Ke tested: get Quan and call upon him to net deer at Chen(?).

In these instances then, the "taking/getting" appears to akin to the personnel appropriations seen above.

[49] The last verb, 冒 has not been reconstructed, but appears in the same contexts as the other levying verbs in addition to appearing to be a name. The paleographic story of *gong* 共 and *deng* 登 is actually a bit more complicated than the above presentation might indicate. These two modern Chinese characters in fact represent three graphically distinct oracle-bone graphs: [illegible], [illegible], [illegible]. The first graph consists of two hand graphemes and is usually transcribed 共, while the second graph has two hands converging on the top of a *dou* 豆-pedestal. The third graph has feet graphemes in the place of the second graph's hands. The last two graphs, [illegible], [illegible], are frequently transcribed as *deng* 登 although *deng* is, in fact, only a direct transcription of the latter graph. Another possibility is that [illegible] is just a simplification of [illegible] and that all three graphs really represent the same word (Keightley 1999a, despite

of levying was predominantly (but not exclusively[50]) military. Indeed, it is likely, given the later history of taxation in China, that the mobilization of people was the major mode of government extraction and the main means by which service was rendered to the king.

(46) 辛巳卜, □貞: 登帚好三千, 登 (?)旅萬，乎伐□〔方〕. (39902)

Cracked on Xinsi day, [ ] tested: levy Fu Hao's three thousand, levy an army of 10,000, and call upon them to attack the [ ] (Fang).

(47) 庚寅卜,㱿貞: 勿冒人三千乎望吾〔方〕. (6185)

Cracked on Gengyan day, Ke tested: (we) should not levy men, three thousand, and call upon them to reconnoiter the Gong (Fang).

(48) 甲申卜,㱿貞: 乎帚好先共人于龐. (7283)

Cracked on Jiashen day, Ke tested: call upon Fu Hao to first levy men at Chong.

(49) 丁酉卜, 㱿貞: 今者王共人五千正土方, 受㞢㞢.三月. (6409)

Cracked on Dingyou day, Ke tested: today the king (should) levy five thousand men to expedition against the Tu fang, (for if he does, he will) receive divine aid. Third month.

transcribing the former as *gong* 共 and the latter as *deng* 登, translates both as "raise"). For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that all four of the graphs under question mean something like "levy" in the contexts under discussion.

50 The non-military levying inscriptions generally follow the patterning of *qu* 取 expropriations, involving livestock as well as retainers and labor for various projects, as in the examples below,

貞: 共牛于奠. (8936)

Tested: levy cattle from the colony(ies).

丙午卜，爭貞:冒羊于𢀛. (11199)

Cracked on Bingwu day, Zheng tested: levy sheep/goats at X.

令須共多女. (675)

Order Xu to levy many women.

辛亥卜, 爭貞: 共眔人,立大史于西奠, 𢦏.□月. (24)

Xin Hai day cracked. Zheng divined: (We should) levy the multitude (in order to) set up a major official in the western colony, Shu(?). [ ] month.

See Keightley (1969) for an early discussion of Shang labor mobilization, and Keightley (2012) for a recent attempt to update that study. As was the case in the taking/getting of livestock and personnel, the Shang king or his agents levied from areas firmly associated with the Shang polity core, suggesting that levying also operated in restricted but intensive political-economic networks or zones.

In the four examples above, we can see something of both the scale of military mobilizations and their contexts. Not only were large forces (up to 13,000, but more typically 3,000–5,000)[51] levied for coercive action, but they were levied by a number of political agents at a number of different locations, and, if my reading of the last example is correct, they could be levied quickly. Moreover, the first example has suggested to some that Shang elites, even royal consorts, may have had their own forces.[52] That this is the case for more distant political actors can be seen in the following example,

> (50) 乙巳，王貞：啟乎祝曰：盂方共〔人〕，其出伐，屯自高．其令東迨〔于〕高，弗每．不𦤎戕．王畜曰：吉．(36518)

> Yi Si day, the King divined: Qi called upon Zhu to say:[53] the Yu fang have levied [men] and may come out to attack, striking the Gao encampment. (We should) perhaps order Dong (the Eastern forces?) to meet [at] Gao, (if we do) there will be no regrets. (There will) not be any harm. The king prognosticating said: auspicious.

Yu 盂 was an important hunting area, the land of an important *bo*-lord 伯 and ally in early period oracle-bone inscriptions, yet in this period IV inscription, Yu raised his own forces in what the Shang king interpreted as offensive or rebellious action. While the distribution of actual forces and practical ability to raise them apparently rested with local leaders, the authority to do so may have been something that the Shang king claimed as his prerogative minimally within the areas he could practically control, at least by the end of the dynasty. As with expropriations of people and things in general, levying generally took place within areas firmly affiliated with Shang networks of authority such as *dian*-colonies/ (re)settlements, Bi (?) 𠂤, 𠂤, Zhi (?) 雀, Zhu 貯 and Que 雀.[54]

[51] By comparison, a Roman legion was supposed to consist of 5,000 men (Heather 2006), and though this is still a matter of controversy the Battle of Hastings is generally to have been fought with somewhere between 7,000 and 15,000 men on each side (Beeler 1966, Brown 1985, Wheeler 1988).

[52] See for instance Li (1997b: 462). In Chapter 5, I will argue against this interpretation of the Fu Hao inscription. Rather than understanding this as Fu Hao's own force levied from her own lands, I believe she is acting as the agent of the King raising troops on his behalf, and so, contextualized, "Levy Fu Hao's three thousand" may simply mean "gather the three thousand men that Fu Hao has assembled."

[53] I am by no means certain of the translation of this phrase. Both *qi* 啟 and *zhu* 祝 are verbs as well as proper names, the former meaning "to announce" and the latter a type of ritual. An alternative translation might be something like "Announcement, call out for a zhu-ritual (to be performed) saying: …"

[54] An apparent exception to this is a period I inscription about levying the forces of Xia Wei 下危, a political place-actor frequently on the receiving end of Shang attacks. However, as

Aside from raising forces or ordering them to be raised by political subordinates, the Shang king could also draw upon the coercive resources of allies, "meeting/joining" (*bi* 比) them for joint endeavors (Lin 1982).[55]

(51) 乙卯卜,㱿貞: 王比望乘伐下危, 受㞢㞢. (32)

Cracked on Yimao day, Ke tested: The King (should) join with Wang Cheng (to) attack Xia Wei, (for if he does) he will receive divine aid.

(52) 貞:叀象令比倉厌. (3291)

Tested: It is Xiang (who the King should) order to join with the lord of Cang.

As with other networks of capital, coercive capital (fighters, leaders, weapons, supplies) apparently circulated in both direct, intensive, and relatively stable networks, and indirect, extensive, and contingent ones. While the unparalleled magnitude of the Shang remains at Anyang suggests that the king may have had direct access to larger forces than any rival or subordinate political actor, the distribution of coercive capital was both wide and practically under local control, making the Shang king dependent on extensive webs of alliance and patronage.

As noted above, royal and elite hunts were a major practice of authority that could involve the mobilization of large forces and movement across the landscape (see also Fiskesjö 2001). While the royal hunt could potentially be used to cement relationships of patronage and allegiance with distant allies, or display the king's authority in a recently subdued area,[56] the

Qiu (1993: 661) has cogently argued, Xia Wei may have succumbed to the Shang and allied (Wang 望) forces and been resettled (*dian* 奠) elsewhere.

[55] There is some controversy over whether in inscriptions like the example above the graph I have transcribed should be read 比 (to join) or 从 (to follow/to cause to follow). The Jiaguwen Heji Shiwen, for instance, transcribes 比 as 从 in examples like (32). I, however, find Lin's (1982) argument persuasive. Based on my own tabulations of oracle-bone political geography, there does indeed seem to be a real statistical difference between place/actors that the king "orders" as opposed to "joining with" or ordering subordinates to "join with" for military action. As Lin (1982: 78) notes, bi 比 "to join with" is never used for close subordinates of the king like Fu Hao 婦好, Que 雀, Zi Shang 子商 and so on.

[56] As suggested in the following examples,

戊辰卜, 尹貞: 王其田亡災. 才正月. 才危卜. (41075)

Cracked on Wuchen day, Yin tested: If the King hunts, there will be no disasters. In the first month. Cracked at Wei.

戊子卜,宁貞: 王〔往〕逐𢦏于沚, 亡災. 之日王往逐𢦏于沚, 允亡災, 隻𢦏八. (9572)



MAP 4.1 Shang Political Geography. The dark-colored areas indicate the distribution of metropolitan ceramic traditions, while the darkest region is the distribution of the Anyang variant of the metropolitan tradition. The numbers indicate the Shang affiliation score (see Appendix A).

king most frequently hunted in areas solidly affiliated with the Shang polity (see Map 4.1). This in turn suggests that the King's oft-cited movements across the landscape were mostly within areas directly under his control.

Logistics of Social Power

In the above section I have attempted to pull together some disparate, and admittedly fragmentary, lines of evidence from the oracle-bone inscriptions concerning the networks of resources upon which Shang

> Cracked on Wuzi day, Bin tested: If the King [goes forth] pursuing hawks(?) at Zhi, there will be no disasters. On this day the King went forth and pursued hawks(?) at Zhi. Indeed there were no disasters and he caught hawks(?), eight.
>
> In the first case, Wei 危 is a freshly subdued polity and in the second, Zhi 沚 is an important early period Shang ally, which most (if not all) oracle-bone geographers reconstruct as being located in north-central Shanxi province (see Map 4.1). The translation of the graph 𦥑 as "hawk" is based on Yan Yiping's 嚴一萍 reconstruction as ying 鷹 (JGWZGL: 1722–1723).

practices of authority depended, through which, in turn, the Shang king's discursive world order was produced. From the above discussion, at least three dimensions can be seen:

1 The flows of material resources (including people) supporting Shang practices of authority can generally be broadly divided into direct, intensive, routine, and indirect, extensive, contingent types of networks.
2 Different types of resources/capital circulated in different networks, which did not necessarily neatly overlap either geographically or structurally. For instance, although harvest divinations and routine contributions to the court economy may both be characterized as belonging to direct and intensive networks, the political actors sending grain to the capital and those bringing say, plastrons, were not necessarily the same, the logistics of transport were certainly different and their geographic distribution was probably not isomorphic.
3 Nevertheless, the intensity and range of particular networks were frequently intertwined and interdependent with other networks and practices (thus Wei 危 became a stage for the royal hunt and source of captives and booty after it was subdued through the mobilization of direct and indirect coercive networks).

An idealization of the above points as zones of political-economic distance from a Shang center can be seen in Figure 4.2. They are idealizations both in their representations of clear and stable boundaries, and in suggesting neatly coextensive networks of practice and capital. Nonetheless, they are idealizations that mirror the earliest extant political-geographic description of the Shang polity, inscribed on the Da Yu Ding 大盂鼎 some fifty–eighty years after the Zhou conquest of the Shang.

(53) 我聞(聞) 殷述(墜)令(命)隹殷邊侯(侯)田（甸）雩（于）殷正百辟率肆于酉（酒）古喪𠂤（師）.

I have heard that Yin's letting fall the Mandate was because the *hou* and *dian*-lords of Yin's peripheries, and the myriad governing officials of Yin all indulged in wine and thus lost their armies.

Here we can see that the Zhou understood the Shang (or Yin) dominions in terms of a bipartite division with an outer zone of *hou* 侯 and *dian* 甸 lords, and an inner zone of officials. While this is an (early) Zhou rather than Shang understanding of the Shang polity, it does fit with the general



FIGURE 4.2 Oracle-Bone Political Economy

political-economic picture we have been assembling from the oracle-bone inscriptions.

Oracle-Bone Political Geography and the Shang Landscape of Authority

If the practices of authority and their sources of capital centered on the Great Settlement Shang can be abstractly represented as a series of partially overlapping networks of differing intensity, regularity, and extent, then another obvious (if difficult to answer) question is how they map onto the geography of North China at the end of the second millennium BCE. While many have tried their hands at reconstructing the historical geography of the oracle-bone inscriptions (often with the explicit intention of discussing the extent of the "Shang state") (e.g. Shima 1958, Chen 1988, Shaughnessy 1989, Zheng 1994), few have attempted to systematically address the political-economic relationships between place and agency. An exception to this is Keightley (1983).

In perhaps the most influential article on the Shang polity in a Western language, Keightley (1983) combined Shima Kunio's (1958) historical geographic reconstruction of important oracle-bone places with a study of their "sovereignty." Keightley came to the famous conclusion that,

> One has the sense, in short, of the state as a thin network of pathways and encampments; the king and information and resources traveled along the pathways, but the network was laid over a hinterland that rarely saw or felt the king's presence and authority. (548)

And, moreover,

> In political terms, the domain of the Shang state and its allies was, as we have seen, honeycombed with non-Shang or enemy groups. (Keightley 2000: 81)

While the results of Keightley's study are widely cited as well-established fact in the English language literature, even Keightley termed his study "preliminary," and there are in truth, some serious methodological issues with it. The most obvious problem is the method by which Keightely (1983) arrives at a "state-score" expressing the degree of Shang sovereignty: namely, multiplying the number of non-hostile divinations concerning a place by the variety of topics about which divinations were made. Thus, to give an example, Upper Wu(?)上𩰫, a place that the king visited regularly, but about which he did not divine about anything other than the weekly fortune, or the auspiciousness of coming and going, gets a state score of 198, while Zhi 沚, frequently divined about by merit of being an important military ally and buffer polity, yet where the Shang king almost never went in person, gets a state score of 331. This would paradoxically indicate that the buffer polity ally Zhi was the most highly affiliated part of the Shang polity aside from the Great Settlement Shang itself, while the royal retreat of Shang Wu(?) was only marginally affiliated with the Shang court. Another problematic assumption evident in Keightley's remarks above concerning the Shang "state's" characterization as, "a thin network of pathways" "laid over a hinterland that rarely saw or felt the king's presence and authority," is that places either not occurring or rarely occurring in the royal divinations were not part of Shang networks of resources. As the discussion above has already highlighted, the oracle-bone divinatory inscriptions, by their very nature, concern matters contingent, uncertain and/or, dangerous. Regular flows of resources, safe, uneventful places, and well-structured relationships of subordination require little divinatory attention. The idea, ubiquitous in Keightley's descriptions of the Shang polity (Keightley 1983, 1999a, 2000), that Shang administration was largely an ad-hoc affair, is entirely an artifact of the assumption that the oracle-bone records can be read as positive evidence for reconstructing Shang political-economic practice. This is simply not the case – the Shang kings had divinations inscribed about

an increasingly restricted number of topics which even in Wu Ding's time never included such obviously important networks as those that supported bronze casting. The Great Settlement Shang, likely the largest population center the world had seen to that point, did not feed its population with ad-hoc royal appropriations, nor fuel its kilns, foundries and hearths with the provisions of kingly expeditions. In addition to topics that did not directly concern the king (but were still relevant in supporting practices of authority) there were entire networks of routine resource flows for which divination was unnecessary (e.g. the inventory records of plastrons and scapula fortuitously recorded on the margins of oracle-bones). Moreover, as recent work on the Tiesanlu bone working area has shown, there was an enormous economy of everyday production, that, for some industries at least, likely dwarfed elite consumption, biased though Chinese archaeological practice is toward mortuary and elite remains (Campbell et al. 2011, Li et al. 2011). The ramifications of these points for a re-analysis of Anyang period Shang political economic geography are firstly that finer distinctions need to be drawn with respect to divinations concerning place/actors and their relative locations in the king's practical and discursive landscape of authority, and secondly, that the brute number of divinations about a place is not necessarily strictly relevant to its importance to the polity. A small agricultural community in the hinterland of the Great Settlement is likely to be both firmly part of the king's direct network of resources, and rarely, if ever, mentioned in divinations about agriculture or levying labor. A strategically important polity or place of frequent military action, however, is likely to have figured large in the Shang king's divinations without necessarily being an integral part of anything but indirect coercive networks, and their attendant linkages with elite gifting and flows of tribute.[57]

Given these issues, a re-analysis of Shang political-economic networks was undertaken based on Keightley's (1983) highest ranking place/actors (which tends to privilege those involved in military endeavors), and adding to it the twenty places most frequently divined at, the place/actors most frequently the subject of harvest divinations and the place/actors about whose contributions of resources divinations were most frequently conducted. The

[57] To make a contemporary analogy, imagine that the only record we had of US administration were transcriptions of the president's nightly prayers. Following Keightley's methodology we might end up concluding that Iraq and Afganistan were two of the most integral and important parts of the American state while Kansas, if it appeared at all, would be part of that hinterland outside the president's networks of resources, and South Dakota perhaps one of those famous "holes" in the swiss cheese.

goal was to discover the relationships between types of "political" action, the location of places/actors in the Shang landscape of authority, their role in networks of capital that supported or resisted that order (see Appendix A). Finally, the most important of these actors were placed, very tentatively, on a historical geographic map based on some of the most recent historical geographical reconstructions (Zheng 1994, Sun and Lin 2010), and the distribution of Anyang period metropolitan ceramic traditions (Map 4.1).

To the extent that confidence can be placed in the reconstructed locations of oracle-bone place/actors, some interesting discrepancies can be seen between the distribution of Shang ceramic traditions (see Chapter 3) and the distribution of place/actors of high Shang political affiliation. Some important allies of the Shang polity did not apparently share metropolitan material cultural traditions (such as Zhi, 沚 (𡆥) and perhaps some of the other western allies) while many of the enemy polities recorded in the oracle-bone inscriptions apparently did, some perhaps even within the distribution of the Anyang variant of the metropolitan tradition (such as Jing/Xing Fang 井/ 邢方). Given the large number of attempts at reconstructing oracle-bone historical geography and their wide range of outcomes, conclusions about the locations of specific places should be considered tentative at best. Yet even if this were not the case, the non-conformity of oracle-bone inscription-based Shang affiliation and Anyang period Central Plains metropolitan ceramic traditions ought to come as no surprise. Indeed, if we accept that ceramic tradition has no necessary or direct bearing on political affiliation (or even ethnic identity) and that relations between political agents in the Anyang period were shifting and contingent,[58] then, contrary to the monolithic impression of the Shang polity given in the Chinese archaeological literature, we should expect the picture to be both complex and dynamic.[59] Nevertheless, on the other extreme, Keightley's (1983) contention that Shang authority was ad-hoc, and the polity a thin network of lines honeycombed with enemy lands is not accurate either, but rather an artifact of his problematic method and assumptions (see Li 2006, 2008 for arguments against a similar characterization of the Western Zhou polity). While we should not forget that the affiliation scores derived from our analysis (Appendix A) collapse some 150–200 years of history into a single

[58] For instance, looking through Appendix A, Table A.4 there are twelve place/actors that have enemy scores > 0 yet are not primarily Shang enemies, suggesting that over the 150–200 years covered by the oracle-bone inscriptions political relationships were fairly mutable.

[59] Though not without ramifications for how most scholars interpret material cultural distribution in Chinese archaeology.

synchronic image,[60] the broad picture these studies paint is of a shifting nexus of routine as well as contingent networks of authority and capital centered on the royal center at Anyang – creating a dynamic mosaic of affiliation and identity. Nevertheless, at two orders of magnitude larger than the next largest contemporaneous North Chinese site, the political landscape of the Great Settlement Shang appears to have been a mono-centric one, Anyang itself a massive center of elite and non-elite production as well as cultural homogenization over the course of its occupation (Jing et al. 2013).

Shang Networks of Power

By now it should be obvious that the sovereign ideals of the Shang kings and their actual networks of capital and practice do not precisely correspond. Moreover, materially and practically, coercive capital was dispersed among local powers of different orientation toward the king even while he claimed universal lordship. Although the king could launch long-range punitive expeditions, the regular ability to exercise direct coercive force was circumscribed to a relatively small area or based on the contingent support of other political agents. Moreover, the frequent conflicts, raids and shifting nature of allegiances suggest dynamic political arrangements. The above investigations of networks of resources also indicate a limited sphere of routine authority within a more expansive, contingent and indirect zone of control/influence. Moreover, many important raw materials used in Shang practices of authority, such as cowry shells, proto-porcelain, lacquer and perhaps jade, came through networks of exchange more extensive than any Shang king's ability to exercise authority or even project force. Networks of kinship, elite gifting and ritual practice also extended beyond the direct authority of the court as the spread of the ritual bronze sphere beyond the distribution of Shang ceramic traditions underlines (see Chapter 3) and the Zhou example demonstrates. Kinship and community will be discussed in the next chapter, but let us turn to the example of the Zhou to illustrate further the non-coextensiveness of different networks of Shang royal authority.

The Case of the Zhou

By Anyang times, the area west of Xian in central Shaanxi was beyond the distribution of Central Plains Metropolitan Tradition ceramics (see Chapter 3),

[60] Future studies combining micro-periodization of oracle-bone inscriptions and with better archaeological data (especially a finer chronology for sites outside of Anyang) may be able to provide a finer-grained picture with at least a four-part division of the Anyang period.

yet is uncontroversially the area from which the conquest of the Shang was launched. Post-conquest, the Zhou continued and developed elite Central Plains Metropolitan material cultural traditions (manifested in bronze casting, major architecture, jade carving, writing and chariot driving) while claiming to have received Heaven's Mandate to rule the four quarters which the Shang had formerly possessed but squandered. Mention of the Zhou, however, appears only in the early Anyang oracle-bone inscriptions (kings Wu Ding–Zu Geng) and then disappears along with most of the political agents/places of King Wu Ding's western frontier (Xia 2005a, Shaughnessy 1985–1987). In those early inscriptions the Zhou appears as enemy, then an agent of the Shang (presumably after pacification) and finally as an enemy before disappearing from the inscriptions. For a time then, the Zhou appears to have been an integral part of the king's networks of authority: receiving orders, bringing in contributions/gifts, and no doubt participating in elite ritual practices and exchange.

(54) 甲午卜，宁貞: 令周乞牛多. (4884)

Cracked on Jiawu day, Bin tested: order Zhou to requisition cattle, many.

(55) 周入十. (3183)

Zhou contributed ten.

This suggests that if the Zhou recorded in the oracle-bone inscriptions is the same Zhou that conquered the Shang in the middle of the eleventh century BCE, then minimally they had at least one period of close contact with Central Plains Metropolitan culture. Moreover, wherever the Zhou of the early Anyang oracle-bone inscriptions was located,[61] by the reign of the last Shang king, it was at the center of a confederacy of polities located in modern Shaanxi province with a leadership, which, while apparently

[61] Shaughnessy (1989) takes up the argument of Qian Mu that several generations before the Zhou conquest of the Shang, the Zhou moved from the Fen river 汾河 area of Shanxi 山西 to the Zhouyuan 周原 area of Shaanxi 陕西, adding an argument based on oracle-bone micro-chronology that this move corresponded to the loss of Shang hegemony in Shanxi to the Gong Fang who invaded from the north-west. Without wishing to get into the complicated and controversial topic of Zhou origins, it should be pointed out that while there seems to be some archaeological corroboration for a post-Wu Ding period (Anyang phase II) retraction of Shang ceramic tradition sites in Shanxi (and a corresponding influx of Lijiaya 李家崖 tradition ceramics and northern complex bronze artifacts – see Chapter 3), most archaeologists currently working in the Zhouyuan area see the ceramic traditions of Zhou as evolving locally (that is, in western Shaanxi). However, since ceramic tradition does not equal ethnic group (which is not necessarily a bounded, stable entity in any case), the theory that the Zhou moved from southern Shanxi to the Zhouyuan is not impossible, only without compelling archaeological evidence.

beyond the Shang king's direct (and perhaps indirect) practical networks of authority, nonetheless participated in the Shang royal sacrificial cult as the Zhouyuan oracle-bone inscription below indicates,

(56) 癸巳彝文武帝乙宗貞王其邵祭成唐… (H11-1)

Guisi day (divined during the performance of the) *yi*-ritual in the ancestral temple of cultivated and martial Di Yi: the King will *shao*-sacrifice to Cheng Tang …

While controversy continues to surround the context of this inscription (and others such as H11-82, H11-84, H11-112), that this is a Zhou tradition oracle-bone inscription, and that it mentions sacrifice to Shang royal ancestors, is not in doubt.[62] Whether a Zhou record of Shang sacrifice (pace Li 1985–1987), or a record of Zhou sacrifice to Shang royal ancestors (pace Shaughnessy 1985–1987), it demonstrates Zhou involvement in Shang royal ritual practices (whether as audience or participants), and thus, a place within the Shang discursive world order – the terms, but perhaps not the structure of which, they ultimately successfully contested.[63] All of this suggests that while western Shaanxi was beyond the Central Plains Metropolitan Tradition material cultural sphere, not to mention the Shang kings' material and practical networks of direct authority, it was nonetheless part of a wider Shang discursive network: that of the Shang kings' universal claims and the structures of authority on which they were based.

Outline of the Shang Polity at Anyang

In the discussion above we have fragmented the easily reified notion of a "Shang state" into a nexus of overlapping networks of capital supporting practices and hierarchies of authority. In doing so we have intentionally

[62] For an English introduction to the controversies surrounding these inscriptions see the "Early China Forum" in *Early China* 11–12 1985–1987: 146–190. For a good Chinese overview of the subject consult Cao (2002).

[63] Keightley (1999a) notes that the power of Di 帝 to cause disaster for the dynasty presaged the Zhou ideology of Heaven's Mandate and thus that the legitimation of their conquest was based on Shang cosmology (as we would expect for such a legitimation to be effective).

> These few "Di makes disaster" cases are significant, for they suggest that Di was potentially a Tian 天 ("Heaven")-like figure capable, like the Zhou deity, of harming and destroying the dynasty. The Zhou claim that Di (or Tian) had ordered their rulers to conquer the Shang … would thus have not been a Zhou invention, but a logical extension of Shang religious concepts. (253)

complicated questions of how large the "Shang state" was, the nature of the polity (city state, territorial state, segmentary state, etc.), or where it fits on a social evolutionary scale (complex chiefdom, archaic state, empire, etc.). To answer the question of size, we would first have to come to an agreement about what aspect of which Shang networks of power we would want to include or exclude, and what degree of authority or routine coercion we would consider sufficient to mark the boundaries of the Shang polity. To understand what kind of or how complex a polity the Shang was, we would have to first jettison pre-packaged typologies and compare instead the nature, extent and interaction of networks of capital and the production of authority. Yet, I believe, these complications do not prevent, but rather form, the basis of a more nuanced and meaningful comparison.

Nevertheless, as productive as this fragmentation is, it is a kind of scholastic vision (Bourdieu 2000) that shatters the holistic sense we typically have of our social and political worlds. If we have shown that the Anyang period Shang polity was neither a crypto-nation-state, nor a mini-version of the Qin or Han empires in the sources and circulation of its networks of authority, then there still remains the question of its polity idea and imagined community. Based on both the (inferred) realities of logistical networks and the Western Zhou account of Shang political organization, the Shang king presided over a dominion of concentric, if mutable, spheres: the royal demesne, the lands of allied but subordinate lords, and the as yet unconquered realm of rebels, enemies and barbarians. The king stood also at the apex of ritual authority, linking the communities of the living, through his genealogy, sacrifices and constant work of pacification, to the royal ancestors and powers of the land. It was moreover, an imagined community conceived largely in terms of webs of actual or fictive kinship, the practice of which significantly involved forms of collective violence and ancestor veneration – topics discussed in the following chapters.

Conceptually, the Shang was a great settlement, a specification that distinguished it from other, lesser settlements, as well as one of hundreds of places mentioned in the oracle-bones that could be entered, departed from, or at which actions could be performed. More expansively, Shang referred to a *fang* 方, a political entity capable of collective military action and possessing settlements, fields and people.

(57) 叀（惠）商方步，立于大乙，戜（翦）尅（羌）方.（27982）

It should be the Shang side that marches, erect (a tablet?) for Greater Yi, (for if we do we will) destroy the Qiang side.

Moreover, as a spatial concept, Shang could apparently be gradated between simply "Shang" and "central Shang," implying Shang was not merely an urban center and a polity, but also a spatial concept.

(58) …卜，屮，羌□至商征. 一月.（20405）

… cracked, X (tested): the Qiang … will reach Shang with their campaign.

(59) 壬午卜，自〔鼎（貞）〕：乎（呼）𠬝（禦）方于商（20450）

Ren Wu (19th day) cracked, Shi tested: call upon (someone context implicit) to repel the Fang at Shang.

(60) … 子（巳）卜，王鼎（貞）：于中商乎（呼）〔𠬝（禦）〕方.（20453）

… Zi (Si) day cracked, the King tested: (we should) to central Shang call upon (someone implicit) to go and repel the Fang (enemy).

(61) 己酉〔卜〕，鼎（貞）：王徲于中商. 一 （20450）

[cracked] on Ji You (46th day), tested: the King should launch a campaign (lit. straighten out enemies) at central Shang.

The overall context of these early king Wu Ding period inscriptions is that the Qiang Fang (here probably referring to a collective of western enemies) were clearly conducting a military campaign somewhere beyond "Shang" that could perhaps reach Shang itself. Once it was established that the Qiang would indeed reach Shang with their campaign, a further distinction was made: the Qiang could reach "central Shang" and it was there that perhaps the defense should be made. The final divinatory proposition has the King himself taking the field at central Shang against the enemy, implying that either he is coming from somewhere else back to the center, or that he is already there but that the center of Shang lands will be the theater of conflict for his campaign. From these examples then, we catch a glimpse of a world where Shang refers to a limited area, one moreover, vulnerable to attack at its very center, where the Shang king himself might have to fight to repel the attacks of invading enemies.

What was the Shang to an ordinary person? Or, put another way, on what basis, and to what extent, was the Shang imagined community made salient and transcendent beyond the royal court? While I will attempt a long answer to these questions in subsequent chapters concerning communities of kinship, structuring violence and the broad social economy

of ancestralization, for now suffice it to say that just as allied leaders and subordinates referred to attacks on *their* settlements and fields, so too do the Shang royal diviners distinguish the populations of even close subordinates like Que as "people of Que," as in the following inscription:

(62) 戊戌卜：雀人芻于效

Cracked on Wuxu day, the people of Que will cut grass/herd at X (20500)

Taken together these lines of evidence paint a picture of a political world of nested and overlapping identities, of a hegemonic central polity, the transcendent universal claims of which, were belied in practice by the limitations of its networks of authority in both extent and nature. On the one hand, Shang was a place among many, of limited extent even as its great settlement was unrivaled, and, on the other, the networks of capital upon which royal power was based, though centered there, were not limited to the place called "Shang." To truly understand the political landscape of the Great Settlement Shang and its polity, we need to leave behind the mental world of nation states and one-to-one correspondence of sovereign political identity with a bounded territory (Campbell 2009, M. Smith 2003, A. Smith 2003). Just as surely as the imagined communities of modern nation states are created through the use of flags, anthems, mass media and mass education, so too the Shang lack of these things, and existence of other patterning practices productive of collective identity would have produced entirely different political worlds. For the Shang the basic unit of identity was the lineage – a hierarchical community of real or fictitious descent, of the living and the dead, of war, sacrifice and feasting – topics taken up in the next chapters.

CHAPTER 5

Kinship, Place and Social Order

To say that kinship was an important aspect of Shang social political organization is uncontroversial among Shang scholars, yet this placid surface of consensus conceals a morass of long-standing controversies concerning the social, political and economic nature of Shang kinship. With assumptions originating ultimately in Weberian sociology, both Keightley and Chang saw the importance of kinship to the Shang as a social evolutionarily problematic. The perceived failure of bureaucratic authority to have replaced kinship-based authority meant for Keightley that the Shang polity was at best an "embryonic state," while for Chang it meant that China was on a different social-evolutionary trajectory from that of the West. But what exactly is "kinship" or "kinship-based authority"? If we unpack the term and see kinship as a cluster of intermeshed local practices of, and discourses on, procreation, descent, co-habitation and obligation, might these practices not intersect differently in different societies, and might they not play different roles in the constitution of authority? Nor is kinship merely a given, static, social fact, or set of relations, but rather,

> the relations between ascendants and descendants themselves only exist and persist by virtue of constant maintenance work, and that there is an economy of material and symbolic exchanges between generations. The same is true of affinal relationships: it is only when one records them as a *fait accompli*, as the anthropologist does when he establishes a genealogy, that one can forget that they are the product of strategies oriented towards the satisfaction of material and symbolic interests and organized by reference to a particular type of economic and social conditions. (Bourdieu 1990: 167)

Kinship then, like "states" or "cities," cannot simply be fit into universalizing evolutionary typologies without reference to the particular ways in

which the many intertwined things that constitute that category are locally constituted in practice and discourse. The question, then, ought to be, "how was descent, co-residence, marriage, identity and obligation figured in Shang Anyang social, political and economic practices and discourse?" Although not phrasing their questions in quite this way, several scholars have made important contributions to understanding the nature and roles of kinship practices in Shang society.

In 1982, the noted Chinese epigrapher Qiu Xigui published a seminal article concerning the structure of Shang lineages, and their role in aristocratic-commoner class relations. In this article Qiu argues three main points that are of interest to our discussion: 1) that Shang lineage organization was similar to that of the Zhou[1] (father-to-son descent, hierarchical distinctions made between main-line and collateral lines of descent); 2) that the Shang king's political-religious authority was basically that of direct descendant of the high god Di and lineage leader of the world;[2] 3) participation in the lineage system separated the elites from the common people. While aspects of first and second claim are fairly uncontroversial, we will argue that the third claim is almost certainly incorrect.

Citing the mostly father-to-son succession of kings after Wu Ding's time[3] and the tendency of the increasingly systematized sacrificial cycle (*zhouji* 周祭), from period II on, to favor main-line royal ancestors in number and

[1] Chang (1980) also makes this claim but then goes on to construct a cyclical ten branch lineage system for royal succession. While Chang's cyclical succession hypothesis has not been met with enthusiasm by oracle-bone specialists and scholars of Shang kinship, its radical departure from Zhou practices makes it a bit surprising that Chang would then reconstruct the social-political ramifications of Shang kinship almost entirely based on the Eastern Zhou text the Zuo Zhuan.

[2] Vandermeersch (1977) arrived at essentially the same conclusion regarding the Shang king as father and high priest of the people, but differed in claiming that the Shang ancestor veneration was fundamentally unlike Zhou kinship practices, that Shang ancestral sacrifice was a royal prerogative and that it created a mythic kinship community that included the entire populace. While there may have been some sharing of common identity based on common myths and the king's claims to mediate between the high god and spirits of the land through his ancestors supports an ideology that at least discursively incorporates the populace at large, non-royal ancestral sacrifice is amply attested in the non-royal oracle-bone inscriptions (especially the Huayuanzhuang oracle-bones), ancestral dedications on bronze vessels and weapons, jade implements (e.g. the six jade handle-shaped objects found at Hougang 91M3) and sacrificial remains at non-royal cemeteries at Anyang (e.g. Hougang H10, Dasikongcun).

[3] According to the Shiji Yinbenji 史記殷本紀 account (Nienhauser et. al 1993), of the eight kings at Yin, there were only two cases of brother-succession (Zu Jia succeeding Zu Geng and Kang Ding succeeding Lin Xin). Lin Xin's status is, moreover, put in question by his lack of mention in period V Zhouji inscriptions (see also Keightley 1978a).

size of sacrifices, and include only the spouses of main-line kings in the sacrificial cycle, Qiu argues that clear hierarchical distinctions were made between main-line and collateral kin. Nevertheless, if the Shiji account can be believed, the practice of fraternal succession was quite common up to Kang Ding's time.[4] Moreover, given that the "main-line" was defined with respect to the genealogy of the living king, and separated him from the descendants of former kings whose progeny had not succeeded to the throne, in practical terms, privileging the main-line ancestors meant privileging the king's own place in the lineage hierarchy at the expense of potential rivals. This "main line" versus "collateral line," however, is (contra Qiu 1982) quite different from that of the Zhou royal house, which did not practice fraternal succession, and for whom main-line and collateral branches were (in theory) absolute and based on seniority. That is to say, the main line of Shang kings was not a line based on lineage seniority, but rather the contingencies of which kingly brother's son managed to succeed in the next generation.[5] Kinship terminology and ancestor veneration practices also show marked differences between Shang and Zhou practices. Based on a systematic study of caches of Western Zhou bronze vessels, Sena

[4] According to the Shiji, from Cheng Tang 成唐 to Kang Ding 康丁 there were twenty-five Shang kings and thirteen of them were brother-to-brother successions (see Appendix B).

[5] While there are a number of slightly different reconstructions of royal Shang genealogy based on received texts and the arrangement of the sacrificial cycle in the oracle-bone inscriptions (compare for instance, Chen 1988: 379 and Keightley 1978a: 185), it is uncontroversial that succession between generations did not necessarily pass to the eldest son of the senior line. The "main-line" of descent was rather the line of kings whose fathers and sons were kings, and any son of any king could potentially become king himself (Chen 1988). This potential narrowed somewhat in the latter half of the Anyang period with five father-to-son successions in a row (but note that fraternal succession continued in the Shang successor state of Song during eastern Zhou times), but even then it was not necessarily the eldest son that succeeded to the throne (Di Xin 帝辛 or Zhou 紂 was supposed to have been the youngest of three brothers). Qiu (1982), however, citing the Shiji, claims that Zhou's older brother Wei Zi Qi 微子启 could not succeed to the throne because of his mother's lowly status. He then goes on to claim that there already existed a *di/shu* 嫡/庶 system in the Shang, but then conflates this with main and collateral lines of descent. However, the distinction between wives and concubines (if it existed in the Shang) was not what separated the main and collateral lines. As argued above, the main-line was simply the descent line of kings whose sons succeeded them, while in absolute terms of seniority they might actually be from a junior line. This is radically different from the *zongfa* 宗法 system recorded in Eastern Zhou texts that Qiu claims already existed in the Anyang period (1982). See also Hu (1944b) for the argument that the *zongfa* system already existed in the Shang. Hu also makes the same argument about Zhou 紂 but based on the Lushi Chunqiu as well as the Shiji account. An alternative explanation might be that the various accounts of why Zhou could succeed despite not being the eldest son were historical exegetical exercises based on Eastern Zhou assumptions about proper succession. See also Li (1997b) for the claim that the *zongfa* and *di/shu* systems already existed in the Shang.

(2005) notes that not only does Zhou genealogical reckoning on bronze inscriptions follow a single line of descent, but terms like *bo* 伯, *zhong* 仲, *shu* 叔, and *Ji* 季 mark differences in birth order,[6] and, thus, seniority in the lineage. In contrast, not only does the Shang royal cult involve sacrifice to "non-main-line" ancestors, but non-royal ancestral dedications such as those found on the Dazu zhuzu 大祖諸祖, Zuzhufu 祖諸父 and Daxiong zhuxiong 大兄諸兄 *ge* dagger-axes戈 (see Figure 5.1)[7] show that while their was some differentiation in seniority within generations, the male ancestors of each generation were collectively worshiped, and referred to, by common kinship terms.[8]

(1) 大祖日己， 祖日乙， 祖日庚， 祖日丁， 祖日己， 祖日己

Great Ancestor day Ji, Ancestor day Yi, Ancestor day Geng, Ancestor day Ding, Ancestor day Ji, Ancestor day Ji

(2) 祖日乙，大父日癸， 大父日癸， 中父日癸， 父日癸， 父日辛， 父日己

Ancestor Day Yi, Great Father day Gui, Great Father day Gui, Middle Father day Gui, Father day Gui, Father day Xin, Father day Ji

[6] There is, however, some uncertainty concerning whether these appellations referred to entire lineage branches or only the sons of a single father (see discussion in Sena 2005). Cao (2005) argues that the day names of Shang ancestors actually refer to birth order and thus seniority within the lineage. This hypothesis has a huge drawback in being unable to explain the prevalence of certain day appellations (such as Yi 乙 and Ding 丁and scarcity of others (such as Bing 丙 and Wu 戊). The hypothesis of auspicious and inauspicious days put forward by Ji (1989) seems much more likely.

[7] There is some controversy over the authenticity of these poorly provenanced bronzes (e.g. Dong 1950, Li 1957, etc.). It should be noted, however, that much of this doubt has been based on the uniqueness of the inscriptions, and opinion seems to have shifted toward acceptance (Ma 1987, Li 1997a, Hwang 2005a, 2005b). More recently other examples of Shang non-royal genealogical reckoning have appeared, such as the jade handle-shaped objects unearthed from Hougang, Anyang (see below) and some non-divinatory oracle-bone inscriptions (Schwartz 2015) making these dagger-axes seem much less anomalous.

[8] Hwang (2005a: 13–14) comparing Shang and Western Zhou period bronze inscriptions using stem names 日干 (and thus indicating Shang-style genealogical reckoning), with the Eastern Zhou Erya Shiqin 爾雅釋親, notes,

> There is no term for collateral and bifurcated kin such as *shu-fu* 叔父, father's younger brother, and *jiu-fu* 舅父, mother's brother, as reckoned in the Er-ya Shi-qin. This means that there is no distinction among male members in the father's generation. The idea of *fu* 父 in the Shang terminology is far wider than the same term in later periods. It included every male member one generation above ego, no matter whether he was from the father's side or mother's side, or older or younger than the father.

FIGURE 5.1 The Dazu zhuzu, Zuzhufu and Daxiong zhuxiong *ge* rubbings (after Ma 1988)

(3) 大兄日乙， 兄日戊， 兄日壬， 兄日癸， 兄日癸，兄日丙

Great Elder Brother day Yi, Elder Brother day Wu, Elder Brother day Ren, Elder Brother day Gui, Elder Brother day Gui, Elder Brother day Bing

Based on parallelism between the inscriptions on the three dagger-axes, it would seem that three generations are represented here with six brothers in each generation and at least some distinctions made between their seniority. What is unclear here, however, is whether the adjectives "great" or "middle" distinguish birth order, or some other status such as lineage leader, which, if it was like royal succession, may not have passed to the

eldest within each generation.[9] Given that ancestral status in the royal cult seems to be based on more than birth order, it seems likely that the *da* 大 "great," and *zhong* 中 "middle" designations referred to status within the lineage in which birth order was one (but not the only) factor.

Compared to the Eastern Zhou 宗法 *zongfa* system then, Shang practices of ancestor veneration and genealogy show fewer intra-generational distinctions, are much more inclusive of descendants, and not strictly based on seniority. Also unlike the *zongfa* system, the line of deceased lineage leaders included some whose direct descendants did not include the current leader, and so a distinction between those deceased leaders and the ancestors of the current leader form the rationale for the distinction between main and collateral lines. In the *zongfa* system, the distinction is rather at the level of lineage branch seniority, and as non-main-line lineage leaders are structurally impossible, no Shang-type ancestral cult distinction is necessary between main-line and non-main-line lineage leaders. Moreover, the *zongfa* concepts of di/shu 嫡/庶 distinguish proper succession rather than directly organize the ancestor cult of deceased lineage leaders.

The most significant difference between the Zhou and the Shang systems is the greater inclusiveness of the Shang ancestral cult with, for instance, fathers and uncles being venerated in common by ego as "fathers." This also means that if King Wu Ding had "fathers" Jia, Geng, Xin and Yi, then so did his brothers and cousins, making Shang generational descent groups comparatively large and undifferentiated, at least at the level of terminology. From the point of view of ownership and control of group capital (land, fighting force, agricultural production, ancestral authority, paraphernalia of rank and ritual, etc.), and to the extent the organization of leadership resembled genealogical structuring, the Shang system would appear to be less rigidly hierarchical than that recorded in Zhou texts (at least intra-generationally): the common worship of generation groups and potential for horizontal succession suggests that any monopolization of

[9] Another example can be found in the six stone "handle-shaped objects" found in Hougang 91M3 (Institute of Archaeology 2005: 21–26) with crimson ancestor dedications on them reading,

祖庚， 祖甲， unclear, 祖辛，父X, 父癸

Ancestor Geng, Ancestor Jia, unclear, Ancestor Xin, Father X, Father Gui

While "Ancestor" can be used to designate two or more generations above ego, "father" designates male kin one generation above ego. Thus, there are at least two "Fathers" mentioned in these dedications indicating again the common worship of ancestors in a kind of generational group.

lineage authority and capital by the lineage leader was (in theory) limited by the contingency of succession, and the relative structural equivalence of his siblings and cousins.[10] This genealogical reckoning might also indicate much more horizontally cohesive (i.e. less genealogically alienated) descent groups in Shang practice.

The main thrust of Qiu's second point, that the Shang king mediated between the people and the high god Di through his royal ancestors, is something of a commonplace in Shang studies (e.g. Vandermeersch 1977, Chang 1980, Chen 1988, Zhu 1991, Itō and Takashima 1996, Keightley 1999, 2000). What is novel about Qiu's claim is his analysis of the word *di* 帝. Developing Shima Kunio's (hypothesis that when 帝 appeared in an ancestor designation it referred to ego's father (distinguishing father from the common generational term "father" for all male kin of the father's generation), Qiu goes on to claim that *di* 帝 (OC**teks*) is actually *di* 嫡 (OC**tek*),[11] and that it shares with the *di* 帝of Shang Di 上帝 "high god" an etymological origin. This would mean that the high god Di 帝 is really a kind of primary ancestor of the Shang kings,[12] and that the use of the word *di* 帝 in the temple names of the last two Shang kings, Di Yi 帝乙 and Di Xin 帝辛 simply means something like "Father Yi" and "Father Xin." While I do not find Qiu's argument entirely convincing,[13] it does add a

[10] This, of course, is merely a structural argument from the point of view of genealogical reckoning and succession. In reality many other factors, such as the competence, success, cunning, patronage, etc. of particular individuals, or the wealth or achieved status of particular lines of descent, might create a practical distribution of power significantly different from its ideal, genealogical structuring.

[11] These are reconstructions using Baxter's (1992) system. While Baxter reconstructs 帝, he doesn't reconstruct 嫡, and I have extrapolated from Karlgren's reconstructions of 嫡 **tiek* and 帝 **tieg*. In any case, Qiu's point is that phonologically it is possible that 嫡 was written with the graph 帝 in the OBI.

[12] See Eno (1990) for the argument that *di* 帝 was actually a collective term for the ancestors.

[13] The counter argument, as I see it, is that *di* 帝 could equally have simply been a term of veneration, given that it was the same graph, if not the same word as *di "deity."* In the Eastern Zhou transmitted texts *di* 帝certainly retains the meanings of both "sovereign" and "deity." Even if *di* 帝 and *di* 嫡 did share an etymological origin, *di* 帝 uncontroversially could refer to a high deity in Shang and Western Zhou times so the use of this graph in ancestral designations may well have been honorific, as Shima argued. A second point is that Di Yi 帝乙 occurs in both a (non-royal) Shang bronze inscription and Zhouyuan oracle bones, which would be strange if it meant something like "direct Father Yi" and was a term limited in use to the king's own son. Yet another objection is that the terms *di* 嫡 and *shu* 庶 as they appear in Eastern Zhou texts, distinguish sons of proper wives from sons of concubines. While this could have been a development from the Shang understanding of main and collateral lines, (which as argued above, were based on different principles than those of the Zhou) it hardly means an idealized Eastern Zhou *zongfa* 宗法 system already existed in the Shang.

suggestive line of evidence to the consensus that the ritual authority of the Shang king was fundamentally cast in terms of kinship.[14]

It is Qiu's third conclusion, however, that participation in ancestor cult distinguished aristocracy from commoner, that is of greatest importance to understanding the relationship between kinship and social order. Qiu's argument, however, rests entirely on interpreting Shang kinship in Zhou terms, based mostly on Zhou received texts like the Shang Shu 尚書, Zuo Zhuan 左傳 and Yi Zhou Shu 逸周書. The first part of the argument runs that like the Zhou, the Shang lineage system would have to fission into sub-branches after a number of generations. This, in turn, would mean that after a period of time, more distant relations would be dropped from the genealogical reckoning of the main-line. Based on an analysis of the early meaning of terms like *baixing* 百姓 "hundred surnames" in the Zhou texts and *duosheng* 多生 "many descendants/many surnames" in the oracle-bone inscriptions, Qiu argues that in both Western Zhou and Shang societies, these terms referred only to the upper echelons of society. This, in turn, is taken to mean that references to clans or lineage groups were references to the elite. Based on an examination of the word *zhongren* 衆人 in the oracle-bone inscriptions, and the Pangeng chapter of the Shang Shu, Qiu comes to the conclusion that the *zhongren* were those distant kin of the king who had been dropped from the genealogy.[15] Then

[14] See also Keightley's (2000) argument about the indirect ancestral hosting of *di* 帝 and Ito's (Ito and Takashima 1996) argument concerning the "ancestralization" of nature spirits.

[15] There is, in fact, a huge literature on the meaning of *zhongren* and their social, political and economic implications. Keightley (1999a: 283, fn 111) gives a long list of scholars who have written on the topic and their opinions. The theory that *zhongren* were slaves and Shang a "slave society" advocated most prominently by Guo Moruo in the 1950s and 1960s now seems to be out of fashion in post-Mao China (however see Li 1997b), with the consensus leaning toward understanding *zhongren* as low-ranking kinsmen (no longer part of the ritual system in Qiu's view, still organized in lower order clans in Zhu's view). Keightley (1999a) and Thorp (1988, 2006) see *zhongren* as petty elites attached in service to the Shang king. Inscriptions such as the following, however, argue against this interpretation.

其乎𢍰羌方，于義則，戕羌眔. (41341)

(We should) perhaps call upon (someone contextually understood) to repel the Qiang Fang and X them at Yi, (for if we do, we will) cause harm to the Qiang forces.

The context of calling upon forces to repel the Qiang and harm their "*zhong*" suggests a more general reading of "forces" than "petty elites." Indeed, Keightley's (1999a) argument that *zhong* should be understood as a specific category of people rather than simply "masses/forces" derives from a contrast he sees in the numbers of *zhongren* called upon to perform tasks (despite recognizing the similar contexts in which both *zhongren* and the more general *ren* (people) appear. Unfortunately, there are only a couple of inscriptions

based on an assumed equivalence of Shang oracle-bone *xiao zhongren chen* 小衆人臣 "minor multitude retainers/officials" with the Zhou *li jun* 里君 "village leader," he argues that the Shang common people or *zhongren* were arranged into administrative rather than kin-based units. Thus, according to Qiu, the aristocracy (both of the royal descent group, and non-royal elite lineages) were socio-politically organized in terms of descent groups while the common people were organized into non-kin administrative units.

In addition to the empirical objections that will be raised below, several logical objections can be raised against Qiu's argument. The first is that the Shang kings' reference to elites, but not commoners, in descent group terms is no more than a structural property of a system in which status was largely determined by genealogical relationship to the king.[16] It should also be remembered that the sources, whether oracle-bone inscriptions or later texts, were written from the vantage point of the high elites as well, so it is not surprising that they did not relate to the lowest strata of society in genealogical terms, since any kin relationship would have been distant. Moreover, even if in the Western Zhou, the non-elite population was arranged into territorial units, it does not preclude the possibility that these units were also kinship-based communities. Finally, based on our discussion of levying in Chapter 4, *xiao zhongren chen* 小衆人臣 "minor multitude retainer/official," is much more likely to be a leader in charge of a group of people temporarily levied for war, agriculture or labor than an official in charge of a permanent administrative unit, not to mention the fact that there is only one mention of *xiao zhongren chen* in the entire corpus the oracle-bone inscriptions. This would surely be odd if these really were officials who wielded authority over permanent administrative units that organized the majority of the Shang population.

that record numbers of *zhongren* out of hundreds of inscriptions about *zhongren* (showing *zhongren* in numbers of hundreds rather than the thousands people (*ren* 人) are sometimes levied in). The number of people levied ought to depend on the task they were being gathered to perform, so a couple of examples showing smaller groups than the thousands of people (*ren* 人) levied for major campaigns might simply indicate that they were being levied for a different purpose in those instances. Thus, contra Keightley, I would argue there is no compelling evidence to read *zhong* "masses" as a specific class separate from ordinary commoners.

[16] In other words, many of the high elite were relatives of the King. Their lower-ranking clansmen, though also sharing a common royal ancestry would have been more distant relations (by definition) and thus not treated as part of the King's practical network of kinship.

Kinship as Network of Social Power

Perhaps the most influential, and certainly the most thorough, attempt to study Shang kinship is that of Zhu (1991). Synthesizing contemporaneous inscriptions, later texts and archaeological information, Zhu arrived at the following main conclusions,

1. Large, internally sub-divided lineages or clans (*zong zu* 宗族) formed the basic social, political, military, and economic units of Shang society.
2. Each lineage had its own territory, frequently of the same name. The central settlement of the territory was occupied by the main branch, with each sub-branch having its own subsidiary settlement, so that political geography, and genealogy were basically isomorphic.
3. Lineages were internally divided into socio-economic classes based on genealogical position, with the lineage leader acting as high priest of the ancestral cult, steward of the economy, and commander of the lineage forces. Status within the lineage was reinforced through ancestral ritual, and strict application of sumptuary laws.
4. Inter-lineage status was mainly based on genealogical relationship to the Shang king. The king led subordinate Zi 子 surnamed branch-lineage leaders in common worship of their royal ancestors, and acted as a kind of lineage leader of a universal patrimony.[17]

In essence then, Zhu (1991) understands Shang social-political structures and practices in terms of a single genealogical organizing principle from which everything else follows. Like Qiu (1982), and, as we have argued above, problematically, Zhu tends to assume continuity between Shang kinship practices and those of the Zhou,[18] reconstructing Shang descent as based on strict patrilineal principles from father to son through the

[17] See also Keightley (1999a), and Wheatley (1971). I would however, critique the Weberian notion of the "patrimonial state" and Wheatley's use of it as being based on universalist assumptions about "patriarchy" and "kinship" as invariant categories. Instead, and in fact, more in the spirit of Weber himself, I would argue that the nature of the "patriarchy" and the ways that "kinship" (the rules and practices of descent, co-habitation, marriage, obligation, etc.) articulates with other institutions are much more meaningful issues than determining the presence/absence of decontextualized categories of socio-political organization.

[18] Indeed, one could make the argument that Zhu's (1991) presentation of a perfect symmetry between genealogical relationship, political status and geographical place mimics the systematizing logic of such texts as the Li Ji 禮記 and Yi Li 儀禮 from which many of his assumptions about Shang kinship seem ultimately to have come. In this context, compare Zhu's socio-political analysis of Shang lineages with Chang's (1983) Zuo Zhuan-derived one.

most senior line (210). Nevertheless, Zhu (1991) and Qiu (1982) differ on the fundamental issue of the organization of the Shang population, with the former claiming that Shang commoners were low-ranking members of larger clans, and the latter claiming that common people had dropped out of the lineage system and were organized into territorial administrative units.[19] This is a decisive issue in understanding social political organization

> As a hypothetical example, consider a major lineage that might have ruled over an urban center with significant political authority … This lineage would be perpetrated by a line of male heirs, whose status would be determined by specified factors such as being the son of a primary wife or being the first-born among brothers.
>
> At some point in the royal lineage's life there would arise reasons for sending some of its male members away from the royal domain to establish a new polity … he would be sent off with a) his clan affiliation and emblem, b) several groups of lineage members of one or more clans to provide both agricultural and industrial labor and military force, c) title to the land of his newly established domain, d) a new name for his new polity, and e) ritual symbols and paraphernalia both to continue his ritual affiliation with his father's lineage and to manifest his new independence. In the new land he would build a new temple, in which his own tablet would eventually be placed as that of the founder of a new lineage. Thus, a new line of lineage segments would be initiated; they would be secondary lineages with respect to the stem lineage from which they had broken off, and their political as well as ritual status would likewise be secondary. This process of branching off would be repeated to form tertiary, quaternary, and subsequent levels of lineage segments. Such a system of segmentary lineages was thus also a system of decreasing political statuses. (16)

Like Zhu's reconstruction, this is an idealized political configuration based solely on genealogical reckoning derived from (Zhou) received texts, and while not necessarily incorrect, most of it (as Chang himself noted) cannot be substantiated with contemporaneous evidence.

[19] Wheatley (1971) and Keightley following him, have characterized the Shang kin-groups as "conical clans" based on Kirchhoff (1955),

> kinship units which bind their members with common familial ties but which distribute wealth, social standing, and power most unequally among the members of the pseudo-family. Such kin units trace their descent back to an original ancestor, real or fictitious; but, at the same time, they regularly favor his lineal descendants over the junior or "cadet" lines in regulating access to social, economic, or political prerogatives. (qtd. in Wheatley 1971: 53–54)

While this statement is in accordance with the evidence for the Shang (the presence of lineages, the king as lineage head of the world, inequality, and an encompassing ideology of common descent from mythic ancestors), it is also broad enough to be in accordance with three mutually exclusive reconstructions of Shang ancestral veneration and social organization. While Vandermeersch claims that ancestral cult was a royal prerogative, Qiu claims that it was also practiced by the elites, but excluded commoners, and Zhu claims that ancestor veneration involved commoners as well as elites. Beyond a vague description of Shang society as having ranked and internally hierarchical lineages, the conical clan model does not actually tell us anything about the ways in which "access to social, economic, or political prerogatives" were "regulated," and thus much about the structuring practices of Shang socio-political organization.

at the Great Settlement Shang, and although we have raised some logical objections to Qiu's argument above, the strongest evidence in favor of the argument that Shang society in general, and not just the elites, was fundamentally organized in kinship terms, comes from archaeological work done at Anyang.

Although a number of authors have written on the topic of Anyang period Shang social organization from a (mostly mortuary) archaeological perspective,[20] Tang (2004) presents the most up-to-date, comprehensive and sophisticated treatment of the topic. Based on his unique access as director of the Anyang Work Station (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of Archaeology), Tang assembled a database of some 2,000 Anyang tombs dating to the Anyang period and conducted a sophisticated, systematic investigation into Shang social hierarchy and organization. He used a diachronic spatial analysis of cemetery formation, and statistically analyzed the unequal expenditure of labor, grave goods, sacrifices and symbols of authority in tombs. Tang concluded that Shang society was highly stratified with not only an enormous range of difference between the smallest, poorest burials, and the largest, richest ones (see also Chapters 3 and 7), but that Anyang cemeteries were divided into spatially discrete and internally status differentiated burial clusters.[21]

In his study, Tang distinguished three levels of burial clustering which he termed A, B and C level clusters. As the boundaries of clusters were determined through the relative spatial proximity of burials during the cemetery formation process, the guiding assumption of this approach is that spatial distribution reflects genealogical or affective distance. This assumption is supported both by burial cluster formation processes which show a tendency to expand outward from closely placed pairs of burials, and the tendency of mortuary practices to show some differences between burial groups (Tang 2004). Interpreting the three levels of burial clusters, Tang came to the conclusion that A-clusters (usually 2–4 burials) represent small families, B-clusters (usually 20–30 burials) extended families, and C-clusters (usually 100–200 burials) represent lineages. C-clusters, in

[20] For examples see Anyang Team 1979, Chang 1980, Ge 1989, Zhu 1991, Han 1997, Tang 1998, Liu and Xu 1998.

[21] See, for instance, the map on page 130 of Chang (1980), which portrays Anyang as an "urban network" of discrete (and a few mixed) areas of "commoners" and "nobility." Liu and Chen (2003) also discuss earlier centers such as Zhengzhou and Erlitou as having discrete areas for commoners and elites. If the Anyang situation had earlier precedent, however, then kin-groups likely cross-cut socio-economic class rendering a binary division of Shang society into commoners and elites not only simplistic, but misleading in terms of a discussion of structural bases of social action.



FIGURE 5.2 Distribution of Pictographs in the B-Clusters at XQ8 (from Tang 2004: 359, fig. 6.10)

addition to being spatially discrete, and showing subtle differences in burial practices between clusters, were also notable for having several large tombs including one or more with at least one ramp – an unequivocal marker of high status in Anyang burials (as we will see in Chapter 7). Another line of evidence concerning social relations within and between the clusters, are the so-called clan insignia. Tang notes that while there are exceptions, "each C-level cluster has its own main pictograph" (192) (Figure 5.2).

While there is still controversy surrounding the nature of "clan insignia" on bronzes, and there are likely some insignia/symbols that have nothing to do with kinship or any other social group,[22] the presence of the same graphs on bronzes found in clusters of tombs of different generations lends support to the hypothesis that many of these graphs were descent group

[22] Such as the *lu* 鹿 (deer) and the *si* 兕 (buffalo) inscribed inside the *lu* 鹿 and *niu fang ding* 牛(sic) 方鼎 respectively, discovered inside royal tomb XBGM1004 (Liang and Gao 1970). In both cases, the vessels were also decorated with deer and buffalo faces respectively, and these inscriptions/insignia may have served another purpose than denoting the lineage affiliation of the owner.

signifiers.[23] Thus, of the three XQ-8 tombs with bronzes, all contained bronze vessels with a variant of a man with a *ge* dagger-axe emblem on them and dated from phase III to phase IV, likely spanning at least two generations. Nevertheless, Tang's claim that C-clusters have a main "pictograph" is only true for two of the four cemeteries that he investigated in detail. XQ-3 is especially complicated, with fourteen different identity graphs spread over twelve tombs. As is well known, however, single tombs may have bronzes with more than one individual or group signifier.[24] In tombs with only one or two inscribed bronzes, it can be difficult to be certain of the relationship between tomb occupant and bronze caster, with war trophy or gift being plausible alternatives explanations to having been cast by the tomb occupant.[25] Another complicating factor is that the largest, ramped, tombs in any C-cluster have invariably been looted, meaning that the putative lineage leadership core, and likely location of the majority of the bronze vessels, is absent from the sample.

If the spatial, mortuary practice and identity inscription evidence suggests that Anyang burials were organized into discrete nested clusters of burials of different status, then the question of the nature of the social groups remains. However, given the importance of ancestor veneration, analogy from royal practice, the presence of sacrificial pits in some of the non-royal cemeteries, and later traditions of kin-based burial grounds, it seems likely that these discrete, hierarchical communities of burial were also kinship based. As mentioned above, Tang distinguishes small family, extended family and lineage level clusters. Factoring in the period of cemetery use, the largest clusters (C-clusters) held approximately 20–40 individuals per generation.[26] Depending on the number of descendants per

[23] Other identity graphs appear to be individual designations often including a title and personal or group name (e.g. Fu Hao 婦好 (M5) (Institute of Archaeology 1980), Zi Chang 子長 (M54) (Anyang Team 2004a), making it difficult in some cases to know whether an identity graph refers to an individual or a group. Nevertheless, where there are clusters of the same identity graph appearing in different tombs across generations it is reasonable to assume that they denote some form of inter-generational group identity.

[24] The most obvious example is that of Fu Hao's tomb in which many of the bronzes bore identity signifiers other than her own (Institute of Archaeology 1980). The explanations for these bronzes range from gifts to booty and illustrate the multiple ways in which bronze vessels might come to be included in a mortuary assemblage.

[25] Zhu (1991) suggests marriage alliance as one possible explanation for this phenomenon while Yan (2006) argues that combined insignia (i.e. two separate insignia appearing combined on a bronze artifact) may be an indication of marriage relations with one of the two insignia representing the woman's birth clan/lineage and the other the clan/lineage she married into.

[26] For example, XQ-3 has two C-clusters with 370 tombs total or about 185 tombs each. Given that it was used between periods II–IV, or for about 100–150 years, there would have been about 20–40 individuals per generation interred there (assuming 20-year generations).

generation and adding in wives and perhaps non-related retainers and dependents attached to the lineage, each lineage would have consisted of kin of no more than 3–5 degrees of genealogical distance.

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, residential areas also appear to follow the pattern of discrete clusters of residences of a range of sizes associated with clusters of burials (Anyang Team 2009), indicating internally hierarchical communities of the living as well as the dead (Campbell 2014a). These lineage settlements together form the "urban" pattern at Anyang – making it a mosaic of lineage villages surrounding the palace-temple core (Tang and Jing 2009, Jing et al. 2013).

Returning to the competing models of Qiu (1982) and Zhu (1991) regarding the organization of the Shang population, it would seem that Zhu's contention that lineages formed the basic units of Shang society is more plausible in light of the archaeological evidence than Qiu's model of administrative units of commoners ruled over by aristocratic lineages. One might attempt to argue, on Qiu's behalf, that the large residences and tombs of Anyang's residential and burial clusters could be those of the *chen* 臣 retainer/official in charge of that particular administrative unit of commoners, but why then were they buried together with their charges instead of in their own elite lineage cemetery? If organization into lineages based around the worship of common ancestors was a central feature of the aristocracy, and distinguished them from commoners as Qiu claims, and an important site of ancestral veneration and sacrifice was the ancestral tomb or cemetery,[27] then the placement of elite and common tombs in the same cemetery would be highly unlikely if not inconceivable. One solution might be to take the position recently argued by Thorp (1988, 2006) and claim that those buried in the non-royal cemeteries at Anyang such as the western area cemeteries were "petty elite"(2006:152). However, the fact that so far upwards of 15,000 "petty elite tombs" have been discovered in the roughly 5–10 percent of Anyang that has been excavated, and that the majority of them are little more than pits just large enough for a coffin and a few ceramic vessels, militates against this interpretation, as does the lack of mortuary remains for the putative majority of "commoners" (Tang 2004). Nevertheless, if descent groups formed a key basis of social organization at Anyang, it does not necessarily follow that it was the only basis. As noted in Chapter 4, there is some oracle-bone inscription evidence suggesting that

[27] This is based both on analogy with royal ancestral sacrifice and the discovery of sacrificial pits in two non-royal cemeteries. While there are sacrificial pits in the palace-temple area, their number is dwarfed by those in the royal cemetery.

forced relocation of populations and colonization were common Anyang-period Shang political practices. In these situations it does not seem impossible that non-kin might be incorporated into lineage-based communities either through adoption, or some form of attached dependency. There are, moreover, a number of issues with the archaeological evidence and its interpretation including the representativeness of the mortuary data. Is everyone or nearly everyone buried in the lineage cemetery? Another issue is the uncertainty surrounding the number of "ash-pit" or midden burials around Anyang. Tang (2004) argues that no more than a few hundred of this type of burial have been found, representing a tiny segment of the remains found thus far (less than 3 percent),[28] but this claim has yet to be backed up with systematic study. A third issue concerns the spatial relationship between residential and burial sites. The cemeteries that appeared in Tang's study, and all previous mortuary studies of Anyang social organization, were excavated prior to the mid-nineties, and at the time, the excavators did not pay much attention to small houses and middens, giving the impression that places such as the Xiqu (western area) burial ground were pure cemeteries. Recent excavations of houses in those areas, however, have cast doubt on the likelihood of this being true. Much more typical are areas like Sipanmo, Shachang and Liujiazhuang with interspersed residential and mortuary remains (Anyang Team 2009, Tang and Jing 2009, Campbell 2014a). A crucial question that remains to be addressed, then, is the spatial relationship between burial and residential areas. Unfortunately, as the location and extent of excavation areas at Anyang are basically dictated by the demands of urban and industrial development, there are considerable difficulties in the way of excavating whole residential clusters and their associated cemeteries. Nonetheless, a tentative reconstruction based on the current state of knowledge might run as follows: the lineage cemetery was located somewhere nearby a lineage-based residential cluster. Certain close retainers might have accompanied their elite patrons to the grave in chariot burials, and as death attendants, while other dependents excluded from the lineage cemetery (such as a child or a wife who bore no sons) might have been buried close to home, still others, lower yet on the social ladder (perhaps slaves) were simply disposed of in midden pits. Much of

[28] He Yulin (personal communication June 2006) expressed doubts about this low number and cited a recent, unpublished, excavation of a dual residential and burial site with many midden burials. Unfortunately we will have to wait for publication to get confirmation of this.

this, however, although fitting the current, fragmented state of information on Anyang cemeteries and residential areas, will require further and finer grained research to substantiate or invalidate.

As it stands then, the mortuary and residential picture from Anyang suggests that the population was divided into groups that cross-cut socio-economic class including both commoners and elites in communities of the living and dead. At the same time, evidence from the cemeteries, the oracle-bones inscriptions, and transmitted texts all emphasize the importance of descent groups and ancestral veneration. Given this, the leading explanation for the layout of cemeteries and neighborhoods is that they were, indeed, kin-based. Later texts such as the following passage from the Zuo Zhuan, concerning the relocation of groups of the defeated Shang people to the command of the newly established Duke of Lu, point in the direction of the Shang people being organized into ramified lineages.

> (4) 殷民六族．條氏．徐氏．蕭氏．索氏．長勺氏．尾勺氏．使帥其宗氏．輯其分族．將其類醜．(定公四年). (236)

> Six lineages (*zu*) of Yin people, the Tiao clan (*shi*), the Xu clan, the Xiao clan, the Suo clan, the Changsao clan, and the Weishao clan, were ordered to lead their main clans, collect their branch lineages and take their ranked multitudes. (Ding Gong fourth year).

Though much ink has been spilt over the exact interpretation of *shi* 氏, *zu* 族 and *chou* 醜 in this passage over the centuries (see Zhu 1991, Tang 2004 for references), it seems apparent that whatever Shang reality is reflected in this Eastern Zhou passage, *zu* and *shi* are being used interchangeably here to refer to some kind of branched decent group organized around an ancestral temple (*zong* 宗). The word *chou* 醜 has been variously interpreted to mean "multitude," "servants" or "slaves," either understood as a further ramification of the main and branch lineages, or as a subordinate group outside of the lineage entirely. The interpretation of "slave," however, has more to do with orthodox Marxist historiography than paleography, as all of the ancient commentaries are unanimous in stating that *chou* means *zong* 眾 "multitude." Based on the parallelism within the line and the increasingly broad inclusiveness of its referent (main lineage < branch lineages < ranked multitudes), it would seem that "ranked multitudes" was meant to include everyone not included in the main and branch lineages, which, in turn, suggests that, if this early Warring States textual account is to be believed, Shang descent groups

had attached dependents of some kind – whether subordinate descent groups, retainers, or captives/slaves.[29]

While the details remain somewhat murky, based on present evidence it would seem that the Anyang period Shang polity was comprised of communities of the living and the dead, based on common descent and ancestor veneration. These communities possibly also included adopted, enslaved or subordinated groups, or individuals bound to the larger group through bonds of affective, and/or coercive dependency.

Kinship and War

If descent and common ancestral veneration served as the basis for residential and burial communities, they also served as the basis for units of coercion or military force. As early as 1956 Ding Shan argued that the term *zu* 族 "clan/lineage" was originally a military unit. The oracle-bone graph for *zu*, which is a pictograph formed from a banner with two people below it, seems to support this conclusion, as do actual examples of its use in the oracle-bone inscriptions,

(5) 庚辰卜, 令王族比𢀛. (T190)

Cracked on Gengchen day, (we should) order the King's clansmen/forces to join with Cha (for an attack on a third party).

(6) 己卯卜, 㐭貞: 令多子族比犬𡿨印周,𠙵王史. 五月. (6812)

Cracked on Jimao day X tested: (we should) order the clans/forces of the many Zi-princes to join with the *Ho*-lord of Quan to capture Zhou, (for if we do, they will) attend to the King's affairs. Fifth month.

While in most cases forces raised for war were conscripted or levied from the capital and areas under the direct control of the king, as argued in Chapter 4, when forces are referred to in group terms, the *zu* 族 is one of the most common terms used (in addition to *zhong* 眾 "multitude," *lu* 旅 "army" and *shi* 師 "army") and suggests the kin-based source of Shang military forces. While it could be argued that *zu* only came to refer to a

[29] Based on the use of *chou* 醜 in the Shi Jing (Legge 1871), Zhu (1991: 134–135) attempts to argue that *chou* means "slaves" because in all of the contexts in which it is used in Zhou texts it refers to enemies or captives. We should note, however, that this is also exactly the situation being described in the Zuo Zhuan passage above where the Shang people being relocated are obviously not considered slaves.

descent group in the Zhou period (as in the Zuo Zhuan passage above), it would indeed be strange if a word that originally referred only to a military unit somehow acquired a principal meaning of "lineage/clan/type" in Classical Chinese (while military terminology in general became increasingly technical and specific) if *zu* did not originally have connotations of kinship.

Another line of evidence supporting the idea that kin groups formed the basic units of military action comes from burials and the widespread presence of weapons, even in relatively poor tombs. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, approximately 20 percent of the tombs at Anyang contained weapons. Nor does this necessarily mean that those tombs without weapons belonged to people who did not participate in war. On the one hand, the burial of weapons is a reflection of mortuary ritual rather than necessarily warrior status, but on the other, the large quantities of weapons found in elite tombs suggest minimally that lineage leaders commanded the resources to have supplied weapons to those who could not afford them.[30] Thus, while cross-culturally grave goods are not necessarily reliable indicators of life roles, seen within the greater context of Shang death ritual and ancestralization, mortuary weapons minimally display, on the one hand, a connection between status and war, and, on the other, the broad distribution of coercive capital.

The lineage, it would seem, was not only the basis for residency and burial, but also for war. Shang lineages then, were hierarchical groups based around genealogical reckoning, common ancestor worship and ties of domination and dependency, the group identity of which was forged through common (but hierarchically structured) experiences of living, fighting and dying together. More than this, though, in any understanding of the organizational bases of Shang practices of authority and their material networks, lineages must figure as institutions of key importance. While it is unlikely that, as Zhu (1991) seems to suggest, kinship was the only structural basis of power in the Shang, it seems nevertheless true that its importance – to politics, war, economic production or religiosity – was unparalleled.

[30] A large number of weapons were discovered in a ramp of the royal tomb XBGM1004 despite its having been repeatedly looted (Liang and Gao 1970). In addition, tomb 160 at Guojiazhuang 郭家庄 contained hundreds of bronze weapons (Institute of Archaeology 1998, see also Chapters 6 and 7).

Marriage

Levi-Strauss (1966) once famously (or infamously) stated that the basis of inter-group solidarity was the exchange of women (and food). If this seems like a misogynist statement, it was nonetheless in keeping with Shang practices and the relative status of women (see Keightley 1999b). As mentioned earlier, women figured in ancestral veneration only as spouses of ancestors (receiving cult with their husbands) and only then, apparently, if they had been mothers of surviving sons. In this patriarchal, patrilineal kin-based society, the exchange of women in marriage was a key part of political strategy. The evidence for Shang marriage patterns is, however, almost entirely comprised of royal oracle-bone inscriptions, and while much has been made of this evidence, it is extremely limited. One popular opinion concerning the Fu 婦 wives of the Shang kings is that they come from political entities of the same name and represent political marriages cementing the Shang kings' networks of alliances. King Wu Ding, for instance, apparently had as many as sixty-four wives (Hu 1944a), many of whom share names with important polities lending support to the political marriage hypothesis. Some of Wu Ding's wives, such as Fu Hao 婦好 and Fu Jing/Xing 婦井/邢 also led troops in battle, took part in agricultural activities, and brought in tribute/booty to the court.

(7) 辛丑卜,㱿貞: 帚妌乎黍〔于〕丘商,〔受年〕. (9530)

Xin Qiu day cracked, Ke tested: (it is) Fu Jing/Xing (whom we should) call upon to plant grain [at] Qiu Shang, (for if we do, we will) [receive harvest].

(8) 貞: 勿乎帚妌伐龍方. (6585)

Tested: Do not call upon Fu Jing/Xing to attack the Long Fang.

(9) 帚井來女. (667 reverse)

Fu Jing/Xing brings women.

While this sort of action suggests a level of political agency for at least some of the royal Shang women (at least in Wu Ding's reign) seldom seen in later Chinese history, contra what is frequently claimed in the literature (e.g. Li 1997b, Song 2005) Shang royal consorts did not have their own independent power bases. The first reason is the clear patrilocal, patrilineal nature of Shang kinship. Based on a study of Shang and Western Zhou period bronze inscriptions with the Shang genealogical practice

of appending day names to ancestor designations, Hwang (2005a) notes that while from the male ego's point of view, there are no generational differentiating terms, from the female ego's point of view there is a special word for husband, and for mother-in-law, denoting the female ego's contingent place in the patrilineage into which she has married.[31] This fact, combined with the picture of Shang patrilineages we have been building above, suggests that it should be the royal consort's senior male relatives that control the forces of their clan – the political status of the consort being dependent on her role in the patrilineage she married into, not the one she left. Thus, the considerable political power of consorts like Fu Hao and Fu Jing is more likely to be based on the delegated or associated authority of the King, as the inscription below suggests,

(10) 甲申卜,㱿貞:乎帚好先奴人于寵. (7283)

Jia Shen day cracked, Ke tested: call upon Fu Hao to first raise men at Chong.

Here we see Fu Hao levying men at Chong 寵 on the king's orders as a first stop in a troop gathering itinerary, and despite the fact there is a Fu Chong 婦寵, who, if we believe the hypothesis of independent demesnes for each royal wife, should be the one to levy at Chong. It is also true that we never hear of Fu Hao 婦好 levying men at Hao 好, nor is there any solid evidence that there is a place called Hao.[32]

[31] While I do not follow Hwang's postulation of ten inter-marrying elite Shang lineages named for the days in the ten-day cycle (the ancestor designations seen in Figure 5.1 would be hard to explain – if there are common generational terms for ancestors then each ego would have several dozen "fathers," something that is not substantiated in contemporaneous inscriptions), his conclusion that "the only possibility seems to be a marriage that exists in a system which has more than two patrilineages in which women married from one patrilineage to another" (16), seems unproblematic. The only question that remains unsolved is the nature and relationship of the inter-marrying patrilineages.

[32] Li (1997b: 462) makes the argument that Fu 婦 and Zi 子 have their own independent territories based on the following three points:

1 The claim that Fu Hao has her own settlement based on reading inscription (32761) as mentioning a "好邑" (Hao settlement). The Jiaguwen shiwen on the other hand, parses this inscription as

乙酉 … 好 … (32761)

Yi You day … Hao …

As can be seen from the rubbing below, there is a graph that may or may not be *yi* 邑, "settlement" (another possibility is *xiong* 兄).

In fact, there are several hypotheses concerning the nature of the royal consort's names, including place name, surname (*xing* 姓), and personal name[33] – none of which is supported with much direct evidence. In my examination of the Fu 婦 inscriptions in the oracle-bones, of the ninety-four recorded consort names, there were only sixteen certain correspondences with known place names, with another five possible correspondences (17–22 percent). This weak correspondence may indicate one of two things: that

Moreover, even if we are willing to throw caution to the wind and accept that this fragmentary inscription records a Hao settlement, the correspondence between Fu Hao's name, and the name of this settlement, no more indicates that she ruled over it than Fu Zhou's 婦周 name means that she ruled over Zhou 周.

2 The authors claim that Fu Jing/Xing had her own agricultural land, but as example (10) above clearly shows, it is King Wu Ding who sends her to Shang Qiu to supervise agriculture there. Shang Qiu, moreover, is not Jing/Xing 井/邢 where she supposedly comes from and where, under this theory, she ought to have her power base.

3 The authors claim that Fu Hao has her own army of three thousand men, as evidence by example (46) in Chapter 4. Given that the general context of Fu Hao's levying activities was her being ordered by the king to go to such and such a place to raise troops (see example (10) in this chapter), it seems much more likely that the "three thousand" referred to in example (46) in Chapter 4 refers to three thousand men she had already been ordered to gather at another place.

[33] For example, Chen (1988: 492–493) comes to the conclusion that consort names should be personal names rather than surnames based on a poor correlation between the consort names and surnames recorded in later texts. Hu (1944a: 106), on the other hand, claims that consort names are surnames (*xing* 姓). Nevertheless, he also sees these as place names, apparently making the problematic assumption that there is a correspondence between surname and polity name. As noted above, Li (1997b) makes the argument that consort names refer to their places/polities of origin.

all or most of the consort names were derived from their places of origin, but that the Kings tended to take consorts from the areas under their direct control, which tend not to show up in the oracle-bone inscriptions (see Chapter 5), or that some other principle was at play in their naming (such as lineage or personal name). Table 5.1 tabulates those consort names that do correspond to place names and their relationship to the court.

Based on the table, political marriage alliances with major allies or potential enemies does not seem to be the rule, with only Fu Jing (Xing) 婦井 (邢), Fu Long 婦龍, Fu Zhou 婦周, and possibly Fu Zhu 婦壴 as exceptions, if indeed, their names indicate their political origins. Instead, and to the extent that royal wives were named for their places of origin, this table suggests that the Anyang period Shang kings generally took wives from areas securely within the ambit of royal power. This might help to explain why only around 20 percent of the Fu names seem to correlate with places, as places of routine activity or direct control were seldom divined about in comparison to contested areas (see Chapter 4). Indeed, all of the cases where a consort was associated with a place that also had hostile relations with the court date to the reigns of Wu Ding, and are located to the north or west. In other words, they all fit within the pattern of early period northern and western subordinate or allied polities that became enemies before falling out of mention in later period oracle-bone inscriptions. It is likely then, that the above four examples are not actually exceptions, but rather consorts from places once securely within the king's networks of power that rebelled and were lost along with the entire northern and western frontier. There is, moreover, no evidence to support the alternative possibilities that Fu names were personal names, or *xing* 姓 surnames. Given that at least a fifth of the Fu names correspond to places, and that roughly half bear the woman radical (roughly 80 percent of which have alternates without the woman radical), it seems likely that as with Zhou period *xing* 姓 surnames, the woman radical (when it appears) is a signific used to denote exogamous marriage groups or patrilineages. In a sense, then, the woman signific denoted "woman" of lineage X or polity Y. This is also in keeping with the liminal position of women in Shang genealogical reckoning as outsiders in the lineages they married into, whose ancestral status was determined by their production of heirs for their husband's lineage, and thus becoming "mothers" and "grandmothers." This then suggests that the Shang kings took wives from closely affiliated lineages, likely representing alliances between a set of endogamous high-ranking Shang clans rather than marriages with outside polities.

TABLE 5.1 *Royal Fu Name Correspondences with Known Place Names*

Fu/Place Name/ Actor	Number of Place/Actor Inscriptions[a]	Political Valencey	Shang Affiliation	Notes
龍	51	E/A	−46	Enemy, ally, brings in captives.
𢀛	50	S	84	Contributes plastrons, Shang agent, becomes enemy.
周	28	S/E	11	Enemy, becomes Shang subordinate, then ultimately conquers Shang.
麓	22	S	100	Place of levying troops, camping forces, royal destination. Fu Hao levies troops there!
鼓	18	S	94	Shang agent, royal destination.
𢍰	17	S	100	Place of agriculture.
𡆥/桑	13	S	100	Royal destination, hunting place, agent ordered by king, attacked by Shang agent.
果	12	S	100	Royal destination, political actor.
良	12	S	100	Ruled by a Zi lineage head/prince who contributes plastrons, is ordered by the king, as well as being a royal destination.

TABLE 5.1 (*cont.*)

Fu/Place Name/ Actor	Number of Place/Actor Inscriptions[a]	Political Valencey	Shang Affiliation	Notes
安	11	S	100	Name of "prince": Zi An (子安), royal destination.
利	10	S	100	Royal destination, agent ordered by king, site of battle.
杞	6	S	100	Royal destination, ruled by a *dian*-lord.
姘/井	5	E	−100	Enemy, previous ally(?), Fu Jing/Xing takes part in military action, brings tribute, has harvest.
豐	4	S	100	King performs rituals and hunts there, a colony of 㠯 (6,068)?
妓	1	S	100	Royal destination.
𢀛	1	S	100	Hunting place.

[a] This is the number of times they appear in the inscriptions *as a place or political actor*. In other words, excluding the examples where the graph clearly refers to a *fu*-consort.

Furthermore, *fu* names do not appear to be Zhou-style *xing*-surnames. The surname hypothesis seems to be contradicted by examples such as Fu Zhou 婦周, given that the surname (*xing* 姓) of the Zhou ruling house was Ji 姬, while Zhou was their place of rulership (and name of their polity). Even more importantly, it is doubtful that *xing*-surnames were a feature of Shang kinship practices at all (as opposed to being purely of Zhou origin). Pulleyblank (2000) has recently written convincingly concerning the deep historical origins of Zhou surname exogamy between the Ji 姬 and Jiang 姜 surname groups, while Hwang (2005a) brings together evidence suggesting the Shang successor state of Song frequently practiced *xing* 姓 surname endogamy, and did not follow the widespread practice of appending *xing*

姓 surnames to women's names in bronze inscriptions. Kyrukov (1966) has, moreover, convincingly argued that the function of *xing*-surnames (see also Sena 2005) was to regulate marriage practices in Zhou times and that males tended to be known by their *shi* 氏, or lineage name, with *xing* 姓 generally only appearing in women's names. In addition, the *xing*-surname recorded in later texts for the Shang is, suspiciously, "zi" 子, the reciprocal kin term for ego's generation vis-à-vis "fathers," or for descendants one generation below ego. Taken together, the fact that *xing*-surnames were a fundamental part of Zhou kinship practices from very early on, their purpose was to regulate marriages between allied kin groups, Shang descendants frequently violated these rules, there is no direct contemporaneous evidence for surnames in the Shang, or in Shang-style kinship designations on later bronzes, and the supposed Shang royal surname looks suspiciously like a blanket generational term for "descendant," it seems likely that the Shang regulated marriage through mechanisms other than *xing*-surname exogamy (see also Vandermeersch 1977). A more likely candidate for exogamous marriage groups among Shang elites, then, is the Shang lineage – the kin group that lived, fought and were buried together. If this is so, then intermarriage between patrilineages would have been one important horizontally integrative Shang social institution along with war, and macro-lineage sacrificial rites.

The Politics of Ancestral Ritual

Many scholars have noted a dual integrative mechanism at play in Shang royal sacrifice, that, on the one hand, non-royal actors frequently took part in rituals dedicated to the royal ancestors, and, on the other, the way in which high ancestors and nature spirits tend to blend into each other creating a kind of "ancestralization" of the powers of the land (Itō and Takeshima 1996). For Zhu (1991), under the assumption that the prescription against sacrificing to ancestors not one's own found in Eastern Zhou texts such as the Zuo Zhuan 左傳 also guided Shang practice,[34] this could only mean that the important political figures of the Shang polity and its satellites were all near, or distant relatives of the Shang king. Using this assumption he calculated the genealogical distance of individuals in terms of the number of generations of royal ancestor worshiped above the king (the remoter the royal ancestor, the more distant the genealogical connection). Itō and

[34] For examples of this injunction see the Zuo Zhuan, 10th year of Xi Gong (Legge 1872: 157); Zuo Zhuan, 31st year of Xi Gong (Legge 1872: 219).

Takeshima (1996), on the other hand, argued that the so-called outer cult, directed toward the pre-dynastic lords and powers of the land, incorporated the deities and perhaps religious practitioners (such as diviners) of conquered peoples into the discursive hegemony of the Shang kings (see also Akatsuka 1977). Moreover, over the course of the Anyang period, Itō argued that a gradual "ancestralization" took place in which the lines between the inner, ancestral cult and outer non-ancestral cult where blurred and the powers of the land seen increasingly as Shang ancestors.

While Zhu's opinion, concerning the Eastern Zhou injunction against worship of ancestors not one's own, has not been accepted by everyone in the field,[35] it nonetheless remains a common position. The most obvious problem with this hypothesis revolves around the date and context of the Zuo Zhuan. Why should a text cobbled together no earlier than the Warring States period (Cheng 1993) and written with an obvious proscriptive intent (Schaberg 2001) be taken at face value? Moreover, as we have already shown, Zhou kinship practices differed from those of the Shang in some important ways, so extrapolating prescriptions – which may, even in the Eastern Zhou, have been more reflective of a polemic ideal than real practice[36] – rigidly back to the Shang, is a dubious enterprise on the face of it. There is, moreover, some contemporaneous evidence against this interpretation in the royal worship of Huang Yin (or Yi Yin) (Zhang 2000) who was an important official rather than king, and the Zhouyuan oracle-bone inscriptions which record sacrifices to a deceased Shang king (see Chapter 4). Nonetheless, as Lin (1979), Zhu (1991), and others have argued, there does seem to be a patterned relationship between the genealogical distance, and royal ancestor worship in the Shang – even if not necessarily as rigid as Zhu would have it. Thus, both in the royal inscriptions where the king ordered someone to perform some ritual activity, or, in the non-royal oracle-bone inscriptions, where agents other than the king divined about their own ritual activities, the non-royal agents undertaking sacrifice to royal ancestors tend to be Zi 子 princes and Fu 婦 consorts.

(11) 乙卯卜，方貞: 乎帚好出㞢于匕癸. (94)

Cracked on Yimao day, Bin tested: (We should) call upon Fu Hao to offer captives to Ancestress Gui.

[35] Shaughnessy (1985–1987), Zhang (2000), Dong Shan (personal communication 2006), Yan Zhibin (personal communication 2006).

[36] Note, for instance, that in every one of the Zuo Zhuan passages that relates to this issue, someone is about to, or does break the taboo only to be remonstrated by an advisor, or castigated by the ensuing adversity.

(12) 翌乙酉乎子商彭伐于父乙. (969)

This coming Yiyou day call upon Zi Shang to perform a *You*-cutting sacrifice to Father Yi.

Other important court officials such as Ya Que 亞雀, while receiving royal ritual interventions on their behalf, tend to be called upon to sacrifice to the powers of the land such as He 河, Yue 岳, and the four directions 四方, rather than royal ancestors.

(13) 貞: 乎雀彭河五十〔牛〕. (672)

Divined: call upon Que to perform a *you*-sacrifice to the River (using) fifty [cattle].

(14) 勿乎雀帝于西. (10976)

Do not call upon Que to perform a *di*-ritual to the (power of the) West.

This sort of privileged ritual action, symbolic as it is of Shang hegemonic claims over the symbolic landscape, was performed by only a select few political actors, such as Que, one of King Wu Ding's most important military leaders, yet someone with his own lands and perhaps military forces.

Zhu (1991) argues, however, that important period 1 Shang allies and agents such as Que 雀, Wu 戉, and Bi 𠂤 were more or less distant relations to the Shang king by merit of their participation in royal ancestral sacrifice or receipt of royal ritual intercession on their behalf.

(15) 壬申卜, 王:㔾𠂤于祖乙. (4326)

Ren Shen day cracked, the King [divining]: perform an exorcism on Bi's behalf against Ancestor Yi.

(16) 貞: 屮于祖乙, 告戉. (Y594)

Divined: Offer to Ancestor Yi and announce Yue.

(17) 甲申卜，㔾雀父乙一羌、一宰。 (413)

Jia Shen day cracked, perform an exorcism of behalf of Que (against) Father Yi (with) one *qiang*-captive, and one penned sheep.

I would argue however, that since divinations showing concern for allies and subordinates and their undertakings on the king's behalf are common in the oracle-bone inscriptions and that the recipients of divine aid or

punishment were uncertain, the Shang king's ritual intercession on behalf of favored allies or agents is entirely predictable without the recipients having to be actual kin. The series of contextually related divinations below demonstrates this point.

(18 a) 壬午卜,㱿貞:亘允其𢦏鼓. 八月. (6945)

Ren Wu day cracked, Ke divined: Huan indeed may inflict damage on Gu. Eighth month.

(18b) 壬午卜,㱿貞:亘弗𢦏.

Ren Wu cracked, Ke divined: Huan will not inflict damage on (Gu)

(18c) 兄丁𢦏王.

Elder Brother Ding curses/harms the King.

(18d) 兄丁𢦏亘。

Elder Brother Ding curses/harms Huan.

(18e) 乎我人先于𢍰。

Call upon our men to first (go to) Wu(?)

(19) [ ][ ]〔卜〕, 爭貞: 曰雀翌乙酉至于𢍰…戈浩亘，𢦏. (6939)

… [cracked] Zheng divined: tell Que this coming Yi You day to reach Wu(?) … dagger-axe X Huan, (for if we do, he will) inflict damage.

(20) 辛丑〔卜〕, [ ]:〔貞〕雀…雀屮〔于〕兄丁. (Y114)

Xin Chou [cracked], [ ] [tested]: Que … Que offer [to] Elder Brother Ding.

In the first of these inscriptions we see divinations about whether or not Huan, an erstwhile subordinate/allied polity will succeed in inflicting damage on Gu. That this is not seen as a good thing from the Shang point of view can be seen in the use of the modal marker *qi* 其 "perhaps" to soften the charge that Gu will indeed be damaged. Furthermore, as we can see from 18c) and d) this adversarial situation is seen in terms of ancestral curses, the only question being whether it is the King or Huan who is, or will be, the recipient of the curse. The subject next turns to the logistics of punitive military action, and whether or not to send the King's forces to Wu first (perhaps to gather more forces). In example (19), we again see Wu on a march itinerary, this time that of one of King Wu Ding's most important

military leaders, Que, for an attack on Huan. Given that Que is involved in this conflict that is seen to be possibly the result of an ancestral curse, it is not surprising to then see him making an offering to Elder Brother Ding, the cursing ancestor in question, in example (18) above. While Zhu sees this last example as proof that Que is a relative of the King, by this same argument, the possibility that Elder Brother Ding is cursing Huan ought to make Huan a relative as well. The logic of this argument falls apart, however, when we consider that the favor of the Shang royal ancestors was considered necessary for victory in battle in general, and thus, logically, their power affected not only their Shang royal descendants. Que, moreover, as we have seen above was in a specially privileged position, such that he acted on the King's behalf in making sacrifices to the powers of the land (although significantly not usually royal ancestors). It may be that this case was exceptional in so far as the ancestral curse concerned Que's mission directly.

In the end then, whether through actual, or fictive kinship, or simply delegated privilege, participation in the Shang royal cult as performer or recipient was a mark of high status or favor, as well as a powerful site of social-symbolic intervention. The duality of this site of power, however, was such that to claim it put one within the space of the King's discursive hegemony, with its hierarchy of genealogical and possibly merit-based privilege.

Kinship and Political Place: The Lineage Polity

Since at least the 1950s many scholars have noted the correspondence between name and place in the oracle-bone inscriptions, with lords, lineage leaders, Zi princes, diviners and consorts all bearing place names as personal designations. The consensus is that people were named for the places they came from, or ruled over (e.g. Rao 1959, Chen 1988, Zhu 1991). In the traditional account of the Zhou and Han received texts, the naming of a lineage for its fiefdom is commonly known as the *shi* 氏 name. While many early Zhou accounts interchangeably use marriage-group or "clan" *xing*-surnames (姓) and lineage names (氏), Kruykov has argued that in fact *xing*-surnames are rarely used outside of marriage context and women's names in Pre-Qin times. Sena (2005) has argued that it is the *shi* 氏 lineage name that designates Western Zhou practical kinship communities of co-residence and common property. Tang (2004) for his part, finds no evidence for anything larger than a "lineage" (which he calls *zu* 族一 using the oracle-bone inscription attested terminology) in Anyang cemetery

groupings, stating that if the Shang had *shi* 氏 "clans" they are not evident in the cemeteries. While the use of different Chinese terms to correspond to the English terms "lineage," and "clan" is confusing, the important point is that there is evidence for kinship-based communities in the Anyang period which may have been contemporaneously referred to as *zu* 族, and which we will term "lineage communities." From the Western Zhou and later times we also know that kinship communities, or at least their leading lineages, were often designated by the names of their seats of power. If, as the frequent correspondence between place and person/polity name in the oracle-bones suggests, this was also a feature of the Anyang period Shang political landscape, then place was experienced simultaneously in geographic, genealogical, and political terms. This, in turn, makes the kinship-based "lineage-communities" we have been exploring more than simply places of co-residence and burial, units of marriage, war and production, but also the basic nexus of Shang social identity. If it is true that kinship networks form the structural bases for much of the Anyang kings' networks of social power, supporting their hierarchy of authority, then it is also true that they also form the boundaries of identity.

(21) 戊戌卜, 雀人芻于效. (20500)

Cracked on Wuxu day, the men of Que will cut grass/ herd at X.

(22) 貞: 勿乎以受人. (1031)

Tested: (we) should not call upon (someone) to bring men of X.

(23) 貞: 王比沚𢦏伐巴方. (93)

Tested: the King (should) join with Zhi Guo to attack the Ba Fang.

(24) [貞]:王比興方〔伐〕下危. (6530)

[Tested:] the King should join with the Xing Fang [to attack] Xia Wei.

In the first two cases the Shang subordinates Que 雀 and 受 have their own people who are identified with them, while in the last two examples Zhi Guo 沚𢦏 and the Xing Fang 興方 obviously stand synecdochally for military forces, as well as the names of an individual, and a polity respectively.

These examples suggest that even close subordinates of the king designated their communities (or were designated) by their own place/ kinship terms, suggesting political identities independent of the Shang

center. In fact, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, given the later Zhou blanket designations of Shang or Yin people, the term Shang itself only appears as a place designation among others (albeit an important one) in the oracle-bone inscriptions. Nor, in the oracle-bone inscriptions concerning military action, is there a clear demarcation between the political inside, and outside of the Shang polity – political entities that were once enemies might become friends and visa versa, the only difference in designation was the addition of the term *fang* 方 for enemy polities. If there was an overarching notion of a Shang political entity it would be a mistake to attempt to understand it in terms of the imagined communities of modern nation states, or even later Chinese Empires such as the Qin or the Han. The Shang polity was, most expansively, a discursive claim to universal ritual-political hegemony, which placed the Shang king in a hierarchically superior position to any other rival via his privileged relationship to the royal ancestors, and ancestralized powers of the land. Somewhat less expansively, or at least less inclusively, the Shang polity was also a hierarchically structured network of genealogical relationships and patronage, marking status through relationship to the king, while structuring, through this dependency, the king's own privileged position. More contingently, the Shang polity was also a network of coercive power, maintained through the pre-eminent force of the center, but dependent, nonetheless, on resources of political communities of varying degrees of independence. These were communities which, moreover, had their own more basic identities, genealogical hierarchies, and social economies of kinship and patronage – their place in a landscape at once political and ancestral, inscribed with lineage settlements, and the burials and ancestral temples around which they were based.

Kinship and the Polity

To summarize, I began the discussion of Shang kinship by questioning the way that this term tends to appear as a little-examined category with a specific socio-political evolutionary place. Instead, I argued that it would be more productive to see kinship as a constellation of practices and beliefs concerning descent, marriage, cohabitation, obligation and identity entangled with political order in historically specific ways.

It was then argued (contra Qiu 1982 and Zhu 1991) that Shang genealogical reckoning and lineage structure differed in important ways from that of the Zhou – complicating the use of later texts to reconstruct Shang social order. The Shang practice of brother-succession and collective

worship of ancestors in generational terms made Shang descent groups more inclusive (at least from the standpoint of ancestor veneration), and their structural hierarchical potential less pronounced.

It was also argued that lineages were not merely an elite form of social organization (contra Qiu 1982), but that rather that they formed the fundamental units of Anyang period Shang society. The strongest evidence for this conclusion comes from the spatial organization of Anyang burials and residences into spatially discrete clusters including both large and small tombs and houses. Inscriptional and transmitted textual evidence also support this position, and further imply that patrilineal descent-groups, and their dependents, formed basic communities of the living and the dead. These groups were, moreover, internally and externally hierarchical, and fundamentally based on genealogical position.

Shang lineages, or *zu* 族, were likely exogamous, but lacked the larger *xing*-surname 姓 groups that regulated Zhou marriage practices, giving rise to the impression in the received textual tradition that Shang descendants frequently violated marriage regulations. Anyang period Shang lineages were thus patrilineal, patrilocal and patriarchal descent-based exogamous communities who lived, were buried and fought together. Moreover, as seen in the frequent identity of name, place and political community in the oracle-bone inscriptions, these communities simultaneously genealogically, geographically and politically structured the world of the Great Settlement Shang.

Political authority and kinship intersected in inter and intra-lineage hierarchy as its repeated performance in ancestor veneration, war, marriage, burial and everyday life shaped the durable dispositions of commoner and elite alike. The King's privileged position, moreover, was that of lineage leader of lineage leaders, presiding over a performance of world-incorporating ancestor veneration – the hierarchically structured participation in which was both sign of privilege and enactment of the Shang social order. The role of the King as the apex lineage leader also mobilized descent-group identities into a supra-local Shang identity, and through bonds of shared blood, obligation, sacrifice and ancestral honor, drove the lineage elites – and with them their clans – to war.

CHAPTER 6

Violence and Shang Civilization

Violence is surely one of the most contested terms in the English lexicon. The reason is that violence sits at the volatile intersection of morality and power, its interpretation concerns positioned judgments about transgression and harm, and its legitimacy and visibility are historically constructed. While violence has traditionally been seen as antithetical to history (Arendt 1970) – the breakdown of order and reversal of developmental sequences – it could instead be argued that both harmful practices and the discursive efforts to vilify or justify, commemorate or ignore, ban or normalize them, reveal a great deal about a time and place. Whether talking about collateral damage from drone strikes, the trans-Atlantic slave trade, Roman circuses or Shang human sacrifice, moral economies of violence are deployed to distance, justify, or glorify what in other contexts would have been impermissible, horrific or unthinkable. These regimes or institutions of violence, moreover, in each case fit into larger complexes of politics, hierarchy, morality and community. The challenge for a twenty-first-century interlocutor into the world of late second millennium BCE North China then, is to understand how vastly different moral economies of violence and order, such as those of the Shang, could have functioned, and what they can tell us about this ancient Chinese kingdom.

Civilization, as discussed in previous chapters, is another highly charged term. While Western political theory has traditionally seen civilization as either begetting violence (e.g. Rouseau) or mitigating it (e.g. Hobbes), more recent approaches (Foucault 1995, Campbell 2014b) have come to recognize the mutable nature of violence, the intimate entanglements of its particular forms with the specific constellations of normativity, hierarchy, power and technology from which civilizations are made.

One of the most influential theorists of "civilization" and its relationship to violence is Norbert Elias. Elias (1994) saw civilization or the "civilizing process" as having three central characteristics: 1) monopolization of the means of violence, 2) the removal of physical violence to behind the scenes, and 3) lengthening chains of interdependence between people – which he claimed, in combination, led to increasingly pacified and civil societies. The historical and logical relationship between these factors was posited to be that the initial process of internal pacification brought about a monopolization of violence, which, in turn, allowed the creation of increasingly extensive webs of interdependence among people who no longer needed fear their neighbors. This then lead to reinforced affective connections. Moreover, the restrictions on physical violence were then seen by Elias to lead to more restraint in expression of affect more generally, and ultimately, to a rationality that is based on foresight and self-restraint. As some authors have noted, however, (Burkitt 1996; Bauman 1989), there is a tendency in Elias' work to conflate the etiological myths of the West with a general theory of civilization.[1] Indeed, some of the worst instances of violence in the last century could be seen as *consequences* of monopolies of violence, the removal of violence behind the scenes, and the lengthening chains of interdependence, which become so tenuous and abstract as to create what Burkitt (1996) calls moral invisibility. Moreover, if, as Sontag (2003) has suggested, "being a spectator of calamities taking place in another country is a quintessential modern experience," our modern "civilizing process" may not imply a reduction or removal of violence from view so much as its transformation into spectacle at a safe distance, virtualization, and commodification as entertainment – not to mention the advent of invisible, structural violences[2] that are now global in extent. While it may be tempting to dismiss the large-scale human sacrifice and endemic warfare of the Anyang period as Bronze Age savagery, I would argue that we are not separated from this violence by some radical socio-evolutionary break, but rather that the networks and connections between social agents have grown so long and abstract that violence that was once immanent now appears mostly virtual, and the relationships between violence and socio-political order are now obscured by the complexity of our

[1] Burkitt (1996) for example argues that Elias' analysis of the Holocaust as an instance of "decivilization" is inadequate in that it was in no sense a product of social disorganization, but rather a sign of the ambivalence of the civilizing process.

[2] Farmer (1997) discusses structural violence in terms of the ways in which social forces structure unequal exposure to social suffering.

increasingly compartmentalized knowledgeability. Indeed, as even Elias himself suggests, violence does not disappear, but rather is transformed into economic and other forms (Elias 1994) with internal pacification (which, in any event, is never perfect). Shang practices of violence then, rather than being mere exotic historical spectacle, can be better understood as part of civilizing, if ambivalent, processes. Thus, rather than see "civilization," or "civilizations," as static, elite cultural contexts in which early states were embedded, understanding civilization as a process and violence as its accompanying shadow, allows us to see at once the dynamic interconnections between institutions and practices of authority, the production of normativity, and the politics of harm.

From the point of view of studying early complex polities like that of Shang Anyang, a critical use of Elias' "civilizing process" suggests some interesting lines of analysis. For instance, to what degree and through what mechanisms was violence monopolized by the Shang kings at Anyang? How was the work of internal pacification figured in their practice and discourse? Moreover, if we modify Elias' first characteristic (borrowed from Weber) to read "monopoly over *legitimate* violence" then we must also take into account the social or moral economy through which monopolized violence was sanctioned.[3] The second characteristic, the removal of violence behind the scenes, raises the question of what Elias would call the sociogenesis of personality structures with respect to violence in the wake of internal pacification. Given that internal pacification is a process rather than an absolute state, and may take different forms in different societies, the question is raised concerning how institutions of pacification and their attendant symbolic economies of legitimacy are figured in the inculcation of dispositions toward violence and its socio-political uses. Moreover, considering the prevalence of spectacular violence in many early complex polities (e.g. Roman circuses, Aztec sacrifices, Neo-Assyrian massacres, etc.), as well as our own society's predilection for violent spectacle in the form of movies, videogames, and contact sports (or even the nightly litany of distant suffering on the evening news), the idea that violence is removed behind the scenes during processes of internal pacification may be too simplistic. It might be more useful to note that as socio-political entities get larger, more integrated and internally diversified, direct participation in inter-subjective violence tends to become specialized (police, professional criminals, soldiers, terrorists), distanced, and/or bracketed into

[3] See also Lewis (1990) for a description of the changing culture of violence and attendant practices of war and politics in Zhou period China.

"exceptional" social fields, even while violent and competitive predilections find different social outlets, and take on different structural forms. The particulars of the specialization, forms and arenas of legitimate violence are thus potentially revealing lines of socio-political analysis. The third characteristic, the lengthening of chains of interdependence, gives rise to questions concerning the development, nature and extent of the Shang community. Moreover, as expanding networks of mutual dependence are supposed to act as a structural constraint on inter-personal violence, the issue of violence and social identity is raised. Against whom, and in what circumstances is violence permitted or restricted? How is interdependence and mutual obligation practically and discursively structured in the Shang? Since interdependence occurs within hierarchical structures, and across asymmetries of power, how do identity, community, power and legitimate violence combine in the Shang social order?

If Elias is optimistic about the positive value of the civilizing process, other authors such as Foucault (1995), and, more recently, Agamben (1998), have seen much the same process in markedly negative terms. Though Foucault's vague and all-pervasive notion of power has been abundantly critiqued (e.g. Giddens 1982, Wrong 1988), his analysis of the prison in *Discipline and Punish* effectively turns Elias' civilizing process on its head, seeing internal pacification and the removal of violence behind the scenes, in terms of pervasive social control and discipline, enacted on the docile bodies of social subjects. If the creation of pacified bodies and minds receptive to authority structures is part of the process that attends increasing socio-political integration and scale, then the question arises of what early regimes of social discipline looked like, and how they related to hierarchical orders.

Agamben (1998), for his part, argues that violence is fundamental to political relations, and has underlain "sovereign" power since antiquity. Indeed, the most crucial aspect of sovereign power for Agamben is its alienating ability to create bare, killable life. Rather than seeing state monopolization of violence as a positive development, Agamben sees grave danger in the increasing extension of state "biopower" over the lives of its citizens. Indeed, the flip side of universal citizenship, and increased integration into the body politic, seen in modern nation states, is the potential power of the state to alienate through the suspension of rights. For early complex polities like the Shang, Agamben's thesis raises questions concerning the creation of non-persons, or more generally, the production of hierarchies of being, and their relationship to unequal exposure to harm. If Agamben is correct in positing the ability to exclude "citizens" from the realm of internal

pacification, to banish them literally, or figuratively, beyond the protection of law and community, and expose them to violence as a fundamental aspect of sovereign power, then the particulars of this social reduction, and its relationship to the social economy of being and power, become critical issues for understanding the nature of polities.

One of the most striking features of Shang Anyang is the scale of its violence. From the thousands of sacrificial victims in the royal cemetery and palace-temple area, the tens of thousands of functional and symbolic weapons buried with the dead in Shang tombs, to the Shang kings' divinatory focus on the spilling of blood in ritual, warfare, or the hunt – it is difficult to escape an overwhelming impression of violence. Indeed, the later Zhou accounts of the depravity and cruelty of the last Shang kings form a ready-made explanation for those inclined to be credulous of much later historical accounts written by the victors. For those more inclined to evolutionary narratives, Shang savagery fits with popular ideas concerning the founding violence of early civilizations. A third choice, and by far the most common, is to pass over Shang violence as incidental, and focus on their brilliant achievements in art and technology. On closer inspection, however, while the third option is a non-explanation, the first two options are also demonstrably problematic – it was the virtuous Wu Ding, not the evil Di Xin who presided over the greatest episode of human sacrifice known to Eurasian prehistory, and, as noted in earlier chapters, Anyang and its ancestral-sacrificial complex were new and elaborated variations on a much older Central Plains Civilizational theme. While we may never know with certainty the historical reasons behind the dramatic increase in evidence for war and sacrifice at Anyang, the contemporaneous importance afforded to these practices suggest that we cannot adequately understand this time and place without reconstructing the social economy of its violence. In other words – what were the cultural logics that made these inhuman practices human?

War, Sacrifice and the Polity

Returning to the questions with which we began this chapter, a crucial issue in understanding the polity centered at Anyang and its local world concerns the issue of internal pacification. In Chapter 4 we have already characterized the King's coercive network as relying on both direct and indirect networks of capital, in a political landscape where the practical and material resources of violence were dispersed among a myriad of local

rulers and lineage heads. From the oracle-bone inscriptions we get a sense of near-constant raiding, campaigns and rebellions – at best a dynamic balance requiring constant maintenance. If internal pacification generally appears more as an endless process rather than a state of affairs for the Shang kings at Anyang, it does not mean that this was equally true of all parts of the polity, or that nothing changed over this approximately 200-year period. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, there was a central zone of direct control – the royal demesne – over which a relatively high level of internal pacification was maintained through touring, hunting, gifting and sacrifice, as well as more routine social, political and economic networks – ruptured only by the occasional rebellion. It is in the indirect zone of allies, clients and buffer polities, and beyond their shifting borders, that the ruling of the four quarters required the constant work of campaigning, alliance-making, and, where possible, subjugation and incorporation. There were, moreover, some trends in the development of the King's technologies of domestication over the Anyang period.

In the oracle-bone inscriptions, the king's use of coercive power could be indirect, as when missions were delegated to subordinates, direct, as when the King himself participated, or a combination of both as in the period 1 oracle-bone examples below.

(1) 癸亥卜,宄貞: 令倉厌帛征亶. (6)

Guihai day cracked, Bin divined: (We should) order Xi, Lord of Cang to launch an expedition against Zhu.

(2) 辛未卜,爭貞: 帚好其比沚或伐巴方，王自東𢀛伐戎𩫖(陷)于帚好立. (6480)

Cracked on Xinwei day, Zheng divining: Fu Hao should perhaps join with Zhi Guo to attack the Ba Fang, the King from East Shen(?), will attack Rong trapping (them) at Fu Hao's position.[4]

(3) 貞: 王叀而白龜比伐□方.

Divined: it should be Xu Bo Gui that the King joins to attack the … Fang.

[4] A number of words in this inscription are ambiguous and other translations are possible. Rong 戎 for instance, could either be translated as the name of a political actor as I have done, or as a verb meaning something like "to war upon." Xian 陷could also be part of a name, Rong Xian, but in any case, this inscription involves the King, Fu Hao and an ally in some sort of joint military endeavor even if the specifics are somewhat uncertain.

This latter example refers to at least three different participating forces (and possibly four, if the King joins Gui the Bo-chief of Shu), with allies, subordinates and the King himself joining the endeavor, suggesting the frequently complicated strategic and logistic calculus involved in major Shang military action. Indeed, it is difficult to be certain that even when there is only a divination about a subordinate being ordered to undertake a coercive endeavor, that the king was not also involved, since it is rarely possible to reconstruct the total context. On the other hand, while it is highly likely that allies, and possibly some subordinates, frequently acted on their own initiative and to their own ends, since the oracle-bones are mostly records of royal divinations, they rarely provide information concerning events not directly concerning the King. Nevertheless, in early period inscriptions, and especially in the reign of Wu Ding, there are some divinations concerning the actions of allies which suggest the King's limited control of military endeavors within the four quarters.

(4) 6623: 癸卯卜，宀貞:叀甫（乎）令 沚𢦏𢦏方. 七月.

Guimao cracked, Bin tested: it is Bu (who we should call upon) to order Zhi to harm the Qiang Fang.

(5) 6995: 沚其戎𢦏。

Zhi will perhaps make war upon X.

(6) 6377: 貞戉弗其伐𠂤〔方〕.

Tested: Yue will perhaps not attack the Gong [Fang].

(7) 4279 (1)貞戉其乎來.

Tested: (It should be) Yue perhaps (whom we) call upon to come.

(8a) 4280 (1)戉其來.

Yue will perhaps come.

(8b) 戉不其來

Yue will perhaps not come.

In example (4) we can see the tortuous route through which the king might exercise authority, divining about whether or not to call upon someone to order a third party to attack an enemy. Example (5) shows that the King is uncertain as to whether or not an ally will attack, while the use of the

modal particle *qi* 其[5] suggests that this attack was not something the King desired. Example (6), on the other hand, shows the opposite situation with an ally possibly not carrying out an attack against a Shang enemy. As examples (7) and (8) show, allies might not necessarily be counted on to come (to court?) if called, suggesting the practical limitations undercutting the King's discursive claims of universal authority.

Indeed, one of the main differences between the early and later period military inscriptions is the relative frequency of divinations concerning allies and allying. In period V military oracles, in contrast with period I inscriptions, the majority of divinations concerning war seem to concern campaigns in which the King is directly participating, and individual allies are mentioned more rarely. Indeed, in some period V campaign inscriptions, other political actors are mentioned only as categories, as in the following example.

(9) 乙丑王卜, 貞, 今囚巫九备: 余作尊遣告厌、田，冊𠭯方、尅方、羞方、纛方. 余其比厌、田，屮伐四邦方. (36528 reverse)

Cracked and tested by the King on Yichou day, (meaning of phrase unclear):[6] I made *zun* and *qian* sacrifices announcing to the *hou* and *dian*-lords to pierce the Qie(?) Fang, Qiang Fang, the Xiu Fang and the Sui(?) Fang. I will join with the *hou* and *dian*-lords in X attacking these four enemy polities.[7]

(10) 丁卯王卜, 貞, 今囚巫九备: 余其比多田于多白, 正盂方白炎. 叀衣翌日步，亡尤. 自上下于㪤(祭)示余受祐屮. 不苗戜〔囚〕. 告于茲大邑商, 亡徙才𠂤. 〔王𠃬曰〕: 引吉. 才十月, 遘大丁翌. (36511)

Cracked and tested on Dingmao day by the King, (meaning of phrase unclear): I will join with the many *dian* and *bo*-lords to mount an

[5] The modal particle *qi* 其 was generally used to soften the undesirable charge in the paired positive/negative divinations (Serruys 1974, Itō and Takashima 1996, Keightley 1997).

[6] Various proposals have been suggested for the phrase 今囚巫九备(see JGWZGL: 847–849), all of them speculative. Suffice it to say it is a routine phrase referring to some aspect of the divination ritual, the details of which we are likely never to fully understand.

[7] Li (2004) argues that the Anyang period Shang kings had a *fen-feng* 分封 (often translated as "feudal") system like that of the Western Zhou and that what I have transcribed (following the JGWHJSW) as 四邦方 should be transcribed as "*si feng bang*" 四封邦, translating as something like "the four feudatory states." While we have argued that the Shang king indirectly ruled over a zone of various "lords" (such as the *hou* and *dian*-lords above) the idea that these lords ruled over fiefdoms granted by the king has no contemporaneous evidence. Moreover, although it seems likely that there were significant structural similarities between Western Zhou and Shang political practices (such as mostly indirect

expedition against Dan, the *bo*-lord of Yu. It should be on the day of the *yi* and *yi*-rituals that we march, there will be no trouble. From the upper and lower spirits through the sacrificial altars I will receive divine aid. There will certainly be no harm [or disasters]. Announce this to this Great Settlement Shang, there will be no harm in the omen-cracks.[8] The King examining the cracks said: extended auspiciousness. (Recorded) in the tenth month, upon the day of Da Ding's Yi ritual.

The first example tests the auspiciousness of making an announcement to the many *hou* and *dian*-lords of an attack on the Qie(?), Qiang, Xiu and Sui(?) Fang, and that the King will be joining forces with them against those four polities. In the second example, we again see the King joining with the many *bo* and *dian*-lords, this time against the rebellious Dan, *bo*-lord of Yu. This statement is followed by a divination that the King will receive divine blessing, and that the campaign will be announced to the Great Settlement Shang. The final phrase records the time in terms of place in the cycle of royal ancestor worship.[9] In these examples we can see a late period trend toward consolidation and standardization that has long been noted in royal divinatory and sacrificial practices, but is apparently symptomatic of wider changes. What is not entirely clear is whether joining forces with the many *bo*, *hou* and *dian*-lords as categories, rather than specific individuals, bespeaks mobilizations of a greater scale,[10] or simply a change in the conventions of royal divination. Nevertheless, if an analogy

rule by kings claiming universal politico-religious hegemony), given the fact that the word *feng/bang* 封/邦 is generally used to describe enemy political entities in the oracle-bone inscriptions, it seems likely that it refers to independent "polities" rather than "fiefs" granted by Shang kings.

8 The translation of this phrase is based on Keightley (2000: 79).

9 Note, for instance, the structure of the charge in 36511(example (10)): it is either a package of actions that the King is seeking divine/ancestral approval and assistance for, or, if Keightley is correct, that the King is vouchsafing through his technologies of socio-physical intervention – domesticating ill fortune through ritual. Note the constant repetition of variations on the phrase "there will be no misfortune." Gone are the ad-hoc inscriptions of King Wu Ding's time when each part of the King's action would be divined and recorded. While it is probable that ad-hoc divinations still occurred in period V (they continue to occur down to today in various divinatory media and social contexts), they no longer seem to have been a topic for royal divinatory record in the latter part of the Anyang period. Combined with the dearth of ad-hoc ritual in later periods and the systematization of burial practices (see Chapter 7), it appears that there was indeed a general restructuring and systematization of ritual practices in the latter part of the Anyang period (Jiang 2011).

10 Collective terms such as "the clan/force of the many Zi-princes" Zi Zu 多子族 do exist in the early period inscriptions (as in the example below) and it is possible that large forces included various *hou*, *bo* and *dian*-lords without mentioning them, but in general, hou and *bo*-lords at least are referred to individually in early period inscriptions.

may be drawn from divination about sacrifice and the reformation of ritual in periods III–V, a systematization of (at least) the discursive practice of war is in keeping with broader changes in the organization of practices of authority in Anyang's latter phases. Moreover, just as Anyang's last kings structured time with the cycle of their ancestral sacrifice, so too the King's campaigns stood as landmarks in the topography of social memory.

(11) 癸未王卜貞: 旬亡𡆥. 王來正人方. (36500)

Cracked and tested by the King on Guiwei day: the week will have no disasters. (During) the King's expedition against the Ren Fang.

Not only do we frequently see divinations recording time in terms of the month and the King's ritual cycle in late period inscriptions, but major campaigns also marked the passage of time as we can see in the period V inscription above. Moreover, royal divinations were not the only place where this pattern can be seen – the bronze inscriptions that begin to appear at the end of the Anyang period, although usually marking time with the King's ritual cycle, sometimes also refer to the King's campaigns, as in the following example,

(12) 丁巳, 王省夒X. 王易小臣俞夒貝. 唯王來正人方. 隹王十祀又五, 肜日. (小臣俞尊 The Minor Retainer Yu *Zun*)

On Dingsi day the King inspected Nao X (a place). The King presented Minor Retainer Yu with Nao cowries. It was during the King's campaign against the Ren Fang. It was the King's fifteenth ritual cycle on the day of the *rong*-ritual.

The impression given by Shang practices of authority in the second half of the Anyang period in general, is thus one of at least discursive consolidation, incorporation and systematization. Allies and subordinates tended to be referred to in corporate rather than individual terms, sacrificial practices were routinized in a cycle, and oracle-bone divinatory inscriptions came to look more like reflections of a structured system for vetting royal decisions than the ad-hoc technology of ancestral communication and negotiation they once were. Moreover, while Wu Ding appears to preside over a larger territory and network of alliances, his ancestral sacrifice was distinguished

辛丑卜，宂貞: 令多紼比望乘伐下危，受祐 . (6524)

Cracked on Xinchou day, Bin tested: order the many officers to join with Wang Cheng in attacking Xia Wei, (for if we do, we will) receive divine aid.

from that of other elites more by its monumental scale than qualitative difference. Kings Di Yi and Di Xin on the other hand, seem to have ruled a smaller domain with fewer allies,[11] but with the King's authority systemically differentiated with the near monopolization of royal/state divination,[12] and the structuring of time with the routinized cycle of royal sacrifice, and punctuated by the King's expeditions.

Nevertheless, the basic structure and cultural logic of war seems to have remained more or less the same over the period covered by the oracle-bone inscriptions. Sacrificial offerings to the ancestors and spirits were undertaken to assure their approval and assistance both before[13] and during campaigns, forces were levied from lineages under the King's direct control and allied forces were mustered. Campaigns could extend over the course of a year or more, and see the King traveling, sacrificing, hunting and bestowing gifts[14] as he moved across the landscape at the head of his forces – suggesting that the King's exercise of coercive power was largely personal, direct and intense, if sporadic and unsystematic, even while tied to a broader panoply of diffuse practices of authority.

One example of a late period campaign is that against Dan the *bo*-lord of Yu which took place over at least five months in the King's ninth and tenth ritual cycle. As we saw in example (50) in Chapter 4, the first divination records the announcement that Yu raised forces and was attacking Gao. Example (10) above then shows the King sacrificing to the ancestors, joining with allied lords, and announcing to the capital the commencement of the

[11] Both archaeological and inscriptional evidence suggest the shrinking of influence in the west and north. Shaughnessy (Xia 2005b) has cogently argued that most, if not all, of the Wu Ding's network of satellites, colonies and allies west of the Taihang mountains were lost by the end of period II never to reappear in the oracle-bone inscriptions.

[12] Early period inscriptions are characterized by a plethora of diviners frequently with names associated with places and polities perhaps indicating their origin and implying broad webs of alliance in a strategy of strength through alliance and shared participation in practices of authority. Wu Ding's numerous wives and consorts may also indicate webs of political alliance. It is probably also not a coincidence that the non-royal oracle bone-inscriptions only date to period I or II at the latest, indicative as they are of high elite participation in practices of authority such as inscribed divination, ancestral sacrifice, hunting and war.

[13] As in examples (9) and (10) above and this period I example below,

丁巳卜，宁，貞賓于王亥十南，卯十牛、三南，告其比望正下危. (6527)

Cracked on Dingsi day, Bin tested: (we should) perform the *liao* burning sacrifice to Wang Hai (with) ten juvenile animals, *liu*-split ten cattle, three juvenile animals (calves?) (and therewith) announce that we will join with Wang in mounting an expedition against Xia Wei.

[14] See example (12) above.

campaign. While we do not know the precise details of the campaign or its results, we do know that over the months of the campaign the King hunted, divined about the weekly fortune and continued to perform the cycle of sacrifices to his ancestors.

(13) …隻白兕，𢍜于… 才二月．隹王十祀，彡日．王來正盂方白□．(37398)

… catch white buffalo, *nai*-offer to … in the second month, during the King's tenth ritual cycle, on the day of the *rong*-ritual to the sun. During the King's expedition against … the *bo*-lord of Yu.

In other campaigns, records of the outcome are preserved.

(14) …小臣□比伐，卑危美…人二十人四，而千五百廿，隮百…丙，車二丙，□百八十三，函五十，矢…用屮白夔于大乙，用𢦏白印…隮于祖乙，用美于祖丁，𨺅甘亭，易 … (36481)

… minor retainer X joined with (someone) to attack, capturing Mei of Wei … people, 24 people; scalps(?), 1,570; captive women(?)[15] 100 … *bing*; chariots, 2; Y 183 armor[16] 50, arrows … use You, *bo*-lord of Wen(?) to Da Yi; use Yin, *bo*-lord of Z … the captured women(?) to ancestor Yi; use Mei (in an offering) to Ancestor Ding; *sai*-lodges,[17] 20 buildings, reward …

Though there remain many uncertainties in the decipherment of these inscriptions, we can nonetheless see what was at stake in Shang inter-community violence. For the losers there was subjugation, servitude and perhaps death, either on the battlefield or on the altars of the victor. For the King, the campaign served to make tangible his authority all along the route of his campaign as he observed the cycle of ancestral ritual, domesticated the unruly spirits of the land through his hunting and sacrifice, and gathered the forces of those allied to him. Discursively, campaigns were figured as exercises in the King's power to punish transgressors and domesticate the dangers that threatened the order created through the regular rhythm of royal sacrifice. They were also critical occasions for the maintenance and negotiation of allegiance, community and identity. Not

[15] In fact this graph appears only once in the oracle-bone inscriptions. JGWZGL states that it is a place name, which is another possibility.

[16] JGWZGL: 2560.

[17] I am reading "𨺅甘亭" as a numerical phrase and ting 亭 as a classifier/counter noun (see Campbell 2004). The reading of 𨺅 as *sai*-lodge is based on JGWZGL: 3135. Moreover, I am assuming that the entire phrase is the pre-posed object of the verb 易（賜） "to reward."

only was service rewarded and disloyalty punished, with the fates of political agents and whole communities potentially decided, but the production of supralocal identity, or its dissolution, was also intimately tied to the strong affective practices of inter-community violence.[18] As seen above, the forces of political actors are described in terms of their polity or leader, not as a dynastic army as Han and Warring States texts would have us believe. Nevertheless, the raising of large forces undoubtedly combined normally independent groups into supra-community units as we can see both in the King's divinations about joining with allies, and the list of *bo*-lords 伯 captured along with Mei, *bo*-lord of Wei 危伯美 seen in example (14) above.

Thus, if war potentially brought together smaller, more basic, socio-political units, it was nevertheless these units that formed the basis for, and informed the basic logic of, inter-community violence. As argued in Chapter 5, the basic socio-political unit at Anyang (and presumably elsewhere in the Central Plains) was the *zu*-lineage. In addition, the correlation between weapons and burial status suggests an ideology of social violence beyond the royal court, while the widespread presence of weapons in tombs suggests the participation of relatively low-status people in this symbolic economy of violence. Based on a statistical analysis of Shang lineage cemeteries at Anyang (see Chapter 7), 20 percent of the tombs were equipped with weapons. While we can't infer that 20 percent of the population participated in war (in fact, the percentage may have been higher), we do know that 20 percent of the burial population went to the next life armed and that mortuary symbols of violence were second in quantity and

[18] Compare, for instance, Evans-Pritchard's account of the Nuer, whose socio-political organization and identity was context dependent, reaching its most expansive and inclusive in cases of war.

> We may conclude that a man's tribe only claims his allegiance in intertribal fighting and in wars against the Dinka. In normal times a man thinks and acts as a member of very much smaller local groups with the members of which he has manifold contacts. (Evans-Pritchard 1972: 147)

Arkush (2006: 286) moreover makes the point that,

> Despite its violent and destructive nature, war as a social institution is *generative*, defining and maintaining groups and group identities, structuring and justifying political hierarchy, and supplying a rich source of images and narratives to be interwoven with belief and expressed in material culture.

This statement could, in fact, be broadened, substituting "war" with "social violence," to include all the ways in which practices of violence shape social bodies and inscribe orientations to being-in-the-world with local moral economies of power.

expense only to equipment for ancestral feasting.[19] There was, moreover, a significant correlation (0.01, two-tailed, r = 0.6) between the number of weapons in a tomb and the size of the tomb, suggesting that there was a relationship between quantities of weapons and burial status even as jade blades, *yue*-axes, pole-sabers and chariots qualitatively distinguished the elite (see Chapter 7, Tang 2004). The importance of weapons in Anyang assemblages, their broad distribution and the care lavished on the making of the finest examples of them, all argue for the extraordinary importance of inter-community violence in the imagination and practice of Anyang society (see Figures 6.1–6.3).

If the oft-quoted Zuo Zhuan 左傳 passage that states "the great affairs of the polity are sacrifice and war" (隱公五年 Cheng Gong 13th year) was in some sense more true for the Anyang period than any other time in Chinese history, it would probably be more accurate to say that for the Shang people, sacrifice and war were the great affairs of the *lineage*, and operated materially, practically and discursively through its hierarchies of being – incorporating the living and the dead, the straight and the crooked, the pacified and the wild. At the same time, however, as argued in Chapter 5, the Shang polity formed a kind of super-lineage, and the king acted as a kind of lineage leader of the world.

The question then, is through what mechanisms were individual lineages integrated into the king's practices of sacrifice and war, offering their capital, labor and blood up the hierarchy of Shang authority?[20] As argued above, part of the answer to this question resides in the king's real or fictitious bonds of kinship with other important lineage leaders, creating a further ramification of the basic social order. In terms of social practices producing dispositions favorably orientated toward the king's order, participation in the king's punishment of rebels and enemies, or defense of Shang lands would have provided the opportunity for the creation of powerful affective bonds of supra-lineage identity. Participants in the capture and sacrifice of enemies, in a moral economy of divinely sanctioned punishment, would also have garnered ancestral honor and merit – to a degree equal to the social actors' physical, and/or ideological involvement – even

[19] See Chapter 7 for the argument that ceramic vessels served a structurally homologous function in smaller tombs to bronze vessels in larger tombs. See Hayashi (1993) for the argument that the bronze vessels buried in Western Zhou tombs were meant to allow the deceased to continue ancestral food offerings. Keightley (2000) asserts that this was also true of the Shang.

[20] See Yan (1996) for an account of how in modern Chinese villages structural inequality creates unequal reciprocity in the flow of gifts.

FIGURE 6.1 *Ge* Dagger-Axe with Jade Blade, Bronze Backing and Turquoise Inlay (after Institute of Archaeology 2005: 187)

as sanctioned participation in the social death of the enemy simultaneously conferred a relative rise in the hierarchy of being, a position within the re-defined circle of the King's community,[21] a sense of awe at the terrible

[21] In saying this I am invoking Girard's (1979) notion of the scapegoating function of sacrifice, channeling violence and reconstituting community even as

> violence strikes men as at once seductive and terrifying; never a simple means to an end, but as an epiphany. Violence tends to generate unanimity, either in its favor or against it. (152)

Agamben's (1998) argument for the creation of bare, killable life as central to "the political" is also relevant here. Violence, then, marks the distinction between good citizens/

FIGURE 6.2 Jade and Bronze Weapons from Anyang: (left) jade-bladed, bronze-socketed spear (after Institute of Archaeology 2005: 184); (right) Fu Hao's *yue*-axe (after Rawson 1996: 104, fig. 46)

majesty of royal sacrifices, and, to the extent that captives could be identified with, perhaps also terror.

Moreover, as seen in Chapter 4, the sheer numbers of people levied for war (3,000–5,000, but sometimes exceeding 10,000), strongly suggests that ordinary lineage members made up the bulk of the Shang kings' armies, even as the advent of the chariot in the Anyang period meant that Shang forces were divided between those who went to battle on foot, and those who rode to war. Chariots, then, as major symbols of elite status, functioned not only as mobile fighting platforms, but also as stages for the enactment of hierarchy on the battlefield – creating differential practices and experiences within a general participation in organized violence. Shang warfare was a pervasive structuring mechanism, a major

loyal clansmen and criminals/rebels/barbarians, affirming a sense of the proper order of things through the alienation, reduction and punishment of the transgressor/alien. Perhaps a similar logic can be seen in the popular use of a term like "criminal" to demarcate someone who has or is thought to have committed a crime from ordinary citizens with an almost ontological distinction.



FIGURE 6.3 Bronze Weapons from Anyang Tombs: (top left) spears (after Institute of Archaeology 1994: 313, fig. 173); (bottom left) *ge* dagger-axes (after Institute of Archaeology 1994: 309, fig. 170); (top middle) yue-axes (after Institute of Archaeology 1994: 312, fig. 172); (top right) pole saber (*da dao*) (after Institute of Archaeology 1994: 314, fig. 174); (bottom right) shield, helmet and chariot riding equipment (after Institute of Archaeology 2003: 402, fig. 7-7)

"tournament of value" (Appadurai 1986) where "the dispositions of the central tokens of value" (21) were at stake. It was, moreover, a game played with human lives, for unequal material, symbolic and existential rewards, where both ancestral place and politico-religious authority could be decisively negotiated.

The Logic of Sacrifice

As noted above, war in the Shang context was embedded in a larger set of practices of pacification which prominently included sacrifice. Indeed, just as the approval of the ancestors and powers were necessary for victory, so too failure was seen in terms of the total structure of authority (see examples

from Chapter 4).[22] Moreover, not only was the approval of the ancestors sought, but successful campaigns ended with the sacrifice of captives – the ancestral capital of one lineage consumed for the sustenance of another. War in the Shang was, thus, not simply diplomacy by other means, but a set of fundamental practices of authority feeding the sacrificial economy and maintaining the king's world order in a turbulent and dangerous spiritual and political landscape. Nevertheless, and to a degree even greater than war, the basic practices of Shang royal sacrifice changed dramatically over the course of the Anyang period with broad implications for the structural bases of royal authority.

Although many scholars have noticed the trend toward routinization and standardization in the royal cycle of five sacrifices that became increasingly prominent by oracle-bone period III (e.g. Chang 1987, Chen 1988, Keightley 1999, etc.), by examining occurrences of the ritual verbs *gao* 告 (to announce), *yu* 禦 (to exorcise/lustrate), and *bin* 賓 (to host) across the five periods of the oracle-bone inscriptions, I have sought to further illuminate these ritual developments and their structural ramifications for the Shang polity at Anyang.

Gao-announcing, as noted in Chapter 4, was also used by allies announcing enemy raids, as well as by the King in making declarations to the great settlement Shang (see example (10) above).[23] Ritually

[22] This is also the case in the Western Zhou with great effort expended to justify the conquest of the Shang in moral-cosmological terms. The Zhou ancestral hymn Shi Mai 時邁 also records a similar concern to mollify the spirits and pacify the four quarters as the King makes his progress through the land.

> Now is the he making a progress through the States,
> May Heaven accept him as its Son!
> Truly are the honour and succession come from it to the House of Zhou
> To his movements all respond with tremulous awe.
> He has attracted and given rest to all spiritual Beings,
> Even to [the Spirits of] the Ho, and the highest hills.
> Truly is the king the sovereign Lord. … (trans. Legge 1871: 577)

[23] A stratified sample was taken from oracle-bone examples of the verb *gao*. There were 248 examples in the CHANT database from which a stratified sample of 80 were taken. The original goal was to get at least 10 examples from each period, but only 3 examples could be found for period III, and none for period V. Of the rest of the sample 48 were period I, 19 period II, and 10 period IV (based on the Heji periodization which means that some or all of the period IV inscriptions may have been period I inscriptions). In addition to the disappearance of *gao*-announcing rituals in later period inscriptions, this ritual (or perhaps the rituals that were performed with this goal) generally used cattle as the offering and in relatively small numbers compared to other rituals (an average of two victims per ritual).

TABLE 6.1 Gao-*Announcing Recipients*

Father	Ancestor	Mother	Ancestress	High Ancestor	Former Minister	Other
10 (15%)	18 (28%)	2 (3%)	4 (6%)	21 (32%)	1 (2%)	9 (14%)

TABLE 6.2 Yu-*Exorcism Sacrifices*

Mao 卯	Liao 燎	Ci 冊	You 酌	Chen 沉
5 （31%）	9 (56%)	4 (25%)	7 (44%)	1 (6%)

announcing to the ancestors and spirits of the land, thus formed an important tool of communication with the upper echelons of socio-physical power. They were, moreover, overwhelmingly directed toward royal ancestors or former ministers (see Table 6.1). This is in accordance with the general impression from period I and II inscriptions, that ritual, as intervention in the world, was predicated on a logic of real or fictive kin relations, a network of patronage and dependency that was an extension of, rather than mirroring, (as Durkhiem would have it), the social world.

Inscribed divinations about announcing to the ancestors appear to be a basically early phenomenon with period III–V examples becoming increasingly rare. While it is entirely possible that announcements to the ancestors continued in the second half of the Anyang period, inscribed divinations about whether or not to perform them decreased, perhaps as announcing rituals became a fixed (but unmentioned) part of the ritual cycle, or were rendered obsolete as the weekly ritual cycle essentially routinized communication with the ancestors.

Turning to *yu*-exorcism 禦 (Table 6.2), a similar pattern emerges, in that this ritual fades from the inscriptions after period II, disappearing entirely from the period V inscriptions. Exorcism, moreover, appears to be a broad heading for ritual action under which many different sacrifices might fall (with *liao*-burning 燎, *mao*-splitting 卯, *chen*-drowning 沉, and *you*-cutting 酌 sacrifices all associated with yu-exorcism).

Exorcism was apparently performed both post-calamity, for relief of illness or ill fortune (as in example (19) below), and in a more routinized, proactive mode (as examples (20) and (21) show).

TABLE 6.3 Yu-*Exorcism Offerings*

Humans	Cattle	Sheep/ Goats	Specially-Reared Cattle	Specially-Reared Sheep	Pig	Dog	Millet Liquor
9 (17%)	10 (19%)	6 (12%)	3 (6%)	13 (25%)	7 (13%)	1 (2%)	3 (6%)
p = 56.6	p = 75.9	p = 4	p = 7.7	p = 111.9	p = 9.3	p = 1	p = 67.7

(19) 貞: 疾止禦于匕己. (40373)

Tested: (as for) the sick foot, perform an exorcism to Ancestress Ji.

(20) 乙亥卜, 宁貞: 乍大禦自上甲. (14860)

Cracked on Yihai day, Bin tested: Make a great exorcism (starting) from Shang Jia.

(21a) 貞: 禦自唐, 大甲, 大丁, 祖乙百羌, 百宰. (300)

Tested: exorcise (starting) from Tang, (through) Da Jia, Da Ding, (and) Ancestor Yi (using) one hundred *qiang*-captives, one hundred specially-reared sheep.

(21b) 貞: 禦，叀牛三百.

Tested: exorcise, it should be cattle, three hundred (that we use).

As these examples also show, exorcisms could be large or small, and target single entities, or groups of ancestors or powers. Exorcisms sometimes involved diverse offerings as in example (21), although human beings, cattle and specially-reared sheep were the most common offerings (Table 6.3).

The fact that exorcism disappears from late period inscriptions is in keeping with the reduction of ad-hoc ritual in the case of the more specifically instrumental curative exorcisms, while the collective, preventative great exorcisms may have been rendered redundant with the advent of the five-ritual cycle. The majority of *yu*-exorcisms were directed toward the nearer, more anthropomorphic ancestors, rather than ancestralized powers of nature (see Table 6.4), showing, as Keightley has argued, that both the source and resolution of ill fortune was seen as lying largely with the nearer ancestors, as they served as the link between the living community and the unseen powers of the world.

Bin-hosting on the other hand, unlike exorcisms and announcing to the ancestors, appears through all periods of the oracle-bone inscriptions. *Bin*-hosting, like exorcism, appears to be a broad category of ritual, or an

TABLE 6.4 Yu-*Exorcism Targets*

Father	Ancestor	Mother	Ancestress	High Ancestor	He (River Spirit)	Tu (Earth Spirit)	Directional Powers
11 (11%)	20 (21%)	7 (7%)	26 (27%)	21 (22%)	5 (5%)	2 (2%)	5 (5%)

TABLE 6.5 Bin-*Hosting Recipients*

Father	Grandfather/ Ancestor	Elder Brother	High Ancestor	Ancestress	Former Minister	Nature Spirits
17 (22%)	27 (36%)	2 (3%)	14 (18%)	2 (3%)	3 (4%)	11 (14%)

event, under which a wide variety of specific rituals or sacrifices could take place.[24] It was generally performed for near ancestors, but more distant ancestors and powers were also hosted (see Table 6.5).

As Liu (2004) has insightfully noted, Shang ritual can be divided into that which was goal directed, and that which was not. Liu (2004) further divides goal-directed ritual into praying for favor, and eliminating ill-fortune, and notes that the trend toward the systematization of ritual

[24] This characteristic has led Liu (2004: 40) following Zhao (1988: 232) to the conclusion that *bin* 賓 simply means that the King personally participated in the ritual. This essentially means that in inscriptions like the following,

乙卯卜,行貞:王賓祖乙𢦏一牛. (22550)

Cracked on Yi Mao day, Xing tested: The King should attend Ancestor Yi's *zhi*-sacrifice of one head of cattle/The King should host ancestor Yi, *zhi*-sacrificing one head of cattle.

The verb *bin* becomes superfluous as the fact that the King is the subject of the sentence implies that he is the one performing the ritual. Moreover, examples like (14422) are difficult to explain with this hypothesis,

貞:岳賓,我燎. (14422)

Tested: it is Yue (mountain spirit) that should be hosted, We should perform the *Liao*-burning sacrifice.

Here we can see that the object has been pre-posed before the verb leaving no doubt that *bin* is a transitive verb with a nature power as its recipient, a fact difficult to explain if *bin* means "attend."

throughout the Anyang period is also a trend toward non-goal directed ritual. Like *gao*-announcing, but unlike *yu*-exorcism, *bin*-hosting can be seen as non-goal oriented ritual, being more relationship maintenance than goal-specific intervention. And yet, *gao*-announcing shares with *yu*-exorcism both an ad-hoc nature dependent on external events, and a disappearance from the late period inscriptions. *Bin*-hosting on the other hand, does not appear to have been performed on an ad-hoc, event-specific basis, and lasts throughout the Anyang period. Thus, if a generalization can be made from these three cases, it seems that it is not so much that goal-directed ritual was gradually replaced with non-instrumental ritual, but rather that the core goals of receiving ancestral favor, and avoiding misfortune, came increasingly to be sought through a systematic cycle of ritual that rendered ad-hoc interventions unnecessary. If Wu Ding and his immediate successors sometimes ritually intervened on behalf of favorites, in the latter half of the Anyang period, ancestral blessing was more systematically negotiated and distributed, thus changing the structural basis of the social economy of ancestral power. While Wu Ding's ancestral sacrifices were distinguished from those of other elites by their magnitude and the prestige of his genealogical and political position, Di Yi and Di Xin's ancestral sacrifices – through their systematized, routine nature – had become "sacrifices of state," patterning the passage of time with their ceaseless ritual cycle, representing the king as steward of a complex apparatus of world pacification.

One aspect of this structural change is reflected in the nature and quantity of the sacrificial victims themselves. Two general trends can be seen: the gradual reduction of human sacrifice, and the decrease in the size of offerings generally over time, as can be seen in Table 6.6.

The reduction in the size of sacrificial offerings over time, if it is not simply an artifact of the narrowing scope of the oracle-bone inscriptions,[25] could stem from two aspects of Anyang period developments, the first being the shrinkage of the King's networks of allies, and, thus, web of resources, and the second being a lack of rationale for huge impressive sacrifices with the institutionalization of royal sacrifice as structurally

[25] Comparing period I and period V oracle-bone inscriptions, there is a definite reduction in the number of divinations concerning the number or type of victims in the latter, and when they are divined, they tend to occur on separate bones from divinations concerning the performance of ritual. This might be due to the systematization of sacrificial practice in the late period inscriptions making divinations about type and quantity of offerings unnecessary. Nevertheless, divinations about the number and type of offerings do not disappear entirely and they do show differences from earlier periods as suggested in Table 6.6.

TABLE 6.6 *Sacrificial Victims Over Time*[a]

	Period I	Period II	Period III	Period IV	Period V	Cumulative Averages
People	26.5%/40	25.5%/16	33%/16	30%/3	5%/18	24%/19
Specially-Reared Cattle	5%/8	0.5%/1*	22%/5	39.5%/4	52%/3	24%/4
Specially-Reared Sheep	21%/18	29%/3	8%/5	1.5%/3*	0	12%/6
Cattle	26%/10	37%/7	24%/2	23.5%/5	39.5%/1	30%/5
Sheep	8%/5	4.5%/2*	12.5%/14	4.5%/4	0	6%/5
Pigs	7%/6	0	4%/29*	1%/5*	0	2%/8
Dogs	2%/2*	0	2.5%/25	0	0	1%/5
Horses	1%/1*	0	1.5%/3*	0	0	0.5%/1
Millet Wine	1%/50*	3.5%/4*	2.5%/NA	0	4.5%/3*	2%/11
Human/ Animal Ratio[b]	1.4: 1	1.1:1	1:1	1:3	1:2	1:1
Mean Offerings / Sacrifice	18.8	7.8	10.8	3.9	3.0	8.5

[a] This table was constructed from a stratified sample of 1,200 sacrificial inscriptions (400 period I and 200 per period for each subsequent period) selected at random from pages of the Heji Shiwen. The percentage score indicates the percentage of inscriptions for that period that involved the sacrifice of that category of offering. The number that follows the percentage is the mean number of victims per sacrifice for that category as calculated from those examples that recorded a number in addition to the type of sacrifice. The asterix signifies that the number of examples that recorded a number of offerings was less than five and so the mean was calculated from a very small sample in those cases.

[b] The human/ animal ratio is the ratio of the sum of human offerings to the sum of animal offerings in each period. This is arrived at by multiplying the percentage of occurrences of human sacrifice multiplied by the mean number of victims and comparing it to the aggregate of animal sacrifice occurrences multiplied by their mean number of victims.

differentiated from the practices of other elites. These two possibilities are not mutually exclusive, and, in fact, it is even possible that economic constraints were the driving force behind the late period ritual reforms. Against this hypothesis, however, is the fact that the Great Settlement Shang continued to grow, while its industries dramatically increased in



FIGURE 6.4 Inscribed Human Skull Fragments Recording Sacrifice (*heji* 38759, 38758)

scale and output in the latter part of the Anyang period (Li 2003a, Institute of Archaeology 2003, Li et al. 2011, Campbell et al. 2011, Campbell 2014a) suggesting that the "Great Settlement Shang" was an undiminished hub of economic, political and ritual activity throughout its existence. The decrease in the use of human sacrifice over the Anyang period could be related to the general decrease in the quantity of sacrificial offerings. As will be argued below, human sacrifice appears to employ two separate logics: that of exaltation, and of trophy taking, and that of reduction, and sacrificial consumption. Example (14) above records the late period use of the enemy leaders captured in the campaign against Mei, *bo*-lord of Wei, and example (22) divines about the use of three enemy leaders in one sacrifice.

(22) 甲申, 貞: 其執三邦 白于父丁. (32287)

Cracked on Jiashen day, tested: perhaps the captured three polity *bo*-lords (should be sacrificed) to Father Ding.

In addition to those examples, the following inscribed human skull fragments (Figure 6.4, examples (23), (24) display and commemorate the ultimate fate of captured enemy leaders,

(24) … 方伯用 … (38759)

… *bo*-lord of … fang, use …



FIGURE 6.5 Inscribed Deer Skull from Xiaotun, Anyang (from Shijie 2008: 64, image 22)

(25) … 方伯 … 祖乙伐 … (38758)

… *bo*-lord of … fang, … Ancestor Yi decapitate …

These skull fragments clearly demonstrate that the Shang sacrifice of leaders followed a logic of display and commemoration – punishment for the losers, and glorification for the victor – analogous to the inscription of hunting divinations on the skulls of prey like deer or tigers (see Figure 6.5).

Nevertheless, the vast majority of the early inscriptions regarding human sacrifice appear to follow another logic, that of reduction from political agent and enemy, to captive and sacrificial capital, interchangeable with animal offerings.

(26a) … 祖甲升 重□□牢屮一牛, 用. (T2343)

… (what is to) Ancestor Jia offered up should be … specially-reared cattle and one (regular) head of cattle, use.

(26b) 其攷三牢. 吉

Perhaps X three specially-reared head of cattle. Auspicious.

(26c) 其五牢.

Perhaps five specially-reared head of cattle.

(26d) 羌十人.

Qiang-captives, ten people.

(26e) 十人屮五.

Ten people and five.

(26f) 廿人. 大吉. 茲用.

Twenty people. Great Auspiciousness. Use this.

In the above example the offering originally divined about was specially-reared sacrificial cattle, but then shifted to the auspiciousness of offering *qiang*-captives[26] instead. Not only were *qiang*-captives a potential substitute for specially reared cattle in this instance, but comparing the numbers of victims offered, the relative value of human offerings appears to be lower than that of cattle (this pattern is generally supported by Tables 6.6 and 6.7).

A process of reduction from political agent, and potentially dangerous enemy, to anonymous victim, can be seen in the pattern of inscriptions concerning war, capture and sacrifice. While in war inscriptions enemies are referred to as *fang*, or by the place/lineage/polity names of their leaders, when capture is divined about, captives are sometimes referred to without reference to their political affiliation (Table 6.8). Perhaps the most remarkable pattern that emerges, however, is the relative number of divinations concerning *qiang*-captives 羌 (42 percent of the divinations concerning capture). Despite the fact that there is a Qiang Fang 羌方, inscriptions concerning it do not account for an equally important percentage of the warfare inscriptions – certainly not more than twice the aggregate of all other named enemies, as in the capture inscriptions.

Examining divinations concerning human sacrifice, an even more striking pattern can be seen. Aside from leaders who are frequently listed

[26] Another example of the same phenomenon can be seen in this near minimal pair of inscriptions,

乙丑卜,屮燎于土羌，宜小。(32118)

Yi Qiu day cracked, (we should) offer a *liao*-burning sacrifice to the earth power (using) *qiang*-captives, *yi*-sacrifice small specially reared sheep.

貞: 燎于土一牛，宜宰。(14396)

Tested: (we should) offer a liao-burning sacrifice to the earth power with one head of cattle, *yi*-sacrifice specially reared sheep.

This pair shows that in a ritual to the earth power liao-burning either *qiang*-captives or cattle was potentially acceptable, and, thus, structurally equivalent.

TABLE 6.7 *Numbers of Victims in Sacrifices where* Qiang*-captives and Animals Co-Occur*[a]

Qiang-Captives	Cattle	Sheep	Pigs	Specially-Reared Animals	Other
30					10
30					10
30	30				
10	20				
10	5				
10	3				
9	1				
9	9				
9	9				1
3				1	
30	10				
10					8
10					5
10				5	
10				1	
5		4	4		
30			30		
3				2	
15				3	
5		4	4		
3				10	

[a] In the 21 divinations where *qiang*-captives and animals are offered together, there are fifteen cases (71 percent) where the *qiang* are more numerous and four cases (19 percent) where the numbers are matched.

by name, title, and or polity (e.g. Mei, *bo*-lord of Wei 危伯美), human sacrificial victims (although presumably taken in war like their leaders), are almost never referred to by their political reference, but rather, as Yao (1979) pointed out, by some variant of the term "captive" (e.g. *yin* 印, *fu* 孚), by the method of their sacrifice (e.g. *fa* 伐), or simply by a general categorical term (*ren* 人 "man/person," *nu* 女 "woman," etc.). The sole apparent exception is *qiang* 羌. The "*qiang*-paradox" has hitherto generally been explained by assuming that for one reason or another, the Shang despised the Qiang people and especially ear-marked them for

TABLE 6.8 *Capture Verbs and their Targets*

	Huo 獲	Qin 𠬝	Zhi 執	Ji 及	Totals
Specific *fang*	20 (15%)	1 (11%)	23 (29%)	4 (9%)	48 (18%)
Fang (generic enemies)	16 (12%)	3 (33%)	13 (16%)	35 (80%)	67 (25%)
Qiang	93 (68%)	4 (44%)	13 (16%)	3 (7%)	113 (42%)
Captives (*yin*, *zhi*, *fu*, etc.)	7 (5%)	1 (11%)		1 (2%)	9 (3%)
Other 芻 𠬝			30 (38%)	1 (2%)	31 (12%)
Totals	136	9	79	44	269

capture and sacrifice.[27] Recently, some scholars have proposed that the Qiang represented a fluid category of barbarian Other whose ethnic identity shifted over time rather than being a specific ethnic group as many scholars have assumed (Wang 1992, Shelach 1996a, Fiskesjö 2001).[28] If this is correct, then the Qiang would be a forerunner of Zhou terms for barbarian outsiders like Yi 夷, Man 蠻, Rong 戎 and Di 狄. While there is a Qiang Fang, in the oracle-bone inscriptions (and perhaps an Yi Fang 夷方), enemy political entities are generally termed *fang* irregardless of their ethnic/cultural affiliation – thus, Yu 盂 becomes Yu Fang 盂方 after it levies forces and threatens to attack Gao 高 (see Chapter 4 example (50). This is in marked contrast with the Zhou practice of referring to polities within its cultural domain by terms such as *bang* 邦 ("polity"/ "state"), and barbarian outsiders by collective ethnic terms. Moreover, this cannot explain the discrepancy between the relatively modest number of war inscriptions concerning the Qiang Fang with the overwhelming frequency of the word *qiang* in capture and sacrifice divinations. If capturing enemy populations was part of Shang Anyang's generalized practice of inter-community violence, then why were *qiang* mentioned so frequently in contexts of capture and captive sacrifice, but not as frequently in war? The Wu Ding period oracle-bone inscription example below suggests an answer to this question.

[27] Chen (1988) argues that the Qiang are the descendants of the Xia, whom traditional texts claim the Shang overthrew, and that it was hatred of the Xia descendants that lead the Shang to specially seek them out them as sacrificial victims.

[28] Indeed, it is generally assumed that they are the same ethnic group that Han dynasty sources record a thousand years later!

(27) 乙未卜,貞:𡆥隻羌. 十二月. 允隻十六,以羌六. (258)

Yiwei cracked, tested: X will capture Y. Twelfth month. Indeed, (X) captured sixteen, (and is) bringing *qiang*-captives, six.[29]

In the charge, the issue divined about concerned the capture of Y (or people of Y) by X. The verification confirms that indeed sixteen were caught, but then they are termed "*qiang*." This strongly suggests that the word "*qiang*" in the captive and sacrifice divinations is not, in fact, referring to people of the Qiang Fang, but rather denotes a more general term for captive or slave. This explanation would go a long way to explaining why there are so many examples of the word *qiang* in capture and sacrifice divinations, not to mention the graphic variant of *qiang* written 𠂤 with a rope around the neck. A remaining question then, is whether or not this sense of *qiang* is merely a semantic extension of Qiang Fang to a generalized barbarian Other, and term for captive, or whether the graph used to write Qiang Fang represents more than one word, one of which means "captive" or "slave." The latter hypothesis is supported by the fact that the word *qiang* 羌 was a homophone of the verb 強 in Old Chinese, and the latter has both verbal and adjectival uses as in "strong/hard" and "to force" (強迫).[30] Although there are no known cases of either 強 or 羌 being used in later transmitted texts in the sense of "slave" or "captive," it would not take a great semantic leap of faith to argue for a meaning of "slave/captive" as a derivative of "to force" (or visa versa).[31] If 強 was written 羌 in the oracle bones it might also explain why Qiang Jia 羌甲, a Shang royal ancestor, nevertheless apparently bore the name of an ethnic group that, in the traditional account, was so despised as to be especially marked out for capture and sacrifice. In this re-reading, Qiang Jia would be rendered something like "Mighty Jia" instead of "Loathsome Barbarian Jia," which would be much more in keeping with the practice of referring to ancestors by either a genealogical marker (father, ancestor, big, middle, small) or terms of glorification such as Tang "the Accomplished," Ding "the Martial," Ding "the Martial and Cultivated," etc. The argument for reading *qiang* as a generalized term for barbarian, on the other hand, is supported by examples such as the following,

[29] Unfortunately, the original bone with this inscription on it has been lost and only a hand copy remains.

[30] Takashima (Itō and Takashima 1996, vol. 2: 63) in glossing a translation of *qiang* 羌 as "toughs," notes that "this functional translation does have some etymological backing, in that *qiang* (*khjang) is probably related to *qiang* 强 (*gjang) meaning "strong, tough."

[31] The oracle-bone inscription verb/noun fa 伐 "attack/decapitate > those who are going to be decapitated" is an analogous example with the nominal sense occurring only in the oracle-bones and leaving no trace behind in later Chinese.

(28) 乙卯卜，爭貞: 王□伐馬羌. (6624)

Yi Mao day cracked, Zheng tested: the King (should) attack the Horse Qiang.

(29) 己酉卜，㱿王叀北羌伐. (6626)

Ji You day cracked, Ke (tested:) it should be the Northern Qiang that the King attack.

(30) □亥卜,羌二方白其用于祖丁, 父甲. (26925)

… Hai day cracked, the *qiang* two Fang *bo*-lords should perhaps be used (in sacrifice) to Ancestor Ding,

In the first two examples, the enemy is neither referred to as a Fang nor as a specific polity/political actor but rather as "*qiang*" of different type/location. In the third example two *bo*-leaders are about to be offered to the royal ancestors, but they are designated simply as "*qiang*" rather than by their polities or personal names. Given that there generally seems to be one *bo*-leader per polity in the oracle-bone inscriptions, "*qiang*" does not appear to refer to a polity here, and is either a loose political/ethnic term or simply designates that the leaders are captives or "barbarians."[32]

Whether the "*qiang*" that appears in the sacrificial inscriptions derives from semantic extension of Qiang Fang or represents a phonological loan for *qiang* 強 ("to force"< "those who are forced"< "captives/slaves"), the important issue is that it does not have a specific political referent in these cases, but rather instantiates a logic of sacrificial reduction, and erasure of agency[33] – a process of "pseudo speciation" rendering captives available for

[32] Niu (2006: 461) notes that if one attempts to reconstruct the location of the Qiang through the typical methodology of looking at the political actors that interacted with them, one arrives at the (to Niu's mind) unsatisfactory result that the associated political actors appear to come from all over the map. Since it is uncontroversial to Niu that the Qiang are a bounded self-identifying, ethnic group that was located to the west of the Shang royal demesne, this result suggests to him that there is a problem with the assumption that interacting political actors should be geographically close by. While this is, indeed, a valid consideration, since the assumption that polities ought to interact more frequently with their nearest neighbors is a basic premise of oracle-bone geography, one either has to accept it or abandon the attempt at oracle-bone-based historical geography altogether. Moreover, if I am correct in my hypothesis that in many cases *qiang* 羌 does not refer to a specific political entity located in the west, Niu's problem of the Qiang being everywhere disappears.

[33] Compare for example, Scarry's (1985) account of torture as the progressive reduction of the victim and consequent inter-subjective enhancement of the torturer in a vampiric dialectic of power and suffering.

> This denial, the third major step in the sequence on which torture is built, occurs in the translation of all the objectified elements of pain into the insignia of power, the

FIGURE 6.6 Sacrificial Pit in Royal Cemetery (after Institute of Archaeology 1994: plate 15, 1)

ancestral consumption along with cattle, sheep, pigs and dogs.[34] From dangerous enemies of specific, named polities, to nameless captives, and, finally, sacrificial capital expended in the tens to hundreds (Figures 6.6 and 6.7).

Returning to the issue of the reduction of human sacrifice in the last half of the Anyang period, this phenomenon may be tied to the wider ritual

> conversion of the enlarged map of human suffering into an emblem of the regime's strength … What by the one is experienced as a continual contraction is for the other a continual expansion, for the torturer's growing sense of self is carried outward on the prisoner's swelling pain. (56)

[34] Though paralleling the reduction of homo sacer (Agamben 1998), the citizen reduced to bare life who can be "killed but not sacrificed," the *qiang* are enemies reduced to bare life who were spared death on the battlefield only to be put to death on the altar. A limitation

FIGURE 6.7 Sacrificial Pit with Headless Victims in Royal Cemetery (after Institute of Archaeology 1994: plate 15, 4)

changes outlined above. In Wu Ding's times, a logic of excess pervaded royal ritual, creating distinction through scale. The King and his network of allies were also very active militarily, and, as noted in Chapter 4, the chief forms of tribute or booty sent in by allies, and divined about by the King, were cattle and captives. The debasement and sacrifice of conquered enemies, moreover, bolstered the King's discursive claims to a privileged place in the hierarchy of being. Royal punishment for rebels and enemies provided *post-factum* verification of the King's divine favor, even while the

of Agamben, however, is his tendency to speak in aphoristic generalizations about such things as "the sacred," "the sovereign," "the political originary" and to only consider the most extreme examples – the exception may define the rule, but the contents of the rule are surely also relevant to understanding the specifics of social-political orders.

outcome of the negative dialectic of inter-subjective power played out on the battlefield was cemented through the transmutation of once-dangerous enemies into faceless captives whose "use" among the livestock of the King's rituals marked their final domestication, and ultimate place within the hierarchy of being. As the King gained with each sacrifice, so too his enemies were reduced, for the King, nearly deified in life, upon receiving a royal burial, would be apotheosized by his descendants, even while his sacrificed enemies were denied places among their kin – bodies hacked, burned or buried alive to feed the glory of the royal line – their social, physical and ancestral deaths dialectically enhancing the King's social, political and ontological being.

In the later reigns of the Anyang kings, the royal ritual had become a systematic, institutionalized complex of techniques of world domestication insinuated into the rhythm of life to an extent unprecedented in earlier reigns. It may have been that the excessive gestures of the earlier kings like Wu Ding – distinguishing their ritual from that of other high elites – were no longer necessary. It may also be that the later Kings simply did not have the same coercive networks, or as frequently used them, as Ding "the Martial" (Wu Ding), or that while enemy leaders were still sacrificed, their followers were more frequently put to other uses – relocated, enslaved, or incorporated into lineages as dependents of some sort (Huang 2004).

Ultimately, the theme of internal pacification reveals the structural instability built into the Shang world with the dispersion of coercive capital, segmental organization and the possibility of other ancestral orders and hierarchies of authority – as the Zhou conquest demonstrated. If the position of the king was vouchsafed during his lifetime significantly through success in war and sacrifice, then his position in the afterworld depended on his descendants, both in terms of their mortuary and sacrificial ritual, and in terms of their relative position in the world. The ancestors of overthrown dynasts, after all, are no longer royal ancestors. The seemingly stable Shang hierarchy of authority then, was actually one of dynamic balance, negotiated with the living, the dead and the powers of the land through the perpetual work of pacification. In this sense, war and sacrifice were two aspects of the same structuring institution, creating order and a measure of ontological security. While later kings such as Di Yi 帝乙 and Di Xin 帝辛 seem to have presided over a less dynamic and more systematic apparatus of pacification, their complex of practices of authority remained fundamentally the same as that of their ancestors: warring, inspecting, hunting, allying, sacrificing and divining: in constant motion across the landscape. From the point of view of the polity, the relationship

between forms of social violence and authority meant that Shang warfare was not an unfortunate aberration of failed communication, or even diplomacy by other means, but rather a key practice of authority, glorified through such elite symbols as ritual weapons, chariots and monumental human sacrifice. Yet, if Shang practices of social violence involved both glorification and internal pacification, it is important to distinguish their particular forms and logics. The glory won through battlefield and sacrificial success has to be seen within the total structural context of ancestral place, and the lineage-based organization of social life. The *kudos* passing from defeated to victor was not merely inter-subjectively constitutive of enhanced personal honor, but that honor was fundamentally predicated on a structuring of social place based on ancestral merit.[35] Internal pacification in the Shang case likewise does not merely refer to the elimination of military threats within a territory, but rather to the pacification of sources of danger in general, and the creation of order out of the anarchic forces of the world. Neither should pacification be seen solely in instrumental, monolithic "state" terms: war and sacrifice were not monopolies of the Anyang kings, but rather general, hierarchically structuring practices differentially participated in by all. These structuring practices, moreover, constituted the authority of other elites as well, their power stemming from their position as ritual and military leaders, and representatives of their lineages. Nevertheless, as will be discussed more fully in the next chapter, the great disparities of symbolic and material capital lavished on royal burials in contrast to those of other lineage leaders, the concentration of the vast majority of sacrificial offerings in the palace-temple area and royal cemeteries, and the size of the forces levied by the Shang kings, all suggest that the ritual and coercive capital of subordinate lineages was largely channeled into the dynastic enterprise, even as the capital of subordinate lineage members was harnessed by their lineage heads.

[35] On the negative dialectic of violence encapsulated in the concept *kudros/kudos* Girard (1979: 152) writes,

> The epithet kudros signifies an attitude of triumphant majesty, a demeanor characteristic of the gods. Man can enjoy this condition only fleetingly, and always at the expense of other men. To be a god is to possess kudos forever, to remain forever a master, unchallenged and unchallengable.

To this I would add that the opportunity for the acquisition of kudos is not generally equally available to all, but rather structured in social fields of power constructing both categories of "men" and "gods."

CHAPTER 7

Constructing the Ancestors: The Social Economy of Burial

In Chapter 4 it was argued that the ancestors played a vital role in mediating the relations between the human community and the unpredictable forces of the world. As such, most key practices of authority (e.g. divination, sacrifice, gift-exchange, reward/tribute, war) directly or indirectly involved the ancestors in some manner. Chapter 5 then expanded on the vital role of kinship at Shang Anyang – structuring virtually every element of existence, locating individuals within a social and spatial matrix of ancestral place. In Chapter 6 the role of violence in the Shang social economy was discussed – tying its primary forms of sacrifice and war both to ancestral approval and lineage aggrandizement. In this chapter we will discuss a further key arena for the construction of ancestral hierarchy: burial. If the social economy revealed in the royal oracle-bone inscriptions is largely one of sacrifice and war, and the pinnacle of Anyang period Shang technology and industry was devoted to the production of ritual vessels for ancestral sacrifice, its social, material and symbolic capital investment was located in temple-halls, sacrificial grounds and tombs. This focus, moreover, revolved around the maintenance of ancestral relations.

Mortuary Archaeology

Burials, at least in some parts of the world, make up a large proportion of the archaeological record, and archaeologists have long been pre-occupied with their excavation and interpretation, producing a large theoretical literature. In the late seventies and early eighties, processual archaeological approaches to mortuary archaeology attempted to derive cross-culturally applicable methodologies for interpreting social structure from mortuary remains, focusing on such things as "energy expenditure," "redundancy" (Tainter 1977), and the material expression of social roles (Saxe 1970,

Binford 1972, O'Shea 1981). Based on structural-functionalist assumptions about society and naïve equations of mortuary distinctions with social structure, these approaches were roundly criticized by post-processual archaeologists[1] who noted the need to understand mortuary practice in its larger cultural context, while casting doubt on the utility of cross-cultural mortuary generalizations (Tilley 1984, Hodder 1985, Pearson 1999).[2] Given the approach taken here – viewing the material, practical and discursive aspects of social life as inextricably intertwined – it should come as no surprise that I eschew both primarily meaning-based approaches, and cross-cultural behavioralist schemes for interpreting structural patterns. Following Morris' (1992) maxim that burials tell us more about death ritual than social structure, but understanding the category of "ritual" as marked social practice (Bell 1992, 1997), burial at the Great Settlement Shang is seen as a key arena of social action – at once a technology of social-physical intervention in the world, and a crucial site for the negotiation between the living and the dead, of social, political and spiritual place. Thus, while death is both universal, and cultural practices dealing with it local, the universal and the local come together "on the category distinction between 'living' and 'dead' and the fuzzy area in between" (Leach 1977 qtd. in Pearson 1999: 46). Death imposes its alterity on life universally instantiated in myriad local variations. For the Shang, death was the beginning of another existence, less tangible or certain, but powerfully linked to the living through bonds of genealogy, the flow of sacrificial gifts and, in return, protection and assistance, or vengeance, misfortune and destruction. Moreover, as Puett (2002) has argued, the Shang oracle-bone inscriptions reveal a picture of dangerous dead, and their attempted mollification and ancestralization through sacrificial ritual. The dead, then, formed a category of intangible Other – potentially dangerous beings that the Shang socio-technological complexes of sacrifice and burial attempted to pacify and bring within the orbit of their patterning practices. Mortuary ritual then, as the body of practices dedicated to the negotiation of the liminal zone between the living and the dead, was the first and perhaps most important step in the construction of the ancestors.

[1] In fact, there were powerful cautionary studies such as Ucko (1969), written even before the processual archaeological boom in cross-cultural mortuary generalizations and one-to-one correlations of burial representation and status in life.

[2] There were also a number of studies which attempted to salvage something of the processualists' general approach to mortuary analysis with more nuanced approaches within the same general paradigm such as Goldstein 1981, Carr 1995, and Brown 1995).

The Division of Space in Anyang Burials

That there are general trends in the placement of objects within Anyang tombs is widely known. Institute of Archaeology (1987a) notes that most ceramic vessels were placed on ledges, while in tombs without such features they tended to be found near the wall at the head end of the tomb. Bronze artifacts were usually placed to one side or the other of the skeleton, and weapons and tools were typically close to the deceased. Stone and jade objects were most frequently found near the head, or on the body, often in the hand, or, in the case of cowries, in the mouth. Ma et al. (1955) noted that in the small burials excavated to that point, that grave goods were placed on ledges or within the burial chamber/outer coffin in rich tombs. More valuable things like bronzes and jades were put in the coffin, and tombs with niches had ceramics located therein. Tombs without ledges had ceramics in the coffin (especially those cases where there were fewer grave goods), and jades were generally found on the body, or in the mouth. Death attendants were almost always found on ledges, while dogs were usually found in the waist pit. Tombs with legs of sheep or cattle had them placed either above the head, or on the ledge. Anyang Team (1979a: 51) on the other hand, notes that dogs were often found in the fill as well as the waist pit. As for the largest, ramped tombs, since all have been looted, it is more difficult to say where the burial goods would have been originally located. While many of the larger, looted tombs still contained the remains of human sacrifices or death attendants, there seems to be a great deal of variation in terms of numbers, type and location. Keightley (1999a), presents the following spatial classification of human remains in the royal burials, stating there are,

> (1) those buried, mainly with their bodies whole and equipped with a bronze or jade dagger-axe, in the "waist pit" or in the burial chamber's four corners; they presumably were to guard the deceased, and (2) those buried whole, with their own coffins, grave goods, bronzes, and even with their own followers-in-death or an attendant dog. Generally placed on the ledge or on the roof of the coffin chamber, and showing no signs of having been bound or having struggled, these presumably were high-status relatives, close dependents, or personal attendants of the deceased. Evidence of this sort suggests that the royal tombs may be regarded as inverted representations of the sociologist's conical clan, with *those retainers close to the king in life being buried close to him in death and enjoying the highest post- mortem status*.

> (3) The most numerous group of victims consisted mainly of young males, between fifteen to thirty-five years of age, and a few children. Generally decapitated or dismembered, they were frequently buried in the fill, in the ramps, or in rows of sacrificial pits in the vicinity of the tomb, mainly with ten pits to a row and 5 to 10 victims to a pit. (267) (italics added)

Thus, for Keightley, there is a hierarchy of space, ranked in terms of proximity to the grave owner. While the question of whether or not the death attendants were "high status relatives," or slaves – as many Chinese authors claim – is contentious, nevertheless, there is a consensus that there was some sort of ordered division of space in the "royal" burials.

Systematically reviewing the spatial data on the hundreds of Shang tombs that have been published to date in sufficient detail, the following generalizations concerning the division of mortuary space in large tombs can be made. The innermost space is the inner coffin and the body. We will call this zone I. Zone II is the space between the inner coffin and the outer coffin / wooden chamber. Beyond that, zone III is the space immediately outside the tomb chamber, often expanded by ledges, and/or, niches. The approaches to the chamber, the waist pit below, the fill above, and the ramps in larger tombs, form zone IV. Beyond the tomb itself (in the case of some elite burials) zone V is the space around the burial which may be used for interning "followers in death," chariots or other sacrifices. Naturally, what I have just described is a kind of ideal Shang mortuary division of space, but the regularities observed in the placement of things within Anyang tombs suggests that there was a kind of basic spatial template – a notion of what and how a tomb should be. If these spatial patterns can be said to be generally valid, questions nevertheless remain concerning the range of variation, and its potential significance. Were there, for instance, different sub-templates for different classes of burials? Was there a division of space analogous to that of larger tombs that can also be seen in the smaller tombs? Indeed, considering that the smaller tombs lack some or all of the features described above for the "ideal" large tomb, to what extent can they be said to be using the same mental template?

From Table 7.1 we can see that most small tombs have at least some of the features of the larger burials. In fact, the small tombs have two major advantages over the larger tombs as data: there is a much larger sample, and many of them are undisturbed.

TABLE 7.1 *Anyang Lineage Cemetery Tombs: Furniture, Grave Goods and Elaboration*[a]

	Frequency	Percent
Single Coffin	1002	80%
Coffin+Chamber	88	7%
Waist Pit	714	62%
Ramps	6	0.4%
Grave Goods	812	87%
Dog Sacrifice	451	33%
Death Attendants	26	2%
Human Sacrifice	1	0.07%

[a] The sample is from the cemeteries at Xiqu 1–8, Guojiazhuang and Liujiazhuang. The total number of tombs is 1,365 of which 929 were undisturbed. The different totals used in the table (e.g. coffins, double coffins and no coffins = 1,256) depend on the portion of the sample for which there is relevant information. Different variables are affected differently by looting or other disturbances. It should be noted that the results of this table are not exactly the same as Tang (2004) even though the database used was the same. Tang (2004) excluded cases that could not be periodized and thus biased his sample in favor of tombs with grave goods. He ended up with 87 percent of his sample with coffins, 10 percent with inner and outer coffins, and only 3 percent with no coffins (Tang 2004, table 7.7).

Sacrificial Remains

Because most of the larger tombs have been looted, but sacrificial victims are mostly left alone, the location of sacrificial victims will be explored separately from the location of grave goods. Appendix C, Table C.5 tabulates a small sample of tombs published in enough detail to reconstruct the positions of sacrificial victims including royal tombs. Based on this data, it appears that sacrificial remains are generally restricted to zones III – V (just outside of the tomb chamber, approaches to the chamber, and the area surrounding the tomb respectively).[3] Making finer distinctions, such as between human sacrifices and death attendants, an even more striking pattern appears.

From Tables 7.2 and 7.3, a clear pattern emerges: death attendants are mostly found in zone III, while human sacrifices are nearly exclusively found in zones IV and V.[4] Thus, death attendants were generally placed

[3] GJZ M160 is an exception with two death attendants within the tomb chamber.

[4] An exception to this is the waist pit "guards."

TABLE 7.2 *Death Attendants*

Zone:	I	II	III	IV	V
Large Burials	0	0	62	20[a]	?[b]
Medium Burials	0	2	19?[c]	13?	0
Small Burials	0	0	24	0	0
Total	0	2 (1%)	105 (75%)	33 (24%)	?

[a] Of the death attendants in zone IV, eleven were waist pits "guards" armed with jade or bronze weapons and usually accompanied by a dog. WGCM1 also has an armed man in a pit in the ramp and another man with a dog beside him suggesting that tomb guards may not have been restricted to waist pits.

[b] Since the treatment of the remains in the "sacrificial pits" is unclear for M1001, how many of these sixty-eight people recorded as being in the sacrificial pits nearby are actually sacrifices rather than death attendants is unclear.

[c] Unfortunately, none of medium tomb reports supply enough information about the condition of the human remains to clearly distinguish between human sacrifices and death attendants.

TABLE 7.3 *Human Sacrifices*

Zone:	I	II	III	IV	V
Large Burials	0	0	0	487	84?
Medium Burials	0	0	0	6?	0
Small Burials	0	0	4	0	0
Total	0	0	4 (1%)	493 (85%)	84 (14%)

in closer proximity to the grave owner than sacrificial victims. Another striking pattern is the ratio of human sacrifices to death attendants. In the large tombs the ratio is 6:1, while in medium tombs it is 1:5, and in the small burials it is 1:6. Thus, although Keightley's (1999a) assertion that human sacrifice is only found in large burials is not exactly true, human sacrifice does seem to be one feature of large tombs that is nearly absent in smaller burials. Death attendants, on the other hand, are a feature shared between large, medium and small tombs – albeit becoming quite rare in the latter. Turning to animal remains, another interesting pattern becomes apparent.

Comparing the number of dog remains to secondary human remains, it is apparent that while the ratio of dogs to humans in the large tombs is heavily in favor of humans at about 1:50, in the medium tombs the ratio is

TABLE 7.4 *Dog Sacrifices*[a]

Zone:	I	II	III	IV
Large Burials	0	0	0	11
Medium Burials	0	0	1	9
Small Burials	0	0	5	17
Total	0	0	6 (14%)	37 (86%)

[a] This table is based on Table C.5, in Appendix C. The relatively small number of examples of dog sacrifice in the table is an artifact of the way tombs are published in Chinese archaeology – while thousands of small tombs have been published (and even more remain unpublished), they are generally published as tables of basic data (tomb size and number and type of grave goods) without spatial information.

only 1:6, while in small tombs, it is roughly 1:1.[5] Thus, the ratio of humans to dogs decreases with the size of the burial. Also of interest is the spatial distribution of dogs (Table 7.4): dogs broadly pattern with humans in terms of their location. In terms of specific location, however, there is both overlap and dissimilarity. While both dogs and humans are found in waist pits from large tombs to small, there is a tendency for humans to be used in the large tombs, and dogs in the smaller ones. It is also notable that dogs (sometimes dismembered), appear in tomb fill, as do humans, suggesting both that there may be a corresponding distinction between sacrificial dogs and death attendant dogs, and that dogs can replace humans in some contexts. On the other hand, while dogs do appear on the ledges, or in niches in small burials (in about 20 percent of the cases), they are most frequently found in waist pits (50 percent of the cases). Secondary human remains in *small tombs*, by contrast, appear on ledges or in niches 96 percent of the time with only one occurrence of a human in a waist pit (unlike the largest tombs where the waist pits are always equipped with armed humans). Thus if the general pattern is that armed humans and dogs occupied waist pits; non-armed human death attendants appeared on ledges and in niches; while sacrificial offerings generally occupied the

[5] In these results we can discern a bias in the sample. Naturally, the data is restricted to those burials that are reported fully enough to record provenience. There is a tendency for an overrepresentation of unusual, or rich tombs, even among the small burials. Using the much larger sample on which Appendix C, Table A.4 is based, dogs appear in about 33 percent of the burials while humans appear in only 2 percent, thus the real figure should be more like 1:17 in favor of dogs in small burials. See Appendix C, Table C.6 for correlations between tomb size, death attendants and dogs.

fill, ramps and associated pits, then we can extrapolate that dogs appear in small burials most frequently as guards (50 percent), less frequently as sacrificial offerings (about 30 percent of the cases), and least frequently as companions in death (20 percent). If this is correct, then we can see a tendency for dogs to replace humans in a number of roles in smaller tombs: as guardians, companions and sacrificial victims.

Looking at the location of animal parts, although the sample is small, and, other than M1550, there are no large or medium tombs represented, there seems to be a tendency for them to be located in niches, or on ledges.[6] Given that cattle, sheep, chicken and fish remains are often placed on trays or in ceramic vessels, they likely represent food offerings, and pattern with the placement of food and drink vessels more generally.

Grave Goods

Due to the issue of looting, the sample used for exploring the relationships between grave goods and the division of space is smaller and more limited in range than that of sacrifices, with the famous tomb of Fu Hao (XTM5) being the largest tomb in the sample.[7]

Looking at the distribution of bronze vessels, it becomes immediately obvious that XTM5 and GJZM160 (see Appendix C, Table C.7) have more bronze vessels than all of the small tombs combined. This fits well with the general assumption that bronze vessels were items of the elite. In terms of location, however, in both XTM5 and the smaller tombs, the vast majority of bronze vessels were located in zone II: between the inner and outer coffins/wooden chamber. In the case of ceramic vessels, however, there is an interesting distinction between the larger of the small burials with bronze vessels, and smaller burials without bronze vessels. In the case of the larger burials, while bronze vessels tended to be placed in zone II (81 percent of the vessels), ceramic vessels were more frequently put in the zone III (57 percent of the vessels). Indeed, in the case of M1057, there were ordinary ceramic vessels on the ledge, but imitation bronze vessels made out of ceramics within the outer coffin. In the burials without bronze vessels, however, roughly two thirds of the ceramic vessels were located in

[6] I am ignoring the special case of GM233, with its twelve animal parts inside the special compartment at the head of the coffin. Note though, that these were all placed on a tray with ceramic vessels, further suggesting their use as food offerings.

[7] Table C.7 in Appendix C shows the division of grave goods into four zones (zone V is outside the tomb and no grave goods were placed there).

TABLE 7.5 *Location of Grave Goods and Sacrifices in Lineage Cemeteries*[a]

Grave Good Type	XAZ93 (242 tombs) Mean Zone	XMT89 (130 tombs) Mean Zone	Totals (372 tombs) Mean Zone	Zones
Vessels	2.6 (n=145)	2.6 (n=105)	2.6 (n=250)	III
Weapons	1.5 (n=52)	1.4 (n=30)	1.5 (n=82)	II
Tools	1.5 (n=8)	1.9 (n=10)	1.7 (n=18)	II
Ritual Jades	1.0 (n=5)	3.0 (n=1)	1.3 (n=6)	I
Ornaments	2.0 (n=29)	1.3 (n=21)	1.7 (n=50)	II
Cowries	1.1 (n=53)	1.0 (n=42)	1.1 (n=95)	I
Food Offerings	NA	3.0 (n=3)	3.0 (n=3)	III
Dog Sacrifice	3.9 (n=89)	3.9 (n=45)	3.9 (n=134)	IV
Death Attendants	3.5 (n=2)	3.0 (n=1)	3.3 (n=3)	III

[a] Table 7.5 utilized the burials excavated in 1989 at Xiaomintun 孝民屯 and in 1993 at Xinanazhuang 新安庄 due to the careful recording of artifact placement. The data was obtained from the database for Tang (2004).

zone II. This pattern suggests that, in tombs without bronze vessels, ceramic vessels played a role analogous to that of ritual bronzes, while in tombs with metal vessels, they played another, subsidiary role. Bronze weapons and tools, and indeed, weapons and tools of other materials, were usually (88 percent) placed in zone II (within the chamber), with the remainder (12 percent) placed in zone III (on ledges or just outside the chamber).

The location of jade and stone artifacts forms an interesting contrast to the location of other grave goods. As indicated in the secondary literature, there is a tendency for objects of jade and stone to be placed in close proximity to the grave owner, if not on his or her person. Thus, in eleven small tombs with jade or stone artifacts, ten of them had jade, or stone objects placed in zone I, while only two of them had jade or stone objects in zone III. Cowries likewise are almost always found in zone I and usually on the person of the grave owner.

Housing the Dead

Looking at the various patterns that have emerged from the data and synthesizing, an interesting picture of the division of space within Shang burials emerges (Table 7.5). While there was a clear distinction in terms

of features between the small burials and the large, in some cases this distinction was categorical (or nearly so), while in others, scalar. Thus, though no small burial had ramps, and only one had human sacrifice, many other features such as death attendants, ritual vessels (whether of bronze or ceramic), tools and weapons, cowry shells, tomb guardians (whether dog or human) and grave furniture were held in common, distinguished only in terms of quantity and quality. This suggests that while there were probably sub-templates for what large, medium and small tombs should look like,[8] there was also a shared set of ideas that spanned Shang mortuary practice (Figure 7.1). Part of that basic template is reflected in the division of space. Shang burials and their contents suggest a belief that the deceased had needs both similar to, and different from, the living. Analogous to life, the tomb could be seen as representing spatial divisions such as those found in a dwelling. Zone I, for instance, seems to correspond to the immediate personal space of the owner, and zone II to the interior of the dwelling where his or her more personal or prized possessions were kept. Zone III was the intermediary space between personal and public – for servants, food and secondary ceramic vessels. Zone IV consisted of the entrances and approaches to the dwelling, while zone V corresponds to the extended space around elite dwellings where subordinates and servants lived. On the other hand, reflecting the particular needs of the dead, cowry shells or small jade artifacts were placed in the mouth of the tomb occupant, and jade disks, and tablets or blades were frequently placed on the body.[9] Likewise, human beings or dogs were sacrificed in the process of the burial, possibly fulfilling the same apotropaic ritual functions as foundation sacrifices, and making Shang tombs inverted houses of the dead.

The Social Economy of Burial

Combining the lines of evidence concerning long-term mortuary change outlined in Chapter 3 with the spatial analysis above, it appears that at Shang Anyang, the majority of the population participated in a basic mortuary ritual – a ritual that imitated some earlier elite practices, even while Anyang period elites moved toward further elaboration to maintain their

[8] Quite probably there were more than just these three types.

[9] The placement of jade on the body of the deceased has deep Neolithic antecedents with the Liangzhu tradition as an especially prominent example. Cowries, jades or other valuables placed in the mouths or hands of the deceased is likewise a mortuary tradition of great antiquity and longevity.



FIGURE 7.1 Idealized Division of Space in Anyang Tombs

distinction. Nevertheless, overall disparity between the wealthiest and poorest interments grew both in the form of increasing quantity (elaboration), and in the creation of new qualitatively different forms of mortuary distinction (burial sacrifices, chariots, ramps, etc.). The analysis of mortuary space, on the other hand, shows that spatially, as well as in terms of the forms of mortuary capital deployed, there were structural homologies between large and small tombs, and a common arena of ancestor creation according to a widespread set of practices and beliefs.

If the above points suggest that there was a mortuary "tournament of value" (Appadurai 1986), in which a majority of the population participated, then the question becomes, "with what rules and for what stakes was it played?" In preceding chapters, what might be termed the ancestral hierarchy of authority was outlined, and the fundamental role of lineages in both materially and discursively structuring the social world of the Great Settlement Shang and the constituting practices and moral economies of social violence. In the housing of the dead and the creation of the ancestors through mortuary ritual, all of these diverse strands come together. As Puett (2002) argued,

> the specific concern of the Shang cult was, in a sense, to anthropomorphize the spirit world: to make the deceased into proper ancestors and to have the ancestors guide the nature spirits and Di. The reigning assumption, then, would appear to be that the relations between humans and spirits were, without this ritual action, agonistic and potentially dangerous; the goal was thus to domesticate the spirits and thereby render them controllable. (53–54)

Anyang tombs, then, as major terminal repositories for economic and symbolic capital, were not merely opportunities to make claims about personal or group status, or even focal sites of individual or collective mourning and commemoration, but also socio-physical installations of crucial importance to the wellbeing of the community. In so far as the ancestors served to link the living to the otherwise uncontrollable forces of world, burials served as the basic infrastructure of this crucial complex[10] of "skillful doing and skillful knowing."[11] The proper provisioning of the dead and their construction as ancestors was thus a matter of utmost importance to the descent group, and, by extension, the community in general. It is with this in mind that we must understand the otherwise extraordinary investment in mortuary ritual manifested in burials at the Great Settlement Shang.

Given the common mortuary practice, its intense importance to the community, and the massive expenditure of material and symbolic capital it incurred, a potentially revealing avenue of inquiry centers on the types and quantities of capital which different individuals or lineages were able to marshal in the construction of their ancestors. In Chapter 3, mortuary difference was measured in terms of aggregate z-scores of grave features and artifacts most strongly correlated with tomb size. The drawback of this approach is that z-scores essentially measure the unusualness of the variables in question and have no direct connection to distinctions in status or value. Nevertheless, while a high degree of aggregate unusualness in theory might indicate idiosyncrasy rather than status or wealth, the use of only those variables that were strongly correlated with tomb size should ensure that what is being measured is not merely heterarchical or

[10] In so far as the ancestors were thought to be able to affect health, military success, the weather and fortune in general, investment in burials as the first step in the creation of the ancestors could be seen as institutionally analogous to modern investment in the basic infrastructure of healthcare, military research, meteorology and natural disaster prevention all rolled into one.

[11] With reference to modern science, Michael Polanyi (1958) writes,

> Tearing away the paper screen of graphs, equations and computations, I have tried to lay bare the inarticulate manifestations of intelligence by which we know things in a purely personal manner. I have entered on an analysis of the arts of skilful doing and skilful knowing, the exercise of which guides and accredits the use of scientific formulae, and which ranges far further a field, unassisted by any formalism, in shaping our fundamental notions of most things which make our world. (64)

It is only with a recognition of our misrecognition of the ontology and aesthetics of scientific truth and the social bases of its authority, that Bronze Age "magic" can be seen not as an instantiation of unfathomable, child-like "primitive" thought, but as an earlier, less differentiated and specialized complex of arts of skillful doing and skillful knowing.

TABLE 7.6 *Weighted Scores for Main Burial Artifacts and Features*

Volume/m³	**1**	**Common Weapon (Stone, Bone, or Shell)**	**2**
Cowries	1	Ritual Jades	7
Ceramic Vessel	1	Jade Weapons	8
Bronze Weapon	3	Dogs Sacrifice	5
Bronze Vessel	5	Death Attendants	15
Jade Ornament	3	Human Sacrifice	19
Common Ornament (Stone, Bone or Shell)	1	Furniture (Coffins, Tomb Chambers, etc.)	3
Common Tool (Stone, Bone or Shell)	3	Waist Pit	3
Bronze Tool	3		

idiosyncratic distinction. Nevertheless, even if the general pattern of mortuary treatment has been basically identified, those variables that were not strongly correlated with tomb size, and thus not included in the z-scores, still remain to be explored. In order to create a more inclusive and complete measure of mortuary expenditure, a table of weights was created (Table 7.6). The goal of this exercise was to determine a measure of the *mortuary* value of each type of artifact or feature by determining the smallest class of tomb that could afford it, and/or was permitted to have it.[12] The result of this, then, is not necessarily a reflection of each form of mortuary capital's relative economic value or cost of production, but rather a measure of its importance to the creation of *mortuary* distinction. Thus, the equal score of common tools (stone, bone and shell), and bronze weapons, is almost certainly due to the relative dispensability of the former to burial assemblages rather than a real equivalence of mortuary value.[13] On the other hand, tomb ramps,[14] although relatively cheap in terms of

[12] In practice this meant taking the mean of the lowest 25 percent of tomb sizes that the minimum number of the variable in question appears in. The mean minimum tomb was then divided by the number of artifacts/features for a ratio of m^3 of tomb size/capital. Thus, for instance, the mean size of tombs for which bronze weapons ≤ 1 but > 0 is 7.1 m^3. The mean size of the smallest 25 percent (n=26) of the tombs with a bronze weapon score ≤ 1 but > 0 is 3 m^3 so the weighted score for bronze weapons is 3.

[13] That is to say tools in general were secondary elaborations to the basic assemblage core of vessels and weapons. Thus, only relatively larger tombs had them although presumably poorer tombs could have afforded stone, bone or shell tools more easily than bronze weapons. Their weighting thus reflects their role in marking mortuary elaboration.

[14] Ramps were not included in Table 7.6 due to the fact that the ramped tombs have all been looted and thus were not included in the samples used to explore value explore total burial investment.

labor, expertise or rare materials, were restricted to the largest tombs, and apparently strictly graded in terms of status.

While there is a general correspondence between the weights in Table 7.6 and the patterns observed in the mean number of grave goods per tomb volume, there are some differences as well. The low score for cowries above, for instance, shows that cowries can be found in the smallest tombs, as can stone, bone or shell ornaments, and ceramic pots. Tools, weapons, jade ornaments, coffins and waist pits only begin to be found in larger (but still small) tombs, while human sacrifices are only found in relatively large tombs. Using these weights and their (admittedly crude) relationship to tomb size classes, applying them to the mortuary variables, and calculating aggregate z-scores, a more comprehensive picture of mortuary wealth investment and relative distinction emerges.

Because the largest tombs at Anyang have been disproportionately looted, as noted above, it is difficult to accurately measure the total disparity in ancestral investment between the richest and poorest segments of the mortuary population. In order to rectify this situation, an additional data set was made of the thirty-one largest unlooted Anyang tombs published to date. Applying the weights from Table 7.6 to the burial variables of this sample and obtaining an aggregate value of mortuary distinction in terms of grave goods (TOTGGVAL) it was then mapped against tomb volume in Figure 7.2. What is immediately obvious from this figure is the exponential relationship between total grave good value and tomb volume, as well as the strength of the correlation ($r = 0.997$). This suggests that the interment of mortuary capital in the royal tombs would have been truly monumental (see Figure 7.9) – an issue we will return to below when we attempt to estimate the overall shape and magnitude of the pyramid of mortuary distinction.

Returning to our sample of tombs from the lineage cemeteries, and again plotting aggregate mortuary capital expenditure versus tomb volume (Figure 7.3) we see that the best fit line is again quadratic rather than linear, suggesting that the regression shown in Figure 7.2 accurately describes the relation between mortuary expenditure and tomb volume for tombs at Anyang in general. Since the weighted calculation of total value is designed to be a more complete measure of mortuary distinction than the previous calculation of difference (ZDIFF) (Figure 7.4), it might be useful to compare the results of the different measures, and then plot them against each other to examine the possibility of variability in mortuary investment. Comparing Figures 7.3 and 7.4, total mortuary investment (TOTVAL1) is clearly more strongly correlated with tomb size than vertical mortuary



FIGURE 7.2 Large Tombs: Total Grave Good Value vs. Tomb Size

differentiation.[15] This finding supports the idea that there is variability in the forms of mortuary investment even within tombs that have similar levels of expenditure. This is even more clearly expressed in Figure 7.5, where vertical differentiation is plotted against mortuary expenditure.

In this figure we can see that while in general, the regression accounts for most of the variability, there are a pair of obvious outliers. Examining these two cases in detail, it turns out that their anomalously high TOTVAL score is due to the disproportionately large number of cowries interred.

Looking at the statistics of tombs XQ8M272 and M261 (Table 7.7) it is immediately obvious that aside from the extraordinary number of cowries, these are otherwise very ordinary tombs. As we have discussed in earlier chapters, cowries were the most common gifts given to inferiors by the Shang kings and other high elites recorded in Shang bronze inscriptions, so there is no question that they were considered valuable, and that such a large number of them would have been a large expenditure of economic

[15] While the regression line for ZDIFF vs. volume has a coefficient of correlation of r = 0.805, TOTVAL1 vs. volume has a correlation coefficient of r = 0.908.



FIGURE 7.3 Lineage Cemeteries: Mortuary Investment vs. Tomb Size



FIGURE 7.4 Lineage Cemeteries: Mortuary Difference vs. Tomb Size

TABLE 7.7 *Lineage Cemetery Tombs with Anomalously High Numbers of Cowries*

Tomb	Volume (m^3)	Furniture	Waist Pit	Cowries	Ceramic Vessels	Bronze Weapons	Bronze Tools
XQ8M272	9	1	1	350	5	0	1
XQ8M261	4	1	1	263	5	2	0



FIGURE 7.5 Lineage Cemeteries: Vertical Differentiation vs. Mortuary Expenditure

capital. Given that the gift of cowries is the occasion for the casting of commemorative bronze vessels, it raises the question of why this economic capital[16] was not turned into symbolic capital in the form of ritual vessels. One tantalizing possibility is that sumptuary rules prevented this transformation of wealth (and perhaps merit) into the social, ritual and symbolic capital of bronze vessels. Based on a wider exploration of tombs with cowries, Tang (2005b) has noted that this phenomenon becomes more frequent in Anyang

[16] In saying this I am claiming that cowries likely functioned as units of exchange even if they were not "money" in the fully abstract, arbitrary modern sense as Li (2003a) has argued.

phase IV, when larger numbers of cowries begin to appear more frequently in tombs, and while M261 and M272 are the most extreme examples, there are other small tombs with relatively large numbers of cowries. Cowries, then, tend to cut across vertical distinction as often as they support it – an alternative form of ancestral investment chosen by, or forced upon a small portion of the population with access to one form of mortuary capital, but apparently not others.[17]

If aggregate variables – whether combining z-scores of variables strongly correlated with tomb volume, or weighted values of all tomb features and artifacts – show a general graded distinction from relatively small, poor tombs to relatively large rich tombs, this does not mean that there was no variability in the expenditure of mortuary capital between tombs with similar positions along the tomb size / aggregate mortuary capital regression lines. We have already suggested that sumptuary laws may have limited the ability of some individuals to furnish the tombs of their dead with certain forms of mortuary capital. Some authors (e.g. Liu 2003, Tang 2004) have suggested possible methods of ranking Anyang tombs in terms of assemblages. Some sumptuary suggestions that have been made involve sets of bronze *gu* and *jue* vessels, *nao*-bells, *yue*-axes (Tang 2004), and bronze weapon sets (Liu 2003). Adding chariot equipment, death attendants and human sacrifices, tomb ramps, tomb furniture, and jade and bronze vessel assemblages to these possible candidates, I have tabulated the data for a dozen unlooted tombs with some or all of these more or less elite forms of mortuary capital (Table 7.8).

Tang (2004) demonstrates a strong correlation between tomb size and *yue*-axes, *nao*-bells and *jue* and *gu* pairs in tombs that have those artifacts. On the other hand, there are tombs with no *yue*-axes or *nao*-bells, but which have many pairs of *gu* and *jue*, and bronzes in general. One possible explanation for this variation is gender: Tang (2004) shows that tombs where the principal occupant has been sexed female rarely contain bronze weapons (Fu Hao being an exception, and even then has proportionately fewer weapons than other elite unlooted tombs such as M54). These patterns may also be due to other, non-gendered role distinctions (e.g. military/non-military)[18] or some

[17] The alternative explanation of difference in mortuary custom between burial grounds can be ruled out by the fact that this phenomenon does not appear to be limited to a single cemetery (Tang 2005b). Despite the increase in occurrence of this phenomenon in phase IV, the centrality of bronze vessel sets does not disappear in phase IV, indeed, there is an increase in the use of lead and imitation bronze vessels made of ceramics.

[18] Note that tombs with *yue*-axes also tend to have more weapons in general and most have chariot equipment, while most of the tombs without *yue*-axes do not.

TABLE 7.8 *Mortuary Grades and Variability in Elite Tombs*

Tomb	Phase	Vol	Fur	BYue-axe	BNao-bell	BGu + Bjue	D Attn	Hum Sac	B ves	B weap	Chrt Eqmt	Jad
XTM5	II	168	2	4	5	40	12	4	200	142	Yes	381
GJZM160	III	77	2	3	3	10	4	0	39	321	yes	32
XTM18	II	54	2	0	0	5	4	0	23	10	no	12
8386LJZM9	IV	36	2	0	0	3	1	0	16	16	yes	16
XQM907	IV	35	2	0	0	1	1	0	7	3	no	0
84AWBM259[a]	II	25	2	1	0	0	2	14	4	4	no	0
XQM613	II	24	2	0	0	1	0	0	4	13	no	2
QJZM269	III	23	2	2	3	3	0	0	20	30	yes	6
XQM1713	IV	23	2	2	0	2	0	0	17	69	no	2
95GJZM26	II	20	2	1	3	2	2	0	22	25	yes	2
WGCBM1	?	?[b]	2	0	0	2	2	4	8	7	no	0
GJZM50	IV	17	2	0	0	1	0	0	6	14	no	3
XQ8M279	IV	15	2	0	0	1	0	0	4	7	no	4

Vol = volume in m^3; Fur = tomb furniture (coffins, tomb chamber, etc.); BYue-axe = bronze *yue*-axe; BNao-bell = bronze *nao*-bell; BGu+BJue = bronze *gu*-goblet and bronze *jue*-vessel; D Attn = death attendant; Hum Sac = human sacrifice; Bves = bronze vessels; Bweap = bronze weapons; Chrt Eqmt = chariot equipment; Jad = jade artifacts

[a] This tomb was partially looted.

[b] The area of this tomb however, is 7.5 m^2, placing it between 95GJZM26 and GJZM50.

other factor. Nevertheless, given the robust pattern of co-occurring, and ever larger sets of *yue*-axes, *nao*-bells, and *gu* and *jue* pairs, some sort of sumptuary grades appear to be in play – something known from the Western and Eastern Zhou periods (though using different markers of status), and prescribed in later ritual texts.[19] If the presence of some categories of grave goods or tomb features (such as ramps) appear to be more or less rigidly ranked, others, such as death attendants, human sacrifices, or bronze weapons,[20] vessels and jades, seem less so (or less obviously so) even while being relatively strongly correlated with tomb size.

If there appear to be sumptuary rules governing the use of some forms of mortuary capital, in addition to variable mortuary investment within tombs of the same class, an obvious question concerns how rigid the restrictions on certain forms of mortuary capital where, and how far down the pyramid of mortuary distinction they extend. To explore this issue, three measures were tabulated for a variety of forms of mortuary capital (see Table 7.9). The results show that human sacrifices, chariot burials (usually in separate burial pits), and single ramps were features that generally occur in tombs in the 70–200 m^3 range.[21] At the same time, while human sacrifice (rarely) appears in relatively small tombs, yet only becomes frequent in tombs at the upper end of this range (two-ramped tombs), burials with a single tomb ramp occur only within a more narrow range of burial size, and are the norm for that size-class. The next mortuary class seems to be characterized by the possible inclusion of *nao*-bells, death attendants, wooden tomb chambers, bronze *yue*-axes, and two or three sets of *gu* and *jue*. Nevertheless, while *nao*-bells occur in tombs no smaller than 20 m^3, bronze *yue*-axes can occur in tombs as small as 3 m^3 and while death attendants only occur in the majority of burials over 25 m^3, wooden chambers become more likely than not in tombs as small as 15 m^3 and up. These facts suggest that although we could devise a

[19] Not that prescriptive texts such as the Li Ji 禮記, Zhou Li 周禮 or Yi Li 儀禮 necessarily accurately reflect earlier practices as Li (1999) notes for the Western Zhou Tian Ma 天马 cemetery, but mortuary sumptuary codes of some kind do nonetheless appear to have been an ancient practice.

[20] Aside from the above noted ranking according to *yue*-axes, Liu (2003)'s argument that tombs can be ranked according to weapon is only crudely accurate. While if one selects a number of tombs with weapons, one can come up with a ranking system based on their count, without correlating weapons to other tomb variables, nothing more can be accomplished other than noting that some tombs have more weapons than others. As it turns out, there is a correlation between tomb size and weapons, but as we saw in Table 7.6 there is still considerable variability.

[21] In the context of lineage cemeteries this would correspond to lineage leaders and other high elites.

TABLE 7.9 *Sumptuary Rules: Tomb Size and Mortuary Capital*

	Smallest Tomb Size[a] (m^3)	Mean Tomb Size with Minimum Number[b] (m^3)	Tomb Size Where > 50% Have Mortuary Capital[c] (m^3)
Human Sacrifices	~20	71 (4–14)	120
Chariot Sacrifice	77	?	?
One Ramp	68	80	68
Bronze *Nao*-Bells	20	36 (3)	?
Death Attendants	7	27 (1)	25
Outer Coffins/ Wooden Chambers	6	27	15
Bronze *Yue*-Axes	3	15 (1)	?
Bronze Vessels	2	11 (1–2)	12
Bronze Weapons	1	5 (1)	8
Jades	1	7 (1)	15

[a] This is the smallest tomb that has at least one of the things in question.

[b] This is the mean size of all the tombs in the sample with the minimum number of grave goods/sacrifices/elaborations. The number in brackets is the minimum number. Thus the smallest number of human sacrifices in the lower end of tombs sizes that had them was between four and fourteen. Bronze *nao*-bells only appeared in sets, the smallest of which were sets of three.

[c] This is a measure of the tomb size at which the mortuary capital in question is more likely to be present than not. Note that this measure is only effective for those types of mortuary capital that become ubiquitous at certain tomb sizes. As seen in Table 7.9, bronze *yue*-axes and *nao*-bells do not occur in all tombs where one would expect them if their presence was simply a function of tomb or bronze assemblage size.

rough tripartite tomb class division based on Table 7.9, most of the mortuary capital in it, especially the last three items (bronze vessels, bronze weapons, and jades) show a large range of variation in terms of the size of the tombs in which they can occur. These facts argue against rigid sumptuary rules for the majority of forms of mortuary capital shown here, or at least the existence of many exceptions and distinctions that cross-cut these categories (such as gender, type of status,[22] merit and changing fortunes of the

[22] Thus, while weapons are correlated with tomb size and richness, not all large rich tombs have them or have them in equal abundance. While from the oracle-bone inscriptions it

lineage,[23] etc.). It may also be that while certain categories of mortuary capital where more or less strictly controlled by sumptuary rules (bronze vessel sets, elaborations in tomb furniture, *yue*-axes, *nao*-bells, ritual jades, human sacrifices and tomb ramps), other forms of mortuary capital show more range of variation (death companions (human or canine), cowry shells, tools and ornaments, numbers of weapons, ceramic vessels, etc.).

Now that we have explored the issues of variation in the expression of mortuary status, and the relative sensitivity of certain categories of burial elaboration to tomb size, it would be interesting to return to the overall shape of mortuary distinction in the lineage cemeteries at Anyang. Figure 7.6 shows all of the unlooted tombs in the lineage cemetery sample with TOTVAL score less than 200.[24]

These tombs have been divided into five groups or classes and descriptive statistics were calculated (see Appendix C, Tables C.8–C.12). Looking at these tables, the poorer classes of tombs appear to have not only less elaborate mortuary treatment or common versions of elite grave goods but also fragments of elite mortuary assemblages,[25] which are, in turn, characterized by the complete representation of all major classes of artifacts, in addition to greater quantity and quality of mortuary offerings. If the dead were housed and equipped for an existence analogous to that of their lives, it would appear that elites at least symbolically owned the complete resources of a large household, from weapons, tools and servants, to feasting and ritual paraphernalia. Smaller tombs, on the other hand, were equipped with less and less complete assemblages, and forms of capital of declining economic and symbolic value, depending on their place within the mortuary hierarchy. This progression can be clearly seen in Table 7.10.

looks as though the high elites were generally military agents and the increasing common placement of weapons in larger tombs seems to at least symbolically verify this. As noted above, there do seem to be at least moderately rich burials with few weapons.

[23] By this I mean to foreground the fact that the dead do not bury themselves and the rank or honor of the deceased while living is only one part of the equation of mortuary distinction. While I have argued above for the intense importance of ancestral creation and thus unlikelihood of the living failing to spend what rank and honor should decree for a dead kinsman, there are no doubt cases where it happened, as well as cases where, for whatever reason, the surviving kinsmen where not able to amass the resources to give the dead their proper due.

[24] In other words, excluding the three tombs at the top of the scale.

[25] An example of this is XQM303. It is 8 m^3 in volume, has an outer coffin/tomb chamber as well as a coffin, six ceramic vessels and nothing else. Another example is XQM782. It is 2 m^3 in volume with a waist pit, one cowry shell, two jade handle-shaped objects and no other grave goods. In the first case, we would expect more grave goods in a larger tomb with an outer coffin/tomb chamber and in the second, we would not expect to find two jade handle-shaped objects in such a small and otherwise poorly equipped tomb.



FIGURE 7.6 Classes of Mortuary Expenditure

In this table we can see that roughly 80 percent of the tombs fall into the class 2 and 3 categories with a mean volume between 3 and 7 m^3, a single coffin, a few ceramic vessels and cowries, frequently with waist pits and dog sacrifices, and sometimes weapons and tools. The remaining 20 percent of the mortuary population in the lineage cemeteries was almost equally divided between the richest and poorest burials. The bottom 10 percent were characterized by small rectangular pits just large enough for a body, occasionally with a coffin, possibly a cowry shell or two, and perhaps a ceramic vessel. The top 10 percent, on the other hand, were buried with increasingly complete assemblages with ever-greater quantities and qualities of grave goods and features.

When we consider the issue of representativeness (of the cemeteries in question – not necessarily the population as a whole), however, it must be recalled that the largest of the tombs are mostly looted, meaning that the sample of unlooted tombs has a bias toward smaller tombs. Plotting a histogram of tomb sizes for the entire sample and another for the unlooted

TABLE 7.10 *Mean Values for Mortuary Variables across Tomb Classes*

Tomb Class	1	2	3	4	5
TOTVAL range	TOTVAL: 0–5	5–20	20–50	50–100	100–200
Mean TOTVAL	3.13	11.7	32.92	66.83	132.48
Volume	1.67	3.73	6.32	10.53	21.09
Furniture	0.32	0.93	1.01	1.16	2
Waistpit	0	0.38	0.76	0.93	1
Cowries	0.24	1.18	2.77	4.47	5.45
Common Ornament	0	0.02	0.05	0.19	1.18
Ceramic Vessel	0.27	2.1	2.66	3.97	5
Common Tool	0	0.02	0.1	0.5	0.55
Common Weapon	0	0.03	0.15	1.40	4.41
Bronze Weapon	0	0.06	0.3	1.71	5.33
Bronze Tool	0	0.02	0.1	0.2	1
Bronze Vessel	0	0	0.05	1.23	4
Jade Ornament	0	0.06	0.18	0.83	1.36
Jade Ritual	0	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.45
Jade Weapon	0	0	0.02	0.11	0.55
Death Attendant	0	0	0	0.01	0.36
Dog Sacrifice	0	0	0.85	1.41	1.64
Total Tombs	98 (10.9%)	408 (45.6%)	305 (34.1%)	70 (7.8%)	11 (1.2%)
Cumulative Percent	10.9%	56.5%	90.6%	98.4%	99.6%

sample (Figures 7.7 and 7.8) it is easy to see that large tombs are proportionately under-represented in the unlooted sample.

However, because there is no direct way of calculating aggregate mortuary capital for looted tombs, I have used the proxy of tomb size (which, as we saw is very strongly correlated with aggregate mortuary distinction) to estimate the relative numbers of tombs in each class (see Table 7.11). Based on these results, it appears that classes 4 and 5 in our unlooted tomb sample are underrepresented by a factor of two and class 6 (totval >200) by



FIGURE 7.7 Lineage Cemeteries: Tomb Volume – Total Sample



FIGURE 7.8 Lineage Cemeteries: Tomb Volume – Unlooted Tombs

TABLE 7.11 *Estimate of Total Lineage Cemetery Tombs in Mortuary Capital Classes*

Class	4: (7.8%)[a]	5: (1.2%)	6: (0.4%)
Volume[b]	8–15 m^3	16–40 m^3	< 40 m^3
	Mean 10.45	Mean 20.68	
Total Sample (n=1364)	297 (21.8%)	63 (4.6%)	14 (1%)
Tombs with TOTVAL (n=896)[c]	106 (11.8%)	20 (2.2%)	1 (0.1%)

[a] These percentages were calculated for the sample of unlooted tombs.
[b] The tomb volume ranges were chosen with reference to the mean tomb size for each value class in the unlooted sample.
[c] This row shows the count and percentage of cases of tombs of the given size range in the unlooted tomb sample. This shows that there is some discrepancy between the proxy measure of value utilizing tomb size and the direct calculation of aggregate mortuary capital.

a factor of 10. A more accurate estimate of lineage cemetery distribution of wealth would thus be classes 1–3: 81.5 percent; 4: 15 percent; 5: 2.5 percent, 6: 1 percent.

Although we have been exploring an abstract measure of Shang mortuary distinction rather than actual value (whether in terms of labor, scarcity or market price), we can nevertheless approximate the distribution of mortuary capital in the crucial arena of Shang ancestor construction. Looking at total distribution of mortuary wealth within lineage cemeteries, if we take GJZM160 to be the tomb of a lineage leader and to represent the richest tomb class in the lineage cemeteries, and then compare its TOTVAL score to the poorest, we get a ratio of about 1:500. Bastomsky (1990), calculating ratios of wealth for Victorian England and Imperial Rome, between the poor, the wealthy and the super-rich, came up with the following, Victorian England 1:24: 6,000, and Imperial Rome 1:714: 17,142. This means that the disparity of (at least mortuary) wealth between the poorest and richest classes of the lineage cemeteries was comparable to that between the rich and the poor in early Imperial Rome, and was an order of magnitude greater than that of Victorian England.[26] Looking at a measure of the total distribution of wealth in the lineage cemeteries by calculating

[26] On the other hand, the difference between the mortuary investment of a lineage leader and an ordinary clansman (roughly ¾ of the mortuary population) was between 1:134 (class 2) and 1:48 (class 3), still greater than the gap between the wealthy and poor in Victorian times.

the percentage owned by the top 1 percent, we arrive at a TOTVAL score of 31, 520 for the entire sample minus tomb GJZM160. Multiplying GJZM160's mortuary capital score by nine[27] we get 14, 976 for a combined total of 46,496 of which the top 1 percent owns approximately 32 percent of the mortuary capital – roughly comparable to the distribution of wealth in the modern US.[28] This, however, is only the lineage cemeteries. What of the royal tombs? Naturally, while any attempt to estimate the wealth of looted tombs is an exercise in speculation, we nevertheless have already plotted a regression with a very good fit between mortuary investment and tomb size based on the largest unlooted tombs, from which the mean mortuary capital expenditures for the largest tombs could be extrapolated. As we can see from Figure 7.9, if the assumptions of this exercise are correct, then the relative wealth of the royal tombs would have been astronomical.

In order to translate these results into ratios of mortuary inequality and percentage of the total wealth, we must first estimate the size of the original mortuary population at Anyang, and the numbers of tombs in each size class. As of 2007 over 10,000 tombs had been excavated at Anyang, from approximately 10–15 percent of the total site.[29] Assuming that some tombs have been completely destroyed by later activity or natural processes, we might assume the 10,000 tombs represent only about 10 percent of what was originally there, meaning that there were some 100,000 tombs spread over the 30 km^2 of the Anyang site. According to Tang (2004), nine tombs with four ramps,[30] 11 with two ramps, and nineteen with single ramps have been discovered. All of the four-ramped tombs were in the royal cemetery, as were three of the two-ramped tombs and two of the single-ramped tombs. Hougang 后冈, which seems to be more than a regular lineage cemetery (Tang 2004), contained five two-ramped tombs and one single-ramped tomb. The remainder, four two-ramped and sixteen single-ramped tombs, were found in regular lineage cemeteries. If we assume that the exceptional, royal and high elite cemeteries have all been found and the remaining 90 percent consists of lineage cemeteries, then we can estimate that there were probably originally around 160 single

[27] This is to account for the looting of the largest tombs in the lineage cemeteries. We are conservatively assuming that they were no richer than M160, but based on size of some of the looted ramped lineage tombs and the correlation between tomb size and mortuary distinction, it is likely that they were in fact richer.

[28] In 1998, the richest 1 percent of the population in United States owned 38 percent of its total wealth.

[29] Tang Jigen, February 1, 2007 personal communication.

[30] One of these was unfinished and so technically speaking doesn't have four ramps.



FIGURE 7.9 Estimated Mortuary Expenditure for the Largest Tombs

ramped tombs, 40–50 two-ramped tombs and 9 four-ramped tombs. If we assume that the larger tombs are less likely to be completely obliterated by later activities than smaller tombs and use the more conservative 15 percent excavation figure, we would still have about 110 single-ramped tombs and 35 double-ramped tombs. According to Tang (2004) the mean volume of the single-ramped tombs was 80 m^3, the two-ramped tombs 290 m^3, and the four-ramped 2525 m^3 (in all cases excluding the volume of the ramps). In terms of percentages of total tombs, the four-ramped tombs were approximately 0.01 percent of the mortuary total, the two-ramped tombs 0.05–0.04 percent, and the single-ramped tombs 0.16–0.11 percent of the total. Collectively the ramped tombs would have accounted for 0.22–0.15 percent of the mortuary total. If we are correct in our estimates above concerning lineage cemeteries, and tombs over 40 m^3 account for 1 percent of the mortuary population, the remaining 0.8 percent would be comprised of large rectangular tombs. Calculating the aggregate mortuary expenditure for the poorer 99 percent of the mortuary population, the mean TOTVAL (vol < 40 m^3) = 24.8 x 99,000 = 2,455,200. Recalculating aggregate mortuary capital of the top 1 percent and accounting for the

estimates for the looted tombs, we get a mean of 638.3 TOTVAL for rectangular tombs 35–100 m^3 (using the large tombs sample), multiplied by their estimated number of 846 for a score of 540,001 for large rectangular tombs (vol > 40 m^3). The single-ramped tombs, using the mean of M160 and M5, give an estimated mean TOTVAL score of 6574.3 multiplied by the conservative estimate of their total number at Anyang (110) yields 723,173. Using the regression in Figures 7.3 and 7.9, the mean TOTVAL score for two-ramped tombs should be around 50,000, multiplied by the conservative estimate of thirty-five two-ramped tombs yields 1,750,000. The four-ramped tombs on the other hand, by Figure 7.9, ought to have had TOTVAL scores in the range of 2–5 million each. Taking 3.5 million as the mean and multiplying by 9 we get 22,500,000. Adding these scores together, the total estimated mortuary capital yields 27,968,374 of which the top 1 percent accounts for 91 percent. Returning to our ratio of poor to wealthy to super-rich, if we use the estimations of royal burial wealth for the super-rich, we get ratios of 1:502:798,722 which are almost two orders of magnitude greater than the disparity between the poorest and the super-rich in Imperial Rome. However, since the Roman Emperors' wealth was not included in Bastomsky's (1990) calculation, perhaps a two-ramped tomb would be a fairer comparison to the Roman super-rich. In this case, we get a ratio of 1:502:15,974 which is roughly comparable to the ratio for Imperial Rome 1:714:17,142. In any case, if the lineage cemeteries display inequality of mortuary distinction similar to the disparity of wealth between the rich and poor in Imperial Rome, and the percentage of the overall wealth owned by the top 1 percent was similar to the modern US, the difference between common lineage member and the Shang kings was truly astronomical. While it could be argued that a comparison of an abstract measure of Shang mortuary distinction and real wealth in historical societies is like comparing apples and oranges, as we will argue below, the massive inequality displayed in the Shang mortuary arena had real social consequences.

For now, however, let us turn to the issue of developments in mortuary practices over the course of the Great Settlement Shang's existence. Given the changes in Anyang period sacrificial and divinatory practice outlined in Chapter 6, an obvious question is whether and how the mortuary phenomena discussed above changed over the course of the period. In a recent, important article, (He (2006a) has argued that Shang Anyang burial practices underwent a process of "*mingqihua*" 冥器化, whereby burial goods for the dead were increasingly differentiated from objects used by the living by their small size, poor quality or replacement with look-alike

TABLE 7.12 *Comparison of Tomb Sizes over Time (Yinxu II–IV)*

Phase	<4 m³	4–8 m³	8–15 m³	16–40 m³	> 40 m³	Total
II	54 (44.3%)	41 (33.6%)	23 (18.9%)	3 (2.5%)	1 (0.8%)	122
III	114 (41.9%)	95 (34.9%)	49 (18.0%)	12 (4.4%)	2 (0.7%)	272
IV	194 (36.3%)	193 (36.1%)	113 (21.1%)	25 (4.6%)	10 (1.9%)	535

artifacts made from less expensive materials. Examples include *gu* and *jue* ceramic drinking sets that began as regular-sized utilitarian objects in phase I, and became crudely made, doll-sized vessels by phase IV; bronze vessels and weapons with increasingly higher quantities of lead;[31] and imitation bronze vessels made of ceramics. Interestingly, He (2006a: 376) notes that this process of differentiating (and economizing) the artifacts buried with the dead first becomes pronounced in phase III, and reaches its peak in phase IV, essentially coeval with the increasing systematization of royal ritual and divination.[32] Moreover, while He (2006a) describes Shang Anyang mortuary change in terms of changes in the quality and form of ceramic and bronze artifacts, there are other, perhaps related, trends in mortuary practice (see also Jiang 2011). Returning to our conclusion in Chapter 3, there appears to have been a series of interrelated changes in burial practice manifested in a gradual increase in tombs without grave goods, or with ceramics as the main grave goods, and a drop in tombs with bronze artifacts (dramatic in phase IV). At the same time, ramped tombs begin to appear in the lineage cemeteries, especially in period IV – at first glance suggesting a simultaneous increase in the number of poor tombs and elaboration in the richest tombs. Nevertheless, a comparison of the distribution of tomb sizes in each phase (Table 7.12) suggests that there was an overall trend toward increasing tomb size over time.

These facts, taken together, would suggest that there were countervailing developments in Anyang burials with slight overall increases in tomb size at the same time as mean decreases in tomb-internal elaborations, and

[31] He (2006a) also lists poor casting and finishing, as well as thinness of vessel walls and lack of proper vessel proportions as indicators of *mingqihua*. There are some instances of pure lead vessels and weapons as well such as the phase IV tomb XQ3M607 that had a lead *ding*-cauldron and a lead *gui*-vessel (Anyang Team 1979b).

[32] In fact, He (2006a) notes that there are already differences between ceramic daily use and mortuary *gu* and *jue* during Anyang phases I and II but notes that they still retain a strong utilitarian character. Likewise some thin, high lead, non-utilitarian bronze weapons also begin to appear in phase I and II tombs.

increasing differentiation of status (Jiang 2011). Given He's (2006a) argument concerning the miniaturization and reduction of ceramic and bronze mortuary artifacts, the small mean increase in total mortuary capital actually masks a large decrease in the resources invested in mortuary practice. If the Anyang social economy of burial became more symbolic than economic over time, then the increase in ramped tombs fits well into this scenario.[33] The rise in cases of otherwise poor tombs with large numbers of cowries (Tang 2005a) noted above fits into this trend of increasingly symbolic status differentiation reflecting stiffening sumptuary regulation and preventing the conversion of cowry shells into more prestigious mortuary capital, such as bronze vessels. The total story, then, appears to be one of increasingly systematized and ascribed mortuary practice. Moreover, this movement toward more rigidly symbolic forms of status differentiation reduced the necessity for distinction through expenditure, just as the systematization of royal ritual was also accompanied by a reduction in the scale of sacrifice (see Chapter 6). Again, as with the routinization and economization of resources expended in royal ritual, rather than seeing these developments as movements away from superstition and toward rational skepticism (e.g. Keightely 1978b, He 2006a), it would be more historical to see them as adhering to the same cultural logic of hierarchically structured mortuary treatment reflective of, if anything, an even more inegalitarian distribution of capital,[34] feeding an even more immutable disparity of being.

Gods and Insects

The monumentally inegalitarian distribution of mortuary wealth on display at the Great Settlement Shang was not simply a disparity in the relative ability to obtain scarce goods and resources, it also signaled great inequality in access to honor and place, to power and to worth. As mentioned above, Shang mortuary ritual was at once a contested field of symbolic status, a site of mourning, of commemoration and filial piety, and a crucial techno-social complex in the ancestral-ritual pacification of the world. Moreover, Shang mortuary ritual was also concerned with the status and type of existence the living could expect for themselves after death. For some,

[33] Tomb ramps were, after all, highly visible stages for mortuary ritual that were relatively inexpensive to build in relation to their symbolic status.

[34] Although this capital became more symbolic than economic, it nonetheless distinguished real differences in ancestral status and thus the opportunity for mortuary construction of intergenerational place and well-being.

like the kings and high elites, death meant apotheosis, while for others, consignment to the midden or sacrificial pit and ancestral oblivion. For a majority of the adult population, however, (at least as reflected in the mortuary population recovered) there was the hope for burial within their lineage cemetery, properly equipped for the next existence among their kin, sustained by the sacrifices of succeeding generations, their place in death determined by genealogical position, acquired merit, and the status of their descendants. Just as with war and sacrifice, in so far as the king acted as lineage leader of the world – binding the people to him through bonds of actual or fictitious kinship, and direct and indirect networks of obligation and dependency – the majority participated, at least indirectly, in the glory of the dynasty, and benefited from the proper burial and domestication of the potent royal dead. An analogous, but more immediate relationship would have pertained between ordinary lineage members and lineage leaders. In a sense, then, the channeling of lineage resources disproportionately into the burials of, and sacrifices to, lineage leaders was not entirely an exercise in the alienation of wealth, but rather one of graded participation, as the lineage leaders in death became ancestors of the entire lineage. The effect of this social economy of ancestral position, however, with its

FIGURE 7.10 Headless Sacrificial Victims in the Southern Ramp of M1001 (after Institute of Archaeology 1994: plate 10, 3)



FIGURE 7.11 Chariot and Charioteers (GJZM52) (after Institute of Archaeology 1998: plate 16)

structured focus of material, social and symbolic capital, was to create a radically inegalitarian hierarchy of being.

Nowhere is this graded structuring of "human" being more clearly illustrated than in the use of human forms of capital in mortuary ritual – whether as death attendants or human sacrifice. On the one hand, while the social meaning and moral economy of violence that supported Shang Anyang human sacrifice has already been discussed in Chapter 6, the distribution of this form of mortuary capital suggests that the spoils of war by and large pertained to the King and a small circle of high elites – demarcating a higher order of exulted and terrible being. Death attendants on the other hand, are the most extreme instantiation of the bonds of obligation in Shang society – for one's death and place in death to be so totally tied to another being is surely an instantiation of extreme dependency (whether figured as transcendent loyalty or the crushing burden of duty). While a

FIGURE 7.12 Death Attendants and Sacrificial Victims in Elite Two-Ramped Tomb (50WGM1) (after Institute of Archaeology 1994: plate 12)

place in the entourage of an exalted ancestor may have been a better choice than the obscurity of a low-status burial, and though many death attendants may have made willing, even joyous self-sacrifices, the practice is nonetheless a stark testament to the fixity of social place with relationships of kinship, dependency and patronage determining life, death and afterlife.

If the sacrifice of war captives operated under the dual logics of pacification, reduction, and consumption, along with trophy taking, and triumphal validation of the royal world order, the killing and interment of servants and dependents in the tombs of their patrons displays – in its total subordination of being – a disparity of social and symbolic capital made existentially

tangible. While the former case demonstrates at once an extra-community moral order of being and caring, and, through the channeling of human sacrificial capital into the symbolic coffers of the king – an unequal division of the spoils of the negative dialectic of violence, death attendants display a community-internal, inegalitarian structuring of the "flow of gifts" that included human life (Figures 7.10–7.12). The elite were, thus, not simply due to a disproportionate share of the common wealth – to relations of economic dominance disguised as reciprocity – but also to unequal claims on the lives and deaths of those of lesser worth. Seen in this light, the awesome difference on display in the distribution of mortuary capital at the Great Settlement Shang instantiates – in one crucial social field – a cohesive, but monumentally hierarchical, structuring of being – of gods and insects.

CHAPTER 8

Technologies of Pacification and the World of the Great Settlement Shang

I have argued that the understanding of the Shang laid out by its two preeminent Western authorities, K.C. Chang and David Keightley drew on problematic historical and anthropological assumptions. Previous studies of the Shang, while generally asserting the central role of "religion" in the constitution of political power (whether understood as shamanism, ancestor worship or something else), failed to explain how exactly "religion" produced authority (beyond vague claims of royal monopoly), shaped *habitus*, or was figured in social practice. Specifically, K.C. Chang characterized the Shang as a shamanistic "civilization of continuity," developing along a different path from the civilizations of the Near East, with the "initial concentration of resources (civilization) … accomplished by political means (the state society), and not by advanced technology" (Chang 1983: 124).[1] Moreover, a key to this political means, in addition to genealogical place and military force, was "*exclusive* access to heaven and heavenly spirits" (italics added, Chang 1983: 107). In Shang China then, civilization was said to be the product of political reorganization rather than

[1] While bronze casting is obviously an example of advanced technology (of which Chang himself takes note), Chang's point is that this technology was not put to use in the intensification of production. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the hypothesis that the Shang saw no agricultural or more general economic intensification is not accurate, and in any case information on the Shang economy is exceedingly sparse. I also view the rigid distinction between economic and politico-religious uses of technology as problematic. Given that bronze vessels carried a great value as symbolic capital (not to mention the expense of their production), it is hard to agree that the concentration of wealth (of which bronze vessels are such a conspicuous example) had nothing to do with advanced technology (of which bronze vessels are again such a conspicuous example). From an inter-emic point of view, the resources and knowledge invested in bronze casting was, in fact, investment in both socio-political status and, through their role in ancestral ritual, the well-being of the community.

increased productivity, or the taming of nature through technology. A key basis of political authority, in turn, was the King's monopoly of the sacred (seen as shamanistic mediation of heaven and earth). In this scheme, the non-elite majority apparently participated in this political order only passively with religious, political and military resources all exclusively in the hands of the high elites.

David Keightley, for his part, saw in Shang civilization, a religious, yet rational, "this worldly" orientation; a bureaucratic mentality presaging that of later imperial institutions, and instantiated in the contemporaneous "proto-bureaucracy" of the Shang kings' "patrimonial theocracy" (Keightley 1978b, 1999a, 2000). The Shang king's authority was based significantly on his "*unique* relationship to the ancestors" (italics added) and his role as lineage leader among lineage leaders (Keightely 1999a). The religious, political and social importance of kinship moreover, made the Shang polity something less than a state for Keightley, despite its "proto-bureaucratic" mentality. What was left unexplored in this very Weberian understanding of the Shang polity is the articulation between belief systems or ideologies and socio-political structures. While the former are figured as "mentalities" and presumed to globally shape the latter,[2] the scope and mechanisms for the mutual shaping of world-views and social-political institutions is left as an unexamined feature of the theoretical model, even as terms such as "chiefdom," "state," "kinship," "bureaucracy," and "rationality" are invoked but never unpacked.

Addressing the issue of the relationships between socio-political forms and discursive orders or world-views, I advocated an "inter-ontic" approach to translocal investigations based on a socio-phenomenological and relational ontological revision of the staple anthropological distinction between emic and etic. This amounts to, on the one hand, recognizing the epistemological and ontological ground of the investigator as an element of translocal perception, and, on the other, an understanding of local worlds in terms both of local ontologies and their material and social conditions. These include both the socio-physical collectives of objects and techniques through which humans constitute their worlds, and their hierarchies of being and moral economies of worth and opportunity, which, in turn, locally construct the category of "human."

[2] The problem with mentalities as historical explanation is the tendency of those invoking them to slide into extreme essentialism and to set up "mentality" as a kind of ahistorical, ur-explanation that, while influencing the shape of social and political forms, is nevertheless immune to their development (e.g. Keightley 1987).

Exploring recent trends in the archaeology of archaic states/ early civilizations, I found that despite the recent consensus in favor of substantive explorations of the constitution of early polities, and against typological debate, much of this discussion is still framed in rigid typological terms and based on functionalist assumptions. Thus, if it is no longer popular to debate whether a given early complex polity is a chiefdom or a state, the literature is nevertheless full of discussions concerning "city-states" and "territorial states," whether one or the other category exists at all, their role in social evolution, and into which bracket a given polity ought to be placed. Although anthropological discussion of the Shang polity has been predictably cast in these terms, I argued that an attempt to understand the bases of Shang social-political power, and the networks of practice and capital that supported them, would be more productive than any exercise in typological shoe-horning. To this end, Yoffee's (2005) discussion of the importance of urban sites as social-political crucibles, and Baines and Yoffee's (1998) notion of civilizations as wider cultural spheres in which polities are embedded, were taken up as potentially useful ideas. Indeed, the entire city-state/ territorial state debate could be seen in terms of rigid and dichotomously typological understandings of the possible relationships between civilizational spheres, polities and population centers.

Building on this approach, prominent interpretations of Chinese Bronze Age archaeology were critically reviewed both from the standpoint of their interpretation of material culture, and their accuracy, in light of recent (and not so recent) work done in China. Beginning with Liu and Chen (2003), I argued that their narrative of Early Chinese Bronze Age states as expansive, highly organized and centralized resource-extraction organizations (the Exxon model), linking a passive periphery to their main production center (Erlitou then Zhengzhou) through secondary processing centers and bonds of tributary dependency, was problematic not only for its political-evolutionary assumptions, but also for its equation of material cultural distribution with political boundaries. In terms of diachronic narrative, while admitting that the textual evidence from Anyang suggests a more decentralized political landscape than they proposed for Erlitou and Zhengzhou, Liu and Chen (2003) saw Zhengzhou as representing a developmental zenith before the instability of the Middle Shang and the partial restitution of Zhengzhou's glory in the polity at Anyang.

Bagley (1999) on the other hand, provided a material cultural history entirely from the perspective of bronze casting, yielding a fresh, but ultimately limited culture history, which, in the end, succumbed to conflations of technological development (specifically bronze-casting), social complexity,

and political relevance. Like Liu and Chen (2003), Bagley (1999) saw the Erligang expansion in terms of conquest by a centralized state, which after a brief period of glory fell apart. In this narrative, Anyang, rather than the superpower that Zhou texts made it out to be, was only one of many competing successors to the great Zhengzhou "state."

Taking up a position explicitly against Bagley's (1999), Allan (2007) argued for a Central Plains metropolitan cultural hegemony from Erlitou times onward, seeing no demise of the Erligang horizon. In discussing Allan's material cultural account of the Chinese Bronze Age, I showed how her use of McDonald's franchises in Asia as a model of cultural borrowing in a field of cultural hegemony, while avoiding equations of material cultural and political boundaries, or conflations of bronze-casting ability with cultural and political influence, was nonetheless also problematic, arguing instead that even down steep gradients of power, cultural borrowing or emulation necessarily involves processes of translation, appropriation and reinterpretation.

Moving from critique, I laid out a synopsis of second millennium BCE culture history drawn from more recent archaeological work (Institute of Archaeology 2003, Campbell 2014a) and drew the following major conclusions: from the point of view of polities, civilizations and urban centers, there was (based on current evidence) a single mega-center in the Erlitou period Central Plains, apparently the central node of a large material cultural network of influence, ranging from everyday ceramics to elite drinking vessels (though bronze vessels appear to be much more restricted in distribution). The material cultural landscape was, moreover, complex, with numerous interacting local traditions and centers of economic and cultural production spread over much of what is now North China. Nonetheless, while Erlitou appears to have been the preeminent center of the Central Plains during the Erlitou period, the nature and extent of its political, economic, or military networks remains essentially conjectural.

The Erligang period saw the explosive growth of the unprecedented urban mega-center at Zhengzhou and a continued expansion of a metropolitan material culture largely borrowed from Erlitou and surrounding traditions. At the same time, Zhengzhou was apparently the site of both centripetal and centrifugal cultural flows, with evidence of the mixing of different ceramic traditions both at Zhengzhou itself, and toward the expanding periphery. The Erligang period also saw the building of smaller walled settlements, sharing orientation, building techniques, and, to a large extent, material culture with Zhengzhou. While possibly set up as

outposts or secondary centers of an expansionist Zhengzhou polity, the actual political, economic and military relationships between these centers and Zhengzhou over time are unknown, and, given the technological and logistical limitations of the period, were more likely to have been segmental satellite polities of royal kinsmen or allies like those of Shang Anyang or the Western Zhou than directly administered provinces such as those of the Qin and Han empires.

The Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei period is still something of an enigma with, on the one hand, Central Plains Metropolitan ceramic traditions reaching their greatest spread, distributed from northern Hunan in the south, to Beijing in the north, and from western Shaanxi in the west to Jinan in the east, and, on the other, the demise of the Zhengzhou mega-center. Nevertheless, the rise of another center at Anyang (Huanbei), the scale of this still largely unexcavated walled site, the continued technological development, and expansion of elite traditions such as bronze casting, not to mention the maximum expansion of the metropolitan material cultural horizon, all argue against a general Central Plains Metropolitan collapse.

The Anyang period political landscape was dominated by a metropolitan center that was unrivaled and unprecedented in size or wealth. In fact, based on more recent evidence than either Bagley (1999) or Liu and Chen (2003) had available, it seems the Shang center at Anyang was more than twice the size of the Erligang site at Zhengzhou, and sat at the center of a metropolitan variant more expansive and uniform than any that came before, despite the retraction of the overall distribution of Shang ceramic tradition variants, and the development of non-metropolitan bronze casting traditions on the periphery. These facts suggest that the polity centered at Anyang was, contra Bagley (1999), a contemporaneous superpower, yet it was no proto-Qin empire, nor can its extent simply be determined by the distribution of ceramics sharing similarities with those at Anyang. Also contra Allan (2007), the cultural history of Bronze Age China was not one of monolithic unidirectional influence, or of a passively adopted cultural imperium on the periphery. Instead, I argued both for ongoing processes of ethnogenesis in the metropolitan centers as diverse traditions were centripetally drawn into the urban cultural crucible. Elite material culture, moreover, showed influences from many directions, even while the soft boundaries of ceramic tradition distribution suggested that, whatever the politics of population movements, on a local level, ceramic production (to the extent that distribution was restricted), generally suggested mixture and continued local traditions rather than rapid replacement.

Focusing on the concept of civilization as locally instantiated socio-technic nexuses of normativity, power and hierarchy, the long-term development of war, sacrifice and burial were explored as conspicuous sites of social energy consumption. I argued that the widely held belief that warfare increased over the course of the second millennium BCE is more product of social evolutionary assumption than archaeological fact, and that its proxies – walls, specialized and symbolic weapons, ill-treated remains, etc. – are prevalent, to lesser or greater extent, from at least the third millennium BCE. Unlike warfare and its deep-time symbolic relationship to authority inferable from ceremonial weapons, sacrifice underwent dramatic change between Erlitou and Anyang – both in scale and in kind. Human sacrifice especially – relatively rare in earlier periods – shows such a dramatic increase at Anyang as to mark a new departure. The history of mortuary ritual over the second millennium BCE Central Plains likewise shows increasing elaboration, with an especially marked development at Anyang. Taken together, the ancestral ritual complex of war, sacrifice and burial, while having antecedents in the Central Plains tradition and beyond, reaches a dramatic zenith at Anyang. Each sequential Bronze Age mega-center then, can be seen as its own novel melting pot of socio-political identity and civilization – drawing in and carrying on traditions from beyond and before, but giving the lie to evolutionary and traditional textual narratives of a monolithic Bronze Age or Three Dynasties civilization.

Narrowing in scope from the longue durée of second millennium BCE culture history to the specific workings of the polity at Anyang, Chapter 4 developed an approach to investigating the discursive, practical and material bases of authority, modifying Mann's (1986) networks approach to social power. Outlining the Shang hierarchy of authority, as linking the living, the dead and the unseen forces of the world through the King and his royal ancestors, I discussed the practices of authority that (re)produced this hierarchy and their material bases in terms of networks of capital. For the Anyang polity, these royal practices of authority included sacrifice, divination, war, hunting, gifting, tribute, and the disposal of land and populations. Moreover, the exploration of the material bases of Shang power arrived at the conclusion that the polity centered at Anyang was based on both direct, routine and indirect, sporadic networks of power. These networks, moreover, were not coextensive, giving rise to a gap between the Shang king's discursive claims of universal kingship, and his more limited zone of direct, routine control. Combining the analysis of the Shang polity at Anyang with the culture history given in Chapter 3,

Shang political actors/places were placed on a topographic map showing Shang ceramic tradition distributions. The result of this exercise, and of the case study of the Zhou, both indicated that the relationships between political affiliation, material culture tradition and orientation toward the Shang king's discursive hegemony were much more complicated than is generally recognized. In the end, my sketch of the Anyang political landscape painted a picture of overlapping material, practical and discursive networks forming concentric but mutable spheres of authority – the limited zone of direct royal power, the indirect zone of allies and practically independent subordinates, and the contested zone of the barbarian, the enemy and the rebel against the moral world order of the Shang kings.

Turning to the social bases of Shang practices of authority, the crucial topic of kinship was discussed in Chapter 5. Understanding kinship as a nexus of genealogy, marriage, cohabitation and obligation, I argued that the basic units of Anyang period Shang society were internally and externally hierarchical *zu*-lineages 族; descent-based practical kinship communities of cohabitation, marriage, war, burial and, ultimately, identity. With status in the lineage largely based on genealogical position, ancestor veneration and sacrifice was essentially a performance of the social order, hierarchically linking ordinary members to lineage elites, even as the leaders were linked to the Shang King through analogous bonds of practical kinship and genealogical enactment. These communities of practical kinship, moreover, geographically, politically and genealogically constructed the Shang ancestral landscape. Basic nodes of social, political and religious identity, these communities both united Shang society from commoner to King in genealogical performances of sacrifice, war and burial, and, at the same time, cut across lines of class and power, creating a hierarchical, but segmental, social-political order. Shang kinship then, was both basis and structural limitation of the kings' power, shaping almost every aspect of the discursive, practical and material networks of authority.

Critically borrowing from Elias' (1994) work concerning internal pacification and the transformation of violence attending the civilizing processes, Chapter 6 explored the constituting role of social violence in Shang civilization, particularly in the form of war and sacrifice. From the point of view of internal pacification, warfare and sacrifice can be seen as linked practices of world domestication. Then as now, ontological security was not sought solely against threats of physical violence, but rather, against a whole panoply of material, social and spiritual dangers. Shang warfare then, was simultaneously a project of social, political and spiritual pacification, and a crucible of identity and status in the ancestral landscape.

Participated in by the majority of the population, war was a generalized structuring institution, performing both local and translocal hierarchy in a political landscape of lineage networks and ancestral honor. Moreover, given the dispersion of coercive capital and the segmental nature of Shang authority, warfare, like sacrifice, was a constant, on-going practice of pacification. Anyang period Shang sacrifice (not to mention divination and ritual in general), was, in some ways, inseparable from war, as a complex of techniques of skillful doing and skillful knowing,[3] based on a logic of kinship hierarchy and obligation, and directed toward the pacification of the unseen, the non-human and the otherwise uncontrollable. Also like warfare, the descent group-based, segmental structure of Shang society and the role of ancestor veneration ensured that everyone, or nearly everyone[4] participated in both the local and supra-local social economy of sacrifice.

The practice of sacrifice, moreover, underwent changes in the Anyang period, with a growing systematization and routinization of royal ritual practice coupled with an apparent reduction in sacrificial victims offered (especially human). Rather than see this in terms of a demise of the royal ritual system or a move toward rational secularization, these reforms, through their creation of a stable ritual cycle, structured time with the passage of the King's ritual. The transformation of earlier ad-hoc royal sacrifice into a stable world-regulating institution under the later kings' stewardship more effectively marked off royal ancestor veneration from the ritual of other elites than any earlier monumental royal displays of sacrificial excess. At the same time, but more ambiguously, the practice of war seems to have undergone analogous changes with divinations about ad-hoc, indirect networks of allies becoming rarer, and direct exercises of coercive power involving the king more typical. While some of this may be an artifact of changes in divinatory recording practices, the overall impression, as with sacrifice, is one of a movement from ad-hoc, individualizing, segmental, to systematic, collective, hierarchical organization.

If descent groups formed the basis of Shang society, and the key domesticating practices of warfare and sacrifice operated in a logic of ancestral patronage and obligation, then the transformation of the dangerous dead into potentially helpful ancestors was of utmost importance (Puett 2002). Moreover, if sacrifice was part of this ongoing process of ritual pacification,

[3] Echoing Polanyi's (1958) description of science.

[4] Excluding the socially (ancestrally) disenfranchised such as slaves or captives, who, nevertheless, through the institution of human sacrifice potentially played another role in Shang ancestor veneration.

then burial was the first and perhaps most important step. Nor was the relevance of this fact germane to elites alone. The study of space in Anyang burials showed that structural homologies existed between simpler/poorer and more elaborate/richer burials, suggesting a shared general mortuary ideology and practice. This conclusion is also supported by the general division of Shang society into descent groups – including both rich and poor, exalted and lowly – and the near universal (though extremely hierarchically structured) participation in ancestor veneration. During the course of the Anyang period, and coeval with changes in the royal divinatory and sacrificial system, Anyang burials underwent an economizing shift toward increasingly symbolic expression of mortuary difference seen in the miniaturization of mortuary ceramic vessels, the increasing lead ratio in bronze artifacts, and the appearance of ceramic imitations of ritual bronzes. As with changes in royal ritual, these trends suggest a movement toward increasing structure, with elite/non-elite distinctions expressed more in symbolic than economic terms, in turn suggesting a stable system of ancestral statuses. These distinctions, nevertheless, show a massive disparity in the access to mortuary resources (both symbolic and economic), and thus, the construction of ancestral being. This asymmetry was nowhere more apparent than in the human forms of mortuary capital, displaying, on the one hand, the unequal division of the material and symbolic profits of war, and, on the other, the radical relations of dependency and obligation that embodied Shang hierarchies of being. In ways that our own structured asymmetries of being only mirror in fragmentary and attenuated form, Shang Anyang hierarchies of power, worth and care aligned social, economic, political and spiritual being in a much more unitary economy of power and worth. This radically inegalitarian ontology, in turn, underwrote both a political order and regimes of social violence that profoundly shaped the world of Shang Anyang.

Combining the archaeological and material cultural evidence concerning the Anyang polity, "the Great Settlement Shang" was the latest and largest of a series of urban sites that stood at the center of widely distributed networks of metropolitan material culture. It was also a nexus of resource networks feeding the industry of an unprecedented scale, its palaces, temples and burials the terminus of monumental flows of capital and skilled labor. Home to the royal clan, location of their ancestral temples and royal burials, Anyang was, as Wheatley (1971) argued, the "pivot of the four quarters"; at once sacred resting place of the terrible royal dead, and site of the complex of institutions and technologies dedicated to their world-pacifying ancestral construction. The centripetal pull of

the great settlement, moreover, brought together disparate populations of craftsmen, diviners, leaders and clansmen, forging new identities and social relations in its urban crucible. The Great Settlement was also the stage upon which both Shang cosmological and social hierarchy was performed through graded participation in ancestral sacrifice, war and burial. It was, at the same time, home to innumerable lineages, who along with their dependents, lived, married, sacrificed to their ancestors, marched off to war and were buried with their kin within its 30 km^2 confines.

If Baines and Yoffee's (1998) notion of civilization is that of a shared cultural order in which early polities were embedded, we have complicated this theoretical picture with a discussion of the ways in which discursive orders are reproduced through social practices and supported by networks of capital. The success or failure, reproduction or subversion of ideologies depends on the social economies of practice and capital that support them – elite cultural forms, though not passive reflections of social, political or economic forces, are nonetheless shaped by them. In exploring the intersection of kinship and violence through the key practices of sacrifice, war and burial, I have attempted to uncover keys to understanding Anyang period Shang civilization and its institutional and material bases. Modifying Elias (1994), we might say that Shang civilization was based on an ongoing process of internal pacification, but one which included non-human forces as much as political ones, and one in which violence was not so much banished, as put in the service of civilization. Indeed, following theorists such as Agamben (1998) and Foucault (1995), it might be said that the constitutive role of social violence is basic to all political orders, the issue being rather the forms that violence takes (physical, symbolic, structural, routine, covert, spectacular, etc.) and the roles it plays in the production of, or resistance to, social orders and their hierarchies of being.

APPENDIX A

Shang Political Geography

TABLE A.1 *Contributions to the Shang Court*

Place/ Agent	Contribute 納	Request/ Requisition 乞	Cause to come 來	Bring 以	Plastrons/ turtles	Scapula	Cattle	*qiang* captives	Other	?[a]
雀 Que	46			8	43				7[b]	4
貯 Ning	21				19					2
壴	19		1		17					3
妻	16		25		26	1	4			10
奠	13		18	1	26					6
[illegible]	11				11					
卑	10				10					
冊 [illegible]	6				6					
[illegible]	5				5					
念	5				5					
唐 Tang	5		3		7					1
[illegible]	10		2	1	10			3		
敘	5				5					
臣 [illegible]	5	25			7	16				7
雩 [illegible]		17				16				1
品 [illegible]		7				6				1

臼	1	2	29	1	2	28	1	
Cha								
奚[c]		4			2		2	2
望		2	2			4		
Wang								
𠂤		4	1			5		
卓	1	1	14	2	10	5	2	
危方			5		5			
Wei Fang								
何			4			4		
龍 方			6			4		2
Long Fang								
疫			6			6		

[a] The resource being sent in could not be ascertained (usually because it was omitted from the inscription or the inscription was damaged).
[b] There are four divinations about Que bringing elephants, two about monkeys and one about captured horses.
[c] 奚 Xi is a Shang ally which the king divines about joining with for an attack on an enemy (e.g. 6477).



FIGURE A.1 **K-means Cluster Analysis of Tribute and Political Affiliation.** SHANG = Shang affiliation score; PLAS = plastrons; SCAP = scapula; CATT = cattle; QIANG = Qiang; OTHER = (horses, monkeys, elephants, etc.); UNCLEAR = unclear (cases where either the thing brought in was not stated, or for some other reason could not be ascertained)

Note: Figure A.1 represents, in bar-graph form, a k-means cluster analysis of things contributed to the court by the twenty-one most frequent contributors (see Table A.1), and their Shang affiliation score. See Table A.4 for an explanation of how this score was calculated. For now suffice it to say that a high positive score indicates close affiliation with the court and a low score a low affiliation (or even enemy status for those with negative scores). The relatively high absolute values for Shang affiliation score guaranteed that the three clusters would be formed mostly on the basis of Shang affiliation. One might even make the simplifying equation of cluster 1 (seventeen cases) with Shang, cluster 2 (six cases) with allied polities and cluster 3 (two cases) with enemy polities. The scores are those of the center point of the cluster (essentially a mean value).



FIGURE A.2 **K-means Cluster Analysis of Shang Affiliation and Contribution Verbs.** SHANG = Shang affiliation score, RU = *ru/na* 入/納 "to contribute"; QI = *qi* 乞 "to request/requisition"; LAI = *lai* 來 "to cause to come"; YI = *yi* 以 "to bring."

Note: Figure A.2. Once again the three clusters were mostly derived from Shang Affiliation. Of the twenty-five cases, twenty are in cluster 1, three in cluster 2 and two in cluster 3. See also Table A.1.

TABLE A.2 *Places/Actors and Harvest*[a]

Places/Actors	Harvest Inscriptions	Shang Affiliation Score[b]	Political Alignment[c]	Political Agency[d]
我, 余，王, 商, 大邑	138	100	S	100/0[e]
婦 姘	28	100	S	100
甫[f]	8	93	S	42
始	7	100	S	0
奠	7	100	S	0
悖 Bei[g]	6	61	S/A	6
辜 Dun	6	95	S	0
雝[h]	4	100	S	0
兕	4	37	A/S	53
雀 Que	3	95	S	94
羽	3	93	S	57
罚	3	60	S	23
㠯 Cha	3	56	S/A	86
鬲	3	100	S	50

[a] Only those place/actors with three or more harvest divinations were included for reasons of convenience. There are over thirty more place/actors that have one or two harvest divinations.

[b] For an explanation of this term see Table A.4.

[c] For an explanation of this term see Table A.4.

[d] For an explanation of this term see Table A.4.

[e] Obviously the first person pronouns *wo* 我 and *yu* 余as well as King (*wang* 王) refer to political actors rather than places. Shang 商 and Da Yi 大邑 (the great settlement), on the other hand, refer to places rather than naming political agents.

[f] There are five inscriptions not included in the table that refer to the receipt of Fu's 甫 tax or yield at Zi 始. Given that Fu frequently appears to be a political agent's name as well as a place name (actually, Fu appears to be a Zi "Prince" [*heji* 9526]), it may be that Zi 始 (which also is the name of a royal consort) is Fu's domain. If this is the case, then the totals for Zi and Fu ought to be added together.

丁酉卜，㱿貞: 我受甫耤才始年. 三月. (900)

Cracked on Dingyou day, Ke tested: We will receive Fu's yield (of grain) at Zi's harvest. Third month.

[g] Bei was apparently a site of battle with Zi Bu in period 1 inscriptions (see examples (14) and (15) above) and was perhaps Zi Bu's demesne. There is also an inscription divining about placing (*dian* 奠) general Ban there, perhaps after pacification.

貞:亦…𠂤般才悖, 乎𠂤才之奠. (7361)

Tested: also … general Ban is at Bei. Call upon the general to station there.

[h] There is a Zi Yong 子雝 who performs an exorcism on behalf of the King and who receives ritual intercessions from the King as well.

TABLE A.3 *Top Ten Hunting Places in the Oracle-Bone Inscriptions*[a]

Place/ Actor	Hunting Divinations	Shang Affiliation Score	Political Alignment	Political Agency	Notes
𠂤	160	100%	S	0%	Hunting, royal destination, ritual
喪	102	97%	S	3%	Royal destination, hunting
宮	69	96%	S	4%	Royal destination, hunting
盂 Yu	67	77%	S	14%	Hunting, agriculture, rebels in period V
㮚	67	98%	S	2%	Hunting, royal destination
𠂤	46	100%	S	0%	Hunting, royal destination
向	32	100%	S	0%	Royal destination, hunting
雝	26	100%	S	0%	Hunting, royal destination, agriculture, labor and troop levies
辜 Dun	19	95%	S	0%	Royal destination, hunting, levies, ritual, agriculture
襄	15	96%	S	4%	Hunting, royal destination, ritual

[a] For an explanation of how the Shang Affiliation, Political Alignment, and Political Agency Scores were calculated see Table A.4. Basically, the SA is a measure of political affiliation with the Shang polity, the PAl distinguishes between non-affiliated allies of the Shang and subordinate polities which rebel, or enemy polities which were conquered (which might other wise have similar SA scores). The PAg score measures the percentage of inscriptions that indicate the Place/Actor in question was a political actor rather than simply a place. As Table A.3 shows, the top-ten hunting places appear as mostly places rather than as seats of political power.

TABLE A.4 *Oracle-Bone Places and Political Actors*

Place/Actor[a]	Graph	Tot	S	A	E	SA	PAl	PAg	Notes
姳		17	17	0	0	100%	S	0%	Agriculture
大邑		7	7	0	0	100%	S	0%	Agriculture
雝		65	65	0	0	100%	S	0%	Hunting, royal destination, agriculture, levies
貯 Ning		26	26	0	0	100%	S	92%	Contributes plastrons
敘		5	5	0	0	100%	S	100%	Contributes plastrons
吼		6	6	0	0	100%	S	67%	Contributes plastrons, agriculture
上嗇		172	172	0	0	100%	S	0%	Royal destination
自裝		63	63	0	0	100%	S	0%	Royal destination, ritual
喜		223	223	0	0	100%	S	0%	Hunting, royal destination, ritual
㑹		22	22	0	0	100%	S	0%	Royal destination
		21	21	0	0	100%	S	0%	Royal destination, ritual
		36	36	0	0	100%	S	0%	Royal destination, hunting, ritual
靈		15	15	0	0	100%	S	0%	Royal destination, ritual
亳 Bo		20	20	0	0	100%	S	0%	Ritual, royal destination
析		10	10	0	0	100%	S	0%	Royal destination
樂		12	12	0	0	100%	S	0%	Royal destination
犅		22	22	0	0	100%	S	0%	Royal destination
㝵		78	78	0	0	100%	S	0%	Hunting, royal destination
鯀		10	10	0	0	100%	S	10%	Royal destination, hunting

		11	11	0	0	100%	S	0%	Royal destination
向		96	96	0	0	100%	S	0%	Royal destination, hunting
桒		124	121	3	0	98%	S	2%	Hunting, royal destination
喪		278	269	9	0	97%	S	3%	Royal destination, hunting
雀 Que		228	218	10	0	96%	S	94%	Shang military agent, contributes plastrons, sends in captives
襄		28	27	1	0	96%	S	4%	Hunting, royal destination, ritual
宫		257	246	11	0	96%	S	4%	Royal destination, hunting
辜 Dun		127	121	6	0	95%	S	0%	Royal destination, hunting, levies, ritual, agriculture
畫		88	83	5	0	94%	S	88%	Contributes plastrons, Shang agent, brings cattle
卑		36	34	2	0	94%	S	92%	Contributes plastrons, Shang agent
羽		14	13	1	0	93%	S	57%	Shang agent, royal destination, agriculture
攸 Xiu		32	31	0	1	93%	S	18%	Royal destination, Shang agent
甫		45	42	3	0	93%	S	42%	Shang agent, agriculture, royal destination, hunting
壴		50	46	0	4	84%	S	84%	Contributes plastrons, Shang agent
自寅	寅	13	11	2	0	84%	S	0%	Royal destination, ritual
唐 Tang		13	10	3	0	81%	S	44%	Contributes plastrons, divinations about building a great settlement there
盂 Yu		173	149	9	15	77%	S	14%	Hunting, agriculture, rebels in period V

(*continued*)

TABLE A.4 *(cont.)*

Place/Actor[a]	Graph	Tot	S	A	E	SA	PAl	PAg	Notes
悖 Bei		51	31	20	0	61%	S/A	6%	Royal and non-royal destination, battle site, levies, agriculture
羌 羌		43	29	11	3	60%	S	23%	Royal destination, battle site, agriculture
永 Yong		17	13	1	3	58%	S	65%	Shang agent, royal destination
臼 Cha		150	113	37	0	54%	S/A	86%	Shang agent, brings in captives, ally
𤔲		22	16	0	6	45%	S/E	26%	Royal destination, rebels in period V
㠱		30	13	15	2	37%	A/S	53%	Ally, royal destination, harvest
戊		114	38	74	2	32%	A	96%	Ally, Shang agent
元		7	3	3	1	29%	S/A	50%	Ally, hunting, enemy
周 Zhou		28	15	1	12	11%	S/E	100%	Enemy, becomes Shang agent
望 Wang		190	32	146	12	11%	A	94%	Ally, agent, enemy
沚 Zhi		316	23	291	2	7%	A	91%	Ally
龍 方 Long Fang		52	7	14	31	–46%	E/A	96%	Enemy, ally, brings captives
危方 Wei Fang		106	10	6	90	–75%	E	91%	Enemy, royal destination, brings cattle
興 方		44	2	4	38	–82%	E	98%	Enemy, ally
吾方 Gong Fang		697	0	4	693	–99%	E	100%	Enemy
土方 Tu Fang		146	0	0	146	–100%	E	100%	Enemy

Tot = total number of inscriptions,[b] S = Shang,[c] A = Ally,[d] E = Enemy,[e] SA = Shang Affiliation,[f] PAl = Political Alignment,[g] PAg = Political Agency.[h]

[a] Political entities that are either places, individuals or both. As it is frequently difficult in the oracle-bone inscriptions to decide whether a divination is referring to a place or an individual of the same name, or an individual representing a place, all of the divinations about a place/individual of a particular name are lumped together under a single place/actor designation.

[b] This is actually the total number of relevant inscriptions, if the graph in question is also used to write a totally unrelated word, then those instances were not counted, nor were instances where the inscription was too fragmentary to ascertain the political relationship.

[c] This score was calculated by totaling all of the inscriptions that indicated the place/actor in question was a Shang agent or place. In the agent category, divinations about the king ordering, or concern for the agent in question were counted as Shang. In the place category, visits by the king, levies, harvest or contributions to the court (other than the verb *yi* 以 "to bring" which we have argued in Chapter 4 is frequently associated with the contingent gifts of allies and even enemies) all contributed to the Shang score of a place. The Shang score is thus the total number of inscriptions about a place/actor suggesting that place/actor was part of a Shang polity.

[d] The Ally score was calculated by totaling inscriptions were the king "joined with" (比) the agent in question, where the agent "brought in" (以) gifts for the court, or where the king ordered a second party to go to the place in question (rather than going there in person).

[e] The Enemy score was calculated by totaling all the divinations about the Shang or its allies attacking or being attacked by the place/actor in question.

[f] The "Shang Affiliation Score" was arrived at by taking the number of inscriptions that positively identifies a place/actor as Shang, subtracting the inscriptions that indicate enemy status and then calculating the resulting number as a percentage (that is, including the inscriptions indicating the place/actor was an ally). In formula form it would be, ((Shang – Enemy)/ (Shang + Ally + Enemy)) 100 = Shang Affiliation score. This yields a percentage between positive and negative 100%. Thus place/actors completely integrated into the king's direct networks of authority ought to have high SA scores (> 50), while allies ought to have scores < 50 and enemies, scores in the negatives (SA <0). This score essentially calculates relative political distance or dependence without distinguishing political orientation. Thus, Zhi 沚, a staunch, but independent, ally of the court, only has an SA score of 7 percent, while Zhou 周, a sometime subordinate, sometime enemy political entity, has a SA of 11 percent.

[g] The "Political Alignment" score is calculated by taking the Shang, Ally and Enemy scores and using the higher number as a first designation and the second highest (if at least 1/3 the value of the highest value) as a second designation. This allows us to distinguish political orientation from political dependence (i.e. distinguishing low SA scores that are allies from low SA scores that resulted from alternating Enemy/Shang status). Thus, Zhou 周, with a SA score of 11 percent has Shang, Ally and Enemy counts of 15, 1 and 12 respectively. Since 15 is the higher number, Zhou has a primary designation of S (Shang), but since 12 > 5 (1/3 of 15) it also has a secondary designation of E (Enemy). Thus, its PAl would be S/E. This reflects the fact Zhou alternated between being a part of the Shang King's network of authority and warring against it.

[h] "Political Agency" distinguishes between places and political actors. This score is calculated as a percentage of the inscriptions concerning a place/actor that indicated that the referent was an individual political agent as opposed to place. Thus, divinations concerning the King ordering X would count toward a high political agency score, while divinations about going to X or hunting at X would count against this score. A place/agent proper noun with a PAg score of 100 percent thus refers to an individual or collective and not a place. A place/agent with a PAg score of 0% is simply a place. Those place/agents that have PAg scores somewhere in between 0 percent and 100 percent, sometimes refer to people and sometimes to places. As noted above, since political actors are often named for their seats of power, the majority of place/agents fall into this category.

APPENDIX B

The Xia and Shang Dynasties – Sources, Chronology and Narrative

TABLE B.1 *The Xia and Shang Dynasties – Sources, Chronology and Narrative*[a]

Archaeological Period	Shiji: Ruler	Capital	Notes	Guben Jushu Jinian: Ruler	Capital	Notes	Jushujinian Year[b] BCE	Three Dynasties Chronology Project Dates BCE
Central Plains Longshan 3000–1850 BCE	Yu			Yu	Xia Yi 夏邑 (?)	Died in 8th year. Assembles leaders, conducts tour of inspection, destroys enemies.	1989–1981	Xia: 2070–1600
	Yi							
	Qi			Qi	Xia Yi 夏邑	Died in 14th year.	1978–1965	
	Tai Kang			Tai Kang	Zhenxun 斟鄩	Died in 4th year.	1957–1954	
	Zhong Kang			Zhong Kang	Zhenxun 斟鄩	Died in 7th year.	1951–1945	
	Xiang			Xiang	Shang 商, Zhenguan 斟灌	Killed in 28th year.	1942–1915	
	Shao Kang			Shao Kang	Xia Yi 夏邑, Yuan 原	Died in 21st year.	1874–1854	
	Zhu			Zhu 杼	Yuan 原, Laoqiu 老邱	Died in 17th year.	1851–1835	
Erlitou Period 1850–1550 BCE	Hui			Fen		Died in 44th year.	1832–1789	
	Wang			Mang		Died in 58th year.	1788–1731	
	Xie			Xie		Died in 25th year.	1729–1705	
	Bu Jiang			Bu Jiang		Resigned in 59th year.	1701–1643	
	Jiong 扃			Jiong		Died in 10th year.	1642–1633	
	Jin			Jin	Xihe 西河	Died in 8th year.	1621–1616	
	Kong Jia			Kong Jia	Xihe 西河	Died in 9th year.	1611–1603	

(*continued*)

TABLE B.1 *(cont.)*

Archaeological Period	Shiji: Ruler	Capital	Notes	Guben Jushu Jinian: Ruler	Capital	Notes	Jushujinian Year[b] BCE	Three Dynasties Chronology Project Dates BCE
	Kao			**Hao**	?	Died in 3rd year.	1600–1598	
	Fa			**Fa**	?	Died in 7th year	1595–1589	
	Lu Gui			**Gui**	Zhenxun 斟鄩， Henan 河南	Banished by Tang in 31st year.	1588–1558	
Erligang Period 1600 – 1400 BCE	**1 Tang**	Bo 亳	Assembles lords and lineage heads and delivers a *gao*-announcement	**1 Tang**	Bo 亳	Died in 29th year.	1574–1545	**Early Shang** 1600–1301
	Yi Yin	Bo 亳	**Tai Ding** died before enthronement, **Wai Bing** reigned three years, **Zhong Ren** four years, **Taijia** – exiled by Yi Yin for three years.	**2 Wai Bing**	Bo 亳	Died in 2nd year.	1545–1543	
				3 Zhong Ren	Bo 亳	Died in 4th year.	1543–1539	
	2 Tai Jia	Bo 亳	Rehabilitated by Yi Yin, reformed Tai Jia follows Yi Yin's sagely model.	**4 Tai Jia**	Bo 亳	Yi Yin imprisons him, seizing the throne. King escapes in his 7th year and puts Yi Yin to death. Died in 12th year.	1539–1527	

	3 Wo Ding	Bo 亳	Yi Yin dies during his reign.	**5 Wo Ding**	Bo 亳	Died in 19th year.	1527–1508
	4 Tai Geng	Bo 亳		**6 Xiao Geng**	Bo 亳	Died in 5th year.	1508–1503
	5 Xiao Jia	Bo 亳		**7 Xiao Jia**	Bo 亳	Died in 17th year.	1503–1486
	6 Yong Ji	Bo 亳	Yin declined, lords fail to pay homage	**8 Yong Ji**	Bo 亳	Died in 12th year.	1486–1474
	7 Tai Wu	Bo 亳	Mulberry trees portent, consults minister and cultivates his virtue –Yin becomes prosperous and the lords return.	**9 Tai Mao**	Bo 亳	Died in 75th year! – legend of the mulberry trees. Lords of the West and East come to pay homage.	1474–1399
Xiaoshuangqiao-Huanbei Period ca. 1400–1250 BCE	**8 Zhong Ding**	Ao 隩		**10 Zhong Ding**	Ao 嚣	Died in 9th year. Moves capital to Ao on the He, goes on expedition against the "Lan Yi."	1399–1390
	9 Wai Ren	Ao 隩		**11 Wai Ren**	Ao嚣	Died in 10th year. People of Xian and Pei revolt.	1390–1380
	10 He Dan Jia	Xiang 相	Yin again declined	**12 He Dan Jia**	Xiang 相	Died in 9th year. Conflicts among regional lords	1380–1371
	11 Zu Yi	Xing 邢	Yin again prospered	**13 Zu Yi**	Geng 耿, Pi 庇	Died in 19th year. Grants mandates to three regional lords.	1371–1352
	12 Zu Xin	Xing 邢		**14 Zu Xin**	Pi 庇	Died in 14th year.	1352–1338

(*continued*)

TABLE B.1 *(cont.)*

Archaeological Period	Shiji: Ruler	Capital	Notes	Guben Jushu Jinian: Ruler	Capital	Notes	Jushujinian Year[b] BCE	Three Dynasties Chronology Project Dates BCE
	13 Wo Jia	Xing 邢		**15 Kai Jia**	Pi 庇	Died in 5th year.	1338–1333	
	14 Zu Ding	Xing 邢		**16 Zu Ding**	Pi 庇	Died in 9th year	1333–1324	
	15 Nan Geng	Xing 邢		**17 Nan Geng**	Yan 奄	Died in 6th year.	1324–1318	
	16 Yang Jia	Xing 邢	"Yin declined." "Since the time of Zhong Ding, the eldest in line was neglected and younger brothers or sons [of the rulers] were enthrone." Struggle over succession for nine generations	**18 Yang Jia**	Yan 奄	Died in 4th year. Expedition against Rong barbarians.	1318–1314	
	17 Pan Geng	"North of the River," Bo亳	Yin prospers and all the feudal lords come to pay homage.	**19 Pan Geng**	Bei Meng 北蒙aka Yin 殷	Died in 28th year. Regional lord comes to pay homage Mandate given to a regional lord.	1314–1286	**Late Shang** (1300–1046) Pan Geng – Xiao Yi 1300–1251
	18 Xiao Xin	Bo亳	Yin again declines	**20 Xiao Xin**	Yin 殷	Died in 3rd year	1286–1283	
	19 Xiao Yi	Bo亳		**21 Xiao Yi**	Yin 殷	Died in 11th year.	1283–1272	
Anyang Period ca. 1250 – 1050 BCE	**20 Wu Ding**	Bo亳	Searches for and finds a sagely minister. Reforms ritual practice. Yin again prospers	**22 Wu Ding**	Yin 殷	Died in 59th year. Receives portents, conducts sacrifices, and expeditions, extinguishes previously mandated regional lord, Di-Qiang barbarians come to pay homage.	1272–1213	1250–1192

	21 Zu Geng	Bo亳		**23 Zu Geng**	Yin 殷	Died in 11th year	1213–1202	Zu Geng–Kang Ding 1191–1148
	22 Zu Jia	Bo亳	Yin declined	**24 Zu Jia**	Yin 殷	Died in 33rd year Leads successful expeditions against the Western Rong barbarians, they submit and come to court, grants mandate to regional lord and two of his sons. Multiplies punishments, fortunes of Yin decayed.	1202–1169	
	23 Lin Xin	Bo亳		**25 Ping Xin**	Yin 殷	Died in 4th year	1169–1165	
	24 Geng Ding	Bo亳		**26 Geng Ding**	Yin 殷	Died in 8th year	1165–1157	
	25 Wu Yi	"North of the River" (Chaoge 朝歌)	Sacrilegeous conduct – struck by lightning during a hunt.	**27 Wu Yi**	"North of the River," Mu (沐)	Died in 35th year. Mandated regional lord moves to Zhou – conducts various conquests from there. Wu Yi killed by lightning while hunting between the He and the Wei (in Eastern Shaanxi).	1157–1122	1147–1113
	26 Tai Ding	"North of the River" (Chaoge朝歌)		**28 Wen Ding**	Yin 殷	Died in 15th year. The Zhou leader Gong Ji conducts various military campaigns and is recognized with a mandate from Shang king. Zhou Gong Ji follows with more victories and is put to death after presenting captives at the Shang court.	1122–1107	1112–1102

(*continued*)

TABLE B.1 *(cont.)*

Archaeological Period	Shiji: Ruler	Capital	Notes	Guben Jushu Jinian: Ruler	Capital	Notes	Jushujinian Year[b] BCE	Three Dynasties Chronology Project Dates BCE
	27 Di Yi	"North of the River" (Chaoge 朝歌)	Yin declined even more. "Emperor Yi's son was called Qi 啟, the Lord of Wei 微," but he couldn't inherit because his mother was not the primary consort.	**29 Di Yi**	Yin 殷	Died in 9th year. Orders subordinate to resist Kun Yi barbarians	1107–1098	1101–1076
	28 Di Xin	"North of the River" (Chaoge 朝歌)	Archetypal tyrant – Di Xin established "three masters" (san gong), but then kills two of them and imprisons the third eventually letting him go after bribes are given. The freed Lord of the West returns to Zhou and cultivates allies. The Zhou then undertake a	**30 Di Xin**	Yin 殷	Died in 52nd year. Gives mandates to three lords in first year. Invents new punishments. Imprisons the lord of the West in his 23rd year. No mention of the fates of the other two lords. Releases the Zhou lord in his 29th year, who, on returning	1098–1046	1075–1046

		campaign of consolidation and conquest in modern Shaanxi province.	west solidifies power base through alliance and conquest. After many campaigns and defections to the Zhou side, the Zhou finally launch their attack on the Shang with many allies. There are many portents throughout the narrative.
		800 lords gathered to the Zhou. Shang officials fled to Zhou with the Shang sacrificial vessels and musical instruments.	
		The Zhou King Wu leads his forces to victory against the Shang claiming Heaven's Mandate.	

[a] The Shiji was written in the Western Han period, nearly 1,000 years after the fall of the last Shang king, Di Xin (see Hulsewé 1993 for an introduction to the text and Neinhauser 1994 for an English translation). The Guben Jushujinian, on the other hand, although purporting to be a Warring States text, was supposedly discovered in a tomb 279 CE. (see Nivison 1993 for an introduction to this text, for an English translation, Legge 1865). These are the two main transmitted sources for early dynastic chronology and narrative. As can be seen from the table, they are frequently at odds.

[b] This is calculated according to the Guben Jushujinian, using the Three Dynasties Chronology date of the Zhou conquest of the Shang in 1046 BCE and adding the reign years credited to each king to it. Although it fits fairly nicely into the Zhengzhou – Anyang archaeological chronology, it is not actually consistent with itself. It states that between Tang and Shou (Di Xin) there were 29 kings and 496 years, not the 30 kings and 528 years that result from actually adding up the reigns of each king. If Di Xin's reign is not included then the numbers accord more closely, but still not exactly.

APPENDIX C

Burial Tables

TABLE C.1 *Bivariate Correlations of Erlitou Tomb Variables*[1]

		Correlations									
		AREA	FURNITUR	CERAMICS	BRONZE	JADE	CINNABAR	TURQUOIS	COWRIES	RITMUS	LACQUER
AREA	Pearson Correlation	1.000	.648**	–.465**	.596**	.493**	.349*	.169	.116	.353*	.513**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.	.000	.005	.000	.003	.037	.324	.500	.038	.002
	N	38	37	35	35	35	36	36	36	35	35
FURNITUR	Pearson Correlation	.648**	1.000	–.180	.248	.315*	.456**	.202	–.052	.080	.450**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.	.254	.114	.042	.002	.199	.743	.612	.003
	N	37	45	42	42	42	43	42	42	42	42
CERAMICS	Pearson Correlation	–.465**	–.180	1.000	–.306*	–.233	–.055	–.221	.002	–.152	–.216
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.005	.254	.	.046	.132	.728	.154	.991	.329	.165
	N	35	42	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43
BRONZE	Pearson Correlation	.596**	.248	–.306*	1.000	.747**	.346*	.405**	.223	.481**	.534**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.114	.046	.	.000	.023	.007	.151	.001	.000
	N	35	42	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43
JADE	Pearson Correlation	.493**	.315*	–.233	.747**	1.000	.229	.141	.061	.169	.367*
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.003	.042	.132	.000	.	.135	.367	.692	.277	.016
	N	35	42	43	43	44	44	43	44	43	43
CINNABAR	Pearson Correlation	.349*	.456**	–.055	.346*	.229	1.000	.288	–.090	.356*	.313*
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.037	.002	.728	.023	.135	.	.061	.562	.019	.041
	N	36	43	43	43	44	45	43	44	43	43

(*continued*)

TABLE C.1 *(cont.)*

		Correlations									
		AREA	FURNITUR	CERAMICS	BRONZE	JADE	CINNABAR	TURQUOIS	COWRIES	RITMUS	LACQUER
TURQUOIS	Pearson Correlation	.169	.202	–.221	.405**	.141	.288	1.000	–.040	–.055	.397**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.324	.199	.154	.007	.367	.061	.	.799	.726	.008
	N	36	42	43	43	43	43	44	44	43	43
COWRIES	Pearson Correlation	.116	–.052	.002	.223	.061	–.090	–.040	1.000	–.032	.145
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.500	.743	.991	.151	.692	.562	.799	.	.837	.353
	N	36	42	43	43	44	44	44	47	43	43
RITMUS	Pearson Correlation	.353*	.080	–.152	.481**	.169	.356*	–.055	–.032	1.000	.356*
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.038	.612	.329	.001	.277	.019	.726	.837	.	.019
	N	35	42	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43
LACQUER	Pearson Correlation	.513**	.450**	–.216	.534**	.367*	.313*	.397**	.145	.356*	1.000
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.002	.003	.165	.000	.016	.041	.008	.353	.019	.
	N	35	42	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Legend: AREA = tomb area (m^2); FURNITUR = grave furniture (e.g. coffins); BRONZE = bronze artifacts; JADE = jade artifacts; CINNABAR = cinnabar; TURQUOIS = turquoise; RITMUS = ritual musical instruments; LACQUER = lacquer artifacts

TABLE C.2 *Bivariate Correlations of Zhengzhou Tomb Variables*

		Correlations													
		AREA	FURNITUR	WAISTPIT	CINNABAR	CERVESS	JADE	OPVESS	OPORN	CWEAP	CRIT	CTOOL	CORN	DOGSAC	BRONZE
AREA	Pearson Correlation	1.000	.656**	.478**	.425**	–.081	.575**	.356**	.379**	.648**	.385**	.654**	.285*	.535**	.764**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.	.000	.000	.000	.518	.000	.003	.002	.000	.001	.000	.021	.000	.000
	N	66	56	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
FURNITUR	Pearson Correlation	.656**	1.000	.364**	.655**	–.166	.402**	.544**	.416**	.485**	.308*	.478**	.200	.470**	.694**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.	.006	.000	.223	.002	.000	.001	.000	.021	.000	.139	.000	.000
	N	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56
WAISTPIT	Pearson Correlation	.478**	.364**	1.000	.126	.013	.415**	.153	.166	.304*	.106	.237	–.061	.747**	.390**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.006	.	.312	.915	.001	.221	.183	.013	.396	.055	.625	.000	.001
	N	66	56	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
CINNABAR	Pearson Correlation	.425**	.655**	.126	1.000	.096	.277*	.398**	.374**	.396**	.158	.426**	.172	.265*	.550**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.000	.312	.	.444	.024	.001	.002	.001	.205	.000	.168	.032	.000
	N	66	56	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
CERVESS	Pearson Correlation	–.081	–.166	.013	.096	1.000	–.146	–.160	–.171	–.182	–.042	–.129	.141	.054	–.229
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.518	.223	.915	.444	.	.241	.199	.169	.144	.737	.303	.258	.665	.064
	N	66	56	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
JADE	Pearson Correlation	.575**	.402**	.415**	.277*	–.146	1.000	.136	.082	.683**	.493**	.673**	.213	.282*	.555**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.002	.001	.024	.241	.	.277	.512	.000	.000	.000	.086	.022	.000
	N	66	56	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66

(*continued*)

TABLE C.2 *(cont.)*

		Correlations													
		AREA	FURNITUR	WAISTPIT	CINNABAR	CERVESS	JADE	OPVESS	OPORN	CWEAP	CRIT	CTOOL	CORN	DOGSAC	BRONZE
OPVESS	Pearson Correlation	.356**	.544**	.153	.398**	–.160	.136	1.000	.191	.182	–.045	.215	.258*	.247*	.545**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.003	.000	.221	.001	.199	.277	.	.124	.145	.720	.083	.036	.046	.000
	N	66	56	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
OPORN	Pearson Correlation	.379**	.416**	.166	.374**	–.171	.082	.191	1.000	.067	–.030	.206	.056	.241	.611**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.002	.001	.183	.002	.169	.512	.124	.	.593	.813	.098	.655	.052	.000
	N	66	56	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
CWEAP	Pearson Correlation	.648**	.485**	.304*	.396**	–.182	.683**	.182	.067	1.000	.627**	.863**	.127	.422**	.651**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.000	.013	.001	.144	.000	.145	.593	.	.000	.000	.309	.000	.000
	N	66	56	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
CRIT	Pearson Correlation	.385**	.308*	.106	.158	–.042	.493**	–.045	–.030	.627**	1.000	.554**	.035	.172	.315**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.001	.021	.396	.205	.737	.000	.720	.813	.000	.	.000	.780	.168	.010
	N	66	56	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
CTOOL	Pearson Correlation	.654**	.478**	.237	.426**	–.129	.673**	.215	.206	.863**	.554**	1.000	.419**	.358**	.764**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.000	.055	.000	.303	.000	.083	.098	.000	.000	.	.000	.003	.000
	N	66	56	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
CORN	Pearson Correlation	.285*	.200	–.061	.172	.141	.213	.258*	.056	.127	.035	.419**	1.000	–.020	.367**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.021	.139	.625	.168	.258	.086	.036	.655	.309	.780	.000	.	.874	.002
	N	66	56	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66

DOGSAC	Pearson Correlation	.535**	.470**	.747**	.265*	.054	.282*	.247*	.241	.422**	.172	.358**	–.020	1.000	.466**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.032	.665	.022	.046	.052	.000	.168	.003	.874	.	.000
	N	66	56	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
BRONZE	Pearson Correlation	.764**	.694**	.390**	.550**	–.229	.555**	.545**	.611**	.651**	.315**	.764**	.367**	.466**	1.000
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.000	.001	.000	.064	.000	.000	.000	.000	.010	.000	.002	.000	.
	N	66	56	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66	66

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Legend: AREA = tomb area; FURNITUR = number of coffins; WAISTPIT = number of waist pits in the tomb; CINNABAR = presence or absence of cinnabar in the tomb; CERVESS = ceramic vessels; JADE = jade artifacts; OPVESS = other precious vessel (e.g. lacquer, ivory, proto-porcelain); OPORN = other precious ornament (e.g. ornaments of ivory, semi-precious stone, gold, etc.); CWEAP = common weapon (bone, stone or shell); CRIT = common ritual (ritual artifact made of stone rather than jade); CTOOL = common tool (bone, stone or shell tool); CORN = common ornament (ornaments made of stone, bone or shell); DOGSAC = dog sacrifice; BRONZE = bronze artifact.

TABLE C.3 *Bivariate Correlations of Taixi Tomb Variables*

		Correlations												
		AREA	FURNITUR	WAISTPIT	DEATHATT	DOGSAC	BRONZE	JADE	CERVESS	COWRIES	CTOOLS	CWEAP	CORN	EVESS
AREA	Pearson Correlation	1.000	.564**	.643**	.522**	.680**	.533**	444**	.541**	.030	.417**	.245*	.200	.281**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.776	.000	.019	.056	.007
	N	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
FURNITUR	Pearson Correlation	.564**	1.000	.357**	.183	.322**	.232*	.153	.483**	–.067	.198	.090	.108	.102
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.	.000	.081	.002	.026	.147	.000	.525	.059	.395	.306	.334
	N	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
WAISTPIT	Pearson Correlation	.643**	.357**	1.000	.265*	.676**	.377**	.254*	.365**	–.054	.222*	.286**	.194	.064
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.000	.	.011	.000	.000	.015	.000	.609	.033	.006	.064	.544
	N	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
DEATHATT	Pearson Correlation	.522**	.183	.265*	1.000	.514**	.756**	.590**	.163	.146	.291**	.085	.278**	.394**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.081	.011	.	.000	.000	.000	.121	.165	.005	.422	.007	.000
	N	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
DOGSAC	Pearson Correlation	.680**	.322**	.676**	.514**	1.000	.486**	.662**	.271**	.060	.395**	.211*	.097	.394**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.002	.000	.000	.	.000	.000	.009	.572	.000	.043	.358	.000
	N	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
BRONZE	Pearson Correlation	.533**	.232*	.377**	.756**	.486**	1.000	.462**	.407**	.046	.457**	.325**	.333**	.524**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.026	.000	.000	.000	.	.000	.000	.662	.000	.002	.001	.000
	N	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
JADE	Pearson Correlation	.444**	.153	.254*	.590**	.662**	.462**	1.000	.067	.016	.328**	–.047	.209*	.542**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.147	.015	.000	.000	.000	.	.525	.877	.001	.654	.046	.000
	N	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92

CERVESS	Pearson Correlation	.541**	.483**	.365**	.163	.271**	.407**	.067	1.000	–.044	.289**	.273**	.136	.251*
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.121	.009	.000	.525	.	.678	.005	.008	.196	.016
	N	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
COWRIES	Pearson Correlation	.030	–.067	–.054	.146	.060	.046	.016	–.044	1.000	–.067	–.069	–.017	–.035
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.776	.525	.609	.165	.572	.662	.877	.678	.	.523	.511	.873	.742
	N	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
CTOOLS	Pearson Correlation	.417**	.198	.222*	.291**	.395**	.457**	.328**	.289**	–.067	1.000	.230*	.044	.669**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.059	.033	.005	.000	.000	.001	.005	.523	.	.027	.675	.000
	N	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
CWEAP	Pearson Correlation	.245*	.090	.286**	.085	.211*	.325**	–.047	.273**	–.069	.230*	1.000	.022	–.060
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.019	.395	.006	.422	.043	.002	.654	.008	.511	.027	.	.833	.572
	N	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
CORN	Pearson Correlation	.200	.108	.194	.278**	.097	.333**	.209*	.136	–.017	.044	.022	1.000	.097
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.056	.306	.064	.007	.358	.001	.046	.196	.873	.675	.833	.	.359
	N	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
EVESS	Pearson Correlation	.281**	.102	.064	.394**	.394**	.524**	.542**	.251*	–.035	.669**	–.060	.097	1.000
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.007	.334	.544	.000	.000	.000	.000	.016	.742	.000	.572	.359	.
	N	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Legend: AREA = tomb area in m^2; FURNITUR = number of coffins; WAISTPIT = number of waist pits; DEATHATT = number of death attendants; DOGSAC = number of dog sacrifices; BRONZE = number of bronze artifacts; JADE = number of jade artifacts; CERVESS = number of ceramic vessels; COWRIES = number of cowry shells; CTOOLS = number of stone, bone, or shell tools; CWEAP = number of stone, bone, or shell weapons; CORN = stone, bone or shell ornaments; EVESS = number of lacquer, ivory or fine ceramic vessels (white ceramics, proto-porcelain, stone ware etc.).

TABLE C.4 *Bivariate Correlations of Anyang Tomb Variables*

		Correlations												
		AREA	FURNITUR	VOLUME	WAISTPIT	COWRIES	CORN	CTOOL	CWEAP	CERAVES	BRONZE	JADE	DEATHATT	DOGSAC
AREA	Pearson Correlation	1.000	.492**	.854**	.224**	.036	.079*	.133**	.349**	.385**	.418**	.280**	.319**	.320**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.	.000	.000	.000	.272	.016	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	929	901	929	920	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929
FURNITUR	Pearson Correlation	.492**	1.000	.485**	.093**	.031	.100**	.053	.239**	.295**	.144**	.094**	.161**	.215**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.	.000	.005	.346	.003	.112	.000	.000	.000	.005	.000	.000
	N	901	901	901	896	901	901	901	901	901	901	901	901	901
VOLUME	Pearson Correlation	.854**	.485**	1.000	.184**	.038	.097**	.175**	.432**	.444**	.595**	.403**	.349**	.339**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.000	.	.000	.244	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	929	901	929	920	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929
WAISTPIT	Pearson Correlation	.224**	.093**	.184**	1.000	.019	.027	.040	.059	.127**	.027	.079*	.031	.115**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.005	.000	.	.565	.411	.227	.076	.000	.413	.016	.344	.000
	N	920	896	920	920	920	920	920	920	920	920	920	920	920
COWRIES	Pearson Correlation	.036	.031	.038	.019	1.000	–.004	–.006	.002	.113**	–.003	.019	.012	.128**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.272	.346	.244	.565	.	.898	.849	.956	.001	.925	.557	.723	.000
	N	929	901	929	920	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929
CORN	Pearson Correlation	.079*	.100**	.097**	.027	–.004	1.000	.056	.064	.078*	.017	.124**	–.008	.118**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.016	.003	.003	.411	.898	.	.089	.050	.017	.607	.000	.798	.000
	N	929	901	929	920	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929
CTOOL	Pearson Correlation	.133**	.053	.175**	.040	–.006	.056	1.000	.231**	.187**	.266**	.319**	.078*	.169**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.112	.000	.227	.849	.089	.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.017	.000
	N	929	901	929	920	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929

CWEAP	Pearson Correlation	.349**	.239**	.432**	.059	.002	.064	.231**	1.000	.293**	.270**	.197**	.211**	.031
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.076	.956	.050	.000	.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.350
	N	929	901	929	920	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929
CERAVES	Pearson Correlation	.385**	.295**	.444**	.127**	.113**	.078*	.187**	.293**	1.000	.261**	.270**	.163**	.165**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.017	.000	.000	.	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	929	901	929	920	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929
BRONZE	Pearson Correlation	.418**	.144**	.595**	.027	–.003	.017	.266**	.270**	.261**	1.000	.632**	.360**	.140**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.413	.925	.607	.000	.000	.000	.	.000	.000	.000
	N	929	901	929	920	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929
JADE	Pearson Correlation	.280**	.094**	.403**	.079*	.019	.124**	.319**	.197**	.270**	.632**	1.000	.240**	.114**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.005	.000	.016	.557	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.	.000	.000
	N	929	901	929	920	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929
DEATHATT	Pearson Correlation	.319**	.161**	.349**	.031	.012	–.008	.078*	.211**	.163**	.360**	.240**	1.000	.062
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.344	.723	.798	.017	.000	.000	.000	.000	.	.061
	N	929	901	929	920	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929
DOGSAC	Pearson Correlation	.320**	.215**	.339**	.115**	.128**	.118**	.169**	.031	.165**	.140**	.114**	.062	1.000
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.350	.000	.000	.000	.061	.
	N	929	901	929	920	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929	929

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Legend: AREA = area of tomb in m^2; FURNITUR = number of coffins, tomb chambers; VOLUME = volume of tomb in m^3; WAISTPIT = number of waist pits; COWRIES = number of cowry shells; CORN = shell, bone, or stone ornaments; CTOOL = shell, bone, or stone tools; CWEAP = shell, bone, or stone weapons; CERAVESS = ceramic vessels; BRONZE = bronze artifacts; JADE = jade artifacts; DEATHATT = death attendants; DOGSAC = dog sacrifices.

TABLE C.5 *Secondary Human and Animal Remains*

Tomb[a]	Size	Phase	Status	Zone I: Coffin	Zone II: Outer Coffin/ Chamber	Zone III: Ledge / Niches/ Outside of Chamber	Zone IV: Ramp(s)/ Fill/Waist Pit(s)	Zone V: Immediate Area Around Tomb
XBGM 1001 (L&G 76a)	L Tomb mouth: 360 m² 4 ramps: Length (in m): N:19.5 E: 14.3 S: 30.7 W: 11	II	Looted	Not preserved	?[b]	**Outside of wooden chamber**: 1 human. **On roof of wooden chamber**: 11 humans, six with coffins, five without, some with bronze weapons, some with stone ornaments.	**Waist Pits**: 9 humans, 9 dogs. **North ramp**: 15 humans, 1 buried in coffin in pit with broken bronze vessels, 14 skulls. **South ramp**: 59 headless bodies, 42 human skulls. **West ramp**: 12 humans, 1 buried in a coffin in a pit with broken bronze vessels, 11 skulls. **East ramp**: 6 human skulls.	37 pits: 68 people in 22 pits; 7 pits with horses, 2 unclear and 6 that have been destroyed. Some of the larger pits have inner and outer coffins, bronze vessels and death attendants.[c]
XBG M1500 (L&G 74)	L 333 m² 4 ramps Length (in m): N:22.6 E: 20.1 S: 48.6 W:22.7	III	Looted	Not preserved	?	?	114 human skulls in fill around the edges of the looter's pit: all face the burial chamber.	Two looted pits associated with tomb, one has dog in waist pit.

XBG M1550 (L&G 76b)	L 231 m², ramps: length in m: N:18.1 E: 6.9 S: 12.5 W: 9.5	II	Looted	Not preserved	?	In fill of tomb chamber, but outside the wooden chamber, three pits: 1 child, 1 "concubine,"[d] with numerous jade and bronze artifacts, 2 people with bronze weapons and tools.	**Waist Pit**: 1 person with jade dagger-axe. **North Ramp**: 1 sheep leg and 1 cattle leg on straw mat. **Fill**: 235 human skulls in fill above north ramp, 8 in fill above south ramp.	None
50WKGM1 (IA 94)	L 168 m² 2 ramps: Length in m: N: 15 S: 15.6	II	Looted	Not preserved	?	**Ledge**: 41 people, some with coffins, bronze vessels, weapons and jade ornaments.	**Fill**: 29 human skulls in fill above chamber. **Ramps**: six pits with horses, two with 6, four with 4. One pit with 2 people: one with a *ge*-halberd, one with a bell; 1 person on tomb ramp with dog beside them.	None
XBGM260 (IA 87a)	L3 78 m², 1 ramp Length (in m): S: 24	II	Looted	Not preserved	?	No ledge, **Outer coffin fill**: 5 people.	**Waist Pit**: 1 person with jade ge, three strings of cowry shells, and a dog. **Ramp**: 22 human skulls, pit with 4 whole human skeletons with coffins. **Fill**: 6 headless human skeletons.	3 sacrificial pits, 2 excavated, 8 headless skeletons each.

(*continued*)

TABLE C.5 *(cont.)*

Tomb[a]	Size	Phase	Status	Zone I: Coffin	Zone II: Outer Coffin/ Chamber	Zone III: Ledge / Niches/ Outside of Chamber	Zone IV: Ramp(s)/ Fill/Waist Pit(s)	Zone V: Immediate Area Around Tomb
AXTM5 (IA 80)	M 22.4 m²	II	Unlooted, flooded	Not preserved	None	**Niche**: 3 humans. **Chamber Roof**: 8 humans.[e]	**Waist Pit**: 1 human, 1 dog. **Fill**: 4 humans: 1 skull, 1 missing lower body, 1 with broken skull and missing arms, 1 is "incomplete";[f] 4 intact dog skeletons, 1 dog head.	None
XQM93 (AT 79)	M 22.1 m² 1 ramp	IV	Looted, flooded	1 human	None	none	**Waist Pit**: 1 human.	None
XQM698 (AT 79)	M 16.8 m² 1 ramp	IV	Looted, flooded	?	?	?	**Ramp**: 2 horses, 1chariot, 1 human, 1 horse at bottom of ramp.	None
XQM699 (AT 79)	M 14.1 m² 1 ramp	IV	Looted, flooded	?	?	**Ledge**: 3 humans.	**Ramp**: 2 humans in fill.	None
GJZM160 (IA 98)	M 13.1 m²	III	Undisturbed	1 human.	2 humans.	**Ledge:** 1 human. **Top of Chamber:** 1 dog.	**Waist pit:** 1 human, 1 dog. **Fill:** 1 dog.	**Chariot pits** M146, M147: 2 chariots, 4 horses, chariot fittings and ornaments.
XQM700 (AT 79)	M 12.1 m² 1 ramp	IV	Looted, flooded	?	?	**Ledge**: 2 humans.	**Ramp**: 1 human.	None

XQM701 (AT 79a)	M 14.3 m² 1 ramp	IV	Looted, flooded	?	?	**Ledge**: 2 humans.	**Ramp**: 9 humans. **Fill**: 1 human.	None
GJZM26 (AT 98)	S 7.8 m²	IV	Unlooted	1 human	None	**Ledge**: 2 humans.	**Fill:** 1 dog. **Waist Pit**: 1 dog.	None
59WGM1 (AT 79)	S 7.5 m²	I	Unlooted	1 human	None	**Ledge**: 6 humans, 2 intact, 4 skulls; 1 dog.	None	None
XQM613 (AT 79)	S 6.4 m²	II	Unlooted	Not preserved	None	**Ledge**: 1 dog.	**Fill**: 1 dog. **Waist Pit**: 1 dog.	None
XQM326 (AT 79)	S 5.0 m²	IV	Looted	Unclear	NA	None	**Waist Pit**: 1 dog.	None
GJZM230 (IA 98)	S 4 m²	IV	Looted	Unclear	NA	**Ledge**: 1 human.	None	None
XQM216 (AT 79)	S 4.2 m²	IV	Looted and flooded	Unclear	None	**Ledge**: 1 horse, 1 human.	None	None
XQM217 (AT 79)	S 5.3 m²	IV	Looted and flooded	Unclear	None	**Ledge**: 1 human, 1 horse.	**Waist Pit**: 1 human, 1 dog.	None
XQM692 (AT 79)	S 4.2 m²	?	Unlooted	Not preserved	None	**Ledge**: 2 humans, 1 sheep leg.	**Waist Pit**: 1 dog. **Fill**: 2 dogs.	None
XQM785 (AT 79)	S 4.8 m²	IV	Disturbed by Shang period well.	Unclear	None	**Ledge**: 2 humans. **On Top of Outer Coffin**: dog.	None	None
XQM1057 (AT 79)	4.8 m²	IV	Unlooted	1 human	None	**Ledge**: 1 sheep skull.	None	None
XQM429 (AT 79)	S 3.1 m²	IV	Unlooted	1 human	NA	**Ledge**: 1 leg of lamb. **On Top of Inner Coffin:** 1 sheep.	None	None

(*continued*)

TABLE C.5 *(cont.)*

Tomb[a]	Size	Phase	Status	Zone I: Coffin	Zone II: Outer Coffin/ Chamber	Zone III: Ledge / Niches/ Outside of Chamber	Zone IV: Ramp(s)/ Fill/Waist Pit(s)	Zone V: Immediate Area Around Tomb
XTXM233 (IA 87)	S 3.9 m²	IV	Unlooted	1 human	**Head Compartment of Coffin:**[g] on tray: 1 cattle head, 3 cattle legs, 6 sheep heads, 2 sheep legs.	**Ledge**: 1 human.	None	None
XQM1713 (AT 86)	S 4.7 m²	IV	Unlooted	1 human	None[h]	**Ledge**: 1 human. **On Top of Outer Coffin**: 2 humans; 1 cattle leg, 1 sheep leg.	**Waist Pit:** 1 dog. **Fill**: 1 dog.	None
QJZM269 (AC 91)	S 4.6 m²	III/IV	Unlooted	1 human	None	**Ledge**: 1 cattle head, 1 cattle foreleg, 2 sheep head, 2 sheep legs.	**Waist Pit**: 1 dog. **Fill**: 1 dog.	None
MYZM7 (AM 86b)	S[i] ~4.8 m²	?	Looted	Not preserved	?	**Ledge**: 4 humans.	**Waist Pit**:?	None
MYZM5 (AM 86b)	S ~4.8 m²	?	Looted	Not preserved	?	**Ledge**: 3 humans.	**Waist Pit**:?	None
MYZM6 (AM 86b)	S ~4.8 m²	?	Looted	Not preserved	?	**Ledge**: 2 humans.	**Fill**: 1 dog. **Waist Pit**:?	None
MYZM8 (AM 86b)	S ~4.8 m²	?	Looted	Not preserved	?	**Ledge**: 1 human.	None	None
LJZM44 (AM 86A)	S 2.6 m²	III	Unlooted	1 H/M/A	NA	None	None	None

LJZM47 (AM 86A)	S 2.2 m²	III	Unlooted	1 H/F/A	NA	None	None	None
MYZM9 (AM 86B)	S 2.0 m²	?	Unlooted	1H/F/A	NA	NA	None	None
XQM656 (AT 79)	S 2.1 m²	II	Unlooted	1 H/?/?	NA	**Ledge**: 1 dog.	**Waist Pit**: 1 dog.	None
MPBM48 (IA 87)	S 2.5 m²	II	Partially disturbed	1 H/?/?	NA	None	**Waist Pit**:? **Fill**: 1 dog.	None
MYZM10 (AM 86B)	S 1.84 m²	?	Unlooted	1H/M/A	NA	NA	None	None
BJWM10 (IA 87)	S 1.8 m²	III	Unlooted	1 human	NA	None	**Waist Pit**: 1 dog.	None
MPBM42 (IA 87)	S 1.8 m²	II	Unlooted	1 human	NA	**Niche**: 1 dog.	**Waist Pit**:? Dogs.	None
XQM610 (AT 79)	S 1.76 m²	II	Unlooted	1 human	NA	**Ledge**: 1 dog.	None	None
LJZM14 (AM 86A)	S 1.7 m²	III	Unlooted	1 human	NA	None	**Waist Pit**: 1 dog.	None
DSKM308 (IA 87)	S 1.1 m²	IV	Unlooted	1 human	NA	NA	None	None

[a] The sources for the tombs listed in this table have been given the following abbreviations, L&G = Liang and Gao; IA = Institute of Archaeology; AT= Anyang Team; AM = Anyang Museum; AC = Anyang City.

[b] A question mark denotes that it is impossible to judge whether or not there were any remains in this area due to some sort of disturbance such as looting.

[c] According to Institute of Archaeology (1994: 106). From this vague description it appears that at least some of the pits were the graves of death attendants, rather than sacrificial pits, but one cannot be certain.

TABLE C.5 *(cont.)*

[d] Identified as such by the excavators by the "peacock – like" array of hair pins above the head, as well as the number of jade and stone ornaments, and bronze vessels. There was also a jade *ge* dagger-axe.

[e] There were eight human skeletons that had "fallen" into the burial chamber, presumably from the roof of the burial chamber, which had collapsed, if so they should be considered to be in zone III.

[f] The author is vague about whether the damage to these skeletons was caused at time of death, excavation, or a result of decomposition. Referring to the human remains the report states: "of the sixteen sacrificial victims, four were males including one youth, two were females, and two were children. The sex and age of the remaining eight cannot be determined. At least one was killed and one probably was cut in half at the waist" (44).

[g] From the illustration of this tomb Institute of Archaeology (1987a: 206), there was apparently a head compartment to this coffin, separate to the part where the grave owner was interred. If this is so, it should probably be considered the equivalent of the outer coffin in terms of being one space removed from the grave owner.

[h] Actually, the two human skeletons as well as sheep and cattle legs were found inside the tomb chamber/outer coffin. We have followed the excavator's interpretation that they fell there when the top of the chamber caved in.

[i] The exact size is not given in the report only that M5–8 and M11 were generally 3.0 x 1.6 m^2.

TABLE C.6 *Lineage Cemeteries: Sacrifice and Tomb Size*

		Correlations		
		DOGSAC	VOLUME	DEATHATT
DOGSAC	Pearson Correlation	1.000	–.143**	–.171**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.	.002	.000
	N	465	465	465
VOLUME	Pearson Correlation	–.143**	1.000	.788**
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.002	.	.000
	N	465	465	465
DEATHATT	Pearson Correlation	–.171**	.788**	1.000
	Sig. (2–tailed)	.000	.000	.
	N	465	465	465

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

TABLE C.7 *Location of Grave Goods*

Tomb	Size	Zone I: Inner Coffin	Zone II: Outer Coffin/ Wooden Chamber	Zone III: Waist Pit, Ledges, Niches, On Outer Coffin	Zone IV: Ramps, Fill
M5 (IA 80)	M 22.4 m²	Large number of ornamental jades in center, "ritual jades" all around inner coffin,7000 cowries to the side.	197+ bronze vessels,[a] 154+ bronze weapons, 17 bronze tools, 4 bronze mirrors, 1 ladle, 6 bronze bow shaped objects, 3 bronze tiger ornaments, 20 other miscellaneous bronze objects, some of the 590 jades (?) (including 62 jade weapons), some of the 70 stone objects (?), most of the 560 bone objects (?).	**Ledge**: two jade vessels (gui); **On Top of Chamber**: 3 bronze vessels, 1 pottery vessel, 1 chime, 1 whistle, 1 stone ox and some bronze arrowheads.	**Fill**: 1 pottery vessel, 1 jade mortar, 1 stone spade, 1 stone chime, 2 bronze *ge*, 20 bone arrowheads, 1 jade tube, 1 "bow shaped object," bronze buttons, 2 jade blades, "a large number" of bone pins, an ivory vessel, 2 stone vessels, 1 jade vessel, 2 stone figurines, 1 stone weight, 1 bronze mirror, agate beads, 1 conch, 1 bone blade, 1 sea snail.
GJZM160 (IA 98)	M 13.1 m²	1 sharpening stone, 2 bronze weapons, 1 bronze tool, 1 bronze bell, 5 jade weapons, 4 jade handle-shape objects, 9 jade ornaments, two broken stone *zhang*-blades, 1 ceramic vessel.	209 bronze weapons (plus 906 bronze arrowheads), 1 pc chariot equipment, 6 bronze tools, 44 bronze vessels, 15 jade artifacts, 12 ceramic vessels, 1 ivory artifact.	**Waist Pit:** 1 jade *ge* **Ledge:** 4 ceramic vessels, 1 lacquer vessel, sheep and cattle bones, 1 chime stone, 13 bronze *ge* dagger-axes.	
59WGM1 (IA 94)	S 7.5 m²	Nothing	8 bronze vessels, 8 ceramic vessels, 5 bronze weapons.	**Ledge**: 3 bronze vessels.	Nothing

XQM613 (IA 79)	S 6.4 m²	2 jades (huang), 1 jade fish.	2 bronze *ge*.	**Ledge**: 2 pottery vessels, 1 bronze bell near neck of dog. **On Top of Outer Coffin**: 4 bronze vessels, 8 bronze *ge*, 1 bronze spear head, 1 stone tablet (zhang), 2 bronze bells, 1 pottery vessel, 1 stone *ge*, 1 bronze awl.	Nothing
XQM1057 (AT 79)	S 4.8 m²	1 jade chime stone, 11 jade tablets, 1 jade *ge*, 11 pieces of turquoise, 13 cowries in mouth and near hand.	1 set of 10 bronze imitation ceramic vessels.	**Ledge**: 3 pottery vessels, 1 sheep head.	Nothing?
XQM1713 (AT 86)	S 4.7 m²	1 small "haft" shaped stone ornament, 1 ladder shaped jade ornament, a piece of turquoise, and a piece of stone with a hole in it.	65 bronze weapons, 3 bronze tools, 3 bronze tubes, 1 stone axe, 41 stone and jade implements, 41 shell ornaments, 5 bone ornaments, 17 bronze vessels.	**Ledge**: 1 horse headed knife. **On Top of Outer Coffin**: 10 pottery vessels and 2 small bronze bells.	Nothing
QJZM269 (AC 91)[b]	S 4.6 m²	6 jade objects, 1 whetstone, 1 bone tube.	19 bronze vessels, 30 bronze weapons, 4 bronze tools and 4 bronze *nao* bells, 1 ivory cup.	**Ledge**: 5 ceramic vessels.	**Fill**: 1 small bronze bell associated with dog.
XQM692 (AT 79)	S 4.2 m²	1 jade (huang) in hand.	2 bronze *ge*, 1 small bronze bell.	**Ledge**: 3 pottery vessels; **On Top of Outer Coffin**: 2 bronze vessels, 5 bronze *ge*, 1 bronze tube.	Nothing

(*continued*)

TABLE C.7 *(cont.)*

Tomb	Size	Zone I: Inner Coffin	Zone II: Outer Coffin/ Wooden Chamber	Zone III: Waist Pit, Ledges, Niches, On Outer Coffin	Zone IV: Ramps, Fill
XTXM233 (IA 87)	S 3.9 m²	3 stone disks by head, 3 stone tablets at feet, 15 cowries in the mouth.	3 ceramic vessels beside 1 lacquer tray (on which the cattle and sheep remains mentioned above are found), 3 ceramic vessels under the tray.[c]	**Ledge**: 4 ceramic vessels.	Nothing
XQM429 (AT 79)	S 3.1 m²	Nothing	**Top of Coffin**: 5 ceramic vessels.	**Ledge**: 3 pottery vessels.	Nothing?
LJZM44 (AM 86a)	S 2.6 m²	1 jade tablet.	5 ceramic vessels.	Nothing	Nothing
M47 (AM 86a)	S 2.2 m²	1 lead *ge*, 4 jade ornaments.	4 ceramic vessels.	Nothing	Nothing
M9	S 2.0 m²	Nothing	3 ceramic vessels.	Nothing	Nothing
M10	S 1.84 m²	Nothing	3 ceramic vessels.	Nothing	Nothing
KBM10	S 1.8 m²	1 cowry in mouth, 1 cowry on pelvis, 1 clam shell on back, 3 stone *gui*-blades, 1 piece of jade.	3 ceramic vessels, 4 whetstones.	Nothing	Nothing

PNM42	S 1.8 m²	1 oracular plastron, and 1 jade ornament between legs, 2 cowries in mout.h	1 ceramic vessel near head.	**Ledge**: 2 ceramic vessels.	Nothing
M14[d]	S 1.7 m²	2 jade *ge*, 2 jade ornaments, 1 jade axe, 1 bone arrow.	2 bronze vessels, 2 ceramic vessels, 4 bronze arrowheads, 1 bronze *ge*.	Nothing	Nothing
SM 308	S 1.1 m²	2 bone awls on upper chest.	2 ceramic vessels near head.	NA	Nothing

[a] Unfortunately, the provenience of the majority of artifacts were not published for M5, leaving one to assume that since the placement of objects on the ledge, the top of the chamber and the fill are all recorded in some detail, the majority of artifacts whose provenience is not recorded in the report must have been located in the wooden chamber or inner coffin. We know, for instance, that there were "over one hundred and thirty" (75) weapons, but, for example, except for two *ge* recorded as being found in the fill, the location of the other eighty-eight is not recorded. The numbers I have arrived at for the contents of the burial chamber are thus estimates based on subtracting what is reported as being in the fill or on the ledge from the total reported. In the case of the jades, it is mentioned that they are "the most important objects" in the inner coffin, but no mention of the number is made or even what percentage of the jades are in there. There is no mention of jades in the burial chamber, on the other hand, but that does not necessarily mean that there are none there.

[b] The locations of the objects in this tomb are in part based on the inference of the excavators since both the chamber roof and inner coffin lid has rotten away allowing everything that was placed on top to collapsed onto what was below.

[c] Although there is no outer coffin in this tomb, from the drawing, the coffin appears to have a head compartment separate from the part where the tomb owner is located. I consider this to be the equivalent to a space once removed from the tomb occupant's person.

[d] While there is no outer coffin and all the artifacts are found in the coffin (or rather where the coffin used to be) it is not clear from the cursory report, or the drawing whether these items were originally on top of the coffin lid or actually inside the coffin.

TABLE C.8 *Lineage Cemeteries Tomb Class 1*

	Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
TOTVAL	98	1.00	5.00	3.1327	1.6599
VOLUME	98	0	4	1.67	.73
FURNITUR	98	0	1	.32	.47
WAISTPIT	98	0	0	.00	.00
COWRIES	98	0	4	.24	.69
CORN	98	.00	.00	.0000	.0000
CTOOL	98	.00	.00	.0000	.0000
CWEAP	98	.00	.00	.0000	.0000
CERAVES	98	0	3	.27	.63
BRONZWEA	98	.0	.0	.000	.000
BRONZVES	98	0	0	.00	.00
BRONZTOO	98	0	0	.00	.00
JADORN	98	0	0	.00	.00
JADRIT	98	0	0	.00	.00
JADWEAP	98	0	0	.00	.00
DEATHATT	98	0	0	.00	.00
DOGSAC	98	0	0	.00	.00
Valid N (listwise)	98				

TABLE C.9 *Lineage Cemeteries Tomb Class 2*

	Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
TOTVAL	408	5.30	20.00	11.7037	3.8608
VOLUME	408	1	10	3.73	1.64
FURNITUR	408	0	2	.93	.26
WAISTPIT	408	0	1	.38	.49
COWRIES	408	0	15	1.18	1.87
CORN	408	.00	2.00	2.206E-02	.1774
CTOOL	408	.00	2.00	2.451E-02	.1699
CWEAP	408	.00	3.00	2.941E-02	.2306
CERAVES	408	0	8	2.10	1.71
BRONZWEA	408	.0	3.0	6.299E-02	.288
BRONZVES	408	0	0	.00	.00
BRONZTOO	408	0	2	1.96E-02	.17
JADORN	408	0	2	6.37E-02	.29
JADRIT	408	0	2	1.23E-02	.13
JADWEAP	408	0	1	2.45E-03	4.95E-02
DEATHATT	408	0	0	.00	.00
DOGSAC	408	0	1	2.45E-03	4.95E-02
Valid N (listwise)	408				

TABLE C.10 *Lineage Cemeteries Tomb Class 3*

	Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
TOTVAL	305	21.00	50.00	32.9242	7.8039
VOLUME	305	1	20	6.32	3.06
FURNITUR	305	0	2	1.01	.23
WAISTPIT	305	0	1	.76	.43
COWRIES	305	0	30	2.77	4.74
CORN	305	.00	3.00	4.918E-02	.2706
CTOOL	305	.00	7.00	9.508E-02	.5627
CWEAP	305	.00	10.00	.1513	.7708
CERAVES	305	0	13	2.66	1.80
BRONZWEA	305	.0	4.1	.302	.735
BRONZVES	305	0	3	.10	.44
BRONZTOO	305	0	3	4.59E-02	.27
JADORN	305	0	5	.18	.63
JADRIT	305	0	1	2.95E-02	.17
JADWEAP	305	0	1	1.97E-02	.14
DEATHATT	305	0	1	3.28E-03	5.73E-02
DOGSAC	305	0	2	.85	.58
Valid N (listwise)	305				

TABLE C.11 *Lineage Cemeteries Tomb Class 4*

	Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
TOTVAL	70	51.00	100.00	66.8257	12.9073
VOLUME	70	3	20	10.53	4.22
FURNITUR	70	0	2	1.16	.40
WAISTPIT	70	0	1	.93	.26
COWRIES	70	0	31	4.47	7.42
CORN	70	.00	5.00	.1857	.7282
CTOOL	70	.00	10.00	.5000	1.5948
CWEAP	70	.00	13.00	1.3986	2.9814
CERAVES	70	0	15	3.97	2.36
BRONZWEA	70	.0	8.0	1.714	2.199
BRONZVES	70	0	6	1.23	1.63
BRONZTOO	70	0	3	.20	.58
JADORN	70	0	14	.83	1.99
JADRIT	70	0	1	5.71E-02	.23
JADWEAP	70	0	2	.11	.36
DEATHATT	70	0	1	1.43E-02	.12
DOGSAC	70	0	3	1.41	.65
Valid N (listwise)	70				

TABLE C.12 *Lineage Cemeteries Tomb Class 5*

	Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
TOTVAL	11	104.20	169.00	132.8000	18.2315
VOLUME	11	12	37	21.09	8.35
FURNITUR	11	2	2	2.00	.00
WAISTPIT	11	1	1	1.00	.00
COWRIES	11	0	31	5.45	9.55
CORN	11	.00	13.00	1.1818	3.9196
CTOOL	11	.00	2.00	.5455	.6876
CWEAP	11	.00	18.50	4.4091	5.6072
CERAVES	11	3	10	5.00	2.53
BRONZWEA	11	1.1	11.3	5.327	3.841
BRONZVES	11	1	10	4.00	2.57
BRONZTOO	11	0	3	1.00	1.00
JADORN	11	0	4	1.36	1.29
JADRIT	11	0	2	.45	.69
JADWEAP	11	0	2	.55	.82
DEATHATT	11	0	2	.36	.67
DOGSAC	11	0	3	1.64	1.03
Valid N (listwise)	11				

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